Philippine ANALYST May 2016

85

INFRASTRUCTURE

INFRASTRUCTURE

Finally, MRT-7The Metro Rail Transit Line 7 (MRT-7) held recently its groundbreaking ceremony, with outgoing Philippine President Benigno Aquino III as guest of honor. The ceremonial event, typical of any big-ticket infrastructure project, marks day 1 of actual construction. It comes 8 years after it was first awarded under the public-private-partnership (PPP) scheme, and 14 years after it was proposed by the Universal LRT Corp. BVI Limited (ULC). Mr. Wallace was on the Board.

“We are finally ready to start construction," San Miguel Corp. (SMC) President and CEO Ramon S. Ang said during the groundbreaking ceremony of the much delayed MRT-7 railway project at the Quezon Memorial Circle in Quezon City. SMC owns 51% stake in ULC, the project proponent for MRT-7.

MRT-7 is a combined 45-km of road and rail transportation project from Bocaue exit North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) to MRT3 at North Avenue-EDSA (see Figure 1. Project Map of MRT-7) . The 22-km, 6-lane asphalt road will connect the NLEX to the major transportation hub development in Tala, San Jose del Monte. The 23-km, mostly elevated, MRT starts from Tala and ends at the integrated MRT 3/MRT7 station at EDSA near SM North EDSA Mall and Trinoma Mall. The rail component of the MRT-7 is envisioned to operate 108 rail cars in a 3-car train configuration. The P69 -billion MRT-7 is expected to initially accommodate 350,000 passengers daily and shorten travel time from the current 3.5 hours on the road to 1 hour. The project is expected to undergo further upgrades after the start of its operations with the ultimate goal of accommodating 800,000 passengers per day.

The MRT-7 railway project, first conceived in the late 1980s as part of the seamless railway plan for Metro Manila, has had a colorful history before it has finally reached this point in time. The Wallace Business Forum (WBF) has been keenly following the developments in MRT-7 ever since ULC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) in 2002 (see Table 1. Timeline of Events of MRT-7).

Several challenges almost derailed the project including multiple changes made in the original project details (at least 15 revisions were done on the original proposal upon the request of the government), controversies over the application of Swiss Challenge to ULC’s unsolicited proposal, the delays in securing project funding, right-of-way (ROW) acquisition issues, etc. The MRT-7 project was also delayed by the change of government leader and a controversy over whether the common station should be built at SM North EDSA or at TriNoma. As of May 2016, the issue of the common station

For 14 years, the MRT-7 project was beset with many issues and challenges that threatened to permanently derail it.

Philippine ANALYST May 2016

86 INFRASTRUCTURE

INFRASTRUCTURE

The original MRT-7 proposal has gone through at least 15 revisions since 2002.

TImElINE oF EvENTS oF mRT-7

December 1984The slow-speed railway project, Light Rail Transit Line 1 (LRT -1), starts commercial operations. A grand plan to add similar railways for a seamless commuter train network across Metro Manila, which includes plans for MRT-7, was announced.

1990 – 2001 Plans for MRT-7 was shelved (or forgotten) as the government focuses on other priority infrastructure projects.

2002

ULC submitted an unsolicited proposal to finance, design, construct, operate and maintain the MRT Line7 project under a build,-gradual transfer- operate-and-maintain scheme, a variant of the build-transfer-operate contractual arrangement. ULC is a consortium originally comprising of Tranzen Corp., La Costa Development Corp., China Railway 18 Group, ULC, Redford Assets Limited (SM Investment Co./Banco de Oro/Penta), Penta Capital Management Corp., Merlin Pacific Capital Inc., TCGI Engineers, E. L. International Holdings Group, and other private investors. ULC is a single purpose company formed and registered in the British Virgin Islands for the purpose of offering and subsequently executing the MRT-7.

03 march 2003

Then Transportation Secretary Leonardo Mendoza, announced that the Technical Working Group of DOTC was set to submit its reviewed proposal for MRT-7 to NEDA for approval. The DOTC announced that it expects construction on the railway project to start the succeeding year.

04 April 2006 NEDA-ICC ordered that the unsolicited proposal of ULC for the MRT-7 has to undergo a Swiss Challenge before project is approved.

24 February 2007Then Transportation Secretary Leonardo Mendoza approved the Bids & Awards Committee’s recommendation to open the project to a “Swiss Challenge”. The Swiss Challenge allows for other interested groups to submit competing proposals and for the original proponent, ULC, to match the offer of these competing parties.

march 2007 DOTC started issuing tender documents for the MRT-7 Swiss Challenge for a nonrefundable amount of P100,000.00 and announced that all interested companies has until 25 June 2007 to submit their bids.

June 2007ULC’s unsolicited bid for the MRT-7 project remains unchallenged as four interested firms failed to meet a government deadline for the submission of counter-offers. Interested firms complained that “two-months” to do a counter-proposal was too short a time for them to properly do so.

october 2007

The Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) chairman, Transportation Assistant Secretary Elmer Soneja, said in an interview that ULC failed to comply with some provisions of the terms of reference (TOR) for the project. DOTC is requiring ULC to post another performance guarantee bond that could amount to $300 million. The DOTC also required ULC to make changes in its original unsolicited proposal. ULC objected to the request saying, “They said they need the $1.9-billion performance bond. You don’t change the rules in the middle of the game. Our proposal was subject to a Swiss challenge.”

2008 The 25-year concession agreement between Universal LRT Corp. (ULC) and the government was signed.

2009 ULC is having difficulty getting financial closure for the project. Despite repeated request, ULC has failed to secure a performance undertaking from the government that was a condition for financial closure.

28 September 2009Memorandum of agreement (MOA) between SMPHI and LRTA was signed which states that the common station or MRT-7, LRT-1 and MRT-3 should be beside SM North City EDSA, after it paid the government P200 million ($4.25 million) for the naming rights to the proposed station

october 2010 SMC finalized a deal to acquire 51% interest in Universal LRT Corp. Ltd., the company in charge of developing the MRT-7.23 July 2013 Then Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima signed the performance undertaking for the MRT-7 project

November 2013The DOTC decided to transfer the common station which will connect the three rail systems of MRT-7, LRT-1 and MRT-3 near Ayala Group’s Trinoma mall instead of SM North EDSA mall due to savings in construction cost as well as convenience of passengers.

August 2014

The Supreme Court has issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) on the planned transfer of the proposed P1.4 billion ($32.03 million*) common station from SM City North EDSA to the Ayala Land-owned TriNoma mall. The High Court has given the DOTC and the Light Rail Transit Authority 10 days to respond to claims they have violated a 2009 MOA with SM Prime Holdings Inc.

November 2015In a bid to finally resolve the one-year issue over the common station that is hampering start of construction for the MRT-7 as well as LRT-1, the DOTC has announced that it has proposed a compromised agreement that would call for two common stations – one located in SM North EDSA Mall and the other in Trinoma Mall.

December 2015 Then PPP Center Executive Director Cosette Calinao announced that they have given notice to ULC to secure financial funding for the P69.30-billion MRT-7 within two months or until February 2016.

16 February 2016

SMC announced that it is “ready” to start building the MRT-7 but that the “DoTC needs to give us contract effectively ASAP (as soon as possible) and deliver ROW (right of way) thereafter”. SMC declared that the construction and construction-related activities should start on Feb. 18 and be completed on Aug. 17, 2019.

19 April 2016 The MRT-7 finally breaks ground marking first day of actual construction.

09 may 2016

The DOTC announced that it is considering the proposal of Metro Pacific Investments Corp. (MPIC) to construct an interim station to connect Light Rail Transit Line 1 (LRT-1) to Metro Rail Transit Line 3 (MRT-3) and MRT Line 7 (MRT-7) instead of the two common stations solution that the DOTC initially suggested to resolve the issue of the location of the main hub for the three railway lines.

Philippine ANALYST May 2016

87INFRASTRUCTURE

INFRASTRUCTURE

1

remains unresolved (see related article, A Not so-common, Common Station). If the MRT-7 project had started on time as planned in its original 2002 proposal submitted by the ULC, Metro Manila would have had the 4th railway already working in 2006. As it is, the long-suffering commuters of Metro Manila would have to wait until 2020 to use the MRT-7.

A not so common, Common Station

It’s been 2 years since the SM Group sued the government over the issue of location of the common station for the 3 railway lines of MRT-3, LRT-1 and MRT-7. This issue alone resulted in delays for 2 major railway projects. Until now, the government is still unable to decide how to go about resolving it.

The latest suggestion to resolve the issue of the common station is the proposal of Metro Pacific Investments Corp. (MPIC) that it will build an interim terminal within the “triangle of Trinoma (mall) and SM (mall)” in Quezon City. This “interim station” is code speak for a temporary infrastructure and is MPIC’s solution to finally get construction on the way for 2 of the pending railway projects affected by the common station issue – the MRT-7 and MPIC’s own project, the P64.9-billion ($1.38-billion) LRT1 Cavite Extension.

The MPIC suggestion comes after the Department of Transportation and Communication’s (DOTC) announcement that it will push for the construction of 2 stations instead of one as a solution to the long-standing issue of location for the Common Station—a cowardly compromise. Let’s hope the Duterte government will have the guts to declare only one, common station.

In a Senate hearing in November 2015, Transportation Secretary Joseph Emilio A. Abaya said, when pressed for an explanation

for the delays in MRT-7 construction, that the government is in talks with MRT-7’s project proponent, Universal LRT Corp. (ULC), for the funding of a station near SM North EDSA, while the government would fund the other station near Trinoma Mall.

In effect, under the government’s proposal, 2 stations – one station that will connect MRT-7 to MRT-3 and another that will connect LRT-1 and MRT-3 – will be built, making the plans for a Common Station, no longer common. While the government’s solution is an obvious middle ground to the issue and would certainly appease the competing interests of 2 of the biggest malls in the area – SM’s North EDSA Mall and Ayala Corp.’s Trinoma Mall, both of which want the Common Station for the guaranteed foot traffic (e.g. shoppers) it will bring—it goes against the reasons for why the idea of a Common Station was included in the plans for the railway projects in the first place. The Common Station was meant as a singular hub that would connect MRT-3, LRT-1 and MRT-7 and allow Filipino commuters who will use the 3 railways a comfortable, safe and seamless travel from one railway line to the next (see Figure 2. SM Mall vs TrinoMa Mall Common Station Proposal). Apart from efficiency, the Common Station was proposed to create cost-savings for the government.

“We will suggest for just one common station in the middle, one exit to SM North EDSA and one exit to Trinoma. Through this, it will increase foot traffic in both malls. This is better instead of putting up 2 common stations wherein passengers will need to transfer from one common station to the other,” MPIC Chairman Manuel Pangilinan declared in a statement. MPIC and Ayala Corp., through its consortium Light Rail Manila, is set to construct the LRT- 1 Cavite Extension which is the project most affected by the Common Station issue. The P1.4-billion ($29.77-million) common station project has been bundled with the LRT-1 Cavite Extension deal which was awarded under the public-private-partnership (PPP) scheme in October 2014.

The government’s proposal for two common stations instead of one goes against the original intent of the project – seamless travel and comfort of passengers.

Philippine ANALYST May 2016

88 INFRASTRUCTURE

INFRASTRUCTURE

The problem over the Common Station began in 2014 when the government insisted that putting up the proposed Common Station near Trinoma mall instead of SM North EDSA Mall would result in “P1 billion ($21.26 million) in savings to the government”. However, the government had already signed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) in September 2009 with the SM Group that the Common Station would be built beside SM North EDSA mall. Under the MOA, the Philippine government through its implementing agency, the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), agreed to interconnect the Light Rail Transit Line 1 and Metro Rail Transit Lines 3 and 7 through a common station in front of SM City North EDSA and name the station after the mall, in exchange for a grant of P200 million ($4.25 million) from the SM Group. The design of the Common Station near SM North ESDA Mall was even included in the project details of MRT-7.

The declaration of the government to unilaterally scrap the MOA with the SM Group at the back of the “P1 billion cost savings” and include in the LRT-1 Cavite Extension project details plans for a Common Station near Trinoma Mall instead of SM North EDSA mall, led to the filing of a lawsuit of SM Group against the government in June 2014 and the subsequent hold order ruling from the Supreme Court in August 2014.

According to SM Group, it was suing the government because it was ".. in complete breach and disregard of the terms of the MOA, and without any official notice to SM Group despite the latter's repeated formal inquiries, the DOTC unilaterally relocated the station to Trinoma and made the same a mere component of the recently bid out LRT Line 1 Cavite Extension Project,” The

TThe problem started when the government changed its mind on an agreement previously made with SM Group.

4

SM Group further said that the proposed Common Station in front of SM North EDSA was duly approved by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) Inter-agency Coordinating Council as a priority infrastructure project in 2007 and it was approved by the NEDA Board on July 7, 2009, thus, the project’s cost details would have already been reviewed, studied and deemed appropriate by the government prior to the signing of the MOA. The government cannot, on the back of another study conducted in 2013 that shows that a possible relocation of the proposed Common Station to Trinoma would generate as much as P800 million to P1 billion in savings for the government, suddenly renege on its signed commitment with SM Group. The DOTC’s declaration came after the transition of government leadership wherein the new officials of DOTC under the Aquino administration decided to review all contracts made under the previous Macapagal-Arroyo administration.

The government back in 2013 defended its decision to back off from the MOA with SM Group stating that it cannot in good faith push through with the project given the huge cost-saving for the government and allow the Filipino taxpayers to carry the cost of an additional P1billion pesos. But now, it seems that the government has changed its mind again, as it is now pushing for a compromise agreement of building not one, but 2 stations, one in each mall – a compromise solution that would likely be more expensive than a singular Common Station. When the government could have just decided to stick to the original agreement with SM Group or if it insisted on the relocation, given back to SM Group the P200 million it paid

SM Mall vs TriNoMa Mall Common Station Proposal

Picture Source: SkyscraperCity Philippines

Philippine ANALYST May 2016

89INFRASTRUCTURE

INFRASTRUCTURE

with some compensation for their troubles. The issue over the Common Station has already resulted in 2-years of additional delay in the start of construction of 2 multi-billion pesos worth of badly needed railway projects the MRT-7 and the LRT-1 Cavite Extension. The wait on these vital railway projects, which would help ease traffic and the daily commute of Filipinos, has surely already cost the country more than the P1 billion it was hoping to save from the original 2009 Common Station proposal.

Is the NAIA-3 saga nearing its end?

The Supreme Court (SC) has upheld with finality its September 2015 ruling ordering the government to pay Philippine International Air Terminals Co. Inc. (Piatco) more than $510 million (about P24 billion) for the expropriation of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Terminal 3. The ruling is the latest development in the 14-year (and counting) saga of the NAIA-3 fiasco.

Back in the early 1990s, the government wanted to build a new terminal (NAIA-3) to replace the outdated NAIA-1. The Ramos administration, in 1996, awarded the contract to build the new airport to Piatco, and in 1998, allowed Piatco to build-operate and maintain the facility for a concession period of 25 years. In 2000, Piatco subcontracted 2 Japanese firms to construct the terminal. Unfortunately, the project did not quite go as planned when the Arroyo administration in 2002, the year NAIA-3 was set to start commercial operations, did not honor Piatco’s contract over allegations of irregularities. NAIA-3 has since been entangled in legal battles and ownership issues which delayed the airport’s opening for 6 years. When it finally opened in 2008 the terminal operated at only half of its capacity as the issues remained unsettled. It was not for another 6 years that the airport was able to operate in full swing. Even then, the problems have not been resolved.

Currently, the government handles the operations of NAIA-3 while Piatco owns the rights over the facility. The government has been managing the airport since 2004, when it won NAIA-3’s expropriation case. The expropriation of the terminal, meanwhile, is subject to the law of just compensation. Based on a 2003 SC ruling, the project proponents should be compensated for building the terminal. Piatco, however, has yet to get a single cent of the estimated $400 million it has invested in the project as both parties have difficulties finding a middle ground (see NAIA-3: What went before?).

Last September, the country’s highest tribunal ruled unanimously that the government must pay Piatco with a just compensation of more than $510 million [as of December 2014] (see Just compensation due to Piatco). The government and Piatco subsequently filed reconsideration pleas, with the government asking for a lower amount of compensation while Piatco asking for a higher amount. The SC recently weighed in on the issues again, and it has decided unanimously last April to stick with its September 2015 ruling. SC spokesman Theodore Te said the ruling is already final and “no further pleadings will be allowed.”

But the question remains: Will the latest SC decision finally put a closure to the NAIA-3 saga? The answer depends on the next steps of new President Rodrigo Duterte’s administration. Considering President Duterte’s recent statement saying that his administration will honor the sanctity of contracts between the government and private sectors, the end of NAIA-3 story may be near. But there might be a problem in terms of where to get the P24 billion just compensation. Last December, the lower house rejected the Senate’s proposal to set aside P20 billion in the 2016 budget for payment to Piatco, arguing that the SC has yet to make a final decision on the government’s and Piatco’s reconsideration pleas.

The Wallace Business Forum has previously said that the government should pay as soon as possible to show that this is a fair government that values the sanctity of contracts and private investments and has no intention to be confiscatory without intention. Leaving the NAIA-3 issue longer in the air more than it already is, only further puts to risk investment opportunities and taints this government’s credibility after the last government lost its.

Philippine ANALYST May 2016

90 INFRASTRUCTURE

INFRASTRUCTURE

NAIA-3: WhAT WENT bEFoRE?

1993 The proposal for the construction of NAIA-3 was first discussed.

1996 Paircargo and Associates (later to be known as Piatco) bagged the contract to build NAIA-3.

1997 A concession agreement between the government and Piatco was executed for NAIA-3’s construction under the build-operate-transfer scheme.

1998 The 1997 concession agreement was amended to authorize Piatco to build-operate and maintain NAIA-3 during the concession period of 25 years.

2000 Piatco hired 2 Japanese contractors (Takenaka and Asahikosan) for the airport construction.

2002

• The government did not honor Piatco’s contract. • Piatco’s contract was nullified by the Pasay city court on the grounds that it was not a duly pre-qualified bidder. • Piatco defaulted on its loan obligations to the 2 Japanese contractors.• The 2 contractors suspended the airport construction.

2003The Supreme Court (SC) granted the petition of the government to have the Piatco contract canceled on the ground that it was a disqualified bidder and that the supplemental contracts contained material deviations from the original contract that was forged in 1997. However, the project proponents should be compensated.

2004 • The government filed an expropriation case before the Pasay city court, which ruled in favor of the government.• The government took over NAIA-3’s operations.

2005

• The lower court appointed 3 commissioners to determine the just compensation for Piatco. • The government made its own assessment which was pegged at $300,206,693 as of December 2002. But it went down to $263,392.081

due to depreciation. It further reduced its assessment to $149,448,037 to account for deductions due to Piatco's non-compliance with contract specifications.

2008 NAIA-3 began commercial operations but operated at only 52% of its capacity.

2011

• The commissioners set the just compensation amount at $376,149,742.56 plus a 12% interest rate per annum.• The Pasay Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 117 rejected the computations submitted by the commissioners. Instead, it went with the

government’s computation of just compensation ($149,448,037).• The High Court of Singapore rejected Piatco’s appeal against a ruling by Singapore-based International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)

Court of Arbitration, which had denied Piatco’s claim to $564 million in compensation for the PH government’s nullification of Piatco’s contract to construct NAIA-3.

2013

Piatco contested the just compensation set by the Pasay RTC and the dispute was elevated to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA disagreed with the decision made by the Pasay RTC to deduct depreciation, deterioration and non-compliance from the construction cost. The CA also held that it is “just and reasonable” for the government to pay interest to Piatco on top of the just compensation. However, the CA placed the annual interest rate at 6%, which is half of what Piatco is asking for, leading the parties to elevate the case before the Supreme Court.

2014 NAIA-3 became fully operational.

2015

• The SC, in September 2015, ruled unanimously that the government must pay Piatco with a just compensation of $267,493,617.26 as of December 2004 plus annual interest of 12% from September 2006 and another annual interest of 6% from July 2013 until full payment. As of December 2014, total amount due from the government is $510 million.

• The government filed a motion for reconsideration through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asking to lessen the just compensation to about $104 million while Piatco asked the SC to partially reconsider its decision to include additional costs amounting to around $107 million in the government’s payment.

2016

The SC upheld with finality its September 2015 ruling and rejected the government’s petition to lower the just compensation due to Piatco as well as Piatco’s request for a higher compensation. The SC also junked the partial appeal filed by Takenaka and Asahikosan for lack of merit. Nonetheless, the SC granted the appeal of OSG to declare government’s full ownership of the airport facility—free from any obligations to any of the claimants (including Fraport, an equity investor of Piatco, and Takenaka and Asahikosan, the subcontractors which actually built the NAIA 3 facility)—upon full payment of compensation to Piatco.

JUST CompENSATIoN DUE To pIATCo (bASED oN SUpREmE CoURT’S 8 SEpTEmbER 2015 RUlINg)

h Amount of just compensation as of 21 December 2004 (when the complaint was filed) = $325,932,221.26 (but the SC deducted $59,438,604.00 from the amount, accounting for the "proffered value" which the government had already paid earlier, bringing the base amount to $267,493,617.26).

h The base amount of $267,493,617.26 will be charged with a 12% annual interest or $32,099,234.07 a year from 11 September 2006 to 30 June 2013, and then from 1 July 2013 until full payment, the government will pay an additional 6% annual interest or $16,049,617.04.

h Based on the Supreme Court’s computation, the total just compensation due to Piatco amounts to more than $510 million (as of December 2014).

Philippine ANALYST May 2016

91INFRASTRUCTURE

INFRASTRUCTURE

STATUS oF bIg TICKET INFRASTRUCTURE pRoJECTS IN ThE pIpElINEAS OF MAY 2016

pRoJECT TITlE ImplEmENTINg AgENCY/ENTITY

FUNDINg SoURCE

CIvIl WoRKS TImEFRAmE pRoJECT CoST STATUS / ISSUES

RoADS/bRIDgES

Laguna Lakeshore Expressway Dike Project DPWH PPP 2016-2023 P122.8 billion

DPWH is seeking to revive the project after failed bidding in March. Feasibility studies ongoing. Any bidding will occur in 2017 at the earliest.

Cavite Laguna Expressway (CALAx) DPWH PPP 2016-2020 P62.72 billion Groundbreaking delayed due to row-of-way issues.

RAIlWAYS

LRT-MRT common station DOTC PPP TBD P1.4 billion

Supreme Court-issued temporary restratining order is still in place (see related story on page 87). Government is studying for a possible interim rail hub between Trinoma and SM in Quezon City in the meantime.

MRT Line 3 Maintenance Contract DOTC PPP TBD P2.4 billion

Metro Pacific is reviving its unsolicted proposal to rehabilitate the MRT-3 under the Duterte administration. In January, they submitted their proposal but was rejected by the Aquino government.

AIRpoRTS

Manila Bay International Airport DOTC PPP TBD P500 billion

San Miguel is reviving its unsolicited proposal to build an alternative airport for Metro Manila under the Duterte administration.

UTIlITIES

Angat Water Transmission Improvement Project MWSS ODA TBD P3.3 billion

NEDA Board approved in May 2014. Contract for the design and construction of the project was awarded to Italian firm Cooperativa Muratori and Cementisti-CMC di Ravenna Societa Cooperativa.

600-MW Malita coal plant PS PS 2016-2019 P60 billion

pRIvATE pRopoNENT: SmC globalFirst of 2 150-MW plants will be operation by mid-2016, other 2 units to be operational not later than 2019.

Philippine ANALYST May 2016

92 INFRASTRUCTURE

INFRASTRUCTURE

pRoJECT TITlE ImplEmENTINg AgENCY/ENTITY

FUNDINg SoURCE

CIvIl WoRKS TImEFRAmE pRoJECT CoST STATUS / ISSUES

RoADS/bRIDgES

Cavitex-C5 South Link road DPWH PPP 2016-2019 P12 billionpRIvATE pRopoNENT: metro Pacific Investment Corp. Groundbreaking was held May 6.

SCTEx upgrade PS PS 2016-2019 P1 billion

pRIvATE pRopoNENT: metro Pacific Investment Corp. Key integration of the 2 tollways now completed. Project unified the toll collection systems of the 2 expressways and implemented an electronic toll collection system in SCTEX.

oThER pRoJECTS

Integrated Transport System (ITS) - Southwest Terminal DOTC PPP 2016-2017 P2.5 billion

pRIvATE pRopoNENT: mWm Terminals, a consortium of megawide Construction Corp. and Wm property management Inc.Groundbreaking held last May 6.

STATUS oF oN-goINg bIg TICKET INFRASTRUCTURE pRoJECTS AS OF MAY 2016

ACRoNYmSDOJ Department of JusticeDOTC Department of Transportation and CommunicationsDPWH Department of Public Works and HighwaysITS Integrated Transport SystemLRT Light Rail Transit MW MegawattsMRT Metro Rail TransitNAIA Ninoy Aquino International AirportNIA National Irrigation AuthorityNLEX North Luzon ExpresswayO&M Operation and MaintenancePPP Public Private PartnershipPQ Pre-qualificationPS Private SectorSLEX South Luzon ExpresswayTBD To be determined