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1nc – appeasement DA

China’s a predator state bent on territorial expansion – this causes war if left uncheckedMulgan 16 - professor of Japanese Politics, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, Australia (Aurelia, “China’s Rise as a Predator State”, The Diplomat, 3/9, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/chinas-rise-as-a-predator-state//AK)

China’s land grab and subsequent militarization of “islands” in the South China Sea have finally dispelled the myth that its rise will be peaceful. Indeed, these developments point to an unwelcome fact – that China has become a predator state.Rand’s Michael Mazarr wrote about predator states in the late 1990s. He argues that what distinguishes a predator state above all is “territorial aggression” – the predisposition to grab territory and resources. China is one of two contemporary examples; the other is Russia in Europe. The best historical examples are Napoleonic France, Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, and more recently Iraq under Saddam Hussein. These examples teach us that predator states cause wars.Predator states are buoyed by an expansionist ideology – the active promotion of the idea that neighbouring territories (both land and maritime) belong by rights to the predator. Such states often possess a sense of historical grievance or victimization that can only be “righted” by territorial grabs. Indeed, a Mazarr contends, the “politics of memory operates powerfully…causing [predator states] to react by forming aggressive, predatory instincts.”Besides territorial aggression, predator states exhibit several other distinguishing features.First, national policy demonstrates very high levels of militarization. Predator states divert large quantities of national resources into military expansion for purposes of power projection. The emphasis in military planning and weapons acquisitions is inherently offensive rather than defensive and is geared to intimidating potential adversaries and winning offensive wars. The flipside domestically is, as Mazarr writes, that “military, nationalistic, and territorial issues continue to play a large role in domestic politics and in the states’ approach to the world.” In China’s case, nationalism has overtaken Marxism and more recently developmentalism as state ideology.Second, predator states adopt a strongly strategic perspective on national advancement and display an associated willingness to use all the institutions and instruments of the state over which they maintain control – economic, cultural, military, technological, resource, trade, legal, media – in the pursuit of this overwhelming important strategic objective. China, for example, deployed a broad range of retaliatory instruments against Japan over the Senkaku Islands affair in 2010, including restricting the export of rare earth metals.The use of such “strategic” instruments extends beyond such punitive acts of state retaliation to a whole range of long-term, so-called “market-based” investments. These include foreign acquisitions in strategically important and sensitive areas such as land, resource and water assets and critical infrastructure as well as in private-sector developments and industries. The “strategic” element cannot be discounted in these acquisitions because the line between private enterprise and state-owned enterprises in the Chinese case is imprecise given the complex interweaving of business and state actors. In the end, everything becomes “strategic” in the sense of supporting national advancement and security.

Third, predator states are not democracies where there exist checks and balances and other moderating influences that negate the potential for predation against other states. Predator states have authoritarian governments with low levels of accountability. Political leaders are only answerable to other power cliques and display a willingness to engage in political repression, including imprisonment and even murder of their opponents. In such states, there is no real separation of the executive from the judiciary and, in that sense, no rule of law.Levels of domestic lawlessness are matched by international lawlessness. Predator states do not respond to appeals to international laws or norms because they are inherently lawless themselves – they understand and respect only power in international affairs. China’s actions in the South China Sea clearly demonstrate that it does not support a rules-based regional or global order; nor does it believe that you can fight power with rules as other states are attempting to do in dealing with this issue.Finally, predator states show a predisposition to act unilaterally rather than multilaterally. Multilateral cooperation is entertained only where it fits with the long-term strategic interests of the state. Moreover, there is little willingness to trade off state interests for larger collective interests in the international community. In that sense, predator states are not interested in providing international public goods and should not be considered as potentially benign hegemons.How should other states deal effectively with predator states? First of all, they need to recognize what they are dealing with and react accordingly. Predator states demand tough responses starting with vigilance, deterrence and containment. At the very least there must be reinforcement of surveillance regimes, the formation of counterbalancing coalitions, and a willingness to act across a whole range of spheres – military, economic, financial, trade and diplomatic – so that predator states’ actions are not cost-free.Other states must also accept that doing nothing is not an option. This only invites further provocation, which increases the risk of serious conflict .

The US is shifting from engagement to enhanced balancing based upon the perception of the China threat – that’s key to sustaining US primacyLumbers 15-Program Director, Emerging Security NATO Association of Canada (Michael, “Wither the Pivot? Alternative U.S. Strategies for Responding to China’s Rise”, 10 Jul 2015, Comparative Strategy, Vol.34, Is 4)//SL

A second strain of enhanced balancing sees the imperative of a strengthened military posture in Asia as part of a larger project of preserving the postwar liberal economic and security order. Concerned with more than just the traditional concept of strategic competition that preoccupies realists like Friedberg, neoconservative thinkers such as Robert Kagan and Robert Lieber regard a more robust containment of China as key to reasserting America's global leadership . Diverging from the popular declinist narrative of waning U.S. power in an age of austerity, they believe the country's advantages in size, population, demography, and resources augur an American renaissance, one that can only be derailed by irresoluteness. The course of modified retrenchment pursued by the Obama administration, in this view, amounts to a misreading of America's power potential. Without vigorous American engagement abroad, the U.S.-led global order responsible for unprecedented peace and prosperity will gradually wither away, as authoritarian states like China and Russia, with no stake in sustaining a set of rules and institutions they had no hand in creating, step to the fore. “International order is not an evolution; it is

an imposition,” Kagan writes. “It is the domination of one vision over others—in this case, the domination of liberal principles…over other, non-liberal principles.” A shift away from an American-dominated world to multipolarity would likely yield chaos and conflict, as China, among others, moved to carve out its own sphere of influence and pursue economic autarky. Rather than accommodate a revisionist China, the United States needs to contain it by working for political change in Beijing, increasing military capabilities in the region, and shoring up alliances.As with confrontation, the adoption of enhanced balancing faces substantial hurdles. Robust internationalism is currently out of favor with a majority of Americans, who consistently express a wish for national leaders to focus on domestic reform and economic recovery. This anti-interventionist sentiment, which no administration can wish away, shows no sign of dissipating anytime soon and will most likely endure as long as the country suffers the aftereffects of the most severe economic recession since the Great Depression. If, as some commentators maintain, America has entered a new era of austerity—one marked by stifling partisanship in Washington, resource constraints, and a dwindling share of the pie for defense expenditures—the political and economic capacity required for a sturdy response to China's ascent will be in short supply. Nor is there any indication that the United States will soon have ideal strategic leeway for focusing on China; hopes for a lighter footprint in the Middle East and Europe, which the Obama administration viewed as a prerequisite for the rebalancing to Asia, have been repeatedly dashed and persistent turmoil in those regions will serve as the most likely spoiler to deeper engagement across the Pacific. Moreover, while not a radical policy option like confrontation requiring a shocking catalyst for adoption, enhanced balancing would sharply escalate tensions with Beijing and close off many avenues for interaction, a grim outcome that any administration would have to weigh against perceived benefits.Yet it is not at all inconceivable to envision a future administration taking such a risk. Indeed, while dismissed by some enhanced balancers as hollow, the rebalancing to Asia announced by Obama in November 2011 amounted to a tacit recognition that an increasingly assertive China required tipping the scales in favor of containment. Should the PRC's regional ambitions continue growing in tandem with its capabilities and influence, as seems likely, this trend will continue . Both in terms of its intentions, which remain murky and therefore open to alarmist interpretations, and its military and economic capacities, which most in Washington see as expanding, China is increasingly regarded as an adversarial actor.Historic practice, economic recovery, and maneuvering by political elites at home could guide America's China policy in a firmer direction over time. By tradition, the United States has not tolerated the emergence of peer competitors. Since its ascendance to world power status at the end of the nineteenth century, it has not shied away from countering authoritarian states (Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet Union) that aspired to regional preponderance. Should China press its various sovereignty claims with greater vigor and steadily work to limit U.S. operations in the Western Pacific, enhanced balancing will gain more converts.While a fiscally and politically hobbled America unable to defend its far-flung interests is a distinct possibility in the future, so too is one that is economically rejuvenated, whose proven capacity for self-correction and inbuilt advantages in resources, competitiveness, and scientific research and technology are augmented by the attainment of energy independence. With the wind in its sails, an empowered America might be unable to resist the temptation to restrain China by flexing its muscles via a military build-up in East Asia.

In a heated political climate that has often been conducive to threat inflation , America's party leaders may come to see advantage in calling for a mobilization of greater resources to counter China. The Cold War, fueled and sustained for so long by the efforts of Republicans to brand their opponents as “soft” on communism and the defensive attempts by Democrats to burnish their anti-Soviet credentials, serves as an informative precedent. American voters, many of whom have long blamed job losses and trade deficits on unfair Chinese economic practices, might eventually be swayed by an alarmist narrative portraying the PRC as a threat to U.S. security. Indeed, the containment of China could potentially serve as a useful, much needed catalyst for clarifying America's global role by harmonizing the two political parties’ foreign policy agendas, which have been at loggerheads since the demise of the Soviet Union.

Pursuing greater engagement creates political divisions that block enhanced balancing and undermine primacyLumbers 15-Program Director, Emerging Security NATO Association of Canada (Michael, “Wither the Pivot? Alternative U.S. Strategies for Responding to China’s Rise”, 10 Jul 2015, Comparative Strategy, Vol.34, Is 4)//SL

While eschewing the radical tactics of confrontationists, enhanced balancers also believe that Sino-American relations are captive to conflict-inducing structural forces and call for a more robust U.S. posture in the Asia–Pacific to check China's ambitions. Yet unlike confrontationists, who argue that a state's polity is irrelevant to the foreign policy it pursues, enhanced balancers stress that the threat posed by the mainland is magnified by its authoritarianism. The United States could acquiesce to a democratic China assuming the dominant role in East Asia, according to this school of thought, as it would be less prone to aggression and viewed less menacingly by its neighbors. With prospects for such a democratic transition decidedly low for the foreseeable future, however, leading enhanced balancers such as political scientist Aaron Friedberg believe that the adversarial components of the Sino-American relationship are overtaking incentives for cooperation. By pursuing engagement out of the naïve belief that this will moderate Chinese behavior , Washington has been asleep at the wheel and is losing ground to a savvier Beijing in the struggle for regional leadership that is already under way.Enhanced balancing draws on an antagonistic reading of Chinese intentions. While agreeing with most China watchers that the PRC has largely sought to lower tensions with its neighbors and America to foster the stable international environment required for domestic stability and economic growth, Friedberg also sees a sleight-of-hand strategy at work that ultimately aims to supplant the U.S. as the Asia–Pacific's hegemon . Beijing realizes this cannot be achieved by conventional means of conquest. It focuses instead on “winning without fighting”: muting America's response to its growing power, sowing doubts of U.S. reliability among its regional allies, and developing “anti-access/area denial” technology that will restrict the ability of U.S. forces to operate near China's coasts by placing its Asian bases within range of Chinese missiles. If Washington cannot adequately respond to this challenge because of its political paralysis and fiscal constraints, Friedberg darkly warns, the military balance in the Western Pacific will tilt in favor of Beijing, leaving its neighbors no other choice but to accommodate its wishes. Such an outcome would be at variance with America's historic interest in blocking an adversarial power from gaining preponderance at either end of the Eurasian continent.

Loss of great power competition with China risks global warCohen, 13 - directs the Strategic Studies program at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (Elliot, “American Withdrawal and Global Disorder” Wall Street Journal, 3/19, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324196204578300262454939952

In Mr. Obama's second term the limits of such withdrawal from conventional military commitments abroad will be tested. In East Asia, an assertive China has bullied the Philippines (with which the U.S. has a 61-year-old defense pact) over the Spratly islands, and China has pressed its claims on Japan (a 53-year-old defense pact) over the Senkaku Islands.At stake are territorial waters and mineral resources—symbols of China's drive for hegemony and an outburst of national egotism. Yet when Shinzo Abe, the new prime minister of an understandably anxious Japan, traveled to Washington in February, he didn't get the unambiguous White House backing of Japan's sovereignty that an ally of long standing deserves and needs.In Europe, an oil-rich Russia is rebuilding its conventional arsenal while modernizing (as have China and Pakistan) its nuclear arsenal. Russia has been menacing its East European neighbors, including those, like Poland, that have offered to host elements of a NATO missile-defense system to protect Europe.In 2012, Russia's then-chief of general staff, Gen. Nikolai Makarov, declared: "A decision to use destructive force pre-emptively will be taken if the situation worsens." This would be the same Russia that has attempted to dismember its neighbor Georgia and now has a docile Russophile billionaire, Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, to supplant the balky, independence-minded government loyal to President Mikhail Saakashvili.In the Persian Gulf, American policy was laid down by Jimmy Carter in his 1980 State of the Union address with what became the Carter Doctrine: "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." America's Gulf allies may not have treaties to rely upon—but they do have decades of promises and the evidence of two wars that the U.S. would stand by them.Today they wait for the long-promised (by Presidents Obama and George W. Bush) nuclear disarmament of a revolutionary Iranian government that has been relentless in its efforts to intimidate and subvert Iran's neighbors. They may wait in vain.Americans take for granted the world in which they grew up—a world in which, for better or worse, the U.S. was the ultimate security guarantor of scores of states, and in many ways the entire international system .Today we are informed by many politicians and commentators that we are weary of those burdens—though what we should be weary of, given that our children aren't conscripted and our taxes aren't being raised in order to pay for those wars, is unclear. The truth is that defense spending at the rate of 4% of gross domestic product (less than that sustained with ease by Singapore) is eminently affordable.The arguments against far-flung American strategic commitments take many forms. So-called foreign policy realists, particularly in the academic world, believe that the competing interests of states tend automatically toward balance and require no statesmanlike action by the U.S. To them, the old language of force in international politics has become as obsolete as that of the "code duello," which regulated individual honor fights through the early 19th century. We hear that international institutions and

http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324196204578300262454939952

agreements can replace national strength. It is also said—covertly but significantly—that the U.S. is too dumb and inept to play the role of security guarantor.Perhaps the clever political scientists, complacent humanists, Spenglerian declinists, right and left neo-isolationists, and simple doubters that the U.S. can do anything right are correct. Perhaps the president should concentrate on nation-building at home while pressing abroad only for climate-change agreements, nuclear disarmament and an unfettered right to pick off bad guys (including Americans) as he sees fit.But if history is any guide, foreign policy as a political-science field experiment or what-me-worryism will yield some ugly results. Syria is a harbinger of things to come. In that case, the dislocation, torture and death have first afflicted the locals. But it will not end there, as incidents on Syria's borders and rumors of the movement of chemical weapons suggest.A world in which the U.S. abnegates its leadership will be a world of unrestricted self-help in which China sets the rules of politics and trade in Asia, mayhem and chaos is the order of the day in the Middle East, and timidity and appeasement paralyze the free European states. A world, in short, where the strong do what they will, the weak suffer what they must, and those with an option hurry up and get nuclear weapons.

1nc – rising expectations DA v.1

The engagement coalition is collapsing – Sino-US relations are dominated by competition, not cooperationShambaugh 15 – professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University (David, “In a Fundamental Shift, China and the US are Now Engaged in an All-Out Competition,” South China Morning Post, June 11th, 2015, http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1819980/fundamental-shift-china-and-us-are-now-engaged-all-out) // EDP

While Washington and Beijing cooperate where they can, there has also been steadily rising competition in the relationship . This balance has now shifted, with competition being the dominant factor. There are several reasons for it - but one is that security now trumps economics in the relationship.The competition is not only strategic competition, it is actually comprehensive competition: commercial, ideological, political, diplomatic, technological, even in the academic world where China has banned a number of American scholars and is beginning to bring pressure to bear on university joint ventures in China.Mutual distrust is pervasive in both governments, and is also evident at the popular level. The last Pew global attitudes data on this, in 2013, found distrust rising in both countries. Roughly two-thirds of both public’s view US-China relations as "competitive" and "untrustworthy" - a significant change since 2010 when a majority of people in both nations still had positive views of the other.One senses that the sands are fundamentally shifting in the relationship. Viewed from Washington, it is increasingly difficult to find a positive narrative and trajectory into the future. The " engagement coalition" is crumbling and a "competition coalition" is rising . In my view, the relationship has been fundamentally troubled for many years and has failed to find extensive common ground to forge a real and enduring partnership. The "glue" that seems to keep it together is the fear of it falling apart. But that is far from a solid basis for an enduring partnership between the world's two leading powers.The macro trajectory for the last decade has been steadily downward - punctuated only by high-level summits between the two presidents, which temporarily arrest the downward trajectory. This has been the case with the last four presidential summits. Occasionally, bilateral meetings like the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, which will convene in Washington in two weeks' time, provide similar stabilisation and impetus for movement in specific policy sectors. But their effects are short-lived , with only a matter of months passing before the two countries encounter new shocks and the deterioration of ties resumes.The most recent jolts to the relationship, just a few months since Xi Jinping and Barack Obama took their stroll in the Zhongnanhai (the so-called Yingtai Summit), have been the escalating rhetoric and tensions around China's island-building in the South China Sea. Behind this imbroglio lies rising concerns about Chinese military capabilities, US military operations near China, and the broader balance of power in Asia.But there have been a number of other lesser, but not unimportant, issues that have recently buffeted the relationship in different realms - in law enforcement (arrests of Chinese for technology theft and falsification of applications to US universities), legal (China's draft NGO and national security laws),

http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1819980/fundamental-shift-china-and-us-are-now-engaged-all-out)


human rights (convictions of rights lawyers and the general repression in China since 2009), cyber-hacking (of the US Office of Personnel Management most recently) and problems in trade and investment. Hardly a day passes when one does not open the newspaper to read of more - and serious - friction.This is the "new normal" and both sides had better get used to it - rather than naively professing a harmonious relationship that is not achievable.This has given impetus to an unprecedented outpouring of commentary and reports by Washington think tanks in recent months. I have lived and worked there a long time, and cannot recall such a tsunami of publications on US-China relations - and they are all, with one exception (Kevin Rudd's Asia Society report), negative in nature, calling for a re-evaluation of US policy towards China, as well as a hardening of policy towards China across the board.A qualitative shift in American thinking about China is occurring. In essence, the "engagement" strategy pursued since Nixon across eight administrations, that was premised on three pillars, is unravelling . The American expectation has been, first, as China modernised economically, it would liberalise politically; second, as China's role in the world grew, it would become a "responsible stakeholder" - in Robert Zoellick's words - in upholding the global liberal order; and third, that China would not challenge the American-dominant security architecture and order in East Asia.

Unconditional engagement means China pockets the plan but generates rising expectations of future concessions. This makes relations crises and war inevitableErikson, 14 - ANDREW S. ERICKSON is an Associate Professor at the U.S. Naval War College and an Associate-in-Research at Harvard University’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. ADAM P. LIFF is Assistant Professor of East Asian International Relations at Indiana University’s School of Global and International Studies, Postdoctoral Fellow in the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program, and Associate-in-Research at Harvard’s Fairbank Center and Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies (“Not-So-Empty Talk: The Danger of China's “New Type of Great-Power Relations” Slogan” 10/9, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2014-10-09/not-so-empty-talk

In uncritically signing on to the “new type of great-power relations” slogan at the Obama-Xi Sunnylands summit in June 2013, the Obama administration fell into a trap. It has what is most likely its last major chance to dig itself out when Obama visits Beijing next month for a follow-up summit. And he should make use of the opportunity. Although some U.S. officials dismiss rhetoric as insignificant and see this particular formulation as innocuous, Beijing understands things very differently. At best, U.S. acceptance of the “new type of great-power relations” concept offers ammunition for those in Beijing and beyond who promote a false narrative of the United States’ weakness and China’s inevitable rise. After all, the phrasing grants China great-power status without placing any conditions on its behavior -- behavior that has unnerved U.S. security allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific. At worst, the formulation risks setting U.S.-Chinese relations on a dangerous course: implicitly committing Washington to unilateral concessions that are anathema to vital and bipartisan U.S. foreign policy values, principles, and interests.Already troubling, each additional invocation of a “new type of great-power relations” grows more costly. Instead of reactively parroting this Chinese formulation, Washington must proactively shape the narrative. It should explicitly articulate and champion its own positive vision for U.S.-Chinese relations,

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2014-10-09/not-so-empty-talk

which should accord China international status conditionally -- in return for Beijing abiding by twenty-first-century international norms, behaving responsibly toward its neighbors, and contributing positively to the very international order that has enabled China’s meteoric rise.THUCYDIDES TRAPThe “new type of great-power relations” concept is appealing to so many policymakers and scholars in both countries because of a misplaced belief in the Thucydides Trap. This is a dangerous misconception that the rise of a new power inescapably leads to conflict with the established one.The Chinese side has exploited this oversimplified narrative to great effect: Xi himself has warned of such confrontation as “inevitable,” and leading Chinese international relations scholars claim that it is an “iron law of power transition.” Hillary Clinton, the former U.S. secretary of state, echoed the sentiment at the 2012 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue when she said that the United States and China’s efforts to avoid a catastrophic war are “historically unprecedented” and that both sides need to “write a new answer to the age-old question of what happens when an established power and a rising power meet.” A year later, at the Sunnylands summit, Tom Donilon, then the U.S. national security adviser, explained that efforts to reformulate the U.S.-Chinese relationship are “rooted in the observation … that a rising power and an existing power are in some manner destined for conflict.”Such sentiments are puzzling, especially coming from Americans. They deny human agency (and responsibility) for past -- and possibly future -- disasters. And they reject progress. Further, they are based on a selective reading of modern history, one that overlooks the powerful ways in which the norms that great powers have promoted through their own rhetoric and example have shaped the choices of contemporaneous rising powers, for better or for worse. Most problematic, the narrative of needing a “new model” to avoid otherwise inevitable conflict is a negative foundation, a dangerous platform on which to build the future of U.S.-Chinese relations.To be sure, Clinton, Donilon, and their successors might understand all this but are prepared to dismiss rhetoric and focus instead on action. This is surely what U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry had in mind at the 2014 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue when he noted that “a new model is not defined in words. It is defined in actions.”Even so, flirting with the Chinese-proposed slogan for bilateral relations, as the administration has done, while dismissing it in private is dangerous. Chinese leaders take such formulations extremely seriously: the phrase “new type of great-power relations” appears repeatedly in their speeches, and permeates Chinese media and public discourse on U.S.-Chinese relations. Uncritical embrace creates an unsustainable situation wherein each side mistakenly expects unrealistic things of the other , worsening the consequences when those expectations are ultimately dashed .

Competitive Sino-US relations ensure stability by maintaining low expectations. Moving towards cooperation collapses the relationship and risks extinctionYan, 10 - Professor and Dean of Institute of Modern International Relations, Tsinghua University (Xuetong, “The Instability of China–US Relations” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, 2010, 263–292doi:10.1093/cjip/poq009

Clarifying their political relationship as political competitors would avoid unexpected conflicts on bilateral or multilateral political matters. On the political level, China and the United States have more

mutually unfavourable than favourable interests that disenable the two nations from being friends. To reduce unexpected conflicts, therefore, each should clearly define the other as political competitor . Most important is that they need to clarify their competitiveness as that between a rising super power and one with super power status. The United States aims to maintain its global dominance, and China to resume its world leading position. This structural conflict makes political competition between them inevitable . As long as the Chinese economy grows faster than that of the United States, the competition between them to offer the best development model is also inevitable. Clarifying their political relationship as competitors would stabilize China– US political relations in several respects. First, they could consider an agreement towards maintaining peaceful political competition. Second, each could get used to the other’s unfavourable policy and restrict any retaliation to within mutual expectations. Although this would not improve bilateral political relations, it would prevent any worsening of already unfriendly political relations. A stable unfriendly political relationship would be healthier than a fluctuating superficial friendship for both China and the United States during China’s rise.Defining their security relationship as military adversaries would reduce the danger of military clashes between China and the United States and provide better conditions for preventative cooperation . China and the United States have more mutually unfavourable interests than favourable ones as regards military security. China is still under the sanction of the US arms embargo, a fact that signifies strong suspicions between the two countries. Defining the China–US military relationship as rivalry might be overstating the case, because Chinese military capability will be no match for that of the United States for the next 10 years. There is hence no substantial competition between them as regards military capability. But as their military interests are mutually confrontational, both would benefit in several respects from acknowledging their military relationship as adversarial. First, lower expectations of cooperation and good will would limit disappointments over one or the other’s unfavourable, or even unfriendly, security policy. Second, they could establish a crisis-management mechanism to prevent escalation of unforeseen military clashes arising from their differences. Third, taking as read one another’s military opacity and reconnaissance would mean fewer rhetoric wars between the two countries. Fourth, the military adversary identity would amplify the credibility of mutual military deterrence, which would help stabilize strategic relations and prevent them from deteriorating to the point of return .Owing to the complicity of their relations, China and the United States should define their general strategic relationship as that of positive competition and preventative cooperation. The world would benefit from competition between China and the United States since competition is an engine for social progress. Competition between China and the United States could provide the world with two models of development, both constantly improving by virtue of each country’s efforts to provide a model more advanced than that of their competitor. Competing to present the best model of development would bring benefits to the peoples of both nations and to countries that learn from their expertise. China and the United States should compete to provide better world leadership. Expanding their international influence by expanding economic aid and taking international responsibilities could bring enormous global benefits, as could the two countries’ competitive scientific research towards technical advances. Competition between China and the United States for the higher moral ground on climate control would also motivate global reductions of CO2 emissions . When competition is peaceful it can be globally

beneficial rather than detrimental. And as long neither of them can win a nuclear war, their competition will not escalate into war but a better world leadership.Preventative security cooperation between China and the United States would help maintain world peace . As China is a rising power and the United States has super power status, their contrasting status makes it difficult to formulate strategic cooperation mainly founded on common threats or common interests. China needs to prevent war between itself and the United States in the interests of maintaining a durably peaceful environment in which to proceed with its economic construction. The United States also fears war against another nuclear power. Both sides, therefore, need to cooperate to keep conflicts and competition at a peaceful level. Although passive, this kind of cooperation is crucial to the world. As long as China and the United States do not go to war against each other, the world today is safe from outbreaks of major war, because other than China and Russia, all major powers are American military allies. China and Russia are semi-allies, but as Russia has neither the real nor potential capability that China possesses to challenge US hegemony, China is the only major power with the potentiality to challenge US global domination. World peace is thus guaranteed if the danger of war between China and the United States can be eliminated, and peoples of the world would benefit from the two countries’ preventative security cooperation.

1nc – rising expectations DA v.2

The engagement coalition is collapsing – Sino-US relations are dominated by competition, not cooperationShambaugh 15 – professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University (David, “In a Fundamental Shift, China and the US are Now Engaged in an All-Out Competition,” South China Morning Post, June 11th, 2015, http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1819980/fundamental-shift-china-and-us-are-now-engaged-all-out) // EDP

While Washington and Beijing cooperate where they can, there has also been steadily rising competition in the relationship . This balance has now shifted, with competition being the dominant factor. There are several reasons for it - but one is that security now trumps economics in the relationship.The competition is not only strategic competition, it is actually comprehensive competition: commercial, ideological, political, diplomatic, technological, even in the academic world where China has banned a number of American scholars and is beginning to bring pressure to bear on university joint ventures in China.Mutual distrust is pervasive in both governments, and is also evident at the popular level. The last Pew global attitudes data on this, in 2013, found distrust rising in both countries. Roughly two-thirds of both public’s view US-China relations as "competitive" and "untrustworthy" - a significant change since 2010 when a majority of people in both nations still had positive views of the other.One senses that the sands are fundamentally shifting in the relationship. Viewed from Washington, it is increasingly difficult to find a positive narrative and trajectory into the future. The " engagement coalition" is crumbling and a "competition coalition" is rising . In my view, the relationship has been fundamentally troubled for many years and has failed to find extensive common ground to forge a real and enduring partnership. The "glue" that seems to keep it together is the fear of it falling apart. But that is far from a solid basis for an enduring partnership between the world's two leading powers.The macro trajectory for the last decade has been steadily downward - punctuated only by high-level summits between the two presidents, which temporarily arrest the downward trajectory. This has been the case with the last four presidential summits. Occasionally, bilateral meetings like the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, which will convene in Washington in two weeks' time, provide similar stabilisation and impetus for movement in specific policy sectors. But their effects are short-lived , with only a matter of months passing before the two countries encounter new shocks and the deterioration of ties resumes.The most recent jolts to the relationship, just a few months since Xi Jinping and Barack Obama took their stroll in the Zhongnanhai (the so-called Yingtai Summit), have been the escalating rhetoric and tensions around China's island-building in the South China Sea. Behind this imbroglio lies rising concerns about Chinese military capabilities, US military operations near China, and the broader balance of power in Asia.But there have been a number of other lesser, but not unimportant, issues that have recently buffeted the relationship in different realms - in law enforcement (arrests of Chinese for technology theft and falsification of applications to US universities), legal (China's draft NGO and national security laws),



human rights (convictions of rights lawyers and the general repression in China since 2009), cyber-hacking (of the US Office of Personnel Management most recently) and problems in trade and investment. Hardly a day passes when one does not open the newspaper to read of more - and serious - friction.This is the "new normal" and both sides had better get used to it - rather than naively professing a harmonious relationship that is not achievable.This has given impetus to an unprecedented outpouring of commentary and reports by Washington think tanks in recent months. I have lived and worked there a long time, and cannot recall such a tsunami of publications on US-China relations - and they are all, with one exception (Kevin Rudd's Asia Society report), negative in nature, calling for a re-evaluation of US policy towards China, as well as a hardening of policy towards China across the board.A qualitative shift in American thinking about China is occurring. In essence, the "engagement" strategy pursued since Nixon across eight administrations, that was premised on three pillars, is unravelling . The American expectation has been, first, as China modernised economically, it would liberalise politically; second, as China's role in the world grew, it would become a "responsible stakeholder" - in Robert Zoellick's words - in upholding the global liberal order; and third, that China would not challenge the American-dominant security architecture and order in East Asia.

New attempts at pretending to be friends is destabilizing – expectations won’t be met and it will generate new conflictsYan, 10 - Professor and Dean of Institute of Modern International Relations, Tsinghua University (Xuetong, “The Instability of China–US Relations” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, 2010, 263–292doi:10.1093/cjip/poq009

A superficial friendship is less stable than a real friendship, mainly because it is on the basis of more mutually unfavourable interests than favourable ones (see Figure 3). Nations that are superficial friends are those with more mutually unfavourable than favourable interests which adopt the policy of pretending to be friends instead of acknowledging their differences and proceeding on that basis. The policy of pretending to be friends engenders the expectation between two nations that one side will support the other in the same way as would a real friend . The reality, however, is that the mutually unfavourable interests that exceed favourable ones disenable the two nations from providing mutually substantive support. Each is hence often disappointed with the other’s unfavourable decisions.The present China–US relationship typifies this scenario. When China and the United States agreed to establish a strategic partnership, each expected the other’s support in protecting its core interests, but did not consider the extent of support it would itself give to protecting the other’s core interests. Beijing and Washington claimed in their joint statement of 2009 that, ‘The two sides agree that respecting each other’s core interests is extremely important to ensure steady progress in China–US relations.’58 It goes without saying that national security is at the centre of a nation state’s core interests, but as China and the United States have more unfavourable than favourable interests, they can hardly offer substantial mutual support. Specifically, China cannot support the United States either in the War in Iraq or in Afghanistan, and the United States cannot support China in counter-secessionism in Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. This is why China so frequently complains that the United States has damaged Chinese core

interests.59 When China and the United States agreed to respect one another’s core interests they did not specify what these interests were precisely because they conflict with one another. For instance, as China regards Taiwan as a part of its territory, preventing Taiwan from purchasing military equipments from foreign powers is one of its core interests. Meanwhile, the United States regards Taiwan as a military ally and providing it with military equipments as one of its core interests of maintaining military domination in East Asia.Disregard for conflicting Chinese–American interests resulted in the Obama administration’s notion that arms sales to the Taiwan would have no fundamental effect on bilateral relations as a whole.60 This judgment is based on three beliefs.61 The first is that President Obama and President Hu Jintao agreed to pursue a positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship. Second, the China–US relationship is now mature. The Obama administration assumed that excluding the fighter planes of F-16 from the list of arms sales to Taiwan would adequately convey to China the United States’s cooperative stance. Third is that US arms sales to Taiwan contribute to the regional peace that is at the basis of China’s economic progress. An Obama administration official said: ‘I don’t think their [the Chinese] reaction goes beyond what we expected.’62 A US State Department spokesman told reporters that the US arms sales to Taiwan reflect ‘long-standing commitments to provide for Taiwan’s defensive needs...We will, as always, pursue our interests but we will do it in a way that we think allows for positive and cooperative relations with China.’63 These statements illustrated how superficial friendship between the two nations led to the US government’s assumption of a cooperative response from China, despite the certain knowledge that sales of arms to Taiwan are unfavourable to China.Since the two nations adopted the policy of deluding themselves that they are friends, they have often covered up conflicts and resumed their superficial friendship in the short-term through fresh friendly rhetoric. For instance, to resume their relations, President Obama told President Hu just two months after authorizing arms sales to Taiwan that the United States acknowledges that the one-China principle is one of China’s core interests,64 even though both sides understood that this acknowledgement did not mean that the United States would stop arms sales to Taiwan. This rapid improvement in relations did not settle conflicts caused by mutual unfavourable interests, but rather temporarily shelved them. There exist many such temporarily shelved conflicts, any of which could potentially reappear and cause a new round of quarrels when the situation arises. Nations that are superficially friends quarrel more frequently than states that are true friends. The difference between China–US relations and Japan–US relations during the two decades 1990–2010 supports this argument.

Competitive Sino-US relations ensure stability by maintaining low expectations. Moving towards cooperation collapses the relationship and risks extinctionYan, 10 - Professor and Dean of Institute of Modern International Relations, Tsinghua University (Xuetong, “The Instability of China–US Relations” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, 2010, 263–292doi:10.1093/cjip/poq009

Clarifying their political relationship as political competitors would avoid unexpected conflicts on bilateral or multilateral political matters. On the political level, China and the United States have more mutually unfavourable than favourable interests that disenable the two nations from being friends. To reduce unexpected conflicts, therefore, each should clearly define the other as political competitor . Most important is that they need to clarify their competitiveness as that between a rising super power

and one with super power status. The United States aims to maintain its global dominance, and China to resume its world leading position. This structural conflict makes political competition between them inevitable . As long as the Chinese economy grows faster than that of the United States, the competition between them to offer the best development model is also inevitable. Clarifying their political relationship as competitors would stabilize China– US political relations in several respects. First, they could consider an agreement towards maintaining peaceful political competition. Second, each could get used to the other’s unfavourable policy and restrict any retaliation to within mutual expectations. Although this would not improve bilateral political relations, it would prevent any worsening of already unfriendly political relations. A stable unfriendly political relationship would be healthier than a fluctuating superficial friendship for both China and the United States during China’s rise.Defining their security relationship as military adversaries would reduce the danger of military clashes between China and the United States and provide better conditions for preventative cooperation . China and the United States have more mutually unfavourable interests than favourable ones as regards military security. China is still under the sanction of the US arms embargo, a fact that signifies strong suspicions between the two countries. Defining the China–US military relationship as rivalry might be overstating the case, because Chinese military capability will be no match for that of the United States for the next 10 years. There is hence no substantial competition between them as regards military capability. But as their military interests are mutually confrontational, both would benefit in several respects from acknowledging their military relationship as adversarial. First, lower expectations of cooperation and good will would limit disappointments over one or the other’s unfavourable, or even unfriendly, security policy. Second, they could establish a crisis-management mechanism to prevent escalation of unforeseen military clashes arising from their differences. Third, taking as read one another’s military opacity and reconnaissance would mean fewer rhetoric wars between the two countries. Fourth, the military adversary identity would amplify the credibility of mutual military deterrence, which would help stabilize strategic relations and prevent them from deteriorating to the point of return .Owing to the complicity of their relations, China and the United States should define their general strategic relationship as that of positive competition and preventative cooperation. The world would benefit from competition between China and the United States since competition is an engine for social progress. Competition between China and the United States could provide the world with two models of development, both constantly improving by virtue of each country’s efforts to provide a model more advanced than that of their competitor. Competing to present the best model of development would bring benefits to the peoples of both nations and to countries that learn from their expertise. China and the United States should compete to provide better world leadership. Expanding their international influence by expanding economic aid and taking international responsibilities could bring enormous global benefits, as could the two countries’ competitive scientific research towards technical advances. Competition between China and the United States for the higher moral ground on climate control would also motivate global reductions of CO2 emissions . When competition is peaceful it can be globally beneficial rather than detrimental. And as long neither of them can win a nuclear war, their competition will not escalate into war but a better world leadership.Preventative security cooperation between China and the United States would help maintain world peace . As China is a rising power and the United States has super power status, their contrasting status

makes it difficult to formulate strategic cooperation mainly founded on common threats or common interests. China needs to prevent war between itself and the United States in the interests of maintaining a durably peaceful environment in which to proceed with its economic construction. The United States also fears war against another nuclear power. Both sides, therefore, need to cooperate to keep conflicts and competition at a peaceful level. Although passive, this kind of cooperation is crucial to the world. As long as China and the United States do not go to war against each other, the world today is safe from outbreaks of major war, because other than China and Russia, all major powers are American military allies. China and Russia are semi-allies, but as Russia has neither the real nor potential capability that China possesses to challenge US hegemony, China is the only major power with the potentiality to challenge US global domination. World peace is thus guaranteed if the danger of war between China and the United States can be eliminated, and peoples of the world would benefit from the two countries’ preventative security cooperation.

Uniqueness

Balancing

U: Shift to balancing

The US is shifting from engagement to balancing – policymakers recognize engagement’s failureEisenman 16 - Assistant professor at UT at Austin Lyndon Baines Johnson School of Public Affairs, Senior fellow for China studies at the American Foreign Policy Council (Joshua, “Rethinking U.S. Strategy Towards China”, Carnegie Council, 1/21, http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles_papers_reports/756//AK)

Questioning EngagementNow, however, a growing contingent in Washington and beyond is arguing that extensive U.S. engagement has failed to prevent China from threatening other countries. One longtime proponent of engagement with China, David M. Lampton, gave a speech in May 2015 entitled "A Tipping Point in U.S.-China Relations is Upon Us," in which he noted that, despite the remarkable "policy continuity" of "constructive engagement" through eight U.S. and five Chinese administrations, "today important components of the American policy elite increasingly are coming to see China as a threat."11 Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd summarized this view: “Beijing's long-term policy is aimed at pushing the U.S. out of Asia altogether and establishing a Chinese sphere of influence spanning the region.12 Similarly, in June, former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson said on PBS Newshour: "The longstanding consensus that China's rise is good for the U.S. is beginning to break down.In response to these misgivings about Beijing's intentions, there have been calls for Washington to actively shape China's strategic choices by enhancing U.S. military capabilities and strengthening alliances to counterbalance against its growing strength. Recent publications reflect increasing apprehension; most argue that policymakers must avoid an enduring "structural problem" in international relations that causes rising powers to become aggressive.

The next President will shift China strategy towards enhanced balancingLumbers 15-Program Director, Emerging Security NATO Association of Canada (Michael, “Wither the Pivot? Alternative U.S. Strategies for Responding to China’s Rise”, 10 Jul 2015, Comparative Strategy, Vol.34, Is 4)//SL

How prominently cooperation will feature in this blend, however, is open to debate. There are grounds for thinking that this relationship will be increasingly weighted more toward competition, in which case enhanced balancing may step to the fore as a strategic option . Should the power gap between Washington and Beijing narrow, future administrations may seek cover in strengthened defense cooperation with China's wary neighbors. Alternatively, a sharp uptick in capacity could tempt U.S. leaders to press their advantage by discouraging the PRC from entertaining hopes of “catching up.” It says much about America's distrust of China and its determination to preserve its regional leadership that policy toward China has hardened during the Obama administration, which has often been ambivalent about exerting U.S. influence abroad and has governed during a period of prolonged economic lethargy and multiple crises outside of Asia. Obama's successor will almost certainly display fewer inhibitions; a combative narrative has taken hold among Republicans and liberal internationalist

http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles_papers_reports/756//AK

factions in the Democratic Party that this president's caution has eroded U.S. credibility and invited aggression from the PRC and other actors. It is not difficult to imagine the next administration, having campaigned on the theme that a more muscular foreign policy is needed to restore U.S. leadership, being even less coy in responding to an assertive China and building on the enhanced balancing ideas represented by Obama's “pivot” to Asia. Indeed, over the long term, a less restrained stance toward China would not be inconsistent for a nation with an exalted sense of its place in the world and that is prone to flexing its muscles. For at least the next two or three decades, an increasingly tense Sino-American relationship marked by perpetual jostling for leverage is the most likely prospect.

The US is abandoning engagement in favor of containmentMearsheimer, 16- Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor University of Chicago Co-director, Program on International Security Policy University of Chicago (John, Interview with Peter Navarro, Huffington Post, 3/10, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-navarro-and-greg-autry/mearsheimer-on-strangling_b_9417476.html

Now, in the 1990s, the Clinton administration did pursue engagement. There was little evidence of containment: and you could do that in the 1990s because China was then weak enough that it didn’t matter.So I believe in the 1990s that the Clinton administration really did believe in engagement and thought that containment was a bad idea and pursued this policy of engagement. But we’re now reaching the point where China is growing economically to the point where its going to have a lot of military capability, and people are getting increasingly nervous. So what you see is we’re beginning to transition from engagement to containment ; and this , of course, is what the pivot to Asia is all about.Hilary Clinton, who is married to Bill Clinton and pursued engagement in the 1990s, is now the principle proponent of the pivot to Asia; and she fully understands that it is all about containment. Of course, what’s going to happen here given that we live in the United States is that we’re going to use liberal rhetoric to disguise our realist behavior . So we will go to great lengths not to talk in terms of containment even though we’re engaged in containment and even though the Chinese know full well that we’re trying to contain them. But for our own sake and for our public we will talk in much more liberal terms. So it’s liberal ideology disguising realist behavior.

The squo is moving towards constrainment – the US is increasingly using military force to deter instead of engagementHeydarian, 15 - Richard Javad Heydarian is an Assistant Professor in international affairs and political science at De La Salle University (“The Forces Awakening Against an Antagonistic China” National Interest, 12/22, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-forces-awakening-against-antagonistic-china-14702?page=show

Today, we are beginning to see the emergence of a “constrainment” strategy against China. Smaller powers like the Philippines have resorted to lawfare (legal warfare) in order to leverage relevant provisions of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) against China’s blatant disregard for the very convention it has signed up to (see my analysis of the arbitration case here).

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-forces-awakening-against-antagonistic-china-14702?page=show

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-forces-awakening-against-antagonistic-china-14702?page=show

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-navarro-and-greg-autry/mearsheimer-on-strangling_b_9417476.html

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-navarro-and-greg-autry/mearsheimer-on-strangling_b_9417476.html

For the Philippines, China’s assertive maritime posturing—regarding its deployment of military and paramilitary patrols to contested features, coercive occupation of contested features like the Scarborough Shoal and Mischief reef, harassment of Filipino fisherfolk, massive construction and reclamation activities across the Spratly chain of islands and destruction of the area’s ecology—are in clear contravention of regional principles such as the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and the UNCLOS.More crucially, the Philippines is asking an arbitration panel (formed under Art. 287, Annex VII of UNCLOS) at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague to also nullify China’s sweeping territorial claims, namely the notorious “nine-dashed line,” based on dubious claims of “historical rights.” This way, the Philippines hopes to use the moral force of international law to embarrass China into better compliance with modern international law. While it is easy to dismiss the Philippines’s legal maneuver as naïve and inconsequential, especially since arbitration bodies under UNCLOS lack compliance-enforcement mechanisms, it would be shortsighted to overlook the strategic consequence of Manila’s bold move to take Beijing to court.Non-claimant states such as Singapore, which has welcomed permanent American naval presence on its soil as a hedge against China, have repeatedly called for the resolution of the South China Sea disputes in accordance with international law. This could be interpreted as an implicit statement of support for the Philippines’s arbitration case against China. Even the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which has grappled with internal divisions and institutional atrophy, has emphasized the necessity for the rule-based resolution of the disputes.With the Philippines successfully overcoming the jurisdiction and admissibility hurdle, other regional states are in a position to also threaten China with a similar suit. While Vietnam has been dangling such option for quite some time, and is now carefully preparing its case, even non-claimant states such as Indonesia, which are fearful of China’s maritime assertiveness and welcomed greater military cooperation with America, have threatened to take China to court. In effect, the Philippines has unleashed a “legal multiplier,” which presents China with the prospect of multiple arbitration showdowns. If anything, since other regional states can now more credibly threaten China with a similar legal action, they are in a position to, at the very least, extract certain concessions in exchange for not filing a case per se.While China obviously has the option of rejecting any unfavorable arbitration verdict, the prospect of multiple legal suits will seriously undermine the Middle Kingdom’s claim to regional leadership and peaceful rise. Thanks to the Philippines’s lawfare, China could soon be branded as an international outlaw by a third-party arbitration body composed of one of the world’s leading legal experts. During the latest ASEAN and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) summits, China was desperate to torpedo any serious discussion of maritime disputes and was clearly isolated, especially as a whole host of regional countries and external powers ramped up their criticism of Chinese reclamation activities in the South China Sea.The core of a constrainment strategy against China, however, lies in the determination of America and its key allies to push back against growing Chinese military presence on the ground, which threatens freedom of (especially military) navigation and overflight in the area.Taming the JuggernautChina’s assertiveness in the South China Sea—embodied by its notorious “cabbage strategy” and various forms of “salami-slicing tactics” against smaller claimant states—entered an intensified phase throughout the early years of the Obama administration. But for long, President Barack Obama held

back, relying instead on diplomacy and bilateral engagement with China. Back in 2013, he held an intimate meeting at the Sunnylands retreat center in California with his Chinese counterpart, President Xi Jinping, in order to develop an element of great-power rapport. Framing Sino-American relations as “the most important bilateral relationship in the world,” the Obama administration always emphasized engagement rather than deterrence.To be fair, Xi tried to assuage fears of impending great power conflict by claiming, “The vast Pacific Ocean has enough space for two large countries like the United States and China.” But, quite controversially, he ended up calling for a “new model of great power relations,” which many interpreted as a demand for American recognition of Chinese core interests such as the Beijing’s sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. The Obama administration tried to double down on the engagement track when the two leaders met in the White House earlier this year, paving the way for the expansion of much-needed confidence-building measures between the two powers’ armed forces, especially in light of growing incidents of Chinese harassment against American aircrafts and vessels roaming the Western Pacific.Almost half a decade into the “Pivot to Asia,” the Obama administration has gradually—but with delays and seeming reluctance—stepped up its efforts to directly challenge Chinese expansionism in East Asia. After much hesitation, the United States finally cleared the deployment of destroyers well into the twelve-nautical-mile radius of Chinese-claimed features in the Spratly chain of islands. Whether intended or not, however, the Obama administration ended up mismanaging the PR campaign around its more robust Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations against China. By invoking the right for “innocent passage” as a legal justification for its FON operations, the Obama administration inadvertently lent credence to China’s (implicit) sovereignty claims over LTEs like Subi Reef, which have been artificially augmented in contravention of UNCLOS (see Article 60).A more accurate understanding of UNCLOS would suggest that the principle of innocent passage presupposes the existence of a territorial sea, which could not be the case when one talks about land features that are, in their natural state, invisible during high tide. Even if the United States chose to suspend the offensive military capabilities of the USS Lassen, for instance, shutting down its fire control radar and not flying any helicopters in the area, the right for innocent passage precludes activities (see Art. 18, Sec. 3, Part II of UNCLOS), which are “prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State,” including “collecting information to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal State.” China also didn’t occupy any nearby naturally formed islands in order to use Subi Reef as its baseline to project a bumped-out territorial sea; Thitu Island is occupied by the Philippines.But one can’t deny that a storm is gathering against China’s revanchist maneuvers in the South China Sea. The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has joined maritime patrols in the area, and the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces (JMSDF) could soon join the fray. The United States Navy is poised to conduct its second quarterly FON operations against China in the coming month, most likely targeting the Mischief Reef, which, similar to the Fiery Cross and Subi reefs, has been artificially augmented into an island with advanced military facilities and airstrips.Like never before, the Xi administration is grappling not only with growing diplomatic pressure and legal backlash, but it is also confronting an American-led maritime coalition of the willing , with little interest in Chinese domination of one of the world’s most important SLOCs.

--AT: Dialogues now

Status quo engagement with China has been shallow, lacking in meaningful outcomes, and largely for symbolic purposes Stanton 15 – Director of the Center for Asia Policy at National Tsing Hua University and former director of the American Institute in Taipei (William, “US Policy Towards Xi Jinping’s China,” Thinking Taiwan, September 19th, 2015, http://thinking-taiwan.com/u-s-policy-xi-jinpings-china/) // EDPThe second argument made by Nixon and Kissinger for improved relations with China and frequently deployed even now is quite reasonable in theory. It is that China’s size, power, and UN status as a permanent member of the Security Council make it unavoidable that we cooperate with China to resolve regional and global problems around the world. In practice, however, such cooperation has been largely illusory when you search for concrete positive outcomes from a U.S. perspective. For example, Nixon and Kissinger both hoped that one immediate payoff of the opening to China would be an end to Chinese political and military support for the Vietnam War, thereby bring about a quicker and more peaceful end to the conflict. That of course never happened.Another example of alleged cooperation is North Korea. From the first round of much ballyhooed Six-Party Talks in August of 2003 through the last round in August of 2007, Washington frequently praised Chinese cooperation and support for making the talks possible. In the final analysis, however, the talks did not halt North Korea’s nuclear program and Beijing consistently weakened UN resolutions and UN sanctions aimed at ending Pyongyang’s weapons programs. Meanwhile, a key reason for this failure from early on until now was that Beijing has never strictly enforced those UN sanctions against North Korea that might have made it more compliant. Luxury goods, for example, never stopped entering North Korea to bolster the Kim family’s hold on power. Whatever dissatisfaction Beijing feels toward Pyongyang’s disobedient leadership, it wants North Korea to continue to exist as buffer state dividing the Korean peninsula.Similarly, while I personally strongly support the Iranian nuclear agreement which the United States reached on July 14 in cooperation with China, Russia, Germany, the UK, and France, I find it rather odd that President Obama should have specifically thanked Xi Jinping for the role Beijing played in reaching the agreement. In the run-up to the agreement, media reports had indicated that in general Russia and China generally lined up against the U.S. and its three European partners in the negotiations, as is the case in all discussions of most UN Security Council resolutions. Moreover, why thank China when surely it is as much in the interest of China as any other country worried about Islamic extremism to halt Iran’s nuclear weapons program?The even greater irony in praising China for the nuclear deal, however, is the substantial evidence over the years of the key role the PRC itself played in advancing Iran’s nuclear program, as was also the case with Pakistan and North Korea. As Orde F. Kittrie reminded us in a July 13 article this year for Foreign Affairs, “little attention has been paid to the longtime leading suppliers of Iran’s nuclear program: ostensibly private brokers based in China who, according to U.S. federal and state prosecutors, have shipped vast quantities of key nuclear materials to Iran. Even at the peak of international sanctions against Iran, China has reportedly made little to no effort to stop these or other such brokers.”This is of course not news. In the Winter issue of Washington Quarterly in 2011, John Garver asked “Is China Playing a Dual Game in Iran?” He concluded that it was. On the one hand, he argued, Beijing wants to maintain an overall appearance of strategic cooperation with the United States to achieve its

development goals, while on the other hand it wants to maintain access to Iranian oil and gas, a sector in which China had become the world’s leading foreign investor by far by 2010.China’s dubious record of not halting the transfer of nuclear technology to Iran is one of the key reasons for ongoing Congressional debate this summer over renewal of the peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with the PRC that the Reagan Administration negotiated nearly 30 years ago and is set to expire in December. Thomas Countryman, the top State Department official on nonproliferation, in a congressional hearing on July 16 acknowledged China has yet to show “the necessary capability and will” to stop illicit transfers of sensitive technology to Iran. The other reason for the debate is concern that China adapted U.S.-designed coolant pumps for nuclear reactors for military purposes on its nuclear submarines.Nonetheless, most observers expect the agreement to be renewed given Xi Jinping’s visit to Washington and the huge commercial losses for the U.S. nuclear industry if it were not renewed. So it is clearly an instance of the United States also having a dual agenda of competing interests in China.The most recent example of alleged successful cooperation between the United States and China was the November 11, 2014 Joint Announcement on Climate Change. While clearly a positive symbolic gesture, critics have rightly pointed out that China is only promising to do what it was already planning to do try to save its own people from choking to death on pollution. Moreover, at this point it remains more aspirational than real . Much will depend on the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris this coming December which hopes to achieve a legally binding and universal agreement on climate.

Current dialogues are symbolic – they don’t require substantive concessionsDingli 16’ - Professor and Vice Dean at the Institute of International Studies, Founder and Director of China’s first non-government-based Program on Arms Control and Regional Security (Shen, “Strategic Dialogue Advances Partnership, with a Limit”, China-US Focus, June 14, 2016, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/strategic-dialogue-advances-partnership-with-a-limit//AK)With Obama commanding the White House, he and the then Chinese President Hu Jintao concurred to combine SD and SED and entitle the combined edition as “strategic”. That is how S&ED has been coined. In this way, Beijing and Washington have continued their top-level institutional dialogues and lifted them to strategic height. Obviously, such talks help address various important issues between China and the US, and have often been effective in limiting negative developments. For instance, the past S&EDs have successfully nurtured, to various degrees, bilateral cooperation on cybersecurity and climate change.So far, these heightened talks have dealt with various issues of cooperation and competition. Categorically, they have yielded all sorts of outcomes, such as positive cooperation and improved collaboration. However, dialogues are not a cure-all. Thus far, no dialogue could resolve fundamental differences on the Taiwan issue and South China Sea issue.

No actual cooperation occurs as a result of dialoguesDingli 16’ - Professor and Vice Dean at the Institute of International Studies, Founder and Director of China’s first non-government-based Program on Arms Control and

Regional Security (Shen, “Strategic Dialogue Advances Partnership, with a Limit”, China-US Focus, June 14, 2016, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/strategic-dialogue-advances-partnership-with-a-limit//AK)The US government, however, is keen to address the South China Sea issue, the DPRK nuclear issue, and some regional hotspot such as Iraq and Syria crisis. Exactly in these most important areas that could alleviate each’s strategic concerns, the S&ED has not been able to reconcile their divergent perspectives. The 8th edition of the S&ED doesn’t seem to narrow the vast gulf existing between Beijing and Washington. The Chinese list of cooperation made no reference to the South China Sea at all. The Chinese official media has reported Chinese officials’ view on this issue but made no reference of American officials’ views.Apparently, the US has taken Chinese moves in the South China Sea as destabilizing, which warrants Washington to launch its “rebalancing” in the region. The US is furthering its program of “freedom of navigation” in the name of international law to probe and shape China’s response. In fact, despite the S&ED, China-US mutual suspicion is deepening rather than decreasing over the past three years. This is not due to the fault of the dialogue itself, but due to the deteriorating strategic trust that even the S&ED has been unable to fix.After all S&ED is a means to help stabilize and improve partnership. However, when each’s strategic interests differ or even collide, a dialogue will not be able to resolve the problem. The best the dialogue could do is to assure that each side will take sensible decisions, ideally through mutual concession. This is what the S&ED of the Obama era has been about.

U: US wins now

China lacks the capability to push the US out – only US concessions can alter the balance of powerRoy, 13 – Senior Fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu who specialises in Asia-Pacific internationalsecurity issues (Denny, “The Problem with Premature Appeasement” Survival, 55:3, 183-202, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2013.802861

White’s policy recommendation asks Washington to accept defeat prematurely. China has not yet caught up economically. Its gross domestic product is about half that of the United States. No serious military analyst suggests the PLA is a match for US military forces in the Pacific. If war broke out today, the most the Chinese could realistically aspire to would be to destroy a major US warship, while it would not be an unrealistic goal of US forces to sink the entire PLA Navy.Beijing’s increasing confidence in challenging the US role in the Asia-Pacific region is largely based on the expectation, which White shares, that present trends will continue and China’s strength, relative to that of the United States, will increase. This expectation is certainly defensible, as China’s faster rate of economic growth suggests it will overtake the United States in economic output in approximately a decade.21 With the world’s largest economy, China would have the wherewithal to build strong military forces and wield unparalleled influence with its many trading partners, laying the foundation for its challenge to US supremacy in the Asia-Pacific. But this premise is highly controversial, and the obstacles that could prevent China from achieving such regional dominance are significant. Former US ambassador J. Stapleton Roy, one of the United States’ foremost China experts, is among those who conclude that it is ‘foolish to postulate that the twenty-first century will belong to China’.22Over the next decade, China will face many internal obstacles to its rapid economic growth. The factors that have driven its expansion in the post Mao era – chiefly an abundant supply of cheap labour and capital, alongside worldwide demand for Chinese exports – are diminishing. Many economists believe that Chinese economic growth will decrease to a rate closer to those of today’s developed economies within a decade or two.23 The effect of Beijing’s one-child policy will begin to impair the country’s productive capacity. China’s fertility rate has dropped to 1.4 births per woman: below the developed country rate of 1.7 and far below the population replacement level of 2.1. The majority of Chinese factory workers are between the ages of 20 and 24, and the number of people in this age bracket will decrease by 42% in 2010–30. This reduction in factory workforce will be compounded by an increasing number of young adults pursuing university studies. It is estimated that the number of people in this age bracket available for factory work will therefore soon shrink by around 50%. Additionally, national savings will decline as the population ages, and the number of Chinese over the age of 60 will double in 2010–30. During this period, the number of workers supporting each retiree will drop from five to two.24 To maintain the economy’s growth, Chinese leaders must rebalance and restructure it to rely on innovation and domestic consumption rather than infrastructure investment and exports. Beijing is aware of the need for changes. Outgoing Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao famously said China’s growth is ‘unbalanced, unsustainable and uncoordinated’.25 The Chinese Communist Party, however, is conservative and wary of social turmoil. The required changes would be opposed by powerful special interest groups and would roil much of Chinese society. The greater transparency and rule of law

needed to boost entrepreneurship and innovation are implicit political challenges to Beijing’s leadership. It is unclear whether China’s rulers will be bold enough to fully implement the necessary reforms.China is a major economic and military power. It is not, however, strong enough to dominate the region. War with the United States would be so devastating that the Chinese leadership could not contemplate it unless a vital Chinese interest was under attack. China’s continued ascension to a position of strength from which it could expect to prevail at acceptable cost in a regional conflict against US forces or against two or more of its neighbours is uncertain. It would be unwise for the United States to make large concessions to China to prevent a scenario that may not occur.

US defense cooperation is still capable of deterring ChinaRoss, 13- Robert S. Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College, associate of the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, senior advisor of the security studies program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Specializing on Chinese foreign and defense policy and U.S.-China relations. (Robert, “US grand strategy, the rise of china, and US national security strategy for East Asia,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, 8/13/2013, 7(2), 20-40, ProQuest//DKThe United States has also strengthened its forward presence in East Asia through cooperation with its regional security partners. Despite domestic political complications in Japan over Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa, cooperation has continued to expand between the US and Japanese militaries, including exercises focused on defending Japanese-controlled islands claimed by China. The 1999 completion of the deep-draft-vessel pier at Singapore’s Changi port facility provided the US Navy with a modern and comprehensive aircraft carrier facility in the South China Sea. In 2005, Singapore and the United States signed the Strategic Framework Agreement, consolidating defense and security ties and enabling greater cooperation in joint naval exercises.21 During the George H. W. Bush administration, the United States developed greater defense cooperation with the Philippines. It expanded access for US naval ships to Philippine waters, and between 2001 and 2005, annual US military assistance to the Philippines increased from $1.9 millionto approximately $126 million, making it the largest recipient of US military assistance in East Asia.22 The US Navy also expanded its access to Malaysia’s Port Klang in the Strait of Malacca.23 More recently, during the Obama administration, the United States further expanded US-Philippine cooperation with increased arms sales, including coastal patrol ships and the expansion of US-Philippine naval exercises, while reaching agreement for US Navy access to its former base at Subic Bay.24 The administration has also developed improved defense cooperation with Indonesia and New Zealand and reached agreement with Australia for stationing US Marines on its military training base in Darwin. Ongoing modernization of US defense capability has been especially important for balancing the rise of China. The development of ISR based weapon systems, including remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV), is an effective response to China’s development of antiship missile capability. These systems will reduce the vulnerability of US regional power-projection operations while contributing to its antisubmarine warfare capability vis-à-vis China’s growing and advanced submarine fleet.25 The deployment of advanced armaments in underwater platforms, including Tomahawk cruise missiles on Ohio-class submarines, is a similarly effective response to Chinese military modernization.

US defense modernization has sustained the ability to deter Chinese use of force to challenge the regional order. Although the PLA dominates China’s land borders, its navy remains grossly inferior to the US Navy.26 It continues to depend on small coastal administration and coast guard ships for its maritime activities in disputed waters in the South China Sea, and its antipiracy activities in the Gulf of Aden consist of unsophisticated operations conducted by very few ships. China’s surface ship capability remains weak; its new aircraft carrier is undersized, lacks aircraft, and is highly vulnerable to US forces. It is primarily a prestige ship rather than a warfighting ship.27 China has just begun construction of its next-generation guided-missile destroyer. Both the quantity and quality of these ships will be vastly inferior to US Aegis-equipped destroyers . The DoD reported that in 2011 less than 30 percent of PLA surface forces, air forces, and air defense forces were “modern” and that only 55 percent of its submarine fleet was modern.28 The recent eagerness of US regional strategic partners to consolidate defense cooperation with the United States reflects its continued dominance vis-à-vis China and confidence that it can provide for their security despite Chinese opposition.

U: US hegemony sustainable

US heg is sustainableMontgomery, 14- senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments CSBA (Evan, “Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific: China’s Rise and the Future of U.S. Power Projection,” International Security, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Spring 2014), pp. 130–139)//DKIs U.S. Military Dominance Enduring, Under Duress, or Both?Despite serious disagreements about the future of the United States’ relative power position and the risks of retrenchment, the deep engagement school and the offshore balancing school agree on one crucial point: U.S. military power will remain sufficient to prevent any nation from dominating its neighbors through aggression or coercion . This means that the United States will be able to deter or defeat China if necessary— not because China is the most likely threat to stability, but because it is the most serious potential threat given the resources at its disposal and the importance of its region. Of course, both sides recognize that the PRC has been steadily increasing its defense spending and improving its military forces. Neither side in the grand strategy debate [End Page 121] views these developments as a major challenge to U.S. military primacy, however, because of their singular focus on global power projection rather than local power balances. Yet this perspective largely ignores the possibility that the United States could remain dominant globally while losing significant ground locallyMilitary Primacy and the Barriers to BalancingProponents of deep engagement generally dispute the claim that U.S. military dominance is eroding and discount the notion that China is becoming a serious strategic competitor. According to Joseph Nye, “[M]ilitary power is largely unipolar, and the United States is likely to retain primacy for quite some time.”14 Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth conclude that the United States’ advantage is actually increasing relative to potential rivals. As a result, “China’s economic rise will not demand a dramatic increase in U.S. military efforts anytime soon.”15 Likewise, Michael Beckley argues that in the event of a Sino-American conflict, the PRC’s performance “would not necessarily be much better than that of, say, Iraq circa 1991,” because the United States retains conventional military superiority over China and can easily counter its offensive capabilities.16For their part, advocates of offshore balancing believe that U.S. military power has declined from its post–Cold War apex. Not only has the emergence of multiple competitors divided Washington’s attention and dispersed its resources, but the proliferation of small arms and military skill has also made taking and holding territory increasingly difficult.17 Yet the underlying premise of their preferred grand strategy is that the United States can reduce the size of its armed forces, pull those forces back from bases overseas, and still ensure that aggressive nations do not dominate critical regions . In the case of East Asia, for example, offshore balancers are confident that the United States could prevent a revisionist China from permanently overturning the status quo, even if it became strong enough to defeat a coalition of its neighbors— which, from their perspective, would be the only situation threatening enough to warrant U.S. military intervention. According to Layne, because U.S. air and maritime power “is based on long-range strike capabilities,” Washington “can keep its forces in an over-the-horizon posture with respect to East Asia and [End Page 122] limit itself to a backstopping role in the unlikely event that the regional balance of power falters.”18

What accounts for this consensus? The existing literature identifies two principal barriers to internal balancing against the United States, both of which suggest that its military primacy will endure even if its relative economic strength declines.19 First, prospective balancers are likely to incur significant opportunity costs, because competing with the United States would inhibit their ability to manage more pressing security challenges. As Robert Jervis notes, while the leading power in a unipolar system is “concerned with everything that happens everywhere,” other nations “are primarily concerned with what happens in their neighborhoods.”20 In most cases, therefore, they will prioritize addressing nearby threats over counterbalancing a distant hegemon. Because these objectives ostensibly require very different military capabilities, few nations can afford to pursue them both at the same time.21Second, even if prospective balancers were not distracted by more urgent demands on their attention and resources, they would still incur enormous sunk costs given the magnitude of the United States’ conventional military edge. By nearly any measure, the United States possesses the world’s most advanced ground, amphibious, naval, aerospace, and special operations forces. It also devotes more resources to defense than almost every other nation combined.22 Most important, its “command of the commons” provides an unparalleled ability to deploy, operate, and sustain military units overseas.23 Other nations, by contrast, can conduct large military operations only in close proximity to their own territory, and it is debatable whether any rising powers, including China, will be able to match the United States’ global reach for decades.24 According to [End Page 123] primacy optimists, this gap is so wide that “any effort to compete directly with the United States is futile, so no one tries.”25 Even primacy pessimists acknowledge that nations hoping to constrain the United States and frustrate its objectives must settle for nonmilitary options, including diplomatic, economic, and institutional measures they refer to as “soft balancing.”26

U: Economic slowdown

Economic slowdown is containing China’s riseBlumenthal 16 (Dan, directior of Asian studies at the American enterprise institute and former senior director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia at the Department of Defense, “The Three Ways We Get China and Its Neighbors Wrong”, https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/three-ways-get-china-neighbors-wrong/, May 16, 2016, NRG)

China, it is now agreed, has entered a period of prolonged economic slowdown. Its own reported 2015 numbers showed that the economy grew only 6.9 percent, down from the breakneck double-digit rates of the first decade of the 21st century. But the true number is surely far lower. Economist Derek Scissors argues: "If Xi [Jinping] does not quickly move beyond talk to profound pro-market reform, China will not slow or struggle-it will just stop."China's economic slowdown has had many causes, including an abysmal demographic situation, high levels of debt, and an inefficient and corrupt financial system. Global demand is shrinking, which means China's export-driven growth model is approaching its end. And the regime's response to the 2008 global financial crisis-namely, government stimulus and the accumulation of massive debt-will continue to cause more problems down the road.A strategic reassessment is in order, and the first question to be asked is what China's slowdown means for the regime's internal stability and external behavior.Tough choices clearly lie ahead for President Xi Jinping. Internally, he must find new ways to build legitimacy for a Chinese Communist Party that faced little organized resistance as long as most Chinese living standards were improving. Theoretically, of course, China could reverse direction and implement substantive market reforms. But politically those reforms do not seem to be in the offing-it is simply too risky to let capital leave Chinese banks and flow freely, as was envisioned by the 2013 Communist Party Plenum. So far, the approach of Xi Jinping has instead been a high-profile "anti-corruption" campaign that has helped to further centralize power and featured a crackdown on the media, lawyers, intellectuals, and churches.

Rising expectations

U: Relations are stable

US-Sino relations are in stable, competitive state. Trying to upgrade positive cooperation generates rising expectations that generate instability and future crises Yan, 14 - Professor and Dean of Institute of Modern International Relations, Tsinghua University (Xuetong, “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement” Chinese Journal of International Politics Volume 7, Issue 2Pp. 153-184, http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/7/2/153.full KLP = describes the Keeping a Low Profile foreign policy of Deng Xiaoping. SFA = describes the Striving For Achievement foreign policy of Xi Jingping

Besides the relatively peaceful outcome of the ADIZ issue and the level of danger involved with military ship collision, quantitative studies of China–US relationship by Tsinghua University also demonstrate improved stability of bilateral relations after China adopted the SFA strategy . The following graph shows that China–US relationship became less bumpy during 2012–2013 than during 2009–2011.As seen from Figure 1, the differential in the amplitude of China–US relationship is 1.7 (between 0.4 and 2.1) during 2009–2011, and 1.3 (between 0.8 and 2.1) during 2010–2011 when China adhered to the KLP strategy, while the differential in the amplitude decreases to 0.7 (between 1.6 and 2.3) during 2012–2013 when China shifted to the SFA strategy. During the three periods, the standard deviations are 0.499, 0.471, and 0.227, respectively.74 A larger standard deviation indicates less stability. An even more important sign is that China–US relations have been improved since August of 2012. These data may suggest that a new type of major power relationship has replaced the superficial friendship between China and the United States. The former relationship is more stable than the latter because these two countries admitted that the core state of their relations is competition rather than cooperation . When one regards the other side as its competitor, their expectation for the other’s favorable policy will not be high and their response to the other’s unfriendly behaviors becomes less emotional.75

The squo is defined by growing competitive relationsYan and Qi, 12 - Yan Xuetong is Professor of International Relations and Director of Institute of Modern International Relations, Tsinghua University. Qi Haixia is Lecturer at Department of International Relations, Tsinghua University (“Football Game Rather Than Boxing Match: China–US Intensifying Rivalry Does not Amount to Cold War” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 5, 2012, 105–127 doi:10.1093/cjip/pos007

1. As the comprehensive power of China and the United States continues towards parity, the character of Sino–US relations as that of superficial friendship determines that conflicts of interests between the two states will continue to be intensified, and that there will be an increasing trend wherein the two compete more than they cooperate. Obama’s strategy of pivoting towards the Asia Pacific Region is a product of relative decline in US power and of the increased pace of China’s rise. It is only natural for structural conflict between China and the United States to deepen as the relative gap in their national power narrows. As conflicts of interests between the two states grow at a rate faster than that of shared interests, regardless of the outcome of the US Presidency elections in 2012—that is of whether Obama

http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/7/2/153.full

continues to be President or if a Republican enters office—hedge will by necessity be the cornerstone of the US policy toward China. As such, the superficial friendship between the United States and China will continue to tilt towards competition outweighing cooperation, or the development of an adversarial relationship that exceeds one of friendship.

Links

Rising expectations

2nc – top level thesis

The US will view improvements in relations through a lens of self-interest – that makes gains unsustainable, generates rising expectations and causes the net collapse of the relationshipYan and Qi, 12 - Yan Xuetong is Professor of International Relations and Director of Institute of Modern International Relations, Tsinghua University. Qi Haixia is Lecturer at Department of International Relations, Tsinghua University (“Football Game Rather Than Boxing Match: China–US Intensifying Rivalry Does not Amount to Cold War” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 5, 2012, 105–127 doi:10.1093/cjip/pos007

The state to which superficial friendship refers is one where neither one of two parties regards the other as a strategic partner, but where both claim a strategic partnership. In their cooperation, each party is solely concerned with the individual benefits to be obtained. Neither of the parties cares whether the other gains or loses as a result of the cooperation, and might even regard achieving benefits at the expense of the other party as reasonable. When one party cannot achieve its objectives in the course of cooperation, it will be disappointed and express discontent , blame the other party, or retaliate by not cooperating, causing a deterioration in relations . For example, China and the United States see one another as trade partners, yet in the face of a trade imbalance, the United States presses China to appreciate the Renminbi solely to enhance United States’ benefits with respect to employment, thus exacerbating China’s difficulties vis-a`-vis exports.21

Superficial enmity is a more sustainable model of relations than superficial friendship, because it generates realistic expectations of behaviorYan, 10 - Professor and Dean of Institute of Modern International Relations, Tsinghua University (Xuetong, “The Instability of China–US Relations” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, 2010, 263–292doi:10.1093/cjip/poq009

This article argues that the instability of China–US relations since the end of the Cold War is mainly attributable to their fewer mutually favourable interests than unfavourable ones. The policy of pretending to be friends the two nations have adopted has resulted in dramatic fluctuations in their relations. Superficial friendship does not serve either of the nations well. Events in the last two decades refute the idea that improving mutual understanding or adjusting mentality can produce substantial and stable cooperation between China and the United States. To achieve stable improvements in their relations, China and the United States should consider developing preventative cooperation over mutually unfavourable interests and lowering mutual expectations of support, rather than on adjusting concepts or improving mutual understanding. Their relations will otherwise maintain a fluctuating pattern. China and the United States understand each other well but have found no effective way of dealing with their mutually unfavourable interests.The theory developed in this article proposes that the instability of China– US relations cannot change until the two countries transform their superficial friendship. No one in the world wants China and the

United States to change their superficial friendship to one of real enmity, because no one wants a return to the Cold War. It would also endanger the world if China and the United States were to become deadly enemies. The only two viable alternatives are those of real friendship and superficial enmity . The power competition between the two nations makes it seem unlikely that China and the United States could establish real friendship during the process of China’s rise. The realistic alternative, therefore, is to transform their relationship from superficial friendship to superficial enmity . Most people ignored that being superficial enemies would be a better choice for China and the United States to stabilize and improve their relations when they have no way to become real friends.As long as China and the United States are frank with one another over their mutually unfavourable interests, transforming their relationship from superficial friendship to superficial enmity would not be difficult. Giving more consideration to their mutually unfavourable rather than mutually favourable interests would enable them to lower unrealistic expectations of the other’s support. Although perceiving one another as more foe than friend might also deviate from reality, superficial enmity would nevertheless have more positive impact on relations than superficial friendship. The complicity and reality of their relations requires that they generally define them as positive competition and preventative cooperation. Developing the concept that China and the United States are cultural friends, business partners, political competitors and military adversaries could also be helpful.To enlarge mutually favourable interests , China and the United States should give up the policy of pretending to be friends . The two nations could benefit in four aspects. First, being psychologically prepared for the other side’s unfavourable or unfriendly decisions would lessen the danger of escalation of conflicts. Second, increasing the credibility of the mutual deterrence strategy would generate more preventative security cooperation between them. Third, their relations would become more stable by reducing unrealistic expectations of one another’s support. Fourth, they could improve their relations at a steadier rate by applying different principles according to specific aspects of their relations. Expecting China and the United States to change the policy of pretending to be friends in the near future may be unrealistic, but the narrowing power gap between them may help the two countries realize that a policy of clarity serves their interests better than one that is ambiguous.

Low relations are inevitable – the aff can’t resolve fundamental differences in core interests. Official moves to upgrade relations create a rosy but false impression of cooperation Yan, 10 - Professor and Dean of Institute of Modern International Relations, Tsinghua University (Xuetong, “The Instability of China–US Relations” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, 2010, 263–292doi:10.1093/cjip/poq009

The history of China–US relations in the last six decades refutes the assumption that presenting a rosy- but-false image of the relationship is beneficial to their stability . A quantitative assessment of the China–US relationship during the period 1950–2009 by the Institute of International Studies of Tsinghua University shows that the relationship was more stable in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s than after the Cold War (see Figure 1).

We can divide Figure 1 into four sections 1950–1970, 1971–1977, 1978– 1988, and 1988–2009. Among them, the period of fewest fluctuations is from 1978, when China and the United States established formal diplomatic relations, to 1988, the year before the 1989 political events in Beijing. During this period, China and the United States were more friends than foes. Figure 1 shows a swing in the relationship of less than two units. Figure 1 shows that the second most stable period was from 1950, when China and the United States fought the Korean War, to 1970, one year before the normalization of China–US relations. It shows a swing in the relationship during this period of 2.5 units. The period 1971–1977 shows the biggest swing of more than six units, but in an upward linear direction. The period of most fluctuations is that from 1989 to 2009. It shows a swing of more than four units and short, frequent fluctuations.The Importance of China–US RelationsOfficials in Washington and Beijing formulated the concept after Obama became president that China–US bilateral relations are the world’s most important.31 It was not long before politicians in both countries held fast to this idea.32 This mutually held concept, however, conveyed the mistaken impression of China–US relations as being based on the two nations’ common interests. Few understood that mutual unfavourable interests make contribution to the importance.The importance of Sino–American relations lies mainly in their conflicting interests rather than shared ones. Those who are agreed that the China–US relationship is the most important in the world today do not address the question of why it should exceed in importance the bilateral relations between China and the United States with other major powers, and those between the other major powers. Bilateral relations between the two largest world powers are indeed the most important, but material power is not the prime consideration at this level. For instance, although the United States and Japan have been the two largest economies since the late 1980s, their relations have never carried the same global weight as Soviet–US relations did during the Cold War or China–US relations today.33 This is not because there are fewer shared interests between the United States and Japan than there were between the United States and the Soviet Union, or are now between the United States and China, but for precisely the opposite reason. The United States and Japan are allies with more shared interests than conflicting ones. This large pool of common interests has enabled Japan to adopt a free-rider policy as well as a follow-the-US policy. US– Japan relations are hence unlikely to entail global impact beyond US policy because Japanese foreign policy is generally to carry out American goals.The global importance today of China–US relations is similar to that of US–Soviet relations during the Cold War in being based on conflicting interests rather than common ones. Conflicting interests drove China and the Soviet Union to adopt policies different from those of the United States which compelled adjustments and compromises in US policy that had global impact. This is why US–Soviet bilateral relations were the most important in the world and China–US bilateral relations now are by virtue of their conflicting rather than common interests. For instance, during 2008–2009 China and Japan were the first two biggest creditors of the United States, the difference in credits owed to them each month less than 7%.34 No one at that time, however, gave consideration to the possibility that Japan might use its US bonds as a bargaining chip in conflicts with the United States. There were, however, frequent reports that China might sell the lion’s share of its US bonds in retaliation against American anti-China actions.35 These facts explain why financial relations between China and the United States are more important than those between the United States and Japan. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia–US relations maintained a greater impact upon world issues than Japan–US relations in general,

even though the Russian economy was much weaker than Japan’s. This was also mainly due to Russia in most cases adopting policy different from that of the United States.There are more mutually unfavourable interests than mutually favourable ones between China and the United States. Mutually favourable and mutually unfavourable interests determine the strategic relationship between two nations. Strategic interests between China and the United States can be divided into four groups which fall, according to content and relationship, under the two broad headings of mutually favourable interests and mutually unfavourable interests. Common interests and complementary interests are mutually favourable, and conflicting interests and confrontational interests are mutually unfavourable (see Figure 2).Common interests refer to those similar in content and mutually favourable. For instance, both China and the United States needed to contain Soviet military expansion in the 1970s and 1980s, a common interest that acted as the foundation upon which to establish their military alliance during that period. Complementary interests refer to those different in content but mutually favourable. For example, China needs the American market for its labour-intensive industry because it creates jobs at home and the United States needs China-made cheap products to maintain its high standard of living at low cost. In 2008, the United States was indeed China’s largest trade partner by country and China the United States’s second largest.36 Conflicting interests refer to those that are both different in content and mutually unfavourable, as exemplified by the conflicting ideologies of communism and liberalism. Conflicting interests were the cause of the finger-pointing quarrels between China and the United States each year after 1989 on the issue of human rights. Confrontational interests are those similar in content but mutually unfavourable. For instance, both China and the United States want military control of the South China Sea but only one can achieve it. This confrontational interest has generated several conflicts in this water area between China and the United States since the EP3 event—the collision of a US EP3 surveillance aircraft and a Chinese fighter jet—in 2001.37If we look in detail at the strategic interests of China and the United States, we find more confrontational and conflicting interests than common and complementary ones (see Table 1). There are, for instance, more mutually unfavourable interests than shared ones in the area of international security. Both need to prevent war between themselves, denuclearize North Korea and protect the safety of international shipping, but they confront one another on a number of security issues, such as US arms sales to Taiwan, the arms embargo on China, maritime control of the South China Sea, US deployment of a missile defence system in East Asia, China’s military modernization, resolving Uygur terrorism, competition in space R&D, arms exports and solving the Iran nuclear problem.From the political standpoint, other than the common interest of maintaining the current permanent membership of the UN Security Council, China and the United States have interests that are mainly confrontational or conflicting. As China is a rising power and the United States has superpower status, China’s endeavour to regain its historical place as world leading power and the United States’s refusal to relinquish its sole-superpower status constitutes their greatest political conflict.38 As one leading European scholar said, ‘its [China’s] rise cannot avoid threatening US sole-superpower status’.39 China and the United States otherwise confront one another on issues such as political ideology, domination of East Asia, judgments on human rights, policy on religions, influence in developing regions, and model of social development. For instance, the Chinese government has published an annual report on American human rights every year since 1999 in retaliation against US criticism of China’s human rights in the US State Department Annual Report on Global Human Rights.40 In March 2010, both governments published reports attacking one another’s human rights.41

As regards economy, China and the United States have both mutually favourable and unfavourable interests. For instance, both benefit from joint ventures, high global market growth, China’s purchase of US bonds, bilateral trade, and reciprocal tourism. But their economic cooperation, also generates conflict, manifest in quarrels over protection of intellectual property rights, the RMB-US$ exchange rate, trade surpluses, CO2 emission reduction standards, high-tech competition, control of national strategic economy, and reform of the global financial system.

L: Unconditional

China will interpret the plan as generating expectations of future concessions that license Chinese aggression and cause allied prolifErikson, 14 - ANDREW S. ERICKSON is an Associate Professor at the U.S. Naval War College and an Associate-in-Research at Harvard University’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. ADAM P. LIFF is Assistant Professor of East Asian International Relations at Indiana University’s School of Global and International Studies, Postdoctoral Fellow in the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program, and Associate-in-Research at Harvard’s Fairbank Center and Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies (“Not-So-Empty Talk: The Danger of China's “New Type of Great-Power Relations” Slogan” 10/9, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2014-10-09/not-so-empty-talk

The Obama administration’s continued flirtation with the “new type of great-power relations” concept appears to have been misunderstood in Beijing and beyond, and risks being misperceived as a precipitous change in U.S. power and policy.First, the terminology paints an absurd picture of a United States too feeble to articulate, much less defend, its own vision for promoting peace, stability, and prosperity in Asia -- only furthering perceptions of U.S. decline in China and its neighbors. The Obama administration’s rhetoric, however well intentioned, sometimes exacerbates this misperception. A case in point: Kerry’s statement to his Chinese counterparts at the 2014 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue that “there is no U.S. strategy to try to push back against or be in conflict with China.” The Obama administration is certainly right to try to allay concerns -- unfounded but extremely prevalent in China -- that the United States is attempting to “contain” China. But it is ill advised to do so in a manner so easily heard as an apology.Second, Beijing’s interpretation of “new type of great-power relations” appears to be linked to an assumption that China’s growing material power has made a power transition inevitable, compelling Washington to accommodate Beijing’s claims in the South and East China Seas now. Such arguments reveal ignorance, first, of fundamental changes to the international order since the days of might makes right and, second, of the manifold sources of U.S. power and preeminence. By allowing the terms “great-power relations” and “equality” to permeate official discourse on bilateral relations, Washington risks tacitly condoning such anachronistic views of international politics.Third, China’s economic growth is slowing, and the country’s future is ever more uncertain as various societal and other domestic headwinds strengthen. Decades of extraordinary economic and military growth make many Chinese assume that the rapid increases in material power will continue indefinitely. That is unlikely, but the consequences of such bullishness are real and unsettling: growing expectations within China for U.S. concessions and anachronistic calls for “equal” treatment and “space.”If that weren’t enough, the “new type of great-power relations” concept is also unnerving to U.S. allies and partners in the region. If fears of abandonment grow, some may seek other -- potentially more destabilizing -- options for deterring China.Such concerns are particularly intense in Japan -- arguably Washington’s closest ally and the best situated to stand up to China independently, if necessary. Xi has already attempted to exploit the Obama administration’s embrace of the “new type of great-power relations” concept to score a victory in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands dispute. During a September 2012 meeting with U.S. Defense Secretary


Leon Panetta, Xi invoked the “important consensus” he claimed that the two had reached in defining their relationship and then pivoted immediately to the most critical flashpoint in Chinese-Japanese relations: “We hope that the U.S., from the point of view of regional peace and stability, will be cautious, will not get involved in the Diaoyu Islands sovereignty dispute, and will not do anything that might intensify contradictions and make the situation more complicated.” The record of China’s Japan policy during the past two years suggests the Xi administration is intent on isolating Japan -- bypassing Tokyo while engaging Washington -- and keeping the country relegated to a status inferior to China and the United States. Indeed, as Australian scholar Amy King argues, China’s conception of a “new type of great-power relations” leaves little room for Japan.

China will pocket concessions from unconditional engagement – it won’t change behavior and it will become more aggressiveWolf, 14 - Dr. Albert B. Wolf is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at ADA University in Baku, Azerbaijan (“The Unipolar Moment is (Almost) Over: What’s Next?” The Times of Israel, 5/1, http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/the-unipolar-moment-is-almost-over-what-next/

Lean ForwardThis is also known as engagement. Unlike other strategies driven by “Who gets more” thinking, under engagement we stop worrying about how big a slice of the pie China gets, and instead focus upon growing the whole pie. Under this strategy, we give up none of our commitments. Instead, we take up new ones. We attempt to influence China’s present and future behavior by using positive inducements (“carrots”), while ensnaring them and us in a web of increasingly intricate international organizationsScholars like Alastair Iain Johnston suggest that China’s participation in international organizations has had a moderating influence on Beijing’s foreign policy since the days of Mao. Jeffrey Legro argues that since Deng Xiaoping, China has pursued an “integrationist” strategy that has benefited its growth. Until outside events demonstrate that it’s current strategy is not working or has failed, Chinese elites have little reason to favor a course correction in a more aggressive direction.DownsidesHas this ever worked? Some would suggest that engagement has never worked because declining states rarely try it. Declining powers are wary of trying it for fear that concessions given to rising powers today will be used against them in the future. China could pocket concessions and use them later in order to further America’s demise . China may also see this as little more than cheap talk: a U.S. ploy to get its way and maintain primacy on the cheap. After all, such a doctrine does not involve deeper defense cuts than what we have now.

Conditional engagement is vital to China’s peaceful riseErikson, 14 - ANDREW S. ERICKSON is an Associate Professor at the U.S. Naval War College and an Associate-in-Research at Harvard University’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. ADAM P. LIFF is Assistant Professor of East Asian International Relations at Indiana University’s School of Global and International Studies, Postdoctoral Fellow in the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program, and Associate-in-Research at Harvard’s Fairbank Center and Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies (“Not-So-Empty Talk: The Danger of China's “New Type of Great-Power Relations” Slogan” 10/9, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2014-10-09/not-so-empty-talk


http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/the-unipolar-moment-is-almost-over-what-next/

The U.S.-Chinese relationship is too important to leave up to a vague slogan rooted in a cynical nineteenth-century premise: that the two countries must do something historically unprecedented to avoid war. In the twenty-first century, an effective international order hinges on powerful states supporting an inclusive, equitable, win-win system that has the same rules for the strong and the weak. Might can no longer make right.That is why the Obama administration should immediately replace the “new type of great-power relations” formulation with a specific, reciprocal , results-oriented, and positive vision -- one that accords China international status in proportion to its active support for the international order that has greatly benefited China over the past four decades. There is precedent for such a framework, most notably the Bush administration’s 2005 call for China to be a “responsible stakeholder.” Such an approach not only welcomes China’s peaceful rise but also explicitly charts a pathway to its coveted status as a great power.Starting now, U.S. policy and rhetoric should build on China’s desire for membership in the great-power club by setting goals for increased contributions to the international system and greater provision of public goods. Washington must also disabuse Beijing of the notion that it can negotiate with the United States over the heads of China’s less “great” neighbors and emphasize that, to be a true twenty-first-century great power, Beijing must follow its own Golden Rule and treat other countries as it wants to be treated. Disputes with smaller neighbors are an excellent opportunity for Chinese leaders to show the world what their self-professed vision of “democracy in international relations” actually means in practice.Above all, the United States must not give tacit approval to a Chinese shortcut to great-power status out of exaggerated fear of inevitable conflict. It must approach Beijing from a position of strength . Like Washington, Beijing has powerful incentives to avoid a military clash. It enjoys tremendous benefits from trading partners across the Asia-Pacific -- in particular, the United States and Japan -- and relies on exports to sustain its national development and domestic stability. Washington need not accept disproportionate responsibility for avoiding conflict.To be sure, explicit rejection of a major foreign policy formulation crafted by China’s preeminent ruler may have costs. But the costs of continued acceptance will only be higher. At a minimum, to avoid validating “new type of great-power relations” Washington should immediately cease using the phrase. If the U.S. government does use the term, it must always follow with a forceful, explicit definition of what “new type of great-power relations” is and what it is not. Washington should also call out aspects of China’s current behavior -- namely its coercion of its neighbors and apparent efforts to undermine U.S. alliances and key international norms -- as antithetical to both U.S. interests and Beijing’s coveted recognition as a great power. That should convince Beijing that even considering division of the Asia-Pacific into spheres of interests is a nonstarter.Given its political system, history, and deep realpolitik traditions, Beijing’s resistance to Washington’s socialization efforts is hardly surprising. China will not do everything the United States wants, and some Chinese observers will cynically interpret U.S. attempts to reformulate the relationship as a ploy to burden China and contain its rise. And that is why Washington must be patient as it provides a consistent focal point for Chinese leaders’ pursuit of great-power status, strengthening the hand of moderates and internationalists in domestic policy debates. China’s growing (and U.S.-encouraged) contributions to peacekeeping and antipiracy have been rightly lauded. Greater contributions in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and sea-lane security should be as well.

LAST CHANCETo its credit, in recent months, the Obama administration has gotten tougher with Beijing. Finally realizing that China was controlling the narrative, the administration has publicly opposed Beijing’s destabilizing policies, restated unambiguously Washington’s support for Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, criticized the mishandled November 2013 rollout of China’s East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, and publicly questioned the basis for China’s overexpansive, vague South China Sea claims.This increasingly firm rhetoric is laudable but insufficient. Without more attention and support from key administration principals, the rebalance risks being seen in the region as more words than action -- ironic, given the similar criticism that U.S. officials have leveled at the “new type of great-power relations” formulation. Since the Asia-Pacific Rebalance is a major component of Obama’s foreign policy legacy, it is especially puzzling that the administration has not articulated a formal strategy for the region. As a first step, the administration should promptly communicate a positive, concrete vision for the Asia-Pacific’s future and China’s role in it. To guide further U.S. action and signal resolve, this should then be codified in a formal policy document, released in conjunction with a major speech by Kerry or by Obama himself.None of this is to deny the role of material power in shaping China’s trajectory. As China expert Thomas Christensen has argued, the United States’ military presence in the Asia-Pacific and its focus on solidifying ties with regional allies and partners are not only hedges against possible Chinese provocations but also important means for influencing Beijing’s foreign policy decision-making. Indeed, the story of China’s rise remains incomplete. No doubt, we’re in a rough patch today. But despite widespread claims to the contrary, nothing about China’s future course -- and certainly not military conflict -- is predetermined. How things play out will depend on the choices made by leaders in many countries, but especially in Beijing and Washington.The so-called Thucydides Trap to the contrary, history tells us that the trajectories of rising powers can be shaped in powerful ways by the leading power’s behavior and rhetoric. And on those terms, “new type of great-power relations” is a deeply flawed concept. The United States must jettison it and replace it with one that charts a clear pathway for the type of twenty-first-century great power that the United States wants China to become. A more effective vision for U.S.-Chinese relations should be positive and aspirational, designed to shape Beijing’s decision-making by tying China’s eventual attainment of great- power status to behaving like a twenty-first-century great power, including by making positive contributions to international peace, stability, prosperity, and especially by behaving responsibly toward its neighbors. That would in effect be a truly new type of great-power relations -- and Washington must consistently lead by example. For many, U.S. Asia policy is directly linked to Obama’s legacy. Yet his administration is increasingly focused elsewhere, with real-world consequences. For the Obama administration’s China policy, it’s time for proactive leadership.

Concessions embolden Chinese aggression – only strict conditions on behavior check appeasementNewsham, 14- Senior Research Fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies (Grant, China, America and the "Appeasement" Question, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-america-the-appeasement-question-11226)//JS

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-america-the-appeasement-question-11226)//JS

US policy towards China over the last 30 years, and particularly in recent times, seems familiar. The United States does its best to understand the PRC’s concerns and its resentments going back to the Opium Wars and the ‘century of humiliation’, to accommodate these resentments, and to ensure China does not feel threatened. Defense and State Department officials enthusiastically seek greater transparency and openness – especially in the military realm – as such openness is perceived as inherently good.In return, the PRC is expected to change, to show more respect for human rights and international law and to become a “responsible stakeholder” in the international community.We now have several decades of empirical evidence to assess this concessionary approach . It has not resulted in improved, less aggressive PRC behavior in the South China Sea or the East China Sea, or even in outer space. Indeed, it seems to have encouraged Chinese assertiveness as manifest in threatening language and behavior towards its neighbors.Nor has the PRC regime shown more respect for human rights, rule of law, consensual government or freedom of expression for its citizens. Serial intellectual property theft continues unabated, as does support for unsavory dictators.Nonetheless, we invite the PRC to military exercises and repeat the “engagement” mantra – expecting that one day things will magically improve. Some argue that letting the PRC see US military power will dissuade it from challenging us. Perhaps, but we are just as likely to be seen as naïve or weak. From the Chinese perspective, there is no reason to change since they have done very well without transforming and the PRC has never been stronger. Indeed, the PRC frequently claims that human rights, democracy, and the like are outmoded Western values having nothing to do with China.This is also demoralizing our allies, who at some point may wonder if they should cut their own deals with the PRC.Some revisionist historians argue that Neville Chamberlain’s 1930’s era appeasement was in fact a wise stratagem to buy time to rearm. This overlooks that even as late as 1939 when Hitler seized all of Czechoslovakia, the Western democracies still had the military advantage. One can appease oneself into a corner. And the beneficiary of the appeasement usually strengthens to the point it is too hard to restrain without great sacrifice.One worries that the Chinese seizure of Philippine territory at Scarborough Shoal in 2012 – and the US Government’s unwillingness to even verbally challenge the PRC - might turn out to be this generation’s “Rhineland”. Had the West resisted Hitler in 1936 when he made this first major demand, there would have been no World War II, no Holocaust, and no Cold War.Our choice about how to deal with the PRC is not simply between either appeasement or treating China as an enemy. Our policy must accommodate options ranging from engagement to forceful confrontation.Who would not be delighted with a China that stopped threatening its neighbors and followed the civilized world’s rules? While ensuring we and our allies have a resolute defense – both in terms of military capability and the willingness to employ it – it is important to maintain ties and dialogue with the PRC and to provide encouragement and support when it shows clear signs of transforming to a freer, less repressive society.We should constantly stress that China is welcome as a key player in the international order – but only under certain conditions . The US and other democratic nations have not done enough to require China to adhere to established standards of behavior in exchange for the benefits of joining the global system that has allowed the PRC to prosper.

Human nature and history are a useful guide to where appeasement (by whatever name) leads. And they also show that a strong defense and resolutely standing up for one’s principles is more likely to preserve peace.

L: Summit meetings

Summit meetings generate superficial friendship onlyYan and Qi, 12 - Yan Xuetong is Professor of International Relations and Director of Institute of Modern International Relations, Tsinghua University. Qi Haixia is Lecturer at Department of International Relations, Tsinghua University (“Football Game Rather Than Boxing Match: China–US Intensifying Rivalry Does not Amount to Cold War” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 5, 2012, 105–127 doi:10.1093/cjip/pos007

A superficial friendship strategy refers to two parties’ exaggerating the nature of their bilateral friendship and paying lip service to the improvement of relations in order to expand the expected value of future cooperation and so temporarily improve bilateral relations. The escalating frequency of summit meetings between China and the United States is a classic example of this strategy. Since January 2009, when Obama took office, to the November 2011 APEC meeting in Hawaii, Hu Jintao and Obama met on a total nine occasions in 22 months—on average once every 10 weeks. Such frequent gatherings make it impossible for any single meeting to produce a substantive outcome, but do delay occurrences of conflicts between the two countries. When I visited the United States in November of 2011, I told a number of State Department Officials that too many summits would make substantive cooperation unachievable , so rendering such meetings pointless . At the time, not a single official agreed with me. They all argued that even though the meetings might not produce substantive cooperation agreements, they still played a positive role. This view is also broadly held among Chinese diplomats. The leaders in both China and the United States meet so frequently without expectation of achieving any substantive outcome hence implies the use of a superficial friendship strategy.

AT: Yan says cooperation good

Yan refers to preventative security cooperation under a competitive relationship – not the plan, which tries to generate positive cooperationYan, 10 - Professor and Dean of Institute of Modern International Relations, Tsinghua University (Xuetong, “The Instability of China–US Relations” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, 2010, 263–292doi:10.1093/cjip/poq009

Table 1 implies that if China and the United States are indeed able to cooperate in all types of interests, the cooperation between them must be more preventative than positive because they share more confrontational and conflicting interests than common and complementary ones. This is the best possible case scenario in China–US relations. The fact is that China and the United States have not developed preventative cooperation in every mutually unfavourable interest. For instance, they have not formulated any durable preventative cooperation on human rights since 1989. There should be many opportunities for China and the United States to develop cooperation if there are more positive than preventative cooperation between them at present because they have more mutually unfavourable than favourable interests for developing preventative cooperation.

AT: Johnston – top level

Ignore Johnston’s response – it predates Xi, and Xi’s foreign policy confirms Yan’s argumentTopping, 15 - A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES GRADUATE PROGRAM IN MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES CALGARY, ALBERTA (Vincent, “Tracing a Line in the Water: China’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region and its Implications for the United States” http://theses.ucalgary.ca/jspui/bitstream/11023/2602/4/ucalgary_2015_topping_vincent.pdf

For decades, China has kept the same discourse: it is seeking peaceful development, it will never seek hegemony, and security alliances in Asia are a relic of the Cold War that should be discarded. Nonetheless, in recent years (and especially since the arrival of Xi Jinping as the President of the PRC), there has been an increasingly severe dichotomy between words and actions. Whereas the official Chinese discourse had long been that China was still a developing country that should not be pushed too hard otherwise it could destroy its social cohesion and enhance the pressure on its domestic tensions,39 and whereas China had for decades kept Deng Xiaoping’s motto of “keeping a low profile and never seek leadership,” now China wants to be recognized as a leading power in the world and is “striving for achievements.” Chinese international relations expert and Dean of the International Relations department at Tsinghua University Yan Xuetong had been preaching since at least 2010 that China and the United States should drop the pretense that they are partners in this new century and accept that they are competitors that will more often than not have divergent and conflicting interests.40 After all, according to Yan, “China’s endeavour to regain its historical place as a world leading power and the United States’ refusal to relinquish its sole superpower status constitutes their greatest political conflict.” 41 In the words of Alastair Iain Johnston, “this is quite an admission about China’s interests” as it goes against every single policy statement and declaratory policy that China has issued over thirty years.42This could be disregarded as a Chinese realist’s perspective who is trying to further his point of view and agenda. However, when Xi Jinping came to power, he projected his vision of China for the future, which entailed that the country needed to undergo a “national rejuvenation” (fuxing zhi lu, 復興之路). According to Yan, this is “a phrase that literally refers to resuming China’s historical international status as the world’s most advanced state in early Tang Dynasty (618-917 AD). Today this phrase specifically refers to China’s efforts to catch up with the United States in terms of comprehensive national power […] the competition for international leadership between China and the United States will be inevitable” (emphasis added).43 This also points out to one inconvenient truth about Chinese politics, one that will definitely leave a bitter taste for American policymakers that have been working tirelessly to “socialize” China in the international system and who thought liberalism would convert China to the benefits of the current international order: not only realist (along with ultra-nationalist) thinkers in China are not on the fringe of Chinese politics, they are very much in the mainstream . 44 International relations theory is still somewhat of a new phenomenon in China, but Chinese experts have quickly appropriated realism (and especially John J. Mearsheimer’s version of offensive realism ) as one of their own.45 It is now, and has been for a while, the most dominant paradigm of international relations in China.46 Some theorists

http://theses.ucalgary.ca/jspui/bitstream/11023/2602/4/ucalgary_2015_topping_vincent.pdf

in China like Wang Jisi, Dean of the International Relations department at the prestigious Peking University, have been trying for years to strike a conciliatory note to reconcile differences and bridge the gap between China and the U.S., but his attempt (and those of likeminded colleagues) to do so is mostly the exception, not the rule.47

Yan’s argument is empirically correct - rising expectations from new engagement in 2010 spurred a hostile overreaction that hurt relationsChristensen, 15 – William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton (Thomas, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, p. 199-200)

The problems with the Obama administration's overeager reassurance campaign would become evident in early 2010 when China reacted harshly to the normal U.S. policies that particularly offended Beijing. According to my Chinese interlocutors, many in China had come to the conclusion that the Obama administration was different from its predecessors in its basic approach to China. Either because the administration realized that the United States was weaker than before the financial crisis or because the Obama team had a different philosophical approach to the bilateral relations, it appeared to many Chinese as more accommodating and sensitive to Chinese concerns than its predecessors. My better-connected contacts said that this view was not shared among officials at the top of the foreign policy establishment, but it was commonly held by both the general public and many in the Party who were not as experienced in foreign affairs. So in early 2010 when the Obama administration behaved like its predecessors—selling arms to Taiwan, criticizing Beijing for infringing on freedom of the press, and arranging for the president to meet with the Dalai Lama—there was real disappointment and a harsher than normal reaction in Beijing . Threats of retaliation were leveled against U.S. firms that were selling arms to Taiwan. Prominent commentators, including military officers, suggested in state-run media that China should dump U.S. Treasury bills to punish the United States in its time of economic turmoil. At a minimum, they said, China should reduce cooperation in policy arenas important to the United States, like North Korea and Iran. In their view, the Obama administration clearly violated China's "core interests." It is only logical, according to many Chinese observers, that Beijing should in turn refuse to assist the United States in pursuing what Beijing believes to be U.S. core national interests, such as preventing nuclear proliferation or helping stabilize the U.S. economy.The top leadership in China wisely eschewed policies that would harm both the United States and China, such as manipulating the purchase or sale of Treasury bills. But the pressure on the leadership from nationalist voices inside and outside the Party was intense. This domestic insecurity helps explain China's ideological and acerbic reactions to several challenges on China's periphery in 2010 that were not of Beijing's making. The result was arguably the worst year for Chinese diplomacy in the reform era. Beijing responded clumsily to North Korean belligerence toward Seoul, sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea, and Japan's arrest of a Chinese fisherman near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In the process, Beijing undercut the achievements of the previous twelve years of constructive reassurance toward its neighbors, from Japan to Vietnam to India. By the end of the year, Beijing had upset its bilateral relations with almost all of its neighbors. The only countries Beijing hadn't offended were Russia and a couple of Southeast Asian nations.

Johnston’s argument is based narrowly on consumer psychology studies, not IRYan and Qi, 12 - Yan Xuetong is Professor of International Relations and Director of Institute of Modern International Relations, Tsinghua University. Qi Haixia is Lecturer at Department of International Relations, Tsinghua University (“Football Game Rather Than Boxing Match: China–US Intensifying Rivalry Does not Amount to Cold War” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 5, 2012, 105–127 doi:10.1093/cjip/pos007

Certain US scholars understand the theory of superficial friendship solely from the vantage point of its characteristics; they have not considered the explanatory power of the theory from the dualistic perspective of both character and strategy. As they perceive the character of superficial friendship solely as one that causes deterioration in Sino–US relations, and do not acknowledge that the superficial friendship strategy can enhance Sino–US ties, these scholars argue that the classic security dilemma theory explains the deterioration of the relationship, so precluding the need to explicate a superficial friendship theory. Below, we focus on points that Alastair Iain Johnston raises in his recently published critique of my theory of superficial friendship.Johnston says: ‘Yan’s basic hypothesis appears to be that superficial friendship generates excessive disappointment due to excessive optimism. This, in turn, accounts for the ups and downs in the US–China relationship, particularly since the end of the Cold War.’22 Obviously, Johnston does not realize that the ups of Sino–US relations result from the strategy of superficial friendship adopted by these two countries, and that the downs are caused by the nature of superficial friendship between them.Although very cautious, Johnston’s psychological critique still leaves room for discussion. Based on David E. Bell’s research, he argues that ‘[A]fter series of disappointments actors will revise their expectations in more pessimistic directions. Thus, one should see more conflictual (though perhaps more stable) relations with interlocutors over time.’23 David E. Bell’s article researches the psychology of consumers when selecting products.24 Whereas research on consumer psychology is about relations among economic interests, Sino–US relations cover the three areas of economics, politics and security. From 1990 to 2011, Sino–US economic relations were obviously much better than Sino–US political or security relations. Deterioration in Sino–US ties over that time were mainly the result of political or security issues, and economic interests helped to enhance relations between the two countries during this period. Moreover, the key assumption in research on consumer psychology—that actors seek to maximize benefits—differs from what happens in Sino–US relations, where interlocutors look at both absolute and relative benefits. For example, although the United States desperately needs to increase employment, the US government nevertheless continues to restrict Chinese investment in the United States to prevent China from controlling United States’ strategic economic sectors. This is a classic example of a policy targeting relative benefits. Hu Jintao requested at the 2011 APEC summit in Hawaii that Obama ease political restrictions on Chinese investment, but there was no progress on the matter.25 Using consumer psychology to analyze the diplomatic policy of states is thus problematic. Johnston admits: ‘Of course, exuberance, disappointment, and shattered expectations are characteristics of the psychology of people and small groups, not nations or states.’26

--AT: Yan data unreliable

Yan’s data is sound and statistically significantYan and Qi, 12 - Yan Xuetong is Professor of International Relations and Director of Institute of Modern International Relations, Tsinghua University. Qi Haixia is Lecturer at Department of International Relations, Tsinghua University (“Football Game Rather Than Boxing Match: China–US Intensifying Rivalry Does not Amount to Cold War” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 5, 2012, 105–127 doi:10.1093/cjip/pos007

As Johnston does not share our understanding of superficial friendship, he questions whether or not the average score we obtain from the trend line of Sino–US relations from 1989 to present supports our theory of superficial friendship. Johnston argues: ‘[T]he fitted trend lines show that the average annual score increases over time and the annual average absolute deviation declines. The monthly disaggregated data shows similar trends. In other words, Sino–US relations improve and the volatility declines.’32Johnston bases his conclusions on a rising trend in the average score and therefore refutes the nature of changing Sino–US relations as defined by the theory of superficial friendship. Johnston understands superficial friendship as bilateral relations that are continuously deteriorating rather than as highly volatile. Relations between sincere friends and enemies are stable, but in different ways. Regardless of whether or not bilateral relations are improving or deteriorating, as long as bilateral relations do not approximate those of either a sincere friend or enemy, the states can be characterized as either superficial friends or superficial enemies. As such, the average score can only show us the changing trends in Sino–US relations during a particular period, and does not give us a basis for assessing whether or not bilateral relations are characterized by sincere or superficial friendship or sincere or superficial enmity.To observe instability of superficial relations between China and the United States since the end of the Cold War we must make comparisons with other historical periods. We cannot otherwise discern whether the overall trend in Post-Cold War relations is towards improvement or deterioration. From a statistical perspective, we cannot use differences within a particular set of statistics to assess differences between different sets. That is to say that superficial friends, real friends, superficial enemies, and real enemies can all demonstrate trends towards improvement or deterioration, but trends in the extent of change of characteristics of a relationship cannot tell us what type of relationship it is. In order to assess the character of the relationship we can only compare average scores across the four periods 1950–1970 (real enemies), 1971–1977 (superficial enemies), 1978–1988 (real friends), and 1989–2011 (superficial friends). See Figures 3–6. In Figure 3–6, time is on the horizontal axis and the average value for Sino–US relations is on the vertical axis. As the unit in the database for the value of Sino–US relations is expressed in months, the average value expressed in Figure 1 is the sum of the 12 monthly values divided by 12.For ease of comparison, the equation used to derive the curve for each period is listed below.33 In the following equations, y is the average value for Sino–US relations, while x represents the year. The first year in the period is assigned the number 1, and the second year the number 2.Formula for the curve representing 1950–1970: y ¼ 0.029x 6.593Formula for the curve representing 1971–1977: y ¼ 0.593x 6.362

Formula for the curve representing 1978–1988: y ¼ 0.322x 0.084Formula for the curve representing 1989–2011: y ¼ 0.087x 0.578From Figure 3 we can see that from 1950 to 1970, the average value for Sino–US relations mainly fluctuated between 8 and 5, with the fitted values trending slightly downward. This is the sole period out of the four exhibiting a downward trend in fitted values. Thus, during the period in which China and the United States were real enemies, the average value for their relationship declined. According to Figure 4, during the superficial enemy period from 1971 to 1977, the score for Sino–US relations hovered between 7 and 2, with the fitted values during the period trending towards a rise. In Figure 5, which depicts the period of real friendship from 1978 to 1988, the value for Sino–US relations fluctuated between 2 and 3, with a trend of increasing fitted values. Figure 6 represents the period of superficial friendship from 1989 to 2011, during which the value for Sino– US relations fluctuated between 1 and 3, with a trend towards a slight increase in the fitted values. Starting from 1971, the average value curve shows a rising trend, but with variation in pace of the rise. We observe that during the period of superficial enemies (19711977) the coefficient on the independent variable for each year is 0.593—higher than that for any other period. The coefficient on the independent variable for each year during the period of real friendship (1978–1988), is 0.322—second highest of the four periods. During the superficial friendship period (1989–2011), the coefficient on the independent variable is only 0.087, implying negligible, statistically speaking insignificant improvements in Sino–US relations, slightly higher only than the real enemy period, on which the coefficient is 0.029, a similarly insignificant difference.Based on the above analysis, the value during the real enemy period (1950–1970) for Sino–US relations was the lowest. No trend towards improvement could be observed during this period. During the superficial enemy period (1971–1977), although the value for Sino–US relations was low, the change trended continuously towards improvement, and the pace of improvement was most rapid. During the period of real friends (1978–1988) and superficial friends (1989–2011), the extent of change in Sino–US relations was mainly between (2, 3), trending towards a gradual rise. The pace of improvement during the real friendship period, however, was second only to that of the superficial enemy period, and much higher than that for the superficial friend period. All of this points to obvious statistical support of the assessment that current Sino–US relations exhibit characteristics of superficial friendship.

Johnston’s regression analysis of Yan’s data is flawedYan and Qi, 12 - Yan Xuetong is Professor of International Relations and Director of Institute of Modern International Relations, Tsinghua University. Qi Haixia is Lecturer at Department of International Relations, Tsinghua University (“Football Game Rather Than Boxing Match: China–US Intensifying Rivalry Does not Amount to Cold War” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 5, 2012, 105–127 doi:10.1093/cjip/pos007

Johnston also used regression analysis of the absolute deviation to demonstrate that Sino–US relations from 1998 to 2011 have trended towards improvement.34 The regression coefficient on the equation for the standard deviation curve from 1989 to 2011, however, is 0.013—not significantly different from zero, and thus cannot be used to demonstrate the trend of decreasing instability. Rather, it is an indication of the lack of change in deviation across time. The instability in Sino–US relations thus remained constant. (See Figure 7)

--AT: Rising expectations improve relations

Even if rising expectations sometimes improve some aspects of relations, it generates a cycle of dissatisfaction and response that disrupts relations overallYan and Qi, 12 - Yan Xuetong is Professor of International Relations and Director of Institute of Modern International Relations, Tsinghua University. Qi Haixia is Lecturer at Department of International Relations, Tsinghua University (“Football Game Rather Than Boxing Match: China–US Intensifying Rivalry Does not Amount to Cold War” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 5, 2012, 105–127 doi:10.1093/cjip/pos007

Johnston further argues: ‘Mere dissatisfaction does not necessarily lead to proactive, conflictual, responses. Rather, disappointment often results in passivity, based on a feeling of helplessness, rather than a more aggressive or angry response.’27 He also notes: ‘[P]eople are more likely to concede to another side if that other side expresses disappointment rather than no emotion at all.’28 It would seem, though, that his point of view perfectly illustrates that a superficial friend can opt not to cooperate, or to protest in order to express dissatisfaction, the difference between non-cooperation and protest being that each causes different extents of deterioration in relations. When one party expresses dissatisfaction, this implies that bilateral ties have deteriorated. If his interlocutor makes a concession, the negative impacts are short-lived, and relations go through a short cycle of deterioration followed by rapprochement. The impacts of such a disturbance are thus relatively limited. If, on the other hand, the interlocutor does not make a concession, the deterioration of relations might be more permanent. By the time one party recognizes that a policy of confrontation will not result in concessions and adopts a strategy of superficial friendship to improve ties, the other party will respond with a superficial friendship strategy, so achieving enhancement of relations. The resultantly lengthy cycle of deterioration– improvement in relations, however, generally leads to a serious disruption of ties. This explains why levels of instability between superficial friends tend to vary so much over time.

--AT: Security dilemma explains behavior

Johnston admits his argument is conjecture and hasn’t been testedJohnston, 11 - Alastair Iain Johnston is the Governor James Noe and Linda Noe Laine Professor of China in World Affairs at Department of Government, Harvard University (“Stability and Instability in Sino–US Relations: A Response to Yan Xuetong’s Superficial Friendship Theory” Chinese Journal of International Politics (2011) 4 (1): 5-29.doi: 10.1093/cjip/por003

The discussion above about an emerging US–China security dilemma explanation is clearly based on anecdotal evidence , and awaits a more systematic testing of its three main hypotheses against a clearer and more rigorously derived set of hypotheses from Yan’s superficial friendship model. Probing the plausibility of an argument is a legitimate reason for preliminary scholarly research, but I would encourage Yan to develop further the theoretical micro-foundations and empirical implications of his model beyond his current assessments of instability in the US–China relationship.

Appeasement links

Engagement

Rivalry is inevitable – expanding economic or political integration of China assists Chinese ascendancyTellis and Blackwill 15 (Ashley** and David*, senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations*, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues**, “U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China”, Council on Foreign Relations, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Blackwill.pdf, April 13, 2015, NRG)

Because the American effort to “integrate” China into the liberal international order has now generated new threats to U.S. primacy in Asia—and could eventually result in a consequential challenge to American power globally—Washington needs a new grand strategy toward China that centers on balancing the rise of Chinese power rather than continuing to assist its ascendancy . This strategy cannot be built on a bedrock of containment, as the earlier effort to limit Soviet power was, because of the current realities of globalization. Nor can it involve simply jettisoning the prevailing policy of integration. Rather, it must involve crucial changes to the current policy in order to limit the dangers that China’s economic and military expansion pose to U.S. interests in Asia and globally.These changes, which constitute the heart of an alternative balancing strategy, must derive from the clear recognition that preserving U.S. primacy in the global system ought to remain the central objective of U.S. grand strategy in the twenty-first century. Sustaining this status in the face of rising Chinese power requires, among other things, revitalizing the U.S. economy to nurture those disruptive innovations that bestow on the United States asymmetric economic advantages over others; creating new preferential trading arrangements among U.S. friends and allies to increase their mutual gains through instruments that consciously exclude China ; recreating a technology-control regime involving U.S. allies that prevents China from acquiring military and strategic capabilities enabling it to inflict “high-leverage strategic harm” on the United States and its partners; concertedly building up the power-political capacities of U.S. friends and allies on China’s periphery; and improving the capability of U.S. military forces to effectively project power along the Asian rimlands despite any Chinese opposition—all while continuing to work with China in the diverse ways that befit its importance to U.S. national interests.The necessity for such a balancing strategy that deliberately incorporates elements that limit China’s capacity to misuse its growing power, even as the United States and its allies continue to interact with China diplomatically and economically, is driven by the likelihood that a long-term strategic rivalry between Beijing and Washington is high. China’s sustained economic success over the past thirty-odd years has enabled it to aggregate formidable power, making it the nation most capable of dominating the Asian continent and thus undermining the traditional U.S. geopolitical objective of ensuring that this arena remains free of hegemonic control. The meteoric growth of the Chinese economy, even as China’s per capita income remains behind that of the United States in the near future, has already provided Beijing with the resources necessary to challenge the security of both its Asian neighbors and Washington’s influence in Asia, with dangerous consequences. Even as China’s overall gross domestic product (GDP) growth slows considerably in the future, its relative growth rates are likely to be higher than those of the United States for the foreseeable future, thus making the need to balance its rising

power important. Only a fundamental collapse of the Chinese state would free Washington from the obligation of systematically balancing Beijing, because even the alternative of a modest Chinese stumble would not eliminate the dangers presented to the United States in Asia and beyond.Of all nations—and in most conceivable scenarios—China is and will remain the most significant competitor to the United States for decades to come.6 China’s rise thus far has already bred geopolitical, military, economic, and ideological challenges to U.S. power, U.S. allies, and the U.S.-dominated international order. Its continued, even if uneven, success in the future would further undermine U.S. national interests. Washington’s current approach toward Beijing, one that values China’s economic and political integration in the liberal international order at the expense of the United States’ global preeminence and long-term strategic interests, hardly amounts to a “grand” strategy, much less an effective one. The need for a more coherent U.S. response to increasing Chinese power is long overdue.

L: Cooperation

New substantive acts of cooperation are concessions to China that embolden nationalists and creates the widespread perception of US declinePickrell 15(Ryan, PhD degree in International Politics and Diplomacy, “The Tipping Point: Has the U.S.-China Relationship Passed the Point of No Return?”, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-tipping-point-has-the-us-china-relationship-passed-the-14168?page=3, 10/26/15, NRG)

China’s proposed solution to the Sino-American strategic stability issue is the “new model of major-country relations,” which encourages the United States and China to avoid confrontation and conflict, respect one another’s political systems and national interests—specifically China’s core interests—and pursue win-win cooperation. China is exceptionally enthusiastic about this proposal and brings it up at every high-level Sino-American meeting. Chinese enthusiasm for the “new model of major-country relations” can be explained in a number of different ways. American acceptance of China’s proposal would facilitate Beijing’s rise, legitimize the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a leader for national strength and revival and reduce the likelihood of American containment. As acceptance of the “new model of major-country relations” would create an international environment conducive to China’s rise, it would essentially allow China to become the preeminent power in Asia without great power competition or conflict. This proposal also has the potential to put China on par with the United States, to elevate it to an equal status, one acknowledged by the United States. Not only would American recognition of China’s strength and power have effects abroad, but it would also stoke Chinese nationalism and strengthen CCP leadership at home. Furthermore, this new model is a means of establishing a new code of conduct for the Sino-American relationship that is more in line with Chinese national interests, opening the door for the creation of a Chinese sphere of influence in Asia and, potentially, a Sino-centric regional order.Prior to the recent meeting between Xi Jinping and Barack Obama, Xi announced that China’s proposed “new model of major-country-relations” would be an important discussion point for the meeting, but, while this proposal was brought up during the meeting, no clear progress was made. Because U.S. leaders believe that the “new model of major-country relations” is not in America’s best interests, the United States has repeatedly dismissed China’s proposal. As the hegemonic power, the United States maintains its power by dominating global politics; to accept a geopolitical framework alternative proposed by a strategic rival requires sacrificing a certain amount of power and influence. Along those same lines, acceptance of China’s proposal might give other states in the international system the impression that the United States is in decline and on the losing end of the classic “Thucydides trap.” Outside of traditional power politics, the call for the United States to respect China’s “core interests”— as many Chinese and foreign scholars have noted—is a loaded statement. While the United States is not opposed to respecting a state’s national interests, it tends to be unwilling to respect national interests which are highly contested, which is the situation for the majority of China’s “core interests.” In addition to traditional Chinese national interests, such as Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, China’s “core interests” also cover most of its territorial claims in Asia. The United States is concerned that China’s “new model of major-country relations” is a ploy designed to trick the United States into acknowledging China’s extensive territorial claims and undercutting the interests of American allies and long-time strategic partners in the Asia-Pacific region, which would likely result in the weakening of the American-led “hub-

and-spoke” security structure, a security framework China hopes to replace with its New Asian Security Concept. There are also suspicions in the United States that China’s proposal is a call for the creation of spheres of influence, a concept to which the Obama administration has been consistently opposed.

L: Unconditional concessions

China will pocket concessions from engagement – it won’t change behavior and it will become more aggressiveWolf, 14 - Dr. Albert B. Wolf is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at ADA University in Baku, Azerbaijan (“The Unipolar Moment is (Almost) Over: What’s Next?” The Times of Israel, 5/1, http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/the-unipolar-moment-is-almost-over-what-next/

Lean ForwardThis is also known as engagement. Unlike other strategies driven by “Who gets more” thinking, under engagement we stop worrying about how big a slice of the pie China gets, and instead focus upon growing the whole pie. Under this strategy, we give up none of our commitments. Instead, we take up new ones. We attempt to influence China’s present and future behavior by using positive inducements (“carrots”), while ensnaring them and us in a web of increasingly intricate international organizationsScholars like Alastair Iain Johnston suggest that China’s participation in international organizations has had a moderating influence on Beijing’s foreign policy since the days of Mao. Jeffrey Legro argues that since Deng Xiaoping, China has pursued an “integrationist” strategy that has benefited its growth. Until outside events demonstrate that it’s current strategy is not working or has failed, Chinese elites have little reason to favor a course correction in a more aggressive direction.DownsidesHas this ever worked? Some would suggest that engagement has never worked because declining states rarely try it. Declining powers are wary of trying it for fear that concessions given to rising powers today will be used against them in the future. China could pocket concessions and use them later in order to further America’s demise . China may also see this as little more than cheap talk: a U.S. ploy to get its way and maintain primacy on the cheap. After all, such a doctrine does not involve deeper defense cuts than what we have now.

The history of appeasement has put the US and China on the brink of war – further demonstration of US weakness means China will be aggressiveChang, 16 - Chang lived and worked in China and Hong Kong for almost two decades, most recently in Shanghai, as Counsel to the American law firm Paul Weiss. He has spoken at Columbia, Cornell, Harvard, Penn, Princeton, Yale, and other universities and at The Brookings Institution, The Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute, RAND, the American Enterprise Institute, the Council on Foreign Relations, and other institutions. He has given briefings at the National Intelligence Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and the Pentagon (Gordon, “America Will Decide If There Is War in Asia” 6/24, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-will-decide-if-there-war-asia-16720?page=show

Aggressors, like China, start wars. Yet whether history’s next great conflict begins in East Asia will not be determined in the councils of a belligerent Beijing. If you’re trying to set your watch to the sound of gunfire, you must, most of all, observe Washington.

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-will-decide-if-there-war-asia-16720?page=show

http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/the-unipolar-moment-is-almost-over-what-next/

The region is in seemingly never-ending crisis because Chinese leaders believe their country should be bigger than it is today. As a result, China is pushing on boundaries to the south and east, using forceful tactics to both take territory under the control of others and close off international water and airspace.The dynamic of aggression has started, and at this point China will not stop until it is stopped.Unfortunately, Washington is in many ways responsible, or at least paved the way, for the latest round of Chinese provocation. That round began in the spring of 2012. Then, Chinese and Philippine vessels sailed in close proximity around Scarborough Shoal, in the northern portion of the South China Sea.To avoid conflict in that critical body of water, Washington brokered an agreement between Beijing and Manila. Both agreed to withdraw their craft, but only the Philippines honored the deal. That left China in control of the shoal.Beijing’s grab was particularly audacious. Scarborough lies just 124 nautical miles from the main Philippine island of Luzon, guarding the strategic Manila and Subic Bays. It was long thought to be part of the Philippines.The Obama administration did not enforce the agreement it had brokered, perhaps under the belief it could thereby avoid a confrontation with Beijing. The White House’s inaction just made the problem bigger, however. Emboldened Chinese officials and flag officers then ramped up pressure on another Philippine feature—Second Thomas Shoal, where Chinese vessels have regularly operated—and the Senkakus, eight specks under Japanese administration in the East China Sea.You would have thought that Washington policymakers had learned the costly lessons of earlier eras when Western timidity opened the door to large-scale conflicts that could have been avoided. Britain and France, for instance, allowed the Third Reich to remilitarize the Rhineland in March 1936. That gambit secured one of Germany’s frontiers and eventually led to Hitler’s annexation of Austria in March 1938 and his bold grab of the Sudetenland the following September. Germany, after the infamous Munich pact, took the rest of Czechoslovakia by the spring of the following year.In the first half of August 1939 Hitler did not think Britain or France would go to war over Poland, and it’s not hard to see why. After all, they did nothing to stop him when they could have, in the Rhineland. Then they meekly stood by while he marched into large parts of Europe.By the latter part of that August the declarations of London and Paris that they would defend Polish borders sounded hollow and in any event were too late. German forces crossed the Polish border on September 1, and London and Paris, likely to Hitler’s surprise, declared war on Germany two days later.Unfortunately, America looks like it is following in the footsteps of Britain and France. The People’s Republic of China is not the Third Reich, but the dynamic in the second half of the 1930s and our era looks eerily similar.Then and now, an aggressive power seized what it wanted. Chinese leaders today, like Germany’s before, believe further advances will not meet effective resistance. Moreover, there is at this time, like there was in that decade, a momentum toward war . Hostile elements—many but not all of them in uniform—are in control of the levels of power in Beijing, as they were in Berlin.This month has seen those elements hit out toward their country’s south and east. To the continental south, in the Himalayas, Chinese troops intruded into Indian-controlled territory at four separate spots in the state of Arunachal Pradesh on the ninth.To the maritime southeast, a Chinese vessel deliberately rammed a Vietnamese fishing boat on June 16. And last week about a dozen of China’s trawlers fished in Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone and confronted local patrol vessels, creating the third such incident in as many months.

Moreover, to China’s east there was a series of incidents in the East China Sea. On June 15, a Chinese intelligence ship entered Japan’s territorial waters in the dark of early morning, loitering close to two islands off the main Japanese island of Kyushu. The intrusion was the first since 2004, when a submerged Chinese submarine transited a strait between two of Japan’s islands, and only the second by China since the end of the Second World War.The incursion followed an incident on June 9 when, for the first time ever, a Chinese warship, a frigate, entered the contiguous zone off the Senkakus. This, in turn, followed the June 7 intercept of a U.S. Air Force RC-135 reconnaissance plane over the East China Sea by two Chinese jets. U.S. Pacific Command called the Chinese action “unsafe.”And this brings us back to Scarborough, which could be as important a turning point to our era as Sudetenland was to last century. “We see some surface ship activity and those sorts of things, survey type of activity, going on,” said Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson to Reuters in the middle of March. As a result, the shoal could end up “a next possible area of reclamation.” Reclamation would make permanent China’s seizure and therefore constitute a game-changer if not immediately reversed.So far, the United States has sent warnings. On April 21, four ground-attack A-10s flew what the U.S. Air Force termed “an air and maritime domain awareness mission in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal.” Then this month in Singapore at the Shangri-La Dialogue Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, in response to a question about Beijing’s possible reclamation of the shoal, spoke of “actions being taken both by the United States and by actions taken by others in the region which will have the effect of not only increasing tensions but also isolating China.”What “actions”? In late March, the New York Times reported that General Joseph Dunford was overhead at the Pentagon asking Admiral Harry Harris, the chief of U.S. Pacific Command, the ultimate question. “Would you go to war over Scarborough Shoals?” the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to know.So far, very few Americans think Scarborough is worth a fight with the Chinese, and the White House seems reluctant to start a war anywhere. Therefore, the risk of conflict over those rocks appears to be extremely low.Yet, despite appearances, the situation could be dangerous. For one thing, the Chinese seem determined to do something provocative when the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague hands down its ruling in Republic of Philippines v. People’s Republic of China. Beijing has refused to participate in the case that will apply the rules of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea to South China Sea issues, and most observers expect a decision favoring Manila in the next month or so.Chinese leaders could simply decide to show the Philippines who’s boss by ignoring the decision, defying U.S. warnings, and building an artificial island over the contested Scarborough. Beijing might think it can get away with such an act, but authoritarian leaders do not have a good track record in reading American intentions.Kim Il Sung was sure Washington would not come to the aid of beleaguered South Korea in June 1950. And at the time it looked like he had correctly read the Truman administration. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in his January 1950 speech at the National Press Club in Washington, left South Korea outside America’s announced “defensive perimeter.” His language, whatever he intended, appears to have convinced Mao Zedong and Josef Stalin, Kim’s backers, that the North Korean was correct in his assessment that the United States would not fight. In June, Kim attacked in full force, and, despite everything, an unprepared, outgunned America went to war.

Saddam Hussein made a similar error. In July 1990, April Glaspie, the American ambassador to Iraq, indicated to him that Washington had little interest in “Arab-Arab conflicts,” words he interpreted to mean the U.S. would not stop him from taking over neighboring Kuwait. The Bush administration could have prevented a generation of tragedy by making a firm declaration of resolve during that pivotal conversation. Instead, Saddam invaded and America had to create a multi-nation coalition and lead a full-scale invasion to free the oil-rich emirate.Today, it would be hard for China to predict what would happen if it started to reclaim Scarborough, in large part because it is not clear that Washington policymakers themselves know what they would do.America is now showing resolve in the South China Sea, but it’s unlikely that, after the feeble response in the first half of 2012, U.S. officials have impressed their Chinese counterparts with the depth of their concern. That makes the situation at this moment extraordinarily dangerous.

L: Crisis management

US crisis management causes crisis escalation because China thinks the US will back down to every provocation. Closing communication channels is vital to demonstrating resolveMastro 15-an assistant professor of security studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Why Chinese Assertiveness is Here to Stay”, The Washington Quarterly, 21 Jan 2015, https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/27434/uploads)//SL italics in original

These efforts are commendable—the United States rightly works to preserve its military superiority and retain its ability to project power in the region. During the Cold War, when the greatest pacing threats were land conflicts, forward deploying U.S. forces in Europe and Asia were sufficient to demonstrate the credibility of the U.S. commitment to peace in those regions. But China is currently testing the waters not because its leaders are uncertain about the balance of power, but because they are probing the balance of resolve . This means that staying ahead in terms of military might is insufficient in contemporary East Asia.China’s strategists are betting that the side with the strongest military does not necessarily win the war—the foundation of the deterrent pillar of its A2/AD strategy. Indeed, China’s experience in fighting the Korean War proves that a country willing to sacrifice blood and treasure can overcome a technologically superior opponent. The belief that balance of resolve drives outcomes more so than the balance of power is the foundation of China’s new, more assertive strategy ; but U.S. responses to date have failed to account for it. Canned demonstrations of U.S. power fail to address the fundamental uncertainty concerning U.S. willingness, not ability, to fight.The U.S. focus on de-escalation in all situations only exacerbates this issue. The Cold War experience solidified the Western narrative stemming from World War I that inadvertent escalation causes major war, and therefore crisis management is the key to maintaining peace.74 This has created a situation in which the main U.S. goal has been de-escalation in each crisis or incident with Beijing. But Chinese leaders do not share this mindset—they believe leaders deliberately control the escalation process and therefore wars happen because leaders decide at a given juncture that the best option is to fight.75 China is masterful at chipping away at U.S. credibility through advancing militarization and coercive diplomacy. It often uses limited military action to credibly signal its willingness to escalate if its demands are not met. Strategist Thomas Schelling theoretically captured this approach when he wrote it is “the sheer inability to predict the consequences of our actions and to keep things under control … that can intimidate the enemy.”76Because China introduces risk for exactly this reason, the U.S. focus on deescalation through crisis management is unlikely to produce any change in Chinese behavior—if anything it will only encourage greater provocations . Beijing has identified the U.S. fear of inadvertent escalation, and is exploiting it to compel the United States to give in to its demands and preferences. In this way, the U.S. focus on de-escalation may actually be the source of instability by rewarding and encouraging further Chinese provocations. To signal to China that the United States will not opt out of a conflict, Washington must signal willingness to escalate to higher levels of conflict when China is directly and purposely testing U.S. resolve. This may include reducing channels of communication during a conflict , or involving additional

https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/27434/uploads)//SL

regional actors, to credibly demonstrate that China will not be able to use asymmetry of resolve to its advantage.

Threatening escalation is vital to crisis stability – de-escalation makes future crises inevitable because it plays into Chinese strategic thinkingMastro 15-an assistant professor of security studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Why Chinese Assertiveness is Here to Stay”, The Washington Quarterly, 21 Jan 2015, https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/27434/uploads)//SL

The current mindset—that crisis management is the answer in all scenarios— will be difficult to dislodge, given the tendency among U.S. military ranks to focus on worst-case “great battle” scenarios. While realistic in Cold War operational planning, decision makers should consider instead the less violent and prolonged engagements that characterize Chinese coercive diplomacy when evaluating risk and reward, such as the 1962 Sino–Indian War or the 1974 Battle of the Paracel Islands. The idea that any conflict with China would escalate to a major war, destroy the global economy, and perhaps even escalate to a nuclear exchange has no foundation in Chinese thinking, and causes the United States to concede in even the smallest encounters. While the Chinese leadership has proven to be more risk-acceptant than the United States (or perhaps more accurately, to assess the risks to be less than those perceived by U.S. strategists), Xi still wants to avoid an armed conflict at this stage . In his November 2014 keynote address at the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference, he noted that China remains in a period of strategic opportunity in which efforts should be made to maintain the benign strategic environment so as to focus on internal development.77Ultimately, the U.S. regional objective must be peace and stability at an acceptable cost. Given this, it is critical to understand the four components of China’s A2/AD strategy, the strategic foundation for China’s recent assertiveness, and how best to maintain the U.S. position as a Pacific power. In addition to regularly attending meetings in the region and developing new technology, new platforms, and new operational concepts designed to defeat China’s A2/AD strategy, the United States needs to break free of its Cold War-based paradigm paralysis and rethink conceptions of limited war, escalation, and risk.Scolding China and imposing symbolic costs for each maritime incident is unlikely to inspire the corrective change U.S. thinkers are hoping for. The United States needs to fundamentally change its approach by accepting higher risk and allowing for the possibility of escalation—both vertically in force as well as horizontally to include other countries. This admittedly is a difficult balance, especially given the need to avoid emboldening U.S. allies to take actions that run contrary to U.S. interests. But only by mastering these two balancing acts—focusing on balancing resolve, rather than forces, and prioritizing stability over crisis management—will the United States be able to maintain peace and stability in East Asia without sacrificing U.S. or allied interests.

L: Economic growth

Increasing economic engagement undermines effective balancingFriedberg 11 - Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, co-director of the Woodrow Wilson School’s Center for International Security Studies (Aaron, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, p. 109)

After 1989 there was an irreducible measure of tension between American efforts to engage China economically while at the same time countering the growth of its military power. By continuing to open its markets and invest its capital, the United States was contributing substantially to the rapid expansion of China's GDP. This fueled Beijing's sustained military buildup, which in turn stimulated Washington to strengthen its Asian alliances and bolster its own forces in the region. Continued engagement thus helped to create the need for more balancing .

Slow Chinese growth increases regional containment of China and moderates its behaviorGlaser and Funaiole, 15 – *senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at CSIS AND fellow with the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Bonnie and Matthew, “Geopolitical Consequences of China’s Slowdown” 11/16, http://csis.org/files/publication/151116_Glaser_Funaiole_Geopolitical.pdfOverinvestment in economic initiatives leaves Beijing susceptible to the same vulnerabilities that threaten the Chinese economy. Should the Chinese economy stumble, aspects of the AIIB and OBOR will need to be scaled back. The knock-on effects of an economic slowdown could diminish China’s future role in the region. The smaller countries of Asia have tolerated Chinese assertiveness in exchange for economic gains and because they fear that challenging China could cause Beijing to punish them economically. If China is no longer able to afford those benefits, many smaller countries may be less willing to show deference and more willing to push back against Chinese threats to their interests.In the South China Sea, where in recent years China has incrementally altered the status quo in its favor, such a development could have a positive effect. Myriad steps taken by some of the other claimants to the disputed land features, as well as by the United States, Japan, and other concerned members of the international community, have not persuaded Beijing to moderate its assertiveness and seek cooperative solutions to the extant territorial disputes. Any reduction in Chinese influence may diminish the disincentives that smaller claimant states and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) face vis-à-vis China. Firmer and coordinated policies among Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia, combined with greater unity among all the ASEAN member countries, might induce Beijing to conclude a binding code of conduct for the South China Sea that ensures disputes are managed peacefully and in accordance with international law.

China receives higher relative gains from trade that allow it to challenge US powerTellis and Blackwill 15 (Ashley** and David*, senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations*, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in

international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues**, “U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China”, Council on Foreign Relations, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Blackwill.pdf, April 13, 2015, NRG)

Although this last development has generated wealth and welfare gains globally, it has also produced several unnerving strategic consequences. It has made many of China’s trading partners, especially its smaller neighbors, asymmetrically dependent on China and thus reluctant to voice opposition even when China’s policies leave them disadvantaged.21 China’s economic integration has also produced higher relative gains for itself, even with its larger trading partners, such as the United States—not in the narrow sense pertaining to the bilateral terms of trade, but in the larger strategic sense that its overall growth has risen far faster than it might have had China remained locked into the autarkic policies of the pre-reform period. U.S. support for China’s entry into the global trading system has thus created the awkward situation in which Washington has contributed toward hastening Beijing’s economic growth and, by extension, accelerated its rise as a geopolitical rival . Furthermore, China’s growing economic ties have nurtured and encouraged various internal constituencies within China’s trading partners to pursue parochial interests that often diverge from their countries’ larger national interests with regard to China.22 Finally, economic integration has shaped the leadership perceptions of many of China’s trading partners in ways that lead them to worry about their dependence on and vulnerability to China. Even if such worry is sometimes exaggerated, it weakens their resistance to both Chinese blandishments and coercion.23 Given these outcomes, it should not be surprising that Beijing has consciously sought to use China’s growing economic power in a choking embrace designed to prevent its Asian neighbors from challenging its geopolitical interests, including weakening the U.S. alliance system in Asia.Beijing’s commitment to sustaining high economic growth through deepened international interdependence, therefore, provides it not only with internal gains—a more pliant populace and a more powerful state—but consequential external benefits as well, in the form of a growing military and deferential neighbors who fear the economic losses that might arise from any political opposition to China. These gains are likely to persist even as China’s economic growth slows down over time—as it inevitably will—so long as Beijing’s overall material power and its relative growth rates remain superior to those of its neighbors.24

Economic integration increases China’s relative power and aggressive behaviorTellis and Blackwill 15 (Ashley** and David*, senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations*, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues**, “U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China”, Council on Foreign Relations, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Blackwill.pdf, April 13, 2015, NRG)

Fourth, some may assert that China’s integration into the international system broadly serves important U.S. purposes, binds Beijing to a rules-based system and increases the costs to the PRC of going against it, and thus should trump other U.S. concerns about China’s internal and external behavior. We accept that integrating China into international institutions will continue and that the United States will accrue some benefits from that activity. Our argument is that basing U.S. grand strategy primarily on such Chinese global integration ignores the strategic reality that China has made far greater relative gains

through such processes than the United States has over the past three decades, that China has accordingly increased its national power in ways that potentially deeply threaten U.S. national interests in the long term, and that therefore the United States needs to understand and internalize this disturbing fact and respond to such PRC international assimilation with much more robust American policies and power projection into Asia.Fifth, critics may also say that the United States’ Asian allies and friends will never go along with the grand strategy outlined in this document. This concern seems to concentrate not on the merits of our strategic approach, but rather on its reception in the region. In any case, what the allies want is not to cut ties with China, but rather increased U.S. capabilities in the region, increased reassurance of American protection, and increased U.S. support for their own economic growth and security. The grand strategy outlined in this report advances all of these objectives. Moreover, it is difficult to exaggerate the current anxiety among virtually all Asian nations about the strategic implications of the rise of Chinese power, recent examples of PRC aggressiveness in the East and South China Seas, and the conviction that only the United States can successfully deter Beijing’s corrosive strategic ambitions. Because of PRC behavior, Asian states have already begun to balance against China through greater intra-Asian cooperation—actions that are entirely consistent with and only reinforce our U.S. grand strategy. Indeed, the worry across Asia today is not that the United States will pursue overly robust policies toward China; rather, it is that Washington is insufficiently aware of Beijing’s ultimate disruptive strategic goals in Asia, is periodically attracted to a G2 formula, and may not be up to the challenge of effectively dealing with the rise of China over the long term. These deeply worried views across Asian governments are fertile ground on which to plant a revised U.S. grand strategy toward China.

China will use engagement to consolidate economic power and challenge the U.S.Tellis and Blackwill 15 (Ashley** and David*, senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations*, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues**, “U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China”, Council on Foreign Relations, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Blackwill.pdf, April 13, 2015, NRG)

Because these twin expectations have not materialized, China’s rise as a new great power promises to be a troubling prospect for the United States for many years to come. China’s economic growth derives considerably from its participation in the multilateral trading system and the larger liberal international order more generally, but its resulting military expansion has placed Beijing’s economic strategy at odds with its political objective of threatening the guarantor of global interdependence, the United States. At the moment, China displays no urgency in addressing this conundrum, aware that its trading partners hesitate to pressure Beijing because of the potential for economic losses that might ensue. Given this calculation, Chinese leaders conclude that their country can continue to benefit from international trade without having to make any fundamental compromises in their existing disputes with other Asian states or their efforts to weaken U.S. power projection in Asia.So long as the United States does not alter the intense “global codependency” that currently defines U.S.-China economic relations, China is content to maintain the current arrangement.32 China still seeks to cooperate with the United States whenever possible, but only when such collaboration is not unduly burdensome in the face of common interests, does not undercut its geopolitical ambitions to undermine U.S. primacy, and does not foreclose future options that might one day prove advantageous to China.

Because China recognizes that its quest for comprehensive national power is still incomplete, it seeks to avoid any confrontation with the United States or the international system in the near term. Rather, Beijing aims to deepen ties with all its global partners—and especially with Washington—in the hope that its accelerated rise and centrality to international trade and politics will compel others to become increasingly deferential to China’s preferences. Should such obeisance not emerge once China has successfully risen, Beijing would then be properly equipped to protect its equities by force and at a lower cost than it could today, given that it is still relatively weak and remains reliant on the benefits of trade and global interdependence.The fundamental conclusion for the United States, therefore, is that China does not see its interests served by becoming just another “trading state,” no matter how constructive an outcome that might be for resolving the larger tensions between its economic and geopolitical strategies. Instead, China will continue along the path to becoming a conventional great power with the full panoply of political and military capabilities, all oriented toward realizing the goal of recovering from the United States the primacy it once enjoyed in Asia as a prelude to exerting global influence in the future.

--Slow growth solves Taiwan

Slow growth prevents China from invading TaiwanMearsheimer, 14 - John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. He serves on the Advisory Council of The National Interest. This article is adapted from a speech he gave in Taipei on December 7, 2013, to the Taiwanese Association of International Relations. An updated edition of his book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics will be published in April by W. W. Norton (“Say Goodbye to Taiwan” National Interest, March-April, http://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931

By now, it should be glaringly apparent that whether Taiwan is forced to give up its independence largely depends on how formidable China’s military becomes in the decades ahead. Taiwan will surely do everything it can to buy time and maintain the political status quo. But if China continues its impressive rise, Taiwan appears destined to become part of China.THERE IS one set of circumstances under which Taiwan can avoid this scenario. Specifically, all Taiwanese should hope there is a drastic slowdown in Chinese economic growth in the years ahead and that Beijing also has serious political problems on the home front that work to keep it focused inward. If that happens, China will not be in a position to pursue regional hegemony and the United States will be able to protect Taiwan from China, as it does now. In essence, the best way for Taiwan to maintain de facto independence is for China to be economically and militarily weak. Unfortunately for Taiwan, it has no way of influencing events so that this outcome actually becomes reality.When China started its impressive growth in the 1980s, most Americans and Asians thought this was wonderful news, because all of the ensuing trade and other forms of economic intercourse would make everyone richer and happier. China, according to the reigning wisdom, would become a responsible stakeholder in the international community, and its neighbors would have little to worry about. Many Taiwanese shared this optimistic outlook, and some still do.They are wrong. By trading with China and helping it grow into an economic powerhouse, Taiwan has helped create a burgeoning Goliath with revisionist goals that include ending Taiwan’s independence and making it an integral part of China. In sum, a powerful China isn’t just a problem for Taiwan. It is a nightmare.

http://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931

--AT: Growth now

The rate of Chinese growth will determine its ability to challenge the USMearsheimer 14 – professor of political science at University of Chicago, co-director of Program of International Security Policy at UChicago (John, “Can China Rise Peacefully,” The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, October 25th, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204)

The rise of China appears to be changing this situation, however, because this development has the potential to fundamentally alter the architecture of the international system. If the Chinese economy continues growing at a brisk clip in the next few decades, the United States will once again face a potential peer competitor, and great-power politics will return in full force. It is still an open question as to whether China’s economy will continue its spectacular rise or even continue growing at a more modest, but still impressive, rate. There are intelligent arguments on both sides of this debate, and it is hard to know who is right.But if those who are bullish on China are correct, it will almost certainly be the most important geopolitical development of the twenty-first century, for China will be transformed into an enormously powerful country. The attendant question that will concern every maker of foreign policy and student of international politics is a simple but profound one: can China rise peacefully? The aim of this chapter is to answer that question.

http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204

--Slow growth key to hegemony

Slowing Chinese economic growth is vital to preserving US hegemonyMearsheimer 14 – professor of political science at University of Chicago, co-director of Program of International Security Policy at UChicago (John, “Can China Rise Peacefully,” The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, October 25th, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204)

There is a small possibility China will eventually become so powerful that the United States will not be able to contain it and prevent it from dominating Asia, even if the American military remains forward deployed in that region. China might someday have far more latent power than any of the four potential hegemons the United States confronted in the twentieth century. In terms of both population size and wealth—the building blocks of military power—neither Wilhelmine Germany, nor imperial Japan, nor Nazi Germany, nor the Soviet Union came close to matching the United States. Given that China now has more than four times as many people as the United States and is projected to have more than three times as many in 2050, Beijing would enjoy a significant advantage in latent power if it had a per capita GNI (gross national income) equivalent to that of either Hong Kong or South Korea.All that latent power would allow China to gain a decisive military advantage over its principal rivals in Asia, especially when you consider that China would be operating in its backyard, while the Unites States would be operating more than 6,000 miles from California. In that circumstance, it is difficult to see how the United States could prevent China from becoming a regional hegemon. Moreover, China would probably be the more formidable superpower in the ensuing global competition with the United States.But even if China’s GNI does not rise to those levels, and it ends up with not quite as much latent power as the United States, it would still be in a good position to make a run at hegemony in Asia. All of this tells us the United States has a profound interest in seeing Chinese economic growth slow considerably in the years ahead. That outcome might not be good for American prosperity, much less for global prosperity, but it would be good for American security, which is what matters most.


--Slow growth solves Sino-Japan

Chinese economic decline prevents Sino-Japan war and cements US leadershipGlaser and Funaiole, 15 – *senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at CSIS AND fellow with the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Bonnie and Matthew, “Geopolitical Consequences of China’s Slowdown” 11/16, http://csis.org/files/publication/151116_Glaser_Funaiole_Geopolitical.pdfSimilarly, China’s economic slowdown could offer Japan an occasion to gain leverage in the Sino-Japanese relationship, creating the possibility to tamp down tensions in the East China Sea and stabilize bilateral ties that remain a fragile, but critically important, component of the regional security landscape. Perhaps most significantly, a Chinese economic slowdown affords the United States an opportunity to buttress its political, economic, and military position in the Asia-Pacific, and assuage worries that the United States lacks sufficient strategic vision and political commitment to the region. The outcome relies on how Washington plays its hand, but the result could be the strengthening of a rules-based, U.S.-led security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region for years to come.

http://csis.org/files/publication/151116_Glaser_Funaiole_Geopolitical.pdf

L: Eport controls

Expanding trade gives access to Chinese dual-use technology – revitalized export controls are key to checking China’s riseTellis and Blackwill 15 (Ashley** and David*, senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations*, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues**, “U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China”, Council on Foreign Relations, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Blackwill.pdf, April 13, 2015, NRG)

■ Create, in partnership with U.S. allies and like-minded partners, a new technology-control regime vis-à-vis Beijing. Washington should pay increased attention to limiting China’s access to advanced weaponry and militarily critical technologies. Although the United States certainly should lead the West in expanding international trade, this policy ought not to be extended to the point where it actually undermines American power and erodes Washington’s ability to discharge its fundamental obligation to guarantee Asian and global security and meet the Chinese challenge. The virtues of enhanced trade with China “must not obscure the reality that deepening globalization increases Beijing’s access to sophisticated weaponry and its associated elements,” including through dual-use technologies.44 Such acquisitions can undermine any American success in balancing China’s rise with decisive and dangerous consequences.Today, such capabilities obviously do not reside solely in the United States—they can be found in many nations, especially Washington’s European and Asian allies. The United States should encourage these countries to develop a coordinated approach to constrict China’s access to all technologies, including dual use, that can inflict “high-leverage strategic harm.”45 To establish a new technology regime toward China, Washington should enter into an immediate discussion with allies and friends with the aim of tightening restrictions on the sales of militarily critical technologies to China, including dual-use technologies. This will obviously not be easy to accomplish, but the effort should get under way immediately.

Only US tech matters – it’s the most advanced in the worldBrooks and Wohlforth, 16 – both professors of government at Dartmouth (Stephen and William, “The Once and Future Superpower Why China Won’t Overtake the United States” Foreign Affairs, May/June, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-13/once-and-future-superpower?cid=nlc-fatoday-20160520&sp_mid=51424540&sp_rid=c2NvdHR5cDQzMUBnbWFpbC5jb20S1&spMailingID=51424540&spUserID=MTg3NTEzOTE5Njk2S0&spJobID=922513469&spReportId=OTIyNTEzNDY5S0)

In forecasts of China’s future power position, much has been made of the country’s pressing domestic challenges: its slowing economy, polluted environment, widespread corruption, perilous financial markets, nonexistent social safety net, rapidly aging population, and restive middle class. But as harmful as these problems are, China’s true Achilles’ heel on the world stage is something else: its low level of technological expertise compared with the United States’. Relative to past rising powers, China has a much wider technological gap to close with the leading power. China may export container after

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-13/once-and-future-superpower?cid=nlc-fatoday-20160520&sp_mid=51424540&sp_rid=c2NvdHR5cDQzMUBnbWFpbC5jb20S1&spMailingID=51424540&spUserID=MTg3NTEzOTE5Njk2S0&spJobID=922513469&spReportId=OTIyNTEzNDY5S0



container of high-tech goods, but in a world of globalized production, that doesn’t reveal much. Half of all Chinese exports consist of what economists call “processing trade,” meaning that parts are imported into China for assembly and then exported afterward. And the vast majority of these Chinese exports are directed not by Chinese firms but by corporations from more developed countries.When looking at measures of technological prowess that better reflect the national origin of the expertise, China’s true position becomes clear. World Bank data on payments for the use of intellectual property, for example, indicate that the United States is far and away the leading source of innovative technologies, boasting $128 billion in receipts in 2013—more than four times as much as the country in second place, Japan. China, by contrast, imports technologies on a massive scale yet received less than $1 billion in receipts in 2013 for the use of its intellectual property. Another good indicator of the technological gap is the number of so-called triadic patents, those registered in the United States, Europe, and Japan. In 2012, nearly 14,000 such patents originated in the United States, compared with just under 2,000 in China. The distribution of highly influential articles in science and engineering—those in the top one percent of citations, as measured by the National Science Foundation—tells the same story, with the United States accounting for almost half of these articles, more than eight times China’s share. So does the breakdown of Nobel Prizes in Physics, Chemistry, and Physiology or Medicine. Since 1990, 114 have gone to U.S.-based researchers. China-based researchers have received two.

Technological innovation is the main source of military power – the US unilateral advantage in tech means China can’t challenge itBrooks and Wohlforth, 16 – both professors of government at Dartmouth (Stephen and William, “The Once and Future Superpower Why China Won’t Overtake the United States” Foreign Affairs, May/June, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-13/once-and-future-superpower?cid=nlc-fatoday-20160520&sp_mid=51424540&sp_rid=c2NvdHR5cDQzMUBnbWFpbC5jb20S1&spMailingID=51424540&spUserID=MTg3NTEzOTE5Njk2S0&spJobID=922513469&spReportId=OTIyNTEzNDY5S0)

Precisely because the Chinese economy is so unlike the U.S. economy, the measure fueling expectations of a power shift, GDP, greatly underestimates the true economic gap between the two countries. For one thing, the immense destruction that China is now wreaking on its environment counts favorably toward its GDP, even though it will reduce economic capacity over time by shortening life spans and raising cleanup and health-care costs. For another thing, GDP was originally designed to measure mid-twentieth-century manufacturing economies, and so the more knowledge-based and globalized a country’s production is, the more its GDP underestimates its economy’s true size.A new statistic developed by the UN suggests the degree to which GDP inflates China’s relative power. Called “inclusive wealth,” this measure represents economists’ most systematic effort to date to calculate a state’s wealth. As a UN report explained, it counts a country’s stock of assets in three areas: “(i) manufactured capital (roads, buildings, machines, and equipment), (ii) human capital (skills, education, health), and (iii) natural capital (sub-soil resources, ecosystems, the atmosphere).” Added up, the United States’ inclusive wealth comes to almost $144 trillion—4.5 times China’s $32 trillion.The true size of China’s economy relative to the United States’ may lie somewhere in between the numbers provided by GDP and inclusive wealth, and admittedly, the latter measure has yet to receive the same level of scrutiny as GDP. The problem with GDP, however, is that it measures a flow (typically, the value of goods and services produced in a year), whereas inclusive wealth measures a stock. As The




Economist put it, “Gauging an economy by its GDP is like judging a company by its quarterly profits, without ever peeking at its balance-sheet.” Because inclusive wealth measures the pool of resources a government can conceivably draw on to achieve its strategic objectives, it is the more useful metric when thinking about geopolitical competition.But no matter how one compares the size of the U.S. and Chinese economies, it is clear that the United States is far more capable of converting its resources into military might. In the past, rising states had levels of technological prowess similar to those of leading ones. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for example, the United States didn’t lag far behind the United Kingdom in terms of technology, nor did Germany lag far behind the erstwhile Allies during the interwar years, nor was the Soviet Union backward technologically compared with the United States during the early Cold War. This meant that when these challengers rose economically, they could soon mount a serious military challenge to the dominant power. China’s relative technological backwardness today , however, means that even if its economy continues to gain ground, it will not be easy for it to catch up militarily and become a true global strategic peer, as opposed to a merely a major player in its own neighborhood.

Chinese indigenous capability won’t match the US – it’s chasing a moving targetBrooks and Wohlforth, 16 – both professors of government at Dartmouth (Stephen and William, “The Once and Future Superpower Why China Won’t Overtake the United States” Foreign Affairs, May/June, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-13/once-and-future-superpower?cid=nlc-fatoday-20160520&sp_mid=51424540&sp_rid=c2NvdHR5cDQzMUBnbWFpbC5jb20S1&spMailingID=51424540&spUserID=MTg3NTEzOTE5Njk2S0&spJobID=922513469&spReportId=OTIyNTEzNDY5S0)

The technological and economic differences between China and the United States wouldn’t matter much if all it took to gain superpower status were the ability to use force locally. But what makes the United States a superpower is its ability to operate globally, and the bar for that capability is high. It means having what the political scientist Barry Posen has called “command of the commons”—that is, control over the air, space, and the open sea, along with the necessary infrastructure for managing these domains. When one measures the 14 categories of systems that create this capability (everything from nuclear attack submarines to satellites to transport aircraft), what emerges is an overwhelming U.S. advantage in each area, the result of decades of advances on multiple fronts. It would take a very long time for China to approach U.S. power on any of these fronts, let alone all of them.For one thing, the United States has built up a massive scientific and industrial base. China is rapidly enhancing its technological inputs, increasing its R & D spending and its numbers of graduates with degrees in science and engineering. But there are limits to how fast any country can leap forward in such matters, and there are various obstacles in China’s way—such as a lack of effective intellectual property protections and inefficient methods of allocating capital—that will be extremely hard to change given its rigid political system. Adding to the difficulty, China is chasing a moving target . In 2012, the United States spent $79 billion on military R & D, more than 13 times as much as China’s estimated amount, so even rapid Chinese advances might be insufficient to close the gap .Then there are the decades the United States has spent procuring advanced weapons systems, which have grown only more complex over time. In the 1960s, aircraft took about five years to develop, but by the 1990s, as the number of parts and lines of code ballooned, the figure reached ten years. Today, it

takes 15 to 20 years to design and build the most advanced fighter aircraft, and military satellites can take even longer. So even if another country managed to build the scientific and industrial base to develop the many types of weapons that give the United States command of the commons, there would be a lengthy lag before it could actually possess them. Even Chinese defense planners recognize the scale of the challenge.

L: Responsible stakeholder

China won’t become a responsible stakeholder – it uses the benefits of engagement to challenge the existing global orderTellis and Blackwill 15 (Ashley** and David*, senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations*, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues**, “U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China”, Council on Foreign Relations, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Blackwill.pdf, April 13, 2015, NRG)

The long-term U.S. effort to protect its vital national interests by integrating China into the international system is at serious risk today because Beijing has acquired the capacity, and increasingly displays the willingness, to pursue threatening policies against which American administrations have asserted they were hedging. Nevertheless, these same U.S. policymakers have continued to interact with China as if these dangerous Chinese policies were only theoretical and consigned to the distant future. In short, successive administrations have done much more cooperating with China than hedging, hoping that Beijing would gradually come to accept the United States’ leading role in Asia despite all the evidence to the contrary, not least because cooperation was so much less costly in the short term than military, geoeconomic, and diplomatic hedging.China has indeed become a rapidly growing economy, providing wealth and welfare gains both for itself and for American citizens, but it has acquired the wherewithal to challenge the United States, endangering the security of its allies and others in Asia, and to slowly chip away at the foundations of the liberal international order globally. In other words, China has not evolved into a “responsible stakeholder” as then Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick called on it to become.37 Instead, in recent decades Beijing has used the benign U.S. approach to the rise of Chinese power to strengthen its domestic economy, and thus the CCP’s hold on power, to enhance its military capabilities and increase its diplomatic and geoeconomic sway in Asia and beyond, all while free-riding on the international order and public goods provided by the United States and its allies.

China’s core interest to maximize its own power – it won’t act to preserve the international systemTellis and Blackwill 15 (Ashley** and David*, senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations*, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues**, “U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China”, Council on Foreign Relations, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Blackwill.pdf, April 13, 2015, NRG)

Now that China(‘s) has become a consequential economic power, its membership in the Security Council has only taken on additional significance—a fact highlighted by Beijing’s determination to avoid any expansion of this body that could dilute its own longstanding privileges. Even beyond the Security Council, however, China’s growing material capabilities have ensured that it becomes fundamentally relevant to all institutions of global order. Unsurprisingly, it has sought increasing power in these bodies

—for example, in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank—to orient their operations toward serving its own purposes . Whether in the functional institutions or in regional ones, China has indeed “gone global,” seeking and taking an active role to ensure that the rules made in these bodies not only do not undermine its interests, but also actively advance them.29 In so doing, China’s behaviors are similar to those of other previous rising powers in international politics.China’s widespread participation in international institutions today, nonetheless, has produced a mixed record. In some cases, China’s activism has been beneficial for global order, but in many other instances Beijing has displayed an unwillingness to bear the commensurate costs of contributing toward global governance. Despite possessing the world’s second-largest economy and military budget, China has generally adopted a strategy of burden shifting, insisting that the United States and others bear the costs of providing global public goods even as China, citing its challenges as a “developing country,” uses them to maximize its own national power . When international institutions are not perceived as advancing Chinese interests, the Chinese government has attempted to create or strengthen alternatives, especially ones that exclude the United States. For example, China has sought to integrate both its Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) partners and its regional neighbors into economic ventures that rival those of the liberal international system, including the New Development Bank (widely perceived as an alternative to the World Bank and the IMF); the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)–initiated free trade agreement (FTA) that China has ardently championed; an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (a rival to the Asian Development Bank); and an Asia-Pacific FTA (that would knit China closer to its neighbors in Asia). In other regions of the world, Beijing has initiated the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the China-Arab Cooperation Forum, and a variety of similar bodies that privilege China’s position and undermine standards of governance set by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Bank, and other international institutions.The character of Beijing’s international involvement, therefore, suggests that its commitment to the current order is considerably instrumental. China is content to operate within that order to the degree that it receives material or status benefits, but it has no fundamental commitment to protecting that system beyond the gains incurred. At one level, this should not be surprising because, as Kissinger astutely noted, China is still “adjusting [itself] to membership in an international system designed in its absence on the basis of programs it did not participate in developing.”30 But, when all is considered, this ambivalence ultimately undermines American national interests and, most important, the premise on which the current U.S. strategy of integration is based: that China’s entry into the liberal order will result over time in securing its support for that regime, to include the avoidance of threats levied against its principal guardian, the United States.31

L: Taiwan

A premature settlement on Taiwan ends US naval deterrence and expands Chinese aggressionFriedberg 11 - Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, co-director of the Woodrow Wilson School’s Center for International Security Studies (Aaron, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, p. 279-281)

The aspect of America's present position of military advantage that is likely to have the greatest geopolitical payoff in the long run is its command of the global commons and, in particular, of the world's oceans. Assuming that current trends continue, over the next several decades China is going to become even more heavily dependent on seaborne imports of energy and raw materials than it is today. Beijing is already spending a great deal on pipelines and other projects designed in part to mitigate the strategic vulnerability that results from these circumstances, and it has begun to take steps toward acquiring elements of an oceangoing navy that might eventually enable it to defend its sea lines of communication and perhaps also to threaten those of its neighbors. For a mix of geographic, economic, technical, and historical reasons, however, Beijing is unlikely to be able to improve its situation any time soon. Assuming that it cannot supply its needs from sources accessible by land, China is going to have to continue to import energy and other resources by sea, using ships that must travel great distances. along routes that pass through narrow choke points and dose to the shores of several major competitors, before arriving at a comparative handful of large ports along its eastern coast. n And even if it could somehow reduce its reliance on imported resources, the vitality of the Chinese economy will continue to depend on its ability to import and export manufactured products by sea. Like it or not, in the last thirty years China has become a maritime nation. In contrast to India, Japan, and Australia, however, to say nothing of the United States, it has virtually no experience in building, training maintaining, or operating a blue water navy. It has no modern seafaring tradition and, at least until quite recently, showed few signs of having a political-naval-industrial complex of the sort that has propelled the acquisition of sea power in other rising states. 24 Unless they believe that they can fight, win, and resolve a war very quickly, Chinese planners will have to reckon for some time to come with the disruptive and potentially devastating consequences of a prolonged naval blockade. If only because most conflicts are begun on the assumption that they will be over "before the leaves fall," there is no guarantee that this will deter war; but it should certainly help.There is one potential wildcard in the deck that American strategists have only recently begun to ponder. If, in the next few years, Taiwan is absorbed by the mainland, whether through coercion or consent, and if China is able to use the island for military purposes, the naval situation could change to its advantage. Using eastward-looking sensors, antiship missiles whose range would now extend farther out to sea, and submarines able to slip easily into the deep waters of the Pacific, Beijing might be able to impose a counterblockade of its own. Threatening to disrupt shipping flowing north, to Japan and South Korea, or east, across the Pacific to the Western Hemisphere, would not solve all of China's problems, but it would put it in a better position to dissuade others in East Asia from taking sides with the United States.25 While it might appear desirable on other grounds, a premature resolution of the Taiwan issue could thus turn out to be damaging, not only to the Taiwanese people but also to the security and autonomy of the region's other democracies. 26

It is these countries that ultimately form the hard core, or rather the sturdy outer rim, of the American position in Asia. Far from being obsolete, the so-called hub-and-spokes arrangement that took shape during the Cold War remains indispensable. Whatever else it does, Washington needs to tend to its bilateral ties with democratic treaty allies (Japan, South Korea, Australia, and, to the extent possible, Thailand and the Philippines) and quasi-allied democracies (Taiwan, Mongolia, and, above all, India). Over time, it should seek to establish a similarly close and cooperative relationship with Indonesia. All of these actors share a commitment to democratic governance and, despite their increasingly tight economic integration, a common desire not to be dominated by China. Asia's democracies are America's true friends and enduring strategic partners, and America's leaders should not be afraid to say so.

Deterrence, not appeasement is the only way to prevent China from avoiding TaiwanCole, 15- analyst at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service( Michael, If the Unthinkable Occurred: America Should Stand Up to China over Taiwan, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/if-the-unthinkable-occured-america-should-stand-china-over-12825)//JSWhite’s realism isn’t a solution; it’s a recipe for chaos. By accumulating enough comprehensive national power, and by crossing the nuclear threshold, states would have free rein to make irredentist or expansionist territorial claims on weaker states, a return to the scorpions-filled bottle pre–World War I, only this time the critters are bristling with nuclear weapons. Not only would this invite aggression by powerful states, it would create incentives for acquiring nuclear weapons and thereby bury existing nonproliferation regimes, not to mention spark arms races all over the planet. If force is the only determinant of international politics, this is the only foreseeable outcome. Moreover, how much comprehensive power would a state assume is necessary in order to get away with aggression? How many nuclear warheads? Rather than bring stability, White’s world would encourage miscalculation.Abandoning Taiwan to its inevitable fate due to China’s strength (and nuclear blackmail) would also undermine existing security alliances and discredit the agreements, legal and tacit, that have helped maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific over the decades. Such signaling would in turn encourage states in China’s neighborhood to do the necessary to protect themselves should the day come when they, too, are left to fend for themselves. It would indicate that good behavior and peaceful democratization—two qualities that apply to Taiwan—are of no intrinsic value to mankind and therefore not worth defending. And it would also prove that even medium powers (with a population of 23 million people and the world’s nineteenth-largest economy, Taiwan is not exactly a gnat) are not immune to the desires of greater powers.Lastly, as I pointed out in my previous piece, there is absolutely no guarantee that after acquiring Taiwan (on a silver platter or at the end of a rifle), China’s appetite would be sated. In fact, much like imperialism, territorial expansionism has its own internal dynamics: the more territory one controls, the greater the incentive to push outwards to protect newly acquired real estate. Should Taiwan become part of Chinese territory, Beijing would likely seek to protect the island from neighboring countries (Japan, the Philippines) and U.S. forces in Guam, all of whom would likely have adjusted their military postures due to the proximity of an expanded China to their territories. The vicious circle that this would risk engendering isn’t too difficult to imagine.All of this shows us that it would be nearly impossible to isolate the absorption of Taiwan from the region in which that transfer of power would occur. A neutral Taiwan is therefore the surest way to ensure stability in that corner of Northeast Asia all the way to the South China Sea.

To quote from Christopher Clark’s The Sleepwalkers, his study of the origins of World War I, “far from being inevitable, this war was ‘improbable.’” The same could be said, perhaps, of alternative scenarios had the international community presented a more credible challenge initially to Nazi Germany, though as David Faber argues in Munich, 1938, Hitler actually felt he’d been stolen the delights of armed conquest by the pact signed with Chamberlain. I am reluctant to use the Nazi analogy when discussing China, but since White raises it, so must I. However, I am far from convinced that China seeks war in the way that Hitler did, and if it did, we would have every reason not to “give” it Taiwan and to make sure it is safely contained in its box. There is more reason to believe that Beijing is un-Hitler-like in that it would heartily welcome a Chamberlain over the Taiwan issue.Opposing authoritarian China’s designs on Taiwan, and extending to Taiwanese the right to self-determination that is theirs, also need not inevitably lead to war. As discussed in this article, there are several steps that the international community and Taiwan itself can take to reduce the risks of war in the Taiwan Strait, chief among them a strong and concerted deterrent strategy. Surrendering to blackmail by powerful states—White’s prescription—would turn back the clock. In fact, doing so would deny those in China who seek alternatives to belligerence and repression the chance to play a leading role in shaping a new international system. By keeping the aggressors in check, deterrence can buy us time and facilitate the emergence of a leadership in Beijing that is more liberal and perhaps less inclined to throw its weight around. Conversely, give in to coercion and you feed the beast.

Engagement politics link story

2nc engagement politics link

The plan creates rising expectations that will be spun to decrease domestic support for a balancing strategyFriedberg 11 - Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, co-director of the Woodrow Wilson School’s Center for International Security Studies (Aaron, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, p. 265)

Unfortunately, the endless stream of diplomatic happy talk emanating from Washington has done very little to change Beijing's perceptions of U.S. intentions and strategy; these are as hard nosed and skeptical as ever. However, the impact of such language on America's domestic discourse has been substantial and problematic. Praising China unduly in hopes that its accomplishments will someday live up to Washington's lofty rhetoric risks raising public expectations to unrealistic levels , thereby setting the stage for disappointment and a possible future backlash . Even more important, ceaselessly exaggerating the quality of Sino-American relations can only make it harder for U.S. political leaders to win support for the costly and difficult measures that will be needed to maintain a favorable balance of power in Asia . "If things are so good," an astute taxpayer might well ask, "why do we need to spend billions on arms, bases and alliances in the Western Pacific?"1 Why indeed?

China will use the plan to end political support for balancing until it’s too late to challenge itFriedberg 11 - Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, co-director of the Woodrow Wilson School’s Center for International Security Studies (Aaron, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, p. 118-119)

In sum, the obstacles to a substantial increase in balancing are many and weighty. They are likely to be broken down by a protracted process of erosion, a sudden crisis or, perhaps most likely, the former followed by the latter. On the other hand, despite the Obama administration's recent disappointments, a gradual move in the opposite direction, toward even more engagement and less investment in balancing , appears to be much more plausible. Putting aside for the moment the question of what the optimal mix of elements would be from a strategic perspective, the political playing field is clearly tilted in a way that favors such a development. Uncertainty over China's trajectory could also help to make such a shift in the overall mix of U.S. strategy more likely. There will always be debates, as there are now, over the scope, pace, and significance of China's military buildup and the meaning and sincerity of its diplomatic initiatives. For as long as the country is ruled by a closed and secretive regime, there will be doubts among outsiders about the true nature of its intentions. If it takes care to conceal its motives and avoid premature confrontations, if it ensures that its interlocutors and trading partners continue to enjoy the benefits of engagement , if it can delay the responses of potential rivals and discourage them from cooperating effectively with one another, China may eventually be able to develop its strength to the point where balancing appears hopeless and accommodation to its wishes seems the only sensible option . For a rising power facing a

still-strong rival, this would be a prudent path to follow. In fact, as I argue in the next three chapters, it is just such a strategy that has guided China's actions since the end of the Cold War.

--AT: No tradeoff / can do both

Friedberg’s argument is that grand strategy is a mixture of engagement and balancing, and that status quo engagement can continue as long as balancing increases. Our 1nc link says that focusing on increasing engagement undermines political support for greater balancingFriedberg, 15 – professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton (Aaron, “Survival interview: Aaron L. Friedberg on the debate over US China strategy” 5/29, https://www.iiss.org/en/politics%20and%20strategy/blogsections/2015-932e/may-7114/debate-over-us-china-strategy-f18a

AF: My starting position for this is to observe that over the last 20 years or so the United States, across Republican and Democratic administrations, has had a pretty consistent strategy for dealing with China. There have been variations, but the basic strategy has combined two elements: the need to engage in diplomacy, trade, scientific–educational cooperation and so on; and balancing – efforts to maintain a balance of military power in the Asia-Pacific region that favours the interests of the United States and its allies. Where there has been variation it has been a matter of emphasis and degree, rather than a fundamental shift.What has happened over the last five or six years, I think, is that that mixed strategy has begun to be called increasingly into question, from a variety of different angles. China’s capabilities are growing. It is wealthier than ever, it is more powerful militarily than it has ever been, and it is starting to assert itself more in its neighbourhood and on the global stage, including in ways which are perceived by many people in the region, as well as in the United States and elsewhere, as potentially threatening to stability.The engagement side of US strategy, I think, was ultimately intended to encourage China’s leaders to see their interests as lying in upholding the existing international system, rather than challenging it . It was also intended, at least originally – we haven’t talked about this so much in recent years – to encourage political liberalisation in China. What has happened is that people have begun to realise that, at least for the moment, China is not liberalising. To some extent, under the new leadership China has gotten tougher and more ideological than it was a few years ago. In part because of these more assertive behaviours, it has become increasingly difficult to sustain the view that China just wants to become a member in good standing of the international system. It wants to change some things, starting with its own neighbourhood – in particular maritime disputes, but also US alliances.So China is growing stronger; it is not democratising; and it is behaving in ways that appear challenging. This, naturally, has led to discussion about whether the current strategy is sustainable, and, if not, what should replace it. In the article, I tried to lay out what seemed to me to be six different positions in this discussion, and to make the case that they all involve varying mixtures of these same two elements of engagement and balancing. Everything from ‘we should redouble our efforts at engagement’, and ‘we should not do things by way of balancing which might stimulate a security dilemma and antagonise China’. Everything from that to (and I don’t think anyone is advocating this yet, but some people in the past have talked about it) shifting towards a strategy of containment, where engagement would be minimised, and we would emphasise balancing and military competition. Those are the extremes, and there are various other positions in between.

https://www.iiss.org/en/politics%20and%20strategy/blogsections/2015-932e/may-7114/debate-over-us-china-strategy-f18a

https://www.iiss.org/en/politics%20and%20strategy/blogsections/2015-932e/may-7114/debate-over-us-china-strategy-f18a

My own view is that the US is not at a point where it is going to abandon the current strategy, and it is a question of how we are going to adjust those elements. In particular, I think we need to increase the balancing part of things. We need to work harder, together with our friends and allies, to make sure that the balance of power in the region remains favourable to us, and that we remain strong enough to deter efforts by China to challenge or change the status quo through threats or through the use of force. That, for want of a better term, is what I call ‘better balancing’. I don’t think we are going to abandon engagement, or that we should – though there are parts of that policy that need adjustment as well. But the real emphasis, I think, has to be on increasing the balancing part of the strategy.

Moving towards better balancing requires constricting engagementFriedberg 11 - Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, co-director of the Woodrow Wilson School’s Center for International Security Studies (Aaron, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, p. 255)

Eliminating the extremes at either end of the continuum of potential strategies leaves less radical variations on the theme of congagement. Logically speaking there are two broad alternatives, with many possible permutations of each: either the United States can intensify engagement, while holding steady or cutting back on anything that appears intended to counter Chinese power; or it can move in the opposite direction, maintaining or partially constricting engagement while stepping up balancing. The first option, a policy of "enhanced engagement," was essentially the one adopted during the opening years of the Obama administration. Notwithstanding its flaws and potential dangers, and despite its evident failure to induce better behavior from Beijing, this is still the approach favored by many American analysts, academics, and policy makers. After identifying the inadequacies of this approach, I close in the next, and final, chapter by making the case for an alternative strategy of "better balancing.”

Nationalism link story

2nc QPQ nationalism link

Conditional engagement is exploited by nationalist critics to attack CCP legitimacyChristensen, 15 – William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton (Thomas, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, p. 99

Fortunately, there are solid responses to these Chinese arguments, some of which are accepted by segments of China's elite. All are based in long-term thinking and a recognition that China has benefited and continues to benefit greatly from the economic stability and security of the current international system. Nuclear proliferation, terrorists finding safe haven in poorly governed states, financial instability in its export markets, and potentially catastrophic changes in the global climate would all affect China at least as much as they do any of the advanced democracies. But such a holistic, over-the-horizon approach to current issues is difficult to market in any country, democratic or authoritarian. It is a particularly hard sell in a country like China with very pressing near-term challenges. All countries, even authoritarian ones, have domestic politics. Chinese leaders worry increasingly about domestic stability and regime legitimacy as the distribution of income grows more stilted, more people lose their land in eminent domain cases, urban housing becomes unaffordable, and widespread corruption remains largely unchecked. Citizens have recently gained many new forms of electronic communication, with a resulting rise in the number of protests against local government officials. Moreover, the CCP has made postcolonial nationalism a major pillar of its legitimacy . In that context, arguments for expending resources and forgoing economic and diplomatic opportunities in order to coordinate China's policies with former enemies such as the United States, Japan, South Korea, and onetime European colonialists are a tough sell in China and could easily be exploited by nationalist critics in the increasingly robust print and electronic media. For this reason and others, the former State Department official and scholar Susan Shirk has called China the "fragile superpower."2Diplomats from the United States and its allies have enjoyed limited success in convincing China to make near-term sacrifices. Such entreaties might appear to be a trap designed to undercut China's overall national power. For example, Professor Pan Wei at Peking University argues that deeper Chinese integration in what he sees to be a hierarchical U.S.-led international order would make China subordinate to the United States. He rejects "pressure [on] China to undertake more 'international responsibilities' and follow 'international standards' as defined by the existing regimes in the global hierarchy." He complains that China is often a "victim ... of that hierarchy," citing China's non- market economy status in the WTO as one example.3 In a somewhat more subtle fashion, another Chinese scholar warns against the danger of China being passively "pulled by the nose" by "the West and international society" into accepting excessive international responsibilities that are divorced from China's actual national capabilities. If China falls for this, he warns, it will become a "loser in the international competition" (guoji jingzhengzhong chengwei shibaizhe)." 4

That means Xi will take a confrontational stance to deflect criticism which turns the caseBlackwill & Campbell 16-*Henry Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. Foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations & ** chair and chief executive officer of the Asia Group, LLC. also serves as chair of the Center for a New American Security, is a nonresident fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and is on the board of directors for Standard Chartered PLC in London, the Asia Group (Robert & Kurt,"Xi Jinping on the Global Stage," Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/CSR74_Blackwill_Campbell_Xi_Jinping.pdf)//SL

Today, China’s thirty-year era of 10 percent annual growth appears to have ended, with official statistics placing gross domestic product (GDP) growth below 7 percent, the government reducing its growth target to 6.5 percent, and a number of major banks and respected forecasters arguing the true growth rate is far lower—and will remain below 5 percent for years.3 In light of this deepening economic slowdown, the future trajectory of Xi’s external policy is in question. Some elements, including China’s geoeconomic policies, will endure; nevertheless, China’s foreign policy may well be driven increasingly by the risk of domestic political instability. For this reason, Xi will most probably stimulate and intensify Chinese nationalism—long a pillar of the state’s legitimacy—to compensate for the political harm of a slower economy, to distract the public, to halt rivals who might use nationalist criticisms against him , and to burnish his own image. Chinese nationalism has long been tied to foreign affairs, especially memories of foreign domination and territorial loss. For example, Xi may be less able or willing to compromise in public, especially on territorial issues or other matters that are rooted in national sentiment, for fear that it would harm his political position. He may provoke disputes with neighbors , use increasingly strident rhetoric in defense of China’s national interests, and take a tougher line in relations with the U nited States and its allies to shift public focus away from economic troubles. He may also turn to greater economic protectionism .

Nationalism supercharges the appeasement link – demanding concessions bolsters nationalist outrage, but engagement itself makes China more aggressiveSmith, 15 - Jeff M. Smith is the Director for Asian Security Programs at the American Foreign Policy Council (“RIP: America's "Engagement" Strategy towards China?” 8/3, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-americas-china-strategy-should-be-13473?page=show

Today, Washington is confronting the dreadful realization that with each passing year, the goals of political liberalization and peaceful integration appear to grow more distant, while the prospect for conflict with China draws nearer. Even advocates of engagement, like Dr. David Shambaugh, are warning that the strategy “is unraveling” while domestic repression in China “is the worst it has been in the twenty-five years since Tiananmen.” So what went wrong?After a decade of reaping the benefits of a soft-power offensive, China’s “peaceful rise” took an abrupt turn in the late 2000s. The country that emerged from a unique confluence of events beginning in 2008 has proven a more assertive, authoritarian and nationalistic rising power.While the precise causes for this shift are still being debated, we know the 2008 global financial crisis was (mis)interpreted by much of China’s elite as symbolic of long-term U.S. decline and retreat from the

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-americas-china-strategy-should-be-13473?page=show

http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/CSR74_Blackwill_Campbell_Xi_Jinping.pdf

Western Pacific. For some in Beijing, the crisis—and China’s hosting of the Olympics that year—reinforced the coalescing perception that China’s long wait to reclaim its position atop the Asian hierarchy had come to an end.Second, in 2009, Vietnam and Malaysia submitted proposals to a UN commission outlining expanded sovereignty claims in the disputed South China Sea. A surge in provocative Chinese posturing there followed, culminating most recently in an unprecedented artificial island-building spree that is inflaming regional tensions. In 2012, China assumed an equally combative posture in the East China Sea after Japan “nationalized” the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, with Chinese naval and air forays into the territorial waters of the disputed islands now a regular occurrence.As these events unfolded, China witnessed the precipitous rise of a new strain of nationalism, cultivated and magnified by a new media and technology landscape. Once confined to a handful of stodgy Communist Party mouthpieces, China’s public space has expanded rapidly in the digital age. While liberal commentary has been heavily restricted, hawkish rhetoric and nationalist outlets like the Global Times have been permitted to fill the void. This proliferation of nationalist discourse has partly served the Party’s interests, but it’s also created new pressures and incentives that reward hardline posturing and raise the political cost of concessions and compromise .Finally, the early tenure of China’s avowedly nationalist and politically powerful president, Xi Jinping, has produced a material rise in domestic repression and tensions with the United States and China’s neighbors. Xi has expanded the definition of China’s “core interests,” militarized its maritime doctrine, and overseen devastating cyberattacks against the U.S. government. At home he’s adopted a hard line on domestic dissent and launched repeated broadsides against “Western values,” NGOs and civil-society groups.Depending on whom you ask, these events either dislodged China from a more peaceful course, or accelerated its path along a preordained, nationalist trajectory. Likewise, America’s “engagement” strategy was either flawed from the start, or is simply proving insufficient to cope with the realities of a neonationalist China. Whatever the case, Xi’s China has brought the flaws in America’s China strategy into sharper focus. Rapid economic growth has correlated with greater repression, while efforts at engagement and integration have been met with more brazen challenges to the status quo.

L: Reciprocal restraints

Demanding reciprocal restraints emboldens nationalism – they see it as an act of imperialismSwaine, 15- senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace( Micheal, Beyond American Predominance in the Western Pacific: The Need for a Stable U.S.-China Balance of Power, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/20/beyond-american-predominance-in-western-pacific-need-for-stable-u.s.-china-balance-of-power)//JS

On the Chinese side, perhaps the most significant obstacle to undertaking a transition toward a stable balance of power in Asia derives from the insecurities and weaknesses of the Chinese government, both domestically and abroad. China’s leaders rely, for their legitimacy and support, not only on continued economic success and rising living standards, but also on a form of nationalism that prizes the ability of the regime to correct past injustices meted out by “imperialist” powers during China’s so-called “century of humiliation” and to stand up to current slights, both real and imagined . Thus, their policies often capitalize on the resentments felt by many Chinese citizens toward the supposedly arrogant West and Japan.This viewpoint makes the Chinese leadership hesitant to quell the more extreme forms of nationalism described above and deeply suspicious of the United States and its allies. It also makes it more receptive to the notion that a rising yet still underdeveloped and relatively weak China must continue to conceal its military capabilities while developing its overall capacities to the maximum extent possible. In other words, the Chinese regime is both excessively vulnerable to ultranationalist pressures and disinclined to contemplate self-imposed limitations on its sovereign rights (for example, with regard to Taiwan) and its political, economic, and military abilities, especially in Asia. While this does not translate into a drive for predominance, it does make Beijing less willing to accept the kind of mutual restraints necessary to achieve a stable balance of power in the Western Pacific.

L: QPQs

Caving to US requests undermines CCP legitimacy and stokes nationalismChristensen, 15 – William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton (Thomas, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, google play)

Like Pan, many Chinese commentators view Zoellick's challenge to China as a ruse to get China to foot the bill for something that will benefit the United States and other countries much more than China. Rather than accepting Zoellick's arguments that global governance is a shared mission of all the great powers, they wonder why China should "help" the United States with its problems. After all, Washington continues to sell weapons to Taiwan and support Japanese military enhancements. Since Chinese elites are worried about regime stability and personal promotion within the CCP, they are likely more concerned about the domestic political need for near-term job creation at home than the future effects of long-term global warming. They are also likely worried about nationalist domestic reactions to the appearance that they have thrown longtime diplomatic partners like North Korea under the bus at the request of the United States, the EU, and Japan. Professor Pan states succinctly, "China is not keen to help the West to oust their disliked regimes and create enemies for itself."5 Leaders' concerns about such reactions at home might outweigh any perceived benefits of explaining the long-term connections between regional instability in poorly governed environments and the harm to China's own national interests. The connections are real and appear to be understood by at least some Chinese leaders, but they are not the stuff of bumper stickers. As one interlocutor put it in 2011, calls for intense cooperation on global projects evoke little emotion in comparison to attacks on the "hegemonic" United States or an "unrepentant" Japan. So when Americans and others ask China to be more assertive on the international stage, they should be careful what they wish for.

Accepting US demands destabilizes the CCP and bolsters a nationalist takeoverChristensen, 15 – William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton (Thomas, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, p. 8

Never before has the world been so tightly integrated and interdependent. It is now more vulnerable than ever to transnational threats and contagions, sometimes emanating from relatively weak actors. But never before has a country as relatively poor as China on a per capita basis held such an important and powerful position in the international system. The combination of these two factors means that the post-Maoist version of the People's Republic of China—an inwardly focused developing country that since 1978 has generally kept a low profile in international politics—is, by necessity, going to be asked to contribute more to international stability than any developing country in history. China's well-cultivated sense of postcolonial victimhood renders requests for Chinese cooperation even more controversial at home, especially on issues that run against its recent diplomatic traditions. Given the CCP's near obsession with maintaining domestic stability and avoiding the kind of nationalist protests that helped destabilize the previous two Chinese regimes (the Qing dynasty and the Nationalist government), CCP

elites might be very reluctant indeed to appear to their colleagues and to the Chinese public to be making sacrifices to satisfy the demands of other powers . This is true even if one can make a sincere and compelling argument that what is being asked of China is in China's own long-term national interest.

Nationalism prevents China from accommodating foreign pressureChristensen, 15 – William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton (Thomas, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, p. 203)

It is analytically useful to ask what explains the acerbic turn in Beijing's foreign policy in 2010. The answer is sobering because most of the factors, unfortunately, are still in place. Many in China believe China is significantly stronger and the United States weaker after the financial crisis. Domestic voices calling for a more muscular Chinese foreign policy have created a heated political environment. Popular nationalism, the growth in the number of media outlets through which Chinese citizens can express their views, and the increasing sensitivity of the government to public opinion have provided space for criticism of Beijing's U.S. policy. Such critiques have notably come from active-duty military officers and scholars at state-run think tanks and universities. Gone are the days when Chinese elites could ignore these hawkish voices. For example, in 2010, during the period leading up to the transition of power from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping in 2012, Chinese officials had to foster their reputations as protectors of national pride and domestic stability. Some prominent Party members did not survive , including Politburo member and Chongqing Party Chief Bo Xilai. Such an environment does not lend itself to accommodation to foreign pressure or being too solicitous of Washington.

L: concessions on sovereignty

Chinese domestic stability is on the brink – China backing down in sovereignty disputes will be the tipping pointChristensen, 15 – William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton (Thomas, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, p. 91-93)

In China, continued Party rule is the top security goal. If there is any doubt about this, please note that the People's Liberation Army is dedicated not to China as a nation but to the Chinese Communist Party. This has always been the case since the days of the revolution, and if the rhetoric of Xi Jinping and the recently selected leadership of the Party is any indication, it is not going to change anytime soon. One major problem for the Party in recent years has been the increase in "mass social incidents" (protests and riots) and the suggestion that Chinese society is increasingly unstable. Before the government stopped publicly discussing the number of such incidents in the middle of the past decade, it was already reporting as many as 87,000 per year.17 Extrapolating from those trends, some analysts estimate that there are more than 100,000 of these every year in China today; one Chinese academic study in 2010 put the number as high as 180,000.lS There is little doubt from my many recent trips to China that the public and the government alike are concerned about the long- term stability of China in a way that they have not been since the years immediately following the Tiananmen protests and massacre of 1989. Citizens seem frustrated by official corruption, eminent domain problems related to the fast-paced growth of cities and infrastructure, environmental degradation, and the unbalanced distribution of wealth. Adding to the unease of Chinese elites are uncertainties about the sources of future Chinese economic growth, particularly since the financial crisis called into question the reliability of markets abroad. There is, therefore, a growing consensus that China needs to restructure its economy to become less dependent on trade and investment and to increase the role of domestic consumption, but there is no consensus on how to achieve this transformation or at what pace.19 All of these changes can create new controversies and dashed expectations, thus sparking new challenges to social and political stability.Since jettisoning Maoist Communist ideology in the reform period, the nominally Communist CCP has legitimized itself through fast-paced economic growth and by nationalism. It portrays itself as an increasingly capable protector of Chinese interests and national honor. The ways that the CCP has managed domestic dissent in China renders nationalist issues such as Taiwan or other sovereignty disputes particularly delicate. The central government in China has successfully ridden the waves of popular discontent by keeping protests local and small and keeping the protestors out of the Party. The higher authorities have often been able to paint themselves as the solution to local problems by coming in to quell protests, making arrests when necessary, firing and replacing local officials, and paying off some of the aggrieved citizens. Still, the increasing frequency of the protests is alarming to Chinese officials.One reason potential nationalist humiliation is so worrisome to the central government is that people angry at the state for other reasons can take the opportunity of such a humiliation to criticize government policies using politically correct slogans fostered for decades by the government's own "patriotic education" campaigns. Take, for example, the urban protests that arose across China over a

nationalist issue: Japan's central government had purchased the disputed Senkaku Islands from a private Japanese family in 2012. One angry Chinese man held a placard that read: "Oppose Japan, Oppose America, Oppose Price Inflation!" (Fan Ri, Fan Mei, Fan Zhangjia!)20 In so doing, he was linking a serious domestic concern with protests over international humiliation. Even when the topics of protests appear to remain international in nature, they can have dangerous domestic repercussions for the Chinese economy and political stability. So protestors targeting "Little Japan" (Xiao Riben) often call on their Chinese compatriots to boycott Japanese products (Dizhi Rihuo!). But a boycott, if enacted, would severely harm China's own economy. Many products in China bearing Japanese brands are made in-country by Chinese workers in Japanese-invested factories. Many other domestic and international firms operating in China depend 011 Japanese parts in their transnational production chains. Chinese officials are well aware of the irony. Anti-Japanese protestors in China often carry portraits of Chairman Mao, indirectly criticizing contemporary leaders for their lack of fortitude on the international stage in comparison to Mao.Popular calls for national action have grown all the more dangerous for the central government as individuals and disgruntled groups around the nation can increasingly communicate through social media. Furthermore, as with most governments and militaries, there is plenty of sincere nationalism within the CCP regime. Protestors in the future then might find sympathetic ears inside the state security mechanism. Moreover, military or civilian elites who are unhappy with their colleagues' lack of fortitude on international issues could stir up popular protest through expanding media channels to pressure more moderate leaders to change policy or, at the extreme, to help drive them from office. In fact, frustration with insufficiently robust resistance to the United States, Japan, and Vietnam, for example, has already been expressed in the mainstream press in China, sometimes by active duty or recently retired military officers. (More broadly, that press, although more open than in earlier decades, is still ultimately controlled by the state.) For these reasons, nationalist humiliation, particularly as it pertains to issues such as Japan or Taiwan independence, is the third rail of Chinese Communist politics.

Xi won’t make concessions on sovereignty issues – fears of domestic weakness preventBlackwill & Campbell 16-*Henry Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. Foreign policy & ** chairman and chief executive officer of the Asia Group, LLC. also serves as chairman of the Center for a New American Security, is a nonresident fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and is on the board of directors for Standard Chartered PLC in London, the Asia Group(Robert & Kurt,"Xi Jinping on the Global Stage," Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/CSR74_Blackwill_Campbell_Xi_Jinping.pdf)//SL

On territorial matters, Xi will be unwilling or unable to make concessions that could harm his domestic position, and may even seek to escalate territorial disputes against Japan or South China Sea claimants as a way of redirecting domestic attention away from the economic situation and burnishing his nationalist record. A dangerous but unlikely possibility is that Xi may even be tempted to use military force to instigate limited conflicts against the Philippines, Vietnam, or Japan. Given that Japan is a prominent target of China’s propaganda and media, and that memories of Japan’s brutal occupation are still influential, ties between China and Japan may continue to worsen.


Xi entered office suggesting that he would not alter China’s policies toward Taiwan, but that may change following the election of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Tsai Ing-wen in January 2016. The DPP has historically been distant toward China, and though it has moderated its pro-independence stance, its leaders remain opponents of current President Ma Ying-jeou’s efforts to strengthen economic links with China, skeptics of the 1992 consensus, and critical of the historic meeting between Presidents Xi and Ma in November 2015. Xi’s unbending stance on sovereignty and territorial integrity, combined with the real domestic political costs he will face if Taiwan makes moves toward independence, may lead him to react strongly and decisively to any Taiwanese policy under the DPP that is designed to increase separation between Beijing and Taipei.

L: North Korea

Xi says no to any compromise on North KoreaBlackwill & Campbell 16-*Henry Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. Foreign policy & ** chairman and chief executive officer of the Asia Group, LLC. also serves as chairman of the Center for a New American Security, is a nonresident fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and is on the board of directors for Standard Chartered PLC in London, the Asia Group(Robert & Kurt,"Xi Jinping on the Global Stage," Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/CSR74_Blackwill_Campbell_Xi_Jinping.pdf)//SL

With respect to North Korea, it appears unlikely that Xi Jinping’s more assertive foreign policy will lead him to exert meaningful pressure on the oppressive communist regime. Xi’s approach has been harsher toward North Korea than that of his predecessors, with Xi refraining from making a traditional state visit to North Korea, restricting exports of weapons-related materials and chemicals, cutting ties with some North Korean banks, and publicly reprimanding the regime for threatening regional security.47 This toughness, however, apparently has limits. Even after North Korea’s January 2016 nuclear test, China has remained unwilling to use its considerable leverage over Pyongyang— which depends on China for food and fuel—to change North Korean behavior. In China’s view, crippling cuts to North Korea’s supply of oil and food would risk chaos in the North, and perhaps even a collapse that could result in a united Korea that is a U.S. treaty ally. Globally, Xi will maintain a proactive and assertive Chinese foreign policy that involves institution-building and occasional provocation in order to demonstrate at home that China is taken seriously abroad. Xi will remain firm in the face of external pressure on the South and East China Seas, human rights, conditions in Tibet and Xinjiang, and diplomatic visits by the Dalai Lama. As China assumes the rotating presidency of theGroup of Twenty (G20), Xi will continue to challenge the U.S. global financial and security order using institutional methods.


L: democracy / rule of law

Promoting democracy or the rule of law spurs Chinese nationalism and makes a confrontation inevitableChristensen, 15 – William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton (Thomas, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, p.225-226

Unfortunately, zero-sum views of U.S.-China relations are most popular in China itself . Raised on a volatile blend of Marxism-Leninism and postcolonial nationalism, many Chinese elites see the world as a brutal struggle for material power in which stronger powers will want to oppress a weaker China. As a Chinese academic once told me, John Mearsheimer is seen by many Chinese as the one honest American strategist , willing to admit that the United States has deep-seated national interests in delaying and halting China's rise. Many Chinese nationalists treat with suspicion American advice about how to improve China's foreign policy and reform its domestic governance. They view the "responsible stakeholder" concept as an unfair burden on China and see the problems the concept is designed to address as being more American, or "Western," than they are Chinese. They also view U.S. advice that Beijing reduce censorship and repression, improve the rule of law, and provide legitimate venues for peaceful social discontent as a Trojan horse. Borrowing from official government propaganda about the dangers of democratization and the loosening of the CCP's grip on power, they argue that the United States is trying to weaken China by westernizing and splitting it.

L: Human rights / Tibet / Xinjiang

Demands for cooperation on Tibet, Xinjiang or human rights drive a nationalist responseBlackwill & Campbell 16-*Henry Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. Foreign policy & ** chairman and chief executive officer of the Asia Group, LLC. also serves as chairman of the Center for a New American Security, is a nonresident fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and is on the board of directors for Standard Chartered PLC in London, the Asia Group(Robert & Kurt,"Xi Jinping on the Global Stage," Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/CSR74_Blackwill_Campbell_Xi_Jinping.pdf)//SL

With respect to North Korea, it appears unlikely that Xi Jinping’s more assertive foreign policy will lead him to exert meaningful pressure on the oppressive communist regime. Xi’s approach has been harsher toward North Korea than that of his predecessors, with Xi refraining from making a traditional state visit to North Korea, restricting exports of weapons-related materials and chemicals, cutting ties with some North Korean banks, and publicly reprimanding the regime for threatening regional security.47 This toughness, however, apparently has limits. Even after North Korea’s January 2016 nuclear test, China has remained unwilling to use its considerable leverage over Pyongyang— which depends on China for food and fuel—to change North Korean behavior. In China’s view, crippling cuts to North Korea’s supply of oil and food would risk chaos in the North, and perhaps even a collapse that could result in a united Korea that is a U.S. treaty ally. Globally, Xi will maintain a proactive and assertive Chinese foreign policy that involves institution-building and occasional provocation in order to demonstrate at home that China is taken seriously abroad. Xi will remain firm in the face of external pressure on the South and East China Seas, human rights, conditions in Tibet and Xinjiang, and diplomatic visits by the Dalai Lama. As China assumes the rotating presidency of theGroup of Twenty (G20), Xi will continue to challenge the U.S. global financial and security order using institutional methods.


L: warming cooperation

The CCP won’t make more concessions on climate change – it threatens regime survivalChristensen, 15 – William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton (Thomas, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, google play)

One would think that China, as an authoritarian state, would find it easier to make sacrifices on greenhouse gas emissions than the democratic United States. But this too would be naive. As stated above, all countries have domestic politics, and the CCP is concerned with something even more serious than elections: regime survival. Job creation and nationalism are the two main pillars of CCP legitimacy, and climate change negotiations touch directly upon both. There has been a clear correlation between China's economic growth and its burning of fossil fuels. To curb that growth in the near term for abstract long-term environmental reasons would be controversial enough. But it would be much more controversial still to do so at the behest of the U nited States and other wealthy economies that are still much bigger polluters than China on a per capita basis and historically have created the bulk of the accumulated greenhouse gases in the atmosphere today.On the positive side, it should be noted that the new leadership under Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang so far seems committed to both fighting corruption and cleaning up the local environment, in part by reducing the rate of coal consumption, an approach that should also limit to some degree China's massive emission of greenhouse gases.45 Overall coal consumption in China has reportedly leveled off since the 2000s despite continued economic growth and may even have shrunk slightly in 2013, demonstrating that China might indeed be able to grow economically in the future without burning ever- increasing amounts of coal in the process.46 And in August 2014 companies in the aforementioned experimental cap and trade zones were fined for exceeding their allotted carbon emissions, suggesting that some level of monitoring and enforcement is indeed taking place, at least in those locations.47But it would constitute a very big change in Chinese Communist Party practices if environmental issues began to trump job creation in cadres' promotion considerations. Moreover, when environmental issues do enter into such calculations, they are much more likely to be local environmental issues that affect Chinese citizens' lives and social stability directly—such as fine-particulate air pollution or water pollution —than they are to be global environmental issues such as greenhouse gas emissions. Fortunately, there is significant overlap between the two types of pollution. Reducing coal burning and using more renewable energy sources, for example, decreases both ground-level fine-particulate pollution and greenhouse gas emissions in the process.

L: International standards

The Century of Humiliation makes China hyper-sensitive to perceived acts of disrespect – the plan makes China a hostile challenger by imposing international standards on its sovereigntyLee, 16 - Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles (James Jungbok Lee (2016) Will China’s Rise Be Peaceful? A Social Psychological Perspective, Asian Security, 12:1, 29-52, DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2016.1140644 SIT = Social Identity Theory

Unfortunately, such glorious heyday had come to an end with the arrival of Western powers in the late 1830s. The Treaty of Nanking (1942), which ended the First Opium War (1839–1842) and took Hong Kong away from China, initiated what is known as China’s Century of Humiliation. The period—coming to an end nearly hundred years later when Chairman Mao Zedong proclaimed the founding of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949116—was marked by major wars and conflicts between China and the Western powers or Japan: the First and the Second Opium War of 1839–1842 and 1856–1860, the Sino-Japanese “Jiawu” War of 1894–1895, the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, and the “War of Resistance against Japan” of 1931/1937–1945.117 Not only causing humiliating military defeats, these events also destroyed China’s sense of sovereignty and territorial integrity by forcing on it unilateral concessions that included indemnities, extraterritoriality, and the opening of treaty ports.118 As sudden and long lasting as these traumatic confrontations were, they have left an indelible mark on China’s historical memory, fundamentally reshaping its views on international politics.In particular, the Century of Humiliation has primed the Chinese to view the Western powers, especially the United States, as holding aggressive, interventionist intentions toward China.119 For example, in 1990, China attacked President George H. W. Bush’s call for a “new world order” as the “invisible integrationist hand of the conspiratorial ‘peaceful evolution’ strategy” that seeks to bring the entire world under hegemonic US rule.120 The Chinese even criticized the stricter policy review standards WTO imposed on China as an attempt by foreigners , especially the United States, to create more opportunities to snoop into and intervene in China’s internal affairs . Considering that the stricter requirements were completely legitimate given China’s admission into WTO prior to its full compliance with the terms of membership, the extent of China’s bias can be said to have been quite substantial.121 Moreover, in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989, Deng Xiaoping said, “I am a Chinese, and I am familiar with the history of aggression against China. When I heard that the seven Western countries, at their summit meeting, had decided to impose sanctions on China, my immediate association was to 1900 [referring to the Boxer Rebellion], when the allied forces of the eight powers invaded China.” 122 Basically, the historical loss of sovereignty has greatly sensitized China to the behaviors and intentions of the Western powers (and other parties involved). Against any signs of disrespect toward its sovereignty, China was willing to go quite far in order to prevent any further acts of disrespect—even as it was pursuing social creativity. The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996 was an exemplar case in point.

IL: Xi gets the blame

Xi gets the blame for saying yesBlackwill & Campbell 16-*Henry Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. Foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations & ** chair and chief executive officer of the Asia Group, LLC. also serves as chair of the Center for a New American Security, is a nonresident fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and is on the board of directors for Standard Chartered PLC in London, the Asia Group (Robert & Kurt,"Xi Jinping on the Global Stage," Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/CSR74_Blackwill_Campbell_Xi_Jinping.pdf)//SL

One downside to Xi’s breathtaking success in consolidating power is that it has left him with near total responsibility for his government’s policy missteps on matters ranging from the stock market slowdown to labor market unrest. His visibility on these issues and his dominance of the decision-making process have made him a powerful but potentially exposed leader. With Xi’s image and political position vulnerable to China’s economic downturn, his country’s external behavior may increasingly be guided by his own domestic political imperatives .


Answers to link turns

AT: Engagement key to Chinese moderates

Zero empirical evidence supports the boost moderates claimFriedberg 11 - Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, co-director of the Woodrow Wilson School’s Center for International Security Studies (Aaron, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, p. 261-262)

If the efforts of outsiders to promote political change in China have thus far accomplished little, it is hard to see how doing less in this regard will achieve more. Some of the "enhanced engagers" do not appear to care very much about this. Their goal, stated with varying degrees of candor, is to build the best possible ties with China regardless of how it is ruled. Others continue to harbor hopes of change but believe that the United States can do more to hinder it, by taking steps that hard-liners can cast as hostile or disrespectful to the Chinese people, than to speed it along. Conversely, more engagement, more deference, more reassurance, and less criticism should help to undercut the arguments of conservative hyper-nationalists and bolster those of the more liberal, cosmopolitan, and reform-minded members of the Chinese elite. This is a pleasing theory, but one that has virtually no empirical evidence to back it up . The idea that China's leadership contains hawks and doves, liberals and conservatives, "good guys" and "bad guys" seems plausible to Americans familiar with their own patterns of domestic politics. Indeed, there may be people among the think tankers and university professors who now opine publicly on questions of foreign and domestic policy to whom these labels could reasonably be applied. Within the Chinese governing elite, however, there appears to be far more unanimity than difference . Here, as senior CIA analyst Paul Heer points out, " the hard-liners versus moderates dichotomy is a false one ." Certainly since the purges that followed the 1989 Tiananmen "incident," the range of acceptable debate on domestic questions has become much narrower. On these issues, writes Heer, China's leaders are "all moderates, and they are all hard-liners." On economic policy, there has been no serious challenge to Deng Xiaoping's market-oriented reforms. Regarding politics, however, "Chinese rulers are all hard-liners, since they retain a commitment to socialism, albeit with Chinese characteristics, and to Communist Party rule."36 Supposing that factions of some kind do exist, it is by no means obvious how their influence would be affected by external events. The notion that a low-key, nonconfrontational American approach will favor China's "moderates" has an intuitive appeal. But the opposite is at least equally plausible. If Washington adopts a softer, more acquiescent stance, Chinese "hard-liners" will no doubt try to take the credit , arguing that the change was a direct result of tough policies, like the sustained military buildup, that they championed. Attempts at accommodation could wind up strengthening precisely the groups and individuals it was intended to weaken.

Engagement can’t spur moderatesEisenman 16 - Assistant professor at UT at Austin Lyndon Baines Johnson School of Public Affairs, Senior fellow for China studies at the American Foreign Policy Council (Joshua, “Rethinking U.S. Strategy Towards China”, Carnegie Council, 1/21, http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles_papers_reports/756//AK)

To improve U.S. policy towards China to avoid, and yet be prepared for, conflict requires going beyond simplistic applications of international relations theory. It means opening the 'black box' of China's policymaking process to understand why it makes the decisions it does and how this process has and is changing. Unfortunately, barriers continue to prevent the U.S. from better understanding and responding to China. Most importantly, Friedberg identified a "yawning ideological chasm" that inhibits the success of U.S.' engagement, arguing that: "The very different domestic political regimes of the two pacific powers" make the liberalization of the Chinese political system essential for "a true trans-Pacific entente." CPC repression inhibits change in China and presents "a significant additional impetus to rivalry.20American policymakers' beliefs about China are rooted in their own preconceived views and experiences in China. Since Americans began visiting the PRC in the early 1970s, rosy assessments have become commonplace. As the Sinologist Robert Scalapino observed after his 1973 visit:There is serious risk that one may be badly misled by what one sees, hears, and instinctively feels [in China]. This is partly due to the tendency within all of us to superimpose our own values and cultural perspectives on another environment. Such tendency surely exists, and for some, it represents an ever-present bias. Their writings consequently reveal far more about their own views of their own social order than about China. Each individual, in any case, carries his prejudices with him in some measure, and he may well reinforce them as he goes.21"Because China is so vast," James Palmer recently observed in the Washington Post, "its successes can be attributed to whatever your pet cause is.22 In short, Americans see what we want to see in China, and what we want to see most, argues Michael Pillsbury, is ourselves: "In our hubris, Americans love to believe that the aspirations of every other country is to be just like the United States. In recent years, this has governed our approach to Iraq and Afghanistan. We cling to the same mentality with China."23American misunderstanding has been facilitated by Beijing's courting of influential Americans. China has done a better job at using engagement to improve American perceptions of China than America has done in changing Chinese perceptions of U.S. intentions. The Communist Party of China (CPC) uses bilateral engagement to assess U.S. capabilities, collect intelligence, and manipulate their American counterparts. Extensive economic, educational, scientific, cultural, and personal ties allow the CPC to build a large, loose coalition of Americans to carry the message that Beijing is Washington's indispensable partner.24 U.S. officials, however, are generally ignorant of CPC objectives and tactics toward them, collectively known as the United Front Doctrine.Americans interact with only a "thin outer crust" of Chinese policymakers.25 Each institution has an office that deals specifically with foreign visitors, and the party maintains dozens of front groups that conduct hundreds of interactions and conferences every year with Americans. The CPC's International Department's front organization is the China Center for Contemporary World Studies; the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs and the China Institute of International Relations are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' front groups; the Ministry of State Security's is the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, and so on. The CPC has also created entities specifically to conduct "host diplomacy" with Americans, including the Hong Kong–based China–United States Exchange Foundation, which "promotes the positions of the Chinese government through the research grants it gives to American institutions.26 These groups both observe Americans and work to influence their views through dialogues and the distribution of English-language propaganda with titles such as The Strength of Democracy: How Will the CPC March Ahead.27

Information asymmetry is a longstanding aspect of U.S.-China relations, but has become increasingly problematic since President Xi Jinping took power in 2011. In July 2015, China enacted new laws regulating all aspects of Chinese interaction with foreigners, including a national security law that covers every domain of public life in China—politics, military, education, finance, religion, cyberspace, ideology and religion. These initiatives are "aimed at exhorting all Chinese citizens and agencies to be vigilant about threats to the party.28 They help explain why Washington's engagement strategy has been unable to change party leaders' perceptions or successfully support moderates over hawks .The consequence of Americans knowing so little about the CPC and its strategies and tactics towards them is that many Americans continue to be badly misled by what they hear and see in China. The extensive U.S.-China engagement architecture has produced analytical limitations, or blind spots, within the U.S. policy community that if remain unaddressed are likely to produce the same types of intelligence failures that have occurred repeatedly in U.S.-China relations since 1911. The only way to redress these systemic deficiencies is to move beyond engagement and containment and adopt a nuanced strategy that prioritizes high quality human intelligence about Chinese leaders and policymaking and incorporates them effectively into U.S. policymaking towards China.

AT: Relations spillover

Divergent interests prevent genuine cooperation – strategic competition is inevitableFriedberg 11 - Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, co-director of the Woodrow Wilson School’s Center for International Security Studies (Aaron, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, p. 259-260)

The problem with this approach is not so much what it includes as what it leaves out. Enhancing engagement without doing more to maintain a favorable balance of power amounts to doubling down on an already risky bet . It is like pushing more and more chips onto a single square at the roulette wheel, or building a new addition to a house that sits astride a geological fault line, while simultaneously cutting back on homeowner's insurance. Will the gamble pay off? Broadening and deepening engagement could lead to greater cooperation on some issues of concern to both Washington and Beijing, but recent experience suggests that Americans should not get their hopes up. The reason why the United States and China have failed to work more closely on combating terrorism, countering proliferation, disciplining "rogue regimes," and reducing their bilateral trade deficit is not a shortage of dialogue but a divergence of interest . To believe that more, higher-level talks will persuade Beijing to see things Washington's way, accept its rules, and follow its lead, even as China's power grows and its options expand, is either naive or condescending , and quite possibly both. Given the differing interests of states at very different stages of industrial development, it also seems fanciful to suggest that the struggle to control carbon emissions can, in itself, provide the cornerstone of a new, improved Sino-American relationship. Indeed, this problem seems at least as likely to be another source of contention between the Pacific powers as it is to be the seed from which a new entente will grow. Cooperation on climate change is no doubt desirable, but that does not mean it will be achieved , still less that confronting this danger will transform the character of world politics. Even if the engagers' fondest dreams come true, and dialogues of every shape and size spring forth, the mixed, and mutually mistrustful, relationship between the United States and Communist-ruled China will remain fundamentally unchanged . Americans will still look askance at a government they see as repressive, secretive, and lacking in democratic legitimacy, and they will continue to worry that as its power grows, the current Chinese regime will seek to displace the United States as the dominant power in Asia. For their part, China's rulers will no doubt welcome the chance to draw closer to Washington and they will be delighted to receive fewer lectures about human rights. But they will continue to see America as a nation determined to cling to its hegemonic privileges and driven by its ideology to seek their eventual removal from power.

Domestic forces make sustained cooperation impossible – the plan’s gains will be reversedSteinberg & O’Hanlon 12-* Dean of the Maxwell School, Syracuse University and University Professor of Social Science, International Affairs and Law, ** senior fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force(James,

Steinberg, “Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: U.S.- China Relations in the Twenty-First Century”,2014, Princeton University press, pg. 24-25)//SLRegime TypeAnother potential source of conflict between the United States and China derives from the two countries’ political and economic regimes. There are several strands to this argument. First, stemming from variants of so- called democratic peace theory, is the view that the possibility of conflict between two states is enhanced when one of the countries is nondemocratic— that the absence of democratic checks on expansionist or aggressive actions, in this case within China, makes conflict more likely. (This argument is somewhat in tension with the view that growing democratization in China could itself contribute to conflict, which will be discussed shortly.) A second factor stems from the role of democracy and human rights promotion as core elements of U.S. foreign policy. In the United States, this policy is justified as a support for universal norms (embodied in the UN Charter and Declaration of Human Rights) rather than an attempt to undermine the Chinese Communist Party. Nonetheless, many Chinese argue that this strategy of “peaceful evolution” is a thinly disguised effort to undermine the regime.9 These sources of conflict are exacerbated by divergence on the economic front, where China’s statist model is seen to pose a direct threat to U.S. interests—whether through manipulation of the value of the RMB currency, favoritism to Chinese industries (through the doctrine of “indigenous innovation”), explicit and hidden subsidies to Chinese manufacturers, or even state complicity in intellectual property theft. Conversely China sees U.S. advocacy of liberal trade and investment policies as threatening to China’s prosperity.Another factor associated with regime type that contributes to the risk of conflict is the closed nature of Chinese government decision making. Secrecy and lack of transparency are the hallmarks of leadership deliberations, especially on matters related to national security. This fuels U.S. suspicion and mistrust and reinforces concerns that certain elements of the Chinese policy elite such as the PLA may have undue influence on some decision making.From the Chinese perspective, the highly pluralist nature of the U.S. government, including the overlapping and sometimes conflicting roles of Congress, the executive branch, and courts, leads to questions about the sincerity and reliability of American commitments. For China, a case in point was the adoption of the Taiwan Relations Act immediately after the abrogation of the U.S.- Taiwan Security Treaty by the executive branch (following the agreement on normalizing U.S.- PRC relations).Domestic Political FactorsLike structural factors, domestic political considerations in each country also suggest a mix of forces potentially leading to either cooperation or conflict. On the optimistic side, there are many elements of the U.S.-China relationship that have positive-sum effects on domestic constituencies, such as the workers in China who benefit from exports to the United States and the consumers in the United States who benefit from China’s low-cost production. China’s large holdings of U.S. debt help keep interest rates low in the United States—a benefit to both the taxpayer and the homebuyer. U.S. farmers and aerospace workers benefit from exports to China, as do their Chinese customers.But domestic political considerations also contribute to conflict. First, while in each country there are constituencies that benefit from the relationship, there are also those who feel victims—be they U.S. textile workers and tire manufacturers or Chinese workers in state- owned enterprises who are at the losing end of U.S.-brought World Trade Organization cases. Moreover, there are important asymmetries between those who gain and those who lose—with the pain of the losers often being concentrated and

deep (e.g., loss of jobs) while the benefits are more broadly spread and shallower (as with lower prices to consumers).In China, rising national pride and memories of past humiliations put increased pressure on leaders not to compromise with foreigners, including Americans. This nationalism is fueled by the emergence of a vibrant and often virulent community of microbloggers who challenge leaders at any sign of weakness. The Communist Party is especially susceptible to these pressures, given its dependence on nationalist credentials as an element of its legitimacy.In the United States, too, nationalist perspectives tend to increase anxieties about China’s rise, fueled by a narrative dating back to the Chinese Civil War about who “lost” China. Ideologically oriented cable news, radio, and Web sites play a role comparable to the microblogging site Weibo in the PRC. Although polling in the United States consistently shows no strong sentiment against China, only 37 percent of Americans expressed positive views of China in a 2013 Pew survey (while only 40 percent of Chinese indicated positive views of the United States).10 Issues like Taiwan and trade tensions as well as cyber security provide ample grist for critics. Problems of history such as China’s role in the Korean and Vietnam wars, and Tiananmen, lurk in the background as well. Overall, uncertainty about where the relationship is now headed in light of China’s rise contributes to a certain tension in the public’s overall mood about the PRC. Indeed, at most points over the last twenty years, 40 percent or more have worried about China as a future threat even as they have also tended to view U.S.-C hina relations in the present as reasonably good. Surveys indicate that the next generation of American leaders holds similarly mixed views about China.11The Way Forward: Managing the U.S.- China Strategic RelationshipThe foregoing discussion illustrates that there are profound forces at work that could undermine the goal of avoiding conflict and maximizing cooperation even though both countries have much to gain by a positive relationship. Without an explicit effort to address these sources of conflict through the tools of what we call strategic reassurance, the prospects for a poor outcome are great. Since neither side can guarantee the other what the goals and ambitions of future leaders might be, they need to craft a set of actions today that will reinforce the benefits of cooperation while undercutting the perceived necessity for hedging and confrontation, consistent with each’s national interest.

AT: Not zero sum

Chinese leaders view competition with the US in zero sum termsChang, 11 – Chang lived and worked in China and Hong Kong for almost two decades, most recently in Shanghai, as Counsel to the American law firm Paul Weiss. He has spoken at Columbia, Cornell, Harvard, Penn, Princeton, Yale, and other universities and at The Brookings Institution, The Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute, RAND, the American Enterprise Institute, the Council on Foreign Relations, and other institutions. He has given briefings at the National Intelligence Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and the Pentagon. (Gordon, “China Takes on America in a 'Zero-Sum Game'” World Affairs Journal, 11/22, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/gordon-g-chang/china-takes-america-zero-sum-game

What is the best way for China to take over the world? Yan Xuetong of Tsinghua University suggests a game plan in his Monday New York Times op-ed, first published online on Sunday.In “How China Can Defeat America,” Yan, perhaps Beijing’s leading international relations analyst, argues that, even without democracy, China can present a more attractive model to the world than the United States and therefore win over allies around the globe. “It is the battle for people’s hearts and minds that will determine who eventually prevails,” Yan writes. “As China’s ancient philosophers predicted, the country that displays more humane authority will win.”In making his points, Yan distorts Chinese history, misdescribes the current global situation, and maligns the United States. Yet along the way he also performs a valuable service for Americans, giving them an opportunity to view his government in a more realistic light. In the provocative op-ed, a distillation of his recently released book, Yan explains that competition between Beijing and Washington is “inevitable.” And then he ends his piece with this thought: “China’s quest to enhance its world leadership status and America’s effort to maintain its present position is a zero-sum game.”Zero-sum competition? That’s not the way Washington’s foreign policy specialists see the international system. Since the end of the Second World War, they have believed that every nation can better its lot with free markets, free trade, and free politics. Chinese leaders have eschewed all three of these “Western” concepts, but they have appropriated that awful phrase, “win-win,” and assure us they believe in it. With a win-win mind-set, governments around the world have sought to “engage” China, nurture it, and ease its entry into the international community.Naturally, the Chinese state has prospered in such a benign environment. But instead of accepting the international system as it was—the fond hope of the engagers—Beijing has sought to upend and replace it with something more friendly to its brand of authoritarianism. In short, liberal institutions are seen as a threat to China’s one-party state, and so it should come as no surprise that its leaders view geopolitics as an I-win, you-lose proposition.Should the United States change its conception of geopolitics in response to Beijing’s world view? No. Yet one thing is clear: the global community needs to understand that engagement with China has not changed the darkish perspectives of its leaders—who continue to believe that it is in their interests to undermine America and its many friends.

http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/gordon-g-chang/china-takes-america-zero-sum-game

http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/gordon-g-chang/china-takes-america-zero-sum-game

China and the US are dominated by zero sum thinkingSwaine, 15- senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace( Micheal, Beyond American Predominance in the Western Pacific: The Need for a Stable U.S.-China Balance of Power, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/20/beyond-american-predominance-in-western-pacific-need-for-stable-u.s.-china-balance-of-power)//JS

In 2011, I argued in a book entitled America’s Challenge: Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century, that, while Washington and Beijing are by no means fated to enter into a hot or even a cold war, the competing assumptions they hold regarding the necessary conditions for long-term stability and prosperity in Asia, if not moderated through a process of mutual accommodation, would likely result in steady movement toward a zero-sum, adversarial mind-set. I wrote that this dynamic could eventually polarize the region and undermine the goals of continued peace and prosperity toward which all sides strive. Unfortunately, in the past three years, this type of mind-set has deepened, in and out of both governments and across much of Asia. Indeed, the international media, along with a coterie of regional and international relations specialists, increasingly seem to interpret every action taken by one government, no matter how small, as being by necessity designed to diminish the position of the other.Even more worrisome, this deepening mind-set is driving policy statements and recommendations in Beijing and Washington that serve to reinforce and strengthen, rather than moderate, the differences between the two sides. While China’s leader, Xi Jinping, speaks of the need to develop an “Asia for Asians” and to create a new regional security architecture as an alternative to the “Cold War era” U.S.-led bilateral alliance structure, American policymakers and analysts criticize Beijing for establishing an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea of the sort long possessed by Washington and Tokyo and encourage other Asian states to resist joining Chinese-initiated economic institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/20/beyond-american-predominance-in-western-pacific-need-for-stable-u.s.-china-balance-of-power)//JS


AT: Credibility theory false

Their indict of credibility assumes states have perfect knowledge of intentions – prior actions inform expectations of future behavior on unrelated issuesGlaser, 15 - Charles L Glaser is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00199

The opposing strand of the credibility debate holds that a state’s past actions do not influence its credibility. According to this line of argument, credibility depends only on an opposing state’s power and interests, both of which are known, not on its past behavior.21 This formulation, however, mischaracterizes the issue of credibility by assuming that the adversary essentially knows the extent of the state’s interests. Uncertainty about the state’s interests, however, lies at the core of the adversary’s uncertainty about the state’s credibility. This in turn creates a role for past actions to influence current assessments of credibility. And, although the adversary may be nearly certain that the state places an extremely high value on defending its homeland, the adversary is likely to be more uncertain about the value that the state places on defending its allies and lesser interests.Given this uncertainty, if the adversary sees logical similarities between the two issues, one would expect that a state’s policy toward a lesser (but possibly still important) interest would enable an adversary to update its assessment of the state’s interests and, in turn, of the credibility of its commitments. For example, ending an alliance could lead an adversary to reduce its assessment of how likely the state would be to meet certain other alliance commitments. The magnitude of the change would depend on the size of the accommodation, the extent of uncertainties about the state’s interests, and the similarity between the terminated and the continuing alliances. In addition, if the adversary believes that a structural change caused the state to adopt accommodation, it will see a similarity across otherwise disparate issues that are affected by the structural change and will, therefore, reduce its assessment of the state’s credibility on all of these issues .

China believes the credibility thesisYan, 14 - Professor and Dean of Institute of Modern International Relations, Tsinghua University (Xuetong, “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement” Chinese Journal of International Politics Volume 7, Issue 2Pp. 153-184, http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/7/2/153.full KLP = describes the Keeping a Low Profile foreign policy of Deng Xiaoping

‘Credibility’ is regarded as a key factor for a good leader, and strategic credibility is a precondition for becoming a humane authority or a hegemon in Chinese traditional political thoughts. The fact that Xi adopted credibility as one of the four foreign policy principles shows that China’s foreign policy is transformed from weak-state diplomacy to strong-power diplomacy. After the Cold War, ‘daguo waijiao’ (major country diplomacy) in Chinese official documents referred to China’s policy toward those countries stronger than China, such as the United States, Russia, Japan, Germany, France, and the UK. The meaning of this phrase changed in Wang Yi’s speech titled ‘Exploring the Path of Major Country


Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics’ in June 2013. The term of ‘major country’ no longer refers to foreign powers but to China itself.53 Besides the new meaning of ‘major country policy’, the principle of ‘credibility’ also implies that China will undertake more international responsibility on international issues, especially security ones. In contrast, the KLP strategy never touched on the concept of credibility because credibility means too much international responsibility and a leadership role. Credibility is opposite to the principle of undertaking no leadership.

Impact

Rising expectations

2nc impact top level

Divergent interests mean the plan’s cooperation is superficial and destabilizes relations by creating unfulfilled rising expectations. Consistency in expectations is vital to stability and managing conflictYan, 10 - Professor and Dean of Institute of Modern International Relations, Tsinghua University (Xuetong, “The Instability of China–US Relations” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, 2010, 263–292doi:10.1093/cjip/poq009

The Instability of Superficial FriendshipCertain people might argue that the mutual delusion of friendship serves the interests of both China and the United States. This argument, however, lacks hard evidence as well as a logical supporting explanation. Contrarily, it is not difficult to explain why superficial friendship is less stable than real friendship or indeed than real or superficial enmity. The substance of a bilateral relationship is determined according to the consistence of two countries’ knowledge of their interest relations and the reality . The relationship is substantive when the knowledge and the reality are in consistence; it is otherwise superficial. A superficial friendship is one where two nations imagine that they have more mutually favourable than unfavourable interests, when the reality is the opposite. Superficial enmity, in contrast, is inconsistence whereby two nations believe that they have more mutually unfavourable interests than favourable ones when the reality is vice versa. Inconsistence between knowledge and the reality is a main destabilizing factor in bilateral relations. The stability of a bilateral national relationship is mainly determined by mutually favourable interests and mutual expectations of support (see Figure 3). That any two nations have both mutually favourable and unfavourable interests is a universal given. Mutually favourable interests engender mutual support between two nations, and mutually unfavourable interests cause conflicts. Both stable and unstable friendship and stable and unstable enmity can exist between two nations. Absence of mutual support, and imbalances between two nations’ mutual expectations of support and that they actually receive can cause instability . Mutual support usually lives up to mutual expectations when two nations have more mutually favourable interests than unfavourable ones. An appropriate balance between mutual support and mutual expectations thus maintains the stability of the countries’ bilateral relations.

Competitive relations allow the US to prevent escalation and warShambaugh 15 – professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University (David, “In a Fundamental Shift, China and the US are Now Engaged in an All-Out Competition,” South China Morning Post, June 11th, 2015, http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1819980/fundamental-shift-china-and-us-are-now-engaged-all-out) // EDP

The upcoming Strategic and Economic Dialogue and Xi's September state visit to Washington are golden opportunities to discuss these issues, try to forge tangible cooperation, and arrest the negative dynamic in the relationship. The question is whether it will be temporary again, or a real "floor" can be put beneath the relationship. If the past is any indicator, we should not expect too much.



What worries me is that in this increasingly negative and suspicious atmosphere, "tests of credibility" will increase. The best we can probably hope for over the next two to three years - as President Obama becomes a lame duck and the election cycle stimulates more heated rhetoric about China - is tactical management of the relationship , with sensitivity to each side's "red lines" and "core interests", while hoping that no "wild card" events occur. This could include another military incident in the air or at sea, or renewed tension over Taiwan.Even the current situation in the South China Sea has real potential to haemorrhage, as China is not going to stop its island-building activities and hence will not meet American demands that it do so. Or if China, having fortified the islands, proclaims an air defence identification zone over the South China Sea. What is Washington to do then? The potential for military confrontation is not insignificant.So, looking to the future, the key responsibility for both countries is to learn how to manage competition , keep it from edging towards the conflictual end of the spectrum , while trying to expand the zone of practical cooperation.Neither country has any playbook to guide such a relationship. Henry Kissinger envisions what he calls "co-evolution" between the two powers, but even he concludes that this will require "wisdom and patience". But it is not at all clear to me that the respective political cultures and existing political systems, national identities, social values, and world views will afford such a strategic grand bargain today.Thus, these two great nations are likely to find it increasingly difficult to coexist - yet they must. However fraught, this is a marriage in which divorce is not an option. Divorce means war.

Competitive relations are peaceful and prevent conflict – attempts to cooperate cause an overreaction and instability when rising expectations aren’t metYan, 14 - Professor and Dean of Institute of Modern International Relations, Tsinghua University (Xuetong, “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement” Chinese Journal of International Politics Volume 7, Issue 2Pp. 153-184, http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/7/2/153.full KLP = describes the Keeping a Low Profile foreign policy of Deng Xiaoping. SFA = describes the Striving For Achievement foreign policy of Xi Jingping

According to moral realism, the SFA strategy stabilized China–US relations during 2012–2013 mainly because it transformed the bilateral relations from a superficial friendship to peaceful competition , namely to a new type of major power relations. While China adhered to the KLP strategy, neither China nor the United States admitted the structural conflict between them. Instead, both adopted a superficial-friendship policy toward each other. Superficial friendship is epitomized in character-strategy duality.110 As strategy it can temporarily reduce tensions between China and the United States, but it also boosted both sides’ unreasonable expectations for the other side’s favorable action . The high expectation will result in over-reaction to any of the other side’s unfavorable actions. Therefore, China–US relations were very bumpy before China shifted to the SFA strategy. Opposite to the KLP, the SFA strategy is based on the assumption of the structural contradiction between a rising power and a status quo hegemon. In August 2011, Xi Jinping and Biden reached a common agreement that the two countries should have healthy competition.111 After both sides agreed on the nature of their relations as competition, they reduced expectations for the other side’s favorable actions and their relations


became stabilized . This explanation can be supported by what Biden said during his visit to China in late 2013. ‘The thing that has impressed me from the beginning — and I said this to the President [Xi Jinping] early on, and he’s concluded as well — is that you are candid, you are constructive’, Biden said. ‘Developing this new relationship, both qualities are sorely needed. Candor generates trust, and trust is the basis on which real change, constructive change, is made.” 112

Turns miscalc

Increasing relations increases the risk of miscalcBaculinao, 11 – staff for NBC (Eric, “Should America and China 'pretend to be friends?'” 1/18, http://behindthewall.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/01/18/5869438-should-america-and-china-pretend-to-be-friends

But the most provocative view from China was aired by Prof. Yan Xuetong, the highly-respected director of the Institute of International Relations at Beijing’s prestigious Tsinghua University.“The visit is very important because the relationship is declining and the visit should aim to stabilize the relationship,” he told NBC News.Still Yan, an author and expert on international security issues, argues that the policy of China and the U.S. “pretending to be friends” is destabilizing and dangerous and can only lead to miscalculations and conflict .“Certain people might argue that the mutual delusion of friendship serves the interests of both China and the United States, but this argument lacks hard evidence and logical support ,” Yan said.“Being superficial enemies would be a better choice for China and the United States to stabilize and improve their relations if they have no way to become real friends,” Yan wrote in the Chinese Journal of International Politics late last year. “If we look in detail at the strategic interests of China and the United States, we find more confrontational and conflicting interests than common and complementary ones.” “To enlarge mutually favorable interests, China and the United States should give up the policy of pretending to be friends. A policy of clarity serves their interests better than one that is ambiguous,” he argued.No one hopes that China and the U.S. become real enemies, he said, but if they cannot become real friends, then “superficial enmity” is more stabilizing than “superficial friendship.”“Inconsistency between knowledge and the reality is a main destabilizing factor in bilateral relations,” he warned.

http://behindthewall.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/01/18/5869438-should-america-and-china-pretend-to-be-friends

http://behindthewall.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/01/18/5869438-should-america-and-china-pretend-to-be-friends

AT: Enmity increases conflict

China’s muted reaction to the pivot proves stable relations are possible even with enmityHarris, 14 - emeritus professor in the Department of International Relations, at the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific.(Stuart, China’s Foreign Policy, google books)

The relationship between China and the US that Yan Xuetong (2010) calls a 'superficial friendship' oscillates between cool and warm, either reflecting renewed US pressures, or Chinese disappointed expectations and/or a resurgence of its victimhood sensitivity, leading to Chinese assertiveness. This state of affairs was viewed by some analysts as stimulating President Obama's announcement in November 2011 of a rebalancing towards Asia, commonly termed the 'pivot', and reaffirmed for many Chinese analysts that the US was trying to contain China. Reflecting a strategic realignment of US policy, the 'pivot' includes an expanded military footprint, ostensibly designed to enable the US to play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future' (Obama 2011), and taking advantage of China's apparent assertiveness from 2010. The pivot appears, however, to reset a regional balance of power that was increasingly shifting towards China (see also chapter 7). China's official responses to the pivot have been low-key, emphasizing the 'importance of maintaining the stable development of US-China ties' (Chase and Purser 2012).

Balancing good

Impact: primacy

US leadership prevents extinction – it accesses every impactDobriansky, 15 - Paula J. Dobriansky served as under secretary of state for global affairs from 2001 to 2009. She is a senior fellow with the Future of Diplomacy Project at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. (“We Asked Paula J. Dobriansky: What Should Be the Purpose of American Power?” The National Interest, 8/25, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/we-asked-paula-j-dobriansky-what-should-be-the-purpose-13678

The purpose of American power, which includes military, economic, diplomatic, ideological, legal and cultural components, is to protect the entire range of our national-security interests. While we face many pressing domestic challenges, America cannot afford to focus on them alone. Americans cannot be secure and prosperous without a stable, rule-driven international order . Terrorism, refugee flows, pandemic diseases , pollution, cyberattacks, economic decay, nuclear proliferation and military aggression can directly threaten our security and prosperity even when they arise overseas.We cannot handle these threats successfully in an ad hoc fashion. American power must be continuously applied to maintain political, military and economic international institutions and alliances that, with effective U.S. leadership, can safeguard global stability, economic growth and the rule of law. This does not mean that every foreign dispute or fight concerns us. But we must counter fundamental assaults on the existing global liberal order.This task is particularly crucial today, since the post–Cold War international framework is under attack by numerous challenges, including Islamic fundamentalism, growing Sunni-Shia strife, Iran’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and become the preeminent power in the Middle East, Russian revanchism , and China’s efforts to exercise dominion over Asia and strong-arm its neighbors.In addition to these hard-power threats, the world faces numerous humanitarian crises, ranging from famines, environmental devastation and extreme weather events to flows of refugees and displaced persons. While the United States cannot solve all of these problems, consistent with our moral values, it has been a world leader in rendering humanitarian assistance and helping to alleviate poverty worldwide . America must always retain the ability, when necessary, to use its power unilaterally. However, the United States has been most successful when it has worked with international institutions and alliances, partnering with like-minded countries and combining their resources and capabilities with our own. Furthermore, the best way to deal with potential international threats is to deter them from arising or at least defeat them before they become acute. This requires continuous American leadership and credibility, especially in upholding our international commitments , to reassure our allies and deter our enemies .

Hegemony solves great power war, economic collapse, and proliferationBrooks and Wohlforth, 16 – both professors of government at Dartmouth (Stephen and William, “The Once and Future Superpower Why China Won’t Overtake the United States” Foreign Affairs, May/June, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-13/once-and-future-superpower?cid=nlc-fatoday-



http://nationalinterest.org/feature/we-asked-paula-j-dobriansky-what-should-be-the-purpose-13678

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/we-asked-paula-j-dobriansky-what-should-be-the-purpose-13678

20160520&sp_mid=51424540&sp_rid=c2NvdHR5cDQzMUBnbWFpbC5jb20S1&spMailingID=51424540&spUserID=MTg3NTEzOTE5Njk2S0&spJobID=922513469&spReportId=OTIyNTEzNDY5S0)

Given the barriers thwarting China’s path to superpower status, as well as the low incentives for trying to overcome them, the future of the international system hinges most on whether the United States continues to bear the much lower burden of sustaining what we and others have called “deep engagement,” the globe-girdling grand strategy it has followed for some 70 years. And barring some odd change of heart that results in a true abnegation of its global role (as opposed to overwrought, politicized charges sometimes made about its already having done so), Washington will be well positioned for decades to maintain the core military capabilities, alliances, and commitments that secure key regions, backstop the global economy, and foster cooperation on transnational problems.The benefits of this grand strategy can be difficult to discern, especially in light of the United States’ foreign misadventures in recent years. Fiascos such as the invasion of Iraq stand as stark reminders of the difficulty of using force to alter domestic politics abroad. But power is as much about preventing unfavorable outcomes as it is about causing favorable ones, and here Washington has done a much better job than most Americans appreciate.For a largely satisfied power leading the international system, having enough strength to deter or block challengers is in fact more valuable than having the ability to improve one’s position further on the margins. A crucial objective of U.S. grand strategy over the decades has been to prevent a much more dangerous world from emerging, and its success in this endeavor can be measured largely by the absence of outcomes common to history: important regions destabilized by severe security dilemmas, tattered alliances unable to contain breakout challengers, rapid weapons proliferation, great-power arms races, and a descent into competitive economic or military blocs.Were Washington to truly pull back from the world, more of these challenges would emerge, and transnational threats would likely loom even larger than they do today. Even if such threats did not grow, the task of addressing them would become immeasurably harder if the United States had to grapple with a much less stable global order at the same time. And as difficult as it sometimes is today for the United States to pull together coalitions to address transnational challenges, it would be even harder to do so if the country abdicated its leadership role and retreated to tend its garden, as a growing number of analysts and policymakers—and a large swath of the public—are now calling for.



--Hegemony internal link

China Rise threatens US HegemonyMearsheimer 14 - R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago (John, “Can China Rise Peacefully?”, National Interest, 10/25, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204//AK)The rise of China appears to be changing this situation, however, because this development has the potential to fundamentally alter the architecture of the international system. If the Chinese economy continues growing at a brisk clip in the next few decades, the United States will once again face a potential peer competitor, and great-power politics will return in full force. It is still an open question as to whether China’s economy will continue its spectacular rise or even continue growing at a more modest, but still impressive, rate. There are intelligent arguments on both sides of this debate, and it is hard to know who is right.But if those who are bullish on China are correct, it will almost certainly be the most important geopolitical development of the twenty-first century, for China will be transformed into an enormously powerful country. The attendant question that will concern every maker of foreign policy and student of international politics is a simple but profound one: can China rise peacefully? The aim of this chapter is to answer that question.To predict the future in Asia, one needs a theory of international politics that explains how rising great powers are likely to act and how the other states in the system will react to them. We must rely on theory because many aspects of the future are unknown; we have few facts about the future. Thomas Hobbes put the point well: “The present only has a being in nature; things past have a being in the memory only, but things to come have no being at all.” Thus, we must use theories to predict what is likely to transpire in world politics.Offensive realism offers important insights into China’s rise. My argument in a nutshell is that if China continues to grow economically, it will attempt to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. The United States, however, will go to enormous lengths to prevent China from achieving regional hegemony. Most of Beijing’s neighbors, including India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, and Vietnam, will join with the United States to contain Chinese power. The result will be an intense security competition with considerable potential for war. In short, China’s rise is unlikely to be tranquil.It is important to emphasize that my focus is not on how China will behave in the immediate future, but instead on how it will act in the longer term, when it will be far more powerful than it is today. The fact is that present-day China does not possess significant military power; its military forces are inferior to those of the United States. Beijing would be making a huge mistake to pick a fight with the U.S. military nowadays. Contemporary China, in other words, is constrained by the global balance of power, which is clearly stacked in America’s favor. Among other advantages, the United States has many consequential allies around the world, while China has virtually none. But we are not concerned with that situation here. Instead, the focus is on a future world in which the balance of power has shifted sharply against the United States, where China controls much more relative power than it does today, and where China is in roughly the same economic and military league as the United States. In essence, we are talking about a world in which China is much less constrained than it is today.

A modernizing China will pursue regional and global hegemony- trades off with American Hard Power Mearsheimer 14 - R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago (John, “Can China Rise Peacefully?”, National Interest, 10/25, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204//AK)In addition to pursuing regional hegemony, a rising China will have strategic interests outside of Asia, just as the United States has important interests beyond the Western Hemisphere. In keeping with the dictates of offensive realism, China will have good reason to interfere in the politics of the Americas so as to cause Washington trouble in its own backyard, thus making it more difficult for the U.S. military to move freely around the world.During the Cold War, the Soviet Union formed a close alliance with Cuba in good part for the purpose of interfering in America’s backyard. In the future, relations between the United States and a country like Brazil will perhaps worsen, creating an opportunity for China to form close ties with Brazil and maybe even station military forces in the Western Hemisphere. Additionally, China will have powerful incentives to forge ties with Canada and Mexico and do whatever it can to weaken America’s dominance in North America. Its aim will not be to threaten the American homeland directly, but rather to distract the United States from looking abroad and force it to focus increased attention on its own neighborhood.This claim may sound implausible at present, but remember that the Soviets tried to put nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba in 1962, had more than 40,000 troops in Cuba that same year, and also provided Cuba with a wide variety of sophisticated conventional weapons. And do not forget that the United States already has a huge military presence in China’s backyard.China will obviously want to limit America’s ability to project power elsewhere, in order to improve Beijing’s prospects of achieving regional hegemony in Asia. However, China has other reasons for wanting to pin down the United States as much as possible in the Western Hemisphere. In particular, China has major economic and political interests in Africa, which seem likely to increase in the future. Even more important, China is heavily dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf, and that dependence is apt to grow significantly over time. China, like the United States, is almost certain to treat the Persian Gulf as a vital strategic interest, which means Beijing and Washington will eventually engage in serious security competition in that region, much as the two superpowers did during the Cold War. Creating trouble for the United States in the Western Hemisphere will limit its ability to project power into the Persian Gulf and Africa.

China rise is a definitive threat – detrimental to US global hegemony and will create significant competition for influence in key areasMearsheimer 14 – professor of political science at University of Chicago, co-director of Program of International Security Policy at UChicago (John, “Can China Rise Peacefully,” The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, October 25th, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204) // EDP

In addition to pursuing regional hegemony, a rising China will have strategic interests outside of Asia, just as the United States has important interests beyond the Western Hemisphere. In keeping with the dictates of offensive realism, China will have good reason to interfere in the politics of the Americas so as to cause Washington trouble in its own backyard, thus making it more difficult for the U.S. military to


move freely around the world. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union formed a close alliance with Cuba in good part for the purpose of interfering in America’s backyard. In the future, relations between the United States and a country like Brazil will perhaps worsen, creating an opportunity for China to form close ties with Brazil and maybe even station military forces in the Western Hemisphere. Additionally, China will have powerful incentives to forge ties with Canada and Mexico and do whatever it can to weaken America’s dominance in North America. Its aim will not be to threaten the American homeland directly, but rather to distract the United States from looking abroad and force it to focus increased attention on its own neighborhood. This claim may sound implausible at present, but remember that the Soviets tried to put nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba in 1962, had more than 40,000 troops in Cuba that same year, and also provided Cuba with a wide variety of sophisticated conventional weapons. And do not forget that the United States already has a huge military presence in China’s backyard. China will obviously want to limit America’s ability to project power elsewhere, in order to improve Beijing’s prospects of achieving regional hegemony in Asia. However, China has other reasons for wanting to pin down the United States as much as possible in the Western Hemisphere. In particular, China has major economic and political interests in Africa, which seem likely to increase in the future. Even more important, China is heavily dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf, and that dependence is apt to grow significantly over time. China, like the United States, is almost certain to treat the Persian Gulf as a vital strategic interest, which means Beijing and Washington will eventually engage in serious security competition in that region, much as the two superpowers did during the Cold War. Creating trouble for the United States in the Western Hemisphere will limit its ability to project power into the Persian Gulf and Africa. To take this line of analysis a step further, most of the oil that China imports from the Gulf is transported by sea. For all the talk about moving that oil by pipelines and railroads through Myanmar and Pakistan, the fact is that maritime transport is a much easier and cheaper option. However, for Chinese ships to reach the Gulf as well as Africa from China’s major ports along its eastern coast, they have to get from the South China Sea into the Indian Ocean, which are separated by various Southeast Asian countries. The only way for Chinese ships to move between these two large bodies of water is to go through three major passages. Specifically, they can go through the Strait of Malacca, which is surrounded by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, or they can go farther south and traverse either the Lombok or the Sunda Strait, each of which cuts through Indonesia and leads into the open waters of the Indian Ocean just to the northwest of Australia. Chinese ships then have to traverse the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea to reach the Persian Gulf. After that, they have to return to China via the same route. Chinese leaders will surely want to control these sea lines of communication, just as the United States emphasizes the importance of controlling its primary sea routes. Thus, it is hardly surprising that there is widespread support in China for building a blue-water navy, which would allow China to project power around the world and control its main sea lines of communication. In brief, if China continues its rapid economic growth, it will almost certainly become a superpower, which means it will build the power-projection capability necessary to compete with the United States around the globe. The two areas to which it is likely to pay the greatest attention are the Western Hemisphere and the Persian Gulf, although Africa will also be of marked importance to Beijing. In addition, China will undoubtedly try to build military and naval forces that would allow it to reach those distant regions, much the way the United States has pursued sea control.

--FON internal link

China’s hostile rise threatens Freedom of NavigationClad and Wahid 15 (James* and Ron**, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asia Pacific Affairs from 2007-09, and is now Senior Advisor to the CNA* Chairman of Arcanum Global, a strategic intelligence company**, “The Real New Type of U.S.-China Relations”, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-real-new-type-us-china-relations-13323, 7/14/15, NRG)

In short, expect no cessation of moves by China to probe U.S. resolve. This in some ways makes things simpler. The love-me/love-me-not pas de deux is over. China’s steady provocations mean much more than another feint in a static, tactical standoff. Within our country’s security establishment, some very basic assessments of long term intent have now changed, irrevocably. The notion of a cooperative U.S./China economic relationship, nicely balanced by some security hedging, is DOA (dead on arrival), however much residual business community voices might wish otherwise.For several generations now, the United States and its partners have offered full economic openness to China. Huge trade and investment gains have given China a growing military capacity and double-digit annual military spending growth. The old template—a partly cooperative/partly competitive relationship—no longer makes sense, though Chinese financing of U.S. sovereign debt crimps our strategic flexibility. We would all wish for a less threatening scenario, but the consequences of strategic mistrust cannot be finessed any longer. While Obama and the United States has dithered, China develops world-class anti-ship missiles. We must now mull plans aimed at striking mainland China preemptively.We coasted for a long time on two contradictory paths—economic integration vs. security confrontation. No longer. In declaring its territorial demands a “core interest,” China poses a direct challenge to our Asian security partners, large and small, and to us. Nothing has a more central role in American strategy than maintaining global norms about access—meaning access to open trade, to freedom of navigation, to common rules. We apply this strategic insistence everywhere, from Venezuela to the Maghreb. Nothing will make us change, especially in the western Pacific.Self-interestedly, China entered the global, U.S.-enabled trading and investment system. This rules-based order belongs just as much to China as to the West, Japan, or India, but Beijing feels no loyalty. Its increasing economic clout gives it the weight to shape common rules, but the words “responsible stakeholder” don’t figure into Beijing’s security agenda. China’s force-fed equities markets show a similar heedlessness.By comparison to the daily alarms in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, East Asia may seem far away. But the stakes there couldn’t be bigger or more consequential; real not fanciful risks of conflict, localized or something wider, have become more pronounced. Add to this some basic concerns about China’s domestic economic stewardship. These anxieties will increasingly overshadow the coming election campaigns.

That’s the litmus test for whether US leadership is sustainableKraska, 11 - Dr. James Kraska is a Senior Fellow in FPRI's Program on National Security. He serves as Mary Derrickson McCurdy Visiting Research Scholar at Duke University Marine Laboratory, where he focuses on international law of the sea and marine policy and governance. (James, Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea: Expeditionary Operations in World Politics, p. 411-412)

Attracting international partners to join in the reinvigorated approach is essential and not impossible. Those nations seeking minimum world public order are natural allies in oceans law and policy because they share the goal of maintaining the stability of the global system. Freedom of the seas generally, and freedom of navigation and overflight in the EEZ in particular, have become a litmus test for the support or rejection of American leadership in world affairs . The global political and economic system of the last few centuries rests on the naval supremacy of British and now of American maritime power. "As a vital element of that system, the leading global power . . . " wrote Walter Russell Mead, "maintains the security of world trade over the seas and air," while also ensuring that international economic transactions unfold in an orderly way.89If the world oceans system can continue to remain stable under the assurance of American power, countries as diverse as Germany, Japan, China, Korea, and India may forgo acquiring the new military capabilities required to ensure access to the world's sea lanes , especially into the Middle East.90 American fleets stretching from the Persian Gulf throughout the Pacific and Atlantic are critical to maintaining world economic and political stability. Ultimately, the U.S. Navy operates to further American national interest, but foreign and domestic interests can converge in a globalized era, and the exercise of America's maritime power generates enormous positive externalities to global security and stability. American naval power is one of the principal public goods of the modern world. On the other hand, however, "The end of America's ability to safeguard the Gulf and the trade routes around it would be enormously damaging, and not just to the United States." suggests Mead.91 If other countries are compelled to maintain fleets in order to protect their supply of energy, defense budgets would dramatically expand in every major center of economic power on the globe .92 In fact this already is happening, as access to the oceans becomes more uncertain for everyone."The potential for conflict and chaos is real."93 "Every ship that China builds to protect the increasing numbers of supertankers needed to bring oil from the Middle East to China in years ahead would also be a threat to Japan's oil security, as well as to the oil security of India and Taiwan."94 These warships, moreover, could be misapplied toward adventurism not only across the Taiwan Straits, but also throughout the South China Sea.

--AT: Hegemonic temptation

US economic weakness means it will focus on the core mission of grand strategy and not peripheral conflictsBrooks and Wohlforth, 16 – both professors of government at Dartmouth (Stephen and William, “The Once and Future Superpower Why China Won’t Overtake the United States” Foreign Affairs, May/June, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-13/once-and-future-superpower?cid=nlc-fatoday-20160520&sp_mid=51424540&sp_rid=c2NvdHR5cDQzMUBnbWFpbC5jb20S1&spMailingID=51424540&spUserID=MTg3NTEzOTE5Njk2S0&spJobID=922513469&spReportId=OTIyNTEzNDY5S0)

Ever since the Soviet Union’s demise, the United States’ dramatic power advantage over other states has been accompanied by the risk of self-inflicted wounds, as occurred in Iraq. But the slippage in the United States’ economic position may have the beneficial effect of forcing U.S. leaders to focus more on the core mission of the country’s grand strategy rather than being sucked into messy peripheral conflicts. Indeed, that has been the guiding logic behind President Barack Obama’s foreign policy. Nonetheless, a world of lasting U.S. military preeminence and declining U.S. economic dominance will continue to test the United States’ capacity for restraint, in four main ways.




Impact: US-China war

Successful China balancing in defense of American primacy outweighs all the thingsTellis, 14—Ashley, senior associate @ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, PhD from U Chicago, former special assistant to the president and senior director for strategic planning and Southwest Asia at the National Security Council. “Balancing Without Containment,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace PDF report, Jan 22, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/balancing_without_containment.pdf, p. 3-9 –br This transition will not occur automatically if China’s GNP one day exceeds that of the United States. Rather, the threat of supersession will be more gradual as continuing Chinese economic growth—at levels

superior to the expansion occurring in the United States— steadily enables Beijing to acquire all the other accoutrements that make for comprehensive national power. On current trends, China will consistently accumulate these capabilities over the next two decades. It certainly aims to do so, at the latest, by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China

and the date by which Chinese President Xi Jinping has declared China’s intention to become a fully developed nation. Acquiring the appropriate foundations of power will position China to achieve, first, strategic equivalence with the United States, thus transforming the international system into a meaningfully bipolar order. Then , depending on Beijing’s own fortunes, China may possibly surpass Washington as the center of gravity in international politics. Irrespective of which outcome occurs—or when— either eventuality would by definition signal the demise o f the primacy that the United States has enjoyed since the end of the Second World War. Even if during this process a power transition in the strict vocabulary of realist international relations theory is avoided—a possibility because China’s per capita income will lag behind that of the

United States for a long time even if it acquires the world’s largest GNP—Beijing’s capacity to challenge Washington’s interests in multiple arenas, ranging from geopolitics to trade and from advancing human rights to protecting the commons, will only increase as its power expands. In other words, China will demonstrate how a rival can, as Thomas J. Christensen phrased it, “[pose] problems without

catching up.”8 <end page 3> As Avery Goldstein has persuasively argued, these hazards could materialize rather quickly because China is currently pursuing provocative policies on territorial disputes over islands in the East and South China Seas.9 That these disputes, which a former U.S. official described as involving “uninhabited and uninhabitable rocks,”10 do not appear prima facie to implicate a systemic crisis should not

be reassuring to the United States because every serious contestation that occurs in future Sino-American relations will materialize against the backdrop of a possible power transition so long as China’s growth rates—even when diminishing—continue to exceed those of the United States. This dynamic , as William R. Thompson has pointed out,

can produce extended “ crisis slides” in which even “relatively trivial incidents or a string of seemingly minor crises” may suffice to escalate what was up to that point a precarious structural transformation into full-fledged geopolitical polarization and major war .11 Since the relative disparity in Sino-American economic performance is likely to

persist for quite some time, even trifling quarrels will push bilateral ties ever more concertedly in the direction of greater abrasion as accumulating Chinese power further constrains U.S. freedom of action . AN UNPRECEDENTED

CHALLENGE In many ways, the challenge posed by China will be more serious than that posed by the previous American competitor—the Soviet Union. While the Soviet Union was indeed a formidable military power, its economic base was always much smaller than

that of the United States. Although insufficiently appreciated during the Cold War, the Soviet Union was actually a deformed entity: a military giant possessing coercive capabilities that rivaled the United States but an economic midget nurturing a productive base that was less than half the size of its avowed competitor .12 Angus Maddison, for example, has estimated that the

gross domestic product (GDP) of the Soviet Union, when at the height of its relative power in 1975, was approximately 44.4 percent of that of the United States in the same year. China does not share this weakness, which makes the dangers posed by its ascent— and the prospect that it will one day acquire genuinely comprehensive power rivaling that of the United States—far more problematic. Furthermore, China’s central location within the larger concentration of Asian economic power—the fastest-growing hub in the international system—endows its growth with even greater significance. There is a risk that Beijing might someday exercise choking control over this critical geopolitical space and thereby endanger larger American and global

http://carnegieendowment.org/files/balancing_without_containment.pdf

security.13 Today, even before China has completely risen, it is already committed to the objective of enforcing a strict hierarchy in Asia, meaning that Beijing’s position at the top of the

continental order is acknowledged and respected by all its neighbors. As François Godement has pointed out, Chinese strategy for securing such primacy has revolved around translating <END PAGE 4> the massive economic gains it has made in recent years into a geopolitical approach that emphasizes “coercion without force.”14 Even more astutely, Christopher Ford has noted that “the ‘thorough submission’ of other countries” that China seeks is meant to be voluntary— that is, these countries “would be expected not to have to be forced to comply, but rather spontaneously to choose to take their place within the status-hierarchy under the benevolent guidance of the virtuous leader.”15 This is the only explanation that does justice to then Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi’s outburst at the 2010 meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations when, staring directly at Singapore’s then foreign minister, George Yeo, he bluntly declared that “China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact.”16 Just in case Beijing’s neighbors do not get the message, however, China has begun to put in place the foundations for enforcing its own version of the Monroe Doctrine along its various peripheries. Beginning with “cartographic aggression”17 through claims such as its “9-dash line” in the South China Sea and its expansive assertions along the Sino-Indian border to further efforts at “national enclosure”18 through its recently expanded air defense identification zone in the East China Sea to mounting “the world’s biggest military

expansion” 19 for several years running, China is systematically laying the foundations to ensure that its neighbors acquiesce to its burgeoning hegemony while simultaneously ensuring their isolation vis-à-vis their most important external protector, namely the United States. To be sure, China does not yet pose the kind of military threats to Asia that the Soviet

Union posed to Europe in its heyday. This condition, however, may not last for long given that China’s relations with its neighbors are troubled in many ways. Disputes over continental and maritime boundaries persist, status rivalries between China and its Asian peers have not disappeared, and Beijing has, at least so far, studiously refused to renounce the use of force in resolving geopolitical disagreements at a time when its own capacity to mount significant standoff attacks on adjacent countries is rapidly growing. Consequently, however remote the prospect may seem at present, the United States could find itself in a conflict with China in the future thanks to its extended deterrence obligations to various Asian nations. Conflicts between China and its neighbors that do not directly involve the United States but nevertheless affect U.S. interests are also possible. On balance, both these contingencies have inevitably impelled China “to expand and rapidly accelerate improvements in … [its] military and economic capabilities as well as increase its external influence to simultaneously establish political and economic dominance over the periphery … [in order to] provide leverage against future

great power pressure.”20 And these developments, all told, will almost automatically accentuate regional security dilemmas vis-à-vis both China’s neighbors and the United States. The specific location of China’s military capabilities makes this danger to the Asian theater especially problematic. The Soviet Union’s air and land lines of communication to its Asian peripheries were long, tenuous, and relatively underdeveloped, which made the sustainability <END PAGE 5> of Soviet military forces in the Far East a challenging proposition. Soviet combat power adjacent to the Pacific, however significant in absolute terms, was considerably weaker than its equivalent in Europe. China, by contrast, is highly advantaged on both counts. It can threaten all the major regional states located along both its continental and maritime peripheries through highly robust, and rapidly improving, interior lines of communication. Furthermore, the bulk of its military capabilities are either directly deployed along its eastern seaboard or can be swiftly moved to any one of its strategic peripheries. Thus, by comparison to the Soviet Union, China can more easily overawe the major power centers in the Indo-Pacific while at the same time more

effectively preventing the United States from bringing rearward reinforcements to bear in defense of its regional allies.21 All these realities— being a continental-sized power , possessing a gigantic and technologically improving economy , enjoying superior rates of relative economic growth, having a strategic ally advantageous location, and rapidly acquiring formidable military capabilities— add up quickly to make China a far more consequential rival to the United States than any Washington has faced in the past . Although U.S. officials are bashful about describing China plainly as a geopolitical threat, there is little doubt that they recognize the possibility of a coming power transition, with all its attendant dangers . Because of the perennial arguments among liberals, realists,

and neoconservatives, there is no agreement in Washington about what the implications of this transition might be. Yet it is precisely this contingency that U.S. grand strategy should aim to thwart because American primacy has been beneficial for the international system and, even more importantly, for the United States itself. Preserving this preeminence, accordingly, remains the central task for U.S. policymakers today. Devising a strategy that is equal to this responsibility must begin with an acknowledgment of both the significance and the complexity of the challenge given China’s deep enmeshment with the world. There is no better way to begin this assessment than by recognizing that globalization in the postwar period has spawned uneven gains that have produced in China a new competitor to the United States. This most recent bout of international integration has been reinvigorated and nurtured by American hegemony , understood simply as possessing more comprehensive power than any other state and being willing to use that power to structure the global order in certain ways. Beijing’s continuing ascent in these circumstances creates a difficult dilemma for Washington: unlike previous great powers that rose largely through autarkic means, China has grown rapidly because it has benefited disproportionately from American investments in sustaining a liberal international economic order. China, admittedly, is not alone in this regard. Many other European and Asian states have enjoyed economic revitalization in the postwar period because of their integration into the multilateral trading system underwritten by American power. But China has experienced disproportionately greater gains than the United States and others because its native comparative advantages have been magnified through three distinctive policies. First, Beijing has opted to maintain a domestic economy characterized by significant protectionist components even as it has pursued an investment-driven, export-led growth strategy that exploits the free access available to the more open economies of the developed world.22 Second, the dominant role of the Chinese state in economic decisionmaking has permitted the government to control critical factors of production, such as land and capital, maintain advantageous exchange rates, and sustain huge state-owned enterprises, which in their totality have enabled China to advance nationalist aims beyond simply allocative efficiency and the increased welfare of its population.23 And third, the consistent and systematic targeting of foreign intellectual property on a gigantic scale has advanced China’s industrial policy goals, which emphasize the

speedy acquisition of advanced technologies by both legitimate and illegitimate means in order to accelerate Chinese growth vis-à-vis other rivals in the international system.24 All these elements operating in unison have raised China’s level of development, which in turn has helped increase American welfare through trade—but at the cost of embodying a rising challenge to

U.S. power. However, it is by no means inevitable that China will continue to rise to the point where it becomes a genuine peer competitor of the United States. Although China has experienced meteoric economic growth in recent decades, the Chinese state has manifold weaknesses. It grapples with the prospect of adverse demographic transitions, contradictions between Beijing’s command polity and pseudo-liberal economy, and an unbalanced growth strategy that emphasizes overinvestment at the cost of domestic consumption. These weaknesses may yet take their toll, leading to either a collapse of China’s hitherto relentless expansion or its severe moderation.25 The evidence indicates that China’s leaders are acutely aware of the precarious character of the nation’s economic achievements thus far. Given their own problematic legitimacy, there is no doubt that they are deeply—even fearfully—concerned about the survival of China’s Communist regime in the context of the rising threats to domestic stability. Given the growing internal inequalities along multiple dimensions, the rampant corruption throughout society (and especially among the elites), and the increasing individuation in the prospering middle classes, China’s leaders remain obsessed by the dangers of internal chaos. They understand that they might not be able to satisfy the rising expectations of their now highly informed and restive population. The decisions reached during the recent third plenum of the 18th Party Congress indicate that the Xi Jinping regime remains intently focused on confronting the country’s myriad economic problems head-on both in order to sustain China’s global rise and to ward off any indigenous threats to Communist control within China.26 However, the Xi regime remains reluctant to face up to the need for constitutional political liberalization, which raises questions about whether its policies (or any similar policies followed by its successors) will indeed satisfactorily dissipate the dangers of domestic instability. On this score, only time will tell. But the reality of China’s internal troubles—which undoubtedly are considerable—has often strengthened the belief that its rise as a great power will not prove as troublesome to others as might be ordinarily expected. According to this line of thought, China’s domestic challenges will prevent its leaders from pursuing those self-regarding policies that have been prosecuted by all other great powers in history.27 There is no doubt that if the Chinese economy falters badly and for a substantial period of time or the Chinese state is gripped by a cataclysmic crisis—for whatever reason—the growing challenge to American hegemony would be attenuated. But absent such calamitous developments, it is unlikely that the weight of China’s internal challenges alone will prevent its leaders from pursuing those willful policies that would seem natural to Beijing as its power continues to grow. After all, elevated levels of Chinese assertiveness, which have been on display since the 2007–2008 global financial crisis, have occurred despite persistent domestic restiveness for over five years now. Moreover, internal problems have not prevented the Chinese state from successfully extracting the necessary resources to sustain a dramatic military modernization over a long period of time. Nor have they prevented recent Chinese leaders from steadily disregarding Deng Xiaoping’s old counsel to “hide and bide” in favor of a new belligerence that takes the form of “show and go.” In fact, Beijing has been able to harness popular sentiments to support its increasingly abrasive foreign policies in the Indo-Pacific

region. Given this reality, the U nited S tates cannot count on the possibility that China might stumble in any fundamental sense. Nor can it assume that China’s relatively higher growth rates will naturally decay well before Beijing acquires sufficient comprehensive power to become a consequential rival. Washington also cannot presume that its own national capabilities writ large will always remain more powerful or more fecund than China’s . Still less can it count on the prospect of Chinese oppugnancy vanishing merely because Chinese growth rates threaten to ease up somewhat in the future. After all, as Moscow did in years past, Beijing could still pose a major threat to U.S. interests despite possessing a smaller economy or experiencing slower

economic growth. Because China alone among all other emerging powers has the potential to displace the United States at the top of the international hierarchy, Washington confronts the necessity of consciously developing a grand strategy that limits Beijing’s ability to erode overall U.S. preeminence. This corrective strategy needs to be developed now , while China is still some distance away from being able to effectively challenge the United States, or else it risks being too late . China’s deep integration with the international

economy, however, implies that the containment strategies that worked so effectively against the Soviet Union cannot be successfully replicated today. Consequently, if Washington

is to escape from the Scylla of paralyzing helplessness in the face of China’s rise and the Charybdis of inveterate opposition to that ascent, it must embark on a novel course of action that can be best described as “ balancing without containment.” This report lays out the logic of such a strategy, focusing not so much on the current crises enveloping China and the United States but rather on the structural quandaries created by Beijing’s continuing rise. It begins by reviewing why China’s rise is unique in modern history and examines the specific predicament posed by China’s ascendancy to the United States. Thereafter, it elucidates the imperative of balancing China, given that other alternatives such as containment are not options that can be easily exercised by Washington at the present time. Finally, it develops the outlines of a strategy that the United States should pursue toward China, an approach that preserves the benefits of economic interdependence while limiting the dangers of a Chinese exploitation of its growing power.

The combination of nationalism and authoritarianism makes China inherently more war prone than the USCoker 15- Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Head of Department (Christopher, “The Improbable War”, 15 January 2015, Oxford University Press, pp.4)//SLHowever, given the logic of competition, I am convinced that China poses a greater threat to world peace than the United States because democratic societies are more accountable than non-democratic societies. The United States is a status quo power whose instincts, though they may often lead to war and conflict, are not necessarily belligerent. The same does not apply in the case of China. Nationalism is already proving to be a dangerous force in Chinese politics, and the military’s relationship with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) gives cause for concern. Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of China’s rise, remarks the dissident Liu Xiaobo, is its almost ‘pathological need’ to overtake the West. Yet wars are not always the product of ambition or malice, but often result from miscalculation. They occur because plans back- fire or because schemes are foiled by chance. When the (un)usual outliers—the

events and personalities that cannot be factored into any account—are also considered, then it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that politics and war are often very illogical.

Nationalism guarantees quick, great power escalation Tellis, 14—Ashley, senior associate @ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, PhD from U Chicago, former special assistant to the president and senior director for strategic planning and Southwest Asia at the National Security Council. “Balancing Without Containment,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace PDF report, Jan 22, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/balancing_without_containment.pdf, p. 17-18 –br Finally, Beijing’s ascent to global hegemony , first as a rival and then as a primate, could also pose an especially concerted threat to American interests because it may intensify the upsurge in Chinese nationalism . If the last two decades of Chinese growth have corroborated anything, it is that expanding economic power invariably stimulates various kinds of national awakenings, including those of the virulent variety. Western states that were once rising powers themselves are familiar with this phenomenon, which they often forget at their peril.45 Not surprisingly, then, China’s growing economic clout has already been accompanied by an unhealthy nationalism stimulated at different times by its media, its increasingly confident middle classes, its new netizen community, or sometimes even by the state itself.46 These entities have boosted Chinese aggressiveness in recent years, which has been manifested in seizures of disputed territories or threats of punishment directed toward traditional rivals. The availability of new resources has empowered Beijing to pursue coercive actions that were previously considered out of reach or excessively risky, and either new social forces within the state or the aroused citizenry has legitimized these actions. This development effectively refutes the widespread expectation that China’s economic growth, deriving as it did from interdependence instead of from the autarkic means that have led to the rise of other great powers, would produce a more pacific and cosmopolitan population focused on securing self-government at home rather than the expansion of national influence abroad. The likelihood that such pernicious nationalism would be aggravated even after China becomes either a peer of the United States or the most powerful state in international politics is great for three different, but mutually reinforcing, reasons. First , if the Chinese Communist Party survives at the helm, its problems of legitimacy could compel it —as is the case today—to excite Chinese nationalism whenever it senses serious threats to its survival or its hold on power.47 Second , the deeply etched memory of China’s “century of humiliation ” at the hands of foreign invaders ensures that a rising Beijing would be strongly motivated to prevent any loss of power . As a result, it would utilize all forms of political mobilization to bolster its strength in hopes of warding off any return to weakness that might spawn fresh indignities.48 Third, a powerful China would quickly discover that it remains surrounded by various challengers , some of whom may be capable of growing at even faster rates over time . Coping with these unending threats would charge Chinese nationalism further, in part because the major competitors along the country’s immediate periphery—Russia, India, and Japan, not to mention the United States—are also significant powers with proud histories and their own unique chauvinisms.49 The persistence of Chinese nationalism , then, will likely intensify the threats Beijing levies on Washington and its allies beyond what is inevitable due to the normal jostling of great-power competition.


China Rise threatens US security in East Asia – Guarantees escalation of Conflict once China reaches regional HegemonyRoss 13’ - Professor of political science at Boston College, Associate of the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, Senior advisor of the security studies program at MIT, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, One of the foremost American specialists on Chinese foreign and defense policy and U.S.-China relations (Robert, “US grand strategy, the rise of China, and US national security strategy for East Asia”, Strategic Studies Quarterly, http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/digital/pdf/summer_2013/ross.pdf//AK)The rise of China poses a challenge to US security in East Asia because, unless balanced, China could achieve regional hegemony. This could occur regardless of Chinese intentions and policies. Given the historical pattern of great-power politics, once China possesses the capabilities to challenge the regional order, it will presumably seek a dominant strategic position throughout East Asia. This has been the European experience, repeated many times over the past 500 years and often characterized by war. It has also been the experience in the Western Hemisphere since 1823, when the United States proclaimed its regional ambitions in the Monroe Doctrine. And it has been the recent experience in South Asia, where only Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons has prevented India from achieving dominance throughout the subcontinent. Great powers in search of security seek a region-wide sphere of influence. Should China have similar aspirations, it would be neither good nor bad nor reflect hostility toward the United States; it would simply reject great-power politics. On the other hand, even should China not have aspirations for regional leadership, it will emerge as the regional hegemon unless its rise is balanced by another great power. Local powers, responding to China’s growing advantage in the balance of capabilities in the region, will gravitate toward it rather than risk its hostility. In the absence of balancing, the rise of China will challenge a cornerstone of US security—a divided rank across the Pacific Ocean.The United States requires sufficient military and political presence in East Asia to balance the rise of China and to deter it from using force to achieve regional hegemony, should it become frustrated at the pace of change. US strength will also reassure local powers that their security does not require accommodation to China’s rise.15The optimal US grand strategy for East Asia will secure balance-of- power objectives at the least possible cost to US blood, treasure, and honor. To do otherwise would divert scarce strategic resources from capabilities and missions that would better serve US security elsewhere and would undermine achievement of critical nonstrategic objectives, including economic development and social welfare. Balancing China’s rise at the least possible cost will require continual modernization of US capabilities while managing US-China relations to avoid unnecessary yet costly conflict. The former is a military challenge; the latter is a political challenge.The United States requires sufficient military capability in East Asia to deter China from using force to realize its strategic ambitions and to reassure US security partners that they can rely on the United States to provide for their security against a rising China. This is how to maintain the balance of power in East Asia.China’s long-term strategy to challenge US military presence focuses on access-denial capabilities. Rather than fund a large power-projection and sea-control naval capability dependent on large and numerous surface ships, it has developed low-cost, secure platforms that may challenge the ability of

the United States to protect its war-fighting ships, especially aircraft carriers. Chinese exports primarily focus on the use of relatively quiet and increasingly numerous diesel submarines. By 2000, China’s submarine force had awakened concern in the US Navy over the wartime survivability of its surface fleet, especially its carriers. More recently, Chinese research and testing of an anti-ship ballistic missile system and anti-ship cruise missiles deployed on submarines and surface ships suggest China may eventually pose an even greater challenge to the US fleet. Should China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) develop an effective intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) targeting capability to inflict critical attacks on US naval assets, it may be able to deter US intervention in its hostilities with local states or create region-wide doubts that the United States has the resolve to defend their security at the risk of war.18 If China believes it can deter US intervention, it may be encouraged to use force against US allies.

Impact: SCS

Balancing deters China in the SCS – it solves comparatively better than engagementPickrell 15(Ryan, PhD degree in International Politics and Diplomacy, “The Tipping Point: Has the U.S.-China Relationship Passed the Point of No Return?”, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-tipping-point-has-the-us-china-relationship-passed-the-14168?page=3, 10/26/15, NRG)

The situation in the South China Sea has been steadily escalating for several years now. In April, 2014, American defense secretary Chuck Hagel met with Chinese defense minister Chang Wanquan. During the meeting, Hagel said, “All parties should refrain from provocative actions and the use of intimidation, coercion, or aggression to advance their claims. Such disputes must be resolved peacefully and in accordance with international law.” Chang replied, “I’d like to reiterate that the territorial sovereignty issue is a Chinese core interest. On this issue, we will make no compromises, no concessions. Not even a tiny bit of violation will be allowed.” The inability to discuss openly or compromise on this issue has made it impossible to resolve and has led to escalation and increased tension.In the aftermath of this meeting, China began investing heavily in island construction and land reclamation activities in disputed waters. As these activities have stirred up a lot of dust in the region, the United States has demanded that China abandon its present course of action, insisting that it is provocative and negatively impacting regional peace and stability. Not only has China dismissed America’s demands, it has also increased its military presence in contested areas in order to establish anti-access zones. While China claims that its actions are within the scope of international law, the United States asserts that Chinese actions are in violation of the law of the sea and laws for the regulation of the international commons. China argues that the South China Sea issue is a territorial sovereignty issue, yet the United States regards this issue as a freedom of navigation dispute, as well as a fight for the preservation of the international legal system—a cornerstone for the American-led liberal world order.In August of this year, the United States launched its new Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, which aims “to safeguard the freedom of the seas, deter conflict and escalation, and promote adherence to international law and standards.” The Asia-Pacific region is now at the heart of the American naval security agenda. In response, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said that China “opposes any country’s attempt to challenge China’s territorial sovereignty and security under the pretext of safeguarding navigation freedom.” Responding to Chinese criticisms of America’s new regional maritime security strategy, American Defense Secretary Ashton Carter stated, “Make no mistake, we will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law permits…We will do that at times and places of our choosing.” In 2014, the United States carried out “freedom of navigation” exercises in various parts of the world and challenged the territorial claims of 18 different countries; however, the United States has yet to officially challenge China’s claims in the South China Sea. But, that may soon change, as the United States is currently considering sending American naval vessels within 12 nautical miles of China’s artificial islands in order to force China to end its land reclamation activities.Such plans are considered aggressive, dangerous and extremely provocative by the Chinese. A recent Global Times editorial read, “China mustn’t tolerate rampant US violations of China’s adjacent waters and the skies over these expanding islands. The Chinese military should be ready to launch countermeasures according to Washington’s level of provocation.” The article further stated, “If the US

encroaches on China’s core interests, the Chinese military will stand up and use force to stop it.” The article stated plainly, “If the US adopts an aggressive approach, it will breach China’s bottom line, and China will not sit idly by.” Other reports from this newspaper, a state-sponsored Chinese media outlet, have made it clear that if the bottom line for the United States is that China must end all of its land reclamation activities in the South China Sea, then war is inevitable, which suggests that this issue may be the tipping point for the Sino-American relationship. How the United States and China choose to move forward on this issue will permanently redefine the relationship between these two great powers.Granted, this may just be saber rattling, but even if that is the case, this issue is still decidedly zero-sum —which increases the likelihood of conflict. For China, political preservation and a potential Chinese sphere of influence are on the line, and for the United States, the liberal world order and American hegemony are at stake. Sooner or later, this trying issue will need to be resolved, and regardless of whether it is resolved through diplomacy or military force, it will take a toll on the geopolitical influence of either one or both countries. Were the international institutions for collective security strong enough to handle situations like this when they arise—and if China and the United States were willing to establish a new relationship model which addresses each country’s respective security concerns and encourages effective collaboration—it might actually be possible to resolve this issue peacefully. But given current circumstances, this is little more than idealism and wishful thinking. As there is currently no clear solution to this problem that would allow both countries to walk out of this situation with their heads held high, these two states are pondering the unthinkable. Depending on each country’s level of commitment and resolve, this situation may have already passed the tipping point. The outcome of the geopolitical power struggle between China and the United States will almost certainly be decided in the South China Sea. Some have suggested that the South China Sea issue is not a Sino-American issue. On the contrary, it is the most pressing Sino-American issue. One side will either choose to back down or be forced to back down. No matter how everything plays out in the South China Sea, geopolitics in the Asia-Pacific region will never be the same again.

China rise causes conflict escalation over South China SeaBarno and Bensahel 16 – Barno is a Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, and Dr. Nora Bensahel is a Distinguished Scholar in Residence, at the School of International Service at American University. Both also serve as Nonresident Senior Fellows at the Atlantic Council (David and Nora, “A GUIDE TO STEPPING IT UP IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA”, JUNE 14, 2016, War on the Rocks, http://warontherocks.com/2016/06/a-guide-to-stepping-it-up-in-the-south-china-sea//AK)The South China Sea has become one of the most dangerous flashpoints in the world as China continues to aggressively expand its influence and capabilities there. One year ago, we proposed several ways in which the United States could try to deter further Chinese encroachments. But, as the recent Shangri-La Dialogue demonstrated, tensions in the region have only risen since then. The Chinese have only accelerated their bellicose behavior, and nothing the United States has done has seemed to have any effect. The United States and its partners now have no choice but to consider a wider range of more assertive responses.We are not seeking a conflict with China, nor do we advocate a war. We do not believe that China is an inevitable adversary of the United States. But we are increasingly concerned that Chinese actions in the South China Sea, if left unopposed, will give it de facto dominance of an area that is a vital strategic

interest to the United States. More direct U.S. actions would involve significant risks — but so would failing to act, and those risks are far less appreciated.Why does the South China Sea matter? It is one of the world’s most important shipping lanes, transited by about one-third of global commercial goods each year. It lies atop at least seven billion barrels of oil and an estimated 900 million cubic feet of natural gas. Conflicting claims to these important waters abound. These involve several U.S. allies and friends and will likely be exacerbated by the pending outcome of an international court case between China and the Philippines. Chinese efforts to establish sovereign claims over these key international waters not only threaten unimpeded access to global shipping lanes and U.S. partners in the region, but also set a dangerous global precedent. Beijing’s forceful efforts are intended to establish regional hegemony by creating a zone of “near seas” over which it can claim sole control.During the past year, Chinese actions have grown bolder. They have completed land reclamation efforts at the three largest outposts in the South China Sea and are now focusing on developing infrastructure. Each one already has an airfield with a 9,800-foot runway, which is long enough to land most military aircraft. They have also landed a military jet on Fiery Cross Reef and deployed advanced fighters and surface-to-air missiles on Woody Island in the Paracels. Taken together, these capabilities provide forward-positioned power projection platforms for Chinese fighters, bombers, and reconnaissance aircraft. Aircraft from these bases could easily reach — and possibly enforce — Chinese claims out to the so-called “nine-dash line” that borders the easternmost rim of the South China Sea. Chinese Navy ships and maritime militia can also use these outposts as refueling and provisioning stops that extend their sea presence across this vast expanse. U.S. aircraft carriers are at best transient visitors in these same waters, and no other country in the region can project and sustain the air and naval presence in the South China Sea that these fixed bases now offer.The United States has responded to this continued expansion with ever stronger warnings and actions. Most notably, the United States conducted its first freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) in the South China Sea in October 2015, when a U.S. destroyer sailed within 12 miles of Subi Reef to demonstrate that the United States rejects any Chinese maritime claims emanating from its artificial islands. At least two other FONOPs have been conducted since then, and the head of U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Harry Harris, has stated that future FONOPs will increase in number, scope, and complexity.Yet Chinese confrontational actions are nevertheless continuing and even escalating. In recent months, for example, Chinese fighter jets have flown dangerously close to U.S. reconnaissance aircraft in both the South and East China Seas, violating an agreement that the United States and China signed last year on safe conduct in the air. And the Chinese government recently announced that it is considering establishing an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the South China Sea as a further signal of its security claims to this key region.China has subtly but forcefully established a permanent presence across a series of outposts on territory that did not exist five years ago. This is the new reality of the South China Sea. As a result, the United States and its regional partners now have little choice but to consider a broader and stronger range of options. These actions should be designed to achieve two primary objectives: to deter China from further expansion and combative behaviors and to better position the United States and its partners for military action to defend the international commons, if required.

China Rise greatly increases the risk of conflict over South China SeaBonciu 15’- PhD, University Professor and Vice-president for Research with the Romanian-American University, Senior Researcher with the Institute for World Economy (Florin, “THE RISE OF CHINA AS THE LARGEST ECONOMY IN THE WORLD: GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR JAPAN”, Romanian Economic and Business Review—Found on Pro-quest, http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqrl/docview/1700066833/A7D55FF632864D02PQ/1?accountid=14667//AK)This challenge determined by the rise of China is particularly complex after 2008 because of a set of new circumstances among which: some of the new leaders in Asia tend to be more nationalistic; many Asian nations have to find new growth strategies as structural reforms are needed to replace export oriented strategies with new ones based on domestic consumption and/or regional cooperation; the role of US in the Asia Pacific region is not so clear anymore and, at the same time there is a lack of strong institutional mechanisms to prevent the escalation of conflicts.The risk of conflicts due to the emergence of a new significant power, China, is not theoretical. The existence of various forms of conflicts and tensions in the South and East China Seas has been a permanent phenomenon after the second World War. But what can be noted is an increase in the number of such conflicts and also in the number of the parties involved. Figure 2 offers a synthetic view of the geographical areas involved, the participants and the number of conflicts as well as their distribution in time.As it can be noted the number of conflicts are higher with some of the nearest neighbors (Philippines, Japan, Vietnam) while more distant countries (like US, India, Indonesia) are less involved. A particular case refers to the conflicts of China with Taiwan which are not so numerous and are however related to the historical and ideological division of the two parts of China.In a more concrete and recent form some of territorial disputes in the South China Sea refer to two island chains, Spratlys and Paracels. The countries involved in the disputes are besides China, Vietnam, Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia and the reason of disputes are the potential natural reserves that may be found in the areas around these islands.In the recent years a number of disputes on this topics were recorded as follows9:- In 2012, China and the Philippines accused each other of intrusions in the Scarborough Shoal area;- In July 2012 China entered in conflict with Vietnam and the Philippines when it formally created Sansha city, an administrative body with its headquarters in the Paracels which it says oversees Chinese territory in the South China Sea;- In 2012 large anti-China protests took place in on Vietnam with reference to claims that the Chinese navy sabotaged two Vietnamese exploration;- In January 2013, Philippines announced that it was taking China to a UN tribunal under the auspices of the UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea;- In May 2014, the introduction by China of a drilling rig into waters near the Paracel Islands led to multiple collisions between Vietnamese and Chinese ships.- In April 2015, satellite images showed China building an airstrip on reclaimed land in the Spratlys.

Balancing solves

Balancing is the only choice – China’s rise is inevitable and engagement won’t preserve American primacy – loss of hegemony drives dangerous transition wars and revives interventionism Tellis, 14—Ashley, senior associate @ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, PhD from U Chicago, former special assistant to the president and senior director for strategic planning and Southwest Asia at the National Security Council. “Balancing Without Containment,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace PDF report, Jan 22, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/balancing_without_containment.pdf, p. 14-15 –br The prospect that China might one day become “the greatest power in the world,” riding to that apex on the back of American investments in maintaining a liberal international order, should be disturbing to the United States. Whatever else it may imply, the loss of American hegemony would be dangerous to U.S. security because it would entail a diminution of strategic autonomy, the first and most important benefit of possessing greater power than others in a competitive environment. Being the most powerful entity in the global system for over a century has not only increased U.S. safety by allowing the United States to defeat threats far from its shores but also permitted Washington to shape the international environment in ways that reflect its own interests. This capacity to configure the milieu in which it operates to its advantage in all arenas—economic, military, geopolitical, ideational, and institutional—implies that Washington can constrain the choices of other states far more than it is constrained by them. This critical measure of relative power affords the United States greater immunity than its competitors enjoy.37 The loss of American primacy to China , therefore, would put Washington at Beijing’s mercy far more than is currently the case. Consequently, as long as the international system remains rivalrous and harbors threats to U.S. security, the United States has no alternative but to preserve American hegemony. Such preeminence provides greater security than the alternative of equality with, let alone subordination to, others. It allows the United States to attract the resources necessary to maintain the most innovative economic system on the planet , a capacity that permits it to enjoy a high standard of living and produce the formidable military instruments that enable it to impose its will on rival powers. It affords the United States the luxury of being able to defend itself by conducting military operations closer to the homelands of its adversaries than to its own. It enables Washington to maintain a robust system of alliances that offers the promise of collective defense against common threats and provides significant reservoirs of capability for expeditionary operations abroad. It gilds the attractiveness of American ideas, customs, and fashions internationally and thus procures legitimation by means that go beyond mere force. And it permits the U nited S tates to protect its national equities through various international institutions that represent a “rule-based” order and secure favorable outcomes for Washington without it having to repeatedly apply raw power . The United States would lose many of these benefits were China to rival or replace it as the most powerful state in the international system. And China’s ascent to this pinnacle would be doubly painful because Beijing has benefited disproportionately from an international system that was originally intended—and is still meant—to advance American interests in the first instance. Concerns about the consequences of losing U.S. preeminence might matter less if it were certain that Chinese primacy would not fundamentally undermine American interests. Such an expectation, however, is absurd in any


competitive system . For all their affinities, even the rising United States drove deep nails into the coffin of British hegemony, a reality that London, blinded by its illusions about its “special relationship” with Washington, often failed to see during America’s own ascent to power. As Correlli Barnett acidly concluded, “For the Americans—like the Russians, like the Germans, like the English themselves in the eighteenth century—were motivated by a desire to promote their own interests rather than by sentiment, which was a commodity they reserved for Pilgrim’s Dinners, where it could do no harm.”38 Naturally, American power in turn would be similarly threatened by Chinese ascendency, even if Beijing currently denies any intention to challenge U.S. preeminence.

A balancing strategy is vital to preventing China’s hostile rise – increasing economic integration threatens US leadership and risks existential impactsTellis and Blackwill 15 (Ashley** and David*, senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations*, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues**, “U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China”, Council on Foreign Relations, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Blackwill.pdf, April 13, 2015, NRG)

The principal task that confronts U.S. grand strategy today, therefore, is adapting to the fundamental challenge posed by China’s continuing rise. Integration, the prevailing U.S. approach toward China and the one followed assiduously since the 1970s, has undoubtedly contributed to China’s rise as a future rival to American power. None of the alternatives usually discussed in the debates in Washington and elsewhere about how to respond to China’s growing strength satisfy the objective of preserving American primacy for yet another “long cycle” in international politics. These alternatives, which include embracing and participating with China, accommodating Beijing through some kind of a Group of Two (G2) arrangement, or containing China à la the Soviet Union, all have severe limitations from the viewpoint of U.S. national interests and could in fact undermine the larger goal of strengthening Washington’s preeminence in the global system.33 Accordingly, the United States should substantially modify its grand strategy toward China—one that at its core would replace the goal of concentrating on integrating Beijing into the international system with that of consciously balancing its rise—as a means of protecting simultaneously the security of the United States and its allies, the U.S. position at the apex of the global hierarchy, and the strength of the liberal international order, which is owed ultimately to the robustness of American relative power.There is no better basis for analyzing and formulating U.S. grand strategy toward China than connecting that strategy directly to U.S. vital national interests—conditions that are strictly necessary to safeguard and enhance Americans’ survival and well-being in a free and secure nation.34U.S. vital national interests are as follows:■ prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of conventional and unconventional attacks on the continental United States and its extended territorial possessions;■ maintain a balance of power in Europe and Asia that promotes peace and stability through a continuing U.S. leadership role and U.S. alliances;■ prevent the use and slow the spread of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, secure nuclear weapons and materials, and prevent proliferation of intermediate and long-range delivery systems for nuclear weapons; and

■ promote the health of the international economy, energy markets, and the environment.China’s Challenge to U.S. Vital National InterestsAlthough Washington seeks a cooperative relationship with Beijing regarding nonproliferation, energy security, and the international economy and environment, the primary U.S. preoccupation regarding these national interests should be a rising China’s systematic effort to undermine the second vital national interest mentioned—that is, to fundamentally alter the balance of power in Asia, diminish the vitality of the U.S.-Asian alliance system, and ultimately displace the United States as the Asian leader. Success in attaining these objectives would open the door to China’s ability to undermine the first and third interests over time. As noted earlier, Beijing seeks to achieve these goals:■ replace the United States as the primary power in Asia;■ weaken the U.S. alliance system in Asia;35■ undermine the confidence of Asian nations in U.S. credibility, reliability, and staying power;■ use China’s economic power to pull Asian nations closer to PRC geopolitical policy preferences;■ increase PRC military capability to strengthen deterrence against U.S. military intervention in the region;■ cast doubt on the U.S. economic model;■ ensure U.S. democratic values do not diminish the CCP’s hold on domestic power; and■ avoid a major confrontation with the United States in the next decade. President Xi signaled China’s aims to undermine the Asian balance of power at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia in early 2014 when he argued that “Asia’s problems ultimately must be resolved by Asians and Asia’s security ultimately must be protected by Asians.”36 The capacity of the United States to deal successfully with this systematic geoeconomic, military, and diplomatic challenge by China to U.S. primacy in Asia will determine the shape of the international order for decades to come.

AT: Allies won’t support balancing

Asia will join the US in counterbalancing ChinaSmith, 15 - Jeff M. Smith is the Director for Asian Security Programs at the American Foreign Policy Council (“RIP: America's "Engagement" Strategy towards China?” 8/3, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-americas-china-strategy-should-be-13473?page=show

As the Obama administration considers the merits of new strategies to cope with China’s rise, it would benefit from focusing on the one silver lining produced by China’s flirtation with neonationalism. A key component of any effective U.S. “balancing” strategy lies in nurturing a balancing coalition of like-minded regional partners. Once an insurmountable task, mounting regional fears over Chinese aggression have arguably rendered the Asian landscape more conducive to such an endeavor than ever before.A decade ago, a handful of Asian “Middle Powers” with little history of collaboration began flirting with new avenues of defense cooperation. What began as tentative steps broke into an open sprint the last two years, largely driven by anxiety over China’s rise. As each has strengthened its ties with Washington, new relationships have blossomed among Japan, India, Australia, the Philippines, Vietnam and others. China’s neighbors, it seems, are reevaluating their own “engagement” strategies and concluding that a more overt balancing posture offers the best insurance against Chinese aggression. While the initial tangible impact may appear modest, the strategic calculus in these capitals is rapidly changing .

Asia fears China and will bandwagon with the USManning and Przystup 16 (Robert* and James**, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. He previously served in the State Department as a senior advisor to the Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific (1989-93) and on the Secretary’s policy planning staff (2004-08)* Senior Fellow at the National Defense University Institute for National Security Studies** , “What Might a New Asian Order Look Like?”, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/what-might-new-asian-order-look-15754, 4/12/16, NRG)

As for the present security architecture in the region, we are witnessing an evolution of the alliance structure from the Cold War ‘hub and spokes’ model to a more open architecture fostering bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with U.S. allies and partners as well as between them. Within the partnership construct, the United States, Japan and Australia are working with countries bordering the South China Sea on initiatives aimed at maritime capacity building, enhanced maritime domain awareness, joint training, exercising and port calls.Why is this happening? In effect China’s assertive nationalist behavior, both military and diplomatic, after the global financial crisis has sparked a bandwagon effect among Asian states, pushing them toward the United States and each other. Take for example the behavior of then Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi in 2010, after Secretary of State Hillary Clinton offered U.S. assistance to resolve South China Sea disputes. After his walk out in response to the Secretary’s presentation, Yang returned later to remind the Southeast Asian nations that "China is big. You’re small. That’s a fact."

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-americas-china-strategy-should-be-13473?page=show

There is a growing recognition that when China pushes against U.S. and Asian interests, the latter will push back. In effect what’s been driving the evolution of the region’s security architecture is a combination of China’s Middle Kingdom efforts to reverse 160 years of ‘humiliation’ and signals from the region that they’re not necessarily interested in that reversal.

AT: Balancing bad impact turn

They can’t win offense – the failure of engagement causes a reversion to containmentLumbers 15-Program Director, Emerging Security NATO Association of Canada (Michael, “Wither the Pivot? Alternative U.S. Strategies for Responding to China’s Rise”, 10 Jul 2015, Comparative Strategy, Vol.34, Is 4)//SL

Containment and EngagementThe policy of choice for the great majority of China watchers, the foreign policy establishment at large, and U.S. policymakers for more than 40 years, containment and engagement draws on a long heritage of essentially liberal ideas about international order. As with confrontation and enhanced balancing, the objective of containment and engagement is perpetuating American preeminence in the Asia–Pacific. It aims to do so, however, by supplementing politico-military pressure to check Chinese ambitions with an interlocking, mutually beneficial web of economic, institutional, and cultural links that incentivizes China to cooperate with the global order rather than challenge it: sticks and carrots. An underlying assumption of this approach is that reliance on overtly hostile measures to ensure Chinese compliance with international norms will only confirm the mainland's worst assumptions of U.S. intentions and turn it into an enemy with a revisionist agenda.Aside from being provocative, most containers and engagers deem such measures unnecessary. “China does not pose a threat to America's vital security interests today, tomorrow or at any time in the near future,” Robert Ross concludes in a typical assessment. In stark contrast to confrontationists and enhanced balancers, these observers draw attention to a myriad of deep-seated economic and demographic problems in China that they see as constraining its development and likely to divert resources needed for an assertive foreign policy, problems that afford some latitude for modulated containment and the pursuit of initiatives aimed at muting the more corrosive elements of the Sino-American rivalry. A defensive, risk-averse foreign policy would seem to be a logical course for a country consumed with implementing much-needed economic reform, meeting the growing demands of a restless populace, and hemmed in on all sides by vigilant regional actors wary of its expanding influence. In fact, this is exactly how containers and engagers interpret Chinese grand strategy in the post–Cold War era. China's overriding priority is to sustain the remarkable economic growth of the past 30 years, which its leaders regard as key to maintaining political and social stability among a populace that can no longer be swayed by appeals to ideology. A stable international environment is conducive to this focus. While Beijing chafes at America's military presence in the region, particularly its informal commitment to the defense of Taiwan, and longs for a transition to a multipolar world where U.S. power is constrained, it recognizes both the need for avoiding confrontation and advancing its economic and security interests through constructive relations with Washington.While cautioning against overreacting to a threat that has been exaggerated in some quarters, containers and engagers do not take a cooperative, peaceful China for granted. According to their logic, the Chinese government's acute sense of aggrievement over historical episodes of international humiliation and its responsiveness to a pugnacious streak of nationalism among its people is worrisome, as are its uncertain long-term intentions, at best shaky commitment to the liberal global order, and rapid military modernization. As a hedge against China's rise veering off in an antagonistic direction, they call for preserving the U.S.-led hub-and-spokes alliance system in Asia. To Beijing's great irritation, this policy

also entails maintaining the flow of arms to Taiwan to uphold the credibility of America's security commitments throughout the region, as well as holding the Chinese government's feet to the fire for human rights violations and pressing it to make itself more accountable to the population, the long-held assumption being that a more democratic China will be less prone to aggression.The great appeal of containment and engagement for U.S. decision makers is that, more than any other choice of strategy toward China, it preserves the greatest number of options and has hitherto proven sufficiently flexible to accommodate evolving conditions in the Sino-American relationship. Most importantly, this blend of deterrence and conciliation has largely succeeded in keeping a lid on tensions between China and its neighbors in a region rife with flashpoints and has made some progress in integrating the PRC into the existing international order. It seems well suited for today's challenging strategic environment, in which the United States is buffeted by resource constraints, extensive global commitments, and anti-interventionist popular sentiment as it looks to preserve its leadership role in Asia by means short of confrontation.Yet over the coming years, this longstanding policy, which has worked well while China has remained relatively weak and preoccupied with internal development, will be subjected to unprecedented strains. Whether it seeks to translate its growing power into increased regional clout or attempts to outwardly deflect domestic discontent through aggressive posturing, acting out of strength or weakness, the PRC is likely to present new security challenges that will test the support of voters and policy elites alike for engagement . If moderate efforts to encourage China's further adjustment to U.S. preferences in the realms of security, trade, and global governance are seen as falling short or, even worse, displaying timidity in the face of Chinese assertiveness, a stronger emphasis on containment will surely result .

But this is still unique offense for us - delaying a transition to balancing increases the risk of major warFriedberg 11 - Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, co-director of the Woodrow Wilson School’s Center for International Security Studies (Aaron, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, p. 262-263)

Regardless of how wide the gap between their military capabilities is at present, the combination of Chinese momentum and American restraint cannot help but accelerate the pace at which the divide narrows. If the optimists are wrong, and the balance is already dose or, regardless of the objective reality, if China's leaders believe it to be, then unilateral restraint could turn out to be a very dangerous policy indeed. While most advocates of enhanced engagement pay lip service to the importance of preserving a favorable military balance, their reading of the current situation, combined with their strong desire to avoid antagonizing Beijing, inclines them toward inaction rather than action. When the time comes to make decisions, they are likely to be wary of deploying additional forces to the Western Pacific, developing new weapons specifically designed for a possible conflict with China, going "too far" in tightening defense ties with U.S. friends and allies, or creating new multilateral mechanisms to enhance strategic cooperation among Asia's democracies. If their arguments carry the day, the shift in the regional balance of military power toward China will accelerate.There are several dangers here. Because of the long lead times involved in designing, building, and deploying new capabilities, it is hard to quickly reverse unfavorable trends in the balance of military power. If today's leaders fail to make sound decisions when conditions are reasonably tranquil , their

successors may find it very difficult to respond in a timely fashion in the future if the Sino-American relationship unravels or if China becomes unstable and unexpectedly aggressive. An unduly muted reaction to China's ongoing buildup could also increase the risk of misperception, miscalculation , and unintended conflict. Washington's seeming passivity could be taken, not as a sign of self-confidence, but as an indication of a waning commitment to some or all of its longtime friends and allies in Asia. Depending on how they assess the military balance, planners in the People's Liberation Army may already be more optimistic about their capabilities than outsiders realize. Even if they are not, absent a vigorous American response, their sense of assurance can only grow with time. In some future showdown with a third party, Beijing might assume that Washington was disinterested, deterred, or both, only to find out too late that it was neither. The fact that the U.S. government has a history of not always being dear, even in its own collective mind, about how it would respond until confronted by aggression makes this an even more plausible, and worrisome, scenario.l7 As it works to reassure Beijing by not overreacting to its initiatives, the United States may also succeed, albeit inadvertently, in demoralizing its own friends. There are already signs of anxiety emanating from some Asian capitals about America's willingness and ability in the long run to maintain its position of regional military preponderance. What seems like a prudent, measured response could appear from the other side of the Pacific as an indication of resignation and the start of a slow retreat. Overreaction doubtless has its dangers, but underreaction could wind up triggering a cascade of appeasement that will hasten the very outcome that American strategists are now trying to prevent.

Engagement is on-balance more risky – it better explains status quo aggression and will cause a major war down the roadJacobs, 15 - Bruce Jacobs is emeritus professor of Asian Languages and Studies at Monash University (Bruce, “Appeasement will only encourage China,” Sydney Morning Herald, 11/1, http://www.smh.com.au/comment/appeasement-will-only-encourage-expansionist-china-20151101-gknz2l.html)//JSThe arguments of people such as Age columnist Hugh White are dangerous. They ignore the cause of tension in Asia and say we have to be careful about becoming involved in a war. History has taught us that "appeasement" of such expansionist powers as China does not stop war. Rather, it only temporarily postpones armed conflict and ultimately leads to a much larger war later . Appeasement of China only enhances Chinese perceptions that the US is a toothless paper tiger. It creates a sense among China's generals and political leaders that they can pursue expansionist policies without international protest.The pretence that Taiwan's vote for its own president and legislature can lead to war is false. Both main candidates, Tsai Ing-wen and Eric Chu, want to maintain the status quo – that Taiwan is de facto an independent state but that it will not announce this. Australians would be appalled if we were told by a foreign power that voting for either Malcolm Turnbull or Bill Shorten would lead to war and that we should vote accordingly.We must be clear that China is the only country threatening anyone else in Asia. The close talks between leaders of such countries as the US, Japan, India and Australia demonstrate that Asia's democratic countries have become aware of the risks.

http://www.smh.com.au/comment/appeasement-will-only-encourage-expansionist-china-20151101-gknz2l.html//JS

http://www.smh.com.au/comment/appeasement-will-only-encourage-expansionist-china-20151101-gknz2l.html//JS

In classical balance-of-power theory, the rise of one expansionist power creates a coalition among other powers. China's expansionist actions have already created a substantial democratic coalition in Asia prepared to prevent China from starting a major war.

And, China perceives the plan as just as hostile as containment – which makes confrontation inevitableLumbers 15-Program Director, Emerging Security NATO Association of Canada (Michael, “Wither the Pivot? Alternative U.S. Strategies for Responding to China’s Rise”, 10 Jul 2015, Comparative Strategy, Vol.34, Is 4)//SL

There were strong overtones of an integrationist strategy toward China during the early phases of Barack Obama's presidency. Hobbled by soaring budget deficits and a slow recovery from a crippling financial crisis, preoccupied with bringing America's external commitments into closer alignment with its finite resources after a decade of military entanglement in the Middle East, and pessimistic about the constraints on U.S. power, the administration was intrigued by the idea of recruiting Chinese cooperation in addressing a host of transnational challenges, such as recovery from the global financial crisis, climate change, and reining in North Korea's nuclear weapons program. To incentivize such assistance, Washington made a concerted attempt to recognize Beijing's increased international stature and accord it with more influence in global deliberations; the G-20 was formally upgraded as the premier forum for guiding the world economy, and the bilateral Strategic Economic Dialogue initiated by the preceding Bush administration was expanded to a Strategic and Economic Dialogue to foster interaction between the two countries across a wider spectrum of issues. Yet Obama officials also viewed efforts to encourage China to assume additional burdens in global governance as extending U.S. hegemony by increasing the PRC's stake in upholding the American-led liberal order, thereby ensuring that its rise occurred within the confines of U.S.-inspired norms. Beijing suspected as much , thinking the Obama administration's call for it to make a greater contribution to the management of global order was an ill-concealed scheme to contain China's rise by burdening it with additional responsibilities that would divert resources from economic development at home.If pursued with the tenacity recommended by its advocates, integration, in its universalistic assumption that what's good for the United States is good for others, could prove as provocative to China as any other strategy . Though craving the respect typically enjoyed by a great power, many Chinese commentators are deeply skeptical of Western calls for it to assume the responsibilities of one, thinking it a devious ploy to tie down China . While unlikely or unable to overturn the liberal international system, it is entirely conceivable that China, with deeply embedded ideas of how to manage domestic and international order that sharply diverge from the West's, could pursue a separate path to security and prosperity. Alternatively, the PRC might eventually reassess its present policy of economic engagement with the Western order if its stratospheric growth rates, the primary means by which the government appeals for support from its people, are no longer sustained.

A shift to balancing gives China no choice but to cooperate on major issues – they won’t like it, but they’ll lack the capability to breakoutTellis and Blackwill 15 (Ashley** and David*, senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations*, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues**, “U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China”, Council on Foreign Relations, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Blackwill.pdf, April 13, 2015, NRG)

Finally, the question arises regarding how China will respond to the U.S. grand strategy recommended here. Are not the risks of pursuing this grand strategy too great? One could certainly expect a strong Chinese reaction and a sustained chill in the bilateral relationship, including fewer meetings among senior officials, little progress on bilateral economic issues, less opportunities for American business in China, reduced military-to-military interaction, a reduction in societal interchange, and perhaps fewer Chinese students in American universities. (We dismiss the likelihood that China would respond to the measures recommended in this report by selling off its U.S. bond holdings because of the consequential reduction in their value.) These steps by Beijing would not be trivial but also would not threaten vital U.S. national interests. If China went further in its policy as opposed to reacting rhetorically, the more aggressive Beijing’s policy response and the more coercive its actions, the more likely that America’s friends and allies in Asia would move even closer to Washington. We do not think that China will find an easy solution to this dilemma.Moreover, it is likely that Beijing would continue to cooperate with the United States in areas that it thinks serve China’s national interests—on the global economy, international trade, climate change, counterterrorism, the Iranian nuclear weapons program, North Korea, and post-2016 Afghanistan. Put differently, we do not think the Chinese leadership in a fit of pique—hardly in China’s strategic tradition— would act in ways that damage its policy purposes and its reputation around Asia. In short, this strategic course correction in U.S. policy toward China would certainly trigger a torrent of criticism from Beijing because it would begin to systemically address China’s goal of dominating Asia and produce a more cantankerous PRC in the UN Security Council, but it would not end many aspects of U.S.-China international collaboration based on compatible national interests. Although there are risks in following the course proposed here, as with most fundamental policy departures, such risks are substantially smaller than those that are increasing because of an inadequate U.S. strategic response to the rise of Chinese power.

Containment is not confrontation – the US would only fight China in response to an attackLumbers 15-Program Director, Emerging Security NATO Association of Canada (Michael, “Wither the Pivot? Alternative U.S. Strategies for Responding to China’s Rise”, 10 Jul 2015, Comparative Strategy, Vol.34, Is 4)//SL

Of the six schools of thought discussed here, confrontation is the least likely strategy that U.S. policymakers would ever consider adopting toward China. The longer a set policy has been pursued and the more institutionally ingrained it is, as is the case with the bipartisan China policy of containment and engagement of the last five decades, the greater is the need for a jarring event to discredit prevailing

orthodoxy and yield a sharp departure in worldview. Dramatic shifts in U.S. national security policy have traditionally occurred in response to surprise attacks—the British occupation of Washington in August 1814, the Japanese bombardment of Pearl Harbor, and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks—that convinced leaders of the need for an expanded world role to safeguard the homeland. The contemplation of preventive war against China, a fully developed nuclear power with the capacity for delivering a catastrophic response to an American attack, would require an unlikely shock to the system, such as an unprovoked Chinese assault on U.S. troops stationed in Asia or on American soil.Short of such a shock, it is exceedingly difficult to envision such a radical departure in strategy garnering support at home or among regional allies. Generally, recent public opinion surveys have revealed that while Americans are uneasy about China's rise, they are roughly divided when asked whether the United States should adopt a tougher economic posture toward China, while strong majorities are opposed to a military confrontation. When asked whether the U.S. should engage with China or work to limit its rise, roughly two-thirds have consistently opted for the former approach. The marked decline in enthusiasm for U.S. activism abroad after a decade of entanglement in the Middle East and in the wake of a financial crisis has surely only cemented this sentiment. Circumstances, of course, could change. For the foreseeable future, however, popular support for a strategy of confrontation would only result from a direct, unprecedented Chinese threat to U.S. security.Support from America's Asian allies, whose cooperation in any military or economic showdown against China would be vital to its success, is even less likely. Confrontationists take it for granted that the PRC's neighbors would have an inherent self-interest in tying down the local bully, but the reality is much different. Anxiety over Beijing's recent saber rattling in the East and South China Seas and over its long-term intentions has stirred widespread endorsement of a reassertion of American influence in the region. Balanced against this demand for U.S. power, however, is an understanding among these states that their future prosperity is inextricably linked to continued trade with an economically vigorous China, as well as an unspoken fear that a sustained American presence in the region cannot be guaranteed, rendering any choice to make an enemy out of the mainland foolhardy. These pressing economic and strategic considerations mandate a tight-rope course that maintains good relations with both Washington and Beijing. Any potential return for the U.S. of temporarily setting back China's ascent would likely be overwhelmed by the diplomatic isolation that such a provocative act would exact.

--AT: Balancing bad – moderates turn

The threat of containment induces moderation in Chinese foreign policyChristensen, 15 – William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton (Thomas, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, p. 226-227)

Although the United States should not feed Chinese fears about U.S. hostility, Chinese anxiety about a U.S. containment effort could carry some benefits for the United States: the potential for future encirclement may encourage Chinese strategists to be more accommodating. Under conditions in which Chinese analysts believe in the possibility of containment, even the most pessimistic realpolitik thinkers might join their more optimistic colleagues in prescribing moderate policies. Chinese strategists sometimes recognize that more coercive Chinese policies toward neighbors increase both the willingness and the ability of Washington to encircle and constrain China. Just as many American experts understand that any attempt by the United States to contain China's rise now would likely weaken the United States, many Chinese observers think bullying by Beijing will create a tighter and more expansive set of U.S.-led security relationships in the region.A fine example of this phenomenon is provided by Professor Yan Xuetong of Tsinghua University, a highly intelligent and prolific Chinese commentator who, like Mearsheimer, tends to view U.S.-China relations as a zero-sum struggle. But rather than calling for a more hostile Chinese stance, Yan actually recommends that Beijing behave in an accommodating and reassuring fashion toward its neighbors so as to reduce the ability of the United States to encircle and strangle China and to prevent regional spirals of tension, thus allowing China to play its full role in global governance. Ironically, he calls for those policies precisely because he sees an intense struggle for relative power between a rising China and a declining United States. In a provocative New York Times editorial entitled "How China Can Defeat America," Yan writes, "China's quest to enhance its world leadership status and America's effort to maintain its present position is a zero-sum game. It is the battle for people's hearts and minds that will determine who eventually prevails. And, as China's ancient philosophers predicted, the country that displays more humane authority will win."2When Yan's op-ed was first published, a very moderate Chinese colleague asked me what I thought. My reaction was mixed. There are indeed competitive elements in U.S.-China relations, but I fully reject Van's argument that they create an overall relationship that is a zero-sum game. Nevertheless, I welcome Van's prescriptions. By cooperating with its neighbors and contributing to global governance, China will indeed be increasing its power and prestige, but in ways that serve rather than challenge U.S. national interests. After all, the real security question posed by China's rise in Asia is not how to keep China down but how to maintain regional stability and guarantee the security and interests of China's neighbors.

Nationalism

Impact – nationalism turns case

A nationalist backlash will wreck any strategy of accommodationGlaser, 15 - Charles L Glaser is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00199

A third feature of China’s policy that is cause for concern is that growing nationalism or weak civil-military relations, or both, may be contributing to greater Chinese assertiveness vis-à-vis its maritime disputes and could contribute to expansion of China’s future goals.57 One interpretation suggests that China is less dangerous than if it were not plagued by these problems, because it is reassuring that China’s leaders do not prefer more assertive policies, and only sometimes feel compelled to pursue them to avoid negative nationalist reactions. An alternative interpretation is more compelling and far less reassuring—if nationalist pressures from Chinese elites and the broader public are pushing China’s leaders to act more assertively or preventing them from stepping back once crises occur, China could be driven to adopt more assertive policies than those preferred by its leaders. Consequently, it is worrisome that careful observers frequently note the role of nationalist pressures in influencing China’s policies. For example, Taylor Fravel and Michael Swaine argue that China’s willingness to use force to resolve territorial disputes in the East China Sea could have increased because “acute nationalist sensitivities toward Japan exist among the Chinese public.” Iain Johnston explains that the Chinese ministry of foreign affairs could not state publicly that reports that China had declared the South China Sea a core interest were wrong, because this “might have raised the ire of nationalists within the population and the elite.”58 If unchecked, nationalism has the potential to lead China to adopt nonsecurity goals—for example, the status that could be envisioned accompanying the acquisition of the economic and military power needed to be a superpower—that could require pushing the United States out of East Asia.59 Chinese nationalism, however, does not appear to have begun to approach this level of influence.60 Accommodation would be more dangerous if the United States eventually faces this type of China, although the much greater peril would be the full incompatibility of the two states’ regional goals.

Nationalism turns human rights

Nationalist Beijing turns human rights-government crackdown on liberal effortsBlackwill & Campbell 16-*Henry Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. Foreign policy & ** chairman and chief executive officer of the Asia Group, LLC. also serves as chairman of the Center for a New American Security, is a nonresident fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and is on the board of directors for Standard Chartered PLC in London, the Asia Group(Robert & Kurt,"Xi Jinping on the Global Stage," Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/CSR74_Blackwill_Campbell_Xi_Jinping.pdf)//SLFinally, Xi’s resistance to Western culture and values may intensify. Xi has arrested countless dissidents, civil society leaders, and activists; sharply curtailed the ability of NGOs to operate; intensified controls over the media and the Internet; and inveighed against Western cultural contamination while extolling Confucianism. Because China’s economy is now slowing, Xi’s fear of political instability may push him to adopt even sterner measures, and new violations of human rights and the emerging challenges that Western NGOs and businesses face will likely cause renewed friction in China’s relationships with the West.


Answers to other turns

AT: Chinese democracy

A democratic transition increases external aggression – nationalists will benefit from democracyFriedberg 11 - Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, co-director of the Woodrow Wilson School’s Center for International Security Studies (Aaron, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, p. 249-250)

Not everyone is convinced of this optimistic forecast. Some self-styled "realists" assert that the interests and objectives of a democratic China will not be much different from those of today's authoritarian state. In this view, domestic reforms may make China richer, stronger, more stable, and hence a more potent competitor, without deflecting it from its desires to dominate East Asia and settle scores with some of its neighbors.10 Even if, in the long run, China becomes a stable, peaceful democracy, its passage could prove rocky. The opening of the nation's political system to dissent and debate is likely to introduce an element of instability into its foreign policy as new voices are heard and aspiring leaders vie for popular support. As one observer ruefully points out, "An authoritarian China has been highly predictable. A more open and democratic China could produce new uncertainties about both domestic policy and international relations."11 Nationalism, perhaps in its most virulent and aggressive form , is one factor likely to play a prominent role in shaping the foreign policy of a democratizing China. Thanks to the spread of the Internet, and the relaxation of restraints on at least some forms of "patriotic" political expression, the current regime already finds itself subject to public criticism whenever it takes what some regard as an overly accommodating stance toward Japan, Taiwan, or the United States. Beijing has sought at times to stir up patriotic sentiment, but fearful that anger at foreigners could all too easily be turned against it, the regime has also gone to great lengths to keep popular passions in check. A democratically elected government might be far less inhibited. American-based political scientist Fei-Ling Wang argues that a post-Communist regime would actually be more forceful in asserting its sovereignty over Taiwan, Tibet, and the South China Sea. As he explains, "A 'democratic' regime in Beijing, free from the debilitating concerns for its own survival but likely driven by popular emotions, could make the rising Chinese power a much more assertive, impatient, belligerent, even aggressive force, at least during the unstable period of fast ascendance to the ranks of a world-class power."12 The last proviso is key. Even those who are most confident of the longterm pacifying effects of democratization recognize the possibility of a turbulent transition. In his book China's Democratic Future, Bruce Gilley acknowledges that democratic revolutions in other countries have often led to bursts of external aggression, and he notes that since the start of the twentieth century, pro-democracy movements in China have also been highly nationalistic. Despite these precedents, Gilley predicts that after an interval of perhaps a decade, a transformed nation will settle into more stable and cooperative relationships with the United States as well as its democratic neighbors.13

Yes China hostile rise

2nc – hostile rise inevitable

Hostile rise is inevitable – offensive realism is the dominant Chinese IR paradigm and Xi embraced the prospect of an inevitable confrontation with the USTopping 15-Military and Strategic Studies Scholar (Vincent, “Tracing a Line in the Water: China’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region and its Implications for the United States”, August 2015, University of Calgary, http://theses.ucalgary.ca/bitstream/11023/2602/4/ucalgary_2015_topping_vincent.pdf)//SLFor decades, China has kept the same discourse: it is seeking peaceful development, it will never seek hegemony, and security alliances in Asia are a relic of the Cold War that should be discarded. Nonetheless, in recent years (and especially since the arrival of Xi Jinping as the President of the PRC), there has been an increasingly severe dichotomy between words and actions. Whereas the official Chinese discourse had long been that China was still a developing country that should not be pushed too hard otherwise it could destroy its social cohesion and enhance the pressure on its domestic tensions,39 and whereas China had for decades kept Deng Xiaoping’s motto of “keeping a low profile and never seek leadership,” now China wants to be recognized as a leading power in the world and is “striving for achievements.” Chinese international relations expert and Dean of the International Relations department at Tsinghua University Yan Xuetong had been preaching since at least 2010 that China and the United States should drop the pretense that they are partners in this new century and accept that they are competitors that will more often than not have divergent and conflicting interests.40 After all, according to Yan, “China’s endeavour to regain its historical place as a world leading power and the United States’ refusal to relinquish its sole superpower status constitutes their greatest political conflict.” 41 In the words of Alastair Iain Johnston, “this is quite an admission about China’s interests” as it goes against every single policy statement and declaratory policy that China has issued over thirty years.42This could be disregarded as a Chinese realist’s perspective who is trying to further his point of view and agenda. However, when Xi Jinping came to power, he projected his vision of China for the future, which entailed that the country needed to undergo a “national rejuvenation” (fuxing zhi lu, 復興之路). According to Yan, this is “a phrase that literally refers to resuming China’s historical international status as the world’s most advanced state in early Tang Dynasty (618-917 AD). Today this phrase specifically refers to China’s efforts to catch up with the U nited States in terms of comprehensive national power […] the competition for international leadership between China and the United States will be inevitable” (emphasis added).43 This also points out to one inconvenient truth about Chinese politics, one that will definitely leave a bitter taste for American policymakers that have been working tirelessly to “socialize” China in the international system and who thought liberalism would convert China to the benefits of the current international order: not only realist (along with ultra-nationalist) thinkers in China are not on the fringe of Chinese politics, they are very much in the mainstream . 44 International relations theory is still somewhat of a new phenomenon in China, but Chinese experts have quickly appropriated realism (and especially John J. Mearsheimer’s version of offensive realism) as one of their own.45 It is now, and has been for a while, the most dominant paradigm of international relations in China.46 Some theorists in China like Wang Jisi, Dean of the International Relations department at the prestigious Peking University, have been trying for years to strike a conciliatory note to reconcile

differences and bridge the gap between China and the U.S., but his attempt (and those of likeminded colleagues) to do so is mostly the exception, not the rule.47

Prefer our evidence – multiple Chinese actions confirm the hostile rise thesis:

a. Current territorial expansion and the history of great power warsMarston 16- Works in a major Washington, DC think tank and writes on Southeast Asia and U.S. foreign policy (Hunter, “More Trade Won’t Stop China’s Aggression”, June 13, 2016, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/more-trade-wont-stop-chinas-aggression-16587?page=2)//SLChina’s brazen and “improper airmanship,” buzzing an American surveillance plane in the skies above the East China Sea last week, is but the latest signal of Beijing’s proclivity for risk and willingness to undermine both its regional reputation and economic stability in order to stake expanding claims in Asia.Western observers have not relinquished the perennial hope that China’s global economic interconnectedness will constrain its proclivity to military conflict. But this belief is misguided and not borne out by history. In fact, as China’s economic and military power rise, it has shown an increased tolerance for risk and raised the likelihood of future war.China has repeatedly harassed Indonesian, Vietnamese and Philippine ships in the latter’s territorial waters, claiming that Chinese citizens have been fishing there “since ancient times,” entitling them to vast maritime sovereignty. Its island construction on top of shallow reefs is another component in Beijing’s strategy to assert dominance over the South China Sea.The near-collision of the Chinese fighter jet with the U.S. spy plane last week follows a string of gutsy, high-risk encounters. Only last month, two Chinese jets flew within fifty feet of an American EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft over the South China Sea.Gregory Poling, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic & International Studies, commented, “It’s clear that China’s tolerance for risk has risen in the last several years and remains high, though luckily below the level at which deadly force is likely.” Despite high-level progress from Beijing and Washington on a Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) in recent years, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) may be testing the strategic limits of the outgoing Obama administration’s patience.Poling added, “What is most worrying to me is that it took less than six months for Beijing to violate the air-to-air annex to CUES that Presidents Obama and Xi inked during the latter’s visit to DC. That suggests that no matter how hard we might try, China is not willing to have its behavior in disputed waters bound in any way , including by bilaterally agreed-upon rules and norms.” Do Chinese military forays in the East and South China Sea signal Beijing’s clear quest for regional domination and the inevitable ratcheting up of tensions with other Pacific powers? Will increasingly risky provocations lead to military conflict as China stakes its claims? Or does China’s dependence on global trade for continued economic growth at home preclude war in the foreseeable future?The past has repeatedly proved wrong those who assume that a rising power’s economic connectivity obviates the inevitability of great power military conflict. Peacenik theorists of the pre–World War I era opined that the level of interconnectivity in global markets had rendered obsolete the great-power warfare of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Likewise, in the interbellum period before the breakout of World War II, advocates of appeasement wagered that a militarizing Germany would not threaten continental peace due to its deep economic ties with the rest of Europe. Obviously, both schools of thought overestimated the ability of global economic connectivity to deter military aggression.What makes scholars think China is different today? Of course, the scale of interpenetration of global markets has risen and bound major powers such as China and the United States, as well as regional groupings like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ever more tightly together. But just as proponents of peace were proven wrong in the twentieth century, echoes of the past are perceivable in Asia and Europe today.Despite its dependence on the EU for revenue from gas exports, Russia invaded Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014. Likewise, European dependence on Russian gas has not prevented the EU from leveling heavy sanctions against Russia for its bellicosity. Nationalist impulses often trump economic considerations that would otherwise impel autocrats toward moderation.Just as the Communist Party in Beijing is beholden to a public whose education hammered home the lessons of a “century of humiliation” at the hands of Western imperialists, Russia’s Vladimir Putin’s legitimacy—and mythos—flows from a narrative of western domination that has prevented Russia from attaining the greater world power that Russians feel their nation deserves.Similarly, though Beijing is investing in massive infrastructure projects across Southeast Asia and pursuant to the sixteen-member Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership free-trade agreement, Beijing’s behavior indicates that it will prioritize security interests over regional economic integration, peace and stability.Material facts dictate that China’s increasing economic wealth and concordant military might will allow Beijing to exercise greater power in its backyard and on the world stage. These factors afford the CCP a greater ability to risk reputational and economic costs to achieve its national security goals.China has shown its capability to drive a wedge in ASEAN to suit its purposes. In 2012, with Cambodia chairing ASEAN, tensions in the South China Sea became so acute that the regional grouping failed to deliver a joint statement for the first time in history since its 1967 founding. Facing a barrage of diplomatic pressure from Beijing, the ten member states were unable to agree on whether to mention even the location of a Philippines-China standoff at the Scarborough Shoal, claimed by both sides and occupied by the Philippines until Chinese ships seized it in 2012.Beijing similarly undermined ASEAN unity in April when it announced that it had come to an agreement with Cambodia, Brunei and Laos—to the surprise of others—that the South China Sea dispute should not jeopardize relations between China and ASEAN.The United States supports ASEAN centrality as a strategic bulwark against China’s attempts to impose unilateral faits accomplis. For its own reasons, Beijing prefers to deal with ASEAN claimants one-on-one so as to reduce the capacity of the group to stand with a unified voice contra its security interests.Satu Limaye, director of the East-West Center in Washington, has written, “Instead of serving as a platform to manage bilateral and multilateral cooperation among member states, ASEAN may become an arena where bilateral and multilateral cooperation are contested.” As the two superpowers battle for influence within ASEAN, China has demonstrated its ability to use both charm and threats to advance its interests.

Moreover, as Nick Bisley of La Trobe University writes, despite a U.S. China policy that blends containment with moral suasion, “it is far from clear that China can be contained or cowed into submission.” Ultimately, “the region’s two major powers have irreconcilable visions for Asia’s future.”If that is the case, expect rocky times ahead as differences of interest not only manifest in further naval and air confrontations, but also introduce further friction into competing visions of the economic and security architecture of Asia. The result is a net loss for all countries concerned.

b. Official documents and Chinese diplomacyTellis and Blackwill 15 (Ashley** and David*, senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations*, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues**, “U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China”, Council on Foreign Relations, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Blackwill.pdf, April 13, 2015, NRG)

Policy experts critical of the grand strategy toward China proposed in this report will likely fall into at least six categories. First, some will argue that China has no grand strategy. Although there may be those in Beijing who disagree with China’s current strategic approach, its dominating elements are not a mystery. Chinese officials insistently argue that the U.S. alliance system in Asia is a product of the Cold War and should be dismantled; that the United States’ Asian allies and friends should loosen their U.S. ties and that failure to do so will inevitably produce a negative PRC reaction; that U.S. efforts to maintain its current presence and power in Asia are dimensions of an American attempt to contain China and therefore must be condemned and resisted; that U.S. military power projection in the region is dangerous and should be reduced (even as the PLA continues to build up its military capabilities with the clear objective of reducing U.S. military options in the context of a U.S.-China confrontation); and that the U.S. economic model is fundamentally exploitative and should have no application in Asia. To not take seriously official Chinese government statements along these lines is to not take China seriously . That Beijing does not hope to realize these policy goals in the short term does not reduce their potential undermining effect in the decades ahead. In short, if China were to achieve the policy objectives contained in these official statements, it would clearly replace the United States as Asia’s leading power. If that does not represent a PRC grand strategy, what would?

c. Prior engagement failuresTellis and Blackwill 15 (Ashley** and David*, senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations*, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues**, “U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China”, Council on Foreign Relations, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Blackwill.pdf, April 13, 2015, NRG)

Second, some may say that the analysis and policy recommendations in this report are too pessimistic, based on a worst-case appraisal of Chinese behavior. To the contrary, we draw our conclusions from China’s current actions regarding its internal and external security, its neighbors, and U.S. presence in Asia. We project nothing that is not already apparent in China’s present policies and strategic intentions.

Nevertheless, this hardly represents the worst case if China began to behave like the Soviet Union, necessitating something far more costly than balancing. The word “containment” comes to mind, and we certainly do not recommend that vis-à-vis China in current circumstances, not least because no Asian nation would join in such an endeavor. Other policymakers might argue that China’s international behavior is “normal” for a rising power, that China is gradually being socialized into the international system and it is far too early for Washington to give up on comprehensive cooperation and strategic reassurance toward Beijing. The issue here is how long the United States should pursue a policy toward China that is clearly not sufficiently protecting U.S. vital national interests. Although Beijing has in general acted responsibly in the international lending institutions and may be slowly moving toward progress on difficult issues (such as climate change), Kurt Campbell, former State Department assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs in the Obama administration, recently stressed, “We were always looking for deeper cooperation with China and attempts to have on-the-ground cooperation—for example, on aid or humanitarian support operations, we weren’t able to bring about; in military-to-military relations, on the diplomatic agenda, on aid, we found it very difficult to get meaningful results.”58“Meaningful results” have been so difficult to achieve in the U.S.- China relationship precisely because China seeks to replace the United States as the leading power in Asia. And although Chinese behavior may be “normal” for a rising nation, that does not diminish China’s overall negative impact on the balance of power in the vast Indo-Pacific region; nor does it reduce the crucial requirement for Washington to develop policies that meet this challenge of the rise of Chinese power and thwart Beijing’s objective to systematically undermine American strategic primacy in Asia.

d. Chinese nationalism escalates security competitionMearsheimer 14 – professor of political science at University of Chicago, co-director of Program of International Security Policy at UChicago (John, “Can China Rise Peacefully,” The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, October 25th, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204)

Nations at times go beyond feeling superior to other nations and wind up loathing them as well. I call this phenomenon “hypernationalism,” which is the belief that other nations are not just inferior but are dangerous, and must be dealt with harshly, if not brutally. In such circumstances, contempt and hatred of the “other” suffuses the nation and creates powerful incentives to use violence to eliminate the threat. Hypernationalism, in other words, can be a potent source of war.One of the main causes of hypernationalism is intense security competition, which tends to cause people in the relevant nation-states to demonize each other. Sometimes leaders use hypernationalism as part of a threat-inflation strategy designed to make their publics aware of a danger they might otherwise not fully appreciate. In other cases, hypernationalism bubbles up from below, mainly because the basic nastiness that accompanies security competition often causes the average citizen in one nation-state to despise almost everything about the rival nation-state. A major crisis can readily add fuel to the fire.Contemporary China is ripe for hypernationalism. In the years between Mao’s decisive victory over the Kuomintang in 1949 and his death in 1976, communism and nationalism were powerful forces that worked hand in hand to shape almost every aspect of daily life in China. However, after Mao’s passing, and certainly after the military crackdown at Tiananmen Square in 1989, communism lost much of its


legitimacy with the Chinese public. In response, China’s leaders have come to rely much more heavily on nationalism to maintain public support for the regime.It would be a mistake, however, to think that nationalism is merely propaganda purveyed by the leadership for the purpose of sustaining the public’s allegiance to the state. In fact, many Chinese citizens passionately embrace nationalist ideas of their own volition. “The 1990s,” as Peter Gries notes, “witnessed the emergence of a genuinely popular nationalism in China that should not be conflated with state or official nationalism.” What makes nationalism in contemporary China such a potent force is that it is both a top-down and a bottom-up phenomenon.Not only has nationalism become a stronger force in China in recent years, its content has also changed in important ways. During Mao’s rule, it emphasized the strengths of the Chinese people in the face of great adversity. They were portrayed as heroic fighters who had stood up to and ultimately defeated imperial Japan. Gries explains, “This ‘heroic’ or ‘victor’ national narrative first served the requirements of Communist revolutionaries seeking to mobilize popular support in the 1930s and 1940s, and later served the nation-building goals of the People’s Republic in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. . . . New China needed heroes.”That proud narrative, however, has largely been abandoned over the past twenty-five years, replaced by one that represents China as a victim of aggression by the world’s other great powers. In particular, great emphasis is placed on what the Chinese refer to as their “century of national humiliation,” which runs from the First Opium War (1839–42) until the end of World War II in 1945. China is depicted during that period as a weak but noble country that was preyed upon by rapacious great powers and suffered deeply as a consequence. Among the foreign devils are Japan and the United States, which are said to have taken advantage of China at almost every turn.The theme of China as a helpless victim is not the only strand of Chinese nationalist thought. There are a number of positive stories as well. For example, Chinese of all persuasions take great pride in emphasizing the superiority of Confucian culture. Nevertheless, pride of place in Chinese present-day nationalist thought belongs to narratives that emphasize the “century of nationalist humiliation,” which, as Gries notes, “frame the ways that Chinese interact with the West today.” Indeed, “for China’s military, avenging humiliation remains a key goal.”We have already seen evidence of how China’s lingering anger and resentment toward Japan and the United States can exacerbate a crisis and seriously damage relations between them. The accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the 1999 Kosovo war was seen by most Chinese as just another example of a powerful country taking advantage of and humiliating China. It generated large protests and outrage against the United States in China. The Chinese reacted similarly in 2001, when an American spy plane collided with and downed a Chinese military aircraft over the South China Sea. And skirmishing between China and Japan over ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 2012–13 ignited a firestorm of anti-Japanese protests across China, some of which were violent.The intensified security competition that lies ahead will only increase China’s hostility toward Japan and the United States, and it is likely to turn into an acute case of hypernationalism. Of course, this development will, in turn, further intensify the security competition and heighten the possibility of war. In essence, ideology will matter in Asia in the future just as it mattered during the Cold War. But the content will be different, as hypernationalism in China, and possibly other Asian countries as well, will replace the dispute between communism and liberal capitalism. That said, the main driving force behind Sino-American relations in the decades ahead will be realist logic, not ideology.

e. Authoritarianism makes the failure of engagement inevitable and drives a hostile challengeBlumenthal & Inboden 15-*the director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, & **Executive Director and William Powers, Jr. Chair, Clements Center for National Security & Associate Professor of Public Affairs (*Dan & **William, “Toward a Free and Democratic China”, May 18, 2015, The Weekly Standard, http://www.weeklystandard.com/toward-a-free-and-democratic-china/article/941091)//SLAt the top of our next president’s task list will be rescuing American foreign policy from the wreckage of the Obama years. The prevailing headlines detail a grim litany of new threats, each one emanating from an Obama administration policy failure. From the expansionist barbarity of the Islamic State, to the collapse of Libya into warring factions, to Yemen’s degeneration into civil war and a terrorist safe haven, to unprecedented concessions that have strengthened Iran, to Russian adventurism forcibly redrawing Europe’s borders, to the expansion of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, the threat environment that the Obama administration is preparing to hand over to its successor is grave.Not since the end of World War II has the American-led international system been under such severe strain from so many quarters. While the above threats all command attention, perhaps the greatest challenge to world order is the resurgence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It is the only nation that has the size, wealth, and ambition to credibly threaten U.S. global leadership and international stability. At stake is not only the national security of the United States but the future of the international system our nation helped create and has led for seven decades. In truth, they are almost inseparable. At the end of the Cold War, the late Samuel Huntington argued that only by remaining the dominant world player could the United States ensure the continuation of a liberal order. Thus, the challenge from China is not only geopolitical; Beijing is also ideologically hostile toward democratic capitalism and free societies.Our next president’s China policy needs to address the heart of the problem: The external assertiveness of the Chinese Communist party (CCP) emanates from its internal repression. As Aaron Friedberg has pointed out, “the party’s desire to retain power shapes every aspect of national policy. When it comes to external affairs, it means that Beijing’s ultimate aim is to ‘ make the world safe for authoritarianism ,’ or at least for continued one-party rule in China.”The CCP has thus far successfully maintained its monopoly on power and avoided any meaningful political reform. American policy in recent years has conceded this monopoly to the CCP and done little to support Chinese reformers, dissenters, and voices for liberty. There may have been short-term rationales for this, but as a policy it has run its course.A new strategy that aims for a freer China would, in the span of history, not be so new at all. It has been part of the strategic conception of most U.S. presidents since the Cold War opening to China.U.S. Policy and Democracy in ChinaNixon and Kissinger’s justly heralded strategic opening to Beijing in 1972 realigned mainland China from a Communist revolutionary adversary to a “normal” authoritarian partner in the Cold War. This new relationship rekindled hopes that China might eventually transition from autocratic to democratic. A series of developments in the 1970s and 1980s—including Mao Zedong’s death, the opening of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, the 1978-79 Democracy Wall movement, Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms, and the collapse of Soviet communism at the end of the Cold War—

http://www.weeklystandard.com/toward-a-free-and-democratic-china/article/941091)//SL

http://www.weeklystandard.com/toward-a-free-and-democratic-china/article/941091)//SL

provided some episodic momentum to these hopes. Many wondered if perhaps the words “Chinese democracy” might eventually become a reality and not just a Guns N’ Roses album.Accordingly, every American administration since 1989 has premised its China policy on a strategic bet: that as China becomes more prosperous, it will also become freer and a more responsible member of the international system. From George H.W. Bush to Bill Clinton to George W. Bush, each administration built its China policy on this assumption that economic reform would lead inevitably to political reform. This was a reasonable premise. Many of Washington’s authoritarian friends in Asia had successfully embraced democracy, including South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. As other Asian societies made this transition, it made sense to assume that China would follow the same path.While encouraging closer economic ties between the United States and China, these presidents also attempted to engage China through outreach and dialogue. Treating China like an adversary would cause it to act like an adversary, the assumption went, whereas engaging with China would lead it to be more like us: peaceful, stable, and free.This strategic bet has failed . China has become much richer, but it has not become freer. A few years ago James Mann perceptively called these dashed hopes that an engaged and prosperous China would become a peaceful and free China “the China fantasy.” If anything, its increased wealth has equipped the Chinese Communist party to devote even more resources to maintaining its authoritarian rule and monopoly on power. It turned out that one critical difference between China and America’s allies and partners in the region was that the United States had little leverage over Beijing. Its allies were dependent on Washington and more susceptible to inducements and punishments on the path to democracy.Just as it has failed to encourage political reform, the current U.S. strategy of engagement has also not enticed China to become a more responsible member of the international system. Evidence otherwise abounds, including China’s destabilizing aggression in the Asian littoral, its free-riding on America’s preservation of the Indo-Pacific’s open maritime order, its shielding of oppressive dictatorships in Syria, Sudan, and North Korea from human rights scrutiny, and its thuggish blockage of meaningful human rights and carbon emissions limitation initiatives in multilateral fora. Xi Jinping’s repeated invocations of “Asia for Asians” provide one of the most explicit statements yet of what has become readily apparent to close observers of Beijing’s strategy and intentions: It wants to push the United States out of the western Pacific and be the sole regional hegemon. No wonder virtually all of its neighbors—with the exception of North Korea—have distanced themselves from China and sought closer ties with the United States.As far back as the Clinton administration, the United States began quietly contemplating the possibility that China’s rise might not always be peaceful. This led to the development of a second prong to the U.S. strategy of engagement: hedging. As Washington deepened its relationship with China, it also began upgrading its security alliances in the region and modestly increasing its defense capabilities as a hedge against potential Chinese bellicosity. The Obama administration’s “pivot” to Asia (once hyped and now largely forgotten) was, in fact, just a continuation of this two-part strategy of engagement and hedging as already pursued by Clinton and Bush.Yet after almost three decades of U.S. engagement and two decades of hedging, China is more threatening externally and no freer internally. If anything, the CCP’s hold on power under Xi Jinping is stronger than ever, even as China’s erstwhile “peaceful rise” has turned into something more ominous.

f. PLA rogue behaviorFeige, 14 - Johannes Feige is a Junior Researcher at the European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS), Brussels (“How Well Does China Control Its Military?” The Diplomat, 11/14, http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/how-well-does-china-control-its-military/

In 2009, Andrew Scobell argued for the existence of a “civil-military gap” in China’s peaceful rise. Scobell uses this expression in two ways. First, it refers to a potentially serious difference between the attitudes and perspectives of civilian and military elites based on different life experiences and career paths; second, it refers to a possible “loose civilian control of the military.” The PLA detests political intrusion by the party into its own affairs and has subsequently carved out more autonomy for itself. Thus, the claim that in recent years, “civilian CCP leaders seem to have adopted a hands-off approach to the day-to-day affairs of the PLA” seems to plausibly describe the relationship between the military and the civilian leadership.This could have far-reaching implications. In 2012, outgoing President Hu Jintao hinted that the chain of military command “might be more fragile than commonly understood,” although the true meaning of this statement remains abstruse. Certainly, confusion in the chain of command is not a new problem for China. Past examples include the 16th Party Congress, when Jiang retired from his post as general-secretary, but retained his seat as chairman of the CMC, while Hu became the new general-secretary. This led to ambiguity as to who was China’s commander in chief and ultimately in charge of the PLA, particularly for potentially explosive issues like Taiwan, where conflict control is complicated by the involvement of the United States.It is assumed that senior CCP leaders hold decisive authority over the main foreign and defense policy issues, but that their authority on military actions of foreign policy relevance on subordinate levels of the policy process is not as clear. Given their status as commander in chief, technocratic civilian CCP leaders possess a broad knowledge of military programs and defense priorities. However, they appear to grant the PLA considerable autonomy and latitude as to how and when programs are implemented. The result is that civil-military coordination regarding specific types of military action impinging on foreign policy is weak.The 2011 stealth fighter test during Gates’ visit is generally regarded as a prime example of the party’s number one not knowing what his military is doing . Yet the idea that Hu would not have known about the test, or would not have been informed of it, appears inconceivable in a system based on collective direction and mutual control. Thus, the timing with Gates’ visit was not coincidental. Indeed, Gates later affirmed that, “I asked President Hu about it directly, and he said that the test had absolutely nothing to do with my visit and had been a pre-planned test.” The PLA was undoubtedly determined to display its prowess and was intent on sending a message to the U.S. at a time many had hoped tensions might be declining , given that China had resumed military contacts with the United States after suspending them following the U.S. announcement that it would sell arms to Taiwan in January that year.A repeat performance took place during U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s trip to China in September 2012, when another stealth fighter was revealed. The incident contained elements of both “showmanship and boasting,” and, as was the case one year earlier, was “carefully timed to reinforce some political point.” A renewed denial by China’s number one that he had been informed about the disclosure makes clear that again a message was supposed to be sent.It is quite possible that some of these incidents are the result of the PLA’s “rogue” tendencies, meaning that the military does not always communicate vital information, such as the dates of tests or other

military activities, to the party leadership in Beijing. The 2007 satellite test is perhaps most conceivable as an example of roguish PLA behavior, since evidence suggests that top-level Chinese leaders really weren’t informed of the test details or schedule, consistent with the idea of a PLA operating on a loose leash, albeit not necessarily with malicious intent. The PLA’s attitude sometimes seems to be that if a policy issue is determined by the PLA to be an agenda exclusive to the military, its external effects need not be taken into consideration, leading to unintended consequences for Chinese foreign relations .A similar, if more pointed assertion, has been put forward by the Japanese National Institute for Defense Studies. Contending that the Chinese military is in fact unwilling to coordinate, the Institute’s scholars assert that the PLA “does not fully recognize the need for policy coordination with the government departments.” They argue that is particularly evident in the relationship between the PLA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2010, Professor Wang Yizhou, Vice Dean of Beijing University’s School of International Studies, stated in reference to various military exercises conducted in the South China Sea, East China Sea and Yellow Sea that “the PLA’s recognition of its right to hold independent events ‘led’ the [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] to lose time to have enough discussions.” In other words, naval activities could not be properly coordinated in advance.Prominent analysts of Chinese foreign policy have hypothesized that the CCP general-secretary and chairman of the Central Military Commission is generally not being informed of issues at the operational level, such as specific weapons tests and training exercises or small military patrols outside of China’s immediate borders. Given the apparent absence of any requirement for the PLA to provide operational information, China lacks an explicit mechanism to make sure that coordination between civilian and military authorities takes place. An exacerbating factor is China’s stove-piped bureaucratic system, which aggravates difficulties in horizontal and vertical coordination as well as information sharing between the army and the civilian apparatus.In a crisis, this lack of a reliable management at the highest levels may lead to unintended and far-reaching consequences, such as accidental escalation. Yet the Chinese foreign policy establishment continues to rely on temporary mechanisms created on an ad hoc basis. During a politico-military crisis, these mechanisms are often as inefficient for information processing as they are ineffective for coordinating actions, since quality information does not reach those in charge in a timely fashion.

g. Chinese strategic culture favors deceptionPillsbury, 15 - director of the Hudson Institute’s Center for Chinese Strategy (Michael, “Top US analyst: We made 5 dangerously wrong assumptions about China” Business Insider, 2/9, http://www.businessinsider.com/the-hundred-year-marathon-excerpt-2015-2

In the late 1990s, during the Clinton administration, I was tasked by the Department of Defense and the CIA to conduct an unprecedented examination of China’s capacity to deceive the United States and its actions to date along those lines.Over time, I discovered proposals by Chinese hawks (ying pai) to the Chinese leadership to mislead and manipulate American policymakers to obtain intelligence and military, technological, and economic assistance. I learned that these hawks had been advising Chinese leaders, beginning with Mao Zedong, to avenge a century of humiliation and aspired to replace the United States as the economic, military, and political leader of the world by the year 2049 (the one hundredth anniversary of the Communist Revolution).

http://www.businessinsider.com/the-hundred-year-marathon-excerpt-2015-2

This plan became known as “the Hundred-Year Marathon.” It is a plan that has been implemented by the Communist Party leadership from the beginning of its relationship with the United States.When I presented my findings on the Chinese hawks’ recommendations about China’s ambitions and deception strategy, many U.S. intelligence analysts and officials greeted them initially with disbelief. Chinese leaders routinely reassure other nations that “China will never become a hegemon.” In other words, China will be the most powerful nation, but not dominate anyone or try to change anything.The strength of the Hundred-Year Marathon, however, is that it operates through stealth. To borrow from the movie Fight Club, the first rule of the Marathon is that you do not talk about the Marathon. Indeed, there is almost certainly no single master plan locked away in a vault in Beijing that outlines the Marathon in detail. The Marathon is so well known to China’s leaders that there is no need to risk exposure by writing it down. But the Chinese are beginning to talk about the notion more openly — perhaps because they realize it may already be too late for America to keep pace.I observed a shift in Chinese attitudes during three visits to the country in 2012, 2013, and 2014. As was my usual custom, I met with scholars at the country’s major think tanks, whom I’d come to know well over decades. I directly asked them about a “Chinese-led world order”— a term that only a few years earlier they would have dismissed, or at least would not have dared to say aloud. However, this time many said openly that the new order, or rejuvenation, is coming, even faster than anticipated. When the U.S. economy was battered during the global financial crisis of 2008, the Chinese believed America’s long-anticipated and unrecoverable decline was beginning.I was told — by the same people who had long assured me of China’s interest in only a modest leadership role within an emerging multipolar world — that the Communist Party is realizing its long-term goal of restoring China to its “proper” place in the world. In effect, they were telling me that they had deceived me and the American government. With perhaps a hint of understated pride, they were revealing the most systematic, significant, and dangerous intelligence failure in American history. And because we have no idea the Marathon is even under way, America is losing.

This debate is an epistemic filter for reading the 1ac – the question of whether China is hostile determines whether they solveKuntić, 15 – visiting fellow at European Union Centre in Taiwan, National Taiwan University; PhD candidate at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb (Dario, “The Ominous Triangle: China-Taiwan-the United States relationship” CIRR XXI (72) 2015, 239-280)

Realists use a concept of power shift to explain the rise of China and the challenge this rise poses to the global domination of the United States. As rapid economic growth and technological modernization enabled China to expand its political and military power, some observers argue that this trend, if it continues, could undermine the U.S.-dominated unipolar international system and even dethrone the United States from a position of a sole global superpower. According to the realist paradigm, a gain for China would result in a loss for the United States.That China might already be on the way to overtake the US raises a prospect of a power transition within the international system. Thus, whether China is a status quo power or one that seeks to revise the international system has become a critical issue in Sino-American relations . As China’s rise includes not only economic and political power, but also the policy that enhances its military capabilities, the United States feels less secure and consequently threatened. Whether China’s rise will be peaceful or violent is a question that preoccupies scholars and statesmen alike … Scholars who examine the

consequences of China’s rise through the lenses of either power transition theory or offensive realism predict a future of conflict (Fravel 2010: 505). Under these assumptions, the push to change the existing distribution of power in China’s favor will raise the stakes between the two powers so high that this could send China and the United States on a collision course .

--xt: territory

Current territorial expansion demonstrates hostile riseRevere 16’- Senior director with the Albright Stonebridge Group, Served as Acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Graduated Princeton University (Evans, “U.S. policy and East Asian security: Challenge and response”, Brookings Institute, http://www.brookings.edu/research/presentations/2016/01/25-policy-and-east-asian-security-revere//AK)The planned major reduction in the size of the PLA underscores China’s determination to improve its ability to engage in modern warfare. By streamlining regional military commands, shifting the center of gravity of the military from ground forces to higher-tech air and naval capabilities, by emphasizing joint command structures, and by moving the savings gained by demobilizing ground troops into improving combat technology and systems, China is building a military based on the U.S. model -- a model that has shown considerable success in power projection and conducting offensive military operations.China’s attention to a more modernized military reflects in part a legitimate desire to defend its territory, sovereignty, and interests. As China has become an increasingly prominent actor on the world stage, the range of these interests has naturally expanded, requiring corresponding attention to the means to defend them. But China’s approach to its interests includes a vigorous assertion of territorial claims that has put the PRC at odds with many of its neighbors, including U.S. allies like Japan and the Philippines, and also contributed to an escalation of tensions in the region.China’s claims in the South China Sea raise particular concerns. Some of these claims contravene or exceed what is permitted under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). And because China often uses military and paramilitary assets to enforce or assert its claims, they pose a potential threat to freedom of navigation and access in these strategically important waters.[v]Meanwhile, China’s use of its naval, air, and Coast Guard assets around the disputed Senkaku Islands (called “Diaoyu” by the Chinese) has heightened Japanese concerns about China’s intentions. In a new development, the PRC has begun to send armed warships into the waters near the Japanese-controlled islands, increasing tensions and creating the possibility of a miscalculation or accidental confrontation.[vi]While experts frequently argue whether China’s military growth and modernization will ever pose a serious threat to the United States, whose military capabilities are hardly declining, China’s actual use of military assets in dealing with several of its neighbors shows that Beijing’s threat is hardly a theoretical one . This challenge is made all the greater by China’s ongoing land reclamation and island-building in the South China Sea and the militarization of newly created land -- steps that will inevitably give China new power projection capabilities in these sensitive waters.

China abandoned the peaceful rise strategy – its actions are far more aggressive and threatening to regional statesGlaser, 15 - Charles L Glaser is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00199

Around the same time, China’s policies in the South China and East China Seas started generating growing concern that China’s goals are more extensive than previously believed and that Beijing places greater value on achieving them. Careful analysis through 2011 finds that many of these fears were exaggerated: although China was acting more assertively, it had not expanded its maritime claims; and much of China’s policy was in reaction to more assertive policies adopted by other claimants. Less reassuring, China’s behavior did reflect its growing military capabilities and its leaders’ sensitivity to nationalist pressures.46China’s more recent policies provide grounds for greater concern. Reacting to the purchase of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands by the Japanese government in 2012, China launched a series of persistent and increasingly risky operations against the islands, which are under Japanese administrative control. Perhaps more significant, China appears to have redefined the nature of its interests in the Diaoyu Islands, stating for the first time that they are among its core interests.47 China’s establishment of an air defense identification zone over part of the East China Sea in 2013 has further fueled tensions.48 China’s policy has also arguably become more assertive in the South China Sea. For example, in 2012 China used patrol ships to prevail over the Philippines in a dispute over the Scarborough Shoal.49 More recently, a serious crisis ensued when a Chinese-controlled oil company installed a large oil rig in waters claimed by Vietnam.50 Although none of these territorial claims is new, China’s changing definition of its interests and its more assertive behavior are causes for concern. First, if China’s changing policies simply reflect its increased military capabilities, then its actions are a reminder of the obvious—as its improved military capabilities increase the probability of success or reduce the costs of conflict, or both, China will become more willing to use, and threaten to use, force in pursuit its goals.51Second, and probably more worrisome, China’s actions could reflect an increase in the value that its leadership places on achieving its goals. The shift in China’s framing of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute implies a reduced willingness to compromise on this issue. Although this could simply reflect the reduced risks of fighting, it could also result from an increase in the value that China places on prevailing. China appears to have largely abandoned its “peaceful rise” strategy, which was intended to avoid scaring neighboring countries and, in turn, to avoid generating military buildups and the formation and deepening of opposing alliances.52 China’s recent actions suggest that it now places lower priority on avoiding provoking other states.

China has motives for a hostile rise – resolving territorial disputes requires military power capable of sustaining threats Mearsheimer 14 – professor of political science at University of Chicago, co-director of Program of International Security Policy at UChicago (John, “Can China Rise Peacefully,” The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, October 25th, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204) // EDP


Why should we expect China to act differently than the United States? Are the Chinese more principled than we are? More ethical? Are they less nationalistic? Less concerned about their survival? They are none of these things, of course, which is why China is likely to follow basic realist logic and attempt to become a regional hegemon in Asia. Although maximizing its prospects of survival is the principal reason China will seek to dominate Asia, there is another reason, related to Beijing’s territorial disputes with some of its neighbors. As Taylor Fravel points out, China has managed to settle most of its border conflicts since 1949—seventeen out of twenty-three—in good part because it has been willing to make some significant concessions to the other side. Nevertheless, China has six outstanding territorial disagreements, and there is little reason—at least at this juncture—to think the involved parties will find a clever diplomatic solution to them. Probably China’s most important dispute is over Taiwan, which Beijing is deeply committed to making an integral part of China once again. The present government on Taiwan, however, believes it is a sovereign country and has no interest in being reintegrated into China. Taiwanese leaders do not advertise their independence, for fear it will provoke China to invade Taiwan. In addition, China has ongoing disputes with Vietnam over control of the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, and with Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam over the Spratly Islands, which are also located in the South China Sea. More generally, China maintains that it has sovereignty over almost all of the South China Sea, a claim disputed not only by its neighbors but by the United States as well. Farther to the north in the East China Sea, Beijing has a bitter feud with Japan over who controls a handful of small islands that Tokyo calls the Senkaku Islands and China labels the Diaoyu Islands. Finally, China has land border disputes with Bhutan and India. In fact, China and India fought a war over the disputed territory in 1962, and the two sides have engaged in provocative actions on numerous occasions since then. For example, New Delhi maintains there were 400 Chinese incursions into Indian-controlled territory during 2012 alone; and in mid-April 2013, Chinese troops—for the first time since 1986—refused to return to China after they were discovered on the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control. It appears that China has been stepping up its cross-border raids in recent years in response to increased Indian troop deployments and an accompanying growth in infrastructure. Given the importance of these territorial disputes to China, coupled with the apparent difficulty of resolving them through the give-and-take of diplomacy, the best way for China to settle them on favorable terms is probably via coercion. Specifically, a China that is much more powerful than any of its neighbors will be in a good position to use military threats to force the other side to accept a deal largely on China’s terms. And if that does not work, China can always unsheathe the sword and go to war to get its way. It seems likely that coercion or the actual use of force is the only plausible way China is going to regain Taiwan. In short, becoming a regional hegemon is the best pathway for China to resolve its various territorial disputes on favorable terms.

Chinese rise inevitably leads to aggression – they’ll mimic US hegemony patterns via control of surrounding areas and will push the US out of Asia, decreasing its ability to deter conflict Mearsheimer 14 – professor of political science at University of Chicago, co-director of Program of International Security Policy at UChicago (John, “Can China Rise Peacefully,” The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, October 25th, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204) // EDP


If China continues its striking economic growth over the next few decades, it is likely to act in accordance with the logic of offensive realism, which is to say it will attempt to imitate the United States. Specifically, it will try to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. It will do so primarily because such domination offers the best way to survive under international anarchy. In addition, China is involved in various territorial disputes and the more powerful it is, the better able it will be to settle those disputes on terms favorable to Beijing. Furthermore, like the United States, a powerful China is sure to have security interests around the globe, which will prompt it to develop the capability to project military power into regions far beyond Asia. The Persian Gulf will rank high on the new superpower’s list of strategically important areas, but so will the Western Hemisphere. Indeed, China will have a vested interest in creating security problems for the United States in the Western Hemisphere, so as to limit the American military’s freedom to roam into other regions, especially Asia. Let us consider these matters in greater detail. Chinese Realpolitik If my theory is correct, China will seek to maximize the power gap with its neighbors, especially larger countries like India, Japan, and Russia. China will want to make sure it is so powerful that no state in Asia has the wherewithal to threaten it. It is unlikely that China will pursue military superiority so that it can go on a rampage and conquer other Asian countries. One major difference between China and the United States is that America started out as a rather small and weak country located along the Atlantic coastline that had to expand westward in order to become a large and powerful state that could dominate the Western Hemisphere. For the United States, conquest and expansion were necessary to establish regional hegemony. China, in contrast, is already a huge country and does not need to conquer more territory to establish itself as a regional hegemon on a par with the United States. Of course, it is always possible in particular circumstances that Chinese leaders will conclude that it is imperative to attack another country to achieve regional hegemony. It is more likely, however, that China will seek to grow its economy and become so powerful that it can dictate the boundaries of acceptable behavior to neighboring countries, and make it clear they will pay a substantial price if they do not follow the rules. After all, this is what the United States has done in the Western Hemisphere. For example, in 1962, the Kennedy administration let both Cuba and the Soviet Union know that it would not tolerate nuclear weapons in Cuba. And in 1970, the Nixon administration told those same two countries that building a Soviet naval facility at Cienfuegos was unacceptable. Furthermore, Washington has intervened in the domestic politics of numerous Latin American countries either to prevent the rise of leaders who were perceived to be anti-American or to overthrow them if they had gained power. In short, the United States has wielded a heavy hand in the Western Hemisphere. A much more powerful China can also be expected to try to push the United States out of the Asia-Pacific region, much as the United States pushed the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth century. We should expect China to devise its own version of the Monroe Doctrine, as imperial Japan did in the 1930s. In fact, we are already seeing inklings of that policy. For example, Chinese leaders have made it clear they do not think the United States has a right to interfere in disputes over the maritime boundaries of the South China Sea, a strategically important body of water that Beijing effectively claims as its own. China also objected in July 2010 when the United States planned to conduct naval exercises in the Yellow Sea, which is located between China and the Korean Peninsula. In particular, the U.S. Navy planned to send the aircraft carrier USS George Washington into the Yellow Sea. Those maneuvers were not directed at China; they were aimed instead at North Korea, which was believed to have sunk a South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan, in the Yellow Sea. However, vigorous protests from China forced the Obama administration to move the exercises out of the Yellow Sea and farther east into the Sea of

Japan. Sounding a lot like President Monroe, a Chinese spokesperson succinctly summed up Beijing’s thinking: “We firmly oppose foreign military vessels or planes entering the Yellow Sea and other waters adjacent to China to engage in activities that would impact on its security and interests.” More generally, there is considerable evidence that Chinese leaders would like to develop the capability to push the U.S. Navy beyond the “first island chain,” which is usually taken to include the Greater Sunda Islands, Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan. If this were to happen, China would be able to seal off the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Yellow Sea, and it would be almost impossible for the U.S. Navy to reach Korea in the event of war. There is even talk in China about eventually pushing the U.S. Navy beyond the “second island chain,” which runs from the eastern coast of Japan to Guam and then down to the Moluccan Islands. It would also include the small island groups like the Bonin, Caroline, and Marianas Islands. If the Chinese were successful, Japan and the Philippines would be cut off from American naval support.

--xt official doctrine

Military displays, maritime threats, internal elite debates, and threats against the US demonstrate hostile riseFriedberg 15-Professor of Politics and International affairs at Princeton University (Aaron L., “The Sources of Chinese Conduct: Explaining Beijings Assertiveness”, Washington Quaterly, Vol. 37, No. 4, Winter 2015, https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/27433/uploads)//SLStarting in 2009, an increasing number of foreign observers (and many Chinese as well ) began to note a shift towards more forceful or “assertive” behavior on the part of Beijing.1 Among the most frequently cited indications of this trend were:An internal debate among Chinese elites in which some participants advocated edging away from Deng Xiaoping’s “hiding and biding” strategy and replacing it with something bolder and more self-confident;2A “newly forceful, ‘triumphalist,’ or brash tone in foreign policy pronouncements,”3 including the more open acknowledgement—and even celebration—of China’s increasing power and influence;Stronger reactions, including the threatened use of sanctions and financial leverage, to recurrent irritations in U.S.–China relations such as arms sales to Taiwan and presidential visits with the Dalai Lama;More open and frequent displays of China’s growing military capabilities including larger, long-range air and naval exercises, and demonstrating or deploying new weapons systems;A markedly increased willingness to use threats and displays of force on issues relating to the control of the waters, air space, surface features, and resources off China’s coasts. These include ongoing disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam (among others) in the South China Sea, with Japan in the East China Sea, and with the United States regarding its conduct of surveillance and military exercises in areas from the Yellow Sea to the vicinity of Hainan Island.

Speeches, actions, and doctrines prove assertive behavior is inevitableMastro 15-an assistant professor of security studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Why Chinese Assertiveness is Here to Stay”, The Washington Quarterly, 21 Jan 2015, https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/27434/uploads)//SLChinese assertive behavior is here to stay because it is the manifestation of a deliberate long-term strategy. Many scholars are more comfortable arguing that a rogue military, a need to cater to Chinese nationalism, or individual leadership traits explain Chinese assertiveness because those explanations suggest China’s dangerous and provocative behavior is a temporary paroxysm.35 But the speeches of Chinese President Xi Jinping, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi highlight the belief that unfriendly, and even hostile, powers are besieging China, especially in the maritime sphere. Wang Yi has emphasized that China periodically exercises restraint, but must stand its ground when provoked in territorial disputes.36 In a May 2013 speech in Germany, Li Keqiang suggested that Chinese assertiveness is even in defense of the post-World War II international system. Though a tenuous connection, Li basically insinuates that China’s active pursuit of its East China Sea claims supports the world order laid out in the Potsdam Declaration of 1945.37 And in recent months, Xi himself has publicly stressed the critical importance of a strong military to a successful foreign policy and dismissed the option of passivity.38 Remaining firm is the preferred official Chinese approach.

Xi Jinping has also emphasized the importance of prioritizing the economic interests of countries that support Chinese core interests, even if it comes at a relative cost economically.39 Past economic goals solely prioritized making money, with little consideration to strategic factors—but today, Chinese leaders are starting to think about how they can use the immense economic benefit of doing business with China in order to gain political influence. The political priority seems to be defending maritime sovereignty above all else. Historically, upholding maritime sovereignty has been critical to a nation’s success, and therefore China should follow a similar trajectory of building a powerful navy that can protect its commercial interests.40 Researchers at Peking University pulled together extensive statistics to demonstrate how important maritime territory is for Chinese economic, and therefore national, interests. They argue that China must utilize available resources to defend vital sea lanes, which include military, diplomatic, and economic wherewithal.41 Meanwhile, China’s top leadership stresses that in spite of China’s assertiveness in maritime disputes, other countries need not worry about China’s rise because it does not seek hegemony or promote imperialism. An anonymous analysis published in the Hong Kong Economic Times of Xi Jinping’s November speech concludes that his foreign policy approach is tough and unyielding, though not unnecessarily aggressive.42China is unlikely to shift strategies away from relying on coercion and manipulating risk to achieve its territorial objectives not only because the top leadership publicly promotes them, but also because they correspond well with China’s overarching strategy of active defense (jiji fangyu). Active defense is the operational component of Jiang Zemin’s National Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period (xin shiqi guojia junshi zhanlue fangzhen), which serves as “the highest level of strategic guidance for all PLA military operations during war and preparation for war during peacetime.”43 Specifically, the guidelines necessitate developing capabilities to deter, deny, disrupt, and delay the deployment of U.S. forces into the Chinese theater—hence the Western nomenclature A2/AD. These can be leveraged to accomplish Chinese goals in its maritime disputes through four distinct but interrelated pathways:1. geographic: increasing the distance and time required for U.S. forces to arrive in theater from areas of safety before China achieves its political objectives;2. kinetic: degrading the U.S. military’s ability to penetrate anti-access environments with an enhanced conventional precision strike system, consisting mainly of cruise and ballistic missiles as well as attacks on key enabling capabilities such as space-based networks that enable C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) missions;3. political: exploiting perceived weaknesses in political support and resolve of U.S. allies and friends , thereby keeping the United States out because countries will not allow it to base there; and4. deterrent: making involvement so costly that the United States opts out of responding, or responds minimally, in a given contingency.44Assertiveness is therefore, in many ways, the logical extension of this Chinese strategy as it grows more confident in the capabilities it has been developing over the last twenty years as part of this active defense strategy. While the strategic objective is the same for each of the pillars, the theory of victory of the first two pillars is significantly different from that of the latter two. Kinetic and geographic aspects rely largely on brute force in that China could theoretically accomplish its goals by force alone, without any collaboration from the United States.45 Take this hypothetical example—if in the early stages of a conflict, China attacks U.S. bases in Japan, cratering runaways and burying aircraft, no amount of U.S. resolve will make those planes fly. In this case, the United States may want to support a Taiwan contingency but be unable to do so.

--xt CMR

Low civilian control makes a peaceful rise impossibleScobell, 9 – Associate Professor of International Affairs and Director of the China Certificate Program in the George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University (Andrew, “Is There a Civil-Military Gap in China’s Peaceful Rise?” Parameters, Summer, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/09summer/scobell.pdf

The actions suggest a lack of civilian control, although after the fact they have been explained as acts of deterrence. The reins of civilian control over the PLA seem to be quite loose. At the very least there is poor communication and coordination with key civilian entities, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The result appears to be a roguish PLA that makes crisis management all the more difficult and heightens the potential for worrisome misunderstandings and misperceptions.While these explanations may help one to make sense of the words and deeds of the Chinese military, they do not provide much relief or reassurance. First, the risk of miscalculation between the United States and China may be higher than many assume. It is dangerous for American policymakers and analysts to consider US resolve in isolation. This strategy presumes that China’s perception of the strength of US resolve in and of itself will be enough to deter Beijing from military action.50 The logic is flawed. For China, US resolve on the question of Taiwan is viewed as limited, especially in comparison to other issues, and smaller than China’s own unshakeable resolve. For Chinese analysts, accurately assessing US resolve is tricky. While Beijing can have a high degree of confidence in its own degree of resolve, it is much harder to judge Washington’s.Second, once a crisis or confrontation develops, the potential for unintended escalation is significant. The militaries of the United States and China continue to think about and plan for a possible conflict over Taiwan. This does not mean that a war is inevitable, but it does mean that in a crisis, escalation might be rapid and difficult to control.51 At least there is improved communication between the two militaries; a hotline linking the Pentagon with the Central Military Commission was established in early 2008.Third, civil-military relations present an ongoing challenge to China’s political development and peaceful rise. Hands-off civilian control is symptomatic of the larger problem of the under-institutionalization of civilian control mechanisms. Without firmer civilian oversight, the kinds of hawkish PLA pronouncements and activities highlighted are likely to persist with the attendant risks. Indicators of enhanced civilian oversight and control would include a revamping of the CMC to have greater civilian representation, an end to active-duty general officers serving as the Minister of National Defense, a reconstituted Defense Ministry with more than mere ceremonial functions, and a vigorous initiative to develop a cadre of civilian defense specialists in China’s national legislature, as well as in think tanks and universities. Such developments are unlikely to occur in the near future.To conclude, there are civil-military gaps in China’s peaceful rise strategy. Military members being permitted or even encouraged to express warlike bravado and engage in overzealous actions seem to demonstrate the point. If Beijing expects other nations to accept Chinese claims about desiring a peaceful rise and yearns to be treated as a responsible great power, then the words and deeds of soldiers ought to be more consistent with those proclaimed policies and aspirations.

http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/09summer/scobell.pdf

AT: Self fulfilling prophecy

The prophecy has already been fulfilled – current Chinese aggression escalates in response to US caution – engagement makes bad behavior more likelyBosco, 16 - Joseph A. Bosco served in the office of the secretary of defense, 2002-2010. He is a member of the U.S.-China task force at the Center for the National Interest (“China Expects the U.S. To Roll Over” 4/6, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-expects-the-us-roll-over-15688?page=show

More realistically, however, given the Communist Party of China’s implacable view of the United States and its allies as the enemy—despite more than four decades of Western engagement —and its expectation that it can achieve U.S. “acquiescence” to the dominance Xi seeks, China will almost certainly become even more ambitious and aggressive.The report lists "policies of the United States" as the first among the "external factors [that] will certainly influence China’s future course." But it describes the official American perception of China more in terms of diplomacy and engagement than deterrence and containment. The United States views China less as an existential threat than as a challenge to its friendships, alliances, and military and economic leadership in the region. Additionally, the study sees Japan as having an equally muted reaction to China’s saber-rattling:“[B]oth the United States and Japan have extensive commercial ties to and personal contacts with China, and China presents only an ambiguous military threat. The underlying Western fear since Nixon's opening to China and through eight subsequent administrations is that "treating China as an enemy will make it one."There is the risk of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. If the United States and Japan base their policies on the expectation of a powerful and aggressive China, and take preparatory measures that Beijing interprets as a containment strategy, China might decide to adopt aggressive policies to defend itself, leading to a cycle of armament and tension that neither side desired.China's leaders clearly understand this Western reticence and consistently exploit it to their advantage, pressing at each incrementally assertive point and expecting the West to exercise the necessary prudence to avoid confrontation and escalation.In the military and security areas, China has been deterred from direct aggression, but has advanced its interests using sophisticated forms of military coercion and simple gunboat diplomacy, as well as a wide range of nonmilitary activities.The paper repeats the conventional wisdom that China sees "the need for a peaceful international environment" in order to pursue its domestic economic development. But Beijing relies on an acquiescent and somewhat intimidated neighborhood to ensure the peace while it pursues its ambitious goals by means just short of outright war. The ink was hardly dry on the SPF report when fresh news arrived of an even more threatening move by China on its islands: the installation of anti-ship missiles that will constrain activities of the U.S. and Japanese navies among others.As the Obama and Abe administrations digest this important SPF report, they will hopefully recognize that the more powerful and aggressive China is already here. The future is now , and it is dire unless U.S. and Japanese policymakers send some strong deterrence and dissuasion messages to China, backed up by meaningful actions. At the very least, that means regular freedom of navigation and overflight

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-expects-the-us-roll-over-15688?page=show

operations in the East and South China Seas that actually challenge China's unlawful sovereignty claims—not merely innocent passages which effectively reinforce them.

China’s regional antagonisms make buildups inevitable regardless of the USMearsheimer 14 – professor of political science at University of Chicago, co-director of Program of International Security Policy at UChicago (John, “Can China Rise Peacefully,” The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, October 25th, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204) // EDP

In terms of actual behavior, China should not initiate any crises with its neighbors or the United States, or add fuel to the fire if another country provokes a crisis with China. For example, Beijing should go out of its way to avoid trouble over sovereignty issues regarding the South China Sea and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. It should also do what it can to limit defense spending, so as not to appear threatening, while working to increase economic intercourse with its neighbors as well as the United States. Chinese leaders, according to this logic, should emphasize that it is all to the good that China is growing richer and economic interdependence is on the rise, because those developments will serve as a powerful force for peace. After all, starting a war in a tightly connected and prosperous world is widely believed to be the equivalent of killing the goose that lays the golden eggs. Finally, China should play an active and cooperative role in as many international institutions as possible and work with the United States to keep the North Korean problem under control. While this approach is intuitively attractive, it will not work in practice. Indeed, we already have evidence that China cannot successfully employ Deng Xiaoping’s prescribed foreign policy over the long run. Before 2009, Beijing did a good job of keeping a low profile and not generating fear either among its neighbors or in the United States. Since then, however, China has been involved in a number of contentious territorial disputes and is increasingly seen as a serious threat by other countries in Asia. This deterioration in China’s relations with other countries is due in part to the fact that, no matter what Beijing does to signal good intentions, they cannot be sure what its real intentions are now, let alone in the future. Indeed, we cannot know who will be in charge of Chinese foreign policy in the years ahead, much less what their intentions will be toward other countries in the region or the United States. On top of that, China has serious territorial disputes with a number of its neighbors. Therefore, China’s neighbors already focus mainly on Beijing’s capabilities, which means they look at its rapidly growing economy and increasingly formidable military forces. Not surprisingly, many other countries in Asia will become deeply worried because they know they are probably going to end up living next door to a superpower that might one day have malign intentions toward them. This problem is exacerbated by the “security dilemma,” which tells us that the measures a state takes to increase its own security usually wind up decreasing the security of other states. When a country adopts a policy or builds weapons that it thinks are defensive in nature, potential rivals invariably think that those steps are offensive in nature. For example, when the United States moves aircraft carriers near the Taiwan Strait—as it did in 1996—or when it redeploys submarines to the western Pacific, American leaders honestly believe those moves are defensive in nature. China, on the other hand, sees them as an offensive strategy of encirclement, not as part of a defensive strategy of containment. Thus, it is not surprising that the Economist reported in 2009, “A retired Chinese admiral likened the American navy to a man with a criminal record ‘wandering just outside the gate of a family home.’” All of this is to say that almost anything China does to improve its military capabilities will be seen in Beijing as defensive in nature, but in Tokyo, Hanoi, and Washington it will appear offensive in


nature. That means China’s neighbors are likely to interpret any steps it takes to enhance its military posture as evidence that Beijing not only is bent on acquiring significant offensive capabilities but has offensive intentions as well. And that includes instances where China is merely responding to steps taken by its neighbors or the United States to enhance their fighting power. Such assessments make it almost impossible for Chinese leaders to implement Deng Xiaoping’s clever foreign policy.

AT: No modernization

China is heavily expanding modernization and it increases conflict escalation risksChase & Chan 16-*Senior Political Scientist & ** a project associate at the rand Corporation.(Michael &Arthur, “China’s Evolving Strategic Deterrence Concepts and Capabilities” http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt1bz3vx1, The Washington Quarterly)//SL

Strategists often think of strategic deterrence as synonymous with nuclear deterrence, the top of the escalation ladder; China does not. In fact, China’s strategic deterrence concepts are evolving and expanding, along with strides in strategic weapons capabilities, reflecting Beijing’s increasing concerns about external security threats and a growing emphasis on protecting Chinese interests in space and cyberspace.After relying on relatively rudimentary strategic deterrence capabilities for decades, China has developed and deployed a variety of new strategic weapons systems in recent years. An important turning point was the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade by the United States in May 1999, which Chinese leaders viewed as deliberate. This incident motivated Beijing to devote even greater resources to improving the capabilities of the PLA by focusing on asymmetric approaches to exploiting potential U.S. military vulnerabilities and developing advanced, high-technology weapons to deter—or, if necessary, counter—U.S. military intervention in any conflict involving China. According to an article by two Chinese military researchers, China’s development of advanced weapons and equipment must adhere to the principal that “what the enemy fears is what we develop,” an approach that was reportedly first articulated following the May 1999 Embassy bombing and that continues to guide China’s approach to developing its strategic deterrence capabilities today.3Reflecting the progress China has made in its strategic weapons programs since this guidance was put forward, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) displayed an impressive collection of nuclear and conventional ballistic missiles during the elaborate September 2015 military parade the Chinese Communist Party held to mark the 70th anniversary of victory over Japan and the end of WWII. China is also continuing to develop and test even more advanced strategic weapons, such as new anti-satellite (ASAT) systems capable of holding U.S. space systems at risk, more modern road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), and hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) that could further enhance China’s nuclear deterrent posture or perhaps give Beijing its own conventional prompt global strike capabilityYet, there is much more to China’s thinking about strategic deterrence than new weaponry. Indeed, PLA publications indicate that China’s broad concept of strategic deterrence is a multi-dimensional set of military and even non-military capabilities combined to protect Chinese interests. For China, powerful military capabilities of several types—including nuclear, conventional, space, and information warfare—are all essential components of a credible strategic deterrent.5 Chinese military publications indicate that non-military aspects of national power—most notably diplomatic, economic, and scientific and technological strength—also contribute to strategic deterrence alongside military capabilities. For Chinese strategists, however, the military components have the most immediate, direct ability to influence a potential adversary’s decision-making calculus.The broad contours of China’s concept of integrated strategic deterrence have remained relatively consistent, albeit with some elaboration and development over the years including a growing emphasis

on its space and information components. Indeed, the increasing importance PLA strategists attach to deterrence in space and cyberspace should come as no surprise, as this tracks with China’s assessment that military competition in those domains is intensifying and that the struggle for information dominance is likely to prove decisive in future wars.7As the concept of integrated strategic deterrence has evolved to keep pace with China’s emerging interests and changes in military technology, the capabilities supporting it have undergone an impressive transformation. Indeed, at least some parts of this integrated strategic deterrence concept went beyond the PLA’s actual capabilities initially, as China lacked many of the required force structure elements to fully support it. However, Chinese strategic deterrence capabilities are now rapidly catching up with the concept of integrated strategic deterrence. This is true across the nuclear, conventional, space, and information warfare domains. China is deploying a more credible nuclear deterrent composed of silo-based ICBMs, some of which are equipped with MIRVs; more survivable road-mobile ICBMs; and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Beijing is also strengthening its conventional military forces. In particular, the air, naval, and missile capabilities most relevant to countering U.S. military intervention provide China with increasingly potent conventional deterrence capabilities, which constitute an increasingly important part of its overall integrated strategic deterrence posture.As a result of these improvements in nuclear, conventional, space, and information warfare forces, Chinese military publications are now replete with references to how China can conduct strategic deterrence operations, both under general peacetime conditions and in crisis scenarios. According to a recent publication by the PLA’s National Defense University (NDU), practical examples could include actions such as displaying advanced weapons, carrying out military exercises, adjusting military deployments, increasing readiness levels, or even carrying out information attacks or limited firepower strikes as a warning to a wouldbe adversary.8The combination of these developments in China’s strategic deterrence concepts and the PLA’s growing strategic deterrence capabilities could have serious implications for the United States. In particular, China’s growing capabilities will likely intensify challenges related to extended deterrence and assurance of U.S. allies, some of whom may be concerned that China’s growing strategic weapons capabilities will undermine the willingness or ability of the United States to come to their aid in the event of a regional crisis or conflict. As China continues developing advanced strategic weapons capabilities, the PLA will be able to offer leaders in Beijing a variety of new options, some of which might lead them to consider changes in China’s traditional policies and strategic and operational concepts, such as its longstanding nuclear no-first-use (NFU) policy. Finally, China’s further development of its integrated strategic deterrence concepts and capabilities is likely to create escalation risks that could make the prospect of a crisis or conflict over potential flashpoints, such as Taiwan or maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas, more dangerous for the United States than any situation it has faced since the end of the Cold War .

Risks of nuclear escalation are highChase & Chan 16-*Senior Political Scientist & ** a project associate at the rand Corporation.(Michael &Arthur, “China’s Evolving Strategic Deterrence Concepts and Capabilities” http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt1bz3vx1, The Washington Quarterly)//SL

In a crisis or conflict, the PLA could adopt a much higher intensity—and potentially very dangerous— approach to deterrence operations, such as by increasing the readiness level of its strategic missile force, displaying its nuclear, long-range conventional strike or anti-satellite weapons to send a deterrence signal, conducting nuclear or conventional missile test launches, or even conducting information attacks or limited conventional strikes designed to compel an adversary to submit to Chinese demands.There are important implications for the United States in several areas. First, China’s evolving integrated strategic deterrence concepts and its growing strategic weapons capabilities could have important implications for U.S. extended deterrence and assurance of allies and partners in the region. Allies and partners may be concerned not only about the possibility they will become targets of Chinese threats in some or all of the relevant domains, but also that China could wield its growing capabilities in ways that are intended to undermine U.S. willingness or ability to intervene militarily to support them in the event of a crisis or conflict in the regionFor example, Sugio Takahashi of Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) writes that if China feels it has deployed a sufficiently powerful strategic deterrent against the United States in the form of its nuclear forces and conventional antiaccess and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, it “may be encouraged to increase its aggressive creeping expansion in the East China Sea and the South China Sea.” 63 Indeed, worries about the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence could become increasingly prominent as China’s capabilities continue to advance, and this could make it more and more difficult for the United States to successfully assure its regional allies and partners.64Second, China’s assessment of its external security environment and its growing capabilities may motivate changes in its thinking about the requirements of integrated strategic deterrence, potentially leading to changes in policy and strategy that could be destabilizing or otherwise problematic for U.S. security interests in the region. PLA strategists appear to regard U.S. “rebalancing” to Asia as part of what they often characterize as a broader pattern of U.S. attempts to “contain” China’s growing power and influence. Moreover, they are concerned about the possibility that future improvements in U.S. military capabilities, particularly in the areas of missile defense and conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) capabilities, could undermine the deterrent credibility of China’s strategic missile force. For example, according to SMS 2013, if the United States ever used CPGS to launch conventional attacks against China’s nuclear missiles, it could “force China into a passive position, greatly influence China’s nuclear counterstrike capabilities, and weaken its nuclear deterrent effectiveness.” 65 In particular, Chinese analysts appear to be concerned that Washington could believe, even if incorrectly, that the combination of missile defense and CPGS capabilities would enable it to coerce China with nuclear threats. Additionally, although China is currently focused on the United States as the main potential threat to its security, other countries could begin to figure more prominently in China’s strategic deterrence calculations in the future. Even though China currently focuses heavily on the United States as the main potential adversary, it is possible China could become more concerned about Indian or even Russian nuclear capabilities, which could result in changes such as a larger arsenal of theater nuclear missiles.Along with the consequences of possible changes in Chinese security assessments, China’s growing capabilities will create some new options for Chinese strategists and decision-makers, probably leading to debates about many aspects of China’s approach to strategic deterrence. For example, at least one important PLA publication has raised the possibility that as the PLA’s strategic early warning capabilities improve, China may want to adopt a launch-under-attack or launch-on-warning posture for its nuclear

missile force—meaning that China would launch its own nuclear weapons upon receiving warning of an enemy’s nuclear launch—an option the authors suggest would strengthen deterrence without violating China’s nuclear no-first-use (NFU) policy.66 Even more disturbingly, although many nuclear and arms control specialists see launch-on-warning (LOW) or launch-under-attack (LUA) as having the potential to be extremely destabilizing if adopted, it remains unclear if Chinese analysts have fully considered the risks associated with such an approach, as sources such as SMS 2013 do not discuss the possibility that it could undermine strategic stability. Indeed, as one observer has pointed out, the authors of SMS 2013 do not consider any of the problems that could result from adopting a launch on warning policy, such as the dangers associated with the risk of a false warning, ambiguous indications of a possible enemy attack, or other errors in judgment by operators or decision-makers.67Finally, China’s integrated strategic deterrence concepts and capabilities have the potential to create serious escalation risks for other reasons. One potential problem is that China’s thinking about the relationships between the nuclear, conventional, space, and cyber components of its strategic deterrent appears to be somewhat unclear, at least as reflected in the relevant chapters in key PLA publications such as SMS 2013. In particular, it is unclear how much attention PLA strategists have devoted to assessing the ways in which effects in one of these domains could trigger escalation in other domains. For example, based on the available sources, it is uncertain whether Chinese strategists have fully considered the potential implications of attacks against strategically important space systems, such as missile early warning satellites or communications satellites, associated with strategic nuclear operations.68 Similarly, available Chinese military publications do not appear to incorporate detailed assessments of the risks of inadvertent or accidental escalation, topics that have been of great interest to U.S. analysts in recent years.69Organizational issues offer other challenges for managing escalation. One is the fact that a single component of China’s military, PLA Rocket Force, is responsible for nuclear and conventional land-based missile forces, raising the possibility of miscommunication if it is difficult or impossible for an adversary to distinguish between nuclear and conventional deterrence signals. If in the midst of some future crisis, China conducted a test launch of a missile that is capable of conducting both nuclear and conventional strikes, the intended message might be unclear to the recipient. Additionally, if a conventional war breaks out, enemy air strikes or perhaps cyber attacks aimed at degrading China’s conventional missile force could be misinterpreted as an attempt to undermine China’s nuclear retaliatory capabilities, perhaps leading to inadvertent escalation. Still other problems could arise as a result of a preference for surprise, deep strikes, and rapid and decisive operations, which could be highly destabilizing in a crisis, especially if both sides feel strong pressure to escalate early in order to seize the initiative, or to limit the risk of losing highly valuable capabilities that could be vulnerable to a preemptive strike by the adversary.

China military capable of Taiwan attack- Modernization workingErickson 16- Professor of strategy at the U.S. naval war college and associate in research at Harvard’s Fairbank Center (Andrew, “HOW GOOD ARE THEY?THE LATEST INSIGHTS INTO CHINA’S MILITARY TECH”, May 18th, 2016, war on the rocks, http://warontherocks.com/2016/05/how-good-are-they-the-latest-insights-into-chinas-military-tech/)//SLWhat it All MeansIn releasing authoritative information that no other organization is capable of, or willing to, provide, the Pentagon has performed a commendable public service. This section on Chinese counter-space activities

and capabilities alone is worth far more than the $95,000 in taxpayer dollars spent in preparing its 2016 report.The real world applications of Beijing’s manifold military improvements are numerous and troubling. “China’s multi-decade military modernization effort has eroded or negated many of Taiwan’s historical advantages” in self-defense, the report stated. Specifically, mainland China has deployed no fewer than 1,200 short-range ballistic missiles, the majority across from Taiwan. At its rollout to the media on Friday, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia Abraham Denmark elaborated from a U.S. policy perspective: “we believe that Taiwan does need to increase its spending, but also needs to make investments in asymmetric capabilities….” After eight years of relative quiescence, cross-Strait relations are heating up as Beijing’s expectations have increased just as President-elect Tsai Ing-wen is poised to assume office advocating a different approach to their management. Much attention is focused on what she will say about relations with mainland China in her inaugural address this Friday, May 20.Such issues will undoubtedly hang over the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in early June, not long after which the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague will likely announce its verdict concerning the legality of Beijing’s “nine-dashed line” claim over the South China Sea and related issues under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Initiated by the Philippines, the case involves China directly; yet, despite its clear legal responsibility as a party to UNLCOS to accept the verdict, Beijing categorically rejects the arbitration and refuses to participate or acknowledge the results.Note well: Beijing has a habit of timing and publicizing the unveiling and testing of new weapon systems to signal capabilities and resolve. Looking forward, there are many potential instances for it to send such a message.Fortunately, in its latest report, the Pentagon has at least contributed to public understanding of key Chinese military dynamics. These will be influencing regional and international security for a long time to come. So stay tuned, and fasten your seat belts. It’s going to be a bumpy ride for all concerned.

AT: Chinese economic collapse now

China’s Economy won’t collapse according to the best Data-Assumes your warrantsRudd 15- Prime Minister of Australia from 2007 to 2010 (Kevin, “How to Break the ‘Mutually Assured Misperception’ Between the U.S. and China”, The World Post, 4-20-2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kevin-rudd/us-china-relations-kevin-rudd-report_b_7096784.html)//SL1. Sorry, but on balance, the Chinese economic model is probably sustainable .On the sustainability of Chinese economic growth as the continuing basis of Chinese national power, on balance we should assume a Chinese growth rate in the medium to medium-high range (i.e. in excess of 6 percent) as probable for the period under review. This takes into account both official and unofficial statistics on the recent slowing of the rate. It also takes into account lower levels of global demand for Chinese exports, high levels of domestic debt, the beginning of a demographically driven shrinking in the labor force, continued high levels of domestic savings, at best modest levels of household consumption, an expanding private sector still constrained by state-owned monoliths, and a growing environmental crisis. But it also takes into account the vast battery of Chinese policy responses to each of these and does not assume that these are by definition destined to fail. Furthermore, if China’s growth rate begins to falter, China has sufficient fiscal and monetary policy capacity to intervene to ensure the growth rate remains above 6 percent, which is broadly the number policy makers deem to be necessary to maintain social stability.It is equally unconvincing to argue that China’s transformation from an old economic growth model (based on a combination of high levels of state infrastructure investment and low-wage, labor-intensive manufacturing for export), to a new model (based on household consumption, the services sector and a strongly innovative private sector) is also somehow doomed to failure. This is a sophisticated policy blueprint developed over many years and is necessary to secure China’s future growth trajectory through different drivers of demand to those that have powered Chinese growth rates in the past. There is also a high level of political backing to drive implementation. The process and progress of implementation has so far been reasonable.Moreover, to assume that China’s seasoned policy elites will somehow prove to be less capable in meeting China’s next set of economic policy challenges than they have been with previous sets of major policy challenges over the last 35 years is just plain wrong. China does face a bewildering array of policy challenges and it is possible that any one of these could significantly derail the government’s economic program. But it is equally true that Chinese policy elites are more sophisticated now than at any time since the current period of reform began back in 1978, and are capable of rapid and flexible policy responses when necessary.For these reasons, and others concerning the structure of Chinese politics , the report explicitly rejects the “China collapse” thesis recently advanced by David Shambaugh. It would also be imprudent in the extreme for America’s China policy to be based on an implicit (and sometimes explicit) policy assumption that China will either economically stagnate or politically implode because of underlying contradictions in its overall political economy. This would amount to a triumph of hope over cold, hard analysis.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kevin-rudd/us-china-relations-kevin-rudd-report_b_7096784.html)//SL

AT: No war

Err neg – historyCoker 15- Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Head of Department (Christopher, “The Improbable War”, 15 January 2015, Oxford University Press, pp.8)//SLWhen contemplating the improbable—a conflict between the United States and China—the analogy that is most frequently drawn upon is the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. In many respects, writes Charles Emmerson, the world on the eve of the Great War seems not so much the world of a century ago as the world of today, curiously refracted through time: ‘It is impossible to look at it without an uncanny feeling of recognition, ... telescoping a century into the blink of an eye’ (Emmerson, 2013a). One of the most notable parallels between the world on the eve of the First World War and the world of today is the fact that so many leading thinkers felt that a great power conflict was as improbable in 1914 as many do today.The causes of the First World War in 1914 have been the subject of an endless debate. The general consensus is that the Great Powers did not so much sleepwalk into war as blunder into it, in part because they thought such a conflict was so improbable. In the Balkan war of 1912, both Austria–Hungary and Russia mobilised parts of their armed forces near their common borders. ‘Bluff, everything a bluff,’ Alfred von Kiderlen-Wachter, the German foreign minister, wrote that year to a friend. ‘War could only happen if one were so unfathomably foolish to bluff so badly as to be unable to back down ... I really consider none of the current statesmen an example of such oxen’ (Afflerbach, 2007: 179). A few years earlier the director of British Military Operations had been asked whether it would not require ‘inconceivable stupidity on the part of statesmen’ to ignite a European conflagration. His response: ‘Inconceivable stupidity is just what you’re going to get’ (Hastings, 2013).One of the lessons that can be drawn from the war is the fact that the leaders of the Great Powers eventually took too many risks because they genuinely believed that great power conflict was unlikely. Jack Beatty, one of the leading figures in the ‘new school’ of historians, distinguishes three stances with regard to the origins of the war—avoidable, improbable and inevitable. War would only have been ‘avoidable’ if the political leaders had set out to do everything in their power to avoid it. They did not do so, in part because they thought it so unlikely. War would only have been ‘improbable’ if they realised how only remarkable crisis management skills could have kept the continent at peace given the tinder box nature of European politics. It therefore fol-lows that war was largely ‘inevitable’ because the politicians did not take the prospect of war seriously enough (Beatty, 2012: 4).Historians will never arrive at a ‘final’ agreement on the causes of the war. Some contend that the war resulted from political miscalculation, while others attribute it to the Central Powers’ decision to risk a successful preventative war. However, the factor underlying all of the contending explanations is the fact that the politicians on all sides concluded that war was improbable with the result that they did too little to avert it.The world is in danger of making exactly the same mistakes today , as we are telling ourselves the same stories we did in 1914. The prevailing complacency about great power conflict is much the same, as too is the misplaced liberal assumption that inter-state war has become almost ‘extinct’ or ‘anachronistic’. This is exactly the kind of thinking that could lead to another conflict in the near future. This book aims to prize inter-state war from the grasp of the rational actor modelists with their narrow understanding of the world, and the economists and globalists who think ‘distance is dead’ because

geography has been trumped by globalisation. History does not suggest that we are part of a process of continual moral improvement and ever greater progress. The course of international relations over the centuries is instead more akin to a pendulum swinging from good times to bad and from war to peace, and this pendulum may swing back once again.

Multiple flashpoints and history suggest the risk is highCoker 15- Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Head of Department (Christopher, “The Improbable War”, 15 January 2015, Oxford University Press, pp.33-34)//SLThe idea that another great war is improbable is also proposed in Noah Feldman’s Cool War: The Future of Global Competition (2013). Both sides, he contends, have too much to lose. War would simply cripple the economies of both countries, and it would also endanger Party rule in the case of China. It would ‘simply be irrational’ to go to war. But just because something is irrational does not mean it cannot happen. There are many examples in history of intelligent governments being right for the wrong reasons, and when driven by their anxieties and demons, wrong for the wrong reasons. People are rarely right for the right reasons. There are plenty of flashpoints that could provoke a conflict (Taiwan for one), and there are many real obstacles to cooperation, however open-minded the protagonists.Feldman is probably right on at least one point: in suggesting that American exceptionalism may prove a problem. From the perspective of the Chinese leadership, it must be frustrating to negotiate policies with a government that views CCP rule as illegitimate because of the undemocratic nature of China’s political system, and which would like to see the entire regime come to an end. As Feldman observes, this is not a good starting point for mutual trust or respect. But the United States is unlikely to alter its position in the near future, and the two societies will find themselves on a collision course if neither can earn the trust and respect of the other.

AT: Interdependence checks

Leaders prioritize security over prosperityMearsheimer 14 – professor of political science at University of Chicago, co-director of Program of International Security Policy at UChicago (John, “Can China Rise Peacefully,” The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, October 25th, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204)

It would be wrong to argue that economic interdependence does not matter at all for the fostering of peace. Leaders do care greatly about their country’s prosperity, and in certain circumstances that concern will help dampen any enthusiasm they might have for war. The key question, however, is whether such calculations are likely to decisively influence policymakers in a wide variety of circumstances. In other words, will the impact of economic interdependence be weighty enough to serve as a firm basis for peace between China and its potential rivals over a long period of time? I believe there are good reasons to doubt that concerns about mutual prosperity will keep Asia peaceful as China grows more powerful.At the most basic level, political calculations often trump economic ones when they come into conflict. This is certainly true regarding matters of national security, because concerns about survival are invariably at stake in the security realm, and they are more important than worries about prosperity. As emphasized, if you do not survive, you cannot prosper. It is worth noting in this regard that there was substantial economic interdependence and prosperity among the European great powers before 1914. Nevertheless, World War I happened. Germany, which was principally responsible for causing that conflict, was bent on preventing Russia from growing more powerful while at the same time trying to become a hegemon in Europe. Politics overwhelmed economics in this important case.

Nationalism trumps economic interdependenceMearsheimer 14 – professor of political science at University of Chicago, co-director of Program of International Security Policy at UChicago (John, “Can China Rise Peacefully,” The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, October 25th, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204)

Politics also tends to win out over concerns about prosperity when nationalism affects the issue at stake. Consider Beijing’s position on Taiwan. Chinese leaders have stressed that they will go to war if Taiwan declares its independence, even though they believe the ensuing conflict would damage China’s economy . Of course, nationalism is at the core of Chinese thinking on Taiwan; that island is considered sacred territory . One might also note that history is littered with civil wars, and in almost every case there was substantial economic interdependence between the combatants before the fighting broke out. But political calculations proved to be more influential in the end.

Interdepedence isn’t permanent – even without economic collapse, war might be more profitableMearsheimer 14 – professor of political science at University of Chicago, co-director of Program of International Security Policy at UChicago (John, “Can China Rise Peacefully,” The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, October 25th, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204)




There are three other reasons to doubt the claim that economic interdependence can sustain peace in Asia in the face of an increasingly powerful China. The theory depends on permanent prosperity to work, but there is no guarantee there will not be a trade war or a major economic crisis that undermines that assumption. Consider, for example, how the ongoing euro crisis is doing serious damage to the economies of many European countries. But even in the absence of a severe global economic downturn, a particular state might be having significant economic problems, which could put it in a position where it had little to lose economically, and maybe even something to gain, by starting a war. For instance, a key reason Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990—despite their close economic ties—is that Kuwait was exceeding its OPEC oil production quotas and driving down Iraq’s oil profits, which its economy could ill afford.

Expected economic gains from war overcome interdependenceMearsheimer 14 – professor of political science at University of Chicago, co-director of Program of International Security Policy at UChicago (John, “Can China Rise Peacefully,” The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, October 25th, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204)

Another reason to question economic-interdependence theory is that states sometimes start wars in the expectation that victory will bring them substantial economic and strategic benefits and that those prospective benefits will be greater than the prosperity lost from damaged inter-dependence. For example, it is widely believed there are abundant natural resources on the floor of the South China Sea. However, China and its neighbors disagree significantly over who controls that large body of water. Although it is unlikely, one can imagine a more powerful China using military force to gain control over the South China Sea so that it can exploit its seabed and fuel Chinese economic growth.

Leaders don’t believe war undermines economic prosperityMearsheimer 14 – professor of political science at University of Chicago, co-director of Program of International Security Policy at UChicago (John, “Can China Rise Peacefully,” The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, October 25th, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204)

The final reason for doubting this theory of peace is that economically interdependent countries can sometimes fight wars and still avoid incurring significant economic costs. To begin with, a country can take aim at a single rival, devise a clever military strategy, and win a quick and decisive victory. In fact, most states go to war thinking they will achieve a swift triumph, although it does not always work out that way. When it does, however, the economic costs are not likely to be significant, since the fight is with a single rival and success comes quickly.The economic costs of war are usually greatest when states get involved in protracted wars with multiple countries, as happened in the two world wars. But leaders do not take their country to war expecting that outcome; indeed, they expect to avoid it. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, nuclear weapons make it extremely unlikely that China will end up fighting a major conventional conflict resembling World War II. In fact, any wars that break out in Asia are likely to be limited in terms of both goals and means. In such circumstances, the economic costs of fighting are likely to be limited and thus do not pose a significant threat to the prosperity of the belligerents. Winning a small-scale war might indeed add to a country’s prosperity, as might happen if China seized control of the South China Sea.



War doesn’t shut down trade relationsMearsheimer 14 – professor of political science at University of Chicago, co-director of Program of International Security Policy at UChicago (John, “Can China Rise Peacefully,” The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, October 25th, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204)

Furthermore, there is abundant evidence that states at war with each other often do not break off economic relations. In other words, states trade with the enemy in wartime, mainly because each side believes it benefits from the intercourse. Jack Levy and Katherine Barbieri, two of the leading experts on this subject, write, “It is clear that trading with the enemy occurs frequently enough to contradict the conventional wisdom that war will systematically and significantly disrupt trade between adversaries.” They add that “trading with the enemy occurs during all-out wars fought for national independence or global dominance as well as during more limited military encounters.” In short, it is possible for a country to fight a war against a rival with which it is economically interdependent, and not threaten its own prosperity.


AT: Confucianism checks

Confucianism won’t cause Chinese pacifismMearsheimer 14 – professor of political science at University of Chicago, co-director of Program of International Security Policy at UChicago (John, “Can China Rise Peacefully,” The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, October 25th, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204)

An especially popular claim among Chinese is that their country can rise peacefully because it has a deeply Confucian culture. Confucianism, they argue, not only promotes moral virtue and harmony but also explicitly rules out acting aggressively toward neighboring countries. Instead, the emphasis is on self-defense. China, so the argument goes, has historically acted in accordance with the dictates of Confucianism and has not behaved like the European great powers, Japan, or the United States, which have launched offensive wars in pursuit of hegemony and generally acted according to the dictates of realism. China, in contrast, has behaved much more benignly toward other states: it has eschewed aggression and pursued “humane authority” instead of “hegemonic authority.”This perspective is popular among academics as well as policymakers in China. Many Chinese scholars like it because they see it as an alternative to the principal international relations theories, which are said to be Eurocentric and therefore oblivious to China’s exceptional culture. Confucianism is obviously a China-centric theory. For example, Xin Li and Verner Worm write, “Chinese culture advocates moral strength instead of military power, worships kingly rule instead of hegemonic rule, and emphasizes persuasion by virtue.” Yan Xuetong, who is probably China’s best-known international relations theorist in the West, maintains, “The rise of China will make the world more civilized. . . . The core of Confucianism is ‘benevolence’. . . . This concept encourages Chinese rulers to adopt benevolent governance . . . rather than hegemonic governance. . . . The Chinese concept of ‘benevolence’ will influence international norms and make international society more civilized.”Chinese policymakers offer similar arguments. For instance, the former premier Wen Jiabao told a Harvard audience in 2003, “Peace loving has been a time-honored quality of the Chinese nation.” And one year later, President Hu Jintao declared, “China since ancient times has had a fine tradition of sincerity, benevolence, kindness and trust towards its neighbors.” The clear implication of these comments is that China, unlike the other great powers in history, has acted like a model citizen on the world stage.There are two problems with this theory of Confucianism. First, it does not reflect how Chinese elites have actually talked and thought about international politics over their long history. In other words, it is not an accurate description of China’s strategic culture over the centuries. More important, there is little historical evidence that China has acted in accordance with the dictates of Confucianism. On the contrary, China has behaved just like other great powers, which is to say it has a rich history of acting aggressively and brutally toward its neighbors.There is doubtless a prominent Confucian strand in Chinese culture going back more than 2,000 years. But as Alastair Iain Johnston points out, a second and more powerful strand is at play in Chinese thinking about international politics. He calls it the “parabellum paradigm” and notes that it places “a high degree of value on the use of pure violence to resolve security conflicts.” This paradigm, he emphasizes, “does not make significantly different predictions about behavior from that of a simple structural realpolitik model.” That is why he uses the term “parabellum paradigm” interchangeably with “cultural realism,” which is the title of his book. Very important is Johnston’s contention that Confucianism and


cultural realism “cannot claim separate but equal status in traditional Chinese strategic thought. Rather, the parabellum paradigm is, for the most part, dominant.”

China is realist, not ConfucianMearsheimer 14 – professor of political science at University of Chicago, co-director of Program of International Security Policy at UChicago (John, “Can China Rise Peacefully,” The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, October 25th, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204)

The discussion up to now has assumed that Confucianism is essentially peaceful and does not advocate initiating war for any reason. But that assumption is not true. As Yan Xuetong makes clear, the high premium Confucianism places on morality does not rule out employing war as an instrument of statecraft. Indeed, it mandates that China be willing to wage just wars when another country is behaving in ways that China’s leaders deem immoral. Yan writes, “Some claim that Confucius and Mencius advocate ‘no war’ and are opposed to all war. In fact, they are not opposed to all war, only to unjust wars. They support just wars.” He further says, “Confucius thinks that reliance on preaching to uphold the norms of benevolence and justice is inadequate. Hence he thinks the way of war should be employed to punish the princes who go against benevolence and justice.”Of course, this justification for war is remarkably pliable. As almost every student of international politics knows, political leaders and policymakers of all persuasions are skilled in figuring out clever ways of defining a rival country’s behavior as unjust or morally depraved. Hence, with the right spinmeister, Confucian rhetoric can be used to justify aggressive as well as defensive behavior. Like liberalism in the United States, Confucianism makes it easy for Chinese leaders to speak like idealists and act like realists.And there is abundant evidence that China has behaved aggressively toward its neighbors whenever it could over the course of its long history. In his survey of Chinese foreign policy since the second millennium BCE, the historian Warren Cohen writes, “In the creation of their empire, the Chinese were no less arrogant, no less ruthless, than the Europeans, Japanese, or Americans in the creation of theirs.” He adds, “Historically, a strong China has brutalized the weak—and there is no reason to expect it to act differently in the future, to behave any better than other great powers have in the past.” The political scientist Victoria Tin-bor Hui observes that when we look at Chinese foreign policy over time, what we see is “the primacy of brute force rather than ‘humane authority.’” She notes, “It is difficult to understand such prevalence of military conflicts throughout Chinese history from only the perspective of Confucian thought.”Numerous other scholars make similar arguments. Yuan-Kang Wang, for example, writes, “Confucian culture did not constrain Chinese use of force: China has been a practitioner of realpolitik for centuries, behaving much like other great powers have throughout world history. . . . Chinese leaders have preferred to use force to resolve external threats to China’s security, take on a more offensive posture as the country’s power grew, and adopted expansive war aims in the absence of systemic or military constraints.” Finally, the historian Hans J. van de Ven writes, “No one even with only a casual interest in Chinese history can be unaware that China’s capacity for war in the last few centuries has proved truly awesome. . . . It is plain that China’s history has in fact been at least as violent as Europe’s.”One might concede that China has done little more than pay lip service to Confucianism in the past, but argue that it has undergone an epiphany in recent years and now embraces that peaceful worldview while rejecting balance-of-power logic. There is little evidence, however, that such a change has taken place. Indeed, it is not unusual for experts on China to note that realism is alive and well there. Thomas


Christensen, for example, argues that “China may well be the high church of realpolitik in the post–Cold War world,” while Avery Goldstein says, “China’s contemporary leaders, like their predecessors in Imperial China, prize the practice of realpolitik.”In sum, there is little basis for the claim that China is an exceptional great power that eschews realist logic and instead behaves in accordance with the principles of Confucian pacifism. Almost all of the available evidence indicates that China has a rich history of trying to maximize its relative power. Furthermore, there is no good reason to think China will act differently in the future.

AT: Nuclear deterrence solves

China Modernization is real and wrecks US deterrence credibilityGADY 16’ – Senior Fellow at the East West Institute, M.A. in Strategic Studies/International Economics at Johns Hopkins, analyst for the Project on National Security Reform (congressionally funded non-profit), research assistant at the Institute for National Strategies Studies of the National Defense University (Franz-Stefan, “Confirmed: China is Upgrading ICBMs With Multiple Warheads”, US-China Perception Monitor, http://www.uscnpm.org/blog/2016/02/19/confirmed-china-is-upgrading-icbms-with-multiple-warheads//AK)For the past several months, China has been upgrading single-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), according to U.S. intelligence agencies, The Washington Times reports.“China is re-engineering its long-range ballistic missiles to carry multiple nuclear warheads,” the head of U.S. Strategic Command Admiral Cecil D. Haney said in a January 22 speech.On February 9, the Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper noted that China “continues to modernize its nuclear forces by adding more survivable road-mobile systems and enhancing its silo-based systems.”U.S. defense officials revealed that the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) has upgraded its older liquid-fuelled, silo-based Dongfeng 5A ICBM with MIRVs containing three (some sources say eight) warheads.An advanced variant of the Dongfeng 5, the DF-5B, was displayed during Beijing’s grand military parade to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the surrender of Japan and the end of the Second World War, held in September 2015 (See: “Here’s What You Need to Know About China’s Grand Military Parade”). The liquid-fueled DF-5B purportedly has a range of 12,000-15,000 kilometers (6,835-7,456 miles).Overall, the PLARF is estimated to possess 20 Dongfeng DF-5B ICBMs, although some analysts believe that the number of missiles has increased beyond 20.“When you add the possibility of MIRVed DF-5s exceeding 20, to the imminent deployment of the road-mobile and rail-mobile MIRVed DF-41, and the potential for a MIRVed version of the DF-31 called the DF-31B, it becomes possible to consider that China may reach 500 or more ICBM warheads in the next few years,” Rick Fisher, a China military analyst, told The Washington Times. “This, combined with China aggressive development of missile defenses, space warfare capabilities and possible non-nuclear prompt global strike missiles, will quickly undermine confidence by U.S. allies in the extended U.S. nuclear deterrent,” he added.“High-confidence assessments of the numbers of Chinese nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads are not possible due to China’s lack of transparency about its nuclear program,” the latest U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission report notes.However, “despite the uncertainty surrounding China’s stockpiles of nuclear missiles and nuclear warheads, it is clear China’s nuclear forces over the next three to five years will expand considerably and become more lethal and survivable (…).”

http://www.uscnpm.org/blog/2016/02/19/confirmed-china-is-upgrading-icbms-with-multiple-warheads//AK

http://www.uscnpm.org/blog/2016/02/19/confirmed-china-is-upgrading-icbms-with-multiple-warheads//AK

The DF-5 missile series will eventually be phased out and replaced by the solid-fueled DF-41 (CSS-X-20) ICBM, last tested in August 2015 (See: “China Tests New Missile Capable of Hitting Entire United States”). Once operational, it will be the PLARF’s most advanced ICBM to date.The re-engineering of China’s ICBM force has been known for some time, although no unclassified assessment has so far been been able to confirm details of China’s ICBMs modernization effort.

AT: Chinese soft power

Soft power’s a broken record for china – they’ll never sustain it and liberal democratic values undermine CCP stabilityTellis and Blackwill 15 (Ashley** and David*, senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations*, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues**, “U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China”, Council on Foreign Relations, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Blackwill.pdf, April 13, 2015, NRG)

The first and most important aim pursued by China’s leaders since the founding of the modern Chinese state has been the preservation of internal order. Though this resolute pursuit of internal order was 9 rooted in the CCP’s self-interest, it also stemmed from a deeper Chinese phobia “of social chaos and political fragmentation or collapse, usually seen as ‘just-around-the-corner’ and often closely associated with [fears of] aggression and intervention from the outside.”14 Because of the historical memory of domestic divisions providing incentives for foreign manipulation and even aggression, China’s rulers have sought to suppress all political disquiet—increasingly by appeals to nationalism, but by coercion when necessary.In contemporary times, this fixation on preserving domestic order has become particularly acute, paradoxically because of China’s recent economic success. High growth has resulted in desires for expanded personal liberties, but the regime has responded by restricting freedom of expression in various realms. Rapid economic growth has also dramatically accentuated stratification and social inequalities while increasing social dislocation and corruption nationally. As a result, the same tool that has accelerated China’s rise in the global system has also weakened the CCP’s domestic legitimacy, and political resentment against Beijing has grown, especially in the Han-minority areas of the country.Despite China’s meteoric economic success, its leadership does not possess easy solutions to the current challenges of governance and legitimacy. Surrendering power in favor of genuine democracy is unthinkable for the Communist regime, and the palliatives offered by anticorruption campaigns, the incorporation of rule by law (as opposed to rule of law), the increased invocation of classical texts in an effort to seek validation in tradition, the growing ideological emphasis on promoting “Chinese values,” the promotion of a new “Chinese Dream” centered on “national rejuvenation, improvement of people’s livelihoods, prosperity, construction of a better society, and military strengthening,” and the stimulation of nationalism have not yet resolved the crisis of legitimacy that now engulfs the CCP.15China’s Communist rulers remain threatened by U.S. campaigns in support of democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of minorities, all of which are viewed in Beijing as thinly veiled attempts at either fomenting secession or engineering regime change. In an effort to ensure that American democratic values and policies do not undermine the CCP’s hold on power, Chinese rulers have prosecuted a multipronged ideological campaign that includes a strident defense of sovereignty and a concerted rejection of all foreign interest in the nation’s internal affairs, intense surveillance of suspect domestic groups and nongovernmental organizations operating in China, and focused propaganda efforts to amplify Chinese nationalism and mobilize public support in defense of the regime and the state.16Beneath these ideational efforts, however, lies the iron fist. Given the CCP’s deep-seated fears for its own survival amid the current economic and social ferment in China, the party has continually expanded

its capabilities for domestic coercion, to the point where its internal security budget, exemplified by the People’s Armed Police (PAP), is larger than that of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) itself. Clearly, internal security competes with, and could even trump, external security. Further complicating matters, the party’s army fears finding itself in the awkward position of having to defend the purported representatives of the people against the people’s own wrath—a conundrum that may prove to be explosive if events like Tiananmen Square were to recur in the future.

AT: Lee – social identity theory

Lee isn’t aff – he says engagement is just as bad as containmentLee, 16 - Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles (James Jungbok Lee (2016) Will China’s Rise Be Peaceful? A Social Psychological Perspective, Asian Security, 12:1, 29-52, DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2016.1140644

Overall, the findings of the article are significant for two main reasons. First, the article sheds light on the critical question of what the United States’ optimal strategy should be for enabling China’s peaceful rise. John Mearsheimer, a leading realist, argues that containment will be America’s most effective strategy by far. In particular, he calls for the US to “keep Beijing from using its military forces to conquer territory and more generally expand its influence in Asia” and, towards this end, “to seek to form a balancing coalition against China with as many of [the latter’s] neighbors as possible.” 171 In contrast, G. John Ikenberry, a leading liberal, claims that the United States should strengthen the “global system of governance that underpins the Western order” and make it “so expansive and so institutionalized” that China has no choice but to become a full-fledged, cooperative member.172 However, the findings of this article indicate that neither of these recommendations are necessary nor sufficient for pacifying China’s rise and are, if anything, counterproductive . That is, because both of these recommendations entail the United States’ subjugating China under an order (whether it be economic or military) crafted under its leadership, they are likely to be perceived by China as acts of disrespect towards its sovereignty designed to prevent its [peaceful] pursuit of becoming a distinctive great power. Therefore, perhaps it now is time for Washington to transition away from heavily relying on those conventional prescriptions for containment or engagement, which by definition treat China as a subordinate . Instead, it should begin implementing policies on a level playing field this time that genuinely display recognition and respect toward China’s core interests and status.

Affirmative

General 2ac material

2ac – engagement now

Over 90 Current Dialogue Mechanisms – SQO Cooperation solves the Aff’s internal linksXinhua English News 15’ (“Backgrounder: China-U.S. cooperation deepens in various fields”, 6/20, Xinhua News, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-06/20/c_134343437.htm//AK)Over the past few years, cooperation between the two countries has continuously deepened in such fields as high-level contact, economy and people-to-people exchanges with fruitful results achieved.HIGH-LEVEL INTERACTIONAt the invitation of U.S. President Barack Obama, Chinese President Xi Jinping will pay a state visit to the United States in September this year.It will be Xi's first state visit to the United States since he took over the presidency in 2013.In November 2014, Obama paid a state visit to China after attending an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation leaders' meeting in Beijing. The two sides reached, among others, a historic deal on climate change.In June 2013, Xi and Obama met at an informal summit at the Annenberg Retreat, California, where they agreed on building a new type of major-country relationship.In March 2014, on the sidelines of a nuclear security summit in The Hague, the Netherlands, the two leaders agreed to maintain close contact and jointly push for the new type of major-country relationship.In September 2013, the two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to bilateral cooperation in talks on the sidelines of a Group of 20 summit held in St. Petersburg, Russia.ECONOMIC COOPERATIONAs the world's two largest economies, the United States and China are increasingly economically interdependent, with their trade volume hitting 550 billion U.S. dollars last year.China and the United States are the second largest trade partner to each other. U.S. investment in China has amounted to nearly 100 billion dollars, while Chinese investment in the United States has also been growing.Talks on a bilateral investment treaty have been accelerated, and the negative-list negotiation also started in 2015, as both countries seek to increase mutual investment, which only accounts for a tiny share of their overseas investment.The upcoming S&ED is a high-level dialogue that serves as the flagship in the various dialogue mechanisms the two countries have developed. On the economic track, the two sides will have in-depth discussions on such topics as macroeconomic policy-making, trade, investment and financial reform.PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE EXCHANGEThe CPE, along with the S&ED, is among more than 90 dialogue mechanisms between China and the United States. It has become the most important regular platform to deepen bilateral people-to-people exchanges and cement understanding between Chinese and U.S. citizens.As a main program of the CPE, the biennial China-U.S. Cultural Forum, which has been held since 2008, has helped promote understanding and strengthen ties between the Chinese and U.S. people. The fourth edition was held in Washington in April.

In December 2014, China and the United States launched a new fellowship initiative aimed at sponsoring 15 to 20 American professionals interested in Chinese culture and China-related work to visit and study in China every year through 2024.The initiative is one of the latest additions to the programs under the CPE.MILITARY EXCHANGEIn the military sphere, China and the United States agreed in 2014 on establishing a new type of military relations to match the new type of major-country relationship between them. The defense departments of the two countries have signed memorandums of understanding on establishing a mutual reporting mechanism on major military operations and a code of safe conduct on naval and air military encounters.

2ac – at: Yan

Yan’s data is limited and social psychology studies disprove itJohnston, 11 - Alastair Iain Johnston is the Governor James Noe and Linda Noe Laine Professor of China in World Affairs at Department of Government, Harvard University (“Stability and Instability in Sino–US Relations: A Response to Yan Xuetong’s Superficial Friendship Theory” Chinese Journal of International Politics (2011) 4 (1): 5-29.doi: 10.1093/cjip/por003

On the other hand, some of this literature in the psychology of expectations and disappointment suggests that one might actually expect to see lower levels of superficial friendship over time. For instance, work on the relationship between disappointment, anger, and dissatisfaction suggests that disappointment is a function of four factors: frustration at not being able to achieve one’s goals, surprise at being wrong, a sense of failure, and a loss of self-esteem because of a proven inability to predict events, and, as prospect theory suggests, because of a loss of expected benefits.5 Actors will learn from these experiences to lower their future expectations which, in turn, will presumably reduce the level of disappointment the next time round. This may stabilize their relationships with interlocutors.A variant on this is that after a series of disappointments actors will revise their expectations in more pessimistic directions. Thus, one should see more conflictual (though perhaps more stable) relations with interlocutors over time.6 If so, this might predict an updating or learning process where, say after 1999 or 2001, the US and China should move towards less optimistic but more stable thinking about the relationship. (This would run counter to Yan’s claims about the persistent and increasing instability in the relationship over time.)Another literature, however, might make predictions consistent with Yan’s empirical claims about persistent instability. Here, however, the persistence of superficial friendship is strategic, not a function of deeply internalized delusions. There is evidence that people are more likely to concede to another side if that other side expresses disappointment rather than no emotion at all.7 Thus, it would pay for an actor to evince disappointment strategically in order to encourage concessions from the other side.8Still another literature suggests a different behavioural implication. Mere dissatisfaction does not necessarily lead to proactive, conflictual, responses. Rather, disappointment often results in passivity, based on a feeling of helplessness, rather than a more aggressive or angry response.9The degree to which exuberance and disappointment characterize a relationship may also vary according to the complexity of the interaction. In relationships where the range of salient issues is quite narrow, the effects of exuberance and disappointment are likely themselves to be more variable. More complex relationships, where multiple issues reside side-by-side, may be more stable: exuberance in one issue area may be offset by more sober or ‘realistic’ assessments and every day interactions in another issue area.Of course, exuberance, disappointment, and shattered expectations are characteristics of the psychology of people and small groups, not nations or states. So to test more observable implications, the research needs to go more micro. The body of theory could be adapted to interstate relationships to generate additional observable implications. What would we expect to see in foreign policy discourses, in the arguments made or not made in the policy process, in the actors involved in policy, and in actions

taken unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally if a theory of disappointment were correct? Can different leaders be classified according to their predispositions towards exuberance and thus disappointment?Yan does use events data to examine overall patterns of conflict and cooperation in the US–China relationship as evidence for superficial friendship-generated instability. But, as I will note later, these data are only one place to look for confirmation (or disconfirmation) of the argument. And these events data do not necessarily capture what is going on at the individual and small group level where, after all, the effects of psychological factors are most observable.

Security dilemma theory is a better explanation for instability in relationsJohnston, 11 - Alastair Iain Johnston is the Governor James Noe and Linda Noe Laine Professor of China in World Affairs at Department of Government, Harvard University (“Stability and Instability in Sino–US Relations: A Response to Yan Xuetong’s Superficial Friendship Theory” Chinese Journal of International Politics (2011) 4 (1): 5-29.doi: 10.1093/cjip/por003

Still, I think Yan might consider additional explanations other than the two he dismisses in this article. An obvious alternative would come from security dilemma theory.31 A security dilemma has the following features. Two or more essentially status-quo-oriented states with more or less benign intentions begin to doubt the other is similarly oriented. Each side takes politico-military steps to enhance its security in the face of this uncertainty. These steps are seen by Self as defensive and non-threatening to the other side’s core interests. Others, however, sees them as offensive and threatening. The result is a spiral of insecurity and the mutual construction of an adversary.Security dilemmas are endogenous social processes. As they intensify, the meaning of cooperative moves is discounted and the meaning of conflictual moves is amplified. Each side comes to believe that it is more or less the status quo state, but increasingly doubts that the other side is. At first, Self’s response is framed in terms of maintaining its prior strategy, perhaps in hopes that the other side is misperceiving the relationship. But Self then begins to shift to a view that the other side is more revisionist than previously thought, e.g. a shift towards a dispositional conclusion about Other. This leads to a reassessment of the wisdom or appropriateness of Self's old strategy, and the rise of voices in support of a more basic shift towards a more coercive strategy. So a security dilemma can start out as a cycle of insecurity between two essentially status quo states but end up changing preferences in less status quo directions. In this regard, security dilemmas are socialization experiences.32 This process also suggests that, contrary to Yan’s logic, relations of enmity are not necessarily more stable than so-called ‘superficial friendship’33—enmity breeds security dilemma dynamics which are likely to amplify and accentuate malign signalling and malign reactions. Although relations will not zigzag between amity and enmity, the probability of conflict increases exponentially or at least non-linearly.To check whether security dilemma dynamics are increasingly characteristic of the US–China relationship, we need to look for three basic pieces of evidence. First, we need to look for evidence that Self discounts Other’s cooperative behaviour and amplifies Other’s non-cooperative behaviour, such that these behaviours are now interpreted differently from in the past. In contrast, superficial friendship theory might suggest an equal exaggeration of positive (exuberance) and negative (disappointment) information.

--1ar – Yan wrong

Yan’s own data disproves the superficial friendship hypothesisAlexandroff, 11 - Alan Alexandroff is a research director of the Program on Conflict Management and Negotiation (PCMN) at the University of Toronto (“Stability and Instability Once Again – Could it Be …?” 3/15, http://blog.risingbricsam.com/?p=489

Now Johnston in a rather persuasive and extended analysis of the events data – as they are currently constructed and characterized – suggest that there are two problems: first that some of the issues identified in the data set might well be coded differently; and secondly there are, in Johnston’s opinion, important issues between China and the US that do not find there way into the data set as currently constituted. Not to get too social ‘sciencey’, Johnston concludes: “In essence, the operationalization and measurement of the dependent variable becomes problematic.” And for good measure Johnston notes the fitted trend – taking the data from 1989 to 2008 – increases over time and the annual absolute deviation declines – in other words, the US-China relations improve and volatility declines, which fails to correspond with the superficial friendship hypothesis.

Yan’s data set has validity and reliability problemsJohnston, 11 - Alastair Iain Johnston is the Governor James Noe and Linda Noe Laine Professor of China in World Affairs at Department of Government, Harvard University (“Stability and Instability in Sino–US Relations: A Response to Yan Xuetong’s Superficial Friendship Theory” Chinese Journal of International Politics (2011) 4 (1): 5-29.doi: 10.1093/cjip/por003

I do not want to suggest that Yan’s codings in Table 1 are necessarily wrong and that alternative codings are right. But I think there are two problems here. First, some issues that Yan codes one way could be plausibly coded differently. Second, there are issues in the relationship that are missing from the list. Thus, it is possible that his estimates of the instability in the US–China relationship have validity and reliability problems.The following are some examples of what, to my mind, are problematic codings. One is that Yan puts competing models of development (presumably something like US capitalist democracy versus Chinese authoritarian developmentalism) in the same class of confrontational interests as maritime control of the South China Sea. Despite pundit talk of a ‘Beijing Consensus’ I do not think many in the US government, at least, see China’s model of development as much of a threat to the USA or vital US interests at the moment.10 Although ideological differences contribute to perceptions of identity difference between the two sides, the US government does not appear to believe that these differences are spilling over into competition for ideological influence in third areas. Indeed, I once heard then-US Deputy Secretary of Defence, Paul Wolfowitz, a quintessential neo-conservative, argue at the Shangrila meeting in Singapore that North Korea should adopt the Chinese model of development.Another problematic coding is the placing of Uyghur terrorism in the same category of conflicting interests as the Taiwan issue. I am not sure these things belong together. The USA is very clear that it recognizes Xinjiang as a part of the Peoples Republic of China. Although there are doubts within the USA about China’s designation of certain separatist movements in China as terrorist, the USA has actually

http://blog.risingbricsam.com/?p=489

helped China in its fight against militant Islamic violence by listing the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, for example, as a terrorist group in 2002. The USA also reportedly gave Chinese officials access to some of the Uyghurs held at Guantanamo. The USA also helped China prepare for possible terrorist attacks against the 2008 Olympics by sending a Nuclear Emergency Support Team with sensitive radiological detection equipment to China.11 In contrast to the Xinjiang case, the USA does not legally recognize the island of Taiwan as a part of the Peoples Republic of China. And US commitments to Taiwan’s security, at this point, rest heavily on the belief in the credibility of commitments to its formal allies in the region. The US scepticism of China’s use of counter-terrorism to clamp down on religious and ethnic identity in Xinjiang is not, it seems to me, the same kind of Sino–US difference as the US commitment to Taiwan’s security.On the Iran issue, also classified by Yan as a conflicting interest, the State Department cables distributed by Wikileaks reveal evidence of more common purpose, though some differences in tactics. Dai Bingguo is reported in one cable to have remarked to US Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg that, ‘China and the United States saw eye-to-eye on the Iran nuclear issue. Nuclear states should reduce their nuclear arsenal with the goal of eventual elimination and should work to prevent other nations, including Iran, from developing nuclear weapons. However, China and the United States had different considerations on how we advanced these goals.’12 When China supports UN resolutions criticizing Iran’s nuclear program or endorsing sanctions, even if the message is diluted from the US perspective, should this count as cooperation or conflict or something in-between?In addition to some questionable coding,13 there are some interests missing from Table 1. For instance, international shipping issues might be put on the conflictual list, given arguments in China that it needs a navy precisely to prevent/deter the USA from monopolizing Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC). Concerning cultural interests, one could imagine adding to the list of conflicting interests the issue of social values—China’s efforts to promote certain Confucian values versus US liberalism. China’s efforts to reduce cross-strait tensions could plausibly be put on the list of common or complementary interests, since both the USA and China benefit from a reduced probability of war provoked by Taiwan independence. Similarly, the subtle shift in US nuclear strategy under the Obama administration to implicitly endorse a mutual deterrence relationship with China could be listed under common or complementary security interests.14 The USA support for the G-20 mechanism might be listed under common interests, since, according to the leaked US State Department cables, a Chinese official once expressed thanks to President Obama ‘for his leadership in institutionalizing the G-20, which had created a “comfortable” platform for countries like China and India to play a larger role’.15Yan’s coding of the issues in Table 1 underscores his broader claim that the USA and China cannot or are not willing to support each other’s core interests in practice because these are, in many instances, in conflict with each other.16 But here, too, I think the evidence is more complicated than Yan implies. His conclusion underestimates the degree to which the USA has not tried to undermine China’s core interests. As defined variously by Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, Dai Bingguo, and Foreign Ministry officials, China’s articulated core interests include: preserving the political system, national security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity (preventing the separation of Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan), and sustainable economic development.17 On almost all of these issues the USA opposed China’s interests in the 1950s and 1960s. But since rapprochement in the early 1970s, the USA has reversed its policies 180 degrees on these core interests. Currently, the USA does not actively try to engineer the downfall of the Communist Party rule. It supports China’s economic development and China’s participation in the global capitalist economy (which actually boosts the legitimacy of the Communist Party). Concerning China’s sovereignty

and territorial integrity issues, the USA legally recognizes Tibet and Xinjiang as integral parts of the Peoples Republic of China. It does not currently support Taiwan’s de jure independence, and it worked quite hard to prevent the Chen Shuibian government from moving in that direction. Indeed, the Chinese government was very pleased at US efforts to counter Chen’s push for a referendum on Taiwan’s entry into the UN in 2007. The USA may not recognize some of China’s current territorial claims in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, but it also does not recognize the claims of other disputants.

Yan’s assessment of conflicting interests is highly subjective and impossible to proveJohnston, 11 - Alastair Iain Johnston is the Governor James Noe and Linda Noe Laine Professor of China in World Affairs at Department of Government, Harvard University (“Stability and Instability in Sino–US Relations: A Response to Yan Xuetong’s Superficial Friendship Theory” Chinese Journal of International Politics (2011) 4 (1): 5-29.doi: 10.1093/cjip/por003

There is a much deeper intellectual issue raised by Yan’s coding of interests, however. This has to do with the question of where interests come from. If one drops the notion of a self-evident national interest, or views interests as domestically derived, or sees interests as multiple and at times conflicting, problems with asserting the existence of an objective (and/or structural) clash or convergence of interests become apparent. Yan’s discussion of US and Chinese interests towards global financial and trade reform illustrates the complexity of, and difficulty using, terms like conflictual or unfavourable interests.19 On the one hand, US and Chinese interests are in conflict from the perspective of one set of domestic interests, namely the interests of those who want to remain in power. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders do not want to risk the destabilizing effect on employment of a rapid and large appreciation of the renminbi (RMB). US politicians do not want to be seen as powerless to get China to import more American products. On the other hand, when assessing US or Chinese national interests, why privilege the interests of ruling elites? From the perspective of other domestic groups such as consumers, one could make the opposite argument about national interests. Chinese consumers would benefit from lower relative import prices and thus ‘share’ an interest with US politicians; US consumers benefit from existing low Chinese import prices as these keep inflation down, and thus ‘share’ an interest with China’s rulers. What is the national interest given these complex economic relationships?Fundamentally, the problem here is the sharp distinction, theoretically, between perceived interests and certain underlying real or given interests. Yan’s argument rests on this difference. If there were no difference, then friendship would not be superficial because it would not be delusional. Thus this gap between perceived and real interests can only exist because he believes there are in fact real interests: ‘A superficial friendship is one where two nations imagine that they have more mutually favourable than unfavourable interests, when the reality is the opposite’ [emphasis added].20 But he is unclear what these given, fixed or real interests are and where they come from. As noted above, some of these interests may actually be determined by political actors (e.g. the CCP wants to stay in power, therefore ‘China’s interest’ is to keep its exports up against the US desire to appreciate the RMB). But if so, then, it is hard to call them fixed, given, and independent of perceptions of leaders. Perhaps, it is the materialist realist in Yan that convinces him there are interests that all states have, and that these are fixed and given and are sources of US–China conflict. But he does not really tell us what these interests are or why they are independent of perceptions. As a result, there is some blurring of the distinction between his own subjective definition of China’s interests, say, and the existence of some ‘real’ conflict that

superficial friendship obscures. Constructivism (and neoclassical realism), however, would ask: what is not real about perceived or imagined interests, since it is (mostly) inter-subjective knowledge that drives behaviour?Indeed, I could make an argument that all of Yan’s conflicting, confrontational, common, and complementary interests in Table 1 are based either on choices made by political leaders or are so-deeply internalized as to be unquestioned. It is therefore easy to imagine different people making different policy choices or taking different interests for granted. For example, in the category of common interests, it could be that denuclearization is a common US–China interest only because neither side believes that a multi-polar nuclear world is stable. Some smart people, on the other hand, do believe nuclear multi-polarity could be stable.21 And indeed there was a time in the past, in the 1960s, when China’s leaders advocated nuclear multi-polarity, presumably because this would help balance against and constrain US power. China’s assessment of the non-proliferation problem has changed, however.In the category of complementary interests, one could argue that bilateral trade is a US–China interest because of the victory of free trade ideology in both countries, indeed globally. There was a time, however, when a new international economic order was the intellectually dominant argument among many developing states. Now market ideology is deeply ingrained, despite the fact that there are clearly absolute and relative losers from free market economics.As for conflicting interests, one could argue that the main reason arms sales to Taiwan are on this list is because the Chinese Communist Party decided in the early1940s to change its position on the status and importance of Taiwan.22 Or because the USA believes (with less evidence than one might think) that the credibility of its commitments are at stake in its relationship with Taiwan.Regarding confrontational interests, maritime control of the South China Sea is on this list only because of a deeply ingrained linkage between territoriality and sovereignty in Chinese concepts of interests. This linkage is a product of a particular nationalist interpretation of Chinese history. It is not fixed, nor is its intensity necessarily shared across all states. Nothing about geography, material power distributions, or anarchy predicts to these definitions of interests.In short, because of problems in the coding of interests, Yan’s analysis may be exaggerating the degree of instability in the relationship after the end of the Cold War. And therefore Yan may be exaggerating the degree of disappointment and shattered expectations on both sides.

Yan’s assessment of Chinese motives doesn’t reflect official policyJohnston, 11 - Alastair Iain Johnston is the Governor James Noe and Linda Noe Laine Professor of China in World Affairs at Department of Government, Harvard University (“Stability and Instability in Sino–US Relations: A Response to Yan Xuetong’s Superficial Friendship Theory” Chinese Journal of International Politics (2011) 4 (1): 5-29.doi: 10.1093/cjip/por003

Yan’s ledger of shared and not shared interests is a mix of interests that include officially announced ones, and those that he infers. An important source of instability, he notes, is essentially a zero-sum relationship between US desire to maintain global leadership and China’s desire to ‘regain its place as world leading power’.18 This is quite an admission about China's interests. Since it is not official policy to challenge or replace the USA as the dominant state in the system, and since there is no obvious evidence for or against this being a deeply held interest among the top leadership, it is hard to know how to assess this claim. The USA certainly openly refuses to relinquish its ‘leadership role’. But does

this therefore mean there is a conflict of interest over hegemony? Not according to the Peoples Republic of China government. Moreover, the USA officially supports China’s rise, and thus does not see US leadership and China’s rise as necessarily zero-sum. So how are we to judge where US and Chinese interests lie on this question? For those officially articulated interests, how do we know they are authoritative expressions of true intentions? And for those that are not officially stated but inferred by Yan himself, how do we know these even exist as interests?In short, I think that there is certain arbitrariness to the list of interests in Table 1. If one plausibly recodes many of the interests in Yan’s list, or adds missing ‘interests’ not on the current Table 1, then the balance of common, complementary, conflictual, and confrontational interests may change. This affects the overall assessment of the degree of stability and instability in the relationship. In essence, the operationalization and measurement of the dependent variable becomes problematic. This, in turn, raises doubts about the reliability and validity of tests of the superficial friendship thesis. One suggestion would be that Yan develops explicit criteria for putting certain issues on this list, for coding them in particular ways, and for keeping other issues off the list.

2ac – link defense

The plan doesn’t prevent a shift to containmentMattis, 15 - Peter Mattis is a Fellow in the China Program at The Jamestown Foundation (“U.S. Policy Towards China: Imposing Costs Doesn't Mean Ending Engagement” 9/10, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/us-policy-towards-china-imposing-costs-doesnt-mean-ending-13810?page=show

The idea of imposing costs or forcing China to face consequences for its actions is easily misunderstood as abandoning the carrot for the stick as a matter of U.S. policy toward China. On some issues and for some analysts, moving from a cordial to an adversarial approach may well be the case in areas such as South China Sea or cyber. Even these, however, are selective, based on Chinese actions in particular areas, and focused on continuing the basic U.S. policy of shaping the choices Beijing can make while encouraging a positive course. Shaping Chinese choices necessarily requires a mix of incentives and disincentives, but the latter can only be as strong as the will to act upon them.It is worth noting that even Michael Pillsbury in his harshly critical book on U.S.-China relations, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower, does not advocate replacing the carrot with the stick. His policy proposals deal most strongly with better assessing China, dealing with Beijing as it is run under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and avoiding being duped. They boil down to how President Barack Obama characterized the way to run foreign policy: “Don’t do stupid stuff.”The idea that imposing costs and consequences on China for actions inimical to U.S. interests means abandoning incentives to browbeat Beijing seems premised on the assumption that such consequences mean the beginning of a containment strategy and the end of engagement.Engagement is not going away. Suggestions of its demise are premature. If you want to persuade or dissuade someone, the only way to ensure your signal was sent, received, and understood is to meet face-to-face, keep dialogue open, and ensure senior officials understand how the other side interprets actions. Apart from that supercilious point, the U.S.-China relationship, regardless of ostensibly shared interests, is not a fragile flower that will wilt at the first frost.

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/us-policy-towards-china-imposing-costs-doesnt-mean-ending-13810?page=show


2ac – moderates turn

Turn – plan bolsters Chinese moderatesLi, 15 – professor, East China Normal University, School of International Relations and Area Studies (Xiaoting, “Dealing with the Ambivalent Dragon: Can Engagement Moderate China’s Strategic Competition with America?” International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International RelationsVolume 41, Issue 3, 2015, DOI:10.1080/03050629.2015.1006728

Can US engagement moderate China’s strategic competition with America? This study indicates the answer is a qualified yes. Under unipolarity, a rising state may face both incentives to accommodate the hegemonic dominance and to expand its own strategic leeway against the latter. Consequently, engagement may help the hegemon to promote cooperation over competition in dealing with an ascending power, but it does not necessarily overwhelm the structural incentives for the competition. Against this theoretical backdrop, this study utilizes both qualitative and quantitative research to demonstrate that China’s reaction to American primacy has long been marked by a profound ambivalence. Specifically, the findings suggest that while US engagement has some restraining impact on China’s competitive propensity, Beijing will continue to hedge against American hegemony, as its capabilities grow, by solidifying its diplomatic and strategic association with the developing world.The endurance of competition, however, does not imply that conflict is inevitable. In fact, facing the reality of rising power, realist theory does not uniformly predict catastrophe or recommend containment: To classical realists, the future is always unwritten, and so wise diplomacy matters (Kirshner 2012:65–66).13 Despite China’s impressive development to date, for example, it is far from certain that the PRC will achieve parity with the United States in economic, military, and technological strength for the foreseeable future (Beckley 2011). Many PRC elites seem to realize this too and hence prefer to keep China committed to peaceful development, by working with rather than against America (Bader 2012:122–123; Sutter 2012:149–150). As noted recently by a renowned Singaporean expert, those “doves” still hold considerable sway in opposition to an aggressive, nationalist approach in Chinese foreign policy (Mahbubani 2014).Under the circumstances, sustained US engagement helps to strengthen the moderate Chinese groups and individuals by signaling that American intentions toward China are not inimical and that there is much room for promoting mutual understanding and benefit. Within this context, a belligerent Chinese posture toward America will appear less appealing or defensible in domestic debates . Engagement, in other words, reduces the likelihood of conflict by preventing the formation of a strong consensus among the ruling elites of an emerging power that the hegemon constitutes an unappeasable threat , a consensus that is a foremost necessary condition for balancing or confrontational behavior (Schweller 2004).

1ar – moderates turn

Engagement on balance increases the risk of peace – tensions are manageable and just call for greater engagementHart 15 – Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, San Diego, and director of Chinese policy at American Progress (Melanie, “Assessing American Foreign Policy Toward China,” Center for American Progress, September 29th, 2015, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2015/09/29/122283/assessing-american-foreign-policy-toward-china/) // EDPThe United States has pursued an engagement strategy toward China for almost four decades. Regardless of party affiliation, every U.S. president since Nixon has aimed to integrate China into the international system. That decision has been and continues to be one of the greatest American foreign policy successes of the post-World War II era. The U.S. engagement strategy toward China and alliance relationships in the Asia-Pacific region made it possible for Asia-Pacific nations to focus on economic development at home instead of strategic competition abroad.Now, nearly 37 years after U.S.-China normalization, China is an upper-middle-income nation. China’s economic growth is allowing it to expand its military capabilities and foreign policy ambitions. That is a natural expansion. Beijing is increasingly unwilling to sit on the sidelines and watch other nations shape international norms. Today, instead of biding their time, Chinese leaders are experimenting with new ways to use their nation’s growing strengths to shape the international environment in China’s favor. On some issues, those efforts dovetail with U.S. interests, so China’s new assertiveness is opening up new opportunities for cooperation. Where U.S.-China interests are not aligned, however, Chinese actions are reheating old frictions and creating new ones. Those frictions—most notably in the South China Sea—are triggering new debates in the United States about overall foreign policy strategy toward China. Some U.S. observers discount the new opportunities for cooperation and argue that because some challenges in the U.S.-China relationship appear difficult to navigate, the United States should scrap the entire engagement strategy and begin treating China as a strategic rival. Those arguments are misguided.The fundamentals of the U.S.-China relationship are the same today as they were in the 1970s when the United States first reached out to turn this former rival into a strategic partner. Chinese leaders still prioritize domestic economic growth and stability above all other policy goals; they still view the U.S.-China bilateral as China’s most important foreign policy relationship and want that relationship to be peaceful and cooperative. The Chinese military still focuses first and foremost on defending the Chinese Communist Party’s right to govern the Chinese mainland and its territories. These fundamentals have not changed. What has changed in recent years is China’s capabilities and the tools Beijing is using to further its domestic and foreign policy interests. Those changes call for some tactical adjustments on the U.S. side. Those changes do not warrant an abandonment of the engagement strategy that has brought, and can continue to bring, decades of enduring peace and economic growth for all Asia-Pacific nations, including the United States.

https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2015/09/29/122283/assessing-american-foreign-policy-toward-china/)

https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2015/09/29/122283/assessing-american-foreign-policy-toward-china/)

Xi’s China is prime for strategic bargains and conditions because of his unique policy outlookRudd 15- Prime Minister of Australia from 2007 to 2010 (Kevin, “How to Break the ‘Mutually Assured Misperception’ Between the U.S. and China”, The World Post, 4-20-2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kevin-rudd/us-china-relations-kevin-rudd-report_b_7096784.html)//SL2. Xi is a powerful leader the U.S. can do business with if it chooses.Three concepts define how Xi Jinping’s leadership differs from that of his predecessors:1. His personal authority2. His deep sense of national mission3. And an even deeper sense of urgencyXi’s audacious leadership style sets him apart from the modern Chinese norm. Both in personality and policy, he represents one part continuity and two parts change. Xi is the most powerful Chinese leader since Deng (Deng Xiaoping 邓小平), and possibly since Mao (Mao Zedong 毛泽东). Whereas his predecessors believed in, and by and large practiced, the principle of collective leadership, Xi Jinping is infinitely more primus than he is primus inter pares. As a Party blue blood, he also exudes a self-confidence that comes from someone utterly comfortable with the exercise of political power.Xi is driven by a deep sense of personal integrity, personal destiny and the decisive role that he is to play in bringing about two great historical missions for his country: first, national rejuvenation, thereby restoring China’s place as a respected great power in the councils of the world; and second, saving the Communist Party itself from the cancer of corruption, thereby securing the party’s future as the continuing political vehicle for China’s future as a great power. Xi is both a Chinese nationalist and a Party loyalist. He is deeply and widely read in both international and Chinese history, including an encyclopedic knowledge of the history of the Communist Party itself.His core, animating vision centers on his concept of the “China Dream” (zhongguomeng 中国梦) which in turn has two objectives: to achieve a “moderately well-off China” (xiaokang shehui 小康社会) by 2021 when the Party celebrates its centenary; and “a rich and powerful” (fuqiang 富强) China by 2049 on the centenary of the People’s Republic. Realizing the China Dream, according to Xi, requires a second phase of transformative economic reform. He sees no contradiction in prosecuting deeper market reforms to achieve his national objectives, while implementing new restrictions on individual political freedom. In fact, he sees this as the essence of “the China Model” (zhongguo moshi 中国模式) in contrast to the liberal democratic capitalism of the West which he describes as totally unsuited to China.For Xi, China must seize the moment of “extended strategic opportunity,” following 10 wasted years when necessary reforms were postponed, and corruption allowed to run rampant. China’s domestic policy needs are now integrally bound up with the country’s foreign policy direction. In Xi’s worldview, an increasingly “rich and powerful” China must now start playing a much bigger role in the world. No longer will China “hide its strength, bide its time, and never take the lead” (taoguang yanghui, juebu dangtou 韬光养晦决不当头), Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy mantra for decades. China must now pursue an “activist” (fenfa youwei 奋发有为) foreign policy that maximizes China’s economic and security interests, and one that begins to engage in the longer term reform of the global order. Xi speaks for the first time of China’s “grand strategy” needing to embrace “a new great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics” (you zhongguo tese de xinxing daguo waijiao 有中国特色的新型大国外交), in order to craft a “new type of great power relations” (xinxing daguo guanxi 新型大国关系) with the United States. Xi, in short, is not a status quo politician. He is the exact reverse. And in pursuing his

sense of national mission and personal destiny, he is prepared to take calculated risks in a traditionally risk-averse Communist Party culture.Xi Jinping’s sense of personal and national urgency is animated by a formidable, Confucian work ethic, which he also expects of his Party colleagues and policy advisors. He is results-driven. He is frustrated by the interminable processes of the Chinese bureaucracy, and its predisposition for formulaic responses to real policy challenges. He is very much a man in a hurry.For these several reasons, Xi, unlike his predecessor, has the personal authority and policy flexibility to be a potentially dynamic interlocutor with the United States, albeit always within the framework of his nationalist vision for China’s future, and his definitive conclusions concerning the continuing role of China’s one-party state. When, therefore, Xi uses the term “win-win” (shuangying 双赢) to describe his desired relationship with the U.S., it should not be simply discarded as a piece of Chinese propaganda. Xi does see potential value in strategic and political collaboration with the United States.In short, there is still reasonable foreign and security policy space for the U.S. administration to work within in its dealings with Xi Jinping, although it is an open question how long it will be before policy directions are set in stone, and the window of opportunity begins to close. I argue that Xi is capable of bold policy moves, even including the possibility of grand strategic bargains on intractable questions such as the denuclearization and peaceful re-unification of the Korean Peninsula . It is up to America to use this space as creatively as it can while it still lasts.

2ac – containment fails

Containment risks warFriedberg 11 - Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, co-director of the Woodrow Wilson School’s Center for International Security Studies (Aaron, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, p. 253)

A small handful of "realists” do believe that regardless of its domestic politics, a rising China will someday come to blows with the United States. Their brutal prescription follows directly from this conviction: if a conflict is coming, Washington would be well advised to try to delay or derail China's rise, perhaps even going so far as to trigger a confrontation while the balance of power is still tilted in its favor.16 At its furthest extreme, containment thus becomes a prescription for preventive war. Fortunately in the real world there is no chance that any American president would follow such advice. An unprovoked shift from congagement to pure containment would face insurmountable domestic political obstacles, but there are sound strategic reasons for rejecting it as well. An unremittingly hostile American stance would guarantee an escalating competition on all fronts, raising the risks of war and possibly frightening some U.S. allies into neutrality. Adopting an openly confrontational posture would confirm the Beijing regime's most pessimistic claims about America's true intentions, lending credence to those within it who support a more militaristic, aggressively nationalistic approach to foreign policy and a less liberal course at home, and alienating many ordinary Chinese who might otherwise have been favorably disposed toward the United States. Reverting to containment before it becomes absolutely necessary would also preclude the possibility that history might eventually follow other, more gradual and less dangerous paths. It would be a tragic example of the worst kind of strategic folly, what Prussian foreign minister Otto von Bismarck (hardly a starry-eyed idealist) is said to have referred to as "committing suicide for fear of death."

1ar – containment fails

China is pushing back against containment nowCarpenter, 16 - senior fellow at the Cato Institute (Ted, “How Beijing Is Countering U.S. Strategic Primacy” 6/21, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/how-beijing-is-countering-u-s-strategic-primacy/

In addition to its diplomatic maneuvers, the United States has been active on the military front. The introduction of U.S. naval vessels into the South China Sea, ostensibly to assert the right of freedom of navigation, was calculated to send a message to Chinese leaders. Plans for deploying a theater missile defense system also seem at least secondarily aimed at China, although the behavior of North Korea’s unpredictable regime was the primary reason.But Beijing has not just passively observed these U.S. actions. Instead, it has pursued a variety of countermeasures. One move was the attempt to establish an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea. Predictably, the United States and its principal allies defied that ADIZ by conducting military flights without notifying Chinese authorities, but establishing the diplomatic position was important, and it carried with it the possibility that other, more neutral, countries would ultimately honor the requirements. Notably, Beijing appears to be considering taking the same step in the even more volatile South China Sea.China has not ceded the field to the United States regarding attempts to influence key strategic players. Beijing has tried to reduce tensions with India, settling one of the border disputes with that country and initiating a hotline between the two military commands to reduce the danger of incidents. And trade between the two Asian giants continues to grow. China has now emerged as India’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade surpassing $80 billion in 2015.Beijing is even courting some formal U.S. security allies. Not only does bilateral trade and investment with South Korea continue to grow, but Beijing has skillfully exploited South Korean historical grievances directed at Washington’s principal East Asian ally, Japan. That point became evident this past summer when South Korean President Park Geun-hye disregarded Washington’s wishes and attended the ceremony in Beijing marking the 70th anniversary of Japan’s defeat in World War II. Park not only attended the celebration, she was an especially honored guest, occupying the chair on the dais directly to one side of Chinese President Xi Jinping. The other chair of honor was occupied by Russian President Vladimir Putin.Not surprisingly, Beijing has attempted to strengthen ties with Moscow as part of a strategy to counter Washington’s primacy strategy in Asia. That approach has met with only limited success, but there are mounting signs of policy coordination between Moscow and Beijing as Washington becomes ever more intrusive militarily into regions close to the Chinese and Russian homelands.Beijing has taken two measures that demonstrate a growing intention to play offense, not just defense. China now plans for the first time to deploy ballistic missile submarines in the Pacific. That is a major change in Beijing’s deployment of forces. Until now, Chinese leaders have been content with a land-based, purely second-strike nuclear deterrent. Putting part of its strategic arsenal aboard submarines both increases deterrent survivability and creates the specter (however remote) of a first-strike capability.

http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/how-beijing-is-countering-u-s-strategic-primacy/

http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/how-beijing-is-countering-u-s-strategic-primacy/

The other component of an offensive rather than purely defensive Chinese strategy is its growing diplomatic and economic (and possibly strategic) penetration of Latin America. Premier Li Keqiang’s high-profile visit to several major South American countries in the spring of 2015 was a potent symbol of that intention. But more important has been the deployment of Chinese economic assets. China has now displaced the United States as Brazil’s largest trading partner, and Beijing has been making multi-billion dollar loans to various Latin American governments.Washington is clearly worried about the influence that might accompany such economic maneuvers. In March 2015, President Obama made an announcement that surprised most observers, declaring Venezuela’s leftist regime to be a national security threat to the United States. What puzzled experts is that this move came on the heels of Obama’s policy of rapprochement with Cuba and the previous willingness of his administration (and its predecessors) to regard the behavior of Caracas as an annoyance rather than a threat. What had changed?One major development took place in January when the Chinese government agreed to a multi-billion-dollar investment in Venezuela to help offset the impact of the global oil price slump on that country. In addition, there were reports in March of an impending $5 billion loan to Caracas from China, which would have brought the cumulative total to $45 billion. Perhaps Obama’s announcement was just coincidental timing, but it seems more likely that it was a recognition of, and a firm response to, a perceived Chinese geopolitical foray into Washington’s traditional sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere.All of this suggests that China does not intend to be a passive victim of U.S. primacy. Beijing may operate at a disadvantage with respect to a geopolitical power struggle against the United States, but it does have some assets to deploy. And it fully intends to do so. Washington may find that its effort to maintain a position of primacy in East Asia is more challenging than it ever anticipated.

Containment Fails- Impossible to galvanize allies because of their economic ties to BeijingCarpenter 16-Senior fellow in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato institute and a contributing editor at the National Interest (Ted Galen, “America’s Doomed China Strategy”, May 26, 2016, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/americas-doomed-china-strategy-16365?page=2)//SLTwo developments in the past month indicate that Washington’s mixed policy of engagement and containment (or “congagement”) toward China has begun to tilt more toward containment. The first development was the visit of Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter to India in mid-April and the signing of a bilateral cooperation agreement on military logistics. The other episode is President Obama’s just-completed trip to Vietnam and the announced lifting of the long-standing arms embargo on that country. As usual, American officials insist that the marked change in U.S. policy toward Hanoi is not in any way directed against China. But such statements strain credulity, especially when viewed in the larger context of U.S. warships conducting “freedom of navigation” patrols in the South China Sea and bluntly reminding Beijing of America’s security obligations to the Philippines under a bilateral defense treaty.The containment side of U.S. policy has gone from merely assembling some of the necessary components, to be activated at a later date if necessary (first gear), to the initial phase of activation (second gear). More emphasis is likely to be placed on China as a serious strategic competitor, if not an

outright adversary. But developing any kind of a containment policy against China is almost certain to prove hopelessly difficult. Despite the sometimes inflammatory rhetoric coming from Donald Trump and some other China bashers, the bilateral economic relationship remains quite extensive and crucial. China is America’s second largest trading partner. In 2015, the United States exported $116 billion in goods to China while importing $482 billion. Disrupting that relationship would be extremely costly and painful for both countries.That point underscores one key reason why reviving anything even faintly resembling the Cold War–era containment policy that worked against the Soviet Union is a hopeless quest . America’s economic relations with the USSR were minuscule, so there was little sacrifice on that front in taking a hardline stance against Moscow. That is clearly not the case today regarding America’s economic connections to China.There is also the matter of assembling a reliable alliance against Beijing. Conducting a containment policy against the Soviet Union during the Cold War was feasible because (at least during the crucial formative stages) neither the United States nor its key allies had much of a political or economic relationship to lose with Moscow. The costs, therefore, of shunning Moscow were minimal. That is clearly not the case with China. Most of the East Asian countries, including close U.S. allies Japan and South Korea, already have extensive economic links with Beijing. Indeed, China is Japan’s largest trading partner, accounting for one-fifth of that country’s total trade. It would not be easy for those countries to jeopardize such stakes to support a confrontational, U.S.-led containment policy aimed at Beijing. Tokyo undoubtedly has concerns about China’s behavior in the East China Sea (and about overall Chinese ambitions), but it would still be a reluctant recruit in a hostile containment strategy.Indeed, as time passed during the Cold War, even the containment strategy directed against the Soviet Union proved increasingly difficult for U.S. leaders. That was especially true after the early 1970s, when West Germany’s policy of Ostpolitik sought better relations with communist East Germany, and indirectly with Moscow and the rest of the Soviet bloc. As connections deepened between democratic Europe and the USSR, support for hard-line U.S. policies began to fade. That point became evident in the 1980s, when U.S. leaders attempted to persuade their European allies to reject the proposal for a natural gas pipeline from the Soviet Union to Western Europe, fearing that it would give Moscow an unhealthy degree of policy leverage. Much to Washington’s frustration, key European allies rejected the advice.If the United States attempts to mobilize regional support for a containment policy against China, it will start out operating in an environment even less conducive than the policy environment regarding the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Washington’s courtship might be welcomed by very small countries, such as the Philippines, that are already on extremely bad terms with Beijing. Larger powers, though, are more likely to see what benefits they can entice and extract from Washington, without making firm commitments that would antagonize China and jeopardize their own important ties to that county.There is a final reason why an overt containment policy against China would be a poor option for the United States. Several troublesome global or regional issues will be difficult to address without substantial input and cooperation from China. It is nearly impossible, for example, to imagine progress being made on the difficult and complex issue of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs without China’s extensive involvement.The United States needs to lower, not increase, its level of confrontation toward China. That also means restoring respect for the concept of spheres of influence. In attempting to preserve U.S. primacy in East Asia and the western Pacific, U.S. leaders are intruding into the South China Sea and other areas that

logically matter far more to China than to America. Such a strategy is likely to result either in a humiliating U.S. retreat under pressure or a disastrous military collision. A containment strategy is a feeble attempt to evade that reality.

Containment fails – it doesn’t assume the current international power structure or lack of necessary support from East Asian allies Kai 14 – doctor of International Relations from the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University, South Korea, and is a lecturer there (Jin, “The US, China, and the ‘Containment Trap,’” The Diplomat, April 30th, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/the-us-china-and-the-containment-trap/) // EDP

Regarding the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute in the East China Sea, U.S. President Barack Obama’s recent position was loud and clear: “And let me reiterate that our treaty commitment to Japan’s security is absolute, and Article 5 covers all territories under Japan’s administration, including the Senkaku Islands.” This confirmation of Washington’s military commitment to Tokyo in a possible clash between China and Japan was called “myopic” by the Chinese state news agency.Given the current situation, even the slightest possibility of U.S. military involvement may push Beijing to alter its expectations and act more decisively and consistently regarding the enduring dispute, all while still trying to prevent the situation from getting worse. After all, recent joint U.S.-Japan military exercises demonstrated to China that the U.S. has already prepared several operation plans for possible military assistance. In fact, China is concerned not only about the probability of U.S. military intervention, but also about the long-term impact of this reassurance toward Japan and the complexity it may add to the current Sino-Japanese standoff.Despite U.S. assurances, in Beijing’s view, a number of signs indicate that the U.S. policy toward China intends to “contain” rather than “engage.” The U.S. supports the Philippines on the South China Sea dispute, reiterates Washington’s security commitment to Japan on the East China Sea dispute, and has also agreed to sell more advanced arms to Taiwan. In almost every dispute that involves China, the U.S. seems to automatically support any party that has trouble with China, either directly or indirectly. Meanwhile, the U.S. labels China’s overseas economic activities as neo-colonialism and calls China’s territorial disputes with its neighbors evidence of expansionism. The U.S. has also called China one of the biggest sources for cyber espionage activities (although Mr. Edward Snowden told the world another story).For the U.S., the rise of China just seems to be an uncomfortable fit with the dominant, U.S.-led system. So the U.S. may rely on its still-dominant power and its alliance relations (especially with its key partners) to sustain its supremacy in and beyond the Asia-Pacific region — particularly without making substantial compromises to accommodate China’s “core interests.” By containing China with regard to Beijing’s “core interests,” the U.S. is trying to gain strategic advantages.Such measures and policies may put real pressure on China in the near future, but they are risky. The fact is that the U.S. might have already been hijacked by its military alliances in East Asia and thus finds it increasingly difficult to handle its relations with both its traditional allies and a rapidly emerging China. The U.S. faces a difficult situation: if it fails to subdue a powerful China, it loses respect and trust from its allies. Hence, at least for the time being, the U.S. is more willing to hold its ground, especially with support and assistance from its traditional allies.

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But this expedient makeshift can hardly solve the fundamental problem. A rising China, like other great powers, needs strategic room for its survival and further development. China surely needs to adapt to regional and global arrangements, while the international community also needs to accommodate or constructively engage this newly emerged great power.In the 1970s and 1980s, improvements in China-U.S. relations contributed to Washington’s strong and successful containment of the former Soviet Union in Europe – the traditional region of concern for the U.S. But the Cold War has been over for decades. The same policy and approach will not necessarily work for an emerged China under completely different international conditions. And that’s not even mentioning the challenge of confronting two great powers (China and Russia) simultaneously. However, the current situation suggests that the U.S. is in danger of falling into the “containment trap” – the more it loses its global supremacy and the more it expects support and assistance from its traditional allies, the more obligated the U.S. will feel to push forward hard-line policies toward China. Such containment might work, given comprehensive and unconditional support from U.S. allies, but reality is rarely that simple. Meanwhile, the U.S. should not underestimate China’s strategic determination and counter-measures to containment.That being said, the rise of China and its disputes with neighboring countries inevitably pose challenges for the long-established regional and global arrangements. Hence China’s rise may cause concerns. In view of this, China needs to handle and adjust its diplomacy very cautiously to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings and misperceptions. On the other hand, particularly in East Asia, the current power structure and regional arrangements were built either during the Cold War era, when there was confrontation between two super powers, or after the Cold War, when U.S. unilateral supremacy prevailed. During these two periods, China did not need and could not afford sizable strategic room. That’s no longer the case today, when China has already become a sizable great power and is still rising.In the long run, the U.S. cannot contain China. Accordingly, rather than relying on excessive containment or a check-and-balance approach, the world and especially the U.S. might find more opportunities from deeper and more constructive policies of engagement with China. Hopefully this engagement can truly be a win-win game.

Containment ruins US soft power and increases Chinese influenceKurlantzick 16 – senior fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations (Joshua, “Let China Win. It’s Good for America,” Washington Times, January 14th 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/let-china-win-its-good-for-america/2016/01/14/bfec4732-b9b6-11e5-829c-26ffb874a18d_story.html) //EDP Still, Obama administration officials see a battle for supremacy. As Clinton told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2011: “Let’s put aside the moral, humanitarian, do-good side of what we believe in, and let’s just talk straight realpolitik. We are in a competition with China” in the Pacific islands. So the White House has increased U.S. diplomatic representation in the region, boosted aid dramatically and rhetorically pointed to a competition between Beijing and Washington. It has done so even though most Pacific nations are tiny economies and the U.S. Navy retains a massive advantage over China’s in speed, technology and basing throughout the Pacific. The White House strategy inevitably diverts scarce U.S. diplomatic resources from other parts of the globe while leaving island nations feeling compelled to choose between closer ties with China or with the United States. The result might embarrass Washington: Many of these nations might prefer China for its lavish aid and possible investment.

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https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/let-china-win-its-good-for-america/2016/01/14/bfec4732-b9b6-11e5-829c-26ffb874a18d_story.html)

Despite China’s growing global influence, its image in many regions, including in Asia, is still weak. In the past decade, its relations with many of its neighbors have soured , largely because of its aggressive claims in disputed coastal waters. The same Pew surveys that found favorable views of China in Africa also showed that negative opinions were much higher in Asian nations such as India, the Philippines, Japan and Vietnam, where 74 percent of people had an unfavorable view of China. In Europe, Australia and parts of Latin America, initial excitement in the 2000s about the impact of new Chinese investment and aid has given way to decidedly mixed views among citizens and governments about Beijing, including fears that China will not play by trade rules, will steal technology and will make investments that offer little benefit to local economies.U.S. popularity, by contrast, has recovered from the lows of the Bush administration, particularly across the Pacific. A 2014 poll of people in 11 Asia-Pacific countries, conducted for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, found that nearly 80 percent of respondents, including those in many countries that viewed China unfavorably in the Pew study, supported a more robust U.S. economic and security presence in Asia — a percentage that would have surely been lower during the 2000s. But the exercise of soft power rests on lasting positive perceptions, and it does not help for Washington to cultivate strongmen such as Malaysia’s Najib or Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev while promoting democracy elsewhere. It leads people in these countries to see little difference between U.S. and Chinese foreign policy.

Containment fails – it provokes a nationalist backlashSwaine, 15- senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace( Micheal, Beyond American Predominance in the Western Pacific: The Need for a Stable U.S.-China Balance of Power, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/20/beyond-american-predominance-in-western-pacific-need-for-stable-u.s.-china-balance-of-power)//JSThe Unsustainability of American Predominance and the Chinese ResponseWhile continued American predominance cannot, at present, be justified on the basis of a Chinese drive for predominance, what of the widespread argument in U.S. policy circles that such predominance is necessary regardless of Chinese intentions, as the best possible means of ensuring regional (and global) order? While deeply rooted in both American exceptionalism and beliefs about the benefits of hegemonic power in the international order, the notion that unequivocal U.S. predominance in the Western Pacific constitutes the only basis for long-term stability and prosperity across the Asia-Pacific is a dangerous, increasingly obsolete concept, for several reasons.First, it is inconceivable that Beijing would accept the unambiguously superior level of American predominance that the many proponents of this course of action believe is required to ensure long-term regional stability in the face of a rising China, involving total U.S. “freedom of action” and a clear “ability to prevail” militarily without excessive costs in any conceivable contingency occurring up to China’s mainland borders. The United States would never tolerate such predominance by any power along its borders, and why should an increasingly strong China? Given China’s expanding interests and capabilities, any effort to sustain an unambiguous, absolute level of American military superiority along Beijing’s maritime periphery will virtually guarantee an increasingly destabilizing and economically draining arms race, much greater levels of regional polarization and friction than at present, and reduced incentives on the part of both Washington and Beijing to work together to address a growing array of common global challenges.

U.S. efforts to sustain and enhance its military superiority in China’s backyard will further stoke Beijing’s worst fears and beliefs about American containment, sentiments inevitably reinforced by domestic nationalist pressures, ideologically informed beliefs about supposed U.S. imperialist motives, and China’s general commitment to the enhancement of a multipolar order. In fact, by locking in a clear level of long-term vulnerability and weakness for Beijing that prevents any assured defense of Chinese territory or any effective wielding of influence over regional-security-related issues (such as maritime territorial disputes, Taiwan, or the fate of the Korean Peninsula), absolute U.S. military superiority would virtually guarantee fierce and sustained domestic criticism of any Chinese leadership that accepted it. This will be especially true if, as expected, Chinese economic power continues to grow, bolstering Chinese self-confidence. Under such conditions, effectively resisting a U.S. effort to sustain predominance along China’s maritime periphery would become a matter of political survival for future Chinese leaders.

2ac – nationalism – economy turn

Future economic decline will wreck Xi’s popularity – it destroys party support and forces him to stoke nationalism to maintain legitimacyBlackwill & Campbell 16-*Henry Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. Foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations & ** chair and chief executive officer of the Asia Group, LLC. also serves as chair of the Center for a New American Security, is a nonresident fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and is on the board of directors for Standard Chartered PLC in London, the Asia Group (Robert & Kurt,"Xi Jinping on the Global Stage," Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/CSR74_Blackwill_Campbell_Xi_Jinping.pdf)//SL

The impact of this situation on Xi’s political position is evolving. For now, Xi remains strong, his opposition is divided, and nothing indicates that his leadership is in jeopardy. Media reports suggest, however, that senior party members were alarmed by the gyrations of the stock market in the summer of 2015 and the country’s sputtering growth and are holding Xi accountable. They are encouraging him to focus more on the economic situation than the anticorruption campaign, which some contend slows growth by paralyzing rank-and-file officials who fear that action on new projects could land them in jail.30 If the economy continues to weaken, party elites who have suffered under the anticorruption campaign may seek to exploit the situation to undermine Xi, who now has the dubious distinction of presiding over the slowest growth in thirty years and whose agenda and image are underwritten by public support that could wane.Xi will need to take clear steps to strengthen his position against rival elites, fortify his public image, and shield the party from the economic downturn. To that end, he will probably intensify his personality cult, crack down even harder on dissent, and grow bolder in using the anticorruption campaign against elites who oppose him. Above all, he will almost certainly choose to intensify and stimulate Chinese nationalism in response to slower growth. Ever since Deng dispatched communist ideology in favor of pragmatic capitalist reforms, the party’s legitimacy has been built on two pillars: economic growth and nationalist ideology. Because the former is fading, the latter may be the primary tool to support the edifice of the party and Xi’s strongman image.


1ar nationalism – economy turn

Xi is Pursuing nationalistic policy to divert attention from economic woesBlackwill & Campbell 16-*Henry Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. Foreign policy & ** chairman and chief executive officer of the Asia Group, LLC. also serves as chairman of the Center for a New American Security, is a nonresident fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and is on the board of directors for Standard Chartered PLC in London, the Asia Group(Robert & Kurt,"Xi Jinping on the Global Stage," Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/CSR74_Blackwill_Campbell_Xi_Jinping.pdf)//SL

Economic growth and nationalism have for decades been the two founts of legitimacy for the Communist Party, and as the former wanes, Xi will likely rely increasingly on the latter. Since 1989, the party has deliberately and carefully laid the foundation for such a strategy through patriotic education, censorship, government-backed protests against Japan, and relentless news and popular media that have reinforced a nationalist victimization narrative.As a powerful but exposed leader, Xi will tap into this potent nationalist vein through foreign policy, burnishing his nationalist credentials and securing his domestic position from elite and popular criticism, all while pursuing various Chinese national interests. For example, an emphasis on territorial disputes and historical grievances could partially divert attention from the country’s economic woes and arrest a potential decline in his public approval; in contrast, a visible setback or controversial concession on such issues could undermine his standing with Chinese citizens and party elites. On economic matters, concerns over growth and employment may lead China to become increasingly recalcitrant and self-interested.In the future, Xi could become more hostile to the West, using it as a foil to boost his approval ratings the way Putin has in Russia. Already, major Chinese newspapers are running articles blaming the country’s economic slump on efforts undertaken by insidious “foreign forces” that seek to sabotage the country’s rise. Even if Xi does not seek more combative relations with the West, he will nonetheless find it difficult to negotiate publicly on a variety of issues, especially when nationalist sentiment runs high.

Economic decline undermines Xi’s popularityBlackwill & Campbell 16-*Henry Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. Foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations & ** chair and chief executive officer of the Asia Group, LLC. also serves as chair of the Center for a New American Security, is a nonresident fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and is on the board of directors for Standard Chartered PLC in London, the Asia Group (Robert & Kurt,"Xi Jinping on the Global Stage," Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/CSR74_Blackwill_Campbell_Xi_Jinping.pdf)//SL

Xi is exposed precisely because he sits at the center of all decisionmaking and is visible to the public. He must address countless domestic challenges for which he is now explicitly accountable, and a major misstep on any of them could be costly to his political popularity and position. Without question, the largest problem looming over Xi’s tenure is China’s economic slowdown and its related manifestations, including unemployment and stock market volatility. As noted, China’s economy, which had expanded at



an annual rate of 10 percent for three decades, is entering a new era of slow growth that has forced the government to reduce its growth target to a record-low 6.5 percent. Xi’s challenge is to smoothly reorient the economy toward consumption and away from exports and investment even as growth continues to fall.

A new economic crisis will destroy Xi’s legitimacyBlackwill & Campbell 16-*Henry Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. Foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations & ** chair and chief executive officer of the Asia Group, LLC. also serves as chair of the Center for a New American Security, is a nonresident fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and is on the board of directors for Standard Chartered PLC in London, the Asia Group (Robert & Kurt,"Xi Jinping on the Global Stage," Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/CSR74_Blackwill_Campbell_Xi_Jinping.pdf)//SL

The real risk to China’s economy, and to Xi’s fortunes, comes not from the stock market’s raw economic impact but from the damage done to the government’s credibility. Xi’s strongman image suffered in the wake of the market collapse. His government had vocally encouraged average Chinese citizens to enter the country’s stock market under the premise that good returns would incentivize higher spending, and was embarrassed when those investors were singed by the crash.24 The government then publicly staked its credibility on a commitment to arrest the stock market decline, but its ill-conceived market manipulations and hasty currency devaluations were of limited effectiveness. Eventually, China was able to reverse the declines, but similar or repeated episodes will undermine the party’s legitimacy.Aside from the perceptual costs posed by such economic downturns, Xi faces the considerable risk that a prolonged slowdown will directly affect the welfare of the average Chinese citizen. The possibility of a hard landing looms, and an economic wreck or a serious financial crisis could produce years of prolonged stagnation and slow growth that could shake the party to its core . Even absent such a disaster, if growth continues to slow, it will worsen a number of internal trends. The labor market already struggles to absorb the eight million college graduates China’s universities produce each year. Blue-collar wages that had risen for a decade have been stagnant for well over a year as layoffs continue in coastal factories, with labor disputes doubling in 2014 and again in 2015.25


Answers to China Rise

2ac – China rise

China can’t challenge the US – the gap is too largeBrooks and Wohlforth, 16 – both professors of government at Dartmouth (Stephen and William, “The Once and Future Superpower Why China Won’t Overtake the United States” Foreign Affairs, May/June, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-13/once-and-future-superpower?cid=nlc-fatoday-20160520&sp_mid=51424540&sp_rid=c2NvdHR5cDQzMUBnbWFpbC5jb20S1&spMailingID=51424540&spUserID=MTg3NTEzOTE5Njk2S0&spJobID=922513469&spReportId=OTIyNTEzNDY5S0)

But what is taking place now is not your grandfather’s power transition. One can debate whether China will soon reach the first major milestone on the journey from great power to superpower: having the requisite economic resources. But a giant economy alone won’t make China the world’s second superpower, nor would overcoming the next big hurdle, attaining the requisite technological capacity. After that lies the challenge of transforming all this latent power into the full range of systems needed for global power projection and learning how to use them. Each of these steps is time consuming and fraught with difficulty. As a result, China will, for a long time, continue to hover somewhere between a great power and a superpower. You might call it “an emerging potential superpower”: thanks to its economic growth, China has broken free from the great-power pack, but it still has a long way to go before it might gain the economic and technological capacity to become a superpower.China’s quest for superpower status is undermined by something else, too: weak incentives to make the sacrifices required. The United States owes its far-reaching military capabilities to the existential imperatives of the Cold War. The country would never have borne the burden it did had policymakers not faced the challenge of balancing the Soviet Union, a superpower with the potential to dominate Eurasia. (Indeed, it is no surprise that two and a half decades after the Soviet Union collapsed, it is Russia that possesses the second-greatest military capability in the world.) Today, China faces nothing like the Cold War pressures that led the United States to invest so much in its military. The United States is a far less threatening superpower than the Soviet Union was: however aggravating Chinese policymakers find U.S. foreign policy, it is unlikely to engender the level of fear that motivated Washington during the Cold War.Stacking the odds against China even more, the United States has few incentives to give up power, thanks to the web of alliances it has long boasted. A list of U.S. allies reads as a who’s who of the world’s most advanced economies, and these partners have lowered the price of maintaining the United States’ superpower status. U.S. defense spending stood at around three percent of GDP at the end of the 1990s, rose to around five percent in the next decade on account of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and has now fallen back to close to three percent. Washington has been able to sustain a global military capacity with relatively little effort thanks in part to the bases its allies host and the top-end weapons they help develop. China’s only steadfast ally is North Korea, which is often more trouble than it is worth.

Mutual interests, interdependence, and the power gap dissuades ChinaRudd 15- Prime Minister of Australia from 2007 to 2010 (Kevin, “How to Break the ‘Mutually Assured Misperception’ Between the U.S. and China”, The World Post, 4-20-2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kevin-rudd/us-china-relations-kevin-rudd-report_b_7096784.html)//SL5. Armed conflict between the U.S. and China is highly unlikely in the coming decade.Xi Jinping is a nationalist. And China, both the U.S. and China’s neighbors have concluded, is displaying newfound assertiveness in pursuing its hard security interests in the region. But there is, nonetheless, a very low risk of any form of direct conflict involving the armed forces of China and the U.S. over the next decade. It is not in the national interests of either country for any such conflict to occur; and it would be disastrous for both, not to mention for the rest of the world. Despite the deep difficulties in the relationship, no Cold War standoff between them yet exists, only a strategic chill. In fact, there is a high level of economic interdependency in the relationship, which some international relations scholars think puts a fundamental brake on the possibility of any open hostilities. Although it should be noted the U.S. is no longer as important to the Chinese economy as it once was.However, armed conflict could feasibly arise through one of two scenarios:Either an accidental collision between U.S. and Chinese aircraft or naval vessels followed by a badly managed crisis; orThrough a collision (accidental or deliberate) between Chinese military assets and those of a regional U.S. ally, most obviously Japan or the Philippines.In the case of Japan, the report argues that, after bilateral tensions reached unprecedented heights during 2013-14, Beijing and Tokyo took steps in late 2014 to de-escalate their standoff over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Hotlines between the two militaries are now being established, reducing the possibility of accidental conflict escalation. However, the same cannot be said of the South China Sea, where China continues its large-scale land reclamation efforts, where tensions with Vietnam and the Philippines remain high, and where mil-to-mil protocols are undeveloped. Xi Jinping has neither the interest, room for maneuver or personal predisposition to refrain from an assertive defense of these territorial claims, or to submit them to any form of external arbitration.Of course, Xi Jinping has no interest in triggering armed conflict with the U.S., a nightmare scenario that would fundamentally undermine China’s economic rise. Furthermore, there are few, if any, credible military scenarios in the immediate period ahead in which China could militarily prevail in a direct conflict with the U.S. This explains Xi’s determination to oversee the professionalization and modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a credible, war-fighting and war-winning machine. Xi Jinping is an intelligent consumer of strategic literature and would have concluded that risking any premature military engagement with the U.S. would be foolish. Traditional Chinese strategic thinking is unequivocal in its advice not to engage an enemy unless you are in a position of overwhelming strength. Under Xi, the ultimate purpose of China’s military expansion and modernization is not to inflict defeat on the U.S., but to deter the U.S. Navy from intervening in China’s immediate periphery by creating sufficient doubt in the minds of American strategists as to their ability to prevail.In the medium term, the report analyzes the vulnerability of the U.S.-China relationship to the dynamics of “Thucydides’ Trap,” whereby rising great powers have historically ended up at war with established great powers when one has sought to pre-empt the other at a time of perceived maximum strategic opportunity. According to case studies, such situations have resulted in war in 12 out of 16 instances over the last 500 years. Jinping is deeply aware of this strategic literature and potential implications for

U.S.-China relations. This has, in part, underpinned his desire to reframe U.S.-China relations from strategic competition to “a new type of great power relationship.”In the longer term, neither Xi Jinping nor his advisors necessarily accept the proposition of the inevitability of U.S. economic, political and military decline that is often publicized in the Chinese media and by the academy. More sober minds in Xi’s administration are mindful of the capacity of the U.S. political system and economy to rebound and reinvent itself. Moreover, Xi is also aware of his own country’s date with demographic destiny when the population begins to shrink, while the populations of the U.S. and those of the North American Free Trade Agreement economies will continue to increase.For these reasons, the report concludes that the likelihood of U.S.-China conflict in the medium to long term remains remote. This is why Xi Jinping is more attracted to the idea of expanding China’s regional and global footprint by economic and political means. This is where he will likely direct China’s diplomatic activism over the decade ahead.6. Chinese political, economic and foreign policy influence in Asia will continue to grow significantly, while China will also become a more active participant in the reform of theglobal rules-based order.

1ar – peaceful rise

China is incapable of threatening US global power – geographical boundaries, economic dependence, military inferiority Thompson 14 – Chief Operating Officer of the Lexington Institute, doctorate in government from Georgetown (Loren, “Five Reasons China Won’t be a Big Threat to America’s Global Power,” Forbes, June 6th 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/06/06/five-reasons-china-wont-be-a-big-threat-to-americas-global-power/#79fb13131b5c) // EDP

It certainly doesn’t help matters when Chinese military leaders attending international forums describe America as a nation in decline , and attribute the Obama Administration’s restrained response in Ukraine to “erectile dysfunction.” However, there is no need to make the administration’s Pacific pivot the prelude to a new Cold War, because for all its dynamism China looks unlikely to be any more successful in dethroning America from global preeminence than Japan and Russia were. This is partly due to intrinsic economic and cultural advantages America enjoys, and partly to limits on China’s ability to continue advancing. Those limits don’t get much attention in Washington, so I thought I would spend a little time describing the five most important factors constraining China’s power potential.1. Geographical constraints. Unlike America, which spent much of its history expanding under doctrines such as Manifest Destiny, China’s potential for territorial growth is severely limited by geography . To the west it faces the barren Tibetan plateau and Gobi Desert. To the south the Himalayan mountains present an imposing barrier to the Indian Subcontinent. To the north vast and largely empty grasslands known as the Steppes provide a buffer with Russia. And to the east stretches the world’s largest ocean (there are over 6,000 miles of water between Shanghai and San Francisco). So aside from the hapless Vietnamese who share the southern coastal plain and China’s historical claim to Taiwan, there isn’t much opportunity for wars of conquest on China’s periphery. Ironically, China’s disputes with neighbors over the disposition of minor islands and reefs underscores how little real potential Beijing has for growing its territory the way other powers have.2. Demographic trends. At 1.3 billion, China has the largest population of any country. However, that population is aging rapidly due to the one-child policy imposed in 1979. The current fertility rate of 1.6 children per woman is well below the level of 2.1 required to maintain a stable population over the long run, and also far below the birthrates seen in other emerging Asian nations. What this means in economic terms, to quote a paper recently published by the International Monetary Fund, is that “within a few years, the working age population will reach a historical peak and then begin a sharp decline.” The vast pool of cheap labor that fueled China’s economic miracle has already begun disappearing, driving up wages and leading some labor-intensive industries to move out. In the years ahead, a growing population of old people will undermine efforts to stimulate internal demand while creating pressure for increased social-welfare spending.3. Economic dependency. China has followed the same playbook as its Asian neighbors in using trade as a springboard to economic development. According to the CIA’s 2014 World Factbook, exports of goods and services comprise over a quarter of China’s gross domestic product. But even if the low-cost labor that made this possible wasn’t drying up, the reliance of an export-driven economy on foreign markets makes China’s prosperity — per capita GDP is below $10,000 – much more vulnerable than America’s. China has sold over $100 billion more in goods to the U.S. so far this year than it has bought, but that longstanding boost to the Chinese economy won’t persist if the labor cost differential between the two

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countries keeps narrowing or Washington decides Beijing is a real danger to its interests. China is so dependent on offshore resources, markets and investors to keep its economy growing that it can’t run the risk of really scaring its trading partners.4. Political culture. Because the Communist Party monopolizes power in China, there is little opportunity for fundamental reform of the political system. Party officials at all levels routinely leverage that monopoly to engage in epic corruption. Bribery, embezzlement, kickbacks and property theft are endemic. The Guardian reports that military posts are sold “for the equivalent of hundreds of thousands of pounds each,” creating a “vicious circle as officers who have paid for their places seek to recoup the cost.” Favoritism towards state-controlled industries and well-connected industrialists results in massive inefficiencies. President Xi Jinping’s crackdown on graft resulted in over 8,000 cases being investigated during just the first three months of this year, suggesting a culture of corruption reminiscent of New York’s Tweed Ring. But Tweed was driven from power through democratic processes, whereas China’s political culture offers no such solution.5. Military weakness. That brings me to the subject with which most defense analysts would have begun this commentary – Chinese military power. Military.com reports today that the Pentagon is out with its latest ominous assessment of China’s military buildup, which is said to encompass everything from stealthy fighters to maneuvering anti-ship missiles to anti-satellite weapons. Those programs actually exist, but the threat they pose to the U.S. at present is not so clear. For instance, Beijing doesn’t have the reconnaissance network needed to track and target U.S. warships, and if it did the weapons it launched would face the most formidable air defenses in the world. Much has been written about China’s supposedly growing investment in nuclear weapons, but the best public information available suggests that China has about 250 warheads in its strategic arsenal, most of which can’t reach America; the U.S. has 4,600 nuclear warheads available for delivery by missile or plane, and an additional 2,700 in storage.Beijing’s decision to sustain only a modest — some would say minimal — nuclear deterrent seems incompatible with the notion that it seeks to rival U.S. power. Until recently it has not possessed a credible sea-based deterrent force, it still does not have a single operational aircraft carrier, and many of its submarines use diesel-electric propulsion rather than nuclear power. When these less-than-imposing features of the Chinese military posture are combined with widely reported deficiencies in airlift, reconnaissance, logistics and other key capabilities, the picture that emerges is not ominous. China is an emerging regional power that is unlikely to ever match America in the main measures of military power unless dysfunctional political processes in Washington impair our nation’s economy and defenses. In fact, secular trends are already at work within the Chinese economy, society and political culture that will tend to make the Middle Kingdom look less threatening tomorrow, rather than like a global rival of America.

China’s rise will be peaceful – cultural norms, focus on domestic development, and reliance on current global orderLi and Worm 10 – professors at the Asian Research Centre of Copenhagen Business School’s Department of International Economics and Management (Xin and Verner, “Building China Soft Power for a Peaceful Rise,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, November 24th, 2010, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/226526970_Building_China's_Soft_Power_for_a_Peaceful_Rise) // EDP

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/226526970_Building_China's_Soft_Power_for_a_Peaceful_Rise)


http://www.forbes.com/profile/xi-jinping/

We argue China has a genuine desire for peace in her rise for several reasons. Firstly, Chinese culture advocates moral strength instead of military power, worships kingly rule instead of hegemonic rule, and emphasizes persuasion by virtue and returning good to evil. Therefore, at the individual level, even if there has been a victim mentality and retaliation sentiment in populace, when promoted to a top leadership position, Chinese will tend to behave like a benevolent sage, partly because of the cultural norm and partly he/she may feel good by doing so. On 10 April 1974, Deng Xiaoping delivered a speech at the United Nations General Assembly in which he declared ‘if one day China should...play the tyrant in the world, and everywhere subject others to her bullying, aggression and exploitation, the people of the world should...expose it, oppose it and work together with the Chinese people to overthrow it’. 3 Secondly, at the state level, China’s priority in the ‘important strategic opportunity period’ is still domestic development so that China would try her best to avoid conflict and seek peace. Thirdly, at the international level, today’s international system is characterized by economic interdependence and nuclear weaponry. This reality makes a military or confrontational power-shift/rise less likely or too costly for China to even consider [4]. Ikenberry [5] argues that China not only needs continued access to the current global capitalist system but also wants to protect the system’s rules and institutions because China has thrived in such system. We argue even if China desires to reform the current world order which China perceives imbalanced and unreasonable, China can be patient enough and adopt a gradualist approach toward that end, just like what China did in its gradual economic reform and opening up. Last but not least, Chinese history does not support that kind of prediction that Chine will use non-peaceful means to rise as well. By reexamining the evidences of diplomacy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Johnston makes a convincing case that China ‘has become more integrated into and more cooperative within international institutions than ever before’ and ‘behaviorally it does not appear at the moment that China is balancing very vigorously against American military power or U.S. interests as its leaders have defined them’ [6]. We also disagree with those arguments based on power transition theory, according to which, the rise of China will ultimately lead to Chinese power parity with the US [7], which may cause structure-changing wars under certain circumstances. Theoretically, the power transition theory posits that a rising power is likely turn into a revisionist with two conditions: its capability and willingness (or dissatisfaction with the status quo). Empirically, history has shown that an international system with shifting power structure is fueled with conflicts and militarized disputes [8–10]. Based on this logic, a rising China will change the international power structure and eventually lead to conflicts. We argue there is a missing point in such argument, namely, there should be another condition: whether the rising power is willing to take unilateral and radical action to reduce its dissatisfaction. Clearly, China appears to be a pragmatic power which prefers modest actions

China is not aggressive – government wants collaboration with surrounding countries, routinely makes concessions for the greater good, and is open to foreign policy reform Li and Worm 10 – professors at the Asian Research Centre of Copenhagen Business School’s Department of International Economics and Management (Xin and Verner, “Building China Soft Power for a Peaceful Rise,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, November 24th, 2010, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/226526970_Building_China's_Soft_Power_for_a_Peaceful_Rise) // EDP ‘On the other hand, we notice that Chinese government is not change-resistant and actually China has a plan to gradually reform its political system. Ramo [28, p. 13] points out that ‘the CCP is the source of most of the change in China in the last 20 years’. Yu [29] points out ‘Chinese know how demagogues can



destroy countries in the name of democracy...China has its own reform agenda based on China’s painful historic experience’. We support Colley’s viewpoint [30] that many people (especially in the West) tend to see China’s development as a glass half empty or largely focus on the negative aspects of China’s development. What those people neglected is the fact that 16 Starting since the end of Cultural Revolution before which the main political ideology was class struggle, CCP has been continuously reforming its political system and improving its domestic political values. Many new ideas have been officially adopted by the CCP government, such as hearing system in 1996, rule of law in 1997, civil society in 1998, developing political civilization in 2001, human-oriented in 2003, protection of human rights and protection of private property written in the national Constitution in 2004, and building a socialist harmonious society in 2004. Colley [30] argues ‘when Chinese leaders like Wen Jiabao talk of “putting people first” and developing a “harmonious society”, they tend to mean it’. We argue China needs and can have more and substantial improvement in domestic governance because even within the current political system a one party democracy can still be developed; and in the meantime, China needs to better communicate with outside world what progress China has made and what the political reform it plans to proceed. Internationally, China has consistently followed the principles of peaceful coexistence and no-interference of other nation’s domestic affairs which reward China a friendly and peaceful image in many countries. China advocates that all nations regardless of size and wealth should be treated as equal and their ways of life should be respected. China maintains that peace and development should be the two major themes of contemporary world and development should be the priority of developing nations. China encourages South–South cooperation to promote economic development of developing world. China claims that all countries should shoulder common but differentiated obligations to solving global issues such as climate change and the developed nations should attend to the needs of development of developing countries when it comes to international obligations like reducing CO2. China pursues common security through dialogue and cooperation17 and insists the UN Security Council should be the core mechanism of international security. China proposes that political and diplomatic solutions should be the primary means to international disputes. China is devoted to improving the current unbalanced and unjust international order in pursuit of a harmonious world. According to Wang and Lu [16], in the reform era, China has adopted an independent foreign policy, i.e., resistant to outside pressure, free from alignment, non-ideological, and non-confrontational, which together with its good neighbor policy have made China appealing. China has been sensitive to being seen as a responsible stakeholder and behaving accordingly. For instance, in 1997 Asian financial crisis, Chinese government resisted the pressure for RMB devaluation which helped East Asia recover at China’s own expense of detrimental economic consequences in short run. In dealing with North Korean nuclear crisis, China abandoned the ideological approach it had used in Mao’s time and played an active mediating role in the Six-Party Talk. In order to promote peace, China has also made unprecedented concessions in solving the territorial disputes with its neighboring countries [32]. We see China’s foreign policies and principles of international relations as a strong source of China’s soft power. Although some scholars argue China’s practice of non-interference might jeopardize some western countries’ efforts to pressure some dictatorship regimes to democratize their domestic governances, we argue China should not compromise on this non-interference principle. The normal practices of Western powers is to use economic sanction and arms embargo to force changes in domestic governance, which can be argued to have little and even negative impact on solving the very problems. Simply, many sanctioned countries are those in urgent need of economic development and economic sanction may bring humanitarian disasters to those countries. Having said this, we nevertheless suggest China to be more flexible to work more closely with international organizations and relevant western powers to find alternative ways to solve those problems.

1ar - peaceful rise – SIT

Social identity theory is the most accurate explanation for Chinese behavior and it means China’s rise will be peacefulLee, 16 - Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles (James Jungbok Lee (2016) Will China’s Rise Be Peaceful? A Social Psychological Perspective, Asian Security, 12:1, 29-52, DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2016.1140644 SIT = Social Identity Theory

By applying SIT to the analysis of Chinese foreign policy, this article has attempted to achieve two goals. First, it aimed to contribute to breaking the current stalemate in the debate over the rise of China, which has largely been dominated by realist and liberal scholarship and thus has not been able to adequately explain the many aspects of Chinese foreign policy that do not readily conform to the rationalist framework. Second, it tried to further develop SIT into an insightful framework for understanding international relations, based on the premise that humans—and by extension, states—are so powerfully motivated by a desire for favorable social competition that they often behave in ways that contradict their material and instrumental pursuits. The key findings are twofold. First, in contrast to the prior literature,170 China has consistently pursued social creativity as its grand strategy since opening up its economy in 1978, instead of pursuing social mobility, social competition, and social creativity in sequence. That is, per Deng Xiaoping’s axioms and guidelines, China has strived to become a distinctive great power based on socialist foundations, while for the most part accepting the legitimacy of the contemporary global order. Second, even while resorting to social creativity, China would not hesitate to enter military conflict in response to an experience of disrespect toward its sovereignty and territorial integrity, as demonstrated by its actions during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. For China, as greatly sensitized it still is to the painful memories of the Century of Humiliation, the feeling of disrespect is likely to encourage a level of anger that negatively biases perceptions, reduces demand for information, and shortens decision times, consequently increasing both the degree and probability of risk prone and aggressive behavior on its part The answer to the central question, “Will China’s rise be peaceful?”, then, is in the affirmative, with a qualification. That is, as long as China is abiding by social creativity, it would err on the side of respecting the status quo world order and maintaining peace, only occasionally voicing out its dissatisfaction with unilateral imposition of Western norms, values and institutions. At the same time, however, China is likely to resort to violence when others (especially the United States) show disrespect toward its sovereignty, even if rational calculations would suggest otherwise.

China is only hostile in response to disrespect of Chinese sovereigntyLee, 16 - Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles (James Jungbok Lee (2016) Will China’s Rise Be Peaceful? A Social Psychological Perspective, Asian Security, 12:1, 29-52, DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2016.1140644 SIT = Social Identity Theory

Overall, in all the three dimensions, the very fact that China was trying to become a distinctive great power within the post-Cold War power and authority structure dominated by the United States rendered its ambition very difficult to achieve if an armed conflict were to break out over Taiwan. That China had nonetheless taken significant military initiatives is a salient point that further convinces us of disrespect as a powerful explanatory variable in driving China’s foreign policy during the conflict . It

also shows the limitations of relying strictly on realist and liberal insights to explain China’s foreign policy.Striking parallelsThese lessons from the Taiwan Straits Crisis become especially salient in light of the recently intensifying geopolitical tension in the South China Sea. On May 21, 2015, the Chinese Navy warned the United States surveillance plane P8-A Poseidon to leave airspace around the disputed islands in the South China Sea.166 A Chinese naval officer told the aircraft, “Foreign military aircraft. This is Chinese Navy. You are approaching our military alert zone. Leave immediately.” And when the plane failed to heed the warnings—which were delivered eight times—the operator became frustrated, shouting the words: “Please go away quickly. . .You go!” The drama follows an escalation of tension in the South China Seas caused by China’s construction of artificial islands in the waters in an attempt to strengthen its grip on those islands, reefs, and rocks that are disputed with countries like the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.167 Defending China’s action, Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hong Lei, claimed Beijing “has the right to monitor certain airspace and maritime areas and safeguard national security, to prevent unexpected incidents at Sea,” adding that other countries should respect China’s sovereignty.168 The foreign minister, Wang Yi, was even more forward, stating that, “The determination of the Chinese side to safeguard our own sovereignty and territorial integrity is as firm as a rock and it is unshakable.” 169 Such a heavy emphasis on sovereignty and territorial integrity during an escalation of tension draws eerie parallels to the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. It clearly demonstrates that that China of 2015—pained as it still is from the memories of the Century of Humiliation—is still ready to resort to offensive measures in response to an experience of disrespect towards its sovereignty, just as it was twenty years ago.

1ar - economic peaceful rise

China’s economic development facilitates a peaceful riseFerchen 16’ - Resident scholar at the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, where he runs the China and the Developing World Program, Associate professor in the Department of International Relations at Tsinghua University, Truman and Fulbright-Hays fellow (Matt, “China Keeps the Peace”, March 8, 2016. Carnegie Center for Global Policy, http://carnegietsinghua.org/publications/?fa=63009//AK)According to conventional wisdom, Chinese president Xi Jinping has launched a more ambitious and geopolitically game-changing era of Chinese foreign economic policy. And Beijing is certainly promoting new economic initiatives, from the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to the rollout of the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. But China’s international economic grand strategy under Xi is not new. It is an extension of Beijing’s long-standing Peaceful Development framework from the mid-1990s, which asserts that China’s own development and stability is contingent on shared prosperity with its international economic partners, especially those in the developing world. In fact, the Peaceful Development strategy has not been uniformly successful, and Xi’s expansion of it is likely to create unexpected challenges for China and the world.Doubling DownRecent analysis from U.S. think tanks and scholars links China’s increasingly assertive behavior in its own neighborhood with its foreign economic policies. CFR Senior Fellow Robert Blackwill and Carnegie Endowment Senior Associate Ashley Tellis argue that China has been systematically but stealthily building leverage over its neighbors, including Washington’s Asian allies, through its trade and investment practices, thus contributing to “the pacification of its extended geographic periphery.” Such assertions conflate worries of China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea with a belief that the AIIB and OBOR will contribute to China’s geoeconomic prowess. This understanding does not do justice to China’s international economic policy track record, however.In fact, Xi has merely doubled down on the Peaceful Development strategy. This framework is based on a purported virtuous circle: according to this theory, China’s continued economic development depends on a peaceful and stable domestic and international environment. And, in turn, China’s continued development will contribute to international peace, security, and prosperity. Such a win-win framework stands in stark contrast to the views of many outside critics, who worry about Chinese mercantilist trade and investment policies at home and abroad. Since Xi came to office in 2012, some of his efforts to display a bolder and more proactive foreign policy approach have likely contributed to such mercantilist fears, yet China’s foreign economic policies remain fundamentally rooted in the conceptual and policy guidelines of Peaceful Development. China has continued to promote a “community of common destiny” in its own neighborhood, despite regional tensions. The logic of such a community is based on the proposed link between mutually beneficial economic growth and enhanced regional stability and security. China’s own identity as a developing country, albeit one that is also a great power, underpins its promotion of regional and global policies that will also catalyze economic development in poor and middle-income countries. Here, newer initiatives like the AIIB and OBOR are illustrative because they center on Chinese-led financing and

construction of infrastructure, something that is seen as both a precondition for development and a key element in China’s own rapid growth in previous decades.

AT: Chinese economy

Claims of declining economic leadership overlook per capita GDPChristensen, 15 – William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton (Thomas, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, p. 59-60)

If we study the issue carefully, we find that the rumors of the death of U.S. economic leadership have been greatly exaggerated. In emphasizing China's remaining challenges and persistent U.S. advantages in the twenty-first century, a diverse set of authors- Joseph Nye, Dan Drezner, Michael Becklev, Robert Lieber, and Joseph Joffe—all subscribe to a thesis regarding U.S.-China relations pioneered by Harvard's Alastair Iain Johnston and Sheena Chestnut Greitens. In 2009 the Harvard scholars asked by what measures China was rising as a potential peer competitor with the United States.7 Even three years later, by the most generous estimates of Chinese GDP (the purchase power parity, or PPP, formula favored by the World Bank), the United States economy was still 26 percent larger than China's.8And even if the OECD is correct that continued growth in China and continued malaise in the United States will allow China's GDP (measured by PPP) to surpass that of the United States by 2016, this alone would not make China an economic peer competitor with the United States.9 China's population is between four and five times larger than the United States's, and in 2012, even with the most generous PPP measures, its per capita income was less than one-fifth that of the United States (by one measure, U.S. per capita income was $50,700 and China's $9,300).10 At least until the 2008 financial crisis, the gap in per capita GDP between the United States and China had actually grown in absolute terms since the end of the Cold War. This is true because, as in military affairs, China was growing from such a low starting point. In order to turn domestic economic wherewithal into political clout on the international stage, states need to mobilize wealth for national policy purposes, usually through taxation. Per capita GDP is a good measure of how easy or difficult it will be for any state to extract any amount of money from individual citizens for arms, foreign aid, and so on. It is also a good measure of the relative cost to citizens of income sacrificed when economic sanctions that harm trade and investment are leveled for reasons of power politics. Anyone who is familiar with progressive tax systems will understand this basic concept. A $100 tax on a Chinese person earning $3,000 per year carries a much larger marginal cost than a similar tax on someone earning many times that much. The same holds true for the hundred dollars that a Chinese citizen might lose if trade and investment relations were to break down with Japan or Korea over a political difference.

The yuan won’t challenge the dollarChristensen, 15 – William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton (Thomas, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, p. 61-62)

Pessimists like Arvind Subramanian also like to cite any moves in the economic sphere that undermine the dollar. For example, Subramanian pointed to the recent phenomenon in which trade transactions among several Asian and Latin American countries can now be settled in yuan (Chinese renminbi). While certainly a sign of growing Chinese economic importance, it hardly poses a challenge to the

indispensability of the U.S. dollar as a global reserve currency. The fact that settlement in yuan (RMB), still a currency that does not float on international markets, is even notable only underscores the true importance of the U.S. dollar in the international marketplace. That importance actually might have grown with the financial crisis, as the dollar has fared much better than its only possible convertible competitor, the euro. I do not find the concept of economic dominance very useful in reference to either China or the United States because economics is far from a zero-sum competition. But if I had to cast such a concept in concrete terms, I might find no better example than the U.S. role in the international financial system after the financial debacle of 2008. Despite the revelation that terrible policies and habits in the world's leading economy levied tremendous economic losses not only on the United States but on the rest of the world, public and private economic entities around the globe, including the Chinese government, still came to the United States to buy Treasury bills and stocks on Wall Street. Why? Because one has to put one's money somewhere, and the strongest economy with the best and most stable institutions will be the preferred safe haven in a storm, even in a storm created by that economy's own faults. If there is such a thing as economic dominance, it must be the ability for a country to remain the clear economic system leader even when its own economy has taken such a terrible blow.

AT: Treasury bill sell-off

No Treasury bill sell-off – it would wreck export-led growthChristensen, 15 – William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton (Thomas, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, p. 62-63)

This contradiction relates to China's much-vaunted surplus in foreign currency reserves—Beijing has become the largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasury bills in the world. Whatever leverage this relationship might provide China, and it is almost certainly quite limited because China would never have an economic incentive to sell off the bills precipitously, the stockpile of Treasury bills is also arguably as much a sign of economic weakness for China as it is economic strength. China's continued disproportionate dependence on exports as a job creator, its fear of domestic inflation, and its subsequent need to "sterilize" its current account surplus with the world compels China to purchase bonds in the United States and elsewhere. In this instance, "sterilization" simply means shipping overseas the foreign reserves accumulated through exporting more than is imported. The only other ways the state could manage that problem would be to allow inflation or to allow its own currency to revalue. Inflation could harm the economy and cause social instability among the many urban citizens and government workers on fixed incomes. Revaluation could cost China manufacturing jobs because it would hurt the competitiveness of exports and increase the competitiveness of imports. But China need not buy U.S. Treasury bills with this excess capital. It could purchase physical assets with the money, invest in stock markets in other countries, or shift from U.S. dollars to a wider basket of currencies. All of this has happened to some degree, but there is little sign that China has significantly slowed down its purchases of U.S. Treasury bills. The main reason, to return to my earlier point, is that despite the financial crisis, and to some degree because of it, the attractiveness of the U.S. bills as a relatively secure and highly liquid safe haven (in comparison to other investments) has only increased. To understand this, one has only to look at interest rates. Compared to, say, Spain, the United States has to pay a very low amount to borrow money because it is seen as a low-risk borrower.The danger that China might sell off bonds precipitously to coerce the United States appeals to many commentators, including Chinese ones. In 2010 nationalist commentators prescribed such a strategy following the announcement of a new tranche of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. But the government was wise not to take such advice. Indeed, the scenario makes little sense. For example, Subramanian posits that China in the future might hold $4 trillion in U.S. debt. If we grant him that, then we would also have to assume that China will have remained overly dependent on exports for continued growth and will not have broken its addiction to sterilization as a means of keeping exchange rates and inflation low. But even if this proves to be the case, why would China want to sell off a large initial portion of its bonds for the intended purpose of hurting the U.S. economy, one of its largest markets for exports? China would likely lose a huge amount of money in the first round, when its remaining bonds dropped precipitously in value. But more important, by damaging the U.S. economy and basically threatening economic warfare, China would almost certainly have done severe damage to a major export market and a source of foreign direct investment. Reducing the overall purchasing power of the United States and upsetting it politically would also risk reciprocal economic punishment.

AT: Chinese trade power

Economic self-interest prevents China from using trade power to pressure the U.S.Christensen, 15 – William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton (Thomas, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, p. 63-64)

The last measure of Chinese dominance employed by pessimists—trade power—reveals an outdated view of the political leverage that trade provides. Subramanian argues that China can exclude U.S. companies from its markets as a punitive measure in order to change U.S. foreign policy. Consistent with Subramanian's claim, Chinese partners have reportedly withheld market access to pressure foreign companies such as Ford Motor Company, General Motors, Kawasaki, Siemens, and BASF to transfer technology directly or, less directly, to build research and development centers adjacent to their factories and offices in China, thereby training Chinese engineers who can then depart to Chinese firms. The CEO of BASF, Jiirgen Hambrecht, reportedly derided this practice as "forced disclosure of know-how" in a meeting with Premier Wen Jiabao and Chancellor Angela Merkel.13 Individual American companies are reluctant to go public with their complaints on this score lest they spoil their relations with Beijing.14 One particularly bold CEO, GE's Jeffrey Imelt, did publicly complain, albeit abstractly: "I really worry about China. I am not sure that in the end they want any of us to win, or any of us to be successful."15 But such Chinese practices are very different from Subramanian's concern about China "offering or denying countries" access to markets for the purpose of altering their foreign policy. First of all, China still generally exports more than it imports (hence the current account surplus and resulting hoard of Treasury bills). Moreover, it depends on those exports to produce jobs and maintain social stability. If China tried to close off its economy to all imports from a major economy, especially a market as large as the United States, the inevitable retaliation against Chinese products would have enormous ramifications for China's own export industries. By grossly violating its WTO commitments, Beijing would also damage its attractiveness as a location for foreign direct investment. This would only exacerbate a growing problem for China, which is that other Asian countries are looking like increasingly attractive alternatives for foreign investment. With its impressive rise in wealth, China's laborers are demanding higher wages, making them less competitive in certain industries than workers in places like Vietnam and Bangladesh. Especially since China's own trade sector is heavily dependent on foreign- invested firms, as outlined in chapter 2, China would not only be shooting itself in the foot by sanctioning major countries like the United States, it would be shooting itself in the head.

AT: Regional adventurism

No conflict with China and its surrounding countries – laundry list of reasons Babones 15— comparative sociologist at University of Sydney (Salvatore, “Is China a Threat? The Devil’s in the Details,” Foreign Policy in Focus, March 12th, 2015, http://fpif.org/is-china-a-threat-the-devils-in-the-details/) // EDP What about regional conflict? China’s growing military certainly sounds like a regional menace. But a menace to whom? Here again the details get in the way of the China threat story.To the east, Japan’s government is responding to Chinese expansion by boosting its own defense spending to record levels, proposing to change its pacifist constitution to allow greater military flexibility, and making a renewed push to resolve the long-standing Kuril Islands dispute with Russia. If Prime Minister Shinzo Abe finally succeeds in making peace with Russia, that would leave China and its ally North Korea as the sole focus for Japan’s entire military capacity. Japan is a rich, technologically advanced country of 127 million people. It can look after itself.For very different reasons, China poses little threat to South Korea. China increasingly views North Korea more as a burden than as an advance column for an attack on the South. And China has recently been courting South Korean technology investment in order to reduce its dependence on Japan.Political relations across the Taiwan Strait are inevitably dominated by questions over the status of Taiwan. Every election in Taiwan sparks talk about and fears of Chinese invasion. But no country in the world has staged a large-scale amphibious assault since the U.S. landings at Incheon, South Korea in 1950. For more than half a century, even American adventures abroad have been small-scale (Grenada) or launched from land bases (Iraq).The Chinese military will never have the capacity to invade Taiwan against armed resistance — not now, not later, not ever. It just can’t be done in the contemporary military context in which a single cruise missile can sink a transport ship carrying thousands of troops. It makes no sense to worry about something that is not technically possible.The Philippines? Why would China want to invade the Philippines? Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar? Ditto, ditto, ditto. China is involved in a plethora of minor border disputes with its neighbors, but none of these involve core territorial interests or serious legal claims that China (or most of its neighbors, for that matter) have historically been interested in pushing. They’re all frozen conflicts that are unlikely ever to thaw.Some pundits worry about the increasing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. India may not rival China as a great power, but even India should be able to contain China’s ability to project power as far away as the Indian Ocean — and India has every reason to do so.In short, it’s difficult to imagine concrete scenarios for major regional conflict sparked by China.

http://fpif.org/is-china-a-threat-the-devils-in-the-details/)


AT: Chinese military challenge

China lacks warfighting experienceChristensen, 15 – William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton (Thomas, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, p. 77)

In addition to having larger numbers of more advanced weapons systems than China, the United States has a massive advantage in training and war-fighting experience. Take the several hundred Chinese fighter aircraft, for example. They are not only outmatched by thousands of superior U.S. planes, but U.S. pilots receive much more training time on flying their aircraft than their Chinese counterparts. Moreover, since the bulk of the PLA is still not considered modern, the Chinese units that use weaponry deemed modern face a challenge not shared by their U.S. counterparts: they need to try to integrate with units of widely varying capabilities, a task that is not easy to accomplish. Finally, while they may find fixes to these problems, the fact will remain that China has not been in a major international conflict since 1979, when Deng Xiaoping ordered the ill-fated ground invasion of Vietnam. Chinese units performed rather poorly in that fight, but that is not as important as the fact that only the most senior Chinese officers have any war-fighting experience at all. The experience they do have from that fight is largely irrelevant to most contemporary military challenges China might face. This is particularly true at sea and in the air in the western Pacific. By contrast, the United States military has been in harm's way somewhere in the world in almost every year since the launch of Operation Desert Storm in January 1991.

China lacks the US alliance systemChristensen, 15 – William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton (Thomas, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, p. 77-78)

Besides technology and experience, allies represent one of the biggest military advantages that the United States enjoys in comparison to China. Michael O'Hanlon points out that the United States alliance system comprises some sixty allies, which, if one includes the United States itself, constitutes some 80 percent of global military spending.53 Similarly, in his book Liberal Leviathan John Ikenberry has presented data comparing U.S. alliances with China's security relations abroad to show the lopsided lead enjoyed by the United States on this score. The United States has formal defense commitments with sixty-two actors around the world.54 China only has a formal alliance with North Korea and a very strong security partnership with one other Asian country, Pakistan. It has defense cooperation and an arms trade relationship with Russia, but mutual mistrust between the two makes it very hard to label it an alliance or security partnership in the same way that one could describe the U.S. relationship with South Korea and Australia (alliances) or Singapore and Taiwan (security partnerships). These alliances and security relationships give the United States more than just additive power in a conflict; they provide permanent basing rights in many cases and, in others, the right to use ports and airstrips for exercises and in certain emergencies. In addition, they provide intelligence sharing and local awareness regarding geography, weather, and the like that serve as a major force multiplier for American power.

While, for reasons offered in chapter 4, this does not necessarily mean that the United States should cut its defense budget or become complacent about the security challenges posed by a rising China, it seriously undercuts arguments that China is quickly closing the gap with U.S. military power or on course to dominate the international system.

AT: Chinese control of SLOCs

China won’t dominate surrounding seaway or airspace – they’re just as dependent on activity occurring thereBabones 15— comparative sociologist at University of Sydney (Salvatore, “Is China a Threat? The Devil’s in the Details,” Foreign Policy in Focus, March 12th, 2015, http://fpif.org/is-china-a-threat-the-devils-in-the-details/) // EDP China has become the bête noire of U.S. security policy, the new universal enemy to replace the Soviet Union.Its economic power and rapid military build-up, after all, make it a much more credible long-term threat than Putin’s Russia or the Islamic State. When policy pundits and military men want to spread alarm about the decline of America and beat the drum for increased defense spending, their scary enemy of choice is China.Take James Jay Carafano , a retired military man and a policy pundit at the right-wing Heritage Foundation who raises the possibility of “a U.S.-China Nuclear War.” He argues at The National Interest that keeping the peace between China and the United States “requires significantly recapitalizing the U.S. armed forces.” This is necessary, he says, to assuage the doubts and insecurities of America’s allies. He argues that Washington “has to close any gap in military power that the Chinese might think could be exploited.”That’s a lot of gap-closing.Carafano identifies America’s “key objectives” in the region as “maintaining freedom of the commons (air, sea, space, and cyberspace) and limiting the potential for large-scale regional conflict.”These certainly are U.S. interests. But are they U.S. responsibilities? And what exactly do these two general principles mean in practice when applied to the Asia-Pacific region?It turns out that that a large-scale conflict in the region is much more difficult to imagine than China hawks like Carafano like to pretend.Staying Open for BusinessThe devil is in the details.Take, for example, China’s possible future capacity to dominate its adjacent waters: the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea. An often-cited figure is that 40 percent of world trade (reportedly worth $5.3 trillion) passes through the South China Sea. Throw in the East China Sea and the Taiwan Strait and the total must be more than 50 percent.Could a more capable Chinese army choke off that trade? Of course it could. Any country can shut down sea lanes with patrols and anti-ship mines. But nearly all of the civilian navigation in question represents trade to and from China. It’s hard to imagine any circumstance under which the Chinese government would want to shut it down.Ditto the airspace over China’s near seas. Nearly all of the civilian aviation through it consists of flights to and from China.



AT: Chinese carriers

Chinese carriers decrease Chinese sea powerChristensen, 15 – William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton (Thomas, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, p. 74-75)

Finally, we have the much-publicized deployment of the Chinese aircraft carrier for sea trials in 2012. On the one hand, tills is indeed a new capability for the Chinese military, which has traditionally emphasized defense of the homeland and the sea corridors near the Chinese coastline, where so much of China's wealth lies. While significant, particularly to China's weaker neighbors, a Chinese carrier can hardly be seen as a game changer that closes an overall gap with the United States. After all, the Chinese bought their vintage, Cold War-era carrier from Ukraine, hardly a leading military power. Both the United States and its former enemy and now regional ally Japan have had the ability to operate carriers since the 1920s! The United States currently has eleven nuclear-powered carriers, and the massive and sophisticated battle groups that accompany and protect them are fully trained and in operation.Merely having a carrier in service does not mean it is inviolable. The United States has decades of experience from World War II through the Cold War in tracking and destroying enemy carriers. In one World War II battle, Midway, the United States sank four Japanese carriers, the Akagi, Hiryu, Kaga, and Soryu. Fortunately, during the Cold War, the superpowers avoided the kinds of direct military conflict that would entail attacks on carriers. But both sides trained extensively for such missions, and in many ways carriers today are much easier to track and hit than they were then. Given the massive expense of the carriers themselves and the even greater expense of the carrier battle groups that need to accompany and defend them, combined with the relative ease with which they could be sunk by the United States, a realpolitik, zero-sum analysis might lead one to hope that China would build many more carriers, not fewer. Already many sophisticated U.S. defense analyses worry more about the future vulnerability of U.S. ships to attack by Chinese missiles and torpedoes than they do about any offensive threat posed by Chinese carriers. One U.S. defense expert who generally frets greatly about trends in China's defense modernization once half-joked to me, "When I dream happy dreams, they are full of new carriers: Chinese carriers."

AT: Chinese cyberwar

US cyberwar capabilities are greater than China’sChristensen, 15 – William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton (Thomas, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, p. 75-76)

Another area that gets a great deal of press is cyberwar. There is little doubt that China has developed a large cadre of government-sponsored hackers and cyberwarriors, and it is difficult to make the distinction between the two, as the capabilities that allow one to penetrate any network and spy on it often track very closely with the capabilities to disable and destroy that network. James Mulvenon, a political scientist turned cyberanalyst in a U.S. think tank, has done much of the best publicly available work on how cyber attacks on U.S. forces could complicate U.S. military operations in the western Pacific. In 2012 he presented some of his findings at Princeton University, pointing out that while combat orders and other sensitive communication would be done on classified systems that are much harder to penetrate, U.S. military operations still rely on relatively vulnerable unclassified systems for logistics purposes. In chapter 4 we will discuss how such Chinese capabilities might prove very important in a coercive struggle with the United States. But one does not need to conclude that China somehow has a lead in cyber warfare capabilities or that the United States has a particularly large deficit in terms of cyber vulnerability. It is difficult to know from publicly available sources which Pacific country enjoys the advantage in cyber warfare. The U.S. government rarely discusses U.S. offensive capabilities, though public reports suggest that cyber attacks were used extensively in Iraq, for example. There has also been widespread public speculation about U.S. and Israeli cyber attacks on the Iranian nuclear program in programs called Stuxnet and Flame. In 2012 General Keith Alexander, the U.S. general in charge of Cyber Command, broke silence when various reports had suggested that somehow the United States was unilaterally vulnerable to foreign cyber attack. He said, "I can assure you that, in appropriate circumstances and on order from the National Command Authority, we can back up the department's assertion that any actor threatening a crippling cyber attack against the United States would be taking a grave risk."51 In 2013 he went further, stating that the U.S. government believes U.S. cyberoffensive capabilities are the "best in the world."52 Since the flight of National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden, many in the United States and China seem to believe that the NSA has the ability' to penetrate large swathes of China's cyberspace. Since penetration is the essential element to cyber attack, this would imply a serious U.S. cyber warfare capability against China. Still, U.S. superiority on this score, even if it exists as General Alexander suggests, does not necessarily provide great safety or comfort, as we will discuss in chapter 4.

AT: Space war / ASAT attacks

No risk of ASAT attack from ChinaCoker 15- Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Head of Department (Christopher, “The Improbable War”, 15 January 2015, Oxford University Press, pp.166-167)//SL

The former UN weapons inspector Geoffrey Forden has published a compelling scenario:High above Asia, as the bars and clubs of Beijing begin to fill up at the end of another work day, a US early warning satellite spots the tell-tale plume of a missile streaking out of the wastes of Western China. Warning bells sound all through the Pentagon. Tensions have been running high between China and the United States, as the two countries struggle to resolve the latest installment of the Taiwanese crisis. And China has had a run of unprecedented activity in space: the past two days have seen China launch four large missions into deep space, three within the last 6 hours. Fortunately, a high resolution American spy satellite will be over that second launch site within minutes, giving the US a unique ability to determine what is going on. But even though tasking orders are given to photograph the suspected launch site, none are returned. The satellite, code-named Crystal 3, no longer responds to commands. Within minutes, US Space Command reports that four NAVSTAR/GPS satellites—used to guide American drones and precision bombs—have stopped broadcasting. China’s space war against the United States has started. (Forden, 2008)In Forden’s scenario a Chinese–US space war would not seriously damage the capabilities of the United States. He argues that even if every Chinese anti-satellite attack missile (ASAT) were to hit its targets and the Americans did not respond despite evidence of an attack well ahead of time, an attack is unlikely to cripple the United States as it would still have enough space assets to mount a conventional counter-attack.The capabilities needed for such a scenario to unfold in reality will not be available for some years to come. China’s only ASAT test in 2007 was aimed against an obsolete weather satellite. The missile is likely to have tracked its target through the use of an on-board telescope using visible light, which, unlike US missile defence interceptors (which focus on the infra-red light that the heat of a target emits), requires that a satellite is attacked in bright sunlight. Indeed, even though the site from which the interceptor was launched was cloaked in darkness, the target satellite was high enough to be illuminated by the sun.

AT: Resource wars

No resource wars – economic interdependence checksChristensen, 15 – William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton (Thomas, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, p. 40)

One of the key reasons is economics. Colonialism was never a particularly smart economic plan for the imperial great powers, as they generally spent more on imperial management and defense than they gained from economically dominating their subjects (as opposed to simply trading with them). But the information revolution that followed the industrial revolution, combined with the diversification of natural resources such as oil and gas, has made ownership of additional raw materials and land much less important to the overall wealth and national security of advanced economies. China does have preexisting disputes over energy resources with its immediate neighbors. But even with that important exception, it is difficult to imagine that China, Japan, the United States, and Russia will find themselves fighting over previously unclaimed areas of the world for the purpose of gaining monopoly control of the resources there.Economic developments over the past 150 years provide major disincentives for great power conflict, even in times of structural shift. The ratio of the value of innovation and skill to raw inputs like natural resources and cheap, unskilled labor has never been greater and is likely only to grow. Scholars like Carl Kaysen had argued that advanced industrialization made war among the developed nations extremely less likely because it could not be profitable for the winner.4 The wars that occurred in the first half of the twentieth century were an atavism of a preindustrial era in which aggression could pay because the victor could enjoy more easily exploited booty, namely land, resources, and a new source of cheap, menial labor. One scholar, Peter Liberman, countered this thesis convincingly by analyzing German conquests in industrialized parts of Europe, such as Czechoslovakia in the early phases of World War II. In those instances, aggression provided Germany great added wealth and military wherewithal. While Liberman's point is convincing that some wars among industrial powers proved profitable and strategically valuable for the aggressor, it is highly doubtful that the same logic would apply to today's knowledge-based transnational production. In Liberman's work, aggressors like Hitler's Germany merely needed to gain the acquiescence of the conquered country's workforce.5 In a world of transnational production, with logistics webs created by the need for on-time delivery, the aggressor state would also need to persuade a diverse set of foreign innovators, suppliers of key components, and logistics companies to continue doing business with the aggressor after the invasion.

AT: Africa dominance

US-China interests in Africa aren’t zero sum and Chinese ties can be explained by resource dependenceChristensen, 15 – William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton (Thomas, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, p. 66-67)

China's Economic Inroads in the Developing WorldDespite the common usage of terms like "a new scramble for Africa" in media circles, the idea that China and the United States are competing for influence there is extremely ill conceived. In my experience as a U.S. government official, neither the United States nor the Chinese government viewed the relations of the other with African countries as part of a zero-sum struggle for global influence. And even if one were to accept such nineteenth- century logic, China would hardly look like the dominant great power in either Africa or Latin America. Of course, it is notable that China has become Africa's largest trading partner since the financial crisis. But U.S. trade with the continent is still large despite a sharp decline in the past few years.As recently as 2008, U.S. trade with sub-Saharan Africa outstripped China's by a considerable amount ($107 billion USD to $83 billion USD).22 Few lauded U.S. "dominance" in the region at that time, nor would such a conclusion have been warranted. Since then, China's trade with sub-Saharan Africa grew by half and U.S. trade dropped by nearly one-third (in 2012 China's trade was $123 billion USD and U.S. trade was $73 billion USD).23 One reason for the increase in Chinese trade is that China's economy is increasingly dependent on imports of foreign oil, of which sub-Saharan African nations are a major supplier. In 2013 China surpassed the United States as the world's largest net importer of oil.24 Still, China's exports to sub- Saharan Africa have grown even more quickly than China's growing energy imports from the region, in part because Chinese energy supplies from Sudan were disrupted by the ongoing tensions between Khartoum ("Northern" Sudan) and newly independent South Sudan. Despite this disruption, imports still constituted nearly 20 percent of the increase in China's trade with the region since 2008,25 and the vast majority of the value of Chinese imports from the region are in natural resources. Another, more important reason that Americans should not panic about these trends in African trade is that the change in the U.S. trade portfolio can be explained largely by energy markets.U.S. energy production at home has increased sharply, and U.S. imports of oil have dropped sharply due to the shale gas revolution; thus, energy imports from Africa have dropped precipitously. Overall trade with Africa is not a problem. In fact in 2012, U.S. exports to sub-Saharan Africa actually increased by 7 percent, faster than U.S. export growth to the rest of the world (4.5 percent). But U.S. imports from Africa dropped 33 percent in the same year-.26 Much of that drop was in the oil sector (oil imports fell 38 percent), followed by precious stones and metals (imports of these commodities fell 25 percent).27 Declines in these imports hardly represent U.S. economic weakness. Moreover, global U.S. firms like Exxon Mobil still produce a great deal of oil in Africa even when their downstream destinations are outside the United States. Most important, since U.S. oil imports from Africa dropped because of development of the domestic energy market in the United States, the decline should probably be viewed as a sign of U.S. economic strength.

The rhetoric about energy independence in the United States on both sides of the political aisle is fundamentally misguided and misinformed. Oil is a globalized commodity and no one can cut the United States off from supply because of the diversity of energy producers and the power of the U.S. Navy. And even if the United States produced all of its energy at home, regions like the Middle East would still be strategically important to Washington because the readily available energy resources there would still produce windfall profits for its owners on global markets. Especially since most of those owners are still states, it will still matter greatly to Washington whether the regimes there are friendly or antagonistic to the United States and its allies. Even now, the U.S. imports from the Middle East are limited, but the region is still of great strategic importance.For this reason, the bipartisan call for energy independence on security grounds is a domestic political canard. But the opposite argument would, if possible, be even more absurd. A country certainly does not become more influential on the international stage by importing more energy and natural resources from any given country or region. No one would argue that we would improve our political power in places like the Middle East or Venezuela by buying more oil from those places. But when Chinese energy imports increase and U.S. imports drop, some analysts begin to worry about Chinese "dominance." Suddenly, Chinese energy dependence becomes a source of national power and U.S. energy independence a cause of national weakness. This makes no sense.

Trade ties don’t shape political influenceChristensen, 15 – William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton (Thomas, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, p. 68-69)

As my colleague, Mr. Swan, pointed out that day, if we consider commonly used instruments like Chinese government preferential financing for Chinese companies operating in countries like Angola or Nigeria or those in China exporting to Africa, the combined numbers for Chinese aid, investment, or both would be much higher. But even if we grant China much higher figures, it is not entirely clear that China would gain great political leverage because of it. Many of these countries have diverse outlets for their natural resources, for example, and the prices are still largely determined by international market forces, not by special deals with China or anyone else.Even when the importing country enjoys something close to a monopoly position as a purchaser of globally available resources from any given supplier, the purchaser does not necessarily enjoy a privileged political position in the relationship. Witness the U.S. relationship with Venezuela. The United States has long been by far the largest purchaser of Venezuelan oil, and oil is by far Venezuela's most valuable economic asset. Moreover, much of the Venezuelan crude is refined in the United States before it returns to Venezuela or is sold elsewhere as combustible fuel. But Washington not only does not dominate the country, it held little sway over its obstreperous and outwardly anti-American leadership under Hugo Chavez, who famously referred to George W. Bush as the devil, praised Iran, and maintained close ties to Castro's Cuba. Realizing this when I was at the State Department, I often chuckled when I saw ominous news reports regarding the political implications of new energy deals that China was cutting with Venezuela. These seemed to be the same kind of credit-for- energy swaps that China had signed in Africa. The prediction was that Venezuela would be able to diversify its export markets and increase oil flows to China. The implication was that this would give China great political influence in

America's backyard. Indeed, Venezuelan exports to China eventually did increase. In 2012 Venezuela reported that exports of oil to China increased 30 percent, to 600,000 barrels per day. U.S. official estimates put the figure at a much lower 260,000 barrels of crude per day (for 2013).34 But even the higher Venezuelan figure is smaller than the flow of crude to the United States, which even at half of what it was in the late 1990s was still over 800,000 barrels per day in 2012 and 2013. Furthermore, Venezuela still depends on U.S. refineries. It has no parallel in its relationship with China 35 The more important point is that, since Washington has had so little influence on Venezuelan policies at home or abroad even when it was an unrivaled leader in Venezuelan energy markets, it is hard to imagine that somehow the United States lost and China gained significant influence in the process of increased Venezuelan exports to China. If eclipsing the U.S. in oil purchases from Venezuela buys China as much influence in Venezuela as we enjoyed during the Bush administration, we can only wish Beijing the best of luck with that.

AT: Latin America dominance

No threat to US trade with Latin AmericaChristensen, 15 – William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton (Thomas, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, p. 69-71

China's overall economic relationship with Latin America has also deepened significantly since the 1990s. Again, in my experience the U.S. government tends not to view these relationships as a zero-sum struggle. But even if we adopt the zero-sum optic as an exercise, the U.S. position would still seem very secure. U.S. trade with Latin America outstrips Chinese trade by a very wide margin. In 2012 China's trade with Latin America was 30 percent of U.S. trade with the region (Chinese trade was $258 billion USD; the United States' was $856 billion USD).37 Chinese investment numbers have been growing—FDI in 2010 totaled $10.5 billion USD. But those numbers are still dwarfed by U.S. investments, which according to the OECD amounted to over $44.5 billion in that year.38 Moreover, by far the biggest target for Chinese "investment" in Latin America still seems to be the Cayman Islands, with the British Virgin Islands in second place. According to a U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission report, in 2009 73 percent of Chinese investment to Latin America went to the Caymans and 22 percent to the British Virgin Islands.39 For 2010, if we subtract $3.5 billion USD investment to the Caymans and $6.1 billion USD to the British Virgin Islands, Chinese FDI to Latin America is only $0.9 billion for that year, or only 1.3 percent of China's global FDI.40 This suggests that a big portion of the Chinese money is being reinvested back into China as faux foreign direct investment by Chinese entities that want the tax and other benefits enjoyed by foreign-invested firms. Some of the money flowing through the Caymans might also be a shelter for ill-gotten gains on the mainland. Of course, a large piece of the U.S. investment in the region is also to places like the Caymans and Suriname, most likely for tax haven purposes, but even accounting for this phenomenon, U.S. investment in the region for more productive purposes is still many times higher than the Chinese figures. For example, in 2012 U.S. net investment in two major South American economies, Brazil and Argentina, was over $12 billion USD.41On the trade front, as is the case with the United States in Venezuela, the Chinese imports from the region are largely raw materials and agricultural products, commodities that have globally determined prices. (The productive parts of Chinese investment in the region are also heavily skewed toward extracting such raw materials.) As is demonstrated by the U.S.- Venezuela case, the purchase of such commodities does not give the buyer inordinate political power over the seller, which has many potential outlets for sale of its products in a global marketplace. It is difficult to see how China could use its newfound position in these markets to do serious damage to the American economic interests in the region, let alone to create leverage to harm U.S. national security interests in the Western Hemisphere.

Impact answers

AT: Hegemony impacts

Their laundry list impacts are exaggerated and hegemony doesn’t solve themMearshimer and Walt 16’ - JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER is R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. STEPHEN M. WALT is Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School (John and Stephen, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy”, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-06-13/case-offshore-balancing//AK)

Defenders of liberal hegemony marshal a number of unpersuasive arguments to make their case. One familiar claim is that only vigorous U.S. leadership can keep order around the globe. But global leadership is not an end in itself; it is desirable only insofar as it benefits the United States directly.One might further argue that U.S. leadership is necessary to overcome the collective-action problem of local actors failing to balance against a potential hegemon. Offshore balancing recognizes this danger, however, and calls for Washington to step in if needed. Nor does it prohibit Washington from giving friendly states in the key regions advice or material aid.Other defenders of liberal hegemony argue that U.S. leadership is necessary to deal with new, transnational threats that arise from failed states, terrorism, criminal networks, refugee flows, and the like. Not only do the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans offer inadequate protection against these dangers, they claim, but modern military technology also makes it easier for the United States to project power around the world and address them. Today’s “global village,” in short, is more dangerous yet easier to manage.This view exaggerates these threats and overstates Washington’s ability to eliminate them. Crime, terrorism, and similar problems can be a nuisance, but they are hardly existential threats and rarely lend themselves to military solutions. Indeed, constant interference in the affairs of other states—and especially repeated military interventions—generates local resentment and fosters corruption, thereby making these transnational dangers worse. The long-term solution to the problems can only be competent local governance, not heavy-handed U.S. efforts to police the world.

US predominance in Asia isn’t sustainableSwaine, 15- senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace( Micheal, Beyond American Predominance in the Western Pacific: The Need for a Stable U.S.-China Balance of Power, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/20/beyond-american-predominance-in-western-pacific-need-for-stable-u.s.-china-balance-of-power)//JS

Second, and equally important, it is far from clear that American military predominance in the Asia-Pacific region can be sustained on a consistent basis, just as it is virtually impossible that China could establish its own predominance in the region. Two Carnegie reports on the long-term security environment in Asia, China’s Military and the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2030 and Conflict and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region,2 concluded that, while the United States will remain the strongest military power on a global level indefinitely, Washington will almost certainly confront increasingly severe,



https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-06-13/case-offshore-balancing//AK


economically induced defense spending limitations that will constrain efforts to decisively keep well ahead of a growing Chinese military and paramilitary presence within approximately 1,500 nautical miles of the Chinese coastline, that is, the area covered by the so-called first and second island chains. This will occur despite Washington’s repeated assertion that the rebalance to Asia will sustain America’s predominant position in the region. Moreover, such largely economic constraints will almost certainly be magnified by the persistence of tensions and conflicts in other parts of the world, such as the Middle East and Central Europe. These events are likely to complicate any U.S. effort to shift forces (and resources) to the Asia-Pacific.

America will lose a war with chinaMajumdar 16-Defense editor for the National Interest (Dave, “A ‘Readiness Crises’ :Would America Lose a War to Russia or China”, June 22, 2016, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/readiness-crisis-would-america-lose-war-russia-or-china-16676?page=2)//SLThe United States military is at a crisis point in terms of readiness against high-end threats such as Russia or China—at least that’s the view of the House and Senate Armed Services Committee majority staffs. While part of the cause stems from the counter-insurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, much of the blame can be attributed to a moribund acquisition system that chokes the life out of innovation.“We’re in a dramatic crisis now. There is no question that we’re capable against the threats on the counter-terrorism side, but we’ve reached a point where we’re in fact—not heading towards—but we’re already hollow against a high-end threat,” said House Armed Services Committee majority staff director Bob Simmons speaking before an audience at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) on June 21. “We lack the capacity and capability that we need to effectively deter on the high-end.”The problem manifests itself in many ways—and it spans across the Pentagon’s entire range of capabilities in the air, on land, at sea and in space. One immediate example is U.S. Marine Corps aviation—where the service does not have enough trained maintainers to fix their aircraft. Out of a total of 271 Marine Corps strike aircraft, only about 64 are flyable at any given time, Simmons noted. The Air Force—meanwhile—is not doing much better with only 43 percent of its aircraft being full mission capable.Because of the aircraft shortage, the Marine Corps’ naval aviators who fly those warplanes are getting far fewer hours in the air than their Russian and Chinese counterparts. These days, Marine pilots are flying only four to six hours per month instead of the twenty to thirty per month they once used to—that creates permanent experience gaps. “To put it bluntly, we fly about as much as the North Korean pilots do and about three times less than Chinese pilots do today,” Simmons said.Meanwhile, the aircraft themselves—except for the handful of Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptors, F-35 Joint Strike Fighters and Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirits—are not able to penetrate into the teeth of enemy air defenses. Be it the Fairchild Republic A-10, Boeing F-15, Lockheed Martin F-16 or the Boeing F/A-18 Hornet, none of those warplanes can survive against the current generation of Russian and Chinese high-end air defense systems. Even the latest Russian fourth generation fighter aircraft can’t survive against Moscow’s own formidable integrated air defense products. “Could the Russian fly their aircraft over Ukraine?” Simmons asked. “Nope. If you’re flying fourth-generation aircraft in the current environment, you’re in trouble.”The Pentagon’s lack of readiness to fight a high-end war can in many ways be attributed to the Defense Department’s byzantine, risk-averse bureaucracy that does everything it can to crush innovation.

Indeed, the current debacle is a direct result of the Pentagon’s pursuit of so-called “transformational” capabilities such the F-22, F-35 and the now defunct Future Combat Systems rather than a more incremental approach. During the Cold War, the United States would evolve systems incrementally over time. “We continued that through the Cold War, we continued that steady incremental improvement to all our weapons systems forcing them to chase us, then the Berlin Wall came down and we adopted their acquisition system,” Simmons said sarcastically. “We’re trying to get back to incrementalism.”Fundamentally, the House and the Senate are trying to reform the Pentagon’s procurement system so that new technologies are developed and fielded faster in an incremental fashion. The country can simply no longer afford to invest tens of billions of dollars into programs that might only bear fruit two to three decades later—if at all. Enemies will catch up in the meantime, Simmons said. Indeed, in some cases—like the Army’s Future Combat Systems—billions were squandered with no appreciable result. Chris Brose, Senate Armed Services Committee majority staff director—who was also speaking at the AEI event—said he agreed with Simmons’ assessment—the current situation is not acceptable. “We’re seeing the exact same problem,” Brose said.The House and the Senate must act now because of the shifts in geopolitics. After the post-Soviet lull, the high-end anti-access threat has reemerged but the low-end counter-terrorism threat will persist into the foreseeable future. Moreover, the current threat does not clearly fit into the Defense Department’s traditional organizational boxes—and addressing those challenges all at the same time is the fundamental problem the Pentagon faces. “The challenge that we have is the need to move faster, the need to not let the perfect be the enemy of the good,” Brose said.As a solution, both Simmons and Brose advocated for an incremental, decentralized approach to acquisitions. Instead of building an all-powerful Death Star—or perhaps F-35—that is massively expensive and might take decades to bring to fruition, development should be completed in smaller incremental chunks that could be fielded much faster, Simmons said. That would also allow the Defense Department to take more risks—which would spur innovation. “By going to incrementalism, innovation has a chance to move along in smaller increments and lower risk,” Simmons said. The message that the Congress wants to sent to the Pentagon is: “We don’t want you to be afraid to fail,” Brose said—which is one reason why huge, ponderous programs persist even when the underlying concept is fundamentally flawed.Ultimately, the Congress has to act—the nation simply does not have a choice given the gravity of the situation. “It is truly a crisis. The Department of Defense—on the civilian leadership side—says there is no readiness problem, but there is no getting around the data,” Simmons said. “ The data is unmistakable, you can’t debate it, those are the facts, and the facts are pesky things.”

Heg bad – terrorism

Hegemony increases the risk of terrorismMearshimer and Walt 16’ - JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER is R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. STEPHEN M. WALT is Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School (John and Stephen, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy”, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-06-13/case-offshore-balancing//AK)Offshore balancing would also reduce the risk of terrorism. Liberal hegemony commits the United States to spreading democracy in unfamiliar places, which sometimes requires military occupation and always involves interfering with local political arrangements. Such efforts invariably foster nationalist resentment, and because the opponents are too weak to confront the United States directly, they sometimes turn to terrorism. (It is worth remembering that Osama bin Laden was motivated in good part by the presence of U.S. troops in his homeland of Saudi Arabia.) In addition to inspiring terrorists, liberal hegemony facilitates their operations: using regime change to spread American values undermines local institutions and creates ungoverned spaces where violent extremists can flourish.Offshore balancing would alleviate this problem by eschewing social engineering and minimizing the United States’ military foot print . U.S. troops would be stationed on foreign soil only when a country was in a vital region and threatened by a would-be hegemon. In that case, the potential victim would view the United States as a savior rather than an occupier. And once the threat had been dealt with, U.S. military forces could go back over the horizon and not stay behind to meddle in local politics. By respecting the sovereignty of other states, offshore balancing would be less likely to foster anti-American terrorism.



Democracy promotion bad

Democracy promotion causes endless warMearshimer and Walt 16’ - JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER is R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. STEPHEN M. WALT is Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School (John and Stephen, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy”, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-06-13/case-offshore-balancing//AK)

Other critics reject offshore balancing because they believe the United States has a moral and strategic imperative to promote freedom and protect human rights. As they see it, spreading democracy will largely rid the world of war and atrocities, keeping the United States secure and alleviating suffering.No one knows if a world composed solely of liberal democracies would in fact prove peaceful, but spreading democracy at the point of a gun rarely works, and fledgling democracies are especially prone to conflict. Instead of promoting peace, the United States just ends up fighting endless wars. Even worse, force-feeding liberal values abroad can compromise them at home. The global war on terrorism and the related effort to implant democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq have led to tortured prisoners, targeted killings, and vast electronic surveillance of U.S. citizens.Some defenders of liberal hegemony hold that a subtler version of the strategy could avoid the sorts of disasters that occurred in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. They are deluding themselves. Democracy promotion requires large-scale social engineering in foreign societies that Americans understand poorly, which helps explain why Washing ton’s efforts usually fail. Dismantling and replacing existing political institutions inevitably creates winners and losers, and the latter often take up arms in opposition. When that happens, U.S. officials, believing their country’s credibility is now at stake, are tempted to use the United States’ awesome military might to fix the problem, thus drawing the country into more conflicts.If the American people want to encourage the spread of liberal democracy, the best way to do so is to set a good example. Other countries will more likely emulate the United States if they see it as a just, prosperous, and open society. And that means doing more to improve conditions at home and less to manipulate politics abroad.



AT: Taiwan impact

China won’t use nuclear weapons over Taiwan – economic concerns overwhelmCole, 15- analyst at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service( Michael, If the Unthinkable Occurred: America Should Stand Up to China over Taiwan, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/if-the-unthinkable-occured-america-should-stand-china-over-12825)//JS

Ironically, White seems almost convinced that China would be willing to engage in nuclear war over Taiwan, an assumption that is both untested and portrays the leadership in Beijing as a bunch of deranged nihilists. For all its faults, and despite the official rhetoric depicting Taiwan as a “core issue,” it is in my view unlikely that the Chinese Communist Party would unleash its nuclear arsenal over the matter of Taiwan; in fact, I would advance that it is probably unwilling to gamble China’s economy over Taiwan by launching major military operations—all the more so if there is a promise that such a course of action would result in a concerted response on the part of the international community. The logic of deterrence is that it diminishes the likelihood that the international community would be faced with the maximalist options given us by White. (The bluster only works if we believe it—and Beijing wants us to believe it just like the good professor seems to do—as winning without a fight is a foundational element of Chinese military strategy.)

AT: Containment CP

Links to politics

Containment links to politicsLumbers 15-Program Director, Emerging Security NATO Association of Canada (Michael, “Wither the Pivot? Alternative U.S. Strategies for Responding to China’s Rise”, 10 Jul 2015, Comparative Strategy, Vol.34, Is 4)//SL

Perhaps the biggest problem with a strategy of confrontation is its lack of viability. “China literally could not be contained even if it were decided that this was a wise course of action,” David Shambaugh notes, “precisely because of China's existing integration in the global system. The genie cannot be put back into the bottle.” Any effort to weaken China's economy by, say, blocking its access to the global trading system would harm the U.S. as much as China, not to mention ignite a firestorm of protest from politically powerful domestic constituencies with vested interests in sustaining economic links to the mainland. Beijing, unlike Moscow during the Cold War, would have formidable tools at its disposal for retaliating against any act of economic warfare. The extent of China's ties to both the American and global economy have created a degree of interdependence that considerably narrows the scope of threatening actions that a rational, economically self-interested actor such as the United States can adopt toward the PRC.

Permutation solves

High level diplomacy is vital to reducing the impact to balancing ChinaTellis and Blackwill 15 (Ashley** and David*, senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations*, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues**, “U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China”, Council on Foreign Relations, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Blackwill.pdf, April 13, 2015, NRG)

The United States should energize high-level diplomacy with China to attempt to mitigate the inherently profound tensions as the two nations pursue mutually incompatible grand strategies, and to reassure U.S. allies and friends in Asia and beyond that Washington is doing everything it can to avoid a confrontation with Beijing.Despite the destabilizing objectives of China’s grand strategy in Asia and in the context of implementing the many policy recommendations in this report to systemically strengthen the American response to the rise of Chinese power, the United States bears major responsibilities to promote international stability, prosperity, and peace—in Asia and across the globe.In this context, take into account the negative consequences for each country’s formidable domestic challenges if the United States and China seriously mismanage their relationship. Imagine the tumultuous effects on the global economy. Consider the dramatic increase in tension throughout Asia and the fact that no country in this vast region wants to have to choose between China and the United States. Envision the corrosive impact on U.S.-China collaboration on climate change. Picture the fallout over attempts to deal with the nuclear weapons programs of North Korea and Iran.With this in mind, the U.S.-China discourse should be more candid, high level, and private than current practice—no rows of officials principally trading sermons across the table in Washington or Beijing. Bureaucracies wish to do today what they did yesterday, and wish to do tomorrow what they did today. It is, therefore, inevitable that representatives from Washington and Beijing routinely mount bills of indictment regarding the other side. All are familiar with these calcified and endlessly repeated talking points. As the Chinese proverb puts it, “To talk much and arrive nowhere is the same as climbing a tree to catch a fish.”For such an intensified high-level bilateral dialogue between Washington and Beijing to be fruitful, it should avoid concentrating primarily on the alleged perfidious behavior of the other side. For instance, no amount of American condemnation of China’s human rights practices—private or by megaphone—will consequentially affect Beijing’s policies, including toward Hong Kong, and no degree of Chinese complaints will lead the United States to weaken its alliance systems that are indispensable to the protection of its vital national interests. Nor is it likely that either side will admit to its actual grand strategy toward the other. In any case, endemic contention will over time contribute to a systemic worsening of U.S.-China bilateral relations that results in all the destructive consequences enumerated earlier.Instead, after thorough consultations with its Asian allies, the United States should commit to working with China on two or three issues that would make a positive contribution to bilateral ties and to international peace and security. After the November 2014 U.S.-China summit in Beijing, Asian security would be good subject with which to begin. For example, subjects for joint exploration could include the

possibility of creating a version of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe for Asia, expanding the talks on North Korea to include broader Asian security issues, or agreeing on enhanced security confidence-building measures between the two sides. To inspire fresh thinking and creative policy initiatives, it might be best if the senior individuals to take the lead in these talks were not in the direct national security chain of command.

The plan doesn’t prevent a shift to containmentMattis, 15 - Peter Mattis is a Fellow in the China Program at The Jamestown Foundation (“U.S. Policy Towards China: Imposing Costs Doesn't Mean Ending Engagement” 9/10, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/us-policy-towards-china-imposing-costs-doesnt-mean-ending-13810?page=show

The idea of imposing costs or forcing China to face consequences for its actions is easily misunderstood as abandoning the carrot for the stick as a matter of U.S. policy toward China. On some issues and for some analysts, moving from a cordial to an adversarial approach may well be the case in areas such as South China Sea or cyber. Even these, however, are selective, based on Chinese actions in particular areas, and focused on continuing the basic U.S. policy of shaping the choices Beijing can make while encouraging a positive course. Shaping Chinese choices necessarily requires a mix of incentives and disincentives, but the latter can only be as strong as the will to act upon them.It is worth noting that even Michael Pillsbury in his harshly critical book on U.S.-China relations, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower, does not advocate replacing the carrot with the stick. His policy proposals deal most strongly with better assessing China, dealing with Beijing as it is run under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and avoiding being duped. They boil down to how President Barack Obama characterized the way to run foreign policy: “Don’t do stupid stuff.”The idea that imposing costs and consequences on China for actions inimical to U.S. interests means abandoning incentives to browbeat Beijing seems premised on the assumption that such consequences mean the beginning of a containment strategy and the end of engagement.Engagement is not going away. Suggestions of its demise are premature. If you want to persuade or dissuade someone, the only way to ensure your signal was sent, received, and understood is to meet face-to-face, keep dialogue open, and ensure senior officials understand how the other side interprets actions. Apart from that supercilious point, the U.S.-China relationship, regardless of ostensibly shared interests, is not a fragile flower that will wilt at the first frost.



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