Foreign Aid and the Failure of State Building in Haiti From 1957 to 2015

8/20/2019 Foreign Aid and the Failure of State Building in Haiti From 1957 to 2015

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Foreign Aid and the Failure of StateBuilding in Haiti from 1957 to 2015

Terry F. Buss

After receiving at least U.S.$38 billion in aid for reconstruction and development over thepast 60 years, Haiti remains a fragile state, one of the worst globally. The reasons for aid

failure are legion but mostly relate to highly dysfunctional Haitian regimes, at timesdestructive U.S. foreign policy and aid policy, and ongoing issues about how to deliveraid, all in the context of devastating natural disasters. The overriding cause of aid failurehas been the social, cultural, and historical context that has led to domination by economicand political elites who have little interest in advancing Haiti and who are totally self-interested—Haiti’s fatal flaw. Donors can go far to improve aid effectiveness, but Haiti willlanguish until its leaders and people find common ground and compromise in managingtheir country.

Después de haber recibido al menos 38 mil millones de dólares en ayuda para lareconstrucción y el desarrollo en los últimos 60 años, Haití sigue siendo un Estado frágil,

uno de los peores a nivel mundial. Hay muchas razones que explican el fracaso de laasistencia económica, pero varias apuntan a lo disfuncional de los regímenes haitianos, auna política exterior estadounidense a veces destructiva y a discusiones continuas respectoa cómo hacer llegar la ayuda, todo en el contexto de desastres naturales devastadores. Lacausa principal del fracaso de la asistencia económica ha sido el contexto social, cultural ehistórico que ha conducido a la dominación de las élites económicas y políticas que tienenmuy poco interés en lograr el avance de Haití y que solamente ven por sus propiosintereses—el error fatal de Haití. Los donantes pueden hacer mucho para mejorar laeficacia de la ayuda, pero Haití languidecerá hasta que sus dirigentes y su puebloencuentren intereses comunes y lleguen a acuerdos respecto a la administración de supaís.

Key words: aid effectiveness, fragile states, foreign policy, NGOs, debt, reconstruction, strategy

Overview

Based on my review of bilateral, multilateral, and charitable donor reports(Buss, 2013; CNN, 2015; Roodman, 2010), it appears that they have collec-tively poured approximately U.S.$38 billion in aid over six decades, so why isHaiti still the poorest country in Latin America and the Caribbean? What can theinternational community learn from aid efforts in Haiti that might be helpful for

assistance to other fragile states? Answering these questions is extremely

Latin American Policy—Volume 6, Number 2—Pages 319–339© 2015 Policy Studies Organization. Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.


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complex, complicated, and controversial, and there is little agreement on how toreconstruct Haiti.

Haiti can be seen as an evolving state in which military dictators and “demo-

cratically elected” leaders have traded places in a series of coups, leading to threedistinct stages of reconstruction and development. These periods can be mappedunder U.S. foreign policy actions that in turn drive donor policy. Foreign policyand aid efforts can be compared with derive lessons on cause and effect, successand failure, and the role of luck in weathering the deadly natural disasters thatplague Haiti.

Most observers would agree that current political, social, cultural, and eco-nomic factors that have strong roots and have evolved over the past 200 years areat play in Haiti (Dupuy, 2006; Fatton, 2002; Gerard, 2010; Locke, 2012).

It is likely that Haiti may be, and has always been, fatally flawed. Perpetual

instability infects and literally eats away at every aspect of governance in Haiti;there are negative consequences of racism, poor distribution of wealth, and a lackof social mobility and social justice, leading to a huge impoverished black popu-lation nearly completely dominated by a powerful mulatto minority and anemerging black elite; there is endemic corruption; and there is a lack of leader-ship from any quarter capable of or willing to break the chains binding thisdysfunctional society.

Aid has failed to improve Haiti and may have even made things worse (James,2010; Polman, 2011; Schuller, 2012). It has been tied to U.S. foreign policy, whichhas led to instability of and insecurity in aid provision; decision makers have

offered aid programs that assumed Haiti had become more normalized, when inreality it was barely out of the conflict phase in each of its coups, made worse bydisasters. Decision makers built a government that could manage its affairs onlyminimally, creating a highly dysfunctional, aid-dependent system. Decisionmakers wrongly believed that rushing to hold elections where there was no realtradition of or intention to create a democracy would solve Haiti’s problems.Finally, decision makers poorly timed and conceived everything, privatization,decentralization, planning, economic development, and civil service reform ini-tiatives. Donors grew tired of Haiti and were anxious to move on.

Lessons learned from Haiti may give us information on debates about fragile

states. The major lesson is that Haiti needs to sort out its governance issues onceand for all; resolve its racial and class issues; distribute wealth more widelythrough economic development; and build wide consensus about what thecountry is, where it should go, and how it should get there. It will be difficultto do so if elites believe that the current state of affairs is in their bestinterest.

Aid needs to be depoliticized; distributed consistently over the long term;allocated based on consensus, commitment, and capacity of Haitians; and tar-geted, accountable, and transparent. Donors need to reassess what programs areappropriate for conflict, reconstruction, and normalization efforts; when and how

democratization should be pursued; how to build capacity to absorb aid andspend it; and how donors can partner with Haitians. Furthermore, the UnitedStates, along with other donors, needs to rethink the potential long-termeffects of embargoes, boycotts, aid suspensions, aid tying, and delayed aiddisbursement.

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Despite any possible changes, if attention is not paid to the fatal flaw, efforts toreform aid and foreign policy are likely to be for naught. At the same time, the factthat aid failed in Haiti does not mean it will fail everywhere. The purpose of this

article is to point out the importance of the fatal flaw.

BackgroundImpetus for this article came at the behest of the Organization of American

States’ envoy to Haiti in 2004–2005, following the ousting of Aristide from power.It is based on onsite interviews held on several visits with President René Préval;Haitian ministers and senior civil servants; World Bank, United Nations (UN),Inter-American Development Bank, and European Union (EU) program officers;

bilateral aid directors, including the United States, France, and Canada; Haitian

and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); development con-tractors; and selected ambassadors. Interviews were also conducted with officialsfrom these organizations in Washington, D.C. Due to the sensitive nature of theproject, nearly all interviewees were promised that their comments would beheld in strictest confidence. Websites and policy documents from these and otherorganizations working in and with Haiti were also reviewed.

Haitian Regimes, Foreign Policy, and AidMost observers would agree that aid to Haiti has failed in most sectors (Buss,

2013; Dubois, 2013). Although there is disagreement on causes for the failure,most blame a lack of good governance by different Haitian regimes, destructiveU.S. foreign policy responses to Haitian regimes and geopolitics of the region,and ineffective bilateral and multilateral aid provisioning to Haiti, all in thecontext of 200 years of Haitian culture, society, and history. Haiti also suffersmany natural disasters and is susceptible to economic shocks.

Haitian Regimes

Haitian regimes can be grouped into three periods, each vividly illustratingthe fatal flaw at work; elites will do almost anything to retain or exploitpower.

Authoritarian rule: 1957–1986. Authoritarian rule best describes theHaitian state under François Duvalier (1957–1971), also known as Papa Doc, andhis son Jean-Claude (1971–1986), Baby Doc. Papa Doc was “democratically”elected with support and financing from the United States and, most important,the Haitian military. Duvalier eliminated opposition candidates. In 1959, follow-ing an attempted coup by the army—upset because he had abandoned them after

gaining their support—Papa Doc launched an unparalleled reign of terror. Hedownsized the army and replaced its officers with loyalists. He executed thosewho did not support him. Next, he formed the tonton macoute, a 10,000-strongparamilitary group of thugs to do his bidding. He then proceeded to run a policestate replete with death squads, kidnappings, show trials, and violence. Papa Doc

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promulgated a new constitution to justify his authoritarian regime andcentralized all administration in Port-au-Prince, emasculating provincial andmunicipal governments. Baby Doc, only 19, took over at his father’s death

and continued these policies.Papa Doc was fervently anti-communist, counterbalancing the emerging com-

munist dictatorship under Fidel Castro in Cuba. He extracted military aid andother assistance in exchange for his hard-line stance.

Papa Doc gained popular support by launching his “noirisme,” a black-powermovement that appealed to Haitians of African descent, against a very smallpower elite of French-African descent—mulattos. He was a practitioner of voodoo. Terror, populism, and voodoo were effective tools for intimidating thepopulation, not to mention elites. The regime ended when a military coupdeposed Baby Doc in 1987.

Political instability: 1987–2004. In 1987, under the junta, another HaitianConstitution was approved in a nationwide referendum to correct the Duvaliers’excesses, but presidential elections were aborted after the junta realized what thelikely voting outcomes were. The junta was soon overthrown in another militarycoup, whose leaders were attacked by yet another junta, although that coupfailed. Being a pariah regime in the international community, the junta aggran-dized itself through lucrative drug trafficking. The juntas were unable or unwill-ing to control the tonton macoute. Eventually, under threats from the George H.W.Bush administration, the junta stepped down and an interim government was

appointed.In 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected president in a free and fair election.Aristide was a former Roman Catholic priest, expelled from his Silesian Order foradvocating “liberation theology” and social violence. Aristide ran for officeagainst the Duvalierists, the Catholic Church, and wealthy mulatto elites, whilecourting leftist and anti-U.S. groups. Violence continued under Aristide as hissupporters avenged grievances.

Eight months after Aristide had taken office, yet another military junta suc-cessfully overthrew him and encouraged a wave of terror against his supporters.Aid was suspended and an economic embargo imposed during this period.

Businesses shutdown and many fled the country, further worsening theeconomy.In 1994, the Bill Clinton administration successfully restored Aristide to his

presidency with an invasion force of 20,000 U.S. Marines, which tarnishedAristide’s legitimacy as president and discredited the United States.

Aristide decided not to risk his presidency to another coup, so he disbandedthe army and retired its officer corps. Some of these officers eventually helpedoverthrow his government in 2004. Modeling himself after the Duvaliers,Aristide empowered a group of loyalist thugs—the Chimere— to intimidate oppo-nents. He appointed numerous Duvalierists, drug kingpins, and human rightsviolators to government posts, often at the expense of his supporters, leading toresentment.

Unfortunately for Aristide, the constitution limited Haitian presidents to onefive-year term, so he was out of office a few months after the United States hadreinstalled him.



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Aristide’s close associate and former prime minister, Rene Préval, was electedpresident in 1995. Even with a turnout of only 30% and an opposition boycott, notto mention fraud, key bilateral and multilateral donors considered the election

free and fair, although many Haitians and the opposition did not. Aristide andPréval were frequently lumped together, with many fearing that Préval wasdoing the bidding of Aristide. In reality, Aristide was undermining Préval, espe-cially when Préval pursued initiatives (e.g., privatization) favored or mandated bydonors. Aristide formed his own party in 1997.

The 1997 elections were a fractured affair, with communists, neo-Duvalierists,Aristide’s party, supporters of Préval, and numerous small parties. Oppositionparties again boycotted the elections. Préval’s prime minister quit in protest overthe fraudulent elections. The electoral commission—a body that oversees thepolls—was forced to flee the country when Aristide’s Chimere went after them.

Préval tried four times to appoint a prime minister but failed. He dissolvedparliament and began ruling by decree from 1999 to 2001, so much of what he didwas illegal.

In 2000, Aristide won the presidency. Numerous election irregularities benefit-ted his party. Opposition parties again boycotted elections. Bilateral and multi-lateral donors immediately withheld aid. Aristide’s Chimere supporters, theNational Police, and other agitators unleashed a wave of violence.

In 2004, parliamentary terms expired, and Aristide, mimicking Préval, beganruling by decree. This action led ex-supporters from Aristide’s paramilitarygroups, ex-military, and gangs—egged on by elites and even the United States

and the Dominican Republic—to overthrow Aristide. The United States exiledhim to the Central African Republic and then to South Africa. A U.S.-led multi-national force arrived in Haiti to secure the country, followed by a more perma-nent UN stabilization force. The United States had once again become associatedwith heavy-handedness.

After Aristide, key donors supported Haiti in forming a transitional govern-ment from 2004 to 2006, after which new presidential elections were to be held.The transitional government was made up of technocrats, mostly nonpolitical,who swore not to run for office in future elections. The transitional governmentwon the confidence of donors, and aid increasingly began to flow to Haiti.

Violence plagued the country during this administration; for example it wasimpossible to visit Port-au-Prince a few blocks from the historic presidentialpalace because the Chimere and gangs were holding it. The transition governmentwas also accused of engaging in extralegal activities against its opposition.

Transition to democracy: 2006–present. In 2006, Préval once again became president. As in the past, the election was delayed several times andplagued by fraud. Participation was low, and opposition boycotts were ongoing.Préval was adept at obtaining donor funding but raised eyebrows when he triedto amend the constitution so he could serve another term. In 2008, Haiti wasdevastated by a hurricane that created food shortages and increased in food price,as 40% of the harvest had been destroyed (see Taft-Morales, 2009). Violence andprotests erupted, forcing Haiti’s prime minister to resign. Préval failed to getparliamentary approval for his next two prime minister appointments. In 2009,the Provisional Electoral Council—appointed by Préval—excluded Aristide’s



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party from participation in elections, disenfranchising much of Haiti’s electorate.Only 11% of voters turned out (Pierre, 2010).

In January 2010, a devastating earthquake rocked the country, killing 230,000

people and leaving millions homeless (Koontz, 2011). Many government build-ings, including the presidential palace and all but one ministry, were destroyed.The civil servant death toll was high. Préval failed to lead Haiti during thiscatastrophe and even withheld support from national organizations created tomanage aid and reconstruction.

In 2011, Michel Martelly became president in a deeply flawed election that hadalso been delayed by the quake. Only 23% of voters participated (Taft-Morales,2011). Parliament was under control of opposition parties, making governingdifficult. It took five months to appoint a prime minister, and when one had beenappointed, he remained in power for only four months, when he suddenly

resigned over disagreements with Martelly. Two attempts to appoint a new primeminister failed. Martelly has periodically attempted to restore the Haitian army.Many Haitians believe Martelly to be a Duvalierist. From all appearances,Martelly is edging his way along a similar path to that of his predecessors.Elections scheduled for 2011 have been repeatedly postponed (and are nowscheduled for August 2015) because of an inability of Martelly and the oppositionto agree on how they would be undertaken.

U.S. Foreign Policy Responses

U.S. foreign policy toward Haitian regimes determines how aid is delivered, sothe fatal flaw is not being addressed and, to some extent, the United States may befurthering Haiti’s dysfunction.

There are three distinct U.S. foreign policy stages associated with Haiti’sregimes and the geopolitical situation in Latin America and the Caribbean. Eachcan be understood in terms of U.S.–Soviet bloc Cold War competition, U.S.presidential and congressional politics, advocacy group agitation and, mostimportantly, U.S.–Haiti relations.

The United States is seen as self-interested, as it and its allies have ignored thefatal flaw when regional interests are being served. When elites have resisted or

exploited foreign policy, Haiti has been severely punished, but not its elites. Eliteshave been incredibly skillful at manipulating the United States and donors.

Eisenhower through Carter. From the Eisenhower to the Carter adminis-trations, foreign policy focused entirely on negating Soviet influence in theAmericas, particularly in Haiti, which is next door to Cuba. The Kennedy admin-istration discontinued all but humanitarian aid when Papa Doc declared himself president for life in 1963. After finding that four-fifths of aid had failed to reachpoor people, Kennedy dispersed humanitarian aid through NGOs, setting aprecedent that persists today. The Johnson Administration continued to suspend

most aid to Papa Doc. So strained had the U.S.–Haiti relationship become that Johnson was in the process of drawing up plans for yet another invasion of theisland. The Nixon Administration restored all aid to Baby Doc in 1973 in thehopes of counterbalancing Castro’s Cuba and encouraging promised reforms.Presidents Ford and Carter continued Nixon’s policies.



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Reagan through GHW Bush. Under the Reagan administration, aid con-tinued to flow into Haiti as an ally in the Cold War, but the United States becameconcerned that U.S. businesses were under threat, that drugs were being trans-

shipped to the United States, and that failing economic conditions were producingillegal immigrants in larger numbers. Reagan granted trade privileges to boost theHaitian economy. After the 1987 elections, Reagan suspended—then restored, andthen suspended again—aid as a result of the military junta’s interference. Follow-ing the coup, the George H.W. Bush administration embargoed trade, frozegovernment assets, stopped arms shipments, and suspended U.S. business activ-ity. The embargo wiped out the garment industry and much of the economy.

Clinton through Obama. Cold War foreign policy issues waned with thefall of the Soviet Union; attention to boat people, drugs, and the economy per-

sisted. Democratization, embodied in Aristide, was a new concern. When BillClinton ran for president in 1992, he campaigned to reverse Bush’s policies onHaiti, including restoring Aristide to power but, as president, Clinton failed to acton Haiti until 1994, when he ordered another invasion. Prior to that, Clinton notonly continued Bush’s policies but also expanded them to include interringHaitian “boat people” in Guantanamo, Cuba, and convincing the DominicanRepublic to seal its borders with Haiti. Aristide’s restoration created a great dealof ill will in the region, where countries tend to resent the long history of invasions. These countries have good reason; the United States invaded Haiti atleast 15 times and occupied the country from 1915 to 1934.

The Clinton administration and donors suspended aid following the 1997parliamentary elections won by Aristide’s party, because of fraud and violence,and because of Préval’s dissolution of parliament.

Some historians affirm that George W. Bush disliked Aristide (Morrell, 2003).In 2000, Bush suspended U.S. aid and pressured others to suspend multilateralaid. The World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the UN with-drew offices from Haiti. When Aristide was deposed in 2004, the United Statesrefused to help; instead, Bush sent U.S. Marines to establish order, and Aristidewas quickly exiled. The Bush administration reengaged in Haiti under the tran-sition government and then the Préval regime. The Aristide affair fractured the

U.S. Congress into pro- and anti-Aristide factions, making it difficult to developconsistent foreign policy. Nevertheless, in 2006, Congress, in a rare bipartisangesture, enacted a very generous trade agreement with Haiti that stimulated itsgarment industry.

When the Barack Obama administration took office, it stated that Haiti was itshighest priority in the region, but Latin American–United States relations are at alow point, with attention now on the Middle East. Obama committed to a greatdeal of funding following the 2008 hurricanes and the 2010 earthquake. Anony-mous interviews conducted for this project suggest that, had it not been for theearthquake, U.S. foreign policy would have ignored Haiti.

Natural DisastersRegardless of their views on Haiti, donors continued to support humanitarian

efforts even when Haitian regimes ran amuck. Haiti is periodically victimized by



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natural disasters—hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes. Maplecroft, a global risk-management consulting firm, ranks Haiti first among all countries in economiclosses sustained in natural disasters (Maplecroft, 2015). From 1993 to 2012, it

experienced one earthquake, two droughts, 31 floods, and 26 tropical storms orhurricanes (Wikipedia, 2015). Every time Haiti progresses in its development, adisaster undoes it, making the country worse off. In the past decade alone, Haitiwas battered by Hurricane Jeanne in 2004, causing losses of 7% gross domesticproduct (GDP); Hurricane Fay and tropical storms Gustav, Hannah, and Ike in2008, resulting in losses of 15% GDP and destroying 40% of Haiti’s harvestablecrop, creating a food crisis; and the 2010 earthquake (Farmer, 2012; Harmeling,2010) producing a loss of 120% GDP, or U.S.$8 billion (Research Department,2015).

Haiti is an ecological disaster. Since colonial times, Haitians (and French colo-

nists) have cut down 95% of forests without replacing them, producing majorflooding in 2002, 2003, 2006, and 2007 (Diamond, 2011). These floods killedhundreds and displaced thousands.

A cholera epidemic in 2010, caused by the UN Peacekeeping Force (Ingram,2015), has taken the lives of 8,546 Haitians and infected another 700,541 throughMarch 2014 (WHO, 2014, p. 1).

Evidence for Aid FailureAfter more than U.S.$38 billion in aid has been spent on Haiti since the

mid-1950s, there has been little progress in improving the lives of the averageHaitian; there have been only slight advances in the country’s governance andsome progress in economic growth and development, which has been reversedfrom time to time (Buss, 2008, 2013).

Dimensions of FailureHaiti is a truly failed state, failing on almost every global performance

measure.

Overall. Foreign Policy (2014) magazine ranks 59 failed states against 12 indi-cators in its Failed State Index. Haiti ranks ninth worst, behind Somalia, Congo,Sudan, Chad, Zimbabwe, and Afghanistan. Haiti leads in democratic pressures,economic decline, de-legitimization of the state, public services, factionalizedelites, and external intervention indicators.

Poverty. In 2013, the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP,2014, table 1) Human Development Index (HDI) ranked Haiti 168 as the worst off among 187 countries. No other Latin American or Caribbean country fell into this“low development” category. The HDI has improved slightly from .335 in 1980 to

.469 in 2013.In 2012, more than 6 million people in Haiti’s 10.4 million population (56%)lived below the poverty line of U.S.$2.44 per day, and 2.5 million (24%) below$U.S.1.24 per day (World Bank, 2013, p. 1). Approximately one-half of Haiti’s GDPis in the underground economy (Bloomberg Business, 2015, p. 15).



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Governance. The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators for 1996–2012 showed Haiti among the worst-governed countries, with fewer than 15% of governments performing less well than Haiti. Government effectiveness, rule of

law, and corruption scores place Haiti at the very bottom of the worst-governedtier of countries (World Bank, 2015).

Bertelsmann’s Transformation Index (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012, p. 1) forfragile states ranked Haiti 106 of 128 countries studied. Haiti fared poorly in stateidentity, basic public administration, free and fair elections, effective power togovern, separation of power, independent judiciary, performance of democraticinstitutions, commitment to democratic institutions, political parties interestgroups, and social capital.

In 2014, Transparency International’s Corruption Index ranked Haiti last of 145countries assessed. In 2011, Haiti moved to 175 out of 182 countries and to 163 in

2013 (TI, 2014, p. 1).

Economy. Average real GDP growth for Haiti is rather low—2.8 in2015—and tracks with political and natural disaster events (Trading Economics,2015, p. 1). In 1995–2000, under Préval, real GDP growth was at 3.8% but declinedsharply from 2001 to 2005 to −.05% under the ill-fated Aristide regime. In 2006–2009, under Préval, GDP grew to 2.3%. In 2010–2013, the economy grew to 4.2%under Martelly, in spite of the quake and its aftermath. Overall, from 1960 to 2005,Haiti has had the lowest GDP growth in the hemisphere, on average at 1%.

Foreign Direct Investment was less than 1% of GDP from 2006 to 2009, the

lowest rate among fragile states (World Bank, 2015). Haiti ranked 151 of 183 of countries for ease of doing business.

The Bertelsmann index measuring capacity to manage the economy rankedHaiti 121 of 128 (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012, p. 1).

The Wall Street Journal/Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedomranked Haiti 151 out of 177 countries in 2015 (Heritage Foundation, 2015, p. 1).Haiti was at the bottom of the index on property rights and corruption and wasranked low in business, investment, and financial freedom.

Aid dependency. Aid from bilateral and multilateral donors contributed

130% of Haiti’s internal revenue in 2009 and almost 400% of its internal budgetin 2010 (Buss, 2013). The increase in aid funding as related to the budget in 2010is understandable because of the quake, but 2009 aid is much more indicative of aid dependency. Even so, Haiti ranked 18th in development assistance in 2005and fourth in 2010 (Buss, 2013). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) “pro-longed use of loans” index shows that, from 1971 to 2000, 51 countries had loansthat were impeding their development as they became more and more depen-dent. Haiti was ranked fourth (IEO, 2002).

Haiti’s external debt was approximately 27% of GDP in 2014 (TradingEconomics, 2015, p. 1). From 1997 to 2009, Haiti’s external debt to GDP averaged38%. Its highest debt to GDP was 61%. Since 2006, it has received debt forgive-ness of U.S.$2.6 billion, without which the amount owned would perhaps beunpayable. In 2000, the Duvaliers incurred 40% of Haiti’s billion-dollar debt.Until 1947, Haiti was still paying off debt it owed to France in reparations forslave revolts approximately 150 years earlier (Buss, 2008).



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Remittances. When remittances are considered, Haiti’s finances seem evenmore unsustainable. Remittances rose gradually from U.S.$736 million in 2000 toU.S.$1.9 billion in 2014 but have declined as a percentage of GDP from 29% in

2003 to approximately 14% at present as the economy grew (IADB, 2015, p. 3).Remittances exceeded aid contributions until aid funding began to flow after the2010 earthquake.

Grand Aid Strategy FailuresBilateral and multilateral donor assessments, beginning in the 1960s, generally

conclude that aid to Haiti has been ineffective, or an outright failure, and thecause of failure is attributable to some aspect of the fatal flaw (see Buss, 2013, fora more comprehensive presentation).

The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO, 1982), in Assistance to Haiti, assessedeffectiveness of programs of the U.S. Agency for International Development(USAID) in Haiti from 1973 to 1981, concluding that, “After 8 years of operatingin Haiti, USAID . . . [p]ast projects designed to improve Haitian governmentinstitutions have had only limited impact” (GAO, 1982, p. i). They concluded thesame thing in a 1985 follow-up assessment (GAO, 1985, p. i). GAO proposedfunding NGOs and consultants and bypassing government and, where projectswere failing, to cancel them altogether (GAO, 1982). GAO concluded that theHaitian government lacked commitment and capacity. Aid to Haiti from 1957 to1971 under Papa Doc was suspended because of the dictator’s “reprehensible

acts” and destruction, through neglect, of the national economy.The World Bank’s (1996) Country Assistance Strategy, developed for the new

Préval administration in 1996, found that

. . . a small economic elite has supported a “predatory state,” progressivelydestroying the country’s social capital, with only negligible investments in humanresources and basic infrastructure. Repression through army, police and paramili-tary groups has been pervasive. This has led to a deep-seated distrust between civilsociety and the state, and also to a ready potential for violence, which still affectprospects for overall stability and reform. Lacking a culture of democraticdecision-making and peaceful consensus-building at a national level, Haiti’s rehabilitation effort has suffered repeatedly from tensions between executive and

legislature. Additionally, Haiti’s institutions are underdeveloped. Its administra-tion is overextended, inadequately staffed, badly equipped and poorly organized.Haiti’s judicial system is particularly weak. The legacy of the longstanding absenceof good governance is widespread poverty, a severe shortage of social, environ-mental and economic capital, as well as a lack of private sector confidence requiredfor medium and long-term investment, employment and growth. (p. 1)

The World Bank’s (2002) Country Assistance Evaluation concluded about aideffectiveness over 14 years that

The development impact of Bank assistance to Haiti since 1986 has been severelylimited. The critical constraints to development governance and public sector

capacity and accountability have not diminished, nor have any sectors registeredsubstantial improvements. Based on both its impact and the ratings of its indi-vidual components, the outcome of the assistance program is rated unsatisfactory(if not highly so), the institutional development impact, negligible, and thesustainability of the few benefits that have accrued, unlikely. The Bank and otherdonors erred by offering traditional assistance programs without identifying the



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fundamental governance and political barriers to development, and by over-whelming the fragile absorptive capacity. Bank performance has, however,improved in recent years through increasingly realistic assessments of Haiti’sproblems. (p. 1)

It also found that

Haiti has never had a tradition of governance aimed at providing services to thepopulation or creating an environment conducive to sustainable growth. Instead,a tight economic elite has supported a “predatory state” that makes only negligibleinvestments in human resources and basic infrastructure. Pervasive repressionthrough army, police and paramilitary groups has created deep seated distrust between civil society and the state. The absence of a culture of democratic decisionmaking and peaceful consensus building has generated tensions and hamperedHaiti’s rehabilitation effort.” (p. 3)

In a follow-up document, the World Bank (2009) published a revised Country

Assistance Strategy, finding that

Governance and state capacity to effectively formulate and implement sound poli-cies, and to deliver core public services to the population, are weak. The state’sability to provide basic public goods has been undermined by a history of neglect,political capture, and corruption. The state is present largely in the major urbancenters and has been unable to provide basic services or infrastructure to largeportions of the population. The non-state sector has filled gaps in the provision of health and education services, but these efforts have been largely uncoordinatedand unregulated. The institutions responsible for providing essential public goodsof security and the rule of law (police and judiciary) are largely ineffective suffer-ing from political interference and corruption. A governance and corruptionsurvey undertaken by the Haitian Government in 2006, identified payment of

bribes—to access basic public services or licenses, influence court decisions, oraward public contracts or positions—as a major form of corruption in the country.The public sector faces human resource weaknesses, due to local skill shortagescompounded by massive outward migration, low state salaries, competition frominternational organizations and the private sector. Inadequate financial and mate-rial resources and outdated organizational structures and procedures pose furtherchallenges. (pp. 4–5)

The UN System’s UN Integrated Strategic Framework for Haiti—2010–2011(UN, 2010) strategy for Haiti came to similar conclusions following the 2010earthquake.

Today, the country faces a combination of post-disaster and stabilization challenges

in addition to enduring structural weaknesses. Prior to the earthquake, Haiti’spublic administration already had limited capacities; with structural weaknessesresulting in inadequate and poor quality services; vulnerability to political instability; high-levels of food insecurity; significant loss of technical know-how withthe departure of qualified personnel; limited mastery of budgetary mechanismsand financial management; an over-centralization of the state, and correspondingweakness of decentralized structures, with significant disparities in access to socialservices outside of the capitol city and rural areas. The social protection sector wasparticularly fragile, characterized by segmented and ineffective interventions andthe absence of a national plan. (p. 7)

The Inter-American Bank’s Country Strategy, 2011–2015 (IADB, 2011), opinesthat

With average growth rates of 1% over the 1960–2005 period, Haiti’s growth wasLatin America and the Caribbean’s lowest. The root causes of economic stagnationare decades of political instability, eroded governance and occasional outburst of social violence, environmental degradation that has exacerbated the impact of natural disasters, an inadequate business climate that has inhibited private sector



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development, a brain drain overseas of Haiti’s most educated women and men,and a weak state capacity to define policies to provide public goods and managesocial risks. (p. 12)

According to an IMF (2013) assessment in 2013—Interim Strategy Note, FY13-FY14—after six decades of aid investment, the same risks or threats identifiedstill remain in play.

(i) high risk of natural disasters such as hurricanes, storms and earthquakes witha limited but improving capacity to prepare and react; (ii) a risk that socio-politicalvolatility could threaten current political stabilization and slow reconstructionefforts; (iii) a risk of insufficient government and institutional capacity to imple-ment policies that favour growth and promote transparent and efficient implemen-tation of programs financed by [International Development Association] IDA and(iv) a risk of corruption. (p. 7)

The best indication of aid failure comes from Canada’s International Develop-ment Agency. In January 2013, Canada suspended new aid to Haiti, citing “theslow progress of development in Haiti due to its weak governing institutions andcorruption” (Clark, 2013, p. 5; see also Katz, 2014).

Haiti’s Fatal Flaw Elaborated

. . . the objective of those who control the predatory state plunder the resources of the state “without any more regard for the welfare of the citizenry than a predator

has for the welfare of its prey. (Peter Evans, as quoted in Alex Dupuy, 2006, p. 28)

Why has Haiti failed to develop after receiving so much aid funding? We needto understand causes before we can craft solutions. The usual way to deal withthis question is to list a rather lengthy set of factors that, when taken together,explain Haiti’s and donors’ poor performance, and U.S. foreign policy (Buss,2008, 2013; Dubois, 2013; Katz, 2014). Among these factors are the incapacity togovern, absence of rule of law, corruption, meddling in foreign policy, ineffectiveaid provisioning, and interference by the United States. If one accepts the fatalflaw, these factors are not causes but rather symptoms of the fatal flaw at work.

Treating the symptoms will make Haiti appear better by reducing pain andoffering temporary relief, but the illness will still thrive below the surface andrepeatedly flare up unless cured.

The scholarly literature on Haiti is replete with researcher attempts to suc-cinctly capture the essence of Haiti’s fatal flaw as a nightmarish, predatory,collapsed, failed, parasitic, kleptocratic, phantom, virtual, pariah, or orphanedstate. As it stands, Haiti’s fatal flaw encompasses nearly all of the economic,political, cultural, and social aspects of society. Expecting aid, even in largeamounts, to eliminate this flaw is unrealistic. It is equally unlikely that U.S.foreign policy would penalize the United States and reward Haitian behavior. It

is necessary to correct the flaw to reconstruct Haiti.Haiti is dominated by political and economic elites who, on the whole, puttheir interests above the country’s and its people (Buss, 2013; Dubois, 2013;Dupuy, 2006; Fatton, 2002; Gerard, 2010). Elites are not only taking advantage of the system but also created and nourished it for more than 200 years. Periodic



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chaos in the system likely benefits elites by making it difficult for government tounify against them to reform. Likewise, it makes it more difficult for outsiders tocompel reform through foreign policy or aid. U.S. foreign policy may have made

the flaw worse by “legitimizing” some of the dysfunctional behavior and byperpetuating chaos. In many ways, aid is helpful to the elites because they canexploit it, by propping up a dysfunctional society unable to fend for itself and bypouring large amounts of money into the system, money that can find its wayinto the pockets of elites.

Elites perceive every political or economic issue in Haiti as a zero-sum gamewhere there are only winners and losers, each with very long memories. There isno compromise among elites, and hence no consensus. There are no widelyaccepted rules of the game. Politics, economics, society, and the Haitian peoplethemselves exist solely for the benefit of elites for purposes of exploitation (Buss,

2013; Dubois, 2013; Dupuy, 2006; Fatton, 2002; Gerard, 2010).To protect their wealth, elites send their money out of Haiti and often have

residences overseas, should they have to quickly escape the island. They do notcare that they are depriving the country of much-needed capital for growth anddevelopment. Aid flowing in will compensate for the loss. In many ways, Haiti’selites are distanced from their own country (Buss, 2013; Dubois, 2013; Dupuy,2006; Fatton, 2002; Gerard, 2010).

Even though elites dominate the political and economic systems for their ownself-interest, this in itself does not explain why growth and development have

been elusive. Presumably, elites could benefit even more in their own self-interest

if they allowed Haiti to prosper. Diamond (2011), in Natural Experiments in History, has an interesting although highly controversial perspective. Diamondcompares Haiti with the Dominican Republic (DR), with whom it shares theisland of Hispaniola. The DR has prospered, whereas Haiti has floundered. TheFrench colonized Haiti, and the Spanish colonized the DR. The French usedslaves to such an extent that the island’s population was 85% enslaved, as com-pared with approximately 15% in the DR (Diamond, 2011, p. 123). French slavesworked on huge plantations in an agriculturally based economy. When Haitianslaves revolted, leaders at the time disassembled the large plantations in favor of small freeholds given to ex-slaves. Haiti lost the economic base that had made it

a prosperous, although heavily exploited, country (slaves on average lived only10 years, being forced to work in a harsh climate with even harsher overseers).Haiti became a poor country (Diamond, 2011).

Successive rulers exploited the ex-slave population, perhaps finding it easier totake from them rather than invest in development. Haiti’s first “president” afterthe slave revolt declared himself emperor, complete with Napoleonic costumesand attendant pomp and circumstance. He was so repressive that he was assas-sinated after only two years in office. His crime was expelling white settlers,oppressing mulattos, confiscating lands, massacring thousands, and aggrandiz-ing himself. His successor, Boyer, a free mulatto, took power and proceeded to

exclude blacks from government positions, and so the tradition of the fatal flaw began.The tyrant Papa Doc Duvalier drove away people who might challenge

his power. Educated people were a particular target. More than 80% of college graduates leave Haiti (Vatav, 2012, p. 1). Haiti’s civil service, donor



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organizations, and private sector cannot attract enough skilled workers to fillneeded positions, even though there are millions of unemployed blacks on theisland.

Haiti is a racist society (Buss, 2008; Dupuy, 2006; Fatton, 2002; Gerard, 2010).Elites constitute a small proportion of the population—some say 5%, yet theycontrol nearly all of the wealth (Gerard, 2010, p. 63). For 200 years, their rankswere made up of people of African and French descent—mulattos, who speakFrench as their main language. The disadvantaged millions in Haiti are mostly

blacks of African descent who speak French-Creole, but not French, as their mainlanguage. Even language has always been used as a way of protecting elites; elitesdo business in French, and the have-nots, in Creole.

Racial dominance by mulattos began to change somewhat under Duvalier andAristide. Being black, they did everything they could to redistribute wealth and

power away from mulattos somewhat toward the emerging group of elite blacksand toward regime loyalists. They did so in the public sector but not the private.Ironically, this emerging black elite that replaced or complemented the mulattoclass appeared to be just as exclusionary as its predecessors.

The widely practiced voodoo religion also plays a role. Papa Doc and Aristide both employed voodoo to hold power. Many Haitians believed that both rulershad magic powers that could force people to do their bidding. A by-product of voodoo is that it makes people believe that gods and spirits are responsible fortheir fate, not their individual will, an idea that plays into the hands of charis-matic leaders. Promotion of voodoo also marginalized the Catholic Church that

once supported the mulatto elites. The Church excommunicated Papa Docand tried to expel Aristide from the country when he launched his politicalmovement.

The upshot of this system—total domination by elites—is a population that isdisengaged from political life, tangential to the economy, and alienated fromgovernment.

It will not be easy to change Haiti. One need only look at Haiti’s presidentialhistory since 1804 to see evidence of the fatal flaw. According to my count, therehave been 57 presidents of Haiti (see also Corbett, 1999, p. 1). Three were assas-sinated or executed. One committed suicide. Six died in office. Twenty-three

were overthrown, two of them—one a military dictator and the other,Aristide—twice. The United States has compelled five to step down in the past100 years. Only 10 completed a full term in office, and 31 served two years or less.Nearly all presidents had military backgrounds or were beholden to military orparamilitary organizations. In recent times, only Aristide, Préval, and Martellyhave been exceptions. Additionally, Haitians have promulgated a new constitu-tion 15 times in their history, mostly to satisfy the needs of its dictators (Cordeiro,2008, p. 10).

What must be done? In part the question hinges on whether one believes thatrecent events in Haiti are the dying gasp of control by elites or that elites are alive

and well, able to morph in the same way that a cancer metastases (Wilentz, 2014).

Addressing the fatal flaw. Bilateral and multilateral donors have given apass to addressing the fatal flaw as a necessary condition for making aid moreeffective.



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Bilateral and multilateral aid agencies in their strategic documents for Haitialways give mention to cultural, society, and political issues that might affect aideffectiveness, but they are typically listed in a “risks” section of the documents

(see, e.g., World Bank, 2002, 2009, 2013; see also Buss, 2013). Once these factorshave been mentioned, reports rarely go on to assess exactly how they should beovercome. In other words, the fatal flaw context is not directly aligned with policyor program interventions to correct it. Likely, donors are treating symptomsrather than the disease.

For some observers, aid agencies know the issues but gloss over them in hopesthat they will be resolved. Consider this conclusion by the World Bank (2002) inits evaluation of aid.

The Bank, in collaboration with other donors, has tried to tackle these challenges

through emergency projects to support economic recovery, stabilization, publicsector reform, privatization, and emergency social programs, as well as invest-ments in infrastructure and a few projects in environment, education and health.While the Bank’s objectives were consistent with Haiti’s major economic problems,their relevance was limited by their failure to give highest priority to resolving thepolitical and governance problems that undermined economic development.(p. 3)

Given that aid has flowed into Haiti with little success over 60 years and thatdonors are likely not able to address the fatal flaw with their methods, many feelthe only reasonable solution is for Haitians to correct the flaw themselves (Buss,

2013; Gerard, 2010). How they would do this is up to them.

Aid and the Fatal FlawEven though the fatal flaw remains in limbo, the Haitian case offers some

additional information for the debate about how to assist fragile states.

Capacity Building

An enduring criticism of the Haitian government is that it lacks the capacity togovern. We hasten to add that the political elite would likely unravel things evenif this were not so. Haiti has been unable (some say unwilling) to provide eventhe most basic services—education, justice, welfare, and security—to its citizens.For example, the IMF (2013, p. 1) concluded in its 2013 assessment that Haiti wasable to absorb only U.S.$27 million in budget support, out of U.S.$55 millionallocated, because of capacity issues. Why?

One view is that Haiti never really had much governance capacity, so it is nota question of reconstructing it—it was never there. The issue is one of inventingit nearly from scratch, an entirely different notion than the one of upgrading skills

of existing civil servants implied in the short-term training approach currently envogue. One reason for a lack of capacity is that Haiti has a very small, educatedmiddle class from which to draw skilled workers and managers. Haiti has failedover time to create this human capital, or its regimes drove it away for politicalreasons (Buss, 2013).



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Longer term initiatives such as earning college degrees cause extensiveoutmigration and brain drain from the country. For these initiatives to work,graduates must have an incentive to stay if educated in Haiti or return if educated

abroad. Haiti has one of the lowest paid civil services of any country (IMF, 2005,p. 17). Because of this, it is difficult to attract or retain good people, as they are indemand from NGOs, donors, and other organizations. A case could be made thatthere would be more money for salaries if there were fewer civil servants.

Much more work is needed regarding the civil service. It needs to be not onlyprofessionalized but also better paid and downsized. Donors need to imbed morefully monitors and auditors throughout the system to hold it accountable.

Capacity is not all the Haitian’s fault by any means. Haitian ministries oftencomplain that they lack capacity because of inefficiency and unreasonableaccountability regimes imposed by donors.

Debt ReliefAn approach referred to as the Washington Consensus expressed the donor

view that, among other things, aid recipient countries needed to institute auster-ity programs and structural reforms in exchange for aid. The approach has notworked well in some developing countries because poor people suffered toomuch and loans had to be paid back even when the projects they funded werefailures. Some have asked why fragile states should be obliged to pay back loansforced on them by donors for projects that failed (Buss, 2008). Haiti has alwayslived under austerity measures, not because it has pursued spending and bor-rowing reform, but because it has been corrupt and has lacked capacity. Havingqualified for debt forgiveness, Haiti now has an opportunity to spend itsresources on future development rather than the mistakes of the past, but it isunlikely to do so without considerable pressure.

History shows that making loans to Haiti has not changed regime behavior andhas led to accumulated debt that the country could not pay back. In the process,Haiti has come to depend on aid. Donors need to restrict loans and grants, but themain problem remains the fatal flaw that leads to bad government.

What is the solution? Haiti could be made a grant-only country for a fixed term

in the future, but necessary reforms must be carried out. The process of givingloans that are then forgiven must be eliminated. The issue is not increasing aidfunding, especially through loans and forgiveness, but rather correcting the fatalflaw. Such large amounts of aid money should no longer be poured into thecountry, so that it will not continue to be aid dependent. The government must becompelled to provide services and reduce NGOs.

Disrupting Aid Flows

Most public managers would agree that stability in and predictability of publicfunding over the long term is essential for good governance. Aid to Haiti over theentire period of this study has been disrupted (1) because of political instability,corruption, and mismanagement; (2) because donors fail to meet aid pledges inamounts due or in timeliness; or (3) donors withdraw, suspend, or cancel aid to



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support U.S. foreign policy or aid policy. Aid suspensions and boycotts wipe outany gains made when aid flowed and often make things worse. BoycottingHaiti’s economy destroyed the country to save it, a policy that did not work.

Similarly, when donors trickle out money, fragile states suffer if they are foolishenough to budget on aid promises rather than disbursements. According to theUN Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti (2012, p. 5), as of December 2012, only56% of earthquake funds for Haiti over the 2010–2012 period had been disbursed.Venezuela, the largest donor, had disbursed only 18.8% of committed funds. TheUnited States has dispersed only 32.9% over the past five years, leaving a giant

budget hole. The situation did not much improve; as of September 30, 2014, theGovernment Accountability Office (GAO, 2015, p. 13) reported that of theU.S.$1.7 billion allocated by the U.S. government to respond to the earthquake in2010, only 54%, or U.S.$900 million had been dispersed.

The dilemma donors must struggle with is that using aid to change regime behavior has not worked, but failing to use aid as a lever condones, and mayencourage, bad behavior. The prevailing wisdom is to continue funding even inthe face of bad behavior, because the alternative is failed aid.

What should be done? Donors should recognize that disrupting aid flows,intentionally (embargos and boycotts) or unintentionally (delayed disbursementor over pledging), negates the effects of aid and does not improve government

behavior. Aid needs to be continuous, even when fragile state governments donot deserve it. The carrot and stick approach has been counterproductive, but aidin all forms should be reduced and targeted.

Bypassing the Haitian GovernmentDonors have been reluctant to provide aid directly to the Haitian government

to fund programs, projects, or government operations, mostly because past expe-rience with Haiti has shown the government to be corrupt, self-interested, andincompetent. According to the Special Envoy for Haiti (Schuller, 2012), only 1% of quake aid went through the Haitian government. Up through 2014, aid agenciesstill preferred to aid Haiti through NGOs and contractors, many affiliated withdonor countries, and through in-kind contributions, all amounting to 75% of

funding allocated (Hillestad, 2014, p. 1).In recent years, donors have increased budget support and untied aid—funding that goes directly to the Haitian government treasury—to be spent as if it were the government’s own revenues, but it is a pittance. Bilateral and multi-lateral donors contributed approximately 9% of aid to the government in general

budget support from 2010 to 2012 (UN Office of the Special Envoy to Haiti, 2012,p. 1).

Haitians need to manage their public finances but are prevented from doing so.The fatal flaw aside, donors cannot continue to complain about capacity buildingif their practices fly in the face of good governance.

Additionally, aid money flowing to Haiti has created a “republic of NGOs”(see Ramanchandran, 2012, p. 1). Haiti boasts more NGOs—10,000 by someestimates—than any other country except India (Kristoff, 2010, p. 1). If aid inef-fectiveness derives in part from what NGOs do, then more cannot be good for thegovernance of the country.



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Critics assert that, in bypassing government, Haiti will never develop thecapacity to rid itself of corruption and deliver the services demanded by itscitizens (Farmer, 2013).

Other critics affirm that bilateral donors have more sinister motives in bypass-ing government; when donors fund their own NGOs and consultants, much of that funding goes back to the donor country.

What is to be done? Even though donors are suspicious of corruption andincapacity and wish to punish or avoid bad behavior, they should contribute

budget support, even knowing that aid will be siphoned off or wasted, andconsider it a cost of doing business. Bypassing government has made Haiti aprotectorate, which has apparently not been very effective.

Inappropriate Institutional ResponsesHaiti, in partnership with the international donor community, created the

Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) to plan, coordinate, and oversee bilateral and multilateral donor projects following the 2010 earthquake. It had a board composed of Haitian officials and donors to foster transparency andaccountability. Haiti’s prime minister and former U.S. president Bill Clintonchaired the IHRC, which was launched in April 2010 with a mandate to operateuntil October 2011. Also in 2010, a Haiti Reconstruction Fund was established toprovide funding to support projects of interest to the IHRC, because it had nofunding of its own. It has since been disbanded. Haitians objected to control of their development by foreigners, even those with money. The balance of nationaldetermination versus donor interest is delicate and not achieved in this venue.

What should be done? It would be naïve to claim that the IHRC was perfect, butit had a good theoretical basis, given the problems of delivering aid in a fragilestate even as the IHRC tried to improve on previous efforts. More experimenta-tion needs to be done in getting the implementation phase right.

Conclusion

It is important to assign responsibility for aid failure to the appropriate partiesin Haiti, U.S. foreign policy, which largely dictates how aid is spent or not; donortheories, biases, and politics in aid provision; and Haitian economic and politicalelites and the political system they fostered. The Haitian people in whose nameaid is spent are in no way to blame; they are truly victims and deserve much

better. It is clear that blame should be assigned to institutions, not peopleworking in them who are diligently trying to make a difference. They are heroesin this story, not villains.

I believe that the Haitian economic and political elite, and many of theirsupporters, are the problem, the fatal flaw. They do not seem willing to change,

and donors are unable to force them. I once asked some of them if it would bemore in their interest to have a prosperous Haiti. They could have even morewealth and power if that were so. They rejected the notion. Among other things,many simply do not like the Haitian people (Dupuy, 2006, p. 20). I am afraid thatif the power of those in charge in Haiti is greatly reduced, others will arise to take



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their place, so the system perpetuates itself. Boycotts, embargoes, and aid sus-pensions have not changed elite behavior. Perhaps they empower them to claimthat outside forces are messing with Haiti and that they are defending it. Trying

to reengineer society through aid is probably not going to work. Many observers believe that Haitians will have to solve the problem themselves.

While it might be true that only Haitians can solve the problem, donors areunlikely to give up the fight, even though many would like to be doing some-thing more productive. After spending billions over six decades, it seems fair tosay that the international community “now owns” the situation in Haiti, so howdo we make aid more appropriate in the Haitian context even though it is deeplyflawed? First, the United States should rethink the long-term implications of itsforeign policy and aid policy. Using aid to manipulate Haiti in the short termthrough a system of rewards and punishments would have to be done with much

more caution. All of the U.S. foreign policies that drive aid have failed, and manyhave made the situation worse. If this rethinking is not done, the United Statesand donors who align with the United States will simply continue throwing goodmoney after bad. Even following the quake, when Haiti was on its knees, itcould not manage to hold required elections, even when threatened with aidsuspension.

Donors overall want aid to be effective in Haiti. Because aid has consistentlyfailed over time, donors seem to want to put on rose-colored glasses so that aidpolicy will succeed out of hope rather than effective strategy, but hope is not astrategy. Holding elections and then certifying them as free and fair when they

are not is self-defeating. Donors should try to view Haiti as it really is and designprograms and policies accordingly.

Donors need to rethink the capacity-building issue. At present, aid is revolvingin a vicious circle; Haiti lacks capacity in no small part because it is corrupt, sodonors bypass government, channeling aid into NGOs, consulting firms, ordevelopers, as long as they are not Haitians. Trying to build capacity in thismanner is like trying to train a surgeon to operate on patients without everhaving touched one. Donors need to bite the bullet and provide much more

budget support and earmarked funding through government. The internationalcommunity has the tools necessary to promote accountability, transparency, and

efficiency. One problem is that these are often waived or ignored. Haiti should beallowed to govern itself, and there should be stringent monitoring on site in realtime and periodically during project implementation. It is crucial to establishtargets and hold public officials accountable before more money is expended.Accountability measures need to be applied more deeply in the process of gov-ernance, not only at top levels.

Pouring massive amounts of money into Haiti year after year to prop up thecountry has only created a welfare-dependent nation. For the short term, Haitishould receive only grant funding, not loans. Making loans and then forgivingthem creates a huge moral hazard. Grants should be greatly reduced in size over

time so that Haiti is weaned from the money supply. Some will rightly claim thatdonors cannot abandon Haiti in this way, but the current system has not worked.A better approach is to treat Haiti like a heavily indebted credit card abuser and

begin cutting it off. If this strategy is followed, perhaps Haiti will progress moreacross its sectors in everything from infrastructure to education.



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No matter what the approach, it seems that donors face a dilemma, as everystrategy has a major downside. Perhaps the most that can be expected is theachievement of small incremental gains as has happened thus far in Haiti. It

would be too bad if it continues.

About the AuthorTerry F. Buss, PhD, is an elected Fellow of the National Academy of Public

Administration in Washington, DC and professor of public policy at CarnegieMellon University.

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Foreign Aid and the Failure of State Building in Haiti From 1957 to 2015

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