Uyghur CP

1NC – Terrorism Text: The United States federal government should (((insert plan)))) if and only if the People’s Republic of China agrees to reverse their counter-terrorism policies aimed which target the Uyghurs. Say yes – China wants the appearance of normalcy Tom Phillips 15, 10-9-2015, "'A brighter future beckons': China tries to get Xinjiang to join the party," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/09/a-brighter-future-beckons-china-tries-to-get-xinjiang-to-join-the-party Tom Phillips is the Beijing correspondent for the Guardian //NV

For decades Xinjiang , a vast region of snow-capped mountains and deserts, has been the setting for frictions and deadly explosions of violence between the native Muslim Uighur minority and a rising influx of Han Chinese migrants. Now, Beijing – which recently lured British chancellor George Osborne to the resource-rich region – is fighting to promote a more dynamic image of Xinjiang, which president Xi Jinping has placed at the heart of an economic “pivot west” towards Central Asia. “This is a big deal with a lot of time and effort being put into it,” James Leibold, a Xinjiang expert from La Trobe University in Melbourne, said of the festivities. “ They need to

demonstrate to a whole range of constituencies that Xinjiang is open for business and that

Xinjiang is calm and normal.”

Chinese policies against Uighurs increase terrorismDRENNAN 15

(Is China Making Its Own Terrorism Problem Worse?JUSTINE DRENNAN FEBRUARY 9, 2015 http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/09/is-china-making-its-own-terrorism-problem-worse-uighurs-islamic-state/?wp_login_redirect=0 - ES -)

Beijing says radicalized members of its Uighur minority are terrorists with ties to the Islamic State and al Qaeda, but its repressive policies may be helping to fuel the violence . When an SUV

crashed through a crowd at Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in late 2013, killing two bystanders and injuring 40, it didn’t take Chinese officials long to name culprits. The attackers, they said, had been members of China’s Uighur Muslim minority, with “links to many international extremist terrorist groups.” Police said they found a flag bearing jihadi emblems in the crashed vehicle and blamed the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, or ETIM, a group named after the independent state China says some Uighurs want to establish in the far-western region of Xinjiang. After the attack, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying called ETIM “China’s most direct and realistic security threat.” Beijing has long characterized cases of Uighur violence as organized acts of terrorism and accused individual attackers of having ties to international jihadi groups. Back in 2001, China released a document claiming that “Eastern Turkistan” terrorists had received training from Osama bin Laden and the Taliban and then “fought in combats in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Uzbekistan, or returned to Xinjiang for terrorist and violent activities.” Since then, China has

frequently blamed ETIM for violence in Xinjiang and elsewhere. But scholars, human rights groups, and Uighur advocates argue that China is systematically exaggerating the threat Uighurs pose to justify its repressive

policies in Xinjiang . The region’s onetime-majority Uighur population of roughly 10 million, which is ethnically Turkic, has been marginalized for decades by ethnic Han Chinese migrants that Beijing has encouraged to move there in the hope that they’d help integrate the restive region into China. The repression has been getting worse. Since the region’s bloody ethnic clashes in 2009, the government has increased regulations on Muslim practices, restricting veils and beards and strictly enforcing rules that prohibit many from fasting during Ramadan or visiting mosques. Heightened security operations have led in some cases to imprisonment,

executions, and suspected torture. Government materials about how to spot extremists (hint: they tend

to look like Uighurs) elide religiosity with terrorism. Now, with the rise of the Islamic State, China has again ramped up its claims about Uighurs waging international jihad. Chinese government-run Global Times asserted in December that about 300 Chinese “extremists” were fighting alongside ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and in January that another 300 had traveled to Malaysia en route to joining the group. The reports suggested that many were “terrorists from the East Turkestan Islamic Movement.” On Thursday, Global Times said ISIS had executed one of these Uighur recruits in September and two in December when they tried to flee its control, attributing the information to an anonymous Kurdish official. Many experts dismiss

Global Times’s numbers. “I assume there are Uighurs joining ISIS, but I also assume the numbers are quite small in comparison to other groups throughout the world,” said Sean Roberts, a George Washington University professor who studies the minority group. “We’re probably talking about 20 to 30 people max.” Nicholas Bequelin, a Hong-Kong-based senior researcher with

Human Rights Watch, called Chinese media’s figure of 300 “implausibly high.” It’s likely that the rise of the Islamic State has given a few disenfranchised young Uighurs a cause to fight and potentially die for. Still, experts say any increase in Uighur extremism is largely due to the fact that the very policies China says are meant to combat terrorism have actually made the threat worse . Chinese reports about hundreds of Uighurs fighting with the Islamic State are likely “intended to make the Uighurs look as if they’re a threat, an Islamist terrorist organization,” said Dru Gladney, an anthropologist who studies ethnic identities in China. Several international media outlets have repeated the numbers from Chinese media. But China’s inflated claims are ultimately counterproductive, Gladney said. “They create more fear and marginalization, which exacerbates the problem.” China isn’t wholly inventing the threat. Propaganda material from a group China links to ETIM that calls itself the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) suggests there are at least 30 to 40 Uighur jihadis in Syria and Iraq, according to Washington Institute for Near East Policy fellow Aaron Zelin, who runs the website Jihadology.net. TIP has an increasingly active online presence that includes footage of young children firing guns in mountain valleys. In recent years, it has also claimed responsibility for attacks like the Tiananmen Square SUV incident via videos in which its purported leader, Abdullah Mansour, has called for more attacks. But many researchers doubt TIP’s claims, as its accounts of attacks often contradict facts on the ground that don’t seem to indicate the sophistication of internationally organized terrorist operations. The general consensus, according to Georgetown professor James Millward, is that radicalized Uighur expats, who mostly seem to be based in Pakistan rather than Iraq

and Syria, haven’t provided any operational support for recent violence in China , but rather just propaganda. And any who are fighting with Middle Eastern jihadi groups don’t seem to be rising very high in their ranks, said Raffaello Pantucci, an analyst at London’s Royal United Services Institute. China, however, has been quick to label moderate Uighurs who speak out as radicals. Last year a Xinjiang court sentenced Uighur professor Ilham Tohti to life in prison on charges of “separatism,” for running a website that discussed Uighur experiences in the region. The United States condemned Tohti’s sentence, with Secretary of State John Kerry warning that silencing moderate voices “can only make tensions worse.” Indeed, acts of apparent Uighur terrorism within China have risen sharply over the past couple years. An attack last March by eight knife-wielding men and women at a train station in Yunnan province’s city of Kunming left 29 dead and at least 130 wounded. In April, people armed with knives and explosives killed three and injured 79 at the railway station in Xinjiang’s capital, Urumqi. The next month, attackers crashed two cars into shoppers at an Urumqi market and set off explosives, killing 31 and injuring more than 90. The Munich-based World Uyghur Congress, the leading advocacy organization for the minority (which uses an alternate spelling of the group’s name),

condemns violence but says China uses the threat of terrorism to stifle peaceful dissent as well . Alim Seytoff, the Washington spokesman for the group, told Foreign Policy by email that he didn’t know whether any Uighurs had joined ISIS, but if they had, “they by no means represent the vast majority of peace-loving Uyghur people, just as those who joined ISIS from the U.S., the U.K., Australia and Europe by no means represent the freedom-loving peoples of America, Great Britain, Australia and Europe.” In order to deflect criticism of its Xinjiang policies, China is “conflating the Uyghur people’s legitimate

demands for human rights, religious freedom, and democracy with international Islamic terrorism,” he said. Gladney, the anthropologist, said any Uighurs with ties to ISIS were more likely driven by resentment of China than by aims of global jihad. They may want militant training to fight China and even to establish a Uighur state, he said, but they’re less interested in creating a global caliphate.They may want militant training to fight China and even to establish a Uighur state, he said, but they’re less interested in creating a global caliphate. Analysts also note that those who do desire a global caliphate seem to have little more than a passing interest in Uighurs’ relatively parochial aspirations, despite some token gestures, such as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s reference to Chinese violations of Muslim rights last July, and exaggerated claims about such abuses made last fall by an al Qaeda-run magazine. Meanwhile, it’s unclear if the group Beijing singles out as the greatest threat, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, comprises a distinct, self-identified terrorist entity or a looser grouping of individuals. The Chinese government first mentioned ETIM in a vaguely sourced document in 2001, shortly after then-U.S. President George W. Bush announced his “global war on terror.” In it, China called the group “a major component of the terrorist network headed by Osama bin Laden.” United States seemed to agree that ETIM posed a real threat, listing the group as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group in 2002 and detaining 22 Uighurs captured in Afghanistan and Pakistan at Guantánamo Bay. Some were held for more than a decade, though the United States later acknowledged that it didn’t have adequate evidence against them. Just over a year ago it sent the last three to Slovakia — one of a handful of small countries that agreed to host them. But George Washington University’s Roberts concluded in a 2012 paper titled “Imaginary Terrorism?” that Washington also may have inflated the Uighur threat. The Uighur detainees at Guantánamo who said

they’d received jihadi training described a training camp in Afghanistan that amounted to a small, run-down shack. The highlight, in Roberts’s words: “A one-time opportunity to fire a few bullets with the only Kalashnikov rifle that was available at the camp.” Although detainees expressed anger about Chinese rule, they all denied belonging to ETIM, and many said they’d never heard of the group. Roberts has argued that the United States may have backed China’s claims about ETIM in order to cement China’s support for the occupation of Afghanistan and, later, Iraq. Nevertheless, various international terrorism analysts continued to perpetuate the allegations about ETIM in work that cited government statements as their primary sources. According to Georgetown’s Millward, China uses this echo chamber of supposed evidence about ETIM to keep alive the idea of an international Uighur threat, conflating ETIM with the newer, propaganda-producing Turkistan Islamic Party. A U.S. State Department official told Foreign Policy that the United States designated ETIM a terrorist group “after careful study,” having concluded that its members were responsible for terrorism in China and were planning attacks on U.S. interests abroad, but declined to specify the sources of this information. The official added that the government still maintains this listing. Officials at Washington’s Chinese Embassy and China’s State Council didn’t return repeated calls and emails seeking comment. What worries Human Rights Watch’s Bequelin, as several countries including the United States move to scale up counterterrorism cooperation with China, isn’t so much that other countries believe China’s inflated claims. It’s more that the need to cooperate on security and other goals may mean de facto acceptance of, or even

practical assistance for, China’s repressive policies. The State Department official said the United States hopes to discuss how to enhance counterterrorism cooperation with China at an upcoming White House summit on countering violent extremism in February, and appreciates China’s aid to Iraq and support for U.N. resolutions aimed at stopping foreign fighters from joining extremist groups. “At the same time we continue to urge China to take measures to reduce tension and reform counterproductive policies in Xinjiang that restrict Uighurs’ ethnic and religious identity,” the official said. But for now, there aren’t too many promising signs from Xinjiang. And China isn’t the only place taking a hard line. Over the past year, governments from the U.K. to Kosovo to Jordan have been accused of clamping down on civil liberties or political opponents in the name of counterterrorism, some basing their actions to seize passports and detain suspects on the U.S.-backed U.N. foreign fighters resolution. Several Xinjiang experts draw parallels between radicalized Uighurs and young men from other countries drawn to extremism in part due to Islamophobia or

alienation at home. So far, the one Chinese national known to have been captured while fighting for ISIS appeared to be Han Chinese — despite initial Chinese allegations that he was Uighur .So far, the one Chinese national known to have been captured while fighting for ISIS appeared to be Han Chinese — despite initial Chinese allegations that he was Uighur. But some Uighurs still face particular suspicion about their aims. In March, Thailand detained more than 200 Uighurs within its borders, and although the group comprised families with several young children, Thai police asserted that they were headed to

fight in Syria. The families were among growing numbers of Uighurs seeking to flee Chinese repression via Southeast Asia. Their ultimate destination is usually Turkey, where many sympathize with Uighurs because they are also a Turkic people. In recent years, Uighur emigrants skirting tightened border regimes in Central Asia and Pakistan have turned up in Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Indonesia, as well as Thailand. The Kunming train station attackers may have been provoked to violence in part because Chinese officials thwarted their attempt to cross into Laos. It’s possible that reasons other than Chinese influence caused Thai authorities to conclude that the apprehended migrants, who claimed to be Turkish, were headed to Syria, said Pantucci of London’s RUSI. “The problem now is that Turkey is the staging point for Syria, so the perception is if they’re trying to go to Turkey, they must be trying to go to Syria.” Although some escaped from custody, many of the families detained in Thailand are still in limbo. China demands their repatriation and rejects Turkey’s offer to take them in; human rights advocates warn that China is likely to mistreat them — the same reason the United States didn’t send the Gitmo detainees back to China. As for Xinjiang, Gladney said, there are “growing concerns at all levels of Chinese society” — even among some government wonks — that China’s policies aren’t working. Many believe the “western development” strategy meant to lift minorities out of

poverty and integrate them into Chinese society, as well as the “strike hard” campaign of the past several years, have only stoked further resentment and violence, spread alarm through the population, and drawn more international attention to Uighurs’ plight. As scholars long predicted, China’s actions against a perceived Uighur threat seem to have actually made that threat more real. “Twenty years ago people thought I was crazy talking about Uighurs,” Gladney said. “Now there’s lots of interest.” Despite increased attention at home and abroad, Gladney didn’t see China making significant changes to its

Xinjiang policy any time soon. “But they may tweak it,” he said, “and that will be the thing to watch.”

Terrorism guarantees extinction Hellman 8 (Martin E. Hellman, emeritus prof of engineering at Stanford, Spring 2008, “Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence”; 5-28-14; http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf)

The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat of a full-scale nuclear war, yet this article focuses primarily on the latter. An explanation is therefore in order before proceeding. A terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon would

be a catastrophe of immense proportions: “A 10-kiloton bomb detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical work day would likely kill some half a million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct economic damage. America and its way of life would be changed forever.” [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix]. The likelihood of such an attack is also significant. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has estimated the chance of a nuclear terrorist incident within the next decade to be roughly 50 percent [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright, a former weapons inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than one percent, but notes, “We would never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1% .... A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we can’t live in a world where it’s anything but extremely low-probability.” [Hegland 2005]. In a survey of 85 national security experts, Senator Richard Lugar found a median estimate of 20 percent for the “probability of an attack involving a nuclear explosion occurring somewhere in the world in the next 10 years,” with 79 percent of the respondents believing “it more likely to be carried out by terrorists” than by a government [Lugar 2005, pp. 14-15]. I support increased efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, but that is not inconsistent with the approach of this article. Because terrorism is one of the potential trigger mechanisms for a full-scale nuclear war , the risk analyses proposed herein will include estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall risk. If that risk, the overall risk, or both are found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies would be directed to reduce which- ever risk(s) warrant attention. Similar remarks apply to a number of other threats (e.g., nuclear war between the U.S. and China over Taiwan). his article would be incomplete if it only dealt with the threat of nuclear terrorism and neglected the threat of full- scale nuclear war. If both risks are unacceptable, an effort to reduce only the terrorist component would leave humanity in great peril. In fact, society’s almost total neglect of the threat of full-scale nuclear war makes studying that risk all the more important. The cosT of World War iii The danger associated with nuclear deterrence depends on both the cost of a failure and the failure rate.3 This section explores the cost of a failure of nuclear deterrence, and the next section is concerned with the failure rate. While other definitions are possible, this article defines a failure of deterrence to mean a full-scale exchange of all nuclear weapons available to the U.S. and Russia, an event that will be termed World War III . Approximately 20 million people died as a result of the first World War. World War II’s fatalities were double or triple that number—chaos prevented a more precise deter- mination. In both cases humanity recovered, and the world today bears few scars that attest to the horror of those two wars. Many people therefore implicitly believe that a third World War would be horrible but survivable, an extrapola- tion of the effects of the first two global wars. In that view, World War III, while horrible, is something that humanity may just have to face and from which it will then have to recover. In contrast, some of those most qualified to assess the situation hold a very different view. In a 1961 speech to a joint session of the Philippine Con- gress, General Douglas MacArthur, stated, “Global war has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. … If you lose, you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer does it possess even the chance of the winner of a duel. It contains now only the germs of double suicide.” Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ex- pressed a similar view: “If deterrence fails and conflict develops, the present U.S. and NATO strategy carries with it a high risk that Western civilization will be destroyed” [McNamara 1986, page 6]. More recently, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn4 echoed those concerns when they quoted

President Reagan’s belief that nuclear weapons were “totally irrational, totally inhu- mane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization.” [Shultz 2007] Official studies, while couched in less emotional terms, still convey the horrendous toll that World War III would exact: “The resulting deaths would be far beyond any precedent. Executive branch calculations show a range of U.S. deaths from 35 to 77 percent (i.e., 79-160 million dead) … a change in targeting could kill somewhere between 20 million and 30 million additional people on each side .... These calculations reflect only deaths during the first 30 days. Additional millions would be injured, and many would eventually die from lack of adequate medical care … millions of people might starve or freeze during the follow- ing winter, but it is not possible to estimate how many. … further millions … might eventually die of latent radiation effects.” [OTA 1979, page 8] This OTA report also noted the possibility of serious ecological damage [OTA 1979, page 9], a concern that as- sumed a new potentiality when the TTAPS report [TTAPS 1983] proposed that the ash and dust from so many nearly simultaneous nuclear explosions and their resultant fire- storms could usher in a nuclear winter that might erase homo sapiens from the face of the earth, much as many scientists now believe the K-T Extinction that wiped out the dinosaurs resulted from an impact winter caused by ash and dust from a large asteroid or comet striking Earth. The TTAPS report produced a heated debate, and there is still no scientific consensus on whether a nuclear winter would follow a full-scale nuclear war. Recent work [Robock 2007, Toon 2007] suggests that even a limited nuclear exchange or one between newer nuclear-weapon states, such as India and Pakistan, could have devastating long-lasting climatic consequences due to the large volumes of smoke that would be generated by fires in modern megacities. While it is uncertain how destructive World War III would be, prudence dictates that we apply the same engi- neering conservatism that saved the Golden Gate Bridge from collapsing on its 50th anniversary and assume that preventing World War III is a necessity—not an option.

Islamophobia NB

1NCLabeling Uyghurs as terrorists justifies China’s islamphobic policies BBC ‘14. "Why Is There Tension between China and the Uighurs?" BBC News. N.p., 26 Sept. 2014. Web. 23 June 2016. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-26414014>. RC

The largest of China's administrative regions, Xinjiang borders eight countries - Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan,

Pakistan and India - and until recently its population was mostly Uighur. Map of Xinjiang territory Most Uighurs are Muslim and

Islam is an important part of their life and identity . Their language is related to Turkish, and they regard themselves as

culturally and ethnically close to Central Asian nations. The region's economy has largely revolved around agriculture and trade, with towns such as Kashgar thriving as hubs along the famous Silk Road. But development has brought new residents. In the 2000 census, Han Chinese made up 40% of the population, as well as large numbers of troops stationed in the region and unknown numbers of unregistered migrants. Has Xinjiang always been part of China? Chinese Uighur delegates from Xinjiang province arrive for the first session of the National People's Congress (NPC) at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on 5 March 2014 Image caption Xinjiang officially became part of Communist China in 1949 The region has had intermittent autonomy

and occasional independence, but what is now known as Xinjiang came under Chinese rule in the 18th Century. An East Turkestan state was briefly declared in 1949, but independence was short-lived - later that year Xinjiang officially became part of Communist China. In the 1990s, open support for separatist groups increased after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of independent Muslim states in Central Asia. However, Beijing suppressed demonstrations and activists went underground. Profile: Xinjiang autonomous region What is at the heart of the unrest? An Uighur woman holds her relatives' ID cards who are are currently detained, as she and others protests on a street

on 7 July 2009 in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang Image caption China's critics say authorities have stepped up a crackdown on Uighurs in recent years While the situation is complex, many say that ethnic tensions caused by economic and cultural factors are the root cause of the recent violence.. Major development projects have brought prosperity to Xinjiang's big cities, attracting young and technically qualified Han Chinese from eastern provinces. The Han Chinese are said to be given the best jobs and the majority do well economically, something that has fuelled resentment among Uighurs. Herdsmen take part in a horse race during a local snow festival in Altay, Xinjiang region, 12 February 2014 Image caption The Uighur culture leans more towards Central Asia than China Activists say Uighur commercial and cultural activities have been gradually curtailed by the Chinese state. There are complaints of severe restrictions on Islam, with fewer mosques and strict control over religious

schools. Rights group Amnesty International, in a report published in 2013, said authorities criminalised "what they labelled 'illegal religious' and 'separatist' activities" and clamped down on "peaceful expressions of cultural identity". In July 2014, some Xinjiang government departments banned Muslim civil servants from fasting during the holy month of Ramadan. It was not the first time China had restricted fasting in Xinjiang, but it followed a slew of attacks on the public attributed to Uighur extremists, prompting concerns the ban would increase tensions. Making sense of the unrest from China's Xinjiang Death on the Silk Route: Violence in Xinjiang How has the violence developed? File

photo of Chinese Paramilitary policemen taking part in an anti-terrorism exercise involving local police, paramilitary and militia

forces, in China's Xinjiang Image caption China has poured troops into the region in recent years as unrest has

rumbled China has been accused of intensifying its crackdown on the Uighurs after street protests in the

1990s and again in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics in 2008. But things really escalated in 2009, with large-scale ethnic rioting in the regional capital, Urumqi. Some 200 people were killed in the unrest, most of them Han Chinese, according to officials. File photo of a child looking out from a door as a Uighur woman walks by in a residential area in Turpan, Xinjiang Image caption Xinjiang's economy has largely revolved around agriculture and trade Security was increased and many Uighurs detained as suspects. But violence rumbled on as right groups increasingly pointed to tight control by Beijing. In June 2012, six Uighurs reportedly tried to hijack a plane from Hotan to Urumqi before they were overpowered by passengers and crew. There was bloodshed in April 2013 and in June that year, 27 people died in Shanshan county after police opened fire on what state media described as a mob armed with knives attacking local government buildings Establishing facts about these incidents is difficult, because foreign journalists' access to the region is tightly controlled, but in recent months, there appears to have been a shift towards larger-scale incidents where citizens have become the target, particularly in Xinjiang. At least 31 people were killed and more than 90 suffered injuries in May 2014 when two cars crashed through an Urumqi

market and explosives were tossed into the crowd. China called it a "violent terrorist incident". It followed a bomb and knife attack at Urumqi's south railway station in April, which killed three and injured 79 others. In July, authorities said a knife-wielding gang attacked a police station and government offices in Yarkant, leaving 96 dead. The imam of China's largest mosque, Jume Tahir, was stabbed to death days later. In September about 50 died in blasts in Luntai county outside police stations, a market and a shop. Details of both incidents are unclear and activists have

contested some accounts of incidents in state media. Vehicles travel along Chang'an Avenue as smoke raises in front of a portrait of late Chinese Chairman Mao Zedong at Tiananmen Square in Beijing 28 October 2013 Image caption Chinese officials blamed the attack at Tiananmen Square on separatists from Xinjiang Some violence has also spilled out of Xinjiang. A March stabbing spree in Kunming in Yunnan province that killed 29 people was blamed on Xinjiang separatists, as was an October 2013 incident where a car ploughed into a crowd and burst into flames in Beijing's Tiananmen Square. In response to the latest slew of attacks, the authorities have launched what they call a "year-long campaign against terrorism", stepping up security in Xinjiang and conducting more military drills in the region. There have also been reports of mass sentencings and arrests of several "terror groups". Chinese state media have reported long lists of people convicted of extremist activity and in some cases, death sentences. High-profile Uighur academic, Ilham Tohti was detained and later charged in September 2014 on charges of separatism., sparking international criticism. Shock and anger after Kunming brutality China tries to block Xinjiang blast memorial Who's to blame? Chinese police walk past abandoned luggage at the scene of an attack at the main train station in Kunming, Yunnan province on 2 March 2014 Image caption China also blamed Xinjiang separatists for the brutal attack in March 2014 at Kunming station China has often blamed ETIM - the East Turkestan Islamic Movement - or people inspired by ETIM for violent incidents both in Xinjiang and beyond the region's borders. ETIM is said to want to establish an independent East Turkestan in China. The US State Department in 2006 said ETIM is "the most militant of the ethnic Uighur separatist groups". The scope of ETIM's activities remains unclear with some questioning the group's capacity to organise serious acts of extremism. ETIM has not said it was behind any of the attacks. Chinese authorities said the Turkestan Islamic Party - which it says is synonymous with ETIM - released a video backing the Kunming attack, however. With the recent apparent escalation in Xinjiang-related violence, the question of who and what is driving it is likely to attract greater scrutiny.

Muslims are scapegoated and feared – only recognition of racist Islamophobic policies can resolve this Musharbash 14 [Yassin Musharbash, 12-10-2014, "Islamophobia is racism, pure and simple," Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/10/islamophobia-racism-dresden-protests-germany-islamisation]

Of course, Islamophobia can’t be laughed away and ours is just small way of dealing with it. But what’s clear is that

traditional racist arguments are now more likely to come in the form of abuse on the basis of religion. The argument is often that Jews share the same values as Christians, and Vietnamese immigrants are good at integrating, but for Muslims neither is true; plus, they want to take over. Which is why their religion is in fact an ideology; which is why it is OK to be against it; which in turn makes you a freedom fighter.¶ What’s feeding this? Clearly 9/11 and other Jihadist terrorist attacks play a role. But that’s

not all. There is fear of losing out economically, for which Muslims are scapegoated; there’s the challenge of living in a society changing rapidly in the light of globalisation; there’s anger about the increasing visibility of immigrants.¶ The organisers of the Dresden demonstrations claim to be responding to street fights

between Salafists and Kurds that broke out in western Germany a few weeks ago. But framing this and other problems as part of a phenomenon of Islamisation is ridiculous.¶ And yet it is time we started to take this seriously. Those people in the streets of Dresden may be nonviolent but they have been infected with a smug contempt for a minority, and may embolden the

more radical fringes of the Islamophobic spectrum.¶ Politicians here have sensed that something is building. But until very recently,

they mostly just maintained that people’s grievances should be taken seriously, rather than criticising the racist sentiment that came with their complaints .¶ This needs to change – now. It needs to be made clear that Islamophobia in Germany is no legitimate expression of anger or frustration and most certainly nothing to be proud

of. It’s racism, plain and simple.

Racism most come first – it is a prior ethical questionMemmi 2k (Albert Memmi 2k, Professor Emeritus of Sociology @ U of Paris, Naiteire, Racism, Translated by Steve Martinot, p. 163-165)

The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never achieved. Yet, for this very reason, it is a struggle to be undertaken without

surcease and without concessions. One cannot be indulgent toward racism; one must not even let the monster in the house, especially not in a mask. To give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in us and in other people, which is to diminish what is human. To accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice, and violence. It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. it is to agree that

the outsider will always be a possible victim (and which man is not himself an outsider relative to someone else?. Racism illustrates, in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the dominated that is, it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition. The anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is, and always in question, is nevertheless one of the

prologues to the ultimate passage from animosity to humanity . In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge. However, it remains true that one’s moral conduit only emerges from a choice: one has to want it. It is a choice among other choices, and always debatable in its foundations and its consequences. Let us say, broadly speaking, that the choice to conduct oneself

morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order, for which racism is the very

negation . This is almost a redundancy. One cannot found a moral order, let alone a legislative order, on racism, because racism signifies the exclusion of the other, and his or her subjection to violence and domination. From an ethical point of view, if one can deploy a little religious language, racism is ‘the truly capital sin. It is not an accident that almost all of humanity’s spiritual traditions counsels respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and disinterested commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests the real utility of such

sentiments. All things considered, we have an interest in banishing injustice, because injustice engenders violence and

death . Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. Bur no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed. All unjust society contains within itself the seeds of

its own death. It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they treat you with respect. “Recall.” says the Bible,

“that you were once a stranger in Egypt,” which means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk becoming one again someday. It is an ethical and a practical appeal—indeed, it is a contract, however

implicit it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality because, in the end, the ethical choice commands the political choice, a just society must be a society accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. True, it is a wager, but the stakes are irresistible.

Extensions The U.S war on terror is used as justification for religious persecution worldwide—especially in China where their policies increase the chance for violent revolt, not stifle it. Only by showing solidarity against such repression will China stop persecuting the Uyghur population—America is key.Cannon 7’. Justin M. Cannon, may 15th, 2007. https://uyghuramerican.org/article/using-terrorism-justify-repression.html EP

The U.S. War on Terror has inspired far-reaching and unexpected consequences. Rebiya Kadeer will speak at MIT tonight on how the Uyghur Muslim minority in western China has

endured one such consequence: the Chinese have adopted our rhetoric, equating Islam with violent separatism and global terrorism. Crossing into Kadeer's home province of Xinjiang in arid northwest China feels more like stepping across a national border than a provincial one. Pagodas give way to minarets, lamb kebab becomes the staple meal, and people who look more Pakistani than Chinese crowd into bazaars selling melons, rugs, yogurt, everything. The women's headdress, the ubiquitous Arabic script, and the constant chatter of a language that sounds nothing like Chinese make it easy to forget you are in China. This rich culture is threatened by the policies of a Chinese government obsessed with cementing its control of the region, which has historically expressed separatist tendencies. In attacking the perceived roots of separatism in

Uyghur religion, the government has inflicted severe damage on the cultural identity of the indigenous Turkic population, known as the Uyghurs (pronounced "wee-gers"). For example, official incentives for migration have led to an influx of Han Chinese (the majority ethnic group in the country) into the region; as a result,

the Uyghur population in Xinjiang now comprises only 45 percent of the total population, down from 95 percent in 1945. China's oppression of Uyghur identity is dangerous to both the Uyghurs and Chinese state, building a legacy of animosity that will not disappear. Fearing separatism, the Chinese government has instituted policies that dramatically fail to discriminate peaceful religious practice from violent political activity. These policies not only repress any hint of political dissent, but are disturbingly unique in their systematic targeting of any brand of Islam that does not, according to a government document "uphold the Marxist point of view of religion, and use the yardstick of the Party's." Repressive policies target Uyghur Islam, but through the inextricable link between culture and religious tradition, affect social, academic, and professional life as well. By law, any Uyghur congregation must register with the authorities, be it a religious study group or community soccer league. Registration is a no-win situation: Chinese authorities can prosecute unregistered groups for violating the law, but, given that fifty percent of Uyghur detainees in 2001 were detained for belonging to "illegal organizations," many Uyghurs

refuse to register for fear of being blacklisted. Local Uyghur religious leaders are required to attend political reeducation campaigns, during which "attitudes" are assessed and recorded in permanent files. The consequences of nonconformity can be devastating; mosques may be targeted for "rectification," imams may lose accreditation, or individuals may be imprisoned for "illegal religious activity." Any expression, oral or literary, that hints at dissent is punished. Undercover academics and investigators have had trouble documenting the repression simply because Uyghurs are too afraid to talk. In 2005, Nurmuhemmet Yasin was sentenced to ten years in prison for writing an allegory about a blue pigeon. Kadeer herself was imprisoned for sending newspaper clippings to her husband

in the United States. The government, in an attempt to mute religious ideology in the young, has instituted restrictions against Uyghur minors. Children may be forbidden to enter mosques, while basic expressions of the Islamic faith are forbidden in schools, from which children can be expelled for praying and fasting. Though the Chinese government reported anti-state violence in Xinjiang prior to 9/11, it has used the momentum of the global war on terror to indiscriminately label all unacceptable political or religious activity as international terror. Local authorities have traditionally insisted that violence and terrorism are practically absent from the region. By October 2001, however, they were decrying a sweeping terrorist movement in Xinjiang and that the "East Turkestan

terrorist forces" constituted China's local front in the War on Terror. Claims that any violent Uyghur groups have connections to Al-Qaeda have been highly publicized by the Chinese, but lack substantial evidence and are considered highly questionable amongst China experts. To warm relations with UN veto-holding China prior to the Iraq invasion, the U.S. added the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) to its blacklist of terrorist

groups in 2002. U.S. officials have since expressed regret and concern that China has used ETIM's inclusion as a rhetorical blanket to justify repression of peaceful protest and religious practice. The Chinese government is justified in approaching state security and potential separatist threats with high concern. These are priorities for any regime. In fact many Uyghurs , like Kadeer, speak out for a peaceful resolution to coexistence within China's borders. and, at very least, a respect for basic human rights and religious expression. But by continuing to institute repressive policies and alienate Uyghur intellectuals and leaders, the Chinese are fomenting discontent and may plant the seeds for future revolt; the divide between radical and alienated citizen will increasingly blur. If the government does nothing to relieve Uyghur repression, the region, exhausting hope and peaceful solutions, may turn to the violence that the current repressive policies are ostensibly targeting. Kadeer's visit provides an opportunity for the MIT community to learn more. Simply becoming more educated would be a step forward —

as Americans we should understand the consequences of our broad rhetorical campaign on terrorism and contribute to fixing the problems it has caused

Chinese religious suppression serves only to force those suppressed to band together behind cultural identities—resulting in more violence, and less co-op, showing that Chinese policies have largely failed.Ma & Chang 14’. Hauyn Ma, I-Wei Jennifer Chang. Sep 10th, 2014 4:39 PM. I-wei Jennifer chang is a Washington, Dc-based writer and researcher on international relations and china. Haiyun Ma is Assistant Professor of History at Frostburg State

University in Maryland, and his research focuses on China’s Islam and Muslims. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42811&no_cache=1#.V2txWLgrK00 EP

Since the Xinjiang government has targeted Uyghur religious activities, Uyghurs unhappy with government restrictions on religion are likely to unify behind their Islamic identity, which serves as a political symbol of anti-Chinese resistance. As recent violent attacks indicate, the repressive religious policies have led Uyghur attackers to aggressively assert their Islamic religion by using religious symbols in their recent attacks, likely in the hopes of mobilizing their fellows Uyghurs to resist Xinjiang’s repressive religious policies. According to Chinese media, perpetrators of major attacks at Tiananmen Square and the Kunming railway station carried Shahada-bearing flags, a symbol of Islamic faith not previously seen during violent incidents

involving Uyghurs. Xinjiang’s repressive policies towards Uyghur religion have produced counter-productive results for the government by contributing to the political and social alienation of elite Ughurs, religious

revitalization among secular Uyghurs, and even radicalization of some Uyghurs. These events appear to reflect a growing trend of Uyghur resistance that is likely exacerbated by current Xinjiang local provincial policies. More importantly, since Uyghur cadres bear the brunt of the religious regulations, they are forced to choose between their religious identity as Muslims and their

occupation as CCP officials. This complicates their role as a bridge between the atheist CCP and the larger Uyghur population. The restrictions on religious expression among Uyghur elites have pushed them far from the state and closer to their own group, which will likely further polarize Xinjiang societal relations between the Uyghurs and the Han.

China is committing cultural genocide upon the Uyghur populationHaskin ‘15, Jonathan. "The People’s War on Terror: Populist Islamophobia in France and China." The Penn Spectrum. N.p., 19 Jan. 2015. Web. 23 June 2016. <https://pennspectrum.org/2015/01/19/the-peoples-war-on-terror-populist-islamophobia-in-france-and-china/>. RC

In the days since a wave of terrorist activity caught the world’s attention, French President Francois Hollande has repeatedly stressed the importance of unity. In a speech given at Elysée Palace, Hollande commented that the French Republic “equals freedom of expression; the Republic equals culture, creation, it equals pluralism and democracy. That’s what the assassins were targeting.” Hollande continued his defense of harmony the next week, when demonstrations against the attackers turned violent in Algeria, Niger, and Pakistan; Hollande took the opportunity to emphasize France’s commitment to its Muslim citizens, and commented that when terrorists strike, “Muslims are the first victims of fanaticism, fundamentalism, and intolerance.” Hollande’s comment was all too accurate. In the days immediately following the attacks, at least 54 Muslim citizens of France have been arrested for “defending terrorism” under the pretext that their comments may constitute hate speech or direct threats of violence. While these details of these cases are not fully available to the public, French authorities have confirmed that at least several of those convicted are undergoing expedited sentencing procedures, and that at least four of those arrested are legal minors. These arrests happen at the same time that Muslims across France have reported and uptick in violence at mosques, while official crime statistics list “Islamophobic attacks” as the country’s fastest growing crime, with at least a 47% increase since 2012. Six months ago, a hypothetical presidential poll in France found that the National Front, France’s far-right, anti-immigrant party, is the most likely of four parties to win a hypothetical presidential election, beating out current President Hollande 32% to 17%. This is coming at a time where unemployment among Muslims in the suburbs of Paris is above 50%, and distrust between Muslim immigrants and native French citizens is at an all time high. It’s perhaps too easy to try and account for the difference between France’s unpopular Socialist Party President and the country’s increasingly well-liked far-right groups as a natural shift from one ideology to another. France is not the first country to become the victims of an Islamic terrorist attack, but the size of France’s Muslim population relative to the anti-Islamic response is a genuine cause for alarm. France has more than 6 Million Muslims relative to its population of 66 Million, making its 9% Muslim population the biggest in Europe. Studies have shown that the worst violence between ethnic groups occurs when a minority group is not dwarfed by the majority, but rather is large enough to constitute a significant, but still smaller segment of the population. As France’s overwhelming immigrant Muslim population increases, while the anti-immigrant, largely anti-Muslim response continues to grow, violence is only going to become more likely. The group most likely to be caught between strains of Islamic radicals and Islamophobic reactionaries are the ordinary, unemployed Muslims living in urban areas like the slums of Paris, the same area where the arrests for “defending terrorism” took place. In light of the government’s overall failure to integrate this largely first and second generation group into France’s economy, many will identify more with the residents of their predominantly Muslim neighborhoods than with the older French population. Ironically, the likelihood of resentment and radical Islamic recruitment will increase over time in these neighborhoods, especially in light of France’s hard-right turn. French Muslim are caught in a tug-of-war for their future, one that resembles the war going on in West China for the future of its Muslim population. Over the last 18 months, China has seen a massive spike in Islamic terrorist activity, leading to a pointed government response. The activity originates largely from Xinjiang, a remote, overwhelmingly Muslim region with a majority Uyghur population. Similar to the

predominantly North African Muslims of France, the Uyghurs are an ethnic minority in China, and are considered

more Turkic than Chinese. The last few years have seen the rise in the activity of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a separatist group with goals of independence for China’s western regions. Unlike the Islamic radicals who caused mayhem in France, who seemed to have vague notions of supporting

global jihad and defending the honor of Muslims, ETIM has territorial aspirations, and a much longer tradition of Muslims living under the authority of Chinese governments to draw its ideology

from. In other words, ETIM’s goals are likely more convincing to the average Uyghur, who are literally marginalized at the furthest edge of China, than radicals in France, who have to speak to a larger concept of Muslim solidarity. This makes China’s response to ETIM activities all the more relevant. During 2014, a series of attacks and suicide bombing took dozens of lives and injured hundreds. While the attacks were largely uncoordinated, Uyghur militants were the assailants in multiple cases, and ETIM took responsibility for several incidents. In response, the Chinese government announced a “People’s War” on terrorism, asking ordinary civilians to try and combat terrorism by passing information of suspicious activities to local authorities. The Chinese government was cautious about the possibility that a movement that served to further marginalize Uyghurs on ethnic and religious lines could breed even more violence – so they coopted nationalist forces directly into their movement against nationalism so that the state could dictate the terms used by nationalists. The People’s War against Terrorism is to defend the “ethnic unity” between the Han Chinese majority and the Uyghur minority. Actions that by themselves could be perceived as anti-Muslim, such as classifying Koran studies as a “suspicious activity”, end up serving a different purpose. Instead of being further radicalized, moderate Uyghurs are pressured to the Chinese side, and lose their distinctly Uyghur characteristics in the process. The result so far is an overwhelming success from the perspective of law enforcement. More than 30,000 citizens mobilized in an attempt to aid police in chasing 10 suspects who later attempted to throw explosives into a crowd.

Crucially, they had committed no terrorist activities before citizens pursued them, but information about their “suspicious” activities spread fast enough to tip the authorities off before they had committed their crimes. As a result of the citizen’s investigation, the police cornered the suspected terrorists, causing their attempted attack to injure no one. In theory, this is exactly what France’s far-right groups want. Muslim groups are sent a clear message: Assimilate, or you’re suspicious. As many have pointed out, this is all too similar to the prejudice against Jews that France suffered under Nazi occupation, a source of great national shame, to ever receive popular support. But it’s an approach that’s distinctively appealing to those who feel that the

fight against radicalism is actually a fight against Islam. Chinese authorities declared the People’s War on Terrorism to be part of China’s goal to build a “Harmonious Society”, a goal that sounds appealing to France’s right-wingers. National Front members spent the days after France’s attack blaming the increasing Muslim culture of France for violence, and high levels of distrust between native born French citizens and Muslim

immigrants mean a “People’s War” on Islam may be on the way. But a crucial difference divides China from France: China has spent years pressuring Uyghur groups to assimilate into overall society, such as offering college scholarships in traditionally Han dominated schools to top performing Uyghur students, or teaching Mandarin as the primary language of state schools. A recent policy in China makes it goals of assimilation even clearer by offering cash incentives to couples that marry interracially. The “People’s War” is a symptom of longer running policies that for the first time are attacking Islam, an aspect of Uyghur culture that survived the anti-religious Cultural Revolution, not by violence, but by eroding trust. In comparison, the Muslims of France are a much more racially diverse group of new arrivals, and they have received mixed messages from French authorities. While France is supposedly tolerant of religious difference, actions like the ban on Burkas in public spaces speaks a different story, one that is all too easy to become recruitment propaganda for radicals. The distance between France’s ideals and its policies mean a “People’s War”

could be catastrophic, giving the far-right an opportunity to turn on Muslims that will only breed further violence from Islamists. While China’s message to its Muslim citizens in consistent, France finds itself divided. That division will make all the difference in future months. With its upcoming Presidential election set for 2017, France has effectively two years to fight a culture war against Islamophobia that could mean the difference between harsher anti-Islamic policies that breed violence and the tolerant assimilation that authorities currently promise. Beating both far-right forces and Islamists will require raising the quality of life for the average French Muslim, economic integration, and campaigns against radicalism for both native and non-native French residents. For France, unity needs to be more than just an ideal: it needs to be the active goal of society.

China abuses it’s law enforcement powers to purposely target the Uighur population, hundreds of thousands have died, millions have been affectedTalat ‘15, Faraz. "Islamophobia in China and Pakistan’s Vow of Silence." - Blogs. N.p., 31 Mar. 2015. Web. 23 June 2016. <http://www.dawn.com/news/1173034>. RC

Recently, in a country that is decidedly not France, a Muslim man has been sentenced to six years in prison for keeping a beard. I daresay it’s time we have a polite talk about Islamophobia with

our good neighbor in the north. In the Muslim dominant region of Xinjiang, the 38-year-old man was

handed the punishment by the Chinese court. In addition, his wife has been sentenced to two years of imprisonment for wearing an Islamic veil. Ironically, this took place in Kashgar: the city romanticised in Iqbal’s poetry as one end of the unbreachable Muslim flank guarding the sacred ‘Haram’. The couple was pronounced guilty of

“picking quarrels and provoking trouble”, which is basically my job description as a blogger. The charge is so absurdly vague and ambiguous; it may as well be Mandarin for “not liking one’s face”. Which is indeed what it sounds like, if one follows the trail of violent suppression of the Uighur populace through history, marked with arbitrary arrests and baffling restrictions. In July last year, the government forbade Xinjiang officials to fast in the month of Ramazan, and initiated a robust campaign discouraging native women from wearing veil. In Urmaqi, bus passengers were banned from

carrying a wide range of common household items, including yoghurt. The restrictions, each a flagrant assault on the Uighur people’s cultural values, are justified by the most valuable excuse available to us in the post-9/11 universe: ‘security’. These increasingly despotic measures are being adopted under the doctrine that counter-terrorism definitively trumps individual liberty, although I’m personally having a hard time figuring out how to weaponise yoghurt and facial hair. Also read: Chinese anti-veil 'beauty' campaign sows ugly tensions I’d reach out and ask the exceptionally inventive Muslims of Uighur, had the Chinese government not dismantled the internet in that region almost to its entirety. One may be forgiven for asking at this point, if there is a giant portrait of Mao Zedong hanging reverently somewhere in the upper offices of Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA). These ‘whimsical’

freedom violations barely make up the prologue of a book on Chinese aggression against the Muslims of Xinjiang. Between 1964 and 1996, China conducted more than 40 poorly-controlled, nuclear tests in Xinjiang. An expert who studied radiation effects from tests by the US, France, and former Soviet Union, calculated that as many as 194,000 people may have died from acute radiation poisoning, among a whopping 1.2 million people who received doses high enough to induce cancer and gross fetal abnormalities. These are the “conservative estimates” of the damage caused in three decades. If this form of aggression appears too indirect and impersonal, it should be viewed in context of decades of arbitrary arrests, executions and reports of heinous torture. The government has been accused of promoting a Hans mass migration to Xinjiang to dilute the natives’ proportion from 90 per cent of the population in 1949, to almost 45 per cent today. The regime now “manufactures consent” (weirdly, a Chomskian term usually reserved for Western imperialists) of its people for these extreme measures against the Muslims of Xinjiang, by citing ‘Islamic terrorism’ against the Hans in the province. Also read: Breaking up with China? Ultimately, the Chinese government’s greatest feat is to have its President sit beamingly in the same room as the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, without ‘Uighur’ creeping into conversation. More impressive still, is the capacity of the Pakistani political leaders, touting Islamic unity and decrying the oppression of Muslims wherever they may be, to ignore the Islamophobia raging in its most favoured state. But that’s realpolitik. I’m more curious about how this information would be processed by an average Pakistani social media user, incensed by the anti-Muslim bigotry across Europe. At the end, I suppose I’m just hoping we’d all get to hear our Prime Minister’s next passionate speech on Sino-Pak friendship over the sound of the invisible elephant blaring in the room.

Chinese government intentionally “otherizes” the Uyghur population in the Xinjiang provinceThabet ‘15, Afifa. "Islamophobia in China: Anti-religious Measures against the Uyghurs | Mvslim." Mvslim. N.p., 04 Aug. 2015. Web. 23 June 2016. <http://mvslim.com/islamophobia-in-china-anti-religious-measures-against-the-uyghurs/>. RC

In a previous article I briefly explained the historical context between the Uyghurs and the Chinese government. Let’s continue with

the political problems that the Uyghurs have to deal with in today’s China. At the end of the last part we saw that Chinese Turkestan, better known as Xinjiang, was definitively annexed in 1949 by the communist People’s Republic of China. In theory Xinjiang would remain an autonomous province, and the Uyghurs would have rights and duties identical to those of the Chinese citizens, but in reality this seems quite far-fetched. THE IMPORTANCE OF XINJIANG FOR THE CHINESE AND THEIR ANTI-RELIGIOUS ATTITUDE AGAINST THE UYGHURS After Mao Zedong’s coup in 1949, Xinjiang came under Chinese rule. Three reasons will clear things out. Firstly, Xinjiang borders Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, India, and Pakistan, therefore it lies in a very strategic location.

Secondly, the province has an enormous oil and gas supply, which is highly important to the Chinese. A third reason would be the will to fully control the constant revolts and turmoil caused by the Sunnite Muslims (= the Uyghurs). In this article we will focus on that. Since 1949, Xinjiang has become a territory home to systematic torture. This cultural and religious Uyghur identity was (and still is) under pressure by the Han-Chinese migration that was enforced (and still is being enforced) by the Chinese government. As from

1949 onwards, the Uyghurs had to bend the knee for the process of assimilation that was created by Mao Zedong. Every expression of cultural, religious, and traditional ideas is not only strictly forbidden but also seen as evil by China’s non-religious communist policy. The Arabic alphabet and the Turkish language are prohibited and have been replaced by the Latin alphabet. The incorporation of Han vocabulary was promoted and seen as modernizing. Officially, these measures serve to reduce illiteracy. However, in reality, they exist in order to undermine the Islamic influence. The serious measures against the Uyghurs mainly took place during the Cultural Revolution (between 1966 and 1976). During that time, the process of assimilation radically influenced the Uyghurs: the Four Elders (which stand for “the old ways of thinking, the old

culture, the old culture and the old habits”) were endangered by the Red Guards. Mosques were plundered, Quran books were burnt publicly. After the Revolution, some Muslims witnessed that they were forced to produce and consume pork. After the Cultural Revolutions, China started to promote a liberal and political tolerance towards Islam. This type of policy had nothing to do with human rights, however. Rather, it served as a way to achieve economic and political relations with wealthy

Muslim countries. The Chinese used the Uyghurs as a way to fix the political connections with Central Asia, and to promote the political and economic relations with the Middle East. They wanted to show the world how they helped repair China’s damaged mosques and make them accessible (through subsidies from the government), how they allowed Quran books again, and how they incorporated the Arab and Turkish language back into Xinjiang’s schools. All of this remained under strict (Chinese) government control. The attempt for a controlled but ethno-religious liberalization process soon proved to be a mere illusion, however. Discrimination towards the Uyghurs would be seen on various levels: at work, in education, at home, through the difference in life standard between the Han Chinese and the Uyghurs, agricultural competition, the Chinese controlling the Xinjiang’s entire oil production (instead of Xinjiang’s proper inhabitants, being the Uyghurs), the nuclear tests in the province (and the resulting Uyghur deaths),… The list goes on. PROMOTING ISLAMOPHOBIA TO JUSTIFY GENOCIDES AGAINST THE UYGHURS Last years have only helped the clearly visible

harshness against anything related to the Uyghurs. Especially after 9/11, and with the “War on Terror” measures, the Chinese government uses this opportunity to continue the harsh oppression policy towards the Uyghurs. China claims that the Uyghurs promote rather radical extremist ideologies and movements. They are convinced that they will “cause a threat to the country once they are out of China and will perform acts of terror against China,” which explains why they are not allowed to travel. Every Muslim (both Chinese Muslims and Uyghurs) is seen as a potential terrorist by the Chinese government. What does China’s political climate towards the Uyghurs look like today? Well, the Uyghurs are currently living in a very bad environment. Some international reports have shown that, during the last few decades, tens of thousands of Uyghurs have been imprisoned and executed in Xinjiang. Uyghur political figures who succeed to represent the Uyghurs in the National People’s Congress and who dare to mention the problems of the Uyghurs (people like Rebiyaa Kadeer), and human rights activists who dare to defend the Uyghurs are prosecuted, arrested, tortured, and may be imprisoned for years before they receive a fair trial. They are also discriminated on the labor market. As mentioned before, Uyghurs are not allowed to travel and therefore it is (nearly) impossible for them to get passports. As a consequence, many attempt to illegally move to Kazakhstan. The Han Chinese are allowed to physically attack the Uyghurs. Should they report this abuse, they will in their turn become a victim of the police, and risk imprisonment. Uyghur students at the University of Xinjiang who support the Uyghur independence movement are not allowed to/able to graduate. It is now more than ever that there is an intense anti-Islamic climate in China. Islamophobia is highly promoted by the Chinese government. Even the Chinese media have become an important tool to sow islamophobia. As a consequence, the Uyghurs have become an easy victim or even target: their schools are under strict control, fasting peacefully during Ramadan is impossible (this year they were even forced to eat and drink during the day), and houses in which Quran lessons are taught are torn down. Uyghur women who wear a headscarf or niqab and Uyghur men with beards are easily arrested and tortured. The atmosphere in Chinese schools is filled with anti-religious propaganda. The Uyghurs may also be forced to sign a commitment in which they are prohibited to pray in government hospitals. Religious books and Uyghur literature are forbidden and are confiscated immediately. These are but a few examples of the sad reality which the Uyghurs have to deal with. Whether their situation will become better or worse remains a mystery.

China dropped nukes on the Uyghur population in an attempt to wipe out the “Islamic” presence within the countryEpoch Times ‘09. "Chinese Nuclear Tests Allegedly Caused 750,000 Deaths." The Epoch Times Chinese Nuclear Tests Allegedly Caused 750000 Deaths Comments. N.p., 31 Mar. 2009. Web. 23 June 2016. <http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/1524571-chinese-nuclear-tests-allegedly-cause-750000-deaths/>. RC

At the "Chinese Nuclear Test Disasters on the Silk Road and the Japanese Role" symposium, sponsored by the Japanese Uyghur Association, Dr. Takada Jun, a professor at the Sapporo Medical University and a representative of the Japanese Radiation Protection Information Center, revealed the disastrous problems of China’s nuclear tests. Dr. Takada said that the Chinese regime has never allowed any form of independent or outside environmental evaluation, analysis, or study of adverse affects on human health

possibly cause by the tests. Dr. Takada said that the 46 nuclear tests were carried out at the Lop Nur site in northwestern XinJiang Province, home of the Uyghur people. The tests had a cumulative yield of over 200 megatons. Though the area of the tests is sparsely populated, many cities on the ancient Silk Road trade route are downwind from Lop Nor and have been exposed to much nuclear fallout from the variety of tests conducted. Prior to 1981, the fallout from surface tests was a major contributor to an increase in the incidences of cancer and birth defects. The professor also said that the largest surface detonation was a 4 megaton thermonuclear bomb, which was 10 times more

powerful than the former Soviet Union's large-scale tests. The fallout from the test allegedly caused an estimated 190,000 deaths and 1,290,000 suffered from radiation poisoning within an area 136 times the size of Tokyo. According to an inside source, 750,000 people allegedly died as a result. Chinese nuclear tests began on Oct. 16, 1964, with the above ground detonation of a 20,000-ton bomb, followed by a two-megaton surface explosions in 1967. The largest was a four-megaton explosion on Nov. 17, 1976. China changed to doing atmospheric tests in 1980 and underground tests from 1982 to 1996. Takada said China is the only country in the world that carries out these large-scale surface tests in living areas. The Director of the Japanese Uyghur Association criticized the tests. "The former

Soviet Union would carry out nuclear tests in an enclosed barb-wired area, but the Chinese regime didn't even inform the local residents,” he said. “The victims included not only the Uyghur people, but also Han Chinese. The authorities disregarded any semblance of humanity and treated the people living there as lab rats." He urged Japan, the first victim of nuclear weapons, to share the information with the rest of the world and help the victims. In July and August of 1998, the British Channel 4 broadcasted a special documentary, “Death On the Silk Road.” A team of doctors and filmmakers posed as tourists in order to assess the possible effects from the nuclear tests in China. From the interviews conducted in local villages, they found a

large number of infants with cleft lips or mental retardation. Among the Uyghur people, many were suffering from malignant lymphoid leukemia. Incidences of cancer in Uyghur began rising in 1970 and by 1990, it was more than 30% higher than the national average. The cancer incidence in the capital city Urumqi doubled that of other areas during 1993 to 2000. Based on data he collected in Kazakhstan near the Chinese border and his research on affects of nuclear fallout, Professor Takada also evaluated the impact in the area and published his findings in a book. He won an award for his contributions. 　 The experience of Professor Tamio Kaneko, a historian who visited the Xinjiang area, also supports the story. An expert in Asian history, Tamio filled his house with ancient relics from central Asia. But he didn't dare to bring back pebble samples in Lop Nur because they have hundreds or thousands of times more radiation than regular samples. Kaneka recalled that while he was at the research site, his eyes watered profusely and bleed slightly. He also suffered from a sore throat and frequent nose bleeds. His tears won't stop in the Spring because of the pollen, a residual effect of the radiation. Takada expressed his concern and anger over highly promoted tourism on the Great Silk Road. Tourist sites are actually in the radiation area, making travel highly risky to innocent people, especially those who visited before 1996. Mr. Dili Anwar, a Uyghur exile living in England, said, "China conducts nuclear tests not only for itself, but also provides the testing site to Pakistan. We all know that Pakistan conducted a nuclear test one week after India’s test. In fact, Pakistan had already tested twice in China before that."

Hatred of Islam is a major foundation for the oppression of the Uyghur peopleBBC ‘14. "Why Is There Tension between China and the Uighurs?" BBC News. N.p., 26 Sept. 2014. Web. 23 June 2016. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-26414014>. RC

The largest of China's administrative regions, Xinjiang borders eight countries - Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India - and until recently its population was mostly Uighur. Map of Xinjiang territory Most Uighurs are Muslim and Islam is an important part of their life and identity. Their language is related to Turkish, and they regard themselves as culturally and ethnically close to Central Asian nations. The region's economy has largely revolved around agriculture and trade, with

towns such as Kashgar thriving as hubs along the famous Silk Road. But development has brought new residents. In the 2000 census, Han Chinese made up 40% of the population, as well as large numbers of troops stationed in the region and unknown numbers of unregistered migrants. Has Xinjiang always been part of China? Chinese Uighur delegates from Xinjiang province arrive for the first session of the National People's Congress (NPC) at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on 5 March 2014 Image caption Xinjiang officially became part of Communist China in 1949 The region has had intermittent autonomy and occasional independence, but what is now known as Xinjiang came under Chinese rule in the 18th Century. An East Turkestan state was briefly declared in 1949, but independence was short-lived - later that year Xinjiang officially became part of Communist China. In the 1990s, open support for separatist groups increased after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of independent Muslim states in Central Asia. However, Beijing suppressed demonstrations and activists went underground. Profile: Xinjiang autonomous region What is at the heart of the unrest? An Uighur woman holds her relatives' ID cards who are are currently detained, as she and others protests on a

street on 7 July 2009 in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang Image caption China's critics say authorities have stepped up a crackdown on Uighurs in recent years While the situation is complex, many say that ethnic tensions caused by economic and cultural factors are the root cause of the recent violence.. Major development projects have brought prosperity to Xinjiang's big cities, attracting young and technically qualified Han Chinese from eastern provinces. The Han Chinese are said to be given the best jobs and the majority do well economically, something that has fuelled resentment among Uighurs. Herdsmen take part in a horse race during a local snow festival in Altay, Xinjiang region, 12 February 2014 Image caption The Uighur culture leans more towards Central Asia than China Activists say Uighur commercial and cultural activities have been gradually curtailed by the Chinese state. There are complaints of severe

restrictions on Islam, with fewer mosques and strict control over religious schools. Rights group Amnesty International, in a report published in 2013, said authorities criminalised "what they labelled 'illegal religious' and 'separatist' activities" and clamped down on "peaceful expressions of cultural identity". In July 2014, some Xinjiang government departments banned Muslim civil servants from fasting during the holy month of Ramadan. It was not the first time China had restricted fasting in Xinjiang, but it followed a slew of attacks on the public attributed to Uighur extremists, prompting concerns the ban would increase tensions. Making sense of the unrest from China's Xinjiang Death on the Silk Route: Violence in Xinjiang How has the violence developed? File photo of Chinese Paramilitary policemen taking part in an anti-terrorism exercise involving local police, paramilitary and militia forces, in China's Xinjiang Image caption China has poured troops into the region in recent years as unrest has rumbled China has been accused of intensifying its crackdown on the Uighurs after street protests in the 1990s and again in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics in 2008. But things really escalated in 2009, with large-scale ethnic rioting in the regional capital, Urumqi. Some 200 people were killed in the unrest, most of them Han Chinese, according to officials. File photo of a child looking out from a door as a Uighur woman walks by in a residential area in Turpan, Xinjiang Image caption Xinjiang's economy has largely revolved around agriculture and trade Security was increased and many Uighurs detained as suspects. But violence rumbled on as right groups increasingly pointed to tight control by Beijing. In June 2012, six Uighurs reportedly tried to hijack a plane from Hotan to Urumqi before they were overpowered by passengers and crew. There was bloodshed in April 2013 and in June that year, 27 people died in Shanshan county after police opened fire on what state media described as a mob armed with knives attacking local government buildings Establishing facts about these incidents is difficult, because foreign journalists' access to the region is tightly controlled, but in recent months, there appears to have been a shift towards larger-scale incidents where citizens have become the target, particularly in Xinjiang. At least 31 people were killed and more than 90 suffered injuries in May 2014 when two cars crashed through an Urumqi market and explosives were tossed into the crowd. China called it a "violent terrorist incident". It followed a bomb and knife attack at Urumqi's south railway station in April, which killed three and injured 79 others. In July, authorities said a knife-wielding gang attacked a police station and government offices in Yarkant, leaving 96 dead. The imam of China's largest mosque, Jume Tahir, was stabbed to death days later. In September about 50 died in blasts in Luntai county outside police stations, a market and a shop. Details of both incidents are unclear and activists have contested some accounts of incidents in state media. Vehicles travel along Chang'an Avenue as smoke raises in front of a portrait of late Chinese Chairman Mao Zedong at Tiananmen Square in Beijing 28 October 2013 Image caption Chinese officials blamed the attack at Tiananmen Square on separatists from Xinjiang Some violence has also spilled out of Xinjiang. A March stabbing spree in Kunming in Yunnan province that killed 29 people was blamed on Xinjiang separatists, as was an October 2013 incident where a car ploughed into a crowd and burst into flames in Beijing's Tiananmen Square. In response to the latest slew of attacks, the authorities have launched what they call a "year-long campaign against terrorism", stepping up security in Xinjiang and conducting more military drills in the region. There have also been reports of mass sentencings and arrests of several "terror groups". Chinese state media have reported long lists of people convicted of extremist activity and in some cases, death sentences. High-profile Uighur academic, Ilham Tohti was detained and later charged in September 2014 on charges of separatism., sparking international criticism. Shock and anger after Kunming brutality China tries to block Xinjiang blast memorial Who's to blame?

Chinese police walk past abandoned luggage at the scene of an attack at the main train station in Kunming, Yunnan province on 2 March 2014 Image caption China also blamed Xinjiang separatists for the brutal attack in March 2014 at Kunming station China has often blamed ETIM - the East Turkestan Islamic Movement - or people inspired by ETIM for violent incidents both in Xinjiang and beyond the region's borders. ETIM is said to want to establish an independent East Turkestan in China. The US State Department in 2006 said ETIM is "the most militant of the ethnic Uighur separatist groups". The scope of ETIM's activities remains unclear with some questioning the group's capacity to organise serious acts of extremism. ETIM has not said it was behind any of the attacks. Chinese authorities said the Turkestan Islamic Party - which it says is synonymous with ETIM - released a video backing the Kunming attack, however. With the recent apparent escalation in Xinjiang-related violence, the question of who and what is driving it is likely to attract greater scrutiny.

Reports signal China’s push toward cultural genocide toward Uighur populationSeytoff ‘14, Alim A. "China's Uighurs Claim Cultural 'genocide'" - Al Jazeera English. N.p., 2 June 2014. Web. 23 June 2016. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/06/china-uighurs-claim-cultural-gen-20146165946224857.html>. RC

When people in the Muslim East and democratic West thought of China, they tended to think of it as a unified, strong, homogeneous and peaceful nation of Chinese people with a long, shared history happily living and advancing under Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) glorious rule. In the relaxed post-Cold War political atmosphere, and especially after the West had engaged China, they tended to think of China as if it were a democracy, completely ignoring or subconsciously forgetting that China was still being ruled by one of the most brutal dictatorships in the world. Impressed by the breathtaking state-led development in China over the past 30 years and wanting strongly to enter the huge Chinese market to make millions, many nations and big corporations simply turned a blind eye to China's policies of heavy-handed repression of the Turkic and Muslim Uighur people of East Turkestan, which China renamed "Xinjiang". However, the myth of a unified, strong, homogeneous and peaceful China has been increasingly challenged and shattered by the recent series of tragic events in East Turkestan and inner China, shocking both the Chinese people and the international community who were used to believing Beijing's interpretation of the political history of annexed territories and its so-called preferential treatment of the minorities. The Uyghur people, just like the Tibetans, will simply not continue to accept China's colonial and apartheid rule in their homeland in the 21st century. The ball is in Beijing's court. On May 22, Chinese state media reported a bombing at an open market in Urumqi which caused the deaths of 31 people and injured 94. Although no Uighur group claimed responsibility, Beijing blamed the Uighurs. The attack was a latest in a series of attacks, including the Urumqi train station, Kunming train station and Tiananmen Square, allegedly carried out by the Uighurs. The attack on civilians was deplorable. While the Chinese government continues to blame the violence on the "three evil forces of terrorism, separatism and religious extremism", many Chinese were brutally awakened to the facade of Beijing's narrative of a "peaceful liberation of Xinjiang" and the "happy dancing and singing" Uighurs in colourful costumes who offer nothing but praise to China's colonial rule in East

Turkestan. The bad blood between the Chinese state and Uighur people didn't begin yesterday. It began when Chinese communist forces led by General Wang Zhen occupied the East Turkestan Republic in October 1949 with the support of the Soviet Union and pacified the resistant Uighur people through public executions and massacres. Tens of thousands of Uighurs were killed by Wang's troops in communist China's conquest of East Turkestan. Promises of self-rule Although Chinese communists initially promised self-rule and even independence for non-Chinese people, it soon reneged on its promise after annexation and established the "Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region" in 1955. Contrary to Beijing's claims that

"Xinjiang has been an inalienable part of China since ancient times", Xinjiang in Chinese literally means "New Territory". The name "Xinjiang" is a direct insult heaped upon the indigenous Uighur people who have lived there for thousands of years while the use of "East Turkestan" by Uighurs is criminalised . The Uighur people, like the Tibetans and Mongols, have never enjoyed autonomy in their so-called Autonomous Region because all the political, military, police and economic decision-making powers are in the hands of Chinese officials. Uighurs at all government levels serve as figureheads, including the regional chairman. Since China annexed East Turkestan, the relationship between the Chinese state and the indigenous Uighurs has been one of coloniser and colonised. In order to control the "New Territory", China ruthlessly suppressed any sign of Uighur unrest and transferred millions of loyal Chinese settlers into East Turkestan, providing them with jobs, housing, bank loans and economic opportunities denied to Uighurs. At the same time, Chinese state corporations exploited the abundant natural resources of East Turkestan and transferred them to the Chinese motherland, leaving nothing to the Uighurs. While East Turkestan which is roughly the size of Iran possesses huge reserves of natural gas, oil, gold, uranium, coal and other

minerals, the living standard of Uighurs is one of the lowest in China. The Uighur population in East Turkestan, which was nearly 90 percent in 1949, is now only 45 percent, while the Chinese population grew disproportionately due to state-sponsored mass settlement from around six percent in 1953 to the current 40 percent (excluding the Chinese military, seasonal workers and

floating population). Many Uighurs believe Chinese are already a majority since Beijing continues to encourage their settlement. The Uighur resentment toward Chinese rule comes from their loss of independence, failure to master and change their political destiny, and the sense of being overwhelmed by millions of Chinese settlers, who threaten their very existence as an historic, sovereign, and

indigenous majority in their homeland of East Turkestan. They also resent the current Chinese colonial and apartheid rule, the systematic repression of Uighur people since 1949 and the reframing of its wholesale attack on the Uighurs as a fight against "Islamic terrorism" since 9/11. Cultural 'genocide'

What is more, China tested 45 nuclear devices, both under and above ground, between 1964 and 1996 in East Turkestan, polluting air, water, land, and slowly killing both people and livestock due to the effects of radiation. Uighur resentment toward Chinese rule was further reinforced by China's current policies of cultural "genocide" on Uighur identity, culture, religious beliefs and practices, in addition to Chinese soldiers' extrajudicial and indiscriminate killings of Uighur men, women and children. The Uighurs feel powerless to defend their historic homeland, their way of life, identity, culture, language and religion from Beijing's ever-intensifying onslaught and Chinese settlers appropriating everything that once belonged rightfully to them. When moderate Uighurs such as Professor Ilham Tohti and linguist Abduweli Ayup who had tried to work within the Chinese system were denounced and arrested, some then took matters into their hands out of desperation and committed horrific acts of political violence against not only Chinese security forces, but also against settlers. Such attacks were immediately taken advantage of by Beijing to skillfully spin the narrative that it faced a "terrorist threat from Muslim Uighurs" and "China was also a victim of terrorism" in order to win public opinion both in China and the world and silence international criticism of its subsequent heavy-handed repression. Regardless of how China spins the story, the vast majority of Uighurs are peaceful and hoping for a peaceful change. Our repeated calls for a peaceful dialogue to resolve the political situation have fallen on deaf ears in Beijing. We believe a peaceful resolution of the East Turkestan issue is in the interest of both sides and the vicious cycle of violence has proven to be not a solution at all. The Chinese government must understand that East Turkestan cannot be a land of opportunity and prosperity for the colonising Chinese settlers and a land of death and destruction for the indigenous Uighur people. Simply put, Beijing cannot maintain political stability or create ethnic harmony in East Turkestan by pointing a gun at every Uighur's head and fight the so-called three evil forces by treating all Uighurs as terror suspects or enemies of the Chinese state. China has a clear choice - either treat the Uighur people as genuine Chinese citizens by honouring China's constitution and Regional Ethnic Autonomy Laws, or treat them as non-Chinese citizens and allow them self-determination to pursue their own political future. The Uighur people, just like the Tibetans, will simply continue to reject China's colonial and apartheid rule in their homeland in the 21st century. The ball is in Beijing's court. If China continues to resist choosing either, but rather applies the same old failing method of heavy-handed repression on the one hand and forcible assimilation on the other, then it only means China has chosen war with all Uighurs and China will eventually turn its "New Territory" into its own Palestine.

Policy of oppression has pushed the Uyghur population to the brink, case of Ilham Tohti provesMillward ‘16, James A. "China's Fruitless Repression of the Uighurs." The New York Times. The New York Times, 29 Sept. 2014. Web. 23 June 2016. <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/29/opinion/chinas-fruitless-repression-of-the-uighurs.html>. RC

Last week, a court in China’s far western Xinjiang region sentenced Ilham Tohti, a member of the Uighur minority, to life in prison for the crime of “inciting separatism.” The conviction of this moderate scholar elicited international condemnation; the sentence was an order of magnitude longer than those given to other Chinese

dissidents. But, far from being a show of strength, the sentence is a sign of the confusion and desperation behind the government’s policies toward Uighurs. That Mr. Tohti, an economics professor and a blogger, should become a celebrated political prisoner is a paradox, for he is in many ways a poster child for what the Communist Party hopes more Uighurs will become. Educated, and eloquent in Mandarin, he was a party member from a family closely engaged with the state (his male relatives include members of China’s military and state security organs). He is professional, entrepreneurial and middle class (his family assets amounted to around $130,000 before state confiscation). He is not outwardly religious (most Uighurs are Muslims, but vary in the degree and nature of their observance). He is distinctive mainly in his outspokenness. Though the Chinese often think of Xinjiang as a remote frontier of deserts and mountains, populated with quaint folkloric natives, it is closely linked to the rest of China and to Central Asia by an expanding transportation infrastructure; the skyscrapers, neon glow, booming commerce and air pollution of Xinjiang’s cities resemble those elsewhere in China; and although, like rural areas throughout the country, Xinjiang’s villages remain poor, the emerging middle class in the cities is scarcely different from its counterparts in other

urban centers. Rapid economic development has benefited Uighurs as well as Han Chinese (each group makes up just over 40 percent of the region’s population of 21 million). Yet the authorities seem puzzled and frustrated that, despite these economic gains, Uighurs remain adamantly Uighur. Sporadic local disturbances are endemic throughout China, but in Xinjiang they are colored by ethno-national and religious sentiments. After a relatively quiet decade, from 1998 to 2007, stability has eroded alarmingly since 2008, with a big, bloody race riot in 2009, sporadic attacks on police stations and representatives of the state and, over the past year, violence perpetrated by Uighurs against random civilians in Urumqi, the regional capital, and in faraway Yunnan Province and

Beijing. Xinjiang authorities have responded to violence with an intense crackdown, including house-to-house searches, and a campaign against traditional symbols of identity: veils, head scarves, beards, traditional hats, Ramadan fasting, prayer. Combined with the recent razing of Uighur architecture in the ancient city of Kashgar and elimination of the Uighur-language educational track from Xinjiang’s schools and universities, these measures seem aimed at repressing Uighur culture. Moreover, the authorities have now doubled down on their post-9/11 tendency to interpret Uighur unrest through a single lens — foreign-inspired Islamic “terrorism” — even when the real causes are local and political. It is unclear if China’s leaders entirely believe their own propaganda — that all Uighur troubles derive from external sources and are unrelated to government policies — but local and regional authorities certainly benefit from it: Whereas common people elsewhere in China enjoy some de facto freedom to protest official and business malfeasance, Uighurs enjoy no such latitude. In the absence of a free press, Beijing has few sources of on-the-ground information in Xinjiang other than its own self-interested and self-protecting local officials, who can readily justify their mistakes and abuses in the name of fighting “separatism, extremism and terrorism.” No surprise, then, that it was the authorities in Xinjiang, not Beijing, who were most eager to prosecute Mr. Tohti, for he has been arguing that Chinese policies themselves, not simply cyber-radicalization, have been engendering Uighur resentment and violence. Yet by condemning Mr. Tohti, Beijing has not only subjected itself yet again to international opprobrium, but has denied itself a critical Uighur viewpoint and an alternative approach to the deteriorating situation in Xinjiang. Before it was shut down, Mr. Tohti’s Uighurbiz website was a forum for Han and Uighur contributors to discuss Xinjiang issues, bridging the two communities; the need for more interethnic communication was a theme when the Communist Party issued revised Xinjiang policy guidelines last May. Most important, Mr. Tohti pointed out that China’s own existing laws could protect minority cultures — if only they were observed. He did not call for a radical American-style democratization, but rather for the protection of indigenous institutions — support for non-Han cultural expression, job opportunities and truly “autonomous” government administration — that is enshrined in the Chinese Constitution and a 1984 law. This system of “ethnic autonomy” was indirectly derived from the pluralist (though not democratic) ideology of the Qing empire (1644-1911), which first brought Xinjiang, Tibet, Mongolia and Taiwan under Beijing’s rule as a “great family under Heaven.” Though superficially resembling the system of national republics undergirding the Soviet Union, the system developed by the People’s Republic of China differed in substantial ways and was adapted to Chinese conditions and outlooks. It functioned successfully in the 1950s, when Xinjiang was designated the “Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region,” and again in the early 1980s, and it remains popular with minority groups even though they have never been afforded real autonomy. Far from “inciting separatism,” Mr. Tohti was advocating a return to foundational promises dating to Mao’s era. Management of diversity and pluralism is a pressing world issue, from Scotland to Ukraine to Ferguson, Mo. China has an opportunity to contribute its own fixes to the bugs in the nation-state model, but cannot do so by locking up its most creative and courageous thinkers.

Terrorism NB

ExtensionsHyping the threat of extremism increases terror Standish 15

(Shadow Boxing With the Islamic State in Central Asia Reliable data on militant recruitment in the region is hard to come by. That isn’t stopping Central Asia’s rulers from using the threat of the Islamic State as a political tool. BY REID STANDISHFEBRUARY 6, 2015 http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/06/shadow-boxing-with-the-islamic-state-in-central-asia-isis-terrorism/ - ES -)

When it comes to the Islamic State’s potential threat to Central Asia, no one quite seems to be able to tell the difference between reality and speculation. On Monday, Uzbekistan’s domestic intelligence agency announced that it had intercepted communications indicating that the militants were planning to carry out terrorist attacks in the country in the spring. The same day, Kyrgyzstan’s Interior Ministry said it had uncovered 83 cases of recruiters trying to bring fighters to Syria. Fighters returning from Syria have not carried out any attacks in Central Asia and apart from such statements from state security organs, there is little reliable information to be had on the inroads the Islamic State has made in the region. The question of how many Central Asian citizens have joined up with the Islamic State or have professed jihadist sympathies has now become a volatile political issue. Hyping the threat could provide justification for the region’s

strongmen to further consolidate power. At the same time , terror experts agree that Central Asia has become a recruitment hub for the militant group. “The estimates and figures from Central Asian governments are all highly politicized and speculative,” John Heathershaw, a Central Asia expert at the University of Exeter, told Foreign Policy. “The simple truth is that no one has an accurate figure.” In October 2014, Rafal Rohozinski, a terrorism expert and CEO of SecDev, a Canadian think tank, told a conference in Kazakhstan that approximately 4,000 Central Asians are fighting with the Islamic State. The figure was picked up and widely circulated in the Russian and Central Asian media . That estimate, according to Rohozinski, was based on an extensive reading of jihadist chat forums and social media. Shortly thereafter, Central Asian leaders began speaking of the Islamic State in dire terms. In December 2014, Uzbek President Islam Karimov asked Vladimir Putin for assistance in combating the threat of extremism in the region. A week later, Emomalii Rahmon, the president of Tajikistan,referred to the Islamic State as “the plague of the new century and a global threat” in an address to his country. There is an element of truth to that claim, but calling the group a “plague” may be overstating things. A January report, the culmination of over a year of research and interviews across Central Asia, Russia, and Turkey, by the International Crisis Group, for example, found that between 2,000 to 4,000 Central Asians have traveled to Syria to wage jihad in the past three years. “The range reflects the fact that government and security agencies in Central Asia are not able to keep track of who is going to Syria,” Deirdre Tynan, the International Crisis Group’s project director for Central Asia, told FP. “Nothing is exact, but 2,000 fighters is a more realistic figure for the region.” The amount of Central Asians returning from Syria remains unknown, but the prospect of fighters returning continues to trouble local governments. The amount of Central Asians returning from Syria remains unknown, but the prospect of fighters returning continues to trouble local governments.Following the release of a video by the Islamic State which allegedly

showed a young Kazakh boy executing two men accused of being Russian spies was released on Jan. 13, Nursultan Nazarbayev, the president of Kazakhstan, announced that he would allocate more funding to securing the country’s borders. Further hampering efforts to collect accurate data, millions of Central Asians travel each year to Russia and Turkey as migrant workers. “How do you tell the differenc ce between someone who is going to Turkey for work or to go to Syria for jihad?” Tynan told FP. According to estimates from the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at King’s College London , Uzbeks — both citizens of Uzbekistan and ethnic Uzbeks from other countries — comprise the largest group of Central Asian foreign fighters currently in Syria. Indeed, radical Islamism has long posed an ill-defined threat to the region’s authoritarian regimes. “The Islamic State represents a romantic call to justice for many who have become disenchanted with the corruption and authoritarianism of Central Asia’s leaders,” Tynan told FP. One doesn’t have to look far to see why the call of radical Islamism might be appealing to the region’s residents. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are governed by authoritarian rulers. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are notoriously corrupt, weak states. Tajikistan’s five-year civil war in the 1990s left more than 50,000 people dead. Kyrgyzstan experienced popular revolutions in 2005 and 2010, each of which resulted in regime change but failed to alter the country’s corrupt and fractured political system. In 2010, violence in southern Kyrgyzstan broke out between ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks, which left 420 dead — mostly Uzbeks — and 80,000 displaced. Kazakhstan has vast reserves of oil and gas, but the political system is autocratic, and the country’s rural population faces widespread poverty. When that discontent has been channeled toward radical Islamism, Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan’s authoritarian leader, has tended to respond violently. Following a series of car bombings in 1999 that left 16 dead and 120 wounded in Tashkent, the capital, Karimov blamed — with little proof — the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a militant Islamist group that aimed to overthrow the government of Uzbekistan and establish a caliphate in Central Asia. Karimov used the incident to eliminate political opposition and consolidate his rule. When Uzbek security forces in 2005 fired into a crowd of protesters, the demonstrators were branded by the government as affiliated with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb ut-Tahrir, a pan-Islamic Sunni group banned in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan as a terrorist organization. Hizb ut-Tahrir has denied that label but still advocates for its goal of establishing a caliphate. Some of the old players in Central Asia’s Islamist scene are now joining up with the Islamic State. “Central Asia’s historical terrorist groups are either losing members or swearing allegiance to the Islamic State,” Esen Usubaliev, the director of Prudent Solutions, a think tank in Kyrgyzstan, and a consultant with the Kyrgyz government told FP. The most prominent example is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in October. With this new threat of radical Islam looming over Uzbekistan and Central Asia, observers are concerned that Karimov and other leaders will exploit the specter of the Islamic State to justify another crackdown on dissent. “We are probably looking at security responses that will breach human rights,” Tynan told FP. “As a result, the communities most likely to be sympathetic with the extremist message are likely to be pushed even more in that direction.” “There needs to be room for the expression of ideas, otherwise movements go underground and can turn to violence,” Shahram Akbarzadeh, a professor of Middle East and Central Asia Studies at Deakin University, toldFP. Or, as Tynan puts it: “The biggest threat to Central Asia is Central Asia itself.”

THE SQ IS KEY—stopping the conflict before it gets any bloodier is an essential task that the Chinese must take or it risks losing critical infrastructure that could topple Chinese reliability. Ma & Chang 14’. Hauyn Ma, I-Wei Jennifer Chang. Sep 10th, 2014 4:39 PM. I-wei Jennifer chang is a Washington, Dc-based writer and researcher on international relations and china. Haiyun Ma is Assistant Professor of History at Frostburg State

University in Maryland, and his research focuses on China’s Islam and Muslims. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42811&no_cache=1#.V2txWLgrK00 EP

The Xinjiang conflict could get much bloodier than it is today. Some Uighurs were captured fighting alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan and there are very likely a number of Uighurs in the ranks of ISIS/ISIL today. If they survive, they will be imbued with confidence, will have seen the benefits of accessing larger-scale financing, and will almost certainly receive encouragement to take their fight to other parts of China with a scale and intensity not yet seen . Our view at this point is that China’s competent and wide-reaching – if imperfect – surveillance apparatus will prevent a large-scale influx of Uighurs who have fought under the radical Islamic banner in the Middle East and Afghanistan/Pakistan. Foreign jihadist movements will serve primarily as cheerleaders , not quartermasters or providers of soldiers, for anti-Beijing elements in Xinjiang. The threat will not be an existential one to the Chinese state, as most Uighurs would prefer a

peaceful accommodation. But even if only 1 percent of Uighurs hold extreme views, there are 10 million in Xinjiang and even for a state security apparatus as formidable as China’s, 100,000 or more angry people present a tough challenge. Even if the attacks are not an

existential threat, they will be very difficult to anticipate and prevent. Recent attacks such as the Boston Marathon Bombing, Westgate Mall Attack in Kenya, and the Charlie Hebdo attack in France mark an emerging trend of low cost, easy to plan terrorist attacks that are exceedingly difficult to prevent. China has already experienced such attacks – for instance the Kunming Train Station attacks,Tiananmen Square attack, and the May 2014 attack on a farmer’s market in Urumqi – where common

items like knives, gunpowder or fertilizer, and SUVs became lethal weapons. Just as important, such attacks do not kill thousands as 9-11 did, but they are immensely disruptive and can sow disproportionate fear in a society. The nature of attacks in Xinjiang suggests that foreign terror actors may provide inspiration , but that the men and materials are all locally-sourced. The fact

that the attacks use readily available local materials (vehicles, fertilizer, gunpowder, knives, axes) poses a real dilemma for Beijing because there is no apparent flow of weapons from abroad that can be interdicted. To boot, unless the Chinese government prevents Uighurs from owning cars and common woodcutting and food preparation tools – which is unlikely – the means of attack are always present. Indeed, the possession of potential bombmaking materials like ammonium nitrate – a common fertilizer – has been seriously restrictedsince at least 2006 in Xinjiang. On a tactical level, Xinjiang’s insurgency does offer China’s public (and private) security apparatus a number of tangible benefits. Xinjiang gives China’s security forces an internal, restricted access “beta lab” in which to test new techniques and technologies (such as drones) before the Chinese military potentially employs them beyond China’s borders. The continuing conflict in Xinjiang is also creating a core group of police and paramilitary personnel with significant live fire experience in a hostile operational environment. These men (and increasingly, women) offer a prime talent pool for China’s new private security providers as they recruit staff to hire out to Chinese miners and construction firms operating in Africa and other areas where

projects may require armed protection. The growing insurgency in Xinjiang is imposing significant costs on the Chinese government, but the province’s rich mineral resources and

strategic geographical position are too valuable to give up, even at the cost of a much bloodier conflict than that which exists today. One looming question is “will Uighur insurgents expand their campaign to include key energy, mining, and other critical infrastructure in Xinjiang?” Such a move is conceivable, but most of these assets lie in open desert and basin and range-type geography that is easily kept under surveillance by unmanned aerial vehicles and

other means. Moreover, destroying infrastructure takes more capability than attacking a train station or market. Firearms, explosives, or heavy tools such as welding and cutting equipment are essential if one hopes to break open a pipeline, destroy rail lines, damage power transformers, or topple power transmission pylons. Such implements are difficult to get ahold of in Xinjiang – for unlike the Middle East and other parts of Central Asia – civilian access to firearms and explosives is tightly restricted and attempts

to obtain such items on the black market risks exposing plotters to law enforcement. The other possibility is that Uighur insurgents or their supporters abroad could launch cyber attacks on critical infrastructure or other assets in China. To date, we locate no mention of such attacks and it appears this threat dimension has not yet manifested itself.

Marginalization risks terror – pushes communities toward radicalization and undermines real counter-terror effortsPoh 15

(Uyghur Terrorism: A Misnomer? Conflating domestic protest with international terrorism is unhelpful. By Angela Poh July 28, 2015 http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/uyghur-terrorism-a-misnomer/ - ES -)

However, it is critical for both Beijing and the international community to recognize that the uneasy coexistence between the Uyghurs and China’s Han majority is a deep-rooted socio-economic problem. China’s “Uyghur problem” was not created by the September 11 attacks or the rise of the Islamic State. Ethnic tensions and violence in Xinjiang stem from decades’ worth of discrimination,

perceived religious and cultural suppression, and economic disparities. Conflating domestic protest with international terrorism – which both Beijing and the international media are guilty of in the case of the Uyghurs – is unhelpful for two reasons. First, it is a distraction. It reduces the pressure for governments to resolve domestic problems and tensions. This could result in further resentment and alienation among groups marginalized by state policies, and increase the allure of a violent

but radically different world such as that promised by the Islamic State. Second, as Brian Jenkins from the

RAND Corporation suggested: “Some governments are prone to label as terrorism all violent acts committed by their political opponents …. what is called terrorism thus seems to depend on one’s point of view.” Overly broad definitions of terrorism can allow governments to label and punish dissenters as terrorists. Governments may therefore be tempted by a ready-made narrative to

back up the claim that domestic unrest derives from outside influences rather than from authentic local concerns. This carries

the risk of undermining the legitimacy of genuine international counter-terrorism efforts.

Chinese policies against Uighurs increase terrorismDRENNAN 15

(Is China Making Its Own Terrorism Problem Worse?JUSTINE DRENNAN FEBRUARY 9, 2015 http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/09/is-china-making-its-own-terrorism-problem-worse-uighurs-islamic-state/?wp_login_redirect=0 - ES -)

Beijing says radicalized members of its Uighur minority are terrorists with ties to the Islamic State and al Qaeda, but its repressive policies may be helping to fuel the violence . When an SUV

crashed through a crowd at Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in late 2013, killing two bystanders and injuring 40, it didn’t take Chinese officials long to name culprits. The attackers, they said, had been members of China’s Uighur Muslim minority, with “links to many international extremist terrorist groups.” Police said they found a flag bearing jihadi emblems in the crashed vehicle and blamed the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, or ETIM, a group named after the independent state China says some Uighurs want to establish in the far-western region of Xinjiang. After the attack, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying called ETIM “China’s most direct and realistic security threat.” Beijing has long characterized cases of Uighur violence as organized acts of terrorism and accused individual attackers of having ties to international jihadi groups. Back in 2001, China released a document claiming that “Eastern Turkistan” terrorists had received training from Osama bin Laden and the Taliban and then “fought in combats in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Uzbekistan, or returned to Xinjiang for terrorist and violent activities.” Since then, China has

frequently blamed ETIM for violence in Xinjiang and elsewhere. But scholars, human rights groups, and Uighur advocates argue that China is systematically exaggerating the threat Uighurs pose to justify its repressive

policies in Xinjiang . The region’s onetime-majority Uighur population of roughly 10 million, which is ethnically Turkic, has been marginalized for decades by ethnic Han Chinese migrants that Beijing has encouraged to move there in the hope that they’d help integrate the restive region into China. The repression has been getting worse. Since the region’s bloody ethnic clashes in 2009, the government has increased regulations on Muslim practices, restricting veils and beards and strictly enforcing rules that prohibit many from fasting during Ramadan or visiting mosques. Heightened security operations have led in some cases to imprisonment,

executions, and suspected torture. Government materials about how to spot extremists (hint: they tend to look like Uighurs) elide religiosity with terrorism. Now, with the rise of the Islamic State, China has again ramped up its claims about Uighurs waging international jihad. Chinese government-run Global Times asserted in December that about 300 Chinese “extremists” were fighting alongside ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and in January that another 300 had traveled to Malaysia en route to joining the group. The reports suggested that many were “terrorists from the East Turkestan Islamic Movement.” On Thursday, Global Times said ISIS had executed one of these Uighur recruits in September and two in December when they tried to flee its control, attributing the information to an anonymous Kurdish official. Many experts dismiss

Global Times’s numbers. “I assume there are Uighurs joining ISIS, but I also assume the numbers are quite small in comparison to other groups throughout the world,” said Sean Roberts, a George Washington University professor who studies the minority group. “We’re probably talking about 20 to 30 people max.” Nicholas Bequelin, a Hong-Kong-based senior researcher with

Human Rights Watch, called Chinese media’s figure of 300 “implausibly high.” It’s likely that the rise of the Islamic State has given a few disenfranchised young Uighurs a cause to fight and potentially die for. Still, experts say any increase in Uighur extremism is largely due to the fact that the very policies China says are meant to combat terrorism have actually made the threat worse . Chinese reports about hundreds of Uighurs fighting with the Islamic State are likely “intended to make the Uighurs look as if they’re a threat, an Islamist terrorist organization,” said Dru Gladney, an anthropologist who studies ethnic identities in China. Several international media outlets have repeated the numbers from Chinese media. But China’s inflated claims are ultimately counterproductive, Gladney said. “They create more fear and marginalization, which exacerbates the problem.” China isn’t wholly inventing the threat. Propaganda material from a group China links to ETIM that calls itself the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) suggests there are at least 30 to 40 Uighur jihadis in Syria and Iraq, according to Washington Institute for Near East Policy fellow Aaron Zelin, who runs the website Jihadology.net. TIP has an increasingly active online presence that includes footage of young children firing guns in mountain valleys. In recent years, it has also claimed responsibility for attacks like the Tiananmen Square SUV incident via videos in which its purported leader, Abdullah Mansour, has called for more attacks. But many researchers doubt TIP’s claims, as its accounts of attacks often contradict facts on the ground that don’t seem to indicate the sophistication of internationally organized terrorist operations. The general consensus, according to Georgetown professor James Millward, is that radicalized Uighur expats, who mostly seem to be based in Pakistan rather than Iraq

and Syria, haven’t provided any operational support for recent violence in China , but rather just propaganda. And any who are fighting with Middle Eastern jihadi groups don’t seem to be rising very high in their ranks, said Raffaello Pantucci, an analyst at London’s Royal United Services Institute. China, however, has been quick to label moderate Uighurs who speak out as radicals. Last year a Xinjiang court sentenced Uighur professor Ilham Tohti to life in prison on charges of “separatism,” for running a website that discussed Uighur experiences in the region. The United States condemned Tohti’s sentence, with Secretary of State John Kerry warning that silencing moderate voices “can only make tensions worse.” Indeed, acts of apparent Uighur terrorism within China have risen sharply over the past couple years. An attack last March by eight knife-wielding men and women at a train station in Yunnan province’s city of Kunming left 29 dead and at least 130 wounded. In April, people armed with knives and explosives killed three and injured 79 at the railway station in Xinjiang’s capital, Urumqi. The next month, attackers crashed two cars into shoppers at an Urumqi market and set off explosives, killing 31 and injuring more than 90. The Munich-based

World Uyghur Congress, the leading advocacy organization for the minority (which uses an alternate spelling of the group’s name),

condemns violence but says China uses the threat of terrorism to stifle peaceful dissent as well . Alim Seytoff, the Washington spokesman for the group, told Foreign Policy by email that he didn’t know whether any Uighurs had joined ISIS, but if they had, “they by no means represent the vast majority of peace-loving Uyghur people, just as those who joined ISIS from the U.S., the U.K., Australia and Europe by no means represent the freedom-loving peoples of America, Great Britain, Australia and Europe.” In order to deflect criticism of its Xinjiang policies, China is “conflating the Uyghur people’s legitimate

demands for human rights, religious freedom, and democracy with international Islamic terrorism,” he said. Gladney, the anthropologist, said any Uighurs with ties to ISIS were more likely driven by resentment of China than by aims of global jihad. They may want militant training to fight China and even to establish a Uighur state, he said, but they’re less interested in creating a global caliphate.They may want militant training to fight China and even to establish a Uighur state, he said, but they’re less interested in creating a global caliphate. Analysts also note that those who do desire a global caliphate seem to have little more than a passing interest in Uighurs’ relatively parochial aspirations, despite some token gestures, such as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s reference to Chinese violations of Muslim rights last July, and exaggerated claims about such abuses made last fall by an al Qaeda-run magazine. Meanwhile, it’s unclear if the group Beijing singles out as the greatest threat, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, comprises a distinct, self-identified terrorist entity or a looser grouping of individuals. The Chinese government first mentioned ETIM in a vaguely sourced document in 2001, shortly after then-U.S. President George W. Bush announced his “global war on terror.” In it, China called the group “a major component of the terrorist network headed by Osama bin Laden.” United States seemed to agree that ETIM posed a real threat, listing the group as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group in 2002 and detaining 22 Uighurs captured in Afghanistan and Pakistan at Guantánamo Bay. Some were held for more than a decade, though the United States later acknowledged that it didn’t have adequate evidence against them. Just over a year ago it sent the last three to Slovakia — one of a handful of small countries that agreed to host them. But George Washington University’s Roberts concluded in a 2012 paper titled “Imaginary Terrorism?” that Washington also may have inflated the Uighur threat. The Uighur detainees at Guantánamo who said they’d received jihadi training described a training camp in Afghanistan that amounted to a small, run-down shack. The highlight, in Roberts’s words: “A one-time opportunity to fire a few bullets with the only Kalashnikov rifle that was available at the camp.” Although detainees expressed anger about Chinese rule, they all denied belonging to ETIM, and many said they’d never heard of the group. Roberts has argued that the United States may have backed China’s claims about ETIM in order to cement China’s support for the occupation of Afghanistan and, later, Iraq. Nevertheless, various international terrorism analysts continued to perpetuate the allegations about ETIM in work that cited government statements as their primary sources. According to Georgetown’s Millward, China uses this echo chamber of supposed evidence about ETIM to keep alive the idea of an international Uighur threat, conflating ETIM with the newer, propaganda-producing Turkistan Islamic Party. A U.S. State Department official told Foreign Policy that the United States designated ETIM a terrorist group “after careful study,” having concluded that its members were responsible for terrorism in China and were planning attacks on U.S. interests abroad, but declined to specify the sources of this information. The official added that the government still maintains this listing. Officials at Washington’s Chinese Embassy and China’s State Council didn’t return repeated calls and emails seeking comment. What worries Human Rights Watch’s Bequelin, as several countries including the United States move to scale up counterterrorism cooperation with China, isn’t so much that other countries believe China’s inflated claims. It’s more that the need to cooperate on security and other goals may mean de facto acceptance of, or even

practical assistance for, China’s repressive policies. The State Department official said the United States hopes to discuss how to enhance counterterrorism cooperation with China at an upcoming White House summit on countering violent extremism in February, and appreciates China’s aid to Iraq and support for U.N. resolutions aimed at stopping foreign fighters from joining extremist groups. “At the same time we continue to urge China to take measures to reduce tension and reform counterproductive policies in Xinjiang that restrict Uighurs’ ethnic and religious identity,” the official said. But for now, there aren’t too many promising signs from Xinjiang. And China isn’t the only place taking a hard line. Over the past year, governments from the U.K. to Kosovo to Jordan have been accused of clamping down on civil liberties or political opponents in the name of counterterrorism, some basing their actions to seize passports and detain suspects on the U.S.-backed U.N. foreign fighters resolution. Several Xinjiang experts draw parallels between radicalized Uighurs and young men from other countries drawn to extremism in part due to Islamophobia or

alienation at home. So far, the one Chinese national known to have been captured while fighting for ISIS appeared to be Han Chinese — despite initial Chinese allegations that he was Uighur .So far, the one Chinese national known to have been captured while fighting for ISIS appeared to be Han Chinese — despite initial Chinese allegations that he was Uighur. But some Uighurs still face particular suspicion about their aims. In March, Thailand detained more than 200 Uighurs within its borders, and although the group comprised families with several young children, Thai police asserted that they were headed to

fight in Syria. The families were among growing numbers of Uighurs seeking to flee Chinese repression via Southeast Asia. Their ultimate destination is usually Turkey, where many sympathize with Uighurs because they are also a Turkic people. In recent years, Uighur emigrants skirting tightened border regimes in Central Asia and Pakistan have turned up in Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Indonesia, as well as Thailand. The Kunming train station attackers may have been provoked to violence in part because Chinese officials thwarted their attempt to cross into Laos. It’s possible that reasons other than Chinese influence caused Thai authorities to conclude that the apprehended migrants, who claimed to be Turkish, were

headed to Syria, said Pantucci of London’s RUSI. “The problem now is that Turkey is the staging point for Syria, so the perception is if they’re trying to go to Turkey, they must be trying to go to Syria.” Although some escaped from custody, many of the families detained in Thailand are still in limbo. China demands their repatriation and rejects Turkey’s offer to take them in; human rights advocates warn that China is likely to mistreat them — the same reason the United States didn’t send the Gitmo detainees back to China. As for Xinjiang, Gladney said, there are “growing concerns at all levels of Chinese society” — even among some government wonks — that China’s policies aren’t working. Many believe the “western development” strategy meant to lift minorities out of

poverty and integrate them into Chinese society, as well as the “strike hard” campaign of the past several years, have only stoked further resentment and violence, spread alarm through the population, and drawn more international attention to Uighurs’ plight. As scholars long predicted, China’s actions against a perceived Uighur threat seem to have actually made that threat more real. “Twenty years ago people thought I was crazy talking about Uighurs,” Gladney said. “Now there’s lots of interest.” Despite increased attention at home and abroad, Gladney didn’t see China making significant changes to its

Xinjiang policy any time soon. “But they may tweak it,” he said, “and that will be the thing to watch.”

Hyping the threat of extremism increases terror Standish 15

(Shadow Boxing With the Islamic State in Central Asia Reliable data on militant recruitment in the region is hard to come by. That isn’t stopping Central Asia’s rulers from using the threat of the Islamic State as a political tool. BY REID STANDISHFEBRUARY 6, 2015 http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/06/shadow-boxing-with-the-islamic-state-in-central-asia-isis-terrorism/ - ES -)

When it comes to the Islamic State’s potential threat to Central Asia , no one quite seems to be able to tell the

difference between reality and speculation. On Monday, Uzbekistan’s domestic intelligence agency announced that it had intercepted communications indicating that the militants were planning to carry out terrorist attacks in the country in the spring. The same day, Kyrgyzstan’s Interior Ministry said it had uncovered 83 cases of recruiters trying to bring fighters to Syria. Fighters returning from Syria have not carried out any attacks in Central Asia and apart from such

statements from state security organs, there is little reliable information to be had on the inroads the Islamic State has made in the region. The question of how many Central Asian citizens have joined up with the Islamic State or have professed jihadist sympathies has now become a volatile political issue. Hyping the threat could provide justification for the region’s strongmen to further

consolidate power. At the same time , terror experts agree that Central Asia has become a recruitment hub for the militant group. “The estimates and figures from Central Asian governments are all highly politicized and speculative ,” John Heathershaw, a Central Asia expert at the University of

Exeter, told Foreign Policy. “The simple truth is that no one has an accurate figure.” In October 2014, Rafal Rohozinski, a terrorism expert and CEO of SecDev, a Canadian think tank, told a conference in Kazakhstan that approximately 4,000 Central Asians are fighting with the Islamic State. The figure was picked up and widely circulated in the Russian and Central Asian media . That estimate, according to Rohozinski, was based on an extensive reading of jihadist

chat forums and social media. Shortly thereafter, Central Asian leaders began speaking of the Islamic State in dire terms. In December 2014, Uzbek President Islam Karimov asked Vladimir Putin for assistance in combating the threat of extremism in the region. A week later, Emomalii Rahmon, the president of Tajikistan,referred to the Islamic State as “the plague of the new century and a global threat” in an address to his country. There is an element of truth to that claim, but calling the group a “plague” may be

overstating things. A January report, the culmination of over a year of research and interviews across Central Asia, Russia, and Turkey, by the International Crisis Group, for example, found that between 2,000 to 4,000 Central Asians have

traveled to Syria to wage jihad in the past three years. “The range reflects the fact that government and security agencies in Central Asia are not able to keep track of who is going to Syria,” Deirdre Tynan , the International Crisis Group’s project director for Central Asia, told FP. “Nothing is exact, but 2,000 fighters is a

more realistic figure for the region.” The amount of Central Asians returning from Syria remains unknown, but the prospect of fighters returning continues to trouble local governments . The amount of Central Asians returning from Syria remains unknown, but the prospect of fighters returning continues to trouble local governments.Following the release of a video by the Islamic State which allegedly showed a young Kazakh boy executing two men accused of being Russian spies was released on Jan. 13, Nursultan Nazarbayev, the president of Kazakhstan, announced that he would allocate more funding to securing the country’s borders. Further hampering efforts to collect accurate data, millions of Central Asians travel each year to Russia and Turkey as migrant workers. “How do you tell the differenc ce between someone who is going to Turkey for work or to go to Syria for jihad?” Tynan

told FP. According to estimates from the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at King’s College London, Uzbeks — both citizens of Uzbekistan and ethnic Uzbeks from other countries — comprise the largest group of Central Asian foreign fighters currently in Syria . Indeed,

radical Islamism has long posed an ill-defined threat to the region’s authoritarian regimes . “The Islamic State represents a romantic call to justice for many who have become disenchanted with the corruption and authoritarianism of Central Asia’s leaders,” Tynan told FP . One doesn’t have to look far to see why the call of radical Islamism might be appealing to the region’s residents . Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are governed by authoritarian rulers. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are notoriously corrupt, weak states. Tajikistan’s five-year

civil war in the 1990s left more than 50,000 people dead. Kyrgyzstan experienced popular revolutions in 2005 and 2010, each of which resulted in regime change but failed to alter the country’s corrupt and fractured political system . In 2010, violence in southern Kyrgyzstan broke out between ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks, which left 420 dead — mostly Uzbeks — and 80,000

displaced. Kazakhstan has vast reserves of oil and gas, but the political system is autocratic, and the country’s rural population faces widespread poverty. When that discontent has been channeled toward radical Islamism, Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan’s authoritarian leader, has tended to respond violently. Following a series of car bombings in 1999 that left 16 dead and 120

wounded in Tashkent, the capital, Karimov blamed — with little proof — the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a militant Islamist group that aimed to overthrow the government of Uzbekistan and establish a caliphate in Central Asia. Karimov used the incident to eliminate political opposition and consolidate his rule. When

Uzbek security forces in 2005 fired into a crowd of protesters, the demonstrators were branded by the government as affiliated with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb ut-Tahrir , a pan-Islamic Sunni group banned in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan as a terrorist organization. Hizb ut-Tahrir has denied that label but still advocates for its goal of establishing a

caliphate. Some of the old players in Central Asia’s Islamist scene are now joining up with the Islamic State. “Central Asia’s historical terrorist groups are either losing members or swearing allegiance to the Islamic State,” Esen Usubaliev,

the director of Prudent Solutions, a think tank in Kyrgyzstan, and a consultant with the Kyrgyz government told FP. The most prominent example is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan , which pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in October. With this new threat of radical Islam looming over Uzbekistan and Central Asia, observers are concerned that Karimov and other leaders will exploit the specter of the Islamic State to justify another crackdown on dissent . “We are probably looking at security

responses that will breach human rights,” Tynan told FP. “As a result, the communities most likely to be sympathetic with the extremist message are likely to be pushed even more in that direction.” “There needs to be room for the expression of ideas, otherwise movements go underground and can turn to violence,” Shahram Akbarzadeh, a professor of Middle East and Central Asia Studies at Deakin University, toldFP. Or, as Tynan puts it: “The biggest threat to Central Asia is Central Asia itself.”

China’s crackdown on Uyghurs has lead to ethnic tension and increase extremismClarke 6/8

(How China uses fear of terrorism to justify increased state power By Michael Clarke, for CNN Updated 11:58 PM ET, Wed June 8, 2016 http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/08/asia/china-xinjiang-terrorism-clarke/ - ES -)

China's long-simmering problems with Uyghur separatism and terrorism in the western region of Xinjiang has been thrust again into the international spotlight. The U.S. State Department has criticized China's "lack of transparency" regarding its claims of Uyghur terrorism in Xinjiang, questioned Beijing's stated desire for greater counter-terrorism cooperation with the U.S., and said Chinese policies in the region " may have exacerbated ethnic tension" and contributed to

"increased violent extremism." State media in Xinjiang reported this week that some Uyghur inhabitants would be required to provide DNA samples, fingerprints and a "three-dimensional image," when applying for passports or other travel documents. China has dismissed criticism of its policies in the region as "inaccurate and "un-objective." Xinjiang violence: Does China have a terror problem? It is clear however that Beijing has increasingly instrumentalized the threat of terrorism in both domestic and foreign policy.

Chinese policies are root cause of Uighur resentmentChung 2(Foreign Affairs ArticlePrintPrint CiteCite China's 'War on Terror': September 11 and Uighur Separatism Author: Chien-peng Chung July/August 2002 http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-war-terror-september-11-uighur-separatism/p4765 - ES -)

What Beijing needs to recognize is that its own policies are the root causes of Uighur resentment. Rather than trying to stamp out the problem through force and repression alone, the Chinese government should instead do what it can to improve the conditions that fuel separatist feelings. The government's call to develop the west has accelerated migration by Han Chinese into Xinjiang, thereby exacerbating tensions. In 1949, the region was almost 90 percent Uighur; today, that figure has dropped to 45-50 percent. Many Uighurs do not speak Mandarin Chinese, which is usually the prerequisite for any good-paying job or government position, and few are as well educated as the immigrants. As a result, the Han dominate commerce in Xinjiang's urban areas and are frequently seen by the locals as having the region's best jobs in the government, the Communist Party, and the military. The Han also usually live in newer neighborhoods and go to informally segregated schools. Rather than allowing the flow of immigration into Xinjiang to remain unchecked, the Chinese regime should regulate it so that immigrants do not compete unnecessarily with the locals for jobs, schools, or state services. Beijing should encourage public-sector corporations, oil companies, and government agencies to increase their hiring of ethnic minorities. Quotas for Uighur admission into colleges and government positions should also be expanded and enforced. The government must also allocate funds fairly among Han and Uighur neighborhoods. Cleaning up the area around China's nuclear test site at Lop Nor in the Taklimakan Desert, where soil and groundwater pollution are causing birth defects and health problems among the local inhabitants, would be another important step.

Furthermore, as guaranteed in the Chinese constitution, the government must uphold religious freedom. Muslim Uighurs who openly practice their faith complain of harassment by the authorities. The regime must respect Muslim customs and allow the free functioning of mosques and religious schools, interfering only if they are found to be educating or harboring militants. Political changes are required as well: less gerrymandering in favor of Han Chinese among Xinjiang's administrative units, more proportionate ethnic representation

in party and government structures, and more devolution of power from Beijing to the region. Hunting down terrorists is only a partial solution to the violence in Xinjiang. Unless China listens to the Uighurs and treats

them better, its troubled western region is unlikely to be calmed any time soon.

Human rights must be prioritized in order to solve terrorism Megally 02/09/16 (Hanny, Senior Fellow at the Center on International Cooperation , “PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM BY PROTECTING RIGHTS AND ADDRESSING ROOT CAUSES”, 02/09/16, 06/23/16, http://peaceoperationsreview.org/thematic-essays/preventing-violent-extremism-by-protecting-rights-and-addressing-root-causes/)//BME

Respecting human rights is key to effective prevention. But how does the Plan help make this happen? The Secretary-General highlighted that national counter-terrorism strategies have often lacked basic elements of due process and respect for the rule of law. “Sweeping definitions of terrorism or violent extremism are often used to criminalize the legitimate actions of opposition groups, civil society organizations and human rights defenders,” he commented. This has led to drastically narrowed space for freedoms of expression, association and assembly. But how will the Plan change this? The problems go much deeper, including how the international community itself has violated rights in addressing violence and acts of terror. By declaring a “war on terror,” states have blurred the distinctions between armed conflict and terrorism, between criminal law enforcement and war-related military action, and ultimately between the legal regimes of international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law (IHRL). Such declarations have had adverse consequences for legal safeguards and rights protections. This includes prioritizing targeted killings or assassinations over pursuing arrest; the muddying of legal status of individuals in detention; and the targeting of individuals beyond the territory of the parties to a conflict. Tactics of war in pursuing criminal suspects abroad have produced a number of undesirable outcomes: the legally questionable use of unmanned drones; targeted killings of a state’s own citizens (if they have gone abroad to join a terrorist group); unilateral decisions to send fighter planes to bomb targets in another sovereign state; the creation of “black sites” abroad to detain and interrogate suspects; and the creation an off-shore detention sites such as at Guantanamo Bay. Using similar logic, the Syrian regime has declared its own “war on terror”. It has barrel bombed its own citizens, bypassed judicial authorities to detain people in prolonged detention without charge, and conducted extrajudicial killings rather than arresting suspects. It has also systematically employed torture. Similar justifications are now used by every government dealing with internal violence. Respect for rule of law and human rights are essential in any counter-terrorism strategy. The link between the violation of such rights, the grievances this creates, and radicalization that may lead to violence is a central thesis in prevention strategies. According to the Secretary-General, “Violent extremism tends to thrive in an environment characterized by poor governance, democracy deficits, corruption and a culture of impunity of unlawful behavior engaged in by the State or its agents. When poor governance is combined with repressive state policies and practices which violate human rights and rule of law, the potency of the lure of violent extremisms tends to be heightened.” But when crisis hits – such as the recent attacks in Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Egypt, France, Lebanon, Mali, Pakistan, Somalia or Tunisia – security responses trump rights imperatives. The resort to language of “war” is quickly adopted and basic safeguards, which are the essence of the UN Charter, are left far behind. Are leaders who quickly adopt such rhetoric being reckless and causing more harm?

UQUyghur terror increasing nowVolodzko3/8

(“China's New Headache: Uyghur Militants in Syria: The number of Uyghurs fighting in Syria has

risen sharply over the past year . How will China respond?” David Volodzko March 08, 2016 http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/chinas-new-headache-uyghur-militants-in-syria/ - ES -)

The dark night of the Syrian soul is now physically manifest in a nationwide blackout , and as Mohanad Hage Ali writes in Al Arabiya, Beijing’s proxy war in the region means that this shadow has also begun to darken China’s

door. Chinese-Pakistani counterterrorism efforts have driven members of the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), a Uyghur separatist group, from the Afghan border and into northwestern Syria, where they’ve been scoring points for Beijing and al-Qaeda alike, and shaping the future of Chinese foreign policy in the process. Beijing’s unbridled opposition to Uyghur militancy in Xinjiang is no secret. To the extent that one can argue that communism is a religion, the Party’s attitude toward Uyghur’s Sunni faith

borders on theological hatred. Uyghur militancy abroad fans that flame, but also gives Party propagandists their due,

redeeming the Chinese narrative, which Western press and Uyghur leaders have long rejected, that the conflict in Xinjiang is an extension of the global struggle against terrorism and not an extension of China’s human rights abuses. In January 2002, the China Internet Information Center (think of a state-owned Wikipedia) claimed that the TIP had received Taliban support, but Hasan Mahsum, founder of the TIP, denied these charges. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. In the wake of the 2009 Urumqi riots, Eligen Imibakhi, chairman of the Standing Committee of the Xinjiang Regional People’s Congress, blamed the violence on terrorists, but President Erdoğan of Turkey likened Beijing’s reaction to genocide. And for

years, Beijing has warned that Uyghur separatists emigrating to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Syria were returning better armed and battle-hardened. The Sydney Morning Herald dismissed this as an attempt to export blame for Xinjiang’s strife, the Daily Mail said that Beijing has no proof, and Richard Bernstein in The New York Review of Books questioned the very existence of Uyghur terrorists in Syria: The charge that they are Syria-bound terrorists comes straight from China’s Ministry of Propaganda. Several years ago, Chinese newspapers began reporting that some one hundred Uyghurs had gone to Syria to join the

jihadist rebellion there. This claim is dubious. But no longer. According to Ali, there were several hundred Uyghur militants in Syria last year. Now, suddenly, there are thousands. Last July, when Bangkok deported 109 Uyghurs, Dilxat

Raxit, spokesman for the World Uyghur Congress, claimed that Uyghur émigrés to Syria are seeking peace and freedom from Chinese oppression, but Andrew McGregor, managing editor of the Jamestown Foundation’s Global Terrorism

Analysis, writes that in Afghanistan, Uyghur militants undoubtedly joined the Taliban. And in Syria, Ali notes, they’ve allied with the local al-Qaeda branch, al-Nusra Front, in battling ISIS, and were instrumental in the capture of Idlib,

southwest of Aleppo, where the majority of Syria’s Uyghurs now reside. The Japanese newspaper Mainichi Shimbun reported that for some Uyghurs in Syria, military training only takes about 70 days. In The Long War Journal, Caleb Weiss describes Uyghur camps in Syria designed to train child terrorists. As you can imagine, this is having considerable impact on Chinese foreign policy. As Uyghurs flee from Xinjiang to Afghanistan, and from Afghanistan to Syria, so China pursues. Last November, Jonathan Fenby of The Guardian argued that Chinese military action is “unlikely,” but that a kind of diplomatic evolution is inevitable. China wants to play a greater role in global affairs, and has tremendous incentive to do so. For instance, by supporting the al-Assad regime in Syria, China stands by its allies, Russia and Pakistan, whilst opposing Turkey, whose officials undermine Beijing by issuing fake passports to Uyghurs (prompting one angry Chinese official to remark that Turkey was using Uyghurs as “cannon fodder”). And nearby, the $46 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor makes political stability there a necessary condition. This partly explain why, in December, Beijing passed legislation authorizing counterterrorism actions abroad, and why there are now rumors that China is entering the Syrian conflict on Russia’s side. But as China becomes more powerful, and more involved, Uyghurs are sure to become more desperate, and China’s response needs to be more sophisticated than dropping the hammer. As I’ve

written before, Beijing’s policy toward Xinjiang’s Uyghurs is ruining them, as it’s intended to do. Beijing has been right about the Uyghur threat, but the difference between terrorism and violent resistance, or counterterrorism and oppression, is often one of perspective. With Syrian peace talks on the horizon, one hopes that Beijing finds perspective in a battle where so many other nations have lost it to the fog of war.

SolvencyChina should reverse new terrorism laws – they target MuslimsUNPO ’16 (Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, “China’s New Law on Counter-Terrorism and its Impact on Minorities,” 6/14/16, 06/22/16 , http://unpo.org/article/19253)//BME

On 7 June 2016, a roundtable conference took place at the Clingendael Institute in The Hague to discuss “China&#39;s new law on counter-terrorism and its impact on minorities”. The conference, organised by the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), brought together many activists, academics and representatives of civil society from all over the world. The conference was opened by Ms

Tsering Jampa, the Executive Director of ICT Europe, who briefly outlined the objective of the conference and stated that the new anti-terrorism law increases tensions and strengthens oppression and therefore decreases peace and security in China. Mr Ko Colijn, the Director of the Clingendael Institute, added to the introductory statements

that anti-terrorism is a universal goal, but that it must not be used to undermine the Rule of Law . The first panel, moderated by Ms Marie Holzman, president of Solidarité Chine, discussed the use and impacts of the counter-terror law on human rights, civil society and minorities. Ms Sharon Hom (Human Rights in China), opened this panel with a general overview of the legal situation and the various laws that the Chinese government has implemented and is planning to implement; from the national security law, to the counter-terrorism law, cybersecurity law and the foreign NGO management law. According to Ms Hom the DNA of the communist party is the root cause of the legislation and the primary objective of these laws is to maintain party power. The cybersecurity law will make it legal to shut down and monitor the Internet. The registration requirements as a result of the foreign NGO management law will place human rights and advocacy groups under strict government control. The

second speaker, Mr Kelsang Gyaltsen (representative of HH the Dalai Lama to Europe), stated that the struggle for the rights of the Tibetans and Uyghurs is getting increasingly difficult and emphasised that the long arm of China is reaching further and further into Europe and the USA. Mr Gyaltsen stated that it is hard to evaluate how much worse the situation for the Tibetans and others currently is due to the new law, because the situation at present is already harder then at any time since the cultural revolution, with the exception of the time between 1989 and 1992. Mr Gyaltsen closed his contribution with a call to the international community to make the acceptance of China into the international community dependent on their adherence to basic human rights standards. Ms Kate Saunders (International Campaign for Tibet) spoke about the security in Tibet and provided several examples of intimidation of Tibetans by the Chinese government, which sees Tibet as being in the frontline of its fight for national security. China implements a great number of cultural and social initiatives in order to dilute the Tibetan identity. Furthermore, Tibet&#39;s natural ecosystem is being compromised by the building of dams. Mr Dolkun Isa (World Uyghur

Congress) informed the participants of the situation of the Uyghurs whose resistance to Chinese oppression has been labelled as terrorism since 2001. Through a series of examples Mr Isa showed that the oppression of the Uyghurs is continuing and is fiercer than ever before. It is also more present in every aspect of daily life. For example, this year China banned Ramadan in Xinjiang and the media is strictly controlled. Activism abroad for the rights of Uyghurs is also very hard because the Chinese film the participants and subsequently threaten the family members of the demonstrators back home. The final speaker of the first panel was Ms Ursula Gauthier (former correspondent of the Nouvel Obs in Beijing). She shared her experiences as a journalist in China and reflected on the reasons of her expulsion from China in December 2015. According to Ms Gauthier you can&#39;t report on

incidents even when they are not terrorist in nature . The Chinese government is misleading the West in framing the oppression of the Uyghurs as the same as the fight against international terrorism. Furthermore, the new law is not needed internally in China, since most of it has been common practice for decades. However, an important aspect of the new law is that it will have an impact on the reporting in the West, not just in China. Foreign correspondents will have to conform to the ideological standards set by the communist party and are no longer able to report on any violent attacks or demonstrations. The second panel saw experts from different countries and regions explaining the international perspective regarding the violation of human rights in the name of counter- terrorism activities. The first speaker presented the Indian view on the situation. Mr Jayadeva Ranade (Centre for China Analysis and Strategy) stated

that the oppression has increased in recent years due to the efforts by the Chinese president Xi Jinping to centralise China even further. The reason for the anti- terrorism law according to Mr Ranade is because the

attacks against the interests of the Chinese government are no longer limited to the minority areas but have spread throughout China. Furthermore, China is increasing its pressure on, and cooperation with, neigbouring Asian countries to limit the movement of

the Uyghurs and Tibetans. For example, Pakistan is closely working with the Chinese to identify Uyghurs in the country and deporting them to China. Chinese influence in Nepal has also sharply increased which threatens the interests and security of the Tibetans. Ms Jessica Carl, the political officer at the US Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, explained the position of the United States government through a series of examples of recent activities. During the Human Rights Council session in March 2016, the US and Canadian Permanent Missions to the UN organised a side-event in Geneva with nobel laureates discussing human rights. The Dalai Lama also attended and used the podium to highlight the ongoing struggle of the

Tibetan people for human rights and dignity. At the 31st HRC session, the USA and 11 other countries presented a joint statement condemning Chinese actions including the “unexplained recent disppaearances and apparant coerced returns”. The third speaker, Ms Garrie van Pinxteren (Sinologist and Senior visiting fellow at the Clingendael Institute) provided the audience with the preliminary findings of her ongoing research into the media in China. According to Ms Van Pinxteren, investigative journalism has become more and more difficult and marginalised since 2012, the start of her research. Only very few critical journalists remain and they have less support than ever. In the past it was possible to be critical at times, especially about the environment and economic transparancy, but this leniency has also disappeared. Ms Joëlle Hivonnet (China division of the European External Action Service (EEAS)), expressed the EU&#39;s position on the new

counter-terrorism law. She pointed to five major concerns: 1. the definition is too vague and can thus be used in too many circumstances; 2. there is no independent legal recourse; 3. it results in total control over the media; 4. the Internet controls are too wide and 5. it sets a framework for arresting persons outside China. The conference was closed with a debate between the panellists and the audience about how to monitor the anti-terrorism actions and how to come up with a joint action to further the respect for human rights of the Tibetans, Uyghurs and Chinese people.

CP Stops SVPolicies protecting Muslim rights must be passed to stop violenceChung 09 (Chien-peng, associate professor of political science at Lingnan University, in Hong Kong, “Pacifying the Uighurs”, 07/08/09, 06/22/16, http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/08/what-should-china-do-about-the-uighurs/?_r=0)//BME

Although no major incidents were reported on Wednesday, unlike the previous three days, most non-government establishments in Urumqi were closed for the entire day. The streets of Urumqi and other major Xinjiang cities were flooded with truckloads and columns of riot policemen, with soldiers massed along Urumqi’s roadsides and at Xinjiang’s military bases on high alert and ready for immediate deployment. Together with nightly curfews, this is a recommendable strategy to restore and maintain order for the time

being. The Chinese authorities cannot be perceived as favoring either the Han Chinese or the Uighurs as it moves to control the unrest. With racial tension still in the air, the danger is that a pattern of attacks and counterattacks between armed Uighur and Han Chinese may emerge in the days to come, not only in Xinjiang, but also in large Chinese cities elsewhere . This would be difficult

and tricky for government security forces to deal with. If the authorities crack down heavily on the protesting Uighurs, it could be seen as further discrimination against them, since most members of the security forces are Han Chinese. But if the authorities are to be equally or more tough on a Han Chinese mob, perception

of official favoritism and appeasement toward minorities could incite further Han-on-Uighur violence everywhere. It is important for the security forces to be perceived as fair and even-handed in preventing destructive acts or apprehending troublemakers. To calm public sentiments further, people who were arrested in connection with the riots over the past few days should either be quickly charged or released. Despite allegations by the Chinese government that the protest on July 5 and riots were instigated, directed and organized from overseas, chiefly by the World Uyghur Congress, the authorities should be mindful that it is perfectly imaginable for Uighurs who had some experience with leadership roles in schools, factories, social groups, trade guilds, mosques, the Communist Youth League and even local Communist Party organizations to take the lead in mobilizing marches before allowing the crowds’ emotion to take over. The arrests of several people on Tuesday in connection with the brawl between Uighurs and Han Chinese workers at the toy factory in Shaoguan, Guangdong, on June 25, 2009, which led to the deaths of two Uighurs and was believed to have sparked off the July 5 riots, was a good start to

pacify Uighur sentiments. However, other grievances broadly held by Uighurs should be addressed. The perception that economic development in Xinjiang aids Han Chinese at the expense of Uighurs cannot be allowed to continue. The government must look into effectively enforcing existing, and devising more, affirmative action policies to ensure that Uighurs do not feel marginalized. Muslim religious activities in Xinjiang could still be closely monitored for separatist or violent tendencies, but left to operate with minimum overt interference by the authorities. Communist Party cadres should demonstrate respect for Muslim and other religious customs whenever possible in public. Travel restrictions to overseas destinations for Uighurs should be no different from those for other Chinese nationals. Governments of countries around China and Xinjiang such as Russia, those of Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India have their own problems with ethnic minorities, separatism and violence, so are very unlikely to support any separatist aspirations by Uighur or other ethnic minorities in China, and have in fact been enlisted as active partners in the fight against ethnic separatism, violence and religious fundamentalism. China’s foreign missions in many European countries were pelted with rocks by Uighur demonstrators yesterday, but the governments of these countries will not allow the situation to continue.

The US must use a policy action to help solve Chinese human rights Lum 15 (Thomas, specialist in Asian affairs, “Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy:Issues for the 114th Congress”, 09/17/15, 06/23/16, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43964.pdf)//BME

The PRC government’s aim of maintaining social stability gradually has become more complicated, according to many observers. Chinese society has become more diverse and

individuals and groups have become more assertive regarding their interests. PRC citizens have become increasingly aware of their legal rights, while emerging networks of lawyers, journalists, and activists have advanced the causes of many aggrieved individuals and groups. Public protests are frequent and widespread, although they predominantly are focused on local or economic issues rather than national political ones. Economic, social, and demographic changes and other factors have fueled labor unrest. The Internet has made it impossible for the government to restrict information as fully as before. Many experts and policymakers have sharply disagreed over the best policy approaches and methods to apply toward human rights issues in China. The United States Congress has been at the forefront of U.S. human rights policy toward China, and has formed the legislative pillars of Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 114th Congress Congressional Research Service that policy. Possible approaches range from supporting incremental progress and promoting human rights through bilateral and international engagement to conditioning the further development of bilateral ties on improvements in human rights in China. Congress and the executive branch have developed an array of policy tools aimed at promoting democracy and human rights in China, including the following: open censure of China; quiet diplomacy; congressional hearings; U.S. support for rule of law and civil society programs in the PRC; support for dissidents and pro-democracy groups in China and the United States; sanctions; coordinating international pressure; bilateral dialogue ; Internet freedom efforts; and public diplomacy

Reforms Key Economic engagement alone fails- China policies must be reformed firstBlank ’09 (Stephen, as served as the Strategic Studies Institute’s expert on the Soviet bloc and the post-Soviet world since 1989, “China: Examining the Root Causes of Xinjiang's Ethnic Discontent”, 07/08/2009, 06/23/16, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav070909b.shtml)//BME

The early July inter-ethnic violence that hit China's western Xinjiang Province may have been shocking, but it shouldn't have been

surprising. Tension between the Uighur and Han Chinese communities had been steadily building over the past three decades, and Communist authorities in Beijing hadn't been doing much to defuse simmering anger. On July 9, Beijing began forcefully reasserting its authority after four days of Uighur rioting in

Xinjiang's provincial capital, Urumqi, and other population centers. "Preserving and maintaining the overall stability of Xinjiang is currently the most urgent task," said a statement issued by China's Politburo Standing Committee on July 9, as reported by the official Xinhua News Agency. Authorities were flooding Urumqi with security forces, some of whom rode into the city center in trucks emblazoned with slogans such as "We must defeat the terrorists." Meanwhile, handbills posted throughout the city called on local residents to "keep calm and maintain public order." Overall, at least 156 people died and 1,100 were injured in the rioting, which began on July 5. Some reports suggest as many as 800 people may have been killed. Many of the victims were Han Chinese who fell at the hands of rampaging Uighurs. As of July 7, authorities had taken over 1,400 people into custody in connection with the unrest. Officials have vowed to execute those responsible for fomenting mayhem. The spark for the social explosion in Xinjiang reportedly was a deadly factory brawl in far-away, coastal Guangdong Province. The brawl broke out amid suspicion that a Uighur worker had sexually assaulted a Han Chinese woman. In an interesting twist, it seems that Uighur protesters mimicked tactics used by anti-government demonstrators in Iran in June -- utilizing internet-based social networking platforms to disseminate information and to organize. Chinese leaders have long sought to contain the internet's power to inform. The Xinjiang events suggest that Beijing's efforts to keep a lid on the internet haven't worked. One gets the sense that the large-scale violence and loss of life in Xinjiang could have been avoided, given that the problems which fueled the rioting have long been

evident. Uighurs not too long ago constituted a healthy majority in Xinjiang. But two decades of programs designed to bolster Beijing's grip over remote Western regions prompted a massive influx of Han Chinese. As a result, the indigenous population now feels that its cultural survival is threatened. On top of ethnic-identity anxiety, there is economic disparity to contend with. Beijing, it is true, has poured a considerable amount of resources into the region to improve its infrastructure, due in large part to the fact that Xinjiang is a hub for trade with Central Asian states, as well as China's largest oil-producing region. But changes seem to have benefited the local Han population more than Uighurs. Signs that frustration was reaching the boiling point were evident in June. On June 16, for example, inter-ethnic tension spiked when a Uighur member of local security forces in Urumqi shot and killed a Han Chinese individual during a protest over a local construction project. Xinhua characterized the incident as an accidental shooting. Earlier news reports indicated that small-scale protests and property damage were fairly common in the region. In one such June incident, a

crowd angered by a proposed tax hike wrecked police cars and temporarily blocked a highway. Such spontaneous outbursts offered clear indicators that the indigenous population is feeling oppressed. But rather than address the root cultural and political causes of rising discontent, Chinese authorities have consistently attributed Uighur restlessness to economic stratification brought on by backwardness. Once order is fully restored, Beijing will likely keep on throwing money at the problem. Yet, experience has shown this approach tends to exacerbate ethnic tension, rather than ease it. Uighurs see their land disappearing and their Muslim religion being persecuted, or co-opted by state agencies. Economic improvements so far haven't offset these perceived disadvantages. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that discontent within the Uighur community will continue to spread. Ultimately, Xinjiang's problem is political. The official reaction to the July

events so far suggests that China's leaders have no ready answers on how to ease frustration before it spills over into violence. The tired response of blaming outside agitators and branding troublemakers as terrorists hints that officials are unwilling to substantively grapple with the root causes of discontent. Economic development tends to intensify ethnic and national consciousness, instead of dissipating such feelings. Within this context, the Uighur unrest of early July serves as another indicator that Chinese leaders should recalibrate their governing style. China has achieved remarkable progress over the last quarter-century. But the socio-economic forces unleashed by rapid development are powerful, and they require the country's leadership to constantly adapt in order to ensure continuing stability.

China’s harsh anti-terrorism initiative is the root cause of Uyghur radicalization – reform is crucialSakaoğlu 14 (Emre Tunç, Research Assistant at the USAK Center for Asia-Pacific Studies, “Ethnic conflict in China's Xinjiang: Reasons behind it and proposals for solution”, 08/20/14, 06/23/16, http://www.turkishweekly.net/2014/08/20/op-ed/ethnic-conflict-in-chinas-xinjiang-reasons-behind-it-and-proposals-for-solution/)//BME

Protests occasionally occur in the region and culminate in bloodshed due to security forces’ harsh interventions. This time however, the reason behind protests was an anti-terror campaign initiated in response to several attacks by assailants of Uyghur origin against Chinese civilians in recent months. Official sources claim that in the last year or so more than 200 people have died in Xinjiang because of widespread unrest and terrorism, making no distinction between the two. The sources trace the roots of the events to individuals, mostly of foreign origin and with links to the outlawed East Turkestan Islamic Movement. It is asserted that these individuals provoke loyal citizens and spread Islamic extremism. But beside foreign influences, which in reality are limited, it is rather

the domestic dynamics, intrinsic to the social and political context in Xinjiang , that actually play the leading role in the radicalization of at least a small minority of Uyghurs. It is known that terror attacks against civilians are unspeakable, therefore what motivates a historically tolerant people, or at least a fraction thereof, to commit

such violence after centuries of peaceful existence needs to be elaborated more clearly. Attacking civilians was never the trend among the Uyghur community until the 1990s, when Chinese authorities increased the pressure on moderate masses and started to restrict their lifestyles in a more concentrated manner as part of the final phase of a decades-old policy of assimilating the region and its people. It was especially a result of Beijing’s push for the assimilation of millions of Uyghurs, which was presented under the guise of fighting “terrorism” and “extremism” following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, that radical groups with links to Pakistan and Afghanistan began to gain influence, although still limited, among Uyghur youth. Moreover, because China shares five border-crossings with Pakistan which are all located in the mountainous southwest of the Uyghur region, Islamist militants are able to infiltrate the region and convince alienated Uyghur youth to accompany them to training and indoctrination camps in Pakistan. The recent spate of terrorist attacks, which were allegedly committed under the influence of jihadism imported from Xinjiang’s close neighborhood, began in October 2013, when a vehicle that was set ablaze struck a group of civilians near Mao Zedong’s portrait in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, in what official sources deemed a suicide attack. A string of such incidents came to follow. In March 2014, a more severe episode occurred when knife and axe-wielding assailants attacked a train station in the southwestern town of Kunming, killing 29 civilians indiscriminately. Many Chinese refer to the events as “China’s 9/11”. In similar incidents which occurred in Xinjiang, a railway station was bombed in April and a market was bombed by terrorists in May, which led to the deaths of at least 46 people and severe injury of over 200 others in total. These attacks prompted officials to launch an extensive, region-wide offensive against the local population as a means of collective punishment under the guise of an anti-terror campaign. Sticking with Chinese leaders’ traditional rhetoric on the issue, Chinese President Xi Jinping ordered during a conference on Xinjiang in May the establishment of metaphoric “walls made of copper and steel” and “nets spread from the earth to the sky” in order to suppress terrorism. He claims that although Chinese and Uyghurs have always been living together in peace and tranquility, jihadists from Afghanistan and Pakistan are radicalizing the environment. Likewise, Tianshan News, which is the official web portal of the Xinjiang government, recently quoted Xinjiang Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian as stating in a provocative tone that “to fight such evils [terrorism and unrest], we must aim at extermination. To cut weeds, we must dig out the roots.”[2] Indeed, such a mindset has been dominant for decades in a China where even moderate activists, intellectuals, and well-educated community leaders who are well-integrated within the Chinese society that dare to voice discontent with the central government’s policies even in a restrained manner are mostly thrown into jail

or exiled on charges of terrorism. But any kind of nationalist or civil rights movement which is so harshly repressed has the potential of being hijacked by religious extremism, which in turn, according to countless experiences gained all around the world, makes

matters worse for all parties involved and creates a black hole in the region. Today, Beijing continues to perceive any kind of peaceful protest originating from home-grown grievances and widespread dissatisfaction with intrusions into Uyghurs’ lifestyle as a sign of global jihadism, and responds harshly. But Beijing’s iron fist policies of not tolerating even a bit of criticism only causes Uyghurs to instead fall prey to foreign propaganda and extremism, thus becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. And it seems as long as Beijing continues to handle the civil conflict that is going on in Xinjiang in a superficial and security-oriented way, Uyghurs, as well as Han Chinese in the region, will continue to suffer.

Reform on crackdown policies must be reversed to solve Uyghur relationsKanat 02/04/16 (KILIÇ BUĞRA, the Research Director at the SETA Foundation at Washington DC. He is also an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Penn State University, “The Securitization of the Uyghur Question and Its Challenges”, 02/04/16, 06/23/16, http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/kanat-18-1-web.pdf)//BME

This new paradigm for XUAR will be possible only if China admits the failure of its current policies. All military and security measures taken by the central administration have contributed to the complexity of the problem rather than to its resolution. The implementation of “strike hard” operations since the mid-1990s have been the number one reason behind the transformation of this problem into an ethnic gangrene. As Uyghurs try to express in different ways the grievances they hold with Chinese policies, dissident movements either move out of the country or retreat underground. Forcing imams to dance in squares or take loyalty oaths has not helped the recovery of the relations between Uyghurs and the State. Considering the last 25 years of relations between the Uyghurs and the PRC, the frequency of protests and demonstrations in XUAR has constantly increased and spread in the country despite all efforts to suppress them. The province of Urumqi, the population of which is 90 percent Chinese and is expectedly to be the most successful in terms of ethnic integration, has been a scene for conflict since July 2009, indicating that the PRC-Uyghur relations continue to be very problematic. Despite bans, crackdowns, the use of force and blackouts in communication, protests and demonstrations have continued to increase. Police violence in cities rapidly triggers demonstrations in different parts of the region. In order to exit this cycle of violence, China should resign from these policies.

CP Effective Promoting human rights through engagement is both peaceful and most likely to be effective Lum 15 (Thomas, specialist in Asian affairs, “Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy:Issues for the 114th Congress”, 09/17/15, 06/23/16, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43964.pdf)//BME

Many experts and policymakers have sharply disagreed over the best policy approaches and methods to apply toward human rights issues in China. Possible approaches range from supporting incremental progress and promoting human rights through bilateral and international engagement to placing human rights conditions upon improvements in bilateral ties. Some approaches attempt to balance U.S. values and human rights concerns with other U.S. interests in the bilateral relationship. Other approaches challenge the underlying assumption that U.S. values and human rights concerns necessarily are in tension with other U.S. interests, arguing instead that human rights are fundamental to other U.S. interests. Since the end of the 1980s, successive U.S. administrations have employed broadly similar strategies for promoting human rights in China. Some analysts have referred to the U.S. foreign policy approach of promoting human rights and democracy in China through diplomatic and economic

engagement , without directly challenging Communist Party rule, as a strategy of seeking China’s “peaceful evolution.”223 President Bill Clinton referred to this approach as “constructive engagement”—furthering diplomatic and economic ties while pressing for open markets and democracy, calling it “our best hope to secure our own interest and values and to advance China’s.”224 President George W. Bush also came to view U .S. engagement as the most

effective means of promoting U.S. interests as well as freedom in China.225 Another theme of both the Bush and Obama Administrations has been to emphasize that China’s respect for international human rights norms would benefit China’s success and stability.226 As China’s importance in global economic, security, environmental, and other matters has grown, the Obama Administration has attempted to forge bilateral cooperation on many fronts, while disagreeing with Beijing on many human rights issues. During President Obama’s first term, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described the Administration’s human rights policy as one of “principled pragmatism.” This approach was based upon the premise that tough but quiet diplomacy is both less disruptive to the overall relationship and more effective in producing change than public censure. Nonetheless, Clinton and Secretary of State Kerry have publicly criticized China’s human rights policies on several occasions.227 In remarks at a joint press conference following discussions on the sidelines of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in November 2014, President Obama emphasized a number of key issues, including trade, climate change, and international security, as well as human rights, stating that “America’s unwavering support for fundamental human rights of all people will continue to be an important element of our relationship with China.”228 Some activists argue that the United States should take principled stands against China’s human rights abuses more openly, forcefully, and frequently. Many prominent Chinese dissidents have emphasized that international pressure and attention has protected them from harsher treatment by PRC authorities.229 Other experts believe that more overt efforts may undermine human rights objectives. Some observers contend that U.S. open criticism of PRC human rights policies can

strengthen hardliners in the PRC leadership or create greater suspicion of foreign influences and ties.230

CP 1 ST The Chinese Government cannot begin to resolve Uighur unrest until the Uighur population is treated with respectHsiu-lun Teng 09 Fall 2009 “Human Rights in China” http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/researchdigest/china/China.pdf Hsiu-lun Ten: Ph.D. Candidate //NV

Resolutions and Their Feasibility The Chinese government has justified its policies in Xinjiang by claiming that it is battling separatism, terrorism, and extremism there. This is true if one defines these terms (as the PRC does) as any action on the part of Uighurs perceived as dissent. However, this claim could be clearly contested when considering that Uighur demands come from a very specific political and economic context of detrimental policies towards them. The Chinese government is not suppressing a small number of extremists, but rather a major portion of the Uighur population. These policies may work indefinitely in suppressing unrest, but they do not address its underlying causes. Until the Chinese government effectively addresses the reasons behind the Uighurs’ protests, offers some type of meaningful autonomy to the region, or at least begins to treat Uighurs with human dignity, the problem will not be resolved.

US Conditions key US ought to take action - (Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China Elizabeth Van Wie Davis Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies January 2008 http://apcss.org/college/publications/uyghur-muslim-ethnic-separatism-in-xinjiang-china/ - ES -)

The April 1990 armed uprising in Baren marked an increase in Uyghur Muslim violence in Xinjiang, China. Two justifications—ethnic separatism and religious rhetoric—are given. The Uyghurs, who reside throughout the immediate region, are the largest Turkic ethnic group living in Xinjiang as well as being overwhelmingly Muslim. This combination of ethnicity and religion also involves the movement of religious and political ideologies, weapons, and people. The desired outcome by groups that use violence is, broadly speaking, a separate Uyghur state, called either Uyghuristan or Eastern Turkistan, which lays claim to a large part of China. While some Uyghurs want a separate state, others want to maintain cultural distinction within an autonomous relationship with China, and

others are integrating into the Chinese system. There is no single Uyghur agenda. The violent outbreaks in Xinjiang occur sporadically, and the groups that claim responsibility are frequently splintering, merging, and collapsing. Some of the Uyghur groups make claims that are difficult to substantiate. Nonetheless, the Uyghur grievances against the Chinese government have old roots. Some of the newer elements include Turkey’s unofficial support and Muslim funding and training from abroad. The heavy-handedness of the multiple “strike hard” campaigns by the central Chinese government in Xinjiang simultaneously tamps down violence in the short-run but fuels a sense of injustice and mistrust among the Uyghurs in the long-run. Beginning in 1996, regular “strike hard” campaigns were used to fight crime and threats to order by mobilizing police, but are used in this decade to deal

increasingly with “separatism, extremism and terrorism.” A heavy police presence is a constant in Xinjiang. U.S. policy on this issue is constrained. Not only does the US need to work with China on issues of geostrategic

importance, but also the Uyghurs who use violence have formed limited associations with

groups that are categorized as terrorist organizations . The best option for the United States is to continue to encourage China to use the rule of law and to respect human rights.

Religious freedom has been violated by preventing Uyghurs from praying and fasting during RamadanLiang ’16 [Yuan-ling Liang, staff writer, 6/16/16, “China Forces Uighurs to Eat During Ramadan,” The News Lens, http://international.thenewslens.com/article/42166] EP

The Chinese government is preventing Uighurs in Xinjiang from practicing religion regardless of the white paper issued ahead of Ramadan, which promised to guarantee their freedom of belief . To restrict religious activities, the Chinese government has been tightening its policy in Xinjiang, where 60% of people are Muslim

and started fasting earlier this month. Besides the detention of residents of the region who encourage religious practices, Muslims have also been forced to eat during Ramadan, a traditional period of fasting for them. Approximately 20 million people practice Islam across China; half of them live in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. On June 2, before the beginning of Ramadan, Chinese officials issued a white paper praising religious freedoms and promised to cause “no stress” on Muslims’ religious practices. “All citizens’ freedom of belief and religious activities are guaranteed,” the paper said, adding that “No citizens should be discriminated for believing in a certain religion or be forced not to believe in one.” The paper not only allowed all restaurants to decide their opening hours during Ramadan, but also barred anyone from intervening in the matter. However, when Ramadan started on June 6, the Chinese government broke its promises. Dilax Raxit,

spokesperson for the World Uyghur Congress, told Taiwan’s Central News Agency that Chinese officials had prevented all workers, students and women from fasting and praying. Uighurs were also required to sign a document of responsibility, promising they would not practice their religion “illegally .” “The Chinese government established these policies at the beginning of Ramadan because they

regard Uighurs’ religious beliefs as a threat to Beijing authorities,” Dilax Raxit said. He said China was

“politicizing” Muslims in Xinjiang. ‘Forced to eat and drink’ campaign Dilax Raxit also said that the Chinese government

has been forcing Uighurs to eat and drink “by all means.” Many governmental organizations held huge events and tea parties, inviting Uighurs to feast. Officials at Aksu City in Xinjiang told the Radio Free China

that schools and parents would be forced to take responsibility if students are found fasting. In some primary schools, Uighur students were even forced to eat zongzi, or sticky rice dumplings, during Dragon Boat Festival celebrations to demonstrate their “recognition of traditional Chinese culture.” The government can also control these people by observing their reaction to such policies. Officials in Korla City and the Qapqal Xibe Autonomous County in Xinjiang both announced that all restaurants should continue to serve food to “make sure that all local people can enjoy the services.” Banning prayer and practices According to the official website of Korla City, a census will be carried out by the local government and the police to “stabilize” the situation in Xinjiang during Ramadan. Throughout that period,

residents will allegedly be punished if they are caught praying or fasting. Party members, public servants and students are all restricted from praying in mosques. If found doing so, public servants will be fired. In Urumqi, mosques have been provided with 10,000 renminbi to prevent people from praying. Mosques and restaurants are monitored 24 hours a day. Six police officers and 12 soldiers have been allocated in each region, raiding households in the early morning to check

residents’ behavior. By June 6, 17 people had already been detained for promoting religious activities in Xinjiang. DNA identification The Public Safety Bureau in Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture announced at the beginning of this month that all traveling documents, such as passports, should include the owner’s DNA, fingerprints, voiceprints and even 3D imaging data. If the information is incomplete, travelers will not get the permission to travel.

Government control of Ramadan fasting causes vast violations of religious freedom and discriminationLong and Jiaquing ’16 [Qiao Long and Pan Jiaqing, translated by Luisetta Mudie, 6/6/16, “China Enters Ramadan With Round-The-Clock Surveillance of Mosques, Uyghurs,” Radio Free Asia, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/ramadan-06062016113750.html] EP

Authorities in northwestern China's troubled Xinjiang region have detained 17 people for encouraging the region's mostly Muslim Uyghurs to fast during the holy month of Ramadan , overseas rights groups said on Monday. Five Uyghurs were taken away by plainclothes police in Qaghiliq county (in Chinese, Yecheng county) near the Silk Road city of Kasghar on Friday, the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) said as Ramadan began. And police in Kuqa county, Aksu (Akesu) prefecture, detained 12 people at the gates of a major mosque in the county town, taking them away in minivans, WUC spokesman

Dilxat Raxit told RFA's Mandarin Service. "According to our sources, the police said they were spreading propaganda at the gates of the mosque about observing Ramadan," he said. Beijing has implemented strict rules in Xinjiang forbidding anyone under the age of 18 from following a religion , levying hefty fines against families whose children study the Quran or fast during Ramadan. Parents and guardians of Uyghur children and teens are frequently pressured by local officials into signing pledges promising not to allow them to take part in any religious activity. Muslim members of the ruling Chinese Communist Party are forbidden to openly follow their religion, while state-run organizations are routinely ordered to encourage everyone to eat during daylight hours, sources in the region have told

RFA. "The Chinese government has forbidden Uyghurs from leaving their places of residence during Ramadan , and if they do leave, they have to give the authorities details of their itinerary or destination," Raxit said.

Payouts to mosques In the regional capital Urumqi, which saw 200 people die in ethnic violence in 2009, officials are handing out payouts to the city's mosques in return for their cooperation with security personnel during Ramadan. "They want the mosque staff to assist the security personnel who are installed in the mosques 24 hours a day to carry

out surveillance," Raxit said on Monday. "They want to confirm the identities of every person who comes to pray at the mosque." The texts of any sermons preached during Ramadan must also be passed by Beijing's censors before they can be delivered, Raxit said. In Ili (Yili) prefecture in the north of Xinjiang, officials were being ordered to read guidelines issued to Communist Party members on party discipline and on the punishments meted out

to officials who fast, before signing pledges not to observe Ramadan, he said. Muslim officials caught observing the fast face expulsion from their jobs and from the party, according to the regulations. Meanwhile, Uyghur-run

restaurants are forbidden to shut their doors during fasting hours, according to a government directive. A Han Chinese resident of Xinjiang surnamed Zhang said some will seek to evade the policy, however. "I asked some Uyghurs about this, and they said they will use indirect methods, such as saying that there were no customers ... or they will prepare all of the food

in advance," Zhang said. "Anyone who takes a government salary or pension has been ordered not to observe Ramadan, so they have to comply, because the government is their source of income ," he said. 'Effectively contained' Zhang said the measures began to be implemented only following the July 5, 2009 riots in Urumqi, which exile groups said were sparked by police firing on an unarmed crowd of demonstrators. "They never used to have these policies in all the decades before July 5," Zhang said. "But they are seldom written down in black at white. No official will actually say

that they don't want people to fast." China last Wednesday issued a white paper lauding "unprecedented" levels of religious freedom in Xinjiang, official media reported. It said "the proliferation and spread of religious extremism

is being effectively contained" in the region, while claiming that "no citizen suffers discrimination or unfair treatment for believing in, or not believing in, any religion." "The government's capacity to administer religious affairs is constantly being strengthened," the document said. Raxit said the white paper

was "unacceptable." "Uyghurs are subject to all manner of government bans and controls on their religious activity , " he said. "Public anger will lead to more disturbances, and Beijing will bear the political responsibility."

China’s Counter-Terrorism Law allows for human rights violations of Uyghur peopleUyghur Human Rights Project 16 . "BRIEFING: China's New Counter-Terrorism Law and Its Human Rights Implications for the Uyghur People." Uyghur Human Rights Project. N.p., 1 Feb. 2016. Web. 23 June 2016. EP

The Uyghur Human Rights Project was founded by the Uyghur American Association. It is run by Alim Seytoff, who has a B.A. in Chinese Studies and Broadcast Journalism, a M.A. in Public Policy, and a J.D(doctor of law). Degree.

The Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP) is concerned a new Counter-Terrorism Law adopted by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on December 27, 2015, and effective as of January 1, 2016, is a mandate for the Chinese government to commit human rights violations against the Uyghur people in East Turkestan. UHRP is

concerned: The broad and vague definitions of “terrorism” and “religious extremism ” contained in the legislation are an attempt to criminalize peaceful expressions of religious belief and legitimize heavy-handed repression i n East Turkestan in order to eradicate all Uyghur opposition, peaceful or otherwise, real or virtual. The curbs placed on reporting of alleged “terror incidents” and on

disseminating information on the Internet violate the right to free expression. In addition, the Chinese state’s efforts to silence all Uyghurs, journalists or citizen journalists alike, from reporting, talking, writing, uploading genuine

photos or videos of all incidents the state labels as “terrorist” by accusing them of spreading “rumors” aims to consolidate the narrative that China faces a concerted terror threat in East Turkestan. The lack of oversight on state security forces will not end the use of excessive force and extrajudicial killings in “counter-terror” operations. The law provides maximum authority for China’s security forces to conduct rights violations against the Uyghur population while reducing protection of the Uyghur people’s legitimate rights. In practice, China has provided immunity to its security forces to deal with Uyghur dissent and protest critical of repressive rule in East Turkestan. The promulgation of mass

education campaigns on “counter-terror” is intended to flush out peaceful Uyghur opponents to the government’s interpretation of “religious extremism.” “The new Counter-Terrorism Law is a pathway to a fresh round of Uyghur human rights violations. The law will not ensure the security of the people of East Turkestan and will only increase tensions through the criminalization of legitimate activities. It will serve to further alienate and marginalize the Uyghurs. I fear the region is

headed toward a descent into further repression. That the Chinese government is preparing for these human rights abuses to happen in an information void is even more disturbing,” said UHRP Director, Alim Seytoff in a statement from Washington, DC. Mr.

Seytoff added: “When foreign governments express concern over human rights violations in East Turkestan, China justifies its repression as part of the global war on terror and condemns its critics for ‘double standards on terrorism,’ even though, as is evident in the new law, the Chinese definition and standard of terrorism fall far short of international standards .” UHRP believes the vague definition of “terrorism” and restrictions placed on reporting “terror incidents” constitute the most serious problems with the Counter-Terrorism Law. Observers should apply a high degree of skepticism in any assessment of a transparent implementation of the new legislation in East Turkestan. China prevents and punishes commentary, domestic and foreign, critical of its repressive policies and “counter-terror” measures in the region. The cases of Uyghur academic Ilham Tohti, Xinjiang Daily editor Zhao Xinwei and French reporter Ursula Gautier demonstrate Beijing’s zero tolerance for such questioning.

Policies = Oppressive China hides behind the ruse of terror threat to violently target MuslimsLodge 6/3 [Carey Lodge, journalist, 6/3/16, “China's Uyghur crisis: The hidden persecution of Muslims,” Christian Today, http://www.christiantoday.com/article/chinas.uyghur.crisis.the.hidden.persecution.of.muslims/87539.htm] EP

China is widely considered to be one of the worst countries in the world for religious freedom. But while the persecuted Church often dominates the headlines in Western media, much less is known about the persecuted Muslim

community in China's far-western corner. Xinjiang is an autonomous region right at the tip of north-western China, bordering eight countries including Tibet, India, Russia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Traditionally, the majority of the population is Uyghur (or Uighur), a Turkic-language speaking group most of whom are Muslim, and Islam plays a significant role in the culture. However, though historically the territory has been fought over for

hundreds of years, it came under the rule of the Qing dynasty in the 18th century and later under Mao's Communist Party of China (CPC), which maintains strict controls on religion. Designated a country of particular concern by the US

since 1999, the Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) last month condemned the government's "severe religious freedom violations", in particular the "at times violent crackdown on Uighur Muslims" in Xinjiang. "China 's leadership has long justified its harsh policies... by asserting the importance of confronting the so-called 'three evils' – separatism, terrorism, and religious extremism," the USCIRF said. "In 2015, the Chinese Communist Party tightened its internal ideology, elevating the crusade

against the three evils, particularly with respect to religious freedom." In January last year, the government's 2014 'strike-

hard' anti-terror campaign was extended, and wide-scale restrictions were imposed against Uyghur Muslims in

Xinjiang. Thousands were detained in security sweeps, some with deadly force, and jail sentences were given out for wearing religious attire. Even men's beards or women's face veils were denounced as "extremist" , and some local authorities threatened action against Muslim business owners if they chose not

to sell alcohol and cigarettes due to their religious beliefs. The previous year, in 2014, some Muslims were imprisoned for taking part in religious gatherings or activities, and were forbidden from fasting during the holy month of Ramadan . Then in April this year, President Xi Jinping urged China to guard itself against foreign infiltration through religion. At a top-level meeting he warned against "ideological infringement by extremists", alluding to a growing concern among officials about Islam in Xinjiang. This week, however, China pledged that there would this year be no interference with Ramadan, which begins next week. A white paper on religious freedom in Xinjiang released on June 1 confirmed: "During the holy Islamic month of Ramadan, whether to close or open halal restaurants is completely determined by the owners themselves without interference. "No citizen suffers discrimination or unfair treatment for believing in, or not believing in, any religion," the document added, insisting that "religious feelings and needs are fully respected". In Xinjiang, "the positive role of religious circles in promoting economic development and social stability is well displayed, the government's capability of administrating religious affairs is constantly strengthened, international exchanges in the religious field are being expanded, and the proliferation and spread of religious extremism is being effectively contained," it said. However, reports surfaced at the end of May that legal and religious officials in the city of Khorgos had already inspected more than 30 ethnic restaurants and had them "guarantee normal business during Ramadan," according to Reuters. Dilxat Raxit, a spokesman for international organisation of exiled Ugyhur groups, the World Uyghur Congress (WUC), urged the US to raise the suppression of Uyghurs during talks in Beijing due to start on Monday. He told

Reuters that China's "lies could not cover up the truth" about its openly repressive religious policies . Speaking to Christian Today, Dolkun Isa, chairman of the executive committee of the WUC, said he agreed that the white paper was not to be trusted. "If China promises to [uphold freedom of religion] it is very welcome, but we cannot trust it. The Chinese government does not respect its own constitution. If it keeps its promise during Ramadan we will be very happy, but I don't believe this statement is reliable," he said. The issue isn't solely a religious one, however. The CPC's main concern is widely considered to be with maintaining absolute power – and religion is just one among many perceived threats. It's why China announced in 2014 plans to nationalise Christian theology, and only allows state-recognised religious institutions to operate. Even they are closely monitored, and state-approved churches have begun to be targeted during crackdowns. "It is erroneous to conclude that the Uighur crisis is solely religious," journalist Usaid Siddiqui wrote for al-Jazeera last July. "The Uighur nationalists' desire for more autonomy has long

been at odds with China's centralization policy. If anything, Chinese authorities are using the 'war on terrorism' as a cover to demolish the Uighur people's nationalist aspirations." Increased tensions and violence in Xinjiang has been attributed by the government to Uyghur separatists, who want to be free from Beijing's control. The separatist movement was forced underground in the 1990s, but there has been an increase in violence stemming from followers in recent years. In 2009, ethnic rioting resulted in more than 200 deaths and in 2014, 29 people were killed in a mass stabbing attack at Kunming train station in Yunnan province; an incident that was attributed to Muslim Uyghurs. Though the WUC condemns all forms of violence, including that perpetuated by Ugyhur groups, Isa said the CPC has actually had a role to play in the formation of these extremist factions. Open discrimination has led to widespread anger among Ugyhurs. They are not allowed to travel between cities without police permission, and have to register relatives when they come to visit. They must carry two ID cards at all time – "daily life is threatened by the police," Isa said. "Ill feeling has grown". But Isa said that though the government is trying to combat

extremism, there's no doubt it is targeting moderate Muslims, too. "The government uses terrorism as an excuse to attack Uyghurs," he said. And the situation shows no sign of getting better. It's actually worsened under President Xi, who Isa said has used the global fear of terrorism to his own advantage. And Isa accused the international community of being too "soft"

on repressive Chinese policies. "China is now an economic power , and every country wants Chinese money. So China thinks 'I can do what I want, nobody can condemn me because all the world needs my money'. That sends a very wrong message to the Chinese government , " he said. Ahead of the talks on Monday, Isa echoed the call for the US to stand up to China on the issue of religious freedom. "There is a lot of dialogue, but no progress," he said. "Religious freedom is getting worse. Dialogue is very important, but only if it's stronger."

New terrorism policies group Uyghur people with terrorist leading to discrimination and religious violations Katzenstein 16, Lawrence. “Breaking down the implications of China’s new anti-terror law”. Global Risks Insights. 11 Jan. 2016. 23 Jun. 2016. EP

These concerns over the anti-terrorism law come to a head when looking at the case of Uyghurs .

While tech firms have resources and often home country support in dealing with the Chinese government, the Uyghurs, a Turkic

Muslim ethnic group in Xinjiang, have neither resources nor ready foreign support. In fact, it is likely that the new law will simply make matters worse. The Chinese are not strong in recognizing the contributions of ethnic diversity. Nationality groups may be legal citizens, and some, like the Mongols, may have even been the recipients of affirmative action policies, but the social reality is that non-Han Chinese are not seen to be mainstream despite their legal status as citizens. Uyghurs who retain their religious practices and customs are seen as separatists. Some of this is still rooted in the old belief in the superiority of Chinese culture. The Uyghurs are a bare majority ethnic group in Xinjiang at 45%, just larger than the Han Chinese at 40%. The loss of substantial majority has resulted from major government investment in railroads that facilitated Han migration from elsewhere in the country. There has also been major economic investment to make the region increase production. Chinese policy makers had assumed that the increase in average income provided would effectively pacify any Uyghur dissent. In fact, since many of these new jobs have favored hiring Han over Uyghurs, the rising income has not been uniform. In addition, some of the new manufacturing substitutes cheaper manufactured goods for local handmade goods driving down the revenues of Uyghur artisans.

Human rights observers contend that the dilution of the Uyghur identity in their own homeland has been the source of a rift. Chinese authorities who lump Uyghur terrorist acts with international Islamist terror have chosen to ban some people from praying in mosques, fasting on Ramadan, growing beards, or wearing religious dress. This has simply escalated local fears about the loss of identity.

China’s anti-terror law broadly defines terrorism which allows for abusesKatzenstein 16, Lawrence. “Breaking down the implications of China’s new anti-terror law”. Global Risks Insights. 11 Jan. 2016. 23 Jun. 2016. EP

The law’s major purpose was to create a statutory basis for China’s future anti-terrorist activities. To do so, it incorporates actions that Chinese security authorities have already taken

in other contexts. Unlike the United States, China does not have high-profile provisions in its constitution barring unreasonable searches and seizures nor does it have a ‘free exercise clause’ guaranteeing religious freedom. The People’s Republic of China has had little respect for personal privacy in instances where state and regime stability appear to be at stake. The new law is so sweeping that it has the potential to interfere with a wide range of human activity. Terrorism is defined as “any proposition or activity that by means of violence, sabotage, or threat generates social panic, undermines public security, infringes on personal and property rights, and menaces government organs, and international organizations with the aim to realize certain political and ideological purposes”. In theory, any growing social movement that issues demands and has a policy agenda other than that of the government could be in violation. In fact, China itself has shown how broadly they view terrorism by labeling Turkey’s recent shooting and destruction of a Russian bomber an act of terrorism.

Despite legally having religious freedom, the Uyghur population is subject to discrimination based on their religionTeng 09 Teng, Hsiu-lun. Human Rights in China. Beijing: Foreign Languages, 1991. University of Denver, Fall 2009. Web. EP

Traditional Chinese culture relies heavily on a rigid set of social and political values, which include, but are not limited to, a strict

education system, the one-child policy, and adherence to religious practices as outlined in the Chinese Constitution. Article

36 of the Constitution states, “[c]itizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief. No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion….” (Constitution of the People’s Republic of China). Although Islam is one of the five official religions in China, the Chinese government reserves the right to refuse equal protection to any religious group. The Uyghurs are treated more unfairly than other Islamic groups in China .

China’s goal is to reinforce traditional Chinese culture for all those living in the PRC. The government has made it close to impossible for Uyghurs to practice their religion by closing Islamic schools and mosques and forbidding traditional Muslim clothing. Although Uyghurs are officially exempt from abiding by China’s one-child

policy, pregnant Uyghur women are forced into late-term abortions at a rate much higher than Han Chinese women. Being forced to go against their religious beliefs is yet another catalyst for Uyghur unrest in Xinjiang. In response to this situation, China has enforced its policies even more harshly.

For example, parents are not permitted to allow their children to participate in religious activities, and imams must pledge allegiance to the Communist party .

China’s current Anti-terror policies are oppressive and include unjustified violence against the Uyhgurs Hunt 15

(Xinjiang violence: Does China have a terror problem? Updated 8:38 PM ET, Wed December 2, 2015, By Katie Hunt and Matt Rivers, CNNhttp://www.cnn.com/2015/12/02/asia/china-xinjiang-uyghurs/ - ES -)

In a raid last month, Chinese paramilitary forces killed 28 suspects accused of a bloody September attack on a coal mine, flushing them out of a cliffside cave with flamethrowers, according to state media. The attack and police response took place in Xinjiang, an ethnically divided and resource rich province in the China's far west, that is home to the mainly Muslim Uyghur ethnic group. China blamed Uyghur separatists for the attack, and it claims they are no different from ISIS or al Qaeda terrorists. But exile groups and human rights activists say repressive religious policies and economic marginalization are provoking the unrest. Beijing complains that the world applies double standards and China doesn't receive the same level of sympathy as other countries that have fallen victim to terror attacks. "We cannot understand why terrorism, when taking place in other countries, is regarded as terrorism but ethnic and religious issues, when taking place in China," Hua Chunying, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson, said Wednesday. "And we cannot understand why other countries' counter-terrorism acts are justified, but China's counter-terrorism actions are so-called repression of ethnic groups," she added.

China’s racist anti terror policies destroy quality of life for Uygurs – discrimination, unemployment, poor education systemsHunt 15

(Xinjiang violence: Does China have a terror problem? Updated 8:38 PM ET, Wed December 2, 2015, By Katie Hunt and Matt Rivers, CNNhttp://www.cnn.com/2015/12/02/asia/china-xinjiang-uyghurs/ - ES -)

The newcomers take most of the new jobs, and unemployment among Uyghurs is high. They complain of discrimination and harsh treatment by security forces, despite official promises of equal rights and ethnic harmony Uyghur exile groups and human rights activists say repressive religious policies and economic marginalization have provoked much of the recent unrest. They add the education system undermines use of the Uyghur language. China has been criticized for apparent efforts in Xinjiang restricting Muslims from observing Ramadan and, in one city, authorities banned men with beards and women wearing veils from public transportation during a weeks long sporting event. "There are concerns amongst many Uyghurs about the use of their language as a medium of instruction in school, to practice a constitutionally protected right to freedom of religion, to wear clothing that they deem to be part of their ethnic culture such as the headscarf, to pray at mosques, to observe Ramadan," said James Leibold, a senior lecturer at Australia's La Trobe University and an expert in China's ethnic policies.

AT Squo Solves The status quo can’t solve- crackdowns failBBC ’14 (BBC, “Why is there tension between China and the Uighurs?”, 9/26/14, 06/21/16, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia- china-26414014)//BME

Activists say Uighur commercial and cultural activities have been gradually curtailed by the Chinese state. There are complaints of severe restrictions on Islam, with fewer mosques and strict control over religious schools. Rights group Amnesty International, in a report published in 2013, said authorities criminalised &quot;what they labelled &#39;illegal religious&#39; and &#39;separatist&#39; activities&quot; and clamped down on &quot;peaceful expressions of cultural identity&quot;. In July 2014, some Xinjiang government departments banned Muslim civil servants from fasting during the holy month of Ramadan. It was not the first time China had restricted fasting in Xinjiang, but it followed a slew of attacks on the public attributed to Uighur extremists, prompting concerns the ban would increase tensions. China has been accused of intensifying its crackdown on the Uighurs after street protests in the 1990s and again in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics in 2008. But things really escalated in 2009, with large-scale ethnic rioting in the regional capital, Urumqi. Some 200 people were killed in the unrest, most of them Han Chinese, according to officials. Security was increased and many Uighurs detained as suspects. But violence rumbled on as right groups increasingly pointed to tight control by Beijing. In June 2012, six Uighurs reportedly tried to hijack a plane from Hotan to Urumqi before they were overpowered by passengers and crew. There was bloodshed in April 2013 and in June that year, 27 people died in Shanshan county after police opened fire on what state media described as a mob armed with knives attacking local government buildings Establishing facts about these incidents is difficult, because foreign journalists&#39; access to the region is tightly controlled, but in recent months, there appears to have been a shift towards larger-scale incidents where citizens have become the target, particularly in Xinjiang. At least 31 people were killed and more than 90 suffered injuries in May 2014 when two cars crashed through an Urumqi market and explosives were tossed into the crowd. China called it a & terrorist incident;. It followed a bomb and knife attack at Urumqi&#39;s south railway station in April, which killed three and injured 79 others. In July, authorities said a knife-wielding gang attacked a police station and government offices in Yarkant, leaving 96 dead. The imam of China&#39;s largest mosque, Jume Tahir, was stabbed to death days later. In September about 50 died in blasts in Luntai county outside police stations, a market and a shop. Details of both incidents are unclear and activists have contested some accounts of incidents in state media. Some violence has also spilled out of Xinjiang. A March stabbing spree in Kunming in Yunnan province that killed 29 people was blamed on Xinjiang separatists, as was an October 2013 incident where a car ploughed into a crowd and burst into flames in Beijing&#39;s Tiananmen Square. In response to the latest slew of attacks, the authorities have launched what they call a year-long campaign against terrorism, stepping up security in Xinjiang and conducting more military drills in the region. There have also been reports of mass sentencings and arrests of several &quot;terror groups&quot;. Chinese state media have reported long lists of people convicted of extremist activity and in some cases, death sentences. High-profile Uighur academic, Ilham Tohti was detained and later charged in September 2014 on charges of separatism., sparking international criticism. China has often blamed ETIM - the East Turkestan Islamic Movement - or people

inspired by ETIM for violent incidents both in Xinjiang and beyond the region&#39;s borders. ETIM is said to want to establish an independent East Turkestan in China. The US State Department in 2006 said ETIM is &quot;the most militant of the ethnic Uighur separatist groups&quot;. The scope of ETIM&#39;s activities remains unclear with some questioning the group&#39;s capacity to organise serious acts of extremism. ETIM has not said it was behind any of the attacks. Chinese authorities said the Turkestan Islamic Party - which it says is synonymous with ETIM - released a video backing the Kunming attack, however. With the recent apparent escalation in Xinjiang-related violence, the question of who and what is driving it is likely to attract greater scrutiny.

Solvency

Conditions Good

US pressure solves for human rightsUS pressure key to human rights in China

HRW 2010 Humans Right Watch, 2010. Web. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/05/07/letter-secretary-clinton-regarding-us-china-human-rights-dialogue>.

At a time when the Chinese government is intensifying its repression so dramatically, there is great skepticism about the dialogue among Chinese and indeed, all who care about human rights. The dialogue should be seen as part of a consistent and principled engagement with China on human rights. This means that the US should regularly press human rights concerns visibly and consistently outside the dialogue, including at summits, meetings at the cabinet level, and by the US Embassy in Beijing. In addition, the US must also use the dialogue to press key human rights issues, with a clear sense of what benchmarks need to be met over time to make the continuation of such a dialogue worthwhile . The dialogue comes at a critical time for human rights in China. Over the past year, the Chinese government has tightened controls on Uighurs and Tibetans, launched attacks on lawyers and human rights defenders, maintained a chokehold on media freedom, and bolstered government surveillance and censoring of internet communications. It has even obstructed civil society organizations, including groups working with victims of the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake and child victims of the 2008 toxic melamine milk

scandal. Yet the Obama administration's record to date on effectively pressing human rights issues with the Chinese government is mixed. We appreciate publicly articulated concerns such as those by President Obama on World Press Freedom Day on May 3, 2010, about restrictions on media freedom in China. We also were pleased that you took a strong stand on the internet in your January 21, 2010 speech in which you said, "Countries that restrict free access to information or violate the basic rights of Internet users risk walling themselves off from the progress of the next century." We particularly appreciate the interventions made by the US Embassy in Beijing on political prisoners, and Assistant Secretary Posner's mention of Liu Xiaobo and Gao Zhisheng at the release of the State Department's annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009 on March 11, 2010. We are encouraged that Assistant Secretary Posner will participate in the upcoming US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Yet the approach remains inconsistent, which enables the Chinese government to disregard some US interventions on important human rights issues. As under the Bush administration, human rights have been downgraded in US-China

summits and foreign policy discussions with China have eclipsed US efforts to press on human rights. The US government's voice on rights is critical, but at times it has been missing. We urge you to publicly express concern about the March 25, 2010 de-registration of the Women's Legal Research and Services Center at Beijing University, particularly as you visited

the Center in February 2009 and the Center's founder, Guo Jianmei, received the Global Leadership award from Vital Voices, an international women's advocacy group that you co-chair. The Women's Legal Research and Services Center is China's leading independent women's rights organization, yet it was abruptly notified that its affiliation with Beijing University had been terminated. Because China's restrictive laws governing the registration of nonprofit organizations mandate that applicants be affiliated and sponsored by a governmental unit, the decision effectively ends the existence of the center as a registered nongovernmental organization (NGO).

Foreign pressure can solve Chinese human rights abuse- Beijing 5 prove

Genser 15. US News15 Web. <http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2015/12/10/its-time-for-world-leaders-to-stand-up-to-chinas-human-rights-abuses>.

When Freedom Now began serving as pro bono counsel to Liu Xiaobo in mid-2010, just months before he won the Nobel Peace Prize, it was already clear this was a challenging case. He had been convicted and sentenced to 11 years in prison in 2009 for "inciting subversion of state power," based on his writings and being the first signatory on Charter 08, a call for democratic reform of China. But once it was announced Liu won the prize in Oct. 2010, the Chinese government doubled down, detaining his wife to silence her ability to speak out on her husband's behalf. She has suffered a heart attack and severe depression from years of isolation. Through her family, she has begged to be able to travel abroad for medical treatment. But the Chinese government has insisted since the beginning she is "under no legal restriction" despite countless independent reports of the virtual impossibility of breaching her security cordon. [READ: Arms on

Parade] So why should the world care about these two people in a country of over 1.3 billion? We must care because their cases demonstrate the way China now humiliates us all. Liu Xiaobo is the world's only imprisoned Nobel Peace Prize laureate, and his wife is detained merely for being married to her husband. If leaders of the most powerful countries on Earth refuse to take meaningful action to secure their freedom, the unequivocal message sent to courageous Chinese dissidents and others considering the same path is clear and it is stark – you will face down the Chinese government alone. And if there is no consequence for the Chinese government in detaining the two most visible political prisoners in the world, then it can easily ignore its own constitution and laws, let alone its obligations under international law, whenever and wherever it wants. The cases of Liu Xiaobo and Liu Xia are indeed uniquely difficult. But they are equally singularly important. With the slightest political courage, even the simplest collective action could dramatically transform

China's considerations. As a start, imagine if the ambassadors of the United States, United Kingdom and European

Union to China privately informed the government that unless Liu Xia is able to travel abroad for medical treatment, the new policies of these governments would be relentless private and public confrontation with China over her case. At every bilateral meeting on any subject, each government would urge Liu Xia's freedom as an opening comment. And these three ambassadors would invite all foreign ambassadors based in Beijing to join them to try and visit Liu Xia under house arrest; if turned away they would hold a joint press conference to challenge China's

claim that she is not imprisoned. [READ: U.S.-China Cybersecurity Pact Highlights Bigger Issues] China has worked very hard to create an illusion that it is impervious to pressure on human rights. But in reality, what it has actually succeeded in doing brilliantly is persuading governments individually that the costs of confronting China on human rights so far outweigh the benefits that the only way forward is self-censorship. Earlier this year, a dramatic counterexample briefly exposed the truth . After an immense global and collective outcry, the Beijing Five – women's rights campaigners who were arrested as they prepared to distribute stickers and posters opposing domestic violence – were released just a month after their arrest. It is easy for China to bully small countries like Norway that stand alone. But if the most powerful governments in the world stood up to China – and did so together – countless others would have the courage to join them. And it would be China who would need to negotiate, in the same way it does on every other contentious bilateral and multilateral issue.

AT: American human rights violations

We must avoid pointing fingers and focus on correcting human rights abuses wherever we can (this card kinda sucks lol)

Stallman 02. "Richard Stallman's Personal Site." Human Rights in the US, and in China. N.p., 02. Web. <https://stallman.org/human-rights-us-china.html>.

The report's conclusion is that the US, being guilty of human rights abuses, should stop criticizing other countries. That conclusion seems to rest on the view that criticism of human rights abuses is nothing but a way of harassing another country — so that China is really telling the US, "Hey, lay off, or I can do the same to you." That cynical view assumes that human rights have no real importance and no one ought to stand up for them. That cynical view is present implicitly any time someone says, "My country is ok

because some countries are worse," or, "You can't talk; your country is guilty too." Chinese leaders may be cynical about human rights; it would not surprise me if US leaders privately agree, because it would explain why they ignore the problem at home. But cynicism is wrong, because it allows violations to continue. All governments should be pressured to correct their abuses of human rights; from Bolivia to Spain, from the US to China, no government should escape. We must avoid getting sidetracked into arguments about which country is worse, and focus on correcting abuses anywhere and everywhere that we can. The US government places little weight on human rights in its foreign policy (or in its domestic policy); its priority is helping megacorporations. We Americans should replace our leaders with people who will

Counter Terrorism Law SUCKSChina’s Counter-terrorism Law targets Human Rights Activists and gives the police sweeping powers used to oppress marginalized groups

Blanchard 16. "China Passes Controversial Counter-terrorism Law." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 28 Dec. 2015. Web. 23 June 2016. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-security-idUSKBN0UA07220151228>.

Passed by China's national legislature on Wednesday, July 1, the vaguely worded law has drawn criticism as it reinforces government controls over a wide range of areas, including politics, finance, military, cyber security, ideology, the environment, food safety and religion. The legislation empowers the state to take "all necessary measures" to protect its sovereignty and calls for vigilance and defense against "bad cultural influences," "malignant groups" and "criminal activities under the guise of religion" and warns of interference of foreign powers in internal affairs. It also calls for tougher management of the Internet, including measures to prevent the spread of "illegal or harmful information."

Human rights groups such as Amnesty International, however, have slammed the law as "draconian" and urged the Chinese government to immediately repeal it, arguing that it gives Beijing a blank cheque to punish and monitor anyone it does not like such as human rights activists, government critics, independent media and opposition voices. In a DW interview, Dr. Eva Pils, an expert on Chinese law at King's College London, says the main motivation behind the new law is that the Chinese leadership feels threatened by the rise of challengers from within the party and civil society and that the new legislation reflects the party-state's newly assertive, authoritarian and anti-liberal stance under President Xi Jinping. Security personnel stand guard as China's President Xi Jinping (C) sing Chinese national anthem with other delegates during the closing session of the National People's Congress (NPC), China's Parliament, at the Great Hall of the People, in Beijing, March 15, 2015 (Photo: REUTERS/Kim Kyung-Hoon) Eva Pils: 'The current leadership feels threatened by the rise of challengers from within the party and within Chinese society' DW: What exactly

does this new far-reaching security law seek to regulate? Eva Pils: It gives extensive powers to – primarily – the police, state security, and the military to take measures to protect national security, which is defined in an incredibly broad way as "the relative absence of international or domestic threats to the state's power to govern, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, the welfare of the people, sustainable economic and social development, and other major national interests, and the ability to ensure a continued state of security." It also imposes an obligation on all Chinese citizens to contribute to the protection of national security, and it purports to legalize measures taken - both by the authorities of the state and by citizens and organizations "assisting" the authorities - to protect national security.

China Says Yes

Net Beneficial To AgreeThe net benefits to the counterplan are reasons why China says yes – <net benefit explanation> is logically worth more to China than repressing a small group of people because it is China’s best interest in the long run.Hsiu-lun Teng 09 Fall 2009 “Human Rights in China” http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/researchdigest/china/China.pdf Hsiu-lun Ten: Ph.D. Candidate //NV

It is in the Chinese government’s best interest to work towards the improvement of the Uyghur community and to work with Uyghurs as part of a larger society rather than oppose and marginalize them. The opportunity is present but it will require the will of policymakers in Beijing to promote economic development for the Uyghurs rather than a reactionary policy of containing opposition.

DialogueOnly dialogue regarding the Uighurs can make China say yes

- Dolkun Isa, chairman of the executive committee of the World Uyghur Congress

Lodge 6/3 [Carey Lodge, journalist, 6/3/16, “China's Uyghur crisis: The hidden persecution of Muslims,” Christian Today, http://www.christiantoday.com/article/chinas.uyghur.crisis.the.hidden.persecution.of.muslims/87539.htm] //NV

"The government uses terrorism as an excuse to attack Uyghurs," he said. And the situation shows no sign of getting better. It's actually worsened under President Xi, who Isa said has used the global fear of terrorism to his own advantage. And Isa accused the international community of being too "soft" on repressive Chinese policies. "China is now an economic power, and every country wants Chinese money. So China thinks 'I can do what I want, nobody can condemn me because all the world

needs my money'. That sends a very wrong message to the Chinese government," he said. Ahead of the talks on Monday, Isa echoed the call for the US to stand up to China on the issue of religious freedom. "There is a lot of dialogue, but no progress," he said. "Religious freedom is getting worse. Dialogue is very important, but only if it's stronger."

Turkey <3 UyghursTurkey considers Uighurs as TurkishJeremy Page 15, 1/30/15, "5 Things to Know About Turkey and the Chinese Uighurs," WSJ, http://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/2015/01/30/5-things-to-know-about-turkey-and-the-chinese-uighurs/ //NV

Turkish nationalists consider Uighurs kin Many Turkish nationalists regard the Uighurs, who speak a Turkic language, as part of a broad family of ethnic Turks spread across Eurasia. They have lobbied successive Turkish governments to offer refuge to those fleeing Chinese rule and to allow Uighurs to campaign against Beijing’s policies from Turkish soil.

China Shows SympathyChina is showing sympathy for the Uighur populationAhmed Rahid 16, 4-25-2016 "Is China changing its policy towards Uighur Muslims?," No Publication, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/04/china-changing-policy-uighur-muslims-160424083056974.html Ahmed Rashid is a journalist and the author of five books on Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia. His latest book is 'Pakistan on the Brink, the future of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the West'. //NV

Has China just issued its first conciliatory statement towards the Uighur Muslim ethnic group, which has been persecuted for years? And has it done so out of fear or embarrassment that Uighur Islamic militants have now gone global, fighting for Islamic causes in many corners of the globe? Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang, speaking to the Communist Party chief and party delegates of Xinjiang province, appeared to be acknowledging for the first time the deep frustration felt by young Uighurs, the eradication of Uighur culture and, most seriously, the lack of jobs in the province. "Let the people, especially the young, have something to do and money to earn," he told them at China's annual meeting of parliament . He urged private companies to invest in Xinjiang and for the majority Han Chinese population to mingle more with their Uighur brothers. ''Xinjiang's development and stability ... have a bearing on nation and ethnic unity and national security,'' he added (according to Reuters).

No Xinjiang Conflict – EconomyChina is reforming the Xinjiang region – They want economic gainsTom Phillips 15, 10-9-2015, "'A brighter future beckons': China tries to get Xinjiang to join the party," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/09/a-brighter-future-beckons-china-tries-to-get-xinjiang-to-join-the-party Tom Phillips is the Beijing correspondent for the Guardian //NV

For decades Xinjiang , a vast region of snow-capped mountains and deserts, has been the setting for frictions and deadly explosions of violence between the native Muslim Uighur minority and a rising influx of Han Chinese migrants. Now, Beijing – which recently lured British chancellor George Osborne to the resource-rich region – is fighting to promote a more dynamic image of Xinjiang, which president Xi Jinping has placed at the heart of an economic “pivot west” towards Central Asia. “This is a big deal with a lot of time and effort being put into it,” James Leibold, a Xinjiang expert from La Trobe University in Melbourne, said of the festivities. “They need to demonstrate to a whole range of constituencies that Xinjiang is open for business and that Xinjiang is calm and normal.”

AT: Perms

AT: Perm Do BothOne does not simply perm both a plan and a plan plus a new human rights agenda.

Perm do both forfeits US leverage—any legitimate perm includes the plan, which means China has no incentive to engage in reforms in exchange for engagement because the perm gives away our bargaining chip up frontThe sequencing of the CP is key—the US must insist on human rights reform before even considering engaging China the perm makes it simultaneous and weakens U.S. stanceBrown 15 – Senator, Ohio

Sherrod, 9-23, Brown and Burr: U.S.-China Bilateral Investment Treaty Depends on China’s Commitment to Adhere to Internal Trade Obligations, https://www.brown.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/brown-and-burr-us-china-bilateral-investment-treaty-depends-on-chinas-commitment-to-adhere-to-internal-trade-obligations

In the absence of any meaningful consequences, China’s government has repeatedly demonstrated that it will adhere to international trade law only when it is in its own interest, not because the WTO accession agreement requires it or because the U.S. government has urged compliance. China’s unwillingness to grant reciprocal market access and a continued pursuit of

export-driven economic growth should not be rewarded with expanded access to the U.S. market. China must demonstrate that it is on the path to adopting sustained market-driven reforms before the U.S. enters into any further agreements. Unfortunately, all signs and evidence continue to point to a state-controlled economy and financial system. ¶ American workers and companies have already paid a heavy price for China’s consistent disregard

of its international commitments since joining the WTO nearly 15 years ago. We have little confidence that an investment treaty will lead China to a newfound sense of obligation to fulfill its promises . And expanded access to our market without securing meaningful reform of China’s non-market economy will only lead to more harm for U.S. workers and businesses.

AT: Perm do CP

1. “Resolved” is definite.

Dictionary.com 06 (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/Resolved, verb)

to come to a definite or earnest decision about; determine (to do something): I have resolved that I shall live to the full.

1. “Should” is mandatory

Nieto 9 – Judge Henry Nieto, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)

"Should" is "used . . . to express duty, obligation, propriety, or expediency." Webster's Third New International

Dictionary 2104 (2002). Courts [**15] interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the

weight of authority appears to favor interpreting "should" in an imperative, obligatory

sense . HN7A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word "should" in jury instructions conforms

with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word.

In the courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word "should" in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the

courts have squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the word "conveys a sense of duty and

obligation and could not be misunderstood by a jury." See State v. McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 891 P.2d 324, 335

(Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v. State, 217 Ga. App. 428, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that "should" is directional but not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 350 Pa. Super. 477, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa.

Super. Ct. 1986). Notably, courts interpreting the word "should " in other types of jury instructions [**16] have also

found that the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion . In Little v.

State, 261 Ark. 859, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word

" should" in an instruction on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word "must" and rejected the

defendant's argument that the jury may have been misled by the court's use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant's argument that the court erred by not using the word " should" in an instruction on witness credibility which used the word "must" because the

two words have the same meaning . State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). [*318] In applying a child

support statute, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that a legislature's or commission's use of the

word "should" is meant to convey duty or obligation . McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 49 P.3d 300, 306

(Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating that child support expenditures "should" be allocated for the purpose of parents' federal tax exemption to be mandatory).

(Optionalish) Severs “should” – it means “must” and requires immediate legal effect

Summers 94 (Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-8, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13)

The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"13 in the May 18 order

connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.14 The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;15 it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.16 ¶5 Nisi prius orders should be so construed as to give effect to every words and every part of the text, with a view to carrying out the evident intent of the judge's direction.17 The order's language ought not to be considered abstractly. The actual meaning intended by the document's signatory should be derived from the context in which the phrase to be interpreted is used.18 When applied to the May 18 memorial, these told canons impel my conclusion that the judge doubtless intended his ruling as an in praesenti resolution of Dollarsaver's quest for judgment n.o.v. Approval of all counsel plainly appears on the face of the critical May 18 entry which is [885 P.2d 1358] signed by the judge.19 True minutes20 of a court neither call for nor bear the approval of the parties' counsel nor the judge's signature. To reject out of hand the view that in this context "should" is impliedly followed by the customary, "and the same hereby is", makes the court once again revert to medieval notions of ritualistic formalism now so thoroughly condemned in national jurisprudence and long abandoned by the statutory policy of this State. IV CONCLUSION Nisi prius judgments and orders should be construed in a manner which gives effect and meaning to the complete substance of the memorial. When a judge-signed direction is capable of two interpretations, one of which would make it a valid part of the record proper and the other would render it a meaningless exercise in futility, the adoption of the former interpretation is this court's due. A rule - that on direct appeal views as fatal to the order's efficacy the mere omission from the journal entry of a long and customarily implied phrase, i.e., "and the same hereby is" - is soon likely to drift into the body of principles which govern the facial validity of judgments. This development would make judicial acts acutely vulnerable to collateral attack for the most trivial of reasons and tend to undermine the stability of titles or other adjudicated rights. It is obvious the trial judge intended his May 18 memorial to be an in praesenti order overruling Dollarsaver's motion for judgment n.o.v. It is hence that memorial, and not the later June 2 entry, which triggered appeal time in this case. Because the petition. in error was not filed within 30 days of May 18, the appeal is untimely. I would hence sustain the appellee's motion to dismiss.21 Footnotes: 1 The pertinent terms of the memorial of May 18, 1993 are: IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BRYAN COUNTY, STATE OF OKLAHOMA COURT MINUTE 5/18/93 No. C-91-223 After having heard and considered arguments of counsel in support of and in opposition to the motions of the Defendant for judgment N.O.V. and a new trial, the Court finds that the motions should be overruled. Approved as to form: /s/ Ken Rainbolt /s/ Austin R. Deaton,

Jr. /s/ Don Michael Haggerty /s/ Rocky L. Powers Judge 2 The turgid phrase - "should be and the same hereby is" - is a tautological absurdity. This is so because "should" is synonymous with ought or must and is in itself sufficient to effect an inpraesenti ruling - one that is couched in "a present indicative synonymous with ought." See infra note 15. 3 Carter v. Carter, Okl., 783 P.2d 969, 970 (1989); Horizons, Inc. v. Keo Leasing Co., Okl., 681 P.2d 757, 759 (1984); Amarex, Inc. v. Baker, Okl., 655 P.2d 1040, 1043 (1983); Knell v. Burnes, Okl., 645 P.2d 471, 473 (1982); Prock v. District Court of Pittsburgh County, Okl., 630 P.2d 772, 775 (1981); Harry v. Hertzler, 185 Okl. 151, 90 P.2d 656, 659 (1939); Ginn v. Knight, 106 Okl. 4, 232 P. 936, 937 (1925). 4 "Recordable" means that by force of 12 O.S. 1991 § 24 an instrument meeting that section's criteria must be entered on or "recorded" in the court's journal. The clerk may "enter" only that which is "on file." The pertinent terms of 12 O.S. 1991 § 24 are: "Upon the journal record required to be kept by the clerk of the district court in civil cases . . . shall be entered copies of the following instruments on file: 1. All items of process by which the court acquired jurisdiction of the person of each defendant in the case; and 2. All instruments filed in the case that bear the signature of the and judge and specify clearly the relief granted or order made." [Emphasis added.] 5 See 12 O.S. 1991 § 1116 which states in pertinent part: "Every direction of a court or judge made or entered in writing, and not included in a judgment is an order." [Emphasis added.] 6 The pertinent terms of 12 O.S. 1993 § 696.3 , effective October 1, 1993, are: "A. Judgments, decrees and appealable orders that are filed with the clerk of the court shall contain: 1. A caption setting forth the name of the court, the names and designation of the parties, the file number of the case and the title of the instrument; 2. A statement of the disposition of the action, proceeding, or motion, including a statement of the relief awarded to a party or parties and the liabilities and obligations imposed on the other party or parties; 3. The signature and title of the court; . . ." 7 The court holds that the May 18 memorial's recital that "the Court finds that the motions should be overruled" is a "finding" and not a ruling. In its pure form, a finding is generally not effective as an order or judgment. See, e.g., Tillman v. Tillman, 199 Okl. 130, 184 P.2d 784 (1947), cited in the court's opinion. 8 When ruling upon a motion for judgment n.o.v. the court must take into account all the evidence favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed and disregard all conflicting evidence favorable to the movant. If the court should conclude the motion is sustainable, it must hold, as a matter of law, that there is an entire absence of proof tending to show a right to recover. See Austin v. Wilkerson, Inc., Okl., 519 P.2d 899, 903 (1974). 9 See Bullard v. Grisham Const. Co., Okl., 660 P.2d 1045, 1047 (1983), where this court reviewed a trial judge's "findings of fact", perceived as a basis for his ruling on a motion for judgment n.o.v. (in the face of a defendant's reliance on plaintiff's contributory negligence). These judicial findings were held impermissible as an invasion of the providence of the jury and proscribed by OKLA. CONST. ART, 23, § 6 . Id. at 1048. 10 Everyday courthouse parlance does not always distinguish between a judge's "finding", which denotes nisi prius resolution of fact issues, and "ruling" or "conclusion of law". The latter resolves disputed issues of law. In practice usage members of the bench and bar often confuse what the judge "finds" with what that official "concludes", i.e., resolves as a legal matter. 11 See Fowler v. Thomsen, 68 Neb. 578, 94 N.W. 810, 811-12 (1903), where the court determined a ruling that "[1] find from the bill of particulars that there is due the plaintiff the sum of . . ." was a judgment and not a finding. In reaching its conclusion the court reasoned that "[e]ffect must be given to the entire in the docket according to the manifest intention of the justice in making them." Id., 94 N.W. at 811. 12 When the language of a judgment is susceptible of two interpretations, that which makes it correct and valid is preferred to one that would render it erroneous. Hale v. Independent Powder Co., 46 Okl. 135, 148 P. 715, 716 (1915); Sharp v. McColm, 79 Kan. 772, 101 P. 659, 662 (1909); Clay v. Hildebrand, 34 Kan. 694, 9 P. 466, 470 (1886); see also 1 A.C. FREEMAN LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 76 (5th ed. 1925). 13 "Should" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with ought but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more

detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an obligation and to be more than

advisory); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, 802 P.2d 813 (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an obligation to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard

false testimony"). 14 In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

We are going to make two main arguments1. (Condo Aff’s only)The plan itself is abusive for being partly conditionala) (If they read BIT) The plan planks say that each side will make a

concession, (the U.S. the NSR and China the FIL) this implies that the affirmative plan already is a conditional plan.

b) (If read Condo AFF) There are two choices putting the Affirmative team in a double bind, first you prefer the resolved and should definition which means the AFF team cannot solve and is abusive or you buy that the AFF team can solve conditionally which gives the CP only more solvency by being presenting further conditions.

2. It is not the AFF’s ground to run a conditional plan thus killing the perma) The Affirmative cannot advocate for just doing the CP that is ridiculous

abusiveb) It is abusive by allowing severance, since the plan is changing its own

advocacy in 2AC to include the CP meaning shifting part of the 1NC to part of the 1AC

c) Severence is a voter because it skews strategy - it makes the plan text conditional which undermines the only stable advocacy on the affirmative- severance allows the aff to spike out of all negative arguments

AT Perm Do CP – Text Comp Bad

Textual competition is bad:

-Education --- Not logical – actions compete based on function – re-wording shouldn’t matter. Distorts real world decision-making – biggest impact

-Infinite Regression – textual competition allows an infinite number of CP clarifications that compete based on grammar, word meaning, language, etc. That’s worse for the aff

-Aff conditionality – they can add the words “not” or “except” in permutations to sever parts of the plan meaning the neg would always lose to unpredictable scramble perms.

-Vague plan-writing – to get out of semantic or grammar PICs, skews negative ground.

-Functional competition best – only way to compare real world policies with differences on substantive, educational issues.

-No offense – bad counterplans can be beaten on theory – text comp isn’t necessary to eliminate them

AT: Competing Interpretations—Not only exclusionary PIC’s are allowed, this condition kills negative ground

Aff Answers

PERMS

Perm 2ACPerm Do Both

Perm Do The CP.a) Immediacy and Guaranteed nature of plan are bad standards for competition – it creates unbeatable CPs with no solvency advocates and there is no resolutional basisb) No competitionShould refers to both mandatory and optional. Heriot 2008(Prentice, Heriot. "Exposure Draft of Proposed Changes to the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing." Exposure Draft of Proposed Changes to the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing. United States Government Accountability Office, 31 Mar. 2008. Web. 23 June 2016. <http://www.gao.gov/assets/80/75739.pdf>. Heriot Prentice is the Director of Standards and Guidance at The Institute of Internal Auditors)//PH

The second sentence of the “must” definition used in the exposure draft instructions is more aligned with the definition of “should” as used by other standards setters, including GAO. The definition of “ should ” as used by GAO, which is intended to be consistent with the definition used by the AICPA and the PCAOB, indicates a presumptively mandatory requirement and contains the following language: “…in rare circumstances, auditors and audit organizations may depart from a presumptively mandatory requirement provided they document their justification for the departure and how the alternative procedures performed in the circumstances were sufficient to achieve the objectives of the presumptively mandatory requirement.”

c) Textual competition is best - excludes abusive CPs, is the most predictable and increases plan focused debate d) Counter-interpretation – only exclusionary PICs are legitimate

Resolved def

“Resolved” doesn’t require certaintyWebster’s 9 – Merriam Webster 2009

(http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolved)

# Main Entry: 1re·solve # Pronunciation: \ri-ˈzälv, -ˈzo ̇lv also -ˈzäv or -ˈzo ̇v\ # Function: verb # Inflected Form(s): re·solved; re·solv·ing 1 : to become separated into component parts; also : to become reduced by dissolving or analysis 2 : to form a resolution : determine 3 : consult, deliberate

Or immediacyPTE 9 – Online Plain Text English Dictionary 2009

(http://www.onelook.com/?other=web1913&w=Resolve)

Resolve: “To form a purpose; to make a decision; especially, to determine after reflection; as, to resolve on a better course of life.”

Should – Desirable

“Should” means desirable --- this does not have to be a mandateAC 99 (Atlas Collaboration, “Use of Shall, Should, May Can,” http://rd13doc.cern.ch/Atlas/DaqSoft/sde/inspect/shall.html)

shall

'shall' describes something that is mandatory. If a requirement uses 'shall', then that requirement _will_ be satisfied without fail. Noncompliance is not allowed. Failure to comply with one single 'shall' is sufficient reason to reject the entire product. Indeed, it must be rejected under these circumstances. Examples: # "Requirements shall make use of the word 'shall' only where compliance is mandatory." This is a good example. # "C++ code shall have comments every 5th line." This is a bad example. Using 'shall' here is too strong.

should

'should' is weaker. It describes something that might not be satisfied in the final product, but that is desirable enough that any noncompliance shall be explicitly justified. Any use of 'should' should be examined carefully, as it probably means that something is not being stated clearly. If a 'should' can be replaced by a 'shall', or can be discarded entirely, so much the better. Examples: # "C++ code should be ANSI compliant." A good example. It may not be possible to be ANSI compliant on all platforms, but we should try. # "Code should be tested thoroughly." Bad example. This 'should' shall be replaced with 'shall' if this requirement is to be stated anywhere (to say nothing of defining what 'thoroughly' means).

“Should” doesn’t require certaintyBlack’s Law 79 (Black’s Law Dictionary – Fifth Edition, p. 1237)

Should. The past tense of shall; ordinarily implying duty or obligation; although usually no more than an obligation of propriety or expediency, or a moral obligation, thereby distinguishing it from “ought.” It is not normally synonymous with “may,” and although often interchangeable with the word “would,” it does not ordinarily express certainty as “will” sometimes does.

Should – Not Mandatory

Should isn’t mandatoryWords & Phrases 6 (Permanent Edition 39, p. 369)

C.A.6 (Tenn.) 2001. Word “should ,” in most contexts, is precatory, not mandatory. –U.S. v. Rogers, 14 Fed.Appx. 303. –Statut 227.

Strong admonition --- not mandatoryTaylor and Howard 5 (Michael, Resources for the Future and Julie, Partnership to Cut Hunger and Poverty in Africa, “Investing in Africa's future: U.S. Agricultural development assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa”, 9-12, http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001784/5-US-agric_Sept2005_Chap2.pdf)

Other legislated DA earmarks in the FY2005 appropriations bill are smaller and more targeted: plant biotechnology research and development ($25 million), the American Schools and Hospitals Abroad program ($20 million), women’s leadership capacity ($15 million), the International Fertilizer Development Center ($2.3 million), and clean water treatment ($2 million). Interestingly, in the wording of the bill, Congress uses the term shall in connection with only two of these eight earmarks; the others say that USAID should make the prescribed amount available. The difference between shall and should may have legal significance—one is clearly mandatory while the other is a strong admonition—but it makes little practical difference in USAID’s need to comply with the congressional directive to the best of its ability.

PermissiveWords and Phrases 2 (Vol. 39, p. 370)

Cal.App. 5 Dist. 1976. Term “should ,” as used in statutory provision that motion to suppress search warrant should first be heard by magistrate who issued warrant, is used in regular, persuasive sense, as recommendation, and is thus not mandatory but permissive. West’s Ann.Pen Code, § 1538.5(b).---Cuevas v. Superior Court, 130 Cal. Rptr. 238, 58 Cal.App.3d 406 ----Searches 191.

Desirable or recommendedWords and Phrases 2 (Vol. 39, p. 372-373)

Or. 1952. Where safety regulation for sawmill industry providing that a two by two inch guard rail should be installed at extreme outer edge of walkways adjacent to sorting tables was immediately preceded by other regulations in which word “shall” instead of “should” was used, and word “should” did not appear to be result of inadvertent use in particular regulation, use of word “should” was intended to convey idea that particular precaution involved was desirable and recommended, but not mandatory. ORS 654.005 et seq.----Baldassarre v. West Oregon Lumber Co., 239 P.2d 839, 193 Or. 556.---Labor & Emp. 2857

Should – No Immediate

Should doesn’t mean immediate Dictionary.com – Copyright © 2010 – http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/should

should    /ʃʊd/ Show Spelled[shood] Show IPA –auxiliary verb 1. pt. of shall. 2. (used to express condition): Were he to arrive, I should be pleased. 3. must; ought (used to indicate duty, propriety, or expediency): You should not do that. 4. would (used to make a statement less direct or blunt): I should think you would apologize. Use should in a Sentence See images of should Search should on the Web Origin: ME sholde, OE sc ( e ) olde; see shall —Can be confused:  could, should, would (see usage note at this entry ). —Synonyms 3. See must1 . —Usage note Rules similar to those for choosing between shall and will have long been advanced for should and would, but again the rules have had little effect on usage. In most constructions, would is the auxiliary chosen regardless of the person of the subject: If our allies would support the move, we would abandon any claim to sovereignty. You would be surprised at the complexity of the directions. Because the main function of should in modern American English is to express duty, necessity, etc. ( You should get your flu shot before winter comes ), its use for other purposes, as to form a subjunctive, can produce ambiguity, at least initially: I should get my flu shot if I were you. Furthermore, should seems an affectation to many Americans when used in certain constructions quite common in British English: Had I been informed, I should (American would ) have called immediately. I should (American would ) really prefer a different arrangement. As with shall and will, most educated native speakers of American English do not follow the textbook rule in making a choice between should and would. See also shall . Shall –auxiliary verb, present singular 1st person shall, 2nd shall or ( Archaic ) shalt, 3rd shall, present plural shall; past singular 1st person should, 2nd should or ( Archaic ) shouldst or should·est, 3rd should, past plural should; imperative, infinitive, and participles lacking. 1. plan to, intend to , or expect to: I shall go later.

Say no

1. China Says No China says no – Won’t even admit oppression happens now.Hayward, ’16. (John Hayward. "China Pushes 'Ethnic Unity' in Restless Uighur Capital." Breitbart. 4-1-2016 Web. Accessed: 6-23-2016. http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2016/04/01/china-pushes-ethnic-unity-restless-uighur-capital/)

Although Beijing seems grudgingly willing to admit there is room for improvement in Xinjiang, it

has always vigorously resisted charges that it systematically persecutes or oppresses the

Uighurs , and refused to recognize the insurgents of Xinjiang as anything more than a tiny handful of

extremist militants.

China says no – feels like it’s being subjected to a double standard on terrorismHunt and Rivers, ’15. (Katie Hunt and Matt Rivers. "Xinjiang violence: Does China have a terror problem?." CNN. 12-2-2015 Web. Accessed: 6-23-2016. http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/02/asia/china-xinjiang-uyghurs/)

(CNN) In a raid last month, Chinese paramilitary forces killed 28 suspects accused of a bloody September attack on a coal mine, flushing them out of a cliffside cave with flamethrowers, according to state media. The attack and police response took place in Xinjiang, an ethnically divided and resource rich province in the China's far west, that is home to the mainly Muslim

Uyghur ethnic group. China blamed Uyghur separatists for the attack, and it claims they are no

different from ISIS or al Qaeda terrorists. But exile groups and human rights activists say repressive religious policies and

economic marginalization are provoking the unrest. Beijing complains that the world applies double standards and

China doesn't receive the same level of sympathy as other countries that have fallen victim to

terror attacks. "We cannot understand why terrorism, when taking place in other countries, is regarded as terrorism but ethnic and religious issues, when taking place in China ," Hua Chunying, China's

Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson, said Wednesday. "And we cannot understand why other countries' counter-terrorism acts are justified, but China's counter-terrorism actions are so-called repression of ethnic groups," she added. So what's going on, and what are the root causes of the issue? What happened in the latest attack? There are conflicting reports. The knife attack on a coal mine in the town of Aksu was first reported on by Radio Free Asia, which has a Uyghur-language service and is funded by the U.S. government. It said that 50 people were killed and more than 50 injured on September 18. The mine, according to Radio Free Asia, employed mostly ethnically Han Chinese workers, who made up the majority of those killed. The incident was acknowledged by Chinese state media only on November 20. The Tianshan web portal reported that 16 people, including five policemen, were killed when a group of people attacked the mine and 18 others were injured. The report said on November 12, after a 56-day manhunt, authorities located the people responsible for the attack in a cave. State media reported that the troops, like "eagles discovering their prey," had used flamethrowers to force people out of the cave, after stun grenades and tear gas failed to draw them out. Photographs showed heavily armed police perched on rocky cliffs and another of them being helped a by a large group of local herders wielding spades, sticks and pitch forks. By the official account, some 28 people were reported to have been killed as they emerged from the cave, and one surrendered in the operation. Radio Free Asia, citing local police, said that 17 people were killed in the raid and of them, seven were women and children. CNN called Xinjiang's provincial

spokesperson for clarification but they declined to comment. Are there Uyghur terrorist groups? In the wake of the Paris attacks,

China called for the world to support its own efforts fighting terror in Xinjiang. "China is also a victim of terrorism, and cracking down on ETIM should become an important part of the international fight against terrorism," Foreign Minister Wang Yi said , according to Reuters. Beijing has blamed the violence on Islamic militants, led by the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) ,

which the U.S. State Department listed as a terrorist organization in 2002 a year after the September 11 attacks.

But many analysts dispute its characterization as an Al Qaeda or ISIS-style group. China steps up anti-terror measures They say that much of the civil unrest inside Xinjiang is carried out by individuals or small groups, rather than an organized militant group. It's difficult for independent journalists to verify the claims. The Chinese government tightly controls access to the area. Journalists are closely monitored when in the province, and sometimes are prohibited from accessing the region all together. The same applies for non governmental organizations. "Violence aimed at terrorizing the population is always utterly deplorable, but it does not shield the government's response from scrutiny. The death toll in China's counterterrorism campaigns is deepening skepticism about Beijing's tactics and goals," said Sophie Richardson, China director at Human Rights Watch. "If China truly has nothing to hide, then it is past time to allow United Nations experts, independent journalists, diplomats, and other observers free access to the region to examine all such incidents." Why is China so concerned? Hundreds of people have been killed in Xinjiang in recent years and authorities have blamed there has been a spate of high-profile attacks outside the province. In 2014, 31 people were stabbed and killed at a rail station in the southern China town of Kunming. In 2013, 5 people were killed in Beijing after a car drove into a crowd of tourists outside Tiananmen gate. And the Global Times, a state-run tabloid, said in 2014 that 300 Chinese nationals were fighting alongside ISIS in Iraq and Syria, raising fears that the militants could return and pose a threat to national security. Xinjiang is one of China's most resource-rich provinces, home to large deposits of coal, natural gas and rare earth metals. And the region plays a key role in the "One Belt, One Road" initiative, championed by President Xi Jinping, that aims to improve economic ties with central Asia as China battles an economic slowdown. Who are the Uyghurs? Xinjiang shares borders with Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India and Uyghurs, who speak a language related to Turkish, and regard themselves as culturally and ethnically close to central Asia, despite a long history of Chinese rule. Tensions have arisen between the Uyghurs and the Han, the predominant ethnic group in China, which have migrated to the province in large numbers over the past 60 years. Xinjiang is now home to more than 8 million Han Chinese, up from 220,000 in 1949, and 10 million Uyghurs. The newcomers take most of the new jobs, and unemployment among Uyghurs is high. They complain of discrimination and harsh treatment by security forces, despite official promises of equal rights and ethnic harmony Uyghur exile groups and human rights activists say repressive religious policies and economic marginalization have provoked much of the recent unrest. They add the education system undermines use of the Uyghur language. China has been criticized for apparent efforts in Xinjiang restricting Muslims from observing Ramadan and, in one city, authorities banned men with beards and women wearing veils from public transportation during a weeks long sporting event. "There are concerns amongst many Uyghurs about the use of their language as a medium of instruction in school, to practice a constitutionally protected right to freedom of religion, to wear clothing that they deem to be part of their ethnic culture such as the headscarf, to pray at mosques, to observe Ramadan," said James Leibold, a senior lecturer at Australia's La Trobe University and an expert in China's ethnic policies.

China won’t reel back their efforts. 4 warrants whyTharoor, 14 (Ishaan Tharoor, foreign affairs writer for Washington Post. May 22nd, 2014. “Why China’s Terrorism Problem is Getting Worse”. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/05/22/why-chinas-terrorism-problem-is-getting-worse/AB)

A gruesome terror attack Thursday morning led to at least 31 deaths in Urumqi, capital of the

far western Chinese region of Xinjiang . The attack — in which assailants in two cars plowed over shoppers and set off explosives in a crowded market area — is the worst such incident in years, surpassing a horrific slaughter in March, when knife-wielding attackers hacked down 29 people at a train station in the southwestern city of Kunming. As in Kunming, authorities suspect ethnic

Uighur extremists. My colleague William Wan explained in March who the Uighurs, a Turkic Muslim group, are and why Xinjiang, the region that comprises their homeland, is so restive. After the latest round of violence, it's worth unpacking further. Here are four underlying reasons why China's crisis in Xinjiang won't go away. [1] Ethnic politics. The Uighurs of Xinjiang are a

distinct minority in China, a Silk Road people with a long, separate history centered around the

oases and mud-brick towns of the Tarim Basin and the caravan routes toward Central Asia . The region's most storied city, Kashgar, was the birthplace, some argue, of the Turkish language — or at least of its first chronicler. For two spells in the 1930s and 1940s, Uighurs in Xinjiang declared independence under the banner of East Turkestan — a name and flag dissidents in exile still use to this day. No matter the lip service to multiculturalism paid by Beijing, the

Uighurs, not unlike the Tibetans next door, struggle with the hardship of being a minority group

in an intensely centralized and authoritarian state. Uighurs face discrimination in major Chinese

cities and, at home , look on as an influx of Han Chinese migrants radically reshape their homeland. Between 1949 and 2008, the proportion of the population of Xinjiang that is ethnic Han Chinese went from 6 to 40 percent. In Urumqi, Han Chinese now make up some three-

quarters of the population. Ethnic riots there in 2o09 led to nearly 200 deaths . [2] Militant

Islam. China is fighting its own war on terror, taking aim at Islamist separatists it views as part of

a wider regional plague of extremism. The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is the group whose name is bandied about the most — though it's sometimes referred to as the Turkestan Islamic Party . ETIM is thought to have links with terror groups elsewhere, particularly

in Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan. Chinese authorities say ETIM has ties to al-

Qaeda and training camps in the tribal area along the Pakistani-Afghan border. Uighurs were

among the hundreds of supposed foreign fighters swept up and detained by the U.S. at

Guantanamo Bay following the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. But all this doesn't amount to a direct causal link between organized transnational terror networks and the current epidemic of violence in Xinjiang. China blamed a bombing at a train station a month ago that killed three people on ETIM, but has now been more circumspect in pointing the finger at specific groups. It's unclear what kind of real operational capacity ETIM and other like-minded outfits have inside China and to what degree attacks like Thursday's are far more local actions. [3] Repression.

Heavy-handed Chinese policies to combat militancy haven't helped the situation. Beijing warns

against separatism and " splittism " and has arrested prominent Uighurs whose public

statements and activities would in more democratic societies not be considered threatening.

Human Rights Watch has documented a regime of mass detentions and enforced

disappearances carried out by the security apparatus in Xinjiang. China has curtailed Islamic

religious practices in the region, razed much of the historic Old Town of Kashgar — a

monument to Uighur culture leveled for the sake of "modernization" — and clamped down on

other freedoms. After the 2009 violence, the government turned off the Internet in Xinjiang to curb the spread of messages that inflamed the riots, an act which radically altered the tapestry of life in Xinjiang for almost a whole year. Under former president Hu Jintao, the region's then-party secretary Wang Lequan downgraded the status of the Uighur language, deeming it unfit "for the 21st century" and making it an optional foreign language taught in state-run schools, akin to English. [4] Marginalization. Chinese government white papers point to the

considerable economic and infrastructure developments brought about by Beijing in the region

— which is rich in resources and sits at a strategic crossroads between China and Central Asia.

Clearly, that's a narrative not accepted by all Uighurs . While their disaffection remains palpable — and many observers call for a liberalization of Chinese policy in the region rather than an inevitable, harsh crackdown — the Uighurs also have very little leverage . While well-known,

their plight is hardly a cause celebre internationally, and few regional governments would risk

trade ties and other diplomatic links with China over the rights of one marginalized minority . In the past, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has expressed solidarity with the Turkic Uighurs, but even he sees little point in compromising relations with the world's next superpower, and promised China's President Xi Jinping on a visit in 2012 that Turkey would not allow any Uighur separatist activity to take place on its soil. In an environment in which Uighurs

have few means to agitate for change, it's perhaps not surprising that some choose such brutal, terrible methods to attract attention.

The only instance in which China would make ethnic reforms would be in a state of pure democracy. They won’t see the Counterplan as a reason to change.Woeser, 09 (Tsering Woeser, Tibetan activist, blogger, poet and essayist in China. December 09, 2009. “On Changing China’s Ethnic Policy”. ChinaGeeks translation from Woeser’s Blog. https://chinageeksarchive.wordpress.com/2009/12/09/on-changing-chinas-ethnic-policy/AB)

After the 7/5 Urumqi incident, Minzu University [i.e. “Ethnicity University ”] Associate Professor

and head of a Uyghur website Ilham Toxti was placed under house arrest, and soon after more

than 400 people from all over the world have signed a petition calling for authorities to return

freedom to this man who dedicated himself to promoting inter-ethnic friendship and [also

calling for authorities to] end the persecution of Uyghur intellectuals . At the end of August, after having endured tortures both physical and mental, Ilham resumed his work and regained his freedoms. In early November, Ilham gave an animated speech at Minzu University about whether China’s ethnic policy needs to be rethought, saying that China’s ethnic minorities should struggle to safeguard their rights and interests. There have never been more problems

with China’s ethnic policies than there are today . If these problems aren’t faced squarely and resolved, in the future there will be even more grave consequences. There was the Tibet incident last year, the Xinjiang incident this year, what will happen next year? As ethnic quarrels gradually become violent racial conflict, [I] believe there’s no one who would dare to slap their chest and say ‘in the future, this won’t become a major reason for the collapse of China.’ Actually, [this] topic has already attracted wide-ranging contemplation and discussion. What’s worth paying attention to is that on this issue, voices inside and outside the system have reached an unprecedented level of agreement; mainstream scholars and dissenters have never agreed this thoroughly before that the problem is coming from China’s [ethnic minority] autonomous regions and admonished the authorities for giving ethnic minorities too much special treatment and strengthening the factors that lead to disloyalty and “split-ism” in the autonomous regions. [Some even say that] when the system of ethnic self government is abolished, China should adopt the American model, and not bother with artificial distinctions between ethnicities. Ilham Toxti was harshly critical of this idea, saying that getting rid of ethnic minority self-government was a lousy idea that, if pursued, was sure to run counter to its intended goal and lead to even more trouble. [He says] that at present, the issue is that the

autonomous region polices haven’t been truly implemented, so that there have been problems

in terms of protecting the culture, language, and religious freedoms of ethnic minorities when

compared to regular citizens . Since there’s no real system of ethnic self-government in Xinjiang

or Tibet right now , where did the problem of eliminating the autonomous self-government system come from? Uyghurs and Tibetans have a need and a strong desire to protect their

culture, language, and religion, and they have the right to enjoy the power of self-government, so what is the excuse or what gives [anyone] the right to eliminate their right to autonomy? He also said that with regards to regional autonomy, one choice for solving the ethnic problems is choosing the policies favored by [the local] ethnic groups, and as for China’s policy of regional autonomy, what needs to be considered is not whether or not it should exist but how it can be better implemented and developed. The past has shown that the ethnic policy has encountered many complex problems, but the current ethnic theories are not up to speed, so [China] should make a fresh start, as the price for continuing down the current track will be a burden we cannot afford to bear. In terms of theory, we must not only pay close attention to the successes and experiences of other [countries], but also need genuine implementation of each and every ethnic policy, and not just try to treat the symptoms without finding a permanent solution. Several months ago, independent Chinese scholar Wang Lixiong was being interviewed by the

BBC and held that canceling the policy of having autonomous ethnic regions was impractical,

because the current ethnic policies have already created some valuble [national] interests , so

China has run into a dilemma. There needs to be a coordinated, large-scale shift before the

problem of ethnic policy can be decided, but that [kind of large scale change] is incompatible

with China’s autocratic political system. Only when there is real freedom and democracy, only

when there is a social system that full protects everyone’s rights can the problem of ethnicity

be resolved.

The President literally does not have the power to make ethnic reformsLeibold 15 (James Leibold, October 19th, 2015. “China's Ethnic Policy Under Xi Jinping”. The Jamestown Foundation. http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=44496&cHash=ff9ccea85bb7d17f906a992105f75603#.V2xsRusrLIU AB

Since assuming power in November 2012, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Secretary General Xi

Jinping has sought to put his imprimatur on the contentious realm of ethnic policy . As with other agenda items, Xi has sought to concentrate power around his own person, believing this to be the only way to push forward reform against vested interest groups, including in the realm of inter-ethnic relations. Yet the minzu (民族) or “ethnic” lobby is a powerful and deeply

entrenched part of the political machine in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). State-run media frequently lauds Xi for his intimate knowledge and personal interest in the nearly 120 million Chinese citizens who belong to an ethnic minority, and especially the troubled regions of Tibet and Xinjiang. His inspection tours of minority regions are front-page news, as are his important speeches on ethnic work. Most recently, his image and words featured prominently at the official celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the Tibetan Autonomous Region and the 60th anniversary of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Xinhua, September 8; Xinhua, October 1). Yet, Xi Jinping’s intervention has failed to end the long-running and deeply

acrimonious debate over the future direction of ethnic policies in the PRC. Xi lacks both the

authority and the political capital to push ethnic policy in the more assimilationist direction he

desires. Rather, he is hamstrung by the liberal legacy of his father Xi Zhongxun and the

continued influence of former Secretary General Hu Jintao, two powerful sources of support for

the ethnic lobby and its defense of ethnic pluralism. The end result is policy paralysis, leaving

local officials to interpret the contradictory messages emanating from Beijing while increasing

the importance of stability maintenance (维稳) work as the only agreed method for dealing

with a complex set of ethnic contradictions.

The Previous Leader of China leaves no wiggle room for ethnic change-regardless of if the government wants reform or notLeibold, 13 (James Leibold. Book published in 2013. “Ethnic Policy in China: Is Reform Inevitable?” PDF. https://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/10125/30617/1/ps068.pdf AB)

Despite the clamor for ethnic-policy change, significant institutional and political barriers render

such changes unlikely in the immediate future . As is the case with broader efforts aimed at

political and economic reform in China, deeply entrenched bureaucratic and patron- age-based

interests makes significant policy changes extremely difficult . This may be evidenced by the failure to alter largely unpopular national Family planning ('i'l' ill '5), re-education through labor (% IR), and household-registration ( H') policies. Moreover, current ethnic policies are closely

associated with the legacy of former Secretary General Hu Jintao. As TAR party-secretary from

1988-92, Hu Jintao played a direct rule in coordinating ethnic policy during his ten-year tenure

at the top. Hu personally identified the "correct handling of ethnic issues" as "an important

criterion judging the ability of the CPC to govern and the capacity of party organizations to

lead " (Leading Group of the SEAC 2012). Any recall or sudden shift in policy would be viewed as

a repudiation of Jintao's legacy and the policies of his mentor Hu Yaobang. the chief architect of

post-Mao ethnic policies and also a key supporter of Xi Jinping's political rise. Recent

administrative appointments also sugggest that Hu ]intao's ethnic-policy legacy is likely to be

carefully guarded for at least the near future.

(AIIB Specific.) China doesn’t need the U.S. to join the AIIB. The United States is not in a position to be negotiating. They’ll lose the negotiations and the plan won’t happen.Perlez 15 (Jane Perlez, December 4th, 2015. “China Creates a World Bank of Its Own, and the U.S. Balks” New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/business/international/china-creates-an-asian-bank-as-the-us-stands-aloof.html?_r=0 AB)

BEIJING — As top leaders met at a lush Bali resort in October 2013, President Xi Jinping of China described his vision for a new multinational, multibillion-dollar bank to finance roads, rails and power grids across Asia. Under Chinese stewardship, the bank would tackle the slow

development in poor countries that was holding the region back from becoming the wealth center of the world. Afterward, the United States secretary of state, John Kerry, caught up with Mr. Xi in the corridor. “That’s a great idea,” Mr. Kerry said of the bank, according to Chinese and American aides briefed on the encounter. The enthusiasm didn’t last long, as the Obama

administration began a rear-guard battle to minimize the bank’s influence. The United States

worries that China will use the bank to set the global economic agenda on its own terms , forgoing the environmental protections, human rights, anticorruption measures and other governance standards long promoted by its Western counterparts. American officials point to China’s existing record of loans to unstable governments, construction deals for unnecessary infrastructure, and villagers abruptly uprooted with little compensation. But the administration suffered a humiliating diplomatic defeat last spring when most of its closest allies signed up for the bank, including Britain, Germany, Australia and South Korea. The calculation for joining is simple. China, with its vast wealth and resources, now rivals the United States at the global

economic table. That was confirmed this week when the International Monetary Fund blessed the Chinese renminbi as one of the world’s elite currencies, alongside the dollar, euro, pound and yen. In June, international delegates attended a signing ceremony in Beijing for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Fifty-seven countries are members. Countries are finding they

must increasingly operate in China’s orbit . And backing the new bank would bring financial advantages, as well as curry favor with Beijing. While many countries had similar doubts as the United States, they figured they could just shape the organization from the inside. The new bank “is an instrument for China to lend legitimacy to its international forays and to extend its sphere of economic and political influence even while changing the rules of the game,” said Eswar Prasad, former head of the China division at the International Monetary Fund and a professor at Cornell University. “And it gives the existing institutions a kick in the pants.” The Chinese-led institution, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, is now in the process of picking its first projects. The choices, expected to be announced in coming months, will provide insight into how China plans to wield its power. Either China is serious about taking a leadership role in the

global economy and prioritizing projects that broadly benefit Asia , or it plans to use the bank as a conduit to further its own ambitions. So far, China appears to be navigating the two extremes. It is assuaging critics by compromising on issues like board makeup, project oversight and procurement. But China is hardly yielding control, raising concerns about where the bank will land on issues like climate change and labor rights. The bank, for example, is still weighing whether to approve coal-fired power plants. China is taking direct aim at the current development regime, the Bretton Woods system established under the leadership of the United States after World War II to help stabilize currencies and promote growth. Beijing officials say they want to take a faster approach than their counterparts at the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank. The new bank, China promises, will not be

bogged down in oversight . The Chinese-led bank will also focus solely on infrastructure. To China, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank failed to deliver on big projects meant to transform backward parts of Asia, resulting in an estimated $8 trillion of needed investment in rails, ports and power plants. As a complement to the new bank, China is rolling out the “One Belt, One Road” program for the construction of a network of roads, rails and pipelines along

the old Silk Road route through Central Asia to Europe. A maritime equivalent calls ports from Southeast Asia to East Africa to the Mediterranean. “ The U.S. risks forfeiting its international

relevance while stuck in its domestic political quagmire ,” Jin Liqun, the president-designate of China’s bank, wrote in a chapter for a recently released book, “Bretton Woods: The Next 70 Years.” He added, in reference to the United States, “History has never set any precedent that an empire is capable of governing the world forever.” At the signing of the agreement for the bank in June, Mr. Jin and Mr. Xi posed for a photo alongside officials from the other 56 founding member nations in the Great Hall of the People. An unexpectedly large group, it included countries as diverse as Iran and Israel, Russia and Poland, and an array of American friends. The total capital commitment, $100 billion, was double the amount originally envisioned. Having underestimated the interest, the Obama administration is now starting to soften its stance. Three months after the signing, Mr. Xi met with President Obama at the White House, in the Chinese leader’s first state visit. At the summit meeting, Mr. Obama urged the existing banks to cooperate with the new institution. The United States, though, would still not join.

China views Uighurs as terrorists and does not want to change their stance on terrorism. They will not agree to the counterplan.Krishnan 16 (Ananth Krishnan, April 26th, 2016. “China hints it won't change stance on JeM chief Masood Azhar”. India Today. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/china-hints-it-wont-change-stance-on-jem-chief-masood-azhar/1/651897.html AB)

China has hinted it won't change its stance on placing a 'technical hold' on Jaish-e-Muhammad

chief Masood Azhar at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions committee despite

India's objections. The Chinese Foreign Ministry said on Tuesday that placing the hold was "in

line with the committee's rules of procedures". The ministry, in a statement sent in response to questions from the media on the hold on Azhar, indicated further that China wanted India to talk directly with Pakistan to resolve the issue, rather than get the UNSC sanctions committee to act. The likelihood of that, however, remains dim, considering Pakistan's past record of failing to address India's concerns on terror emanating from its soil. Separately on Tuesday, the Foreign

Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying confirmed that China had raised its concerns with India

over the issuing of an electronic visa to the Uighur exile leader Dolkun Isa. India on Monday said it cancelled the visa, citing a red corner notice issued by Interpol on China's behest. "At first when we saw India planned to issue a visa to Dolkun Isa we expressed our concerns to the Indian side immediately," Hua said. "Dolkun is on the red corner notice of Interpol and we believe it is the responsibility of all countries to bring him to justice. At the moment China and

India are in very good communication and we hope two countries will properly deal with the

relevant issue."Beijing views Isa as "a terrorist" and has blamed him for bombings carried out in

Xinjiang in the 1990s, although Isa, who has been living in Germany for a decade and has been

awarded by the West for his human rights activism, denies the charges and says he is working

to highlight the plight of Uighurs.

(If anyone asks questions about this card, just explain that JEM is a terrorist organization that roughly translate to “Army of Mohammed”. This card is here so you can make the argument that if China isn’t going to budge on this, despite other country’s pleading, then there is no reason why the Uighurs, who they view as terrorists will be any different. Azhar and Isa are different people. Azhar is the guy talked about in the beginning of the card. He is the leader of JEM which serves as an example of the fact that China won’t budge on terrorism. Isa the guy talked about at the end and is part of the Uighurs, not JEM. China still views him as a terrorist, though.)

Say no – Culture China views the imposition of “human rights” as western and un-ChineseHan, ’16. (Bochen Han. "China's Human Rights Lawyers: Political Resistance and the Law." Diplomat. 2-11-2016 Web. Accessed: 6-23-2016. http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/chinas-human-rights-lawyers-political-resistance-and-the-law/)

The party-state has, as you say, portrayed the Chinese tradition as harmony-loving and opposed to the ‘confrontational’ idea of rights. It points to traditional phrases like ‘valuing harmony’ (和为贵) to claim that complaining and litigating is disruptive and inherently un-Chinese. There is also the argument that because rights discourse first emerged in western countries and the Chinese word for ‘rights’ was a translation created in the 19th century,

universal human rights are a western fabrication.

Say no – Concessions Say no – Beijing will play it down for concessions elsewhere Mueller, ’16. (Kai Mueller. "China Pressures Europe to Stay Silent on Human Rights." Diplomat. 5-15-2016 Web. Accessed: 6-23-2016. http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/china-pressures-europe-to-stay-silent-on-human-rights/)

China’s belligerent diplomacy in Europe has been in the spotlight this week after a German lawmaker who chairs the Bundestag’s Human Rights Committee was refused access to China after he criticized rights violations in Tibet. The Chinese Foreign Ministry said he was “not welcome” because of his support for “Tibetan independence.” German Christian Democrat politician Michael Brand, who had intended to travel with the Parliamentary Committee to Tibet in late May, was robust in his response to the visa ban when he said: “We can’t just accept it when

authoritarian regimes like China, Russia or Turkey carry out censorship and oppression, certainly not if [and] they want to export these methods — and to Germany too. When it comes to human rights, pussyfooting around doesn’t pay off.

Human rights are not an internal affair of the state of China.” China’s attempts to export its methods of censorship and authoritarianism raise serious questions for all European countries about whether their

approach has contributed to Beijing’s aggressive diplomacy . When governments adopt a softer approach on human rights and Tibet, their country’s potential for negotiation on important strategic issues becomes more constricted. Going to great lengths to accommodate the Chinese leadership’s sensitivities at a time when Chinese President Xi Jinping is presiding over the most eviscerating crackdown on civil society in a generation weakens a country’s leverage instead of strengthening it. Demands from China to Western democracies, which have included telling prime ministers not to meet the Dalai Lama, or to withdraw criticism, as with this example, are aimed at reducing their negotiating strength, and asserting Beijing’s own agenda for greater gains. Some countries in Europe, such as the United Kingdom, have acceded to such demands and kowtowed to such a significant degree that they have faced a major public backlash for doing so. In the UK, even those involved in doing business with China expressed concern about the British government’s overly accommodating approach to Xi’s state visit last year. James McGregor, a business consultant with operations in China, said: “If you act like a panting puppy, the object of your attention is going to think they have got you on a leash.” Sometimes the accommodating approach arises from short-term considerations of political expediency, rather than from an informed position. There is no credible evidence of significant economic loss when governments do risk Chinese wrath and take a position on, for instance, whom they can and cannot meet, whether it is the Dalai Lama or anyone else. For instance, when Norway did not apologize for the Nobel Peace Prize being awarded to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo, there was no evidence of any serious economic consequences –

indeed, bilateral trade significantly increased, according to an analysis in The Diplomat. Experienced China hands understand that the Beijing leadership will seek to frame the debate in its own terms, amplifying issues that are less important in order to compel concessions elsewhere. In the case of the row with the Bundestag Committee Chair, the official statement from the Foreign Ministry deliberately blamed his support for “Tibet independence” – although the issue of the status of Tibet has never entered the equation. Virtually all Western governments acknowledge that Tibet is a part of the PRC, and the Dalai Lama’s position is that he is seeking a genuine autonomy for Tibet under the auspices of the PRC. And yet even so, Chinese diplomats have had some success in pushing governments to adopt specific language on the “Tibet independence” question, perhaps with a view to closing down future possible support for the Tibetan people. The UK, France and Denmark have all caved in this respect, giving the unnecessary addition to their official position that they “do not

support Tibetan independence.” It is nothing new that China attempts to use economic and commercial interests to enforce submission to its agenda, but it is new that in recent years too many European democracies seem willing to cooperate with this process, sometimes even engaging in pre-emptive capitulation and self-censorship before any demands are even made.

Say no – they really hate Uyghurs China will say no- they’re calling for more support against the Uighur population. (This could also be used as threats in Uighur population are real, but that’s probably morally wrong.)Ben Blanchard and Michael Martina, 11-16-2015, "After Paris, China calls for world's support in Xinjiang," No Publication, https://www.yahoo.com/news/china-says-global-war-terror-target-uighur-militants-030350619.html?ref=gs (EG)

BEIJING (Reuters) - China has appealed for international help in the battle it says it is waging against Islamist militants in its far western region of Xinjiang, as Beijing seeks Western support for its own " war on terror " in the wake of the Paris attacks. Hundreds of people have died in unrest in Xinjiang, home to the mostly Muslim Uighur people , and other parts of China over the past three years or so. Beijing has blamed much of the violence on Islamist militants, led by the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a group it says has ties to al Qaeda and wants to establish an independent state called East Turkestan. More recently China has reported that some Uighurs have traveled to Syria and Iraq to fight with Islamic State and other groups. Speaking in Turkey on Sunday on the sidelines of the G20 summit, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called on the international community to form a "united front to combat terrorism " in the aftermath of Paris attacks, state news agency Xinhua said on Monday. "The UN's leading role should be brought into full play to combat terrorism, and a united front in this regard should be formed," Wang said. "China is also a victim of terrorism, and cracking down on ETIM should become an important part of the international fight against terrorism," he added . Many foreign experts doubt ETIM exists as the coherent group China portrays, or even exists at all. Western countries have long been reluctant to share intelligence with China or otherwise cooperate, saying China has provided little evidence to prove ETIM's existence and citing worries about possible human rights abuses in Xinjiang. One Beijing-based Western diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, said it was inevitable China would try to use what happened in Paris to seek Western support in Xinjiang, much as it did after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in the United States. Then, China was able to get both the United Nations and Washington to place ETIM on lists of terrorist organizations. "URGENT" NEED FOR COOPERATION Li Wei, a terrorism expert at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, a think-tank backed by the secretive Ministry of State Security, wrote in the official China Daily that it was "urgent" that China should increase cooperation, such as joint drills, with Western countries. "China is facing the same threats from IS as France and must prepare for similar terror attacks , " Li said. Rights groups and exiles say the violence stems more from widespread Uighur resentment at Chinese controls on their religion and culture rather than being committed by a well-organized militant group. China strongly denies abusing human rights in Xinjiang. Nicholas Bequelin, Amnesty International's East Asia director, said China would struggle to win much substantive support from Western countries. "Nobody wants to cooperate closely with a government that is so oppressive at the religious level," he said. The Global Times, an influential tabloid published by the ruling Communist Party's People's Daily, on Monday slammed what it said was the hypocrisy of Western nations, who reel from their own attacks and yet refuse to offer wholehearted support to combat China's militant problems. "Objectively speaking, the pressure Western

countries are facing from international terrorism is on the increase, and over the long-term it will be in the West's interests to strengthen anti-terror cooperation with China," it said in an editorial. President Xi Jinping, in Turkey for a G20 summit, called on Sunday for the world not to adopt "double standards" when it comes to terrorism, Chinese code for the anger it feels at the lack of strong Western condemnation of violence in Xinjiang. Xinhua pointed out that ETIM had claimed responsibility for three recent attacks, including a fatal vehicle crash in 2013 in Beijing's Tiananmen Square in which five died. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said ETIM was also becoming an international terror threat, though he did not explain how. "We have extensively explained the threat presented by ETIM-led forces to the international community and provided ample evidence," he told a daily news briefing. There have been no reports of Uighurs detained in Europe in connection with groups such as Islamic State.

AT Turkey-Sino relation

China relations 1 st Turkey is ignoring the Uighers to keep positive relations with china.Bradsher 15(Keith Bradsher, 12-25-2015, "China Plans a New Silk Road, but Trade Partners Are Wary," New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/26/business/china-plans-a-new-silk-road-but-trading-partners-are-wary.html?_r=0 Keith Bradsher is the Hong Kong bureau chief of The New York Times, covering Asian business, economic, political and science news.)//PH

Now the president of Turkey, Mr. Erdogan is prioritizing ties with China. He calmed the anti- Chinese protests last summer by urging his countrymen to be wary of rumors on social media about China’s treatment of the Uighurs. Nationalistic Turkish groups like Anatolia Youth, previously outspoken about the Uighurs, have responded by softening their stance toward China. Mahmut Temelli, the chairman of Anatolia Youth’s foreign relations council, said that he believed that on missiles, “the bid should have remained with China.” The missiles became an international issue two years ago, when Turkey’s defense ministry announced it favored a Chinese bid. It beat out an American offer to sell fully built Patriot missiles, as well as similar deals with Western Europe and Russia.

Relations high now Chinese-Turkish relations are high now – Cooperation of the “Modern Silk Road” proves.Xinhua 5/18(Xinhua, 5-18-2016, "Spotlight: Turkey, China in joint efforts to revive ancient Silk Road," No Publication, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-05/18/c_135369315.htm)//PH

ISTANBUL, May 18 (Xinhua) -- Turkey and China , two countries at the ends of the ancient Silk Road, are joined together once again through their respective efforts to revive and expand the economic belt . To their delight, China's "Belt and Road" initiative and Turkey's "Middle Corridor" plans can be aligned in their execution. "Our vision for the region is focused on building a Modern Silk Road , upgrading the existing transportation infrastructure and building new ones, and removing the impediments to intercontinental transport and trade," said Ambassador Ayse Sinirlioglu, Turkish Foreign Ministry's deputy undersecretary for economic affairs. "We are pleased that the 'Belt and Road' initiative shares many of our aims: to contribute to regional development and connectivity, provide new employment opportunities, enhance energy security, facilitate cultural exchanges and people-to-people contacts," she told Xinhua in an interview by email. China's initiative, which comprises the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, was first brought up by President Xi Jinping in 2013, with the aim of building a trade and infrastructure network connecting Asia with Europe and Africa along the ancient Silk Road routes. In remarks delivered late April, Xi voiced hope for all countries along the routes to "actually feel the benefit brought by the initiative." Turkey signed with China last November a memorandum of understanding ( MOU) on the harmonization of the "Belt and Road" with the "Middle Corridor." Turkey's initiative is seeking a modern revival of the ancient Silk Road, which started from China and ended in Turkey, by means of linking Turkey, the Caucasus and the Central Asian states via the Caspian Sea. Sinirlioglu described Turkey's joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank ( AIIB ) as a founding member with a capital investment of 2.6 billion U.S. dollars a s "another important step forward for our cooperation within Belt and Road initiative." "We are committed to move forward to realize cooperation under the framework of this MOU," she said. "It will be a cost-effective route linking Europe and Asia," she added, referring to Turkey's plan. "Trade between Asia and Europe continues to expand. We view the Middle Corridor as complementary to existing routes which will all need to be utilized in order to facilitate this growing commerce." She noted that the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway link, which will be operational by the end of this year, connects Beijing to London through the Caspian and the Bosphorus. Turkey and China have agreed on a high-speed rail linking Kars in Turkey's east with the country's western city of Edirne. "The Edirne-Kars high-speed railway will be an important component of the Middle Corridor," noted Sinirlioglu. " Realization of a Modern Silk Road, in other words connecting 'London to Beijing' using the Middle Corridor, will contribute not only to our bilateral trade volume but also to our cooperation in the region," she added. "Collaboration in railroad projects is the best way to further Turkish-Chinese cooperation," observed Altay Atli, a research fellow with the Asian Studies Center of Bogazici University in Istanbul. In his view, there is "a favorable environment" in Turkey "for future projects to hold," as the country's policy-makers have stated their "positive view" of China's initiative while the business community has "great enthusiasm" toward it. Turkey's economy

continues to grow and it is making efforts to escape the middle-income trap, so projects through the Road and Belt "will significantly contribute to Turkish economy in this respect," said Atli. China's project "would be a great opportunity for Ankara and Beijing to upgrade their trade relation, which has always been the basic parameter of the two countries' relations, and strengthen their cultural and military ties," said Cumhur Simsek, chief representative of the Turkish Chinese Industrialists-Businessmen Association. "There is no doubt this project may open the door for expanding global economy not only for China as well as for other countries," remarked Erdogan Topuz, a retired Boeing engineer and entrepreneur. In the view of Kadir Temiz, a research assistant with Bogazici University, "a new project, which would bring an alternative economic dynamism and new partners for Turkey, is so critical in these days," as Turkey's traditional economic partners like the EU and Middle Eastern countries are in "big trouble." Geographically a bridge linking Asia and Europe, Turkey can become an "economic, social and cultural hub" in the Belt and Road projects, observed Temiz. Ambassador Sinirlioglu voiced readiness to work with China and others to improve border facilities and custom cooperation, simplify and shorten border crossing procedures, develop logistic hubs and hinterland connections, adopt computerized clearance systems and assure harmonization with EU standards, homework needed to be done for better execution of the "Belt and Road" initiative. She called for the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund to play their parts in helping fund important infrastructure projects. Referring to the fact that almost all the countries along the route are being beset by political instability or violent conflict, Atli warned that the problems can "negatively" affect the implementation of projects. He called for Turkey and China, in particular, to overcome the problems facing them so as to provide "much better ground" for cooperation on "Belt and Road" projects. In Atli's view, lack of dialogue is the biggest one confronting the two countries. He voiced support for the establishment of a joint commission to help the two sides to consult regularly "within a systematic and institutionalized setting."

Relations are growing now- the Turkish president is pushing for better cooperation.Josh Chin, 7-29-2015, "Turkish President Aims to Boost Ties With China," WSJ, http://www.wsj.com/articles/turkish-president-aims-to-boost-ties-with-china-1438183330 (EG)

BEIJING—Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan offered to step up cooperation with Beijing on everything from trade to terrorism in meetings with Chinese leaders on Wednesday. The visit is Mr. Erdogan’s first to China since he was elected president in 2014 and comes days after Turkey entered into a tricky alliance with the U.S. in the fight against militants in Syria. Meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping , Mr. Erdogan reaffirmed Turkey’s support for Chinese territorial integrity and its opposition to the E ast T urkestan I slamic M ovement, a separatist group made up of Muslim Uighurs that wants to create an independent state in the northwestern Chinese region of Xinjiang, according to state broadcaster China Central Television. First as prime minister and now as president, Mr. Erdogan has cultivated closer economic and political ties with China, but the relationship has been strained by disagreements over the Uighurs, a minority group in China that speaks a Turkic language and considers itself part of the broad family of ethnic Turks. Turkey has been accepting Uighurs who flee China since the 1950s as part of a policy to welcome ethnic Turks from Eurasia—a policy that irks Beijing.

Turkey doesn’t careTurkey doesn’t care about the Uighur issues- siding with China improves their relationship.Zan Tao, 10-25-2013, "An Alternative Partner to the West? Turkey’s Growing Relations with China," Middle East Institute, http://www.mei.edu/content/alternative-partner-west-turkey%E2%80%99s-growing-relations-china (EG)

The Uighur issue is the most sensitive topic between Turkey and China, especially on the Chinese side. Turkey used to serve as a shelter for Uighur exiles and activists from the Xinjiang autonomous region in northwest China, and Turkey sympathized with the Uighur people’s resistance to the Communist government. However, with the development of stronger bilateral relations, the Turkish government, in its attempt to improve relations with China, has aimed to restrain the activities of the Uighurs who have migrated to Turkish territory . For example, following the visit of Turkish President Süleyman Demirel to China in 1995, the Turkish government issued a confidential circular signed by Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz that pointed out that the Chinese government was uneasy about the activities of Turkish associations established by citizens of Uighur origin and forbade any minister or civil servant from participating in their meetings.[16]

The Turkish president opposes any separatist movements in China.Shannon Tiezzi, The Diplomat, 7-30-2015, "Can China-Turkey Relations Move On?," Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/can-china-turkey-relations-move-on/ (EG)

As I noted previously, the trip faced an unwelcome complication thanks to issues related to ethnic Uyghurs in China. Anti-China protests broke out in Turkey earlier this month over reports that Uyghur celebrations of Ramadan were being restricted by the Chinese authorities. For its part, Beijing is angry that Turkish diplomats in Southeast Asia have reportedly been providing travel documents to Chinese Uyghurs, allowing them to more easily travel to Turkey. China is wary of Uyghurs seeking to carve out an independent state from China, and increasingly concerned about Uyghurs becoming radicalized and joining international terrorist groups. In an oblique nod to those concerns, Erdogan assured Xi that Turkey opposes all forms of terrorism and also opposes any attempts to harm China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity , according to Xinhua . Erdogan also stressed that Turkey itself is a victim of terrorism. He promised that Turkey will not allow its cooperation with China to “be affected by ill-minded forces,” according to Xinhua’s paraphrasing. Before leaving for China, Erdogan accused unnamed forces of hyping the Uyghur issue to undermine his trip.

Turkey has issues similar to the Uighurs, they can’t maintain a double standard with China.Zan Tao, 10-25-2013, "An Alternative Partner to the West? Turkey’s Growing Relations with China," Middle East Institute, http://www.mei.edu/content/alternative-partner-west-turkey%E2%80%99s-growing-relations-china (EG)

Turkey’s concession to Chinese pressure on the Uighur issue may be an indication of its understanding of how sensitive the issue is to China . In addition, Turkey has similar concerns, such as Kurdish terrorism and separatism and the Northern Cyprus problem. As such, it is hard for Turkey to maintain a double standard on similar issues.[23] Yet this should not be read as proof that Turkey will completely share China’s view on the Uighur/Xinjiang issue. This is because the segment of the Turkish public concerned with its “fellow men” of “Eastern Turkistan” will always pressure politicians to take a more supportive stance vis-à-vis the Uighurs.

Terrorism policies strengthen Relations Anti-terrorism efforts strengthen China-Turkey relations.Xinhua, 4-27-2016, "," http://www.chinadailyasia.com/nation/2016-04/27/content_15423994.html (EG)

China and Turkey on Wednesday pledged to strengthen anti-terrorism cooperation , such as fighting the terrorist group East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). The pledge came during a meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and his Turkish counterpart Mevlut Cavusoglu, who is in Beijing for a foreign ministers' meeting on Asian security. "Anti-terrorism and security cooperation are important components of China-Turkey political trust . Both sides should work closely to combat terrorist organizations including the ETIM, oppose extremism and address illegal immigration," Wang told Cavusoglu. Cavusoglu said Turkey treats China's security concerns as its own and will take all necessary measures to enhance bilateral cooperation in this regard, echoing Wang's remarks about combating illegal immigration and the ETIM. Turkey will continue to attach importance to China's security concerns and will never allow anybody in Turkey to engage in activities that threaten China's security, Cavusoglu said. Cavusoglu came to attend the fifth foreign ministers' meeting of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), on Wednesday and Thursday

US Involvement = collapse relations The US should not meddle and disrupt the strategic Turkey-China relationsGurcan, ’15. (Metin Gurcan. "Oppressed by China, Uighurs drawn to Salafist ideas." Al-Monitor. 1-19-2015 Web. Accessed: 6-23-2016. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/01/turkey-china-uyghurs-to-salafist-oppressive.html)

The Uighurs' status is followed closely in Turkey both by nationalists and Islamists, and is often the subject of harsh debates.

Is the approach of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government to the Uighur question based on emotion or strategy? The Uighur issue provides substantial ammunition for the AKP’s ever increasing nationalist narratives . It's not unusual for the pro-government media to call for the AKP decision makers not to keep silent about the Uighur issue and to extend assistance to them.

But in the AKP there are also those who do not agree. They say Turkey has to adopt a strategic approach to the Uighur question so as not to endanger the close relations achieved with China .

For columnist Ergun Diler of the pro-government daily Takvim, the Uighur issue is an instrument used by the United States that does not want to cultivate relations between China and Turkey. The United States must not be allowed to meddle in the Uighur issue and damage Turkey’s strategic relations with China. It must be because of this confusion that the AKP government is persistently rejecting a Turkish visa to the president of the World Uyghur Congress, Rabia Kadir, who lives in the United States and is called “the mother of Uighurs."

AT Islamophobia

Alt CausesAlt causes – other Muslim groups, desire for economic development, political discrimination, non-terror discriminationYildirim, ’16. (Cihangir Yildirim. "Why China increases oppression in Xinjiang." DailySabah. 6-8-2016 Web. Accessed: 6-23-2016. http://www.dailysabah.com/asia/2016/06/09/why-china-increases-oppression-in-xinjiang)

The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region is a vast region located in the northwestern corner of the China. Many from the local Uighur population refer to China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, which is home to many ethnic minority groups including the Turkic-speaking Uighurs, as East Turkestan.

Chinese officials claim that Xinjiang has been part of China since the Han Dynasty. Uighurs are one of many Turkic-speaking ethnic groups in the region who are culturally and historically connected to Central Asia, and do not consider themselves as part of China. Officially, Xinjiang became part of China invaded and took East Turkestan over in 1949, the same time as Tibet. Most Uighurs are Muslim and Islam can be an important part of their lives and identity. Of China's 55 officially recognized minorities, 10 groups are predominantly Sunni Muslim. The highest concentrations are found in the northwestern provinces of

Xinjiang, Gansu, and Ningxia, with significant populations also found throughout Yunnan province in southwest China. Chinese officials

value the region as a source of natural resources crucial to economic development, a space to

absorb migrants and a strategic link to the former Soviet Central Asian republics . Xinjiang is an important

trade and pipeline route into Central Asia. It borders eight countries: Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and

India. The region has rich deposits of natural gas, oil and nonferrous metals. Xinjiang was also a nuclear testing ground in the past. In the late 19th century the region was noted for producing salt, soda, borax, gold, jade and coal. Xinjiang's economy was largely based on agriculture and trade in the past, with cities such as Kashgar developing as hubs along the famous Silk Road. China, continuing its transportation infrastructure projects, is building 12 new highways in Xinjiang to connect it with Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Pakistan. The longest road will stretch 1,680 kilometers from Xinjiang to Uzbekistan, Iran, Turkey and finally Europe. Other infrastructure projects completed in 2007 include a south-to-north water diversion, a west-to-east natural gas pipeline, a west-to-east power transmission and the Qinghai-Tibet Railway. China and Turkmenistan signed a framework agreement on gas pipelines in 2006. Since 2009, gas pipelines from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to China are in the works. These pipelines connect with the Xinjiang-Shanghai gas pipeline and contribute to the implementation of China's development policies. Turkmen gas reserves are thought to be the largest in Central Asia. The oil and petrochemical industry accounts for 60 percent of Xinjiang's local economy. China and Kazakhstan signed the Transnational Atasu Pipeline project in 2004 and completed it in November 2005. The agreement is based on joint exploration for and development of oil and gas resources in the Caspian Sea. China and Kazakhstan are also stepping up plans for a natural gas pipeline to connect gas fields in the Caspian Sea with China. Another agreement signed with Kazakhstan is to build up international passenger and freight rail transport in an effort to boost trade and complete routes to Europe. The two countries opened a free trade zone on their border to increase their

economic relationship. China is home to a many Muslim ethnic minorities who subjected to assimilation

by Chinese policies . According to the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), there are more than 21 million Muslims in the

country. A Pew Research Center study based on the Chinese census found that there are 21.6 million Muslims in China, accounting for 1.6 percent of

the total population. According to the 2011 census, the largest Muslim ethnic group is the Hui, also known as Dungans, with 12

million, and the second-largest group is the Uighurs at 10 million. The rest, in descending order, are Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Tajiks and. Additionally, the small amount of Tibetan Muslims are officially classified along

with the Tibetan people. The Chinese government imposed birth restrictions on Muslim

minorities in Xinjiang in 2014. The party chief said it was necessary to lower fertility and implemented a family planning policy as part of

efforts "to fight terrorism." In 2015, Xinjiang doubled payouts to Uighur couples who have fewer than their quota to 6,000 yuan ($950). Ethnic Han Chinese forced to move to Xinjiang arrived at different times since 1776. According to a census from early 19th century, 75 percent of the region's total population was Uighur. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), at the beginning of the Chinese economic reform in 1978, including population

planning, Uighurs dropped to 42 percent of the population. Uighurs have long suffered ethnic discrimination, oppressive religious controls and continued poverty and joblessness in Xinjiang. For years, Chinese officials restricted fasting during Ramadan for civil servants, students and children. In 2015, China's ruling Communist Party launched an anti-terrorism campaign in Xinjiang following a string of deadly attacks Beijing blamed on extremist Uighurs seeking to establish an independent state.

According to a Uighur Human Rights Project report, 700 people were killed due to political activities in 2015. The number of those arrested increased 95 percent compared to the 2014, reaching 27,000. The number of those sentenced to execution or life

imprisonment increased 50 percent last year. Chinese officials continue to censor media in the region, as in other parts of China. Some 26.3 million people are estimated to have been killed between 1949, when China took over the region, and the Great Leap Forward, and

8.7 million people since 1965. About 35 million people have died because of military oppression or famine. Wearing a headscarf in

public, including on public transportation and when getting married in a religious ceremony, was banned in some places in 2014, with fines of about $353 for wearing a headscarf in public. Radical behavior is banned, which the Chinese government defines as not drinking alcohol, not smoking and avoiding eating non-halal food. A group of five Uighur men who had "crescent moon-shaped" beards were on trial in Xinjiang for religious extremism after they were found to have secretly attended unsanctioned religious ceremonies in June 2015.

Alt causes – Kazakhstan discriminates against Uighurs.Panicciari, ’10. (Giulia Panicciari. Giulia Panicciari, PhD candidate University of Turin. "Uyghurs in Kazakhstan." Forced Migration Online. 8-1-2010 Web. Accessed: 6-23-2016. http://www.forcedmigration.org/podcasts-videos-photos/video/across-the-border)

Ethnic Tensions in the Post-Soviet Era With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new nations based on ethnic elements, the presence of minorities in Kazakhstan has become problematic for the Kazakh political elite. By the 1990s the Kazakhs were no longer a majority ethnic group, threatening the legitimacy of the Kazakh political elite3. Since the first years of independence, post-Soviet Kazakhstan has conducted an ambiguous political discourse over the presence of national minorities on its territory. On one side, the political leadership has guaranteed Kazakhstani citizenship to all ex-Soviet residents. Moreover, it has promoted a positive image of its country, stressing the friendly and tolerant character of the Kazakhs, and their acceptance of the different cultures and religions of other national groups. Particular emphasis is given to the fact that Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs shared a common past under the occupation of

the Soviets. On the other side, the political leadership has supported discriminating linguistic and demographic policies4, as well as encouraging the promotion of ethnic Kazakhs in the public sector . Positive discourses repeated in official speeches, such as tolerance and harmony granted by the Kazakhs to the minorities, reveal in fact a subtle political game giving more importance to ethnicity, to the detriment of full citizenship, as well as civil rights. As Saule Mukhametrakhimova points out in this documentary, the political leadership has proved to be very pragmatic in keeping a delicate balance between the concessions granted to national minorities (mostly related to culture and folklore) and a tight control over any initiatives which could undermine the Kazakh hegemony. Such a policy is accepted at the street level due to a fear of potential interethnic conflicts, reinforced in 2010 by violence in Kyrgyzstan.

These events have caused tensions between the political group and the minorities , especially those with

family ties in Kyrgyzstan, and have led to tightened controls over the non-Kazakh population, include[ing]ed the Uyghurs. The Uyghur Community The Uyghur minority started to settle in today’s Kazakh territory in the 19th century, following an agreement with the Tsarist empire granting them refuge from the Qing conquest of Dzhungaria. Since then, the Uyghur community has been concentrated in the South Eastern regions of Kazakhstan, living mainly in ethnically homogeneous settlements. Many villages or towns inhabited by this minority, repeat the Uyghur names of the towns they left on the other side of the border. For instance, Dzharkent, situated near the border with China, or the villages around Almaty. During the 20th century, new migration flows from Xinjiang increased the Uyghur presence again. Significant influxes occurred in 1949, after the fall of the short-lived Republic of East Turkestan, and again in 1962, when the political and ideological tensions between the Soviet Union and communist China were accompanied by an increase in oppression by the Chinese government over the Turkic minorities. As a result of repeated migratory flows and of Soviet politics, aimed at involving (at least on paper) all nationalities in the construction of the Soviet people, the Uyghurs, while never

forgetting the dream of autonomy beyond the Kazakh, started to view Kazakhstan as a home state5. The more insular minority groups in Kazakhstan are often viewed with suspicion by the political leadership and the press and can be treated as potentially destabilizing elements by the local authorities. For the Uyghurs in particular, China’s repressive policies in the neighbouring region of Xinjiang, tend to influence Kazakh policies at home . Kazakhstan's close economic and political relationship with China (both countries are part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) has caused trouble for the Uyghur community. Uyghurs are often described as extremists,

separatists and terrorists . In light of such claims, Kazakhstan has often refused protection to Chinese citizens of Uyghur ethnicity, fleeing from persecution6. Moreover, the fact that many Uyghurs consider themselves to be natives of Kazakhstan, has created a belief in some sectors that Uyghur groups claim sovereignty over some Kazakh territories as well7. Uyghurs and the other minorities in Kazakhstan, live today in a sort of limbo. They can do business, study their native language and organize cultural events, provided they do not interfere with politics and accept limited freedom of thought and tight State control. This situation gives minorities the opportunity to survive as a community and enjoy stability, unlike in the neighbouring countries, but it does not grant them the status of full citizens.

Alt cause – media portrayal of IslamEspiritu, 2/29. (Belinda F. Espiritu. Belinda F. Espiritu is an associate professor of communication in the University of the Philippines Cebu. She teaches communication theory and research, development communication, speech communication, and media studies. "Islamophobia and the "Negative Media Portrayal of Muslims"." Global Research. 2-29-2016

Web. Accessed: 6-23-2016. http://www.globalresearch.ca/islamophobia-and-the-negative-media-portrayal-of-muslims/5440451)

There is a current obsession in mainstream media and academic discourse pertaining to Islam and the West.

This current obsession is tinged with negative signifiers with the global media’s predominantly negative portrayal of Islam and Muslims, depicting Muslims generally as violent, fanatical, bigoted, or as extremists and terrorists. Islamophobia, fear of Islam and Muslims, has intensified with the 9/11 bombing of the World Trade Center

in New York, the Taliban’s fundamentalist proscriptions and restrictions in Afghanistan, the Charlie Hebdo attack in France, and the emergence of the self proclaimed “Islamic State group (ISIS) which allegedly shows videos of the beheadings of their prisoners who are more often journalists. There are factual analyses which show that ISIS is supported covertly by US-NATO forces, just as the Taliban was supported by the US to fight against the Soviet Union, and that the 9/11 World Trade Center bombing was used as a pretext to wage war against Afghanistan (October 2001) and oil-rich Iraq (March 2003). These were often labeled as conspiracy theories, but more in-depth investigations and analysis can bring out the truth

behind each of these geopolitical events. The point is that Islam has been consistently portrayed by global media as a violent-prone religion that is diametrically opposed to the West. The question of “Islam and the West” has been the theme of various academic conferences in US, Europe, and other countries including Malaysia; it has also been the theme of analytical writings, discourses, and publications. These trends illustrate the significance of the topic, which has significance for other countries in Asia and Africa where

Muslims can be found. F. A. Noor (2007) argued that “Muslim identity and the concerns of Muslims are increasingly being defined in terms of an oppositional dialectic that pits Islam and Muslims against the rest of the world” (p. 261), as Islamophobia has become the mainstream media discourse “where images of Muslims as murderous fanatics abound in movies, videos and computer games” (p. 267). He proposed that the solution to the present predicament faced by Muslims the world over can be found in the corpus of Islamic theology and praxis itself, particularly in the concept of tawhid, which refers to the unity of all creation and the fundamental equality of the singular human race. The idea of tawhid reminds Muslims that all human beings are equal and are thus entitled to their own share of respect and dignity. As hostility and misperceptions between Muslims and Christians persist in an alleged “clash of civilizations”, Noor (2007) asserted that there is the urgent need for Muslims to get out of this rut by shifting their focus to other issues and concerns that are more universal in nature such as the debate over globalization, specifically, “the environmental movement, the pacifist movement against war and the trade of arms, the campaign for equal labor, the campaign against exploitation of children and most recently the wave of anti-globalization….” (p. 274). When Muslim concerns for justice, equity, rights and freedom are articulated in the context of a borderless world where the audience is not only Muslims but the world as a whole, that will be the time when “the image of Islam and Muslims will stand above the crude and poisonous images we see today” (p. 276). In relation to Noor’s ideas propounded above, it is essential to counteract the predominantly negative media portrayal of Islam and Muslims with a condensed exposition of the phenomenon of Sufism, which is barely portrayed or understood by Western media, through the writings of two Turkish Sufi spiritual masters, namely: Osman Nuri Topbas on Sufi spirituality, and Bediuzzaman Said Nursi on the need for Christians and Muslims to unite in a critique of modern civilization. It is the nature of media to report on the novel, the sensational, the bizarre, the dramatic, the extraordinary but not the ordinary occurrences in life. Hence, with regard to Islam, it does not report about peace-loving Muslims, or Muslims’ striving for holiness and daily jihad against their egos and natural temptations, or peaceful coexistence between Muslims and Christians in different parts of the world. Through an exposition of Sufism, it will be shown that Muslims who genuinely seek the path to holiness and union with God will never be murderous in their hearts but will be filled with profound gentleness and compassion for all.

Alt causes – media portrayal and lack of accountabilityGoodenough, ’14. (Patrick Goodenough. "Global ‘Islamophobia’ Report Points to ‘Islamaphobe’ on U.S. Religious Freedom Watchdog." CNS News. 6-20-2014 Web. Accessed: 6-23-2016. http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/patrick-goodenough/global-islamophobia-report-points-islamaphobe-us-religious-freedom)

CAIR, a controversial lobby group that describes itself as “America’s largest Muslim civil liberties and advocacy organization,” features a number of times in the OIC Islamophobia report, invariably as the complainant in cases ranging from anti-Muslim graffiti in California to allegations that the Florida Republican Party was inviting “speakers who espouse anti-Islamic views.” The report, which was released during a two-day OIC foreign ministers’ meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, defines Islamophobia as “a contemporary form of racism that continues to

grow in many parts of the world and particularly in the West.” Citing opinion polls suggesting that Americans’ views of Islam were growing more negative, it also charged that “Western media, including the social media,

continued to play a key role in promoting and disseminating an anti–Muslim culture .” Some quarters of

the Western media, it said, were “propagating fascist and irresponsible anti-Islam hate discourses.” “The lack of objectivity and biased reporting combined with continuous focus on the issue of ‘Islamic extremism’ steadily consolidated negative stereotyping of Muslims.” Another problem area identified by the Islamophobia

Observatory was the failure of some governments and political leaders to take legal action against

“perpetrators of Islamophobia.” “Such inaction helps propagate negative stereotypes regarding Islam, including the notion that Islam is linked to terror; that it is intolerant of other religious beliefs; that its values and practices are incompatible with modern democratic systems; that it favors repression of freedom of expression and that it undermines human rights,” the report said. The Islamophobia Observatory did, however, find what it portrayed as positive developments during the period under review. These included Brandeis University’s hotly-debated decision last April to withdraw an honorary degree from Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a Somali-born naturalized American scholar known for her advocacy for women in Islamic societies. “It was with satisfaction that the Observatory noted the University of Brandeis, in the United States, making a step back in giving an award to a known Islamophobe, Ayaan Hirsi Ali,” the report said. Among other “constructive developments with regard to combating Islamophobia,” it highlighted remarks last March by CIA Director John Brennan, who said al-Qaeda had “a perverse and very corrupt interpretation of the Qur’an.” The OIC report cited a CNSNews.com article in which Brennan was quoted as saying, “One of the things that I'm struck with when I travel throughout the Middle East and I meet with leaders, military and civilian – these are individuals who are Qur’anic scholars themselves and they are the ones who are most annoyed at how al-Qaeda has hijacked their religion and how they have really distorted the teachings of Mohammed, you know, for violent purposes.” The OIC, which comprises 56 Muslim-majority nations plus “Palestine,” has described itself as “the second largest intergovernmental organization after the United Nations.” The U.S. has had a special envoy to the OIC since 2008.

Islamophobia not the cause Discrimination against Uighurs is not based in Islamophobia, but rather, Chinese ethnocentrism (note, this still says the Chinese oppress Uighurs)Beech, ’14. (Hannah Beech. "If China Is Anti-Islam, Why Are These Chinese Muslims Enjoying a Faith Revival?." TIME. 8-12-2014 Web. Accessed: 6-23-2016. http://time.com/3099950/china-muslim-hui-xinjiang-uighur-islam/)

The road to Linxia, in China’s vast, sere northwest, is known locally as the Quran Belt, with a profusion of newly built mosques and Sufi shrines lining the motorway. Some are built in a traditional Chinese style, with pagoda-like eaves; others, with their green tiled domes, echo Middle Eastern

architecture. With violent unrest affecting northwestern Xinjiang, a spotlight has been cast on that area’s Muslim Uighurs, who have long chafed at rule from Beijing. But the Uighurs, some of whom yearn for autonomy from the

People’s Republic, are not the biggest Muslim population in China, which has more adherents to Islam than the European

Union. That distinction belongs to the Hui, a 10.5 million-strong group that is also the second largest of China’s 55 officially recognized ethnic minorities. One of the Hui centers of Islamic learning is the Wild West town of Linxia, in Gansu province, where Sufi traditions remain

vibrant. With the bloodshed in Xinjiang escalating — the most recent clash late last month, which the Chinese government

labeled a “violent terrorist attack,” saw nearly 100 people killed, according to an official count — authorities have intensified a crackdown on spiritual expression by Uighurs. (Tibetans face religious repression too as their disenchantment with Chinese rule grows.) But this does not mean that Beijing is curtailing Islam

nationwide . Indeed, members of the Muslim Hui community are enjoying a flowering of faith in what

is, officially, still an atheist communist nation. Linxia’s Islamic places of worship are just one symbol of this religious boom. Ismail, a Hui who

works for a state-owned enterprise in the Ningxia autonomous region , says he openly practices his faith. “Of course, I fast during Ramadan,” he says. “All my Hui friends do it, too. It’s our obligation as Muslims.” But a Uighur college student says he and his classmates were not allowed to do the same. “[Han university authorities] make sure we eat at the cafeteria. They say they don’t want us to be

tired, but I don’t believe them. It is because we are Uighur.” Hui participation in the hajj pilgrimage to Mecca has increased over the past several years, say scholars. Another sign of renewed religious commitment: Ismail says he has noticed more Hui women in his hometown wearing veils in recent years. “As more Hui women receive education, they learn more about their own identities,” he says. “As a result, they realize the protection brought by Islam and are starting to wear veils more.” By contrast, a local paper in the Xinjiang town of Karamay reported last week that residents with long beards, headscarves, veils and clothing with an Islamic crescent moon and star would not be allowed to board public buses while the city played host to a sporting event. In Kashgar, a Silk Road outpost that is a repository of Uighur culture, the local government has promoted a campaign called Project Beauty that urges Uighur women to “show your pretty faces

and let your beautiful hair fly in the wind.” Uighurs also have a hard time getting passports to travel abroad, especially to go on the hajj. “ It’s not

an issue of freedom of religion ,” says Dru Gladney, one of the foremost academics studying Chinese Muslims. “Clearly, there

are many avenues of religious expression that are unfettered in China , but when you cross these

very often nebulous and shifting boundaries of what the state regards as political , then you’re

in dangerous territory. Obviously this is what we see in Xinjiang and in Tibet.” Unlike Tibetans

or Uighurs, who speak a Turkic language and are racially distinct from the Han, the Hui are not

agitating for increased autonomy, much less a split from China . One reason may be influenced by geography.

While Uighurs are concentrated in Xinjiang, and Tibetans clustered on the high plateau in far western China, the Hui are spread out across the nation. True, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region is dedicated to them, but Hui communities exist in practically every major Chinese city. A significant population lives in Beijing. Racially and linguistically, the Hui — whose ancestors include Persian, Central Asian and Arab traders who plied the Silk Road and intermarried with local

Chinese — are virtually indistinguishable from China’s Han majority. Often, it is only the presence of a white prayer cap that differentiates a Hui man from his Han counterpart. Partly because of their cultural affinity to the Han and their geographic dispersal, the Hui are far more integrated into mainstream Chinese life than those ethnic minorities living in China’s borderlands. “The way [the government treats] the Uighurs and the Hui is completely different,” says a foreign scholar who studies the Hui, requesting anonymity. “The standard line for the Uighurs is that everything is oppression and violence and conflict, and the standard narrative for the Hui is that they are complicit with state power and that they are

not real Muslims. The Hui are considered the good Muslims and the Uighurs the bad Muslims.” That division has implications for the future of Xinjiang, which was once predominantly Uighur but has played host to waves of government-encouraged internal migration. While many of the recent arrivals who work at military or state-owned farms and mines are Han, other newcomers are Hui. China’s 2010 national census recorded 983,015 Hui in Xinjiang, up from 681,527 in the 1990 count. During the 2009 rioting in Xinjiang’s capital Urumqi that killed around 200 people, one reported refrain from extremist Uighurs spread across social media: “Kill the Han, kill the Hui.” The Hui’s forebears include a long line of military generals loyal to imperial Chinese governments. (There were, however, Hui rebels who battled the late Qing dynasty from a base in Ningxia.) The Hui also excelled at trading, a talent which spread their numbers across China. Even in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, many trinket stores and restaurants near the main city square are now owned by Hui merchants. The Hui, along with the Han, were targeted when ethnic violence broke out in Tibetan regions in 2008. Indeed, ancient history in China’s far west is filled with battles between Tibetans, Uighurs, the Hui and the Han, with borders and allegiances shifting like desert sands. Animosities endure. “Post-2008 [violence in Tibet] and 2009 [bloodshed in Xinjiang], it’s like it’s every group for themselves,” says the foreign Hui scholar. External influences are also becoming more important in Chinese Islam. The proliferation of Middle Eastern–style mosques in Linxia mirrors the rise of purist Salafi Islam across the world, from Indonesia to North Africa, in which a unified faith trumps indigenous variations. “In China, the Hui have extraordinarily illustrated this beautiful accommodation between Chinese culture and Islam,” says Gladney, who teaches at Pomona College in California. “But with the rise of social media and an idea of one Islamic world, this historic accommodation is being debated.” Gladney notes that Hui clerics have studied at Egypt’s al-Azhar University, one of the world’s most important centers of Islamic learning, while around 300 Hui live in the holy Saudi Arabian city of Medina. “For 1,300 years, the Hui have been able to not only survive but thrive,” says Gladney. “But we have to also remember that revolutions in Chinese Islam have tended to come from increased communication and travel abroad, and we’re in a period where the Hui with the right connections are doing just that.”

CircumventionChina will use “terror attacks” to justify oppression.Rashid, ’16. (Ahmed Rashid. Ahmed Rashid is a journalist and the author of five books on Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia. His latest book is 'Pakistan on the Brink, the future of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the West'., . "Is China changing its policy towards Uighur Muslims?." Al Jazeera. 4-1-2016 Web. Accessed: 6-23-2016. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/04/china-changing-policy-uighur-muslims-160424083056974.html)

There has been a harsh crackdown on Islamic traditions for what is the largest group of Muslims in China. Mosques are barred from calls to prayer, fasting during Ramadan is forbidden, children under 18 are banned from entering mosques and

Uighur culture and language is being ignored. As ethnic and religious persecution has multiplied, so have attacks by Uighurs on security forces and Han Chinese. However, rather than punish a few Islamic militants or independence-seeking nationalists, China has victimised and punished the entire Uighur population. Chinese actions are being increasingly depicted in the wider Muslim world as a war against the very practice of Islam. In turn, Chinese officials claim they have dismantled 200 terrorist groups and executed 49 militants since 2014 in Xinjiang. For nearly two decades, Uighur militants have been training and fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan with the Taliban and other Central Asian groups, much to the anger of the Chinese. More recently, Uighurs have started attacking security forces in Xinjiang itself, usually with knives and clubs rather than explosives or Kalashnikovs.

China will fall back on ‘anti-separatist’ justification for oppression.Crane, ’14. (Brent Crane. "A Tale of Two Chinese Muslim Minorities." Diplomat. 8-22-2014 Web. Accessed: 6-23-2016. http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/a-tale-of-two-chinese-muslim-minorities/)

The most striking difference between the two groups though is their respective positions in relation to the Chinese government. Unlike the Hui, the

Uyghurs face an alarming amount of state discrimination. “Under the guise of counterterrorism and

‘ anti-separatism ’ efforts, the government maintains a pervasive system of ethnic discrimination against Uighurs…and sharply curbs religious and cultural expression,” notes a 2013 Human Rights Watch report on China. It cites an “omnipresence of the secret police,” a “history of disappearances” and an “overtly politicized judiciary” as common components of the “atmosphere of fear among the Uighur population.” The Hui are not mentioned in the full-country report. The cause behind the gap in government treatment is twofold.

China justifies its actions by saying it is tamping down separatism and violence.Davis, ’08. (Elizabeth Van Wie Davis. Davis received her BA in Liberal Arts from Shimer College,[1] where she enrolled at the age of 16 through the school's early entrance program.[2] She went on to obtain her PhD in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia in 1985.[1] Her dissertation was a study of East Asian maritime law, titled Oceans Policy: A New Search for Cooperation.[3] "Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China." Asia-Pacific Center For Security Studies. 1-23-2008 Web. Accessed: 6-23-2016. http://apcss.org/college/publications/uyghur-muslim-ethnic-separatism-in-xinjiang-china/)

The heavy-handedness of the multiple “strike hard” campaigns by the central Chinese government in Xinjiang simultaneously tamps down violence in the short-run but fuels a sense of injustice and mistrust among the Uyghurs in the

long-run. Beginning in 1996, regular “strike hard” campaigns were used to fight crime and threats to order by mobilizing police, but are used in this decade to deal increasingly with “separatism, extremism and terrorism.” A heavy police presence is a constant in Xinjiang.

China is cracking down on Uighurs to stop separatism.Davis, ’08. (Elizabeth Van Wie Davis. Davis received her BA in Liberal Arts from Shimer College,[1] where she enrolled at the age of 16 through the school's early entrance program.[2] She went on to obtain her PhD in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia in 1985.[1] Her dissertation was a study of East Asian maritime law, titled Oceans Policy: A New Search for Cooperation.[3] "Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China." Asia-Pacific Center For Security Studies. 1-23-2008 Web. Accessed: 6-23-2016. http://apcss.org/college/publications/uyghur-muslim-ethnic-separatism-in-xinjiang-china/)

Clearly the Chinese government has been cracking down on Uyghur militants . Western human rights groups are

concerned about overall treatment of prisoners and the targeting of minorities, while the Chinese government is concerned that Islamic militant rhetoric and funding are finding their way into China . The issue then becomes whether

China is victimizing the Uyghur minority, using terrorism and separatism as an excuse to violate their human rights, or whether China itself is a victim of separatists and terror networks like the al-Qaeda camps,[15] which trained Uyghurs in Afghanistan for activities in Xinjiang.[16] The Chinese tend to refer to this concern by the three character slogan of separatism, extremism and terrorism, implying a distinct link between the three concepts. For instance, Chinese President Hu Jintao said on June 17, 2004, that “We have to fight against the three evils of separatism, extremism and terrorism,” in a speech at a summit meeting of the six-nation Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), adding that terrorism in all forms must be suppressed and double standards must be ruled out in fighting what is regarded as a grave threat to world peace and development. Efforts should be made to tackle the problems of regional confrontation and poverty, which are considered the roots of

terrorism, said the Chinese president. “Terrorism is not automatically related to certain ethnic groups or religions,” he added.[17] It is clear that the Chinese leadership fears that Xinjiang separatism has and will continue to gain support from transnational Muslim extremists, with possible ramifications both for other latent Chinese separatist movements without a Muslim connection and for other Chinese Muslims without a separatist agenda.

A2 TerrorMajority of fleeing Uighurs have no connection to terrorism.Yenni Kwok, 12-28-2015, "Is a Uighur Terrorist Buildup Taking Place in SE Asia?," TIME, http://time.com/4161906/uighur-terrorism-indonesia-thailand-islam-isis/ (EG)

The Uighurs, from China’s northwestern region of Xinjiang, are Muslims who speak a Turkic language. They have long complained of repression and violence at the hands of the predominantly Chinese Han majority. Thousands have fled China in recent years, including to Southeast Asian countries like Thailand and Cambodia. The vast majority have no connection whatsoever to terrorism or Islamist extremism, instead claiming legitimate asylum. Their peaceful hope is to be allowed to go on to Turkey , but the Thai and Cambodian governments have instead deported them back to China, despite well-founded fears that the Uighurs will be persecuted on their return.

InevitableTerrorism against China is inevitable- they’ve already done enough to trigger extremist groups.Zachary Keck, The Diplomat, 10-22-2014, "Al-Qaeda Declares War on China, Too," Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/al-qaeda-declares-war-on-china-too/ (EG)

Al-Qaeda central appears to have joined the Islamic State in calling for jihad against China over its alleged occupation of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. This week, al-Sahab media organization, al-Qaeda’s propaganda arm, released the first issue of its new English-language magazine Resurgence. The magazine has a strong focus on the Asia-Pacific in general, with feature articles on both India and Bangladesh, as well as others on Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, the first issue also contains an article entitled “10 Facts About East Turkistan,” which refers to the name given to Xinjiang by those who favor independence from China. The ten facts seek to cast Xinjiang as a longtime independent state that has only recently been brutally colonized by Han Chinese , who are determined to obliterate its Islamic heritage . “In the last 1,000 years of its Islamic history,” the article says, Xinjiang “has remained independent for 763 years, while 237 years have been spent under Chinese occupation at various intervals.” This occupation has been costly, the article argues, alleging that: “In 1949, 93 percent of the population of East Turkistan was Uyghur, while 7 percent was Chinese. Today, as a result of six decades of forced displacement of the native population and the settlement of Han Chinese in their place, almost 45 percent of the population of East Turkistan is Chinese.” The article goes on to claim that teaching the Quran in Xinjiang is punishable by up to ten years in prison, and that Muslim women caught wearing the hijab can be fined more than five times the average annual income of the area. Al-Qaeda also claims that following its takeover of the mainland in 1949, the C hinese C ommunist P arty murdered some 4.5 million Muslims in Xinjiang . The group further claims that China has conducted no less than 35 nuclear weapon tests in Xinjiang, and the radioactive fallout from these are estimated to have killed 200,000 Muslims. In 1998 alone, the article adds, 20,000 babies were born deformed in Xinjiang as a result of these nuclear tests. Although “10 Facts About East Turkistan” stops shorting of calling for jihad against China, the point is more directly articulated elsewhere in the first issue of Resurgence. For example, one article says that the “the victory of the Ummah” will be a “deathblow” and a “bitter defeat… for America, Iran, Russia, China and all those who have fought this war by proxy against Muslims. ” In a particularly troubling article for China and other state actors, al-Qaeda calls on its followers to try to disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and Strait of Malacca, noting the waterways’ centrality for China and other Asian economies in particular. Al-Qaeda central’s sudden focus on China follows closely on the heels of the Islamic State also condemning Beijing for its handling of its Uyghur Muslim population . Back in July, IS leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi gave a speech in which he argued “Muslim rights are forcibly seized in China, India, Palestine” and many other countries around the world. Later, IS released a map that outlined the borders of its envisioned Caliphate. Notably, Xinjiang province was included in the Caliphate.

Policies stop terrorism Legitimate terrorism is being carried out by some Uighurs.Potter, ’14. (Philip Potter. "Terrorism in China: the global dimension." Guardian. 5-6-2014 Web. Accessed: 6-23-2016. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/06/terrorism-china-uighur-militants-afghanistan-pakistan)

The knife attack in which six people were injured in southern China is the third high-profile incident at a Chinese train station in a little more than two

months. It seems that China is in the grip of a mounting terrorist campaign, with militants apparently able to strike when and where they want. Last week a railway station in Urumqi was attacked with suicide bombs and knives, with at least three killed and dozens injured. The authorities quickly attributed that attack to Uighur separatists. More jarring, the attack came at the end of President Xi Jinping's trip to that city for the explicit purpose of

announcing a "get tough" policy on terrorism. That incident followed close on the heels of an eerily similar March

attack in Kunming. Details are sketchy, but in that brutal episode approximately nine militants wielding knives stormed the city's railway station, killing at least 28 and wounding about a hundred. Only a few months before, that

there was a high-profile attack on the most visible symbol of Chinese political authority – Tiananmen Square in Beijing. In

that case, aggrieved Uighurs apparently drove across the country and mowed down tourists at the edge of the square with their Jeep before setting it on fire. While these incidents have set China on edge, they have received relatively little attention from the outside world. Western analysts tend to draw on the "low-tech" weaponry and comparatively low death tolls to conclude that these are minor incidents. Even specialists often miss the potential for broader international implications, seeing only an internal separatist struggle. Both of

these instincts are wrong. Attacks like those in Urumqi, Kunming and Beijing are serious, and their increasing sophistication indicates a growing threat. If they continue to escalate, there is potential for far-reaching

consequences for China and the world. Despite their reliance on relatively unsophisticated weapons, Uighur militants seem to have already mastered some of the most challenging problems that extremist organisations face . The ability to conduct complex, co-ordinated attacks like those in Urumqi and Kunming are hallmarks of organisational strength. Moreover, while it might

seem counterintuitive, restraint is also a clear indicator of capability. Weak movements lash out without discipline and coordination, while strong ones wait for opportune moments and symbolically valuable targets. Last week's attack in Urumqi certainly fits the latter description. Timing an attack to coincide with Xi's visit to Xinjiang, explicitly to demonstrate his toughness on the separatist question, is a clear act of defiance and it set Chinese social media ablaze before the censors stepped in. The

attackers dramatically undermined any remaining confidence that the authorities have this situation under control. This compounds the concern that militants will be able to project still more violence out of long-restive Xinjiang and into distant Chinese cities as they appeared to do in Kunming and Beijing. This approach makes perfect sense. Terrorism is only effective when the fear that it generates reaches its intended audience, which in this case is the Chinese public. Chinese security forces had, until this recent spate of attacks, been very successful in bottling up violence in Xinjiang and keeping it out of view, but this apparent new capability to time attacks to coincide with symbolic opportunities and strike distant Chinese population centres upsets that equilibrium. Indiscriminate attacks on civilians always warrant attention, but the evolving violence in China has under-appreciated potential to develop into global concern. When al-Qaida struck the United States on 9/11, it reshaped global politics, culminating in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. As an emerging global power, China's response to its terrorist problem could have consequences that are nearly as far-reaching. It is often forgotten that China's restive Muslim regions border Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal regions, putting it at the geographic centre of the "war on terror". The withdrawal of Nato forces from Afghanistan will leave a host of problems on China's doorstep. More troubling still, some of the most militant among the Uighurs have been active at high levels with jihadi organisations fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan. As the west winds down its presence in Afghanistan, it would be prudent to anticipate that these militants will return their attention to China. When they do, they will bring a great deal of experience and capacity with them. China may then find itself at the mercy of militants operating from safe havens across borders, much as the US did. Only time will tell how China might respond. All this suggests

that it is time to take Chinese terrorism seriously. The attackers have carried only knives and crude bombs, but they and their kind have the potential to reshape both Chinese and international politics.

AT QPQ

QPQ =/= Economic Gain Quid Pro Quo results in no economic increase. Holmes et al 13 (Thomas J. Holmes- Consultant , Ellen R. McGrattan-Consultant ,Edward C. Prescott- Senior Monetary Advisor July 2013“Quid Pro Quo: Technology Capital Transfers for Market Access in China” https://www.princeton.edu/~ies/Fall13/HolmesPaper.pdf)

A key assumption of our theory, based on microevidence from Chinese patent applications, is that the property rights being exchanged apply in China, not outside; for example, the joint venture Shanghai GM can sell Chevrolets and Buicks in China, but not in the United States. An important implication of this assumption is that even as China develops and accumulates significant property rights to technology capital in China, FDI outflows from China to the advanced economies will remain low. After 1985, an explosion in patenting took place in China. Prior to 1985, the patent system did not even exist, but its scale is now comparable to the systems in the United States, Europe, and Japan.3 Indeed, in a single decade, from 2000 to 2010, the domestic share of published patents in China increased from 37 percent to 73 percent. Yet, despite this explosion in Chinese patenting, FDI outflows from China to the advanced economies continue to be relatively small when compared with countries doing significant R&D, consistent with our theory (see Figure 2). To understand the economic effects of quid pro quo, a useful approach is to compare and contrast quid pro quo policy with a tax imposed by a host country on FDI profits. Both distort investment decisions, and both entail a payment by foreign firms to the host government—payment in cash in the case of a tax on profits and payment with technology capital in the case of quid pro quo. The key difference lies in what happens after payment. With a tax, foreign firms continue to own and manage the technology, whereas with quid pro quo requirements, management is reallocated to domestic firms, and this result can have significant effects on productivity. In particular, domestic management need not confront the barriers to investment that foreign firms face, which implies a productivity gain, in part because the transferred technology is no longer subject to further quid pro quo and the distortions that accompany it. This productivity gain may potentially be offset by a loss in effective management of the technology when it is transferred from the foreign to the domestic firms. We allow for such a loss in our analysis.

QPQ with China will not benefit any of the other countries involved Holmes et al 13 (Thomas J. Holmes- Consultant , Ellen R. McGrattan-Consultant ,Edward C. Prescott- Senior Monetary Advisor July 2013“Quid Pro Quo: Technology Capital Transfers for Market Access in China” https://www.princeton.edu/~ies/Fall13/HolmesPaper.pdf)

Over the past two decades, China has grown rapidly and become a major destination for foreign direct investment (FDI). Surprisingly, however, relatively little of China’s FDI inflows come from the technologically advanced, dominant players in global investment such as the United States, Europe, and Japan, and little of China’s FDI outflows goes to these advanced countries (see Prasad and Wei 2007 and Branstetter and Foley 2010). In this paper, we assess these seemingly puzzling bilateral flows in light of China’s quid pro quo policy—a policy that

makes technology transfer a precondition of foreign firms selling in China. First, using surveys of foreign multinationals operating in China, we document the existence of quid pro quo policy. We then use microevidence from Chinese patents to analyze the terms of the technology transfer deals. Finally, we incorporate quid pro quo policy into a multicountry dynamic general equilibrium model and show that the policy greatly enhances the model’s ability to match observations from the international accounts. We use this extended model to quantify the impact that China’s quid pro quo policy has had on global innovation, growth, and welfare. A number of authors have previously documented that FDI flows into China from advanced countries like the United States are relatively small. For example, Branstetter and Foley (2010) argue that inflows from the United States into China are small relative to flows of U.S. FDI to other destination countries, as well as relative to other source countries of investment into China. A potential explanation for this puzzle is that investment from other source countries investing in China is actually Chinese investment, which is sent to and from China’s provinces in order to take advantage of policy incentives for FDI or sent to and from Caribbean islands in order to take advantage of tax-minimizing schemes. However, even when we combine flows for China and its provinces of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao—netting out intraprovincial flows—and exclude flows from the tax havens such as the British Virgin Islands (BVI) and the Cayman Islands, we still find that inflows from the United States are modest and decreasing as a share over time. If we additionally include countries in Europe and Japan, we find that the share of China’s inward FDI from these advanced countries falls from roughly 70 percent in 1990 to less than 30 percent in 2010. This finding is puzzling given that multinationals in technologically advanced countries have already invested in and accumulated know-how, such as R&D capital, that can be used nonrivalrously in locations abroad, and China has promoted itself as an attractive destination for this capital.

The only positive economic outcome of a QPQ would only affect China, not the counter members. Holmes et al 13 (Thomas J. Holmes- Consultant , Ellen R. McGrattan-Consultant ,Edward C. Prescott- Senior Monetary Advisor July 2013“Quid Pro Quo: Technology Capital Transfers for Market Access in China” https://www.princeton.edu/~ies/Fall13/HolmesPaper.pdf)

We use our quantitative model to conduct welfare analysis and to estimate the extent of technology capital transfer in China over the period 1990–2010. The model has six economies, namely, China and its provinces, the United States, Western Europe, Japan, an entity comprising Brazil, Russia, and India, and the rest of the world. We assume that changes in total factor productivities are such that per capita GDPs are aligned in the model and data, and we assume that policies governing capital accounts are such that total FDI inflows into the six economies are aligned in the model and data. We then compare statistics for the model with and without quid pro quo policy.2 We find that the model predictions about innovative activity and international capital flows depend critically on the inclusion of quid pro quo technology capital transfers. We also find that following a quid pro quo policy yields large welfare gains for China—on the order of 4.5 percent in annual consumption—whereas all other economies suffer welfare losses.

QPQ Can fail No grantee to have a successful QPQ, requirements increasing over time.Holmes et al 13 (Thomas J. Holmes- Consultant , Ellen R. McGrattan-Consultant ,Edward C. Prescott- Senior Monetary Advisor July 2013“Quid Pro Quo: Technology Capital Transfers for Market Access in China” https://www.princeton.edu/~ies/Fall13/HolmesPaper.pdf)

Ample evidence supports the key mechanisms of the model. Prior to 2002, when China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), quid pro quo transfer of technology was explicit Chinese policy. Since then, the policy has become implicit and is accomplished through requirements such as joint ventures. Surveys of multinationals we cite below confirm that that quid pro quo is an implicit policy and a majority of respondents say that

requirements are increasing over time. Furthermore, microevidence from patent data support a key mechanism of the model; the data show that as part of the quid pro quo arrangement, the property rights transferred apply inside China, not outside. To demonstrate this, we construct a unique data set of Chinese patents—with foreign and domestic patents separately catalogued—and we use it to determine which patents go outside China in the form of patents in other countries. We focus in particular on patents in China that are jointly owned by a foreign multinational and a local Chinese partner. These come out of the various joint ventures that foreign firms have been forced into as a requirement for market access. They are direct evidence of technology connections between foreign and domestic firms and direct evidence of Chinese firms obtaining property rights in China. We document a sharp empirical finding about these jointly-owned patents: the property rights of the Chinese partners stop at the border, exactly as assumed in our theory. An interesting example in our data set is the case of the joint venture between the foreign telecommunications giant Alcatel-Lucent and the domestic firm Shanghai Bell. Through 2010, 97 of the jointly owned patents in China have gone outside in the form of WIPO applications. Yet in all but five cases, the applications make explicit that Shanghai Bell shares ownership only in China and Alcatel-Lucent is the sole owner in every other country. Although this example is revealing, it turns out that the typical way that Chinese 3 ownership stops at the border is that the jointly owned patents do not go outside of China in the first place. For example, in the case of General Motors (GM), which co-owns 70 patents with its Chinese partner Shanghai Automobile Industry Company (SAIC), none of the patents extend outside of China. What makes these cases particularly striking is that when we look by comparison at patents that are not owned via joint venture, a nonnegligible fraction of these patents do go outside China.

Chinas policies make it harder for countries to have any incentives to actually engage in a QPQ relation Holmes et al 15 (Thomas J. Holmes- Consultant , Ellen R. McGrattan-Consultant ,Edward C. Prescott- Senior Monetary Advisor January 29, 2015 “The Costs of Quid Pro Quo” https://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/economic-policy-papers/the-costs-of-quid-pro-quo)

First, we find that China has a very strong incentive to use quid pro quo policy. In fact, it would continue to use it even if advanced countries retaliated by imposing quid quo pro

policies on China’s access to their home markets. Second, because of China’s quid pro quo policy, firms in advanced countries have less incentive to innovate and have therefore invested less in innovation than they would have had it not been applied. We estimate that, by 2010, advanced country stocks of knowledge in the model economy were approximately 5 percent less under quid pro quo relative to what they would have been had China not imposed the policy. In other words, China’s economy is big enough that its policies have significant global consequences for investment and growth.

Trade agreements are a game of perspective on trade value Galles 14

(Gary Galles professor of economics at Pepperdine University 10/23/2014 “Understanding "Quid Pro Quo"” https://mises.org/library/understanding-quid-pro-quo)

Market exchanges are not quid pro quo arrangements in its newer sense. Individuals’ self-interest would require that if you voluntarily traded me a baseball bat in exchange for a glove, it would have to be true that I valued the bat more than the glove and you valued the glove more than the bat. Every such exchange is better than equal for all parties. As Clarence Carson recognized, “The equity consists in the advantage which each party receives, not in some sort of equality supposed to be in the goods traded.” Because both gain, improving their well-being in their own eyes, it is equitable. Inquiring into whether equal values were exchanged, when the exchange itself demonstrates that the parties involved placed different values on the goods or services in question, can only undermine understanding.

QPQ Bad – Generic QPQ Bad Galles 14(Gary Galles professor of economics at Pepperdine University 10/23/2014 “Understanding "Quid Pro Quo"” https://mises.org/library/understanding-quid-pro-quo)

Perhaps even more important, as writers in the Austrian tradition have led the way in pointing out, no outsider can know all the determinants of value to everyone involved, including many the decision-makers themselves may be unable to articulate, but whose willing tradeoffs can nevertheless be revealed by their market choices. When government overrides those choices, that mode of communication is cut off, ensuring that any such attempt is an exercise in arbitrary government dictation in place of leaving both choice and responsibility in the hands of the owners involved. Characterizing social arrangements as involving equal values is misleading. It sharply understates both the value created by voluntary market arrangements and the costs of government “improvements” to those results. It creates confusion and the leverage for envy to grow government, shrinking freedom and the social cooperation only freedom makes possible. And the new version of quid pro quo has offered society no compensation for the trouble it has caused.