Finnish Support to Local Governance- An Assessment of 10 Programmes and

NSLGCP in Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Tanzania

Finland January 2012

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Overview of Presentation1. Background2. What is Decentralisation and Local

Governance (DLG)?3. Recent studies and findings on DLG4. NSLGCP and the 10 Programmes/Projects5. Some major findings6. Lessons Learned and Conclusions

Background The objectives of the evaluation are to achieve: A better understanding of the value and validity of the

concept of AFLRA´s support among the development cooperation modalities of Finland, directed to the level of local municipalities;

A wider knowledge of the state-of-the-art of and the need for inclusion of the level of local government and governance development in the development cooperation programmes overall, and the special significance of local government capacity in the furtherance of the wider development policy objectives of Finland.

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Background The Evaluation Team (ET): Compiled all relevant background documentation for the AFLRA/NSLGCP in

terms of programme documents The ET had extensive interviews with the NSLGCP programme

management, participating municipalities and MoFA officials in Helsinki in the beginning of September 2011.

The ET has also been through all the availed documentation on the twinning arrangements in the 16 linkages and field visits to Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Tanzania were conducted in September 2011 to ascertain the views of Programme stakeholders in the recipient countries.

Field visit were conducted in September and early October to Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Tanzania and interviews conducted with all southern linkage partners as well as national stakeholders and Finnish embassy staff.

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Municipality in Finland South Municipality

Haapavesi

Hartola

Kemi

Kokkola

Vaasa

Tampere

Hattula, Janakkala

Hämeenlinna

Hämeenlinna (Education and Training Consortium)

Kangasala

Lempäälä

Vantaa

Oulu

Raseborg

Lahti

Salo

Bagamoyo (Tanzania)

Iramba District Council (Tanzania)

Tanga (Tanzania)

Ilala (Tanzania)

Morogoro (Tanzania)

Mwanza (Tanzania)

Nyahururu (Kenya)

Nakuru (Kenya)

Omaruru (Namibia)

Keetmanshoop (Namibia)

Ondangwa (Namibia)

Windhoek (Namibia)

Tshwane (South Africa)

Makana/Grahamstown (South Africa)

Bojanala Platinum District Municipality (South Africa)

Mbabane (Swaziland) Slide 5

Background The Evaluation Team (ET): Furthermore collected documents and set up meetings with

MoFA key staff to discuss not only NSLGCP but also for the 10 programmes / projects identified for assessment.

The 10 selected programmes / projects are within Governance, Local Governance, Decentralisation and Agricultural Development in four of the five cooperation countries where NSLGCP has established twinning interventions.

Furthermore, 1 of the 10 programmes is a regional capacity building programme, which has been more or less dormant for the past 3 years.

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BackgroundKenya Public Sector Reform Programme

Kenya Gender and Governance Programme Support to Governance, Justice, Law and

Order Sector

Tanzania Finnish Support to the Local Government Reform Programme

Local Government Capital Development Grant

District Economic and Social Empowerment Programme

Namibia Capacity Building for Local and Regional Authorities in Namibia

Regional Africa Support to African capacity building foundation

South Africa Limpopo Agricultural Development Programme

Cooperation Framework on Innovation Systems between Finland and South-Africa

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What is Local Governance? Local governance comprises a set of institutions,

mechanisms and processes, through which citizens and their groups can articulate their interests and needs, mediate their differences and exercise their rights and obligations at the local level. The building blocks of good local governance are many: citizen participation, partnerships among key actors at the local level, capacity of local actors across all sectors, multiple flows of information, institutions of accountability, and a pro-poor orientation (UNDP 2004).

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Concepts - Forms of Decentralisation Decentralisation a sub-component of Public Sector

Reforms. A wide concept that commonly includes:

De-concentration: decentralise responsibilities to field level CG staff – often done in e.g. Education Sector (Kenya and South Africa, Ghana)

Delegation: decentralisation to semi autonomous organisations but accountable to central government (often seen in tertiary education, health, Road Funds)

Devolution – decentralisation to (semi) autonomous Local Governments – ”democratic decentralisation” (Tanzania, Uganda)

And recently decentralisation to user groups - often used by various sectors with more or less involvement of Local Governments (LGs)

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Ways to Enhance Accountability to the poor (WB Development Report 2004)

Poor People

National policy makers(Central

Government)

Local Policy makers (Local

Governments)

Providers

1. Long route of accountability

2. Decentralisation by devolution

3. Decentralisation to user groups etc

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Concepts - Forms of Decentralisation While it may seem obvious that “all service delivery is local”, the

public sector arrangements that are used to provide people with key public services vary dramatically from country to country.

A common feature in many developing countries, however, is that only a relatively small share of public financial resources flows down to the local level where these resources can be used for the front-line delivery of public services.

Instead, funds often remain stuck at the central government level, where resources frequently fund bloated and inefficient bureaucracies.

This systemic problem limits the ability of many developing countries to effectively deliver critical, pro-poor public services such as basic education, health services, and other public services that are essential to economic development and poverty reduction.

Concepts - Forms of Decentralisation The main measure of sub-national public sector finances that is

currently available on a consistent basis is the local government finance data reported by the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics, which reports on the revenues and expenditures of elected or “devolved” local governments.

A frequent concern with regard to the IMF’s financial data on the local government sub-sector is that this data set only captures one specific type of dimension of local public sector finances, notably finances that involved devolved local governments.

However, roughly half of the countries around the world deliver public services (predominantly or exclusively) through non-elected, or “deconcentrated” local administrative structures.

Local public sector finances for deconcentrated entities in these countries are not recorded in the current Government Finance Statistics as being part of sub-national finances.

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Concepts - Forms of Decentralisation Even in countries that rely on elected local governments to deliver

important public services to the people, considerable funding for public services is often provided through delegation or through deconcentrated structures, on top of (or around) the funding separately provided to the local government level.

As such, a comprehensive metric of local public sector finances ought to recognize that virtually no country around the world is purely devolved or purely deconcentrated, but rather, that central authorities in each country simultaneously interact with residents, civil society and the private sector through four mechanisms: through the direct delivery of public services (by central government entities); through the delegated delivery of public services (for instance, through NGOs or parastatal organizations); through deconcentrated sub-national departments or jurisdictions; or through devolved, elected local governments.

Together, these four institutional and fiscal mechanisms comprise the range of arrangements that make up the Local Public Sector

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14

One Indicator: Decentralisation Ratios in the OECD Countries (NA of OECD 2005) – Share in general government revenue and expenditure -2004

1

Rev

enue

s

Spending

Aut

Bel

Can

Deu

USA

Dnk

Fin

Fra

Grc

Cze

Ita Jpn

LuxNld

Nor

Prt

Esp

Swe

Gbr

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

Pol

UgandaTanzaniaKenya

S. Africa

LGs’ Share of total Public Expenditure (%)

DLG Trends in Evaluation Countries

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Kenya Uganda Tanzania LGs play major role in service provision?

Role in Education (Few Lgs) P.E. (SE) PE (SE)

Role in Health (Few LGs) Role in Agriculture Role in Roads () Role in water - urbanRole in water – rural

()-

(-)

(-)

Key LG Legislation 1963 LG Act amended

1997 LG Act – minor ams

1982 LG Acts amended 99-00

LGs entrenched in Constitution - -with details on functions-With protection of LG roles

--

--

LG legislation compiled in one comprehensive Act

()

LGs with clearly defined mandates - Legal issues Over ruled

by sector laws

Minor Sectors & Pub. Sector

Act

Key Characteristics of Current LG Legislation

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Overall Decentralisation Trends Deconcentration in Kenya Devolution in Tanzania and some extent South Africa (although in a

strongly controlled form as there is focus on unitary state) with common key challenges: HRM autonomy issues – how to manage staff? LG revenue – stagnant/decline in many places LG fiscal transfers harmonisation and autonomy How to involve people and the users?

Significant trend towards user group management in all sectors Significant trend towards:

Direct Community Funding (all) Constituency Funds, (Kenya, Tanzania) Sector Funds (all), Newly created capital/development funds (non-sectoral in South Afric and

Tanzania) Lack of coordination of these funding channels (all)

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Sector Trends – many developing countries, including the East African Countries

Issue EducationSWAP and common local approach

Increasingly strong in most countries

Level of Local funding (10 years)

Very substantial increase

Decentralisation of recurrent funds to user groups

Yes – substantial

Decentralisation of development funds to user groups

Some countries – especially in TZ and Kenya

Governance issues Parallel planning systems – No. of district programmes reduced , but other parallel

streams persist

Service issues Substantial improvements but issues in quality?

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Sector Issues - Basic Education

Issue Uganda Tanzania Kenya

UPE Policy 1997 2001 2003

Who does District Planning?

Technical staff and LG Council but very earmarked funding

LG Council but very earmarked funding

Technical staff and Education Board (Not LG)

School Management Committees

Significant emphasis – mainly non PE recurrent

Significant emphasis both recurrent and development

Significant emphasis (handle most funds)

Lower level LG involvement

Nil (except for LC3 in LGDP)

Nil n.a.

Sector Provision – Coordination Issues

Challenges in the interactions between LGs Sectors Constituency Development Funds User Committees Development partners

Often lack of clarity of responsibilities

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Fiscal Decentralisation– How are primary education expenditures funded?

Expenditure Uganda Kenya Tanzania Ghana

General Administration

Grants UPE (5%) + LG revenue

Direct central government (CG)

Grants to districts + LG rev

Direct CG

Teachers salaries

Conditional grants

Direct CG Conditional recurrent grants

Direct CG

School contruction

SF-Grant + LGDP +LG revenue

Very limited, projects, CDF + LATF

Partly from the LGCDG, earmar-ked for school construction

District specific, programmes and non-sectoral grant (DDF/DACF) - multiple

School books Allocation to LGs + some CG purchase

Part of capitation grant (9 USD per pupil)

Part of capitation grants

Part of capitation grants, but mostly CG

Other exp. (capitation)

Small UPE 3 USD per pupil

Part of capitation grant to schools (5 USD per pupil)

Capitation grants Capitation grants

Inspection LG inspection from grants +CG inspection

Inspection from CG (centrally)

Funded centrally (CG)

Funded centrally (CG) Slide 22

HR Management - TeachersIssue Uganda Kenya Tanzania Ghana

Hirring of teachers

District Service Commissions with ”guidance”

Deconcentrated: Districts (not LG) with guidance from centre

Teachers Service Commission (TSC) reporting to the centre

Centralised

TSC

Common Challenges

Weak discipline; Absenteeism;Lack of facilities;Inequalities in distribution, - no incentives to move to remote areas

Weak discipline, absenteeismLack of facilitiesInequalities in distribution, no incentives to move to remote areas

Weak discipline, absenteeismLack of facilitiesInequalities in distribution, no incentives to move to remote areas

Weak discipline, absenteeismLack of facilitiesInequalities in distribution, no incentives to move to remote areas

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Impact of decentralisation Mixed impact

No clean models of decentralisation – all have hybrid models with strong level of control

Not possible to say “good” or “bad” impact, but some positive elements can be observed

Quantitative improvements and LGs have been instrumental to implement this scaling-up…quality is still to be addressed…

LGs have been instrumental in school construction, also confirmed by reviews in Asia (India, Nepal, etc.)

Push of funds to local levels, have increased transparency, increasing transparency in allocations, monitoring, etc.

Equity – decentralisation alone has not been sufficient, need for multiple initiatives, such as hardship incentives, CB, etc.

Funds to user boards has had a positive impact, but needs to be supported, supervised and capacitated

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Impact on Accountability Financial Accountability improved over time

(auditors reports etc), Mainly ”upwards” accountability – especially

due to mode of sector funding Limited direct citizen control User Groups helps – but mainly when own

contributions are made Measures for staff accountability weak – both

through CG, LG system and user groups (e.g. teachers)

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Key Challenges for Decentralised Service Delivery

1. Sector versus cross-sector planning,2. Empowerment of LG councils versus

user groups,3. LG Financing System,4. Local Human Resource Management,5. LG and Sector Reform Coordination

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Sectoral – Cross Sectoral Planning In Tanzania mainly: how sectors will relate to

LGCDG system; Agriculture now being integrated, Education supposedly easy:

LGs used to plan and implement class rooms etc Health – a substantial challenge

Balancing community priorities and technical (recurrent costs) considerations

LGCDG to balance rigid minimum conditionality with aim of integrating more of sectors (balance between access and adherence to PFM)

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Empowerment of LG Councils and User Groups

Not necessarily a contradiction In education, user groups have generally

been supportive of LG structures … User Group Challenges:

Balance local ownership, user fees and targeting of poor

Financial accountability / integration into LG and Government accounting systems and procedures

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Decentralisation Impact on Participation

Indirect through LG structures: Mainly strengthened by non-sectoral grant

systems Only selective parts of LG system involved in

sector planning & budgets Through User Groups:

Weakened by lack of user payments

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Coordination of LG and Sector Reforms

Need to ensure stronger links between SWAPs and decentralisation issues

Better dialogue between Ministry of LG and line ministries

Stronger involvement of President/Prime Ministry’s office and Ministry of Finance

Fiscal reforms shows some progress for coordination through formula based systems and LGCDG, particularly if capital funding schemes can be rationalised

HRM a critical area where engagement of cross-cutting ministries are needed

Constraints and Challenges Lack of balance (disjoint) between functions, funding and

“functionaries” Balance between pursuing national targets and ensuring local

autonomy/flexibility Un-predictable and late transfer of funds to LGs and service

providers Insufficient possibilities to address hardship areas and equity

issues Inabilities of LGs/SMCs to discipline and provide sufficient

incentive teachers Insufficient preparations of abolishment of user fees and LG taxes

LGs’ revenues declined, hence less funds for inspection and core operations

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Lessons Learned Funding systems impact on downward accountability

(e.g. removal of user fees) IGFTS (grants) should be predictable, timely, formula-

based, transparent… CG should move away from micro-control towards

broader lines and overall targets LG needs to be involved in funding of service

providers, otherwise accountability suffers Need to establish better linkages between sector and

decentralisation issues, e.g. in planning, funding, etc. Need to establish better links between LG and user

committees and boards, instead of by-passing LGs

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Lessons learned

LG Own source revenue should enable LGs to adjust service levels at the margin

Adequate financing of all assigned responsibilities – clear principles for sharing with CG Cost compensation when new tasks are transferred

Use of clear formulas for allocations across LGs and providers, with due attention to the incentives

Need for harmonisation of all the parallel sources of funding – especially for development funding

Ensure a strong system of recurrent grants (enabling LGs some PE – OC flexibility)

Gradually loosen tight controls on grants… Enhance downwards accountability (participation, involvement,

information) Improve information from CG to LG and information on transfers

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Tanzania – Recent Developments1. Still reforming towards a system with substantial

functions and resources devolved to LGs, but:2. Loss of LG Revenue (impact on finance, autonomy

and local accountability)3. Central HRM: central DED and continued

transfers -> unclear lines of accountability,4. Progress of fiscal decentralisation of recurrent

grants – but not Personnel Emoluments (PE)5. Very substantial progress through LGCDG on

harmonisation of development grants – but still TASAF and sectors

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Kenya – Recent Policy Developments

1. Several parallel systems (Province sectors, LGs, constituencies);

2. Recent progress on LG reforms as in proposed new constitution (which was rejected on other grounds)

3. Substantial increase of local development / investment funding through Constituency Development Fund (MPs)

4. Some efforts for harmonising financing modalities

South Africa – Recent Developments Apartheid local government consisted of over 1.200 racially based local

authorities. Local government was transformed in two phases: In 1995, 843 transitional municipalities were created. The second phase, in 2000, was characterised by the incorporation of urban and rural areas, reducing the number of local municipalities to 284 (47 Districts, 6 Metros, 231 Local Municipalities). Each municipality has to develop a 5-year Integrated Development Plan (IDP), which guides all investments at local level.

Local government transition, 1993 - The Local Government Transition Act of 1993 envisaged the restructuring and transformation of local government.

New constitution, 1996, and the White Paper on Local Government, 1998 - The new constitution of 1996 clearly defined three separate but inter-connected spheres of government. This was followed by the White Paper on Local Government in 1998. This envisaged greater decentralisation and local government as ‘a sphere of government in its own right and no longer a function of national or provincial government.’

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South Africa – Recent Developments New dispensation for local government, 2000 - The elections of 2000 saw

the creation of what was referred to as a new democratic municipal dispensation. An emphasis was placed on providing people with better access to basic services and more opportunities for participation in the economy at local level.

Project Consolidate, 2007 - The growing crisis in local government led to Project Consolidate. This was a bold and high profile central government intervention aimed at rescuing ailing and failing municipalities. It intended to intensify support to municipalities by deploying support personnel from within government, State Owned Enterprises, and the private sector to render infrastructure investment, financial management and other technical support to municipalities.

Local Government Turnaround Strategy, 2009 - The 2009 Government Programme of Action committed to build a developmental state, improve public services and strengthen democratic institutions. Project Consolidate may have some limited impact, but the fact of the matter was that local government continued to show signs of distress, dysfunction and lack of basic capacity.

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Finnish Support to DLG Kenya: No linkage between NSLGCP two linkages and interventions of

MFA in Kenya and there seems to be very little synergy between the interventions and the twinning/linkages.

No apparent linkage between interventions and local governance / decentralisation issues. This is also due to the situation in Kenya where devolution and decentralisation only recently have become key GoK strategies/policies.

The Finnish have supported the Constitutional Review and Reforms under GJLOS which has led to new devolved structure. Under separate funding support was availed to the Committee of Experts and the Interim Independent Electoral Commission.

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Finnish Support to DLG Kenya: Both linkages have been able to achieve more or less all proposed activities

increasingly linked to fewer objectives. However, for Nakuru MC two components from the 2008-2010 Application (public health and social affairs and technical services) were never implemented and later dropped.

Performance reporting and M&E have improved over time and in later reports linkages try to report against indicators. However, reporting is mostly rather lengthy and focuses on narrative rather than results.

Turnover of southern staff has meant delays and some times quality is lacking. Has impact on effectiveness.

Finnish added value examples are in the field of education (teaching methods, teachers training) where many inputs and outcomes are very much appreciated. Other example are university students from Finland coming to do field studies and contributed with ICT and environmental know how.

Fragmentation of activities have improved over time but still a tendency to have many small activities under each component

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Finnish Support to DLG Kenya:  For all three interventions there seems to be a high degree of

coherence and alignment with Government policies and reform agenda. Especially, GJLOS and PSR programmes are implemented by the Government MDAs themselves.

Finland has participated in all relevant sector working groups. Complementarities and alignment to Paris Declaration is achieved

through joint programme funding under a basket fund arrangement in all 3 programmes with several other donors. Government takes the lead.

Until recently all basket funds have been managed by external agents (private sector and UN) but GoK expects to take over financial management in the coming phase using GoK procedures for GJLOS and perhaps also the PSR.

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Finnish Support to DLG Namibia: No linkage between NSLGCP and FiSNDP However there appears to be strong potential for future linkages

in order to test pilot functions identified for delegation/devolution (e.g. ECD, rural water supply)

Need for definition of clearer (time bound) NSLGCP development objectives

Need for country/municipal context, needs and risk assessments in order to secure impact and sustainability

NSLGCP needs to be aligned to Paris Declaration principles (southern planning, programming, budgeting and procurement)

Particular need for more predictability in project funding (longer timeframe)

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Finnish Support to DLG Namibia: Impact is not measurable under the programme. No baseline studies or

context analyses to determine human and institutional development needs and priorities

Strong ownership in most linkages, but high staff turnover threatens sustainability

Evidence of Finnish value-added and innovation not sustainable within the LG resource envelope and context. Ex. Multi purpose community centre creates rising expectations, but is difficult to sustain and replicate elsewhere. This reflects on the need for improved needs and risk assessment during project and partner identification

Impact and sustainability of the programme becomes questionable since all despondences in north and south indicated that cooperation will not continue without MFA funding.

Mismatch between frequent funding applications and little attention to time-bound/sustainable activities

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Namibia:Findings on Coherence, Alignment and Complementarities FiSNDP has had a relatively high degree of coherence and

alignment with Government policies and reform agenda, but impact and sustainability is seriously threatened by lack of political commitment, non-consultative practices and bureaucratic competencies and skills

Complementarities and alignment to Paris Declaration were achieved in terms of mutual cooperation with the FrSNDP

Outcomes and outputs had no visible impacts on strengthening decentralisation according to Namibian stakeholders

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Finnish Support to DLG South Africa: NSLGCP modality is at its best when applied to linkages with strong

political commitment at both sides and a conducive resource envelope/absorption capacity

Linkages development modality utilises external networks in Finland which broadens the expertise available for southern partners

Evidence of value-added and innovation achievements, although not necessary sustainable

NSLGCP modality not significantly aligned to Finnish Development Cooperation policy, priorities and modalities

Strong need for continuous engagement with the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) to secure lobbying capacity and advocacy, replication and ownership – focus on mutual benefit

Slide 44

Finnish Support to DLG South Africa: NSLGCP impact not measurable. Benchmarks missing: baseline studies or risk/context

analyses, to determine human and institutional development needs and priorities during basic planning and implementation programme cycle

Lack of ownership in most linkages – Negative signals: Lack of stakeholder interest in programme evaluation (Bojanala and Tshwane); dwindling commitment and ownership: Tshwane - moved anchoring of prog. to external agency; Bojanala – lost interest for no rational reason - even before current cycle; also high staff turnover of particularly programme champions threatens sustainability

Evidence of Finnish value-added and innovation not sustainable within the LG resource envelope and context: E.g.- Smart City concept (Oulu-Tshwane) over-ambitious according to southern partner – need a more basic and contextual/realistic approach. This, inter alia, reflects on the need for improved needs and risk assessment during project and partner identification

Impact and sustainability of the Programme becomes questionable since all respondents in north and south indicated that cooperation will not continue without MFA funding.

Mismatch between frequent funding applications and little attention to time-bound/sustainable activities

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Finnish Support to DLG South Africa:Coherence, Alignment and ComplementaritiesCooperation Framework on Innovation Systems between Finland and South Africa (COFISA) - In

terms of Programme Components: Enhancement of the SA National System of Innovation at the National Level: Very little to no

impact Province Level Implementation of the SANSI: Provincial and local governments of the three

target provinces appear to have been actively involved in COFISA activities (although not programme management)

Limpopo Agricultural Development Project (LADEP) – In terms of overall objective: Enhanced sustainable income generating activities of smallholder farmers through Integrated

Natural Resource Management techniques Relatively high degree of coherence and alignment with Government policies and (land)

reform agenda Very little signs of sustainable income generation activities Programme ends – ownership, continuity and sustainability ends No significant evidence of Integrated Natural Resource Management No evidence of outcomes and outputs that a visible impact on the strengthening of good

local governance or decentralisation

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Finnish Support to DLG Tanzania: No linkage between NSLGCP and interventions of MFA in Tanzania and there

seems to be very little synergy between the interventions and the twinning/linkages. Example of Bagamoyo MC that is deemed poor in latest assessment and twinning not questioned though it seems more cultural than municipality twinning.

Many of the twinning activities in Tanzania are dominated by an NGO type approach and not core issues of municipalities, but relevant in a wider social development context.

Fragmentation of activities have improved over time but still a tendency to have many small activities under each component with expenditure varying from EUR 500 – 1,500 per activity which hardly can have any impact.

There seems to be an issue with coordinators some times not being fully employed by the municipality (both southern coordinators are not MC staff). This creates weak linkages with municipality in daily implementation. Furthermore, both coordinators in north and south are funded to varying degrees by the Programme making the set-up non-sustainable. There is also high turnover of coordinators in the south.

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Finnish Support to DLG Tanzania: Key outcome of CDG is an increase in discretionary funding at

local government level. LGRP has been a key reform over the past 10 years and

supported by Finland. Has too degree stalled and seems to be loosing momentum due to lack of commitment from GoT – at the same time sectors have been persuaded to fold into the LGDG with sector windows. However, not clear how far the sector have come in this process and how wholehearted they are behind the process.

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Finnish Support to DLG Tanzania:Findings on Coherence, Alignment and Complementarities For all three interventions there seems to be a high degree of coherence and alignment with

Government policies and reform agenda. Especially, the LGRP and the CDG sector support are implemented by the Government MDAs themselves.

Finland has participated in all relevant sector working groups. Complementarities and alignment to Paris Declaration is achieved through joint programme

funding under a basket fund arrangement in for LGRP and sector budget support for CDG. Government takes the lead. LIMAS is an area based programme approach building on previous Mtwara/Lindi district support pre-LGRP.

DESEMP now LIMAS has experienced problems in design and implementation. LGRP stalled for 2 years from 2008-2010 due to issues of integration and mainstreaming of

programme activities into PMORALG that were not carried out. LGRP still executed by external PMU. Programme dominated by a lot of administrative expenses – transport, TA salaries, administration, FM and councillor training.

CDG – recent report cast doubt on GoT commitment to process or demonstrates reporting from LGAs and and from central government is flawed or lacking or both. System in principle very good and cornerstone of DP commitment to decentralisation process in Tanzania.

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Conclusion and Recommendations “The ‘aid relationship’ has an in-built tendency to

undermine ownership. Imbalances in resources, power and knowledge can give a feeling of mastery to the helper and dependence to the helped. It can confer ‘expert’ status on the helper that may be justified in terms of technical knowledge but is usually unwarranted in terms of process skills or country knowledge. It is likely to focus attention on gaps and weaknesses that can further add to the feelings of dependence and disempowerment of country actors. External initiatives quickly become ‘owned’ by development agencies.” (Source: ECDPM: Baser & Morgan 2008)

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Conclusion and Recommendations Need to reconsider NSLGCP format if to continue in future Programme management arrangements need to be spelt out clearly

and fully in the design of this type of programme. The twinning approach adopted under the NSLGCP has left too much

room for interpretation of what exactly administrative costs – salaries and other recurrent costs – could be included under the Programme both in overall Programme management and also under the individual linkages.

Municipalities should be asked for own contribution that should at least be 10% cash contribution to the twinning linkages. This would ensure a less supply driven nature of interventions and more focus on mutual benefits. It would also lead partners to discontinue cooperation that was not in their own best interests.

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Conclusion and Recommendations Political commitment is widely accepted as the sine qua non of effective

democratic decentralisation Successful pro-poor decentralisation is associated with governing

parties that are politically committed to the democratic empowerment of local governments, which is not always the case in any of the visited cooperation countries.

There is a need for a stronger focus on institutional issues, both the rules that influence the behaviour of actors at different levels of government, in the private sector and in civil society, and the organisations that implement those rules, is increasingly evident.

This broader agenda has led to an enhanced focus on accountability and capacity and that this has strong implications for project design and policy dialogue. These types of analysis and assessments are lacking in the case of NSLGCP and some of the sector interventions and this hampers impact of Programme activities.

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Conclusion and Recommendations The evidence clearly demonstrates that local governance

implemented under overwhelming central government domination (or the ones lacking community “ownership”) has not achieved the expected results, as the public’s commitment to project goals is a crucial determinant of outcomes.

Finnish approach to support decentralisation and local governance as demonstrated through the assessment of the programmes in cooperation countries and NSLGCP is to focus on ownership. Finland maintains a programmatic as well as a project approach thereby trying to bridge the gap between a centrally driven reform process and a more local “needs’ oriented approach with more local ownership. This has limitations as well - local project approaches often can become isolated and have little influence on national priorities and strategies

Slide 53

Conclusion and Recommendations Many local governance and decentralisation projects/programmes have

set up their own project management units (PMUs) to bypass weak agencies or to assist in implementation where local capacities are lacking. This negatively affects project sustainability as PMUs phase out at a certain point and local institutions and communities are usually left with little improved, or no capacity, to follow up on operational issues.

On the contrary, local institutions and community organisations often lack financial, human, and physical resources that hinder their effective participation in local governance projects.

Different studies point out that many problems in project implementation stem from deficient project design. One of the assessments describes the design-related problem as “poor diagnosis of problems and a pervasive optimism over possible solutions.” The challenge has always been to design a strategy or programme which, though it incorporates necessary levels of information, is flexible enough to allow for adjustments during the implementation cycle.

Slide 54

Conclusion and Recommendations Another important factor that usually is broadly talked about at

the design stage, but not always put into practice, is giving proper consideration to social, economic, and cultural peculiarities of the chosen locality. Usually, detailed location-tailored research is necessary to guide project design and implementation.

It is a risk that decentralisation can reinforce existing local elite structures and that local elites capture a fledgling decentralisation process. Obviously this only reinforces the need to work with both aspects of decentralisation and local governance when trying to improve local democratic process and civil society involvement.

Slide 55

Conclusion and Recommendations The factors impeding programme sustainability include:

Heavy reliance on technical assistance with little training for the local staff to effectively take over the implementation;

High level of investments, which significantly exceed local norms, result in resource unavailability (e.g. no way to find replacement parts or afford maintenance) when project disbursements end;

Establishment of project-specific institutions that do not get absorbed into regular institutional settings;

Relatively short duration of programmes, which results in the inability to produce results during the project implementation cycle; and

Low level of community involvement and lack of sense of ownership

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Conclusion and Recommendations This leads to following recommendations: MoFA should develop a DLG strategy paper with Finland’s

position to how DLG programming can be tackled in future and not least how this functions together with sector support/SBS and GBS activities.

Continue to support overall DLG agenda in cooperation countries and participate in the spirit of Paris Declaration in joint programmes, reviews, formulations in this area. This is of course linked to the countries own processes.

Increase the capacity at both headquarters and in embassies to deal with DLG issues. This entails better overall knowledge of decentralised HRM, fiscal and institutional issues – international best practices and local applicability.

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End of Presentation