http://www.thelawsofcanadainformation.org 1 PUBLIC LAW TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. BASIC THEORIES OF LAW ................................................................................................................................... 2 Positivism and Natural Law ....................................................................................................................................................................... 2 Feminist Perspectives on Law .................................................................................................................................................................. 3 Critical Legal Studies ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 4 Law and Economics ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 5 Other Cases ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 6 Articles ................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 7 Early Relations with Aboriginal Peoples .............................................................................................................................................. 8 Reception of English Common Law ........................................................................................................................................................ 8 Civil Law and Bijuralism ........................................................................................................................................................................... 10 Treaty ................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 10 Convention ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 10 Customary International Law ................................................................................................................................................................ 10 Statutory Law ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 11 Other Cases ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 11 Articles ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 13 3. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CANADIAN LEGAL SYSTEM....................................................... 14 Rule of Law ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 14 Constitution of Canada .............................................................................................................................................................................. 14 Parliamentary Sovereignty and Constitutional Supremacy ...................................................................................................... 16 Separation of Powers ................................................................................................................................................................................. 16 Judicial Independence ............................................................................................................................................................................... 18 Other Cases ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 18 4. BASIC ARCHEITECTURE OF THE CANADIAN LEGAL SYSTEM ............................................................... 21 Chapter 4: Parliament and the Legislative Process ...................................................................................................................... 21 Chapter 5: The Exercise of Executive Authority ............................................................................................................................ 26 Chapter 6: The Courts and the Judiciary ........................................................................................................................................... 29 Chapter 8: Constraints on Legislative and Administrative Action ......................................................................................... 34 5. RELATIONSHIP OF ABORIGINAL PEOPLES TO THE CANADIAN STATE ............................................. 38 Aboriginal Rights ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 38 Aboriginal Title ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 42 Aboriginal Self‐Government Aspirations .......................................................................................................................................... 44 The Modern Treaty Making Process ................................................................................................................................................... 44 Statute ............................................................................................................................................................................................................... 45
Law is also generally thought tobe easilydeterminedandmoreor less certain.Morality canbe contingent andrelative.
Moraldisagreements–debatedbyphilosophersforcenturies. Legaldisputes–capableofresolutionbylawyersandjudges. Natural law does not deny the necessity of positive law, but where positive law contravenes natural law, the
Thejudgeattemptstoappealtomoralconscience. Facts:TheWEAboughta lot,whichhadarestrictivecovenantpronouncingthat the landwas“not tobesold to
Jewsorpersonsofobjectionablenationality”.TheWEAappliedtohavethecovenantdeclaredinvalid. Issue: Is the covenant racially restrictive and void against public policy? Does the covenant contravene the
provisionsoftheRacialDiscriminationAct? Reasoning:Theparticularcovenantwascontrary topublicpolicy in that it “tends tocreateordeependivisions
Thefollowingtheoriesarenormativetheories–theyseektodescribehowexistinglawsfailtoachieveanexternalobjective, be it genderor class equality or the efficientdistributionof scarce societal resources.Theyareoftencriticalintheirpostureandorientedtowardsreform.
FeministPerspectivesonLaw Feministphilosophybeganinthelate19thcentury. Much of feminist legal philosophy reflects a critique (and oftentimes a rejection) of liberalism as a political
Early feministmovements in law– centredongaining thevoting franchise forwomen, seekingwomen’s formalequalitywithmen,andreformofmarriagelaws.
o Priorto1916,Canadianlawsdidnotallowwomentovote.Throughpoliticalstruggle,lawswereamendedtoallowwomentovotein3provincesinCanada.Otherprovincessoonfollowedsuit.
o In1918,ParliamentpassedtheWomen’sSuffrageAct,whichgaveeveryfemaleBritishsubjectover21theright to vote, as long as she possessed the same qualifications required for men under the provincialfranchise.
Feministanalysisbecamemoresophisticatedthroughthe20thcentury. LiberalFeminists–arguethatitispossibletohavegeneralequalitywithinaliberalconceptualframework. RadicalFeminists –areunsureabout the liberal feministsargument;asdivisionbetweenmenandwomenare
Amalefocusontherightsofdisconnectedindividualsignoresthehumanelementoflaw. Others view law as fostering social practices that are combative and litigation oriented – where the idea of a
dispassionatejudgehandingdowndecisionsisalsocastasmale‐centric. Vaguenotionsof “policy”, “commonsense”or “humannature”have found theirway into law,andbeenusedby
judgestopreservemaleprivilege. Regardless of the approach, implicit in many of feminism’s central themes is that women, given the ability to
Reasoning:o Customs develop into traditions which are stronger than law and remain unchallenged long after the
reason for them has disappeared. Theword “Persons” is ambiguous and in its originalmeaningwouldundoubtedly embracemembersof theopposite sex.At the timeof enactment, “Persons”would refer tomalesbecauseatCLawomanwasincapableofservingapublicoffice.Therefore,appealtoRomanlawandearlyEnglishdecisionsarenotasecurefoundationonwhichtointerprettheBNAAct.
o Parliament did notmanifest an intention, by express limitation, that section 24 “Persons are limited tomales.Parliament setout in section23all thequalificationsdeemednecessary foraSenator, andbeingmaleisnotoneofthem.
JusticeWilson,who agreedwith themajority in the end result, rendered a separate opinion.Her decision is anexampleofmodernfeministapproachtopubliclawconcerns.
Facts:Threedoctorswerechargedwiththeoffenceofprocuringamiscarriagecontrarytosection251(1). Issue: In 1988, the SCC was asked to determine whether section 251 of the Criminal Code (criminalizing the
o (2)“Reification”–AMarxisttermmeaningtoconvertintosomethingmaterial.Inthesecondstage,thesebeliefsarereifiedintoamaterialthing:theyarepresentedasessential,necessaryandobjective.
o (3)“Denial”–ThepsychoanalyticaltermusedbyFreud.Inthefinalphase,lawsandlegalthinkingaidinthedenialofrealtruths:theyassistinourcopingwithavaststorehouseofcontradictionsthatwouldbetoopainfulforustoholdinourconsciousness.ForaCLSscholar,thedenialoccursbetweenthepromiseofa certain state of law, such as equality, and the reality, such as the vast amounts of discrimination orracismthatcanbefoundsoreadilyinsocietyifonlywelook.
Theliberalbeliefthatlawshouldbecertainandneutralis,forCLSscholars,illusory. Law reproduces the oppressive characteristic of contemporary Western societies. Law is not independent or
Reasoning: {Majority} General proposition – Judges should avoid making comments based on generalizationswhen assessing the credibility of individual witnesses. However, the comments may be appropriate. Thesecommentsmustbeexaminedincontext,throughtheeyesofthereasonableandinformedpersonwhoistakentoknowalltherelevantcircumstancesofthecase,includingthepresumptionofjudicialintegrity,andthisunderlyingsocial context. The duty to be impartial does not mean that judges cannot bring to the bench many existingsympathies, antipathies or attitudes. The Court noted that "A high standard must be met before a finding ofreasonable apprehension of bias can bemade. Troubling as Judge Sparks’ remarksmay be, the Crown has not
o {Minority} The test for reasonable apprehension of bias reflects the reality that judges can never beneutral,inthesenseofpurelyobjective,buttheymuststriveforimpartiality.Thereasonableperson,whendeterminingreasonableapprehensionofbias,expectsjudgestobeimpartial.
o {Dissent}Agreedwiththetest laidoutbytheMajority,butdeterminedthat thetrial judgedidnot judgebasedontheevidencebeforeher.Therewasnoevidenceintroducedthatthepoliceofficerwasracist.Thetrialjudgeinferredthisbasedonhergeneralviewofthepoliceandsociety.Sheerredinlaw.
The economic theory of regulation, or public choice theory, applies basic economic theory in an attempt tounderstandpublicpolicy.Itattemptstoexplaingovernmentinterventionasa“corrective”tomarketfailure.
o Thetheoryseekstounderstandwhysomegovernmentprogramsseemtoruncountertothepublicgood,oratleastdonotmaximizethepublicgood.
A basic proposition of public choice theory is that diffuse and fragmented groups are less effective thanmorefocused and concentrated groups in achieving success in the political arena and in influencing legislators andregulators.
Issue: Does a claim in tort for loss of future earnings survive the death of a victim? If so, how is the claimcalculated?
Reasoning:The lossof theability to capacity to earn income is anactual financial loss,which canbevalued incommercial terms. There is no justice in a rule that the respondent need not offer compensation because Mr.Duncancannolongerenjoyit.
o {Dissent}–ItwastheintentofthelegislatureinframingtheSurvivalofActionsActtoeliminatetheclaimofa victim, who died instantaneously as a result of the tort of a wrongdoer, for damages for loss ofexpectationoflifetoincludethelossoffutureincome.Avictimwhowaskilledinstantaneouslyasaresultofatorthasnotsufferedan‘actual’;asopposedtoa‘potential’ora‘speculative’loss.
This case provides an interesting backdrop to the idea of public choice theory. Themain issue in the casewaswhetherthehumanrightsregimecoverstheentirefieldofantidiscriminationlaw.
Facts:Bhadappliedfornumerousjobopeningsatthecollege.Shewasnotgrantedaninterviewforany,althoughshe had the requisite qualifications. She alleged this was because of her ethnic origin. She issued a claim fordamagesfordiscrimination.Sheallegedthattherespondentwasinbreachofitscommonlawandstatutorydutiesnottodiscriminateagainsther.
Reasoning:Theinterestsofpersonsofdifferentethnicoriginsareentitledtoprotectionofthelaw.ThepreambletotheCodeisevidenceofthepublicpolicyoftheProvincerespectingfundamentalhumanrights.Fromthispolicy,the judge recognized a new tort of discrimination. As such, if the plaintiff can make out that she has beendiscriminated against and has suffered injury as a result, the common lawmust afford her a remedy (Ashby vWhite).
Reasoning:Thereisanarrowlinebetweenfoundingacivilcauseofactiondirectlyuponabreachofstatueandasarisingfromthestatuteitself;andfoundingacivilcauseofactionatcommonlawbyreferencetopoliciesreflectedinthestatuteandstandardsfixedbythestatute.Thisnewtortisaspeciesofaneconomictort,foundonastatuteenacted in an area outside a fully recognized area of common law. The Code forecloses any civil action baseddirectlyuponabreach thereofbut italsoexcludesanycommon lawactionbasedonan invocationof thepublicpolicyexpressedintheCode.
attempttoestablishalternativevisionsofwhatjusticemightbe. Law and economics theories look at law from another perspective, grounded less inmoral theory andmore in
ideasaboutefficiency. The public choice critique in law and economic theory echoes the complaints voiced by the CLS and feminist
sealing certain documents. Allegations found to be untrue and without foundation. Hill sued the Church fordamages in libel. The Church argued that the principles of the common law ought to be interpreted, even in apurelyprivatelawaction,inamannerconsistentwiththeCharter.Theyarguedthatthiscouldonlybeachievedbyadoptingthe“actualmalice”standardofliabilityadoptedbytheUS.
Issue:DoestheCharterapplytothecommonlawtortofdefamation? Reasoning:TheCharterdoesnotdirectlyapplytothecommonlaw,unless it is thebasisofsomegovernmental
action. Even though the Charter does not directly apply to the common law absent governmental action, thecommonlawmustnonethelessbedevelopedinaccordancewithChartervalues(RWDSUvDolphinDeliveryLtd).Inotherwords,thebasicruleisthatabsentgovernmentaction,theCharterappliedonlyindirectlytothecommonlaw.
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Outcome:TheSCCheldthatitwouldnotfollowthe“actualmalice”standardsetforthintheUScaseofNewYorkTimesCo. v Sullivan. The SCCupheld the Court ofAppeal’s decision and the underlying jury award of general,aggravatedandpunitivedamages.
Societedel’assuranceautomobileduQuebecvCyr
Facts:SAAQ,aprovincialauto‐insurancemonopoly,enteredintoKwithCVVM,toconductsafetyinspections.Cyr,anaccreditedmechanic,mentionedinanappendixtotheK,wouldconducttheseinspections.Hewasnotapartytothe K. He signed appendix agreeing to comply with required inspection procedures. SAAQ revoked hisaccreditation for failure to complywith procedures. Cyr and CCVM filed a case claiming that the SAAQhad notfollowed its obligation of “procedural fairness” under the “Act respecting administrative justice” (AAJ), whichgovernsexecutivepowersoforganizationslikeSAAQ.
o SuperiorCourt –Held that thiswasaquestionofprivateK law,notpublicadministrative law,and theSAAQhadfulfilleditsobligationsunderK.
o Court of Appeal – Set aside that decision. The Kwas between SAAQ and CCVM, not Cyr, and that theexistenceofaKcouldnotexcuseSAAQfromitsobligationsunderAAJ.
hadverylittleimpactonracialinjusticeinCanadao Racial inequalitiesmainly occur in the realms of jury selection, bail hearings, attitudes of trial judges (R v
Brown – confirm theory that composition of the judiciary and inherent conservatism of judicial review aresomeifthebiggesthurdlesinusinglitigationasapoliticaltoolofchange)
o Racehasbeenexcludedasan issue in litigationbecausegenerallywhite lawyersdonotseethemselvesasaraceoreverydayconducttheproductofwhiteprivilege,feelconstitutionalargumentsontheirownwillsuffice–WhitePrivilege
o RefusalofjudgestoactandlackofraceconsciousnessbylawyersarehavingadirectimpactontheabilityoftheChartertoremedyracialinjustice
o Needtodiversifyethnicitiesofjudgessittingonthebenchandmakepeoplemoreraceconsciousconcerningdecisionsrelatingtobailandsentencing
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2.SOURCESOFLAW
EarlyRelationswithAboriginalPeoples CanadawaspopulatedbyaboriginalFirstNationspriortoitscolonizationbytheEuropeanempires. Some early Canadian cases recognized that the assumption of control by the British Crown during the colonial
and Indian The assertion of English sovereignty did not annul “the territorial rights, politicalorganizations,suchasitwas,orthelawsandusagesoftheIndiantribes”.
Aboriginal interests and customary laws were presumed to survive the assertion of sovereignty, and wereabsorbedintothecommonlawasrights,unless:
o (1)TheywereincompatiblewiththeCrown’sassertionofsovereignty,o (2)Theyweresurrenderedvoluntarilyviathetreatyprocess,oro (3)Thegovernmentextinguishedthem.
When Canada’s constitution was amended to entrench existing aboriginal and treaty rights, this elevated theexistingcommonlawaboriginalrightstoconstitutionalstatus.
Aboriginalrightsfallingwithintheconstitutionalprotectionofs.35(1)couldnotbeunilaterallyabrogatedbythegovernment. The government retained the jurisdiction to limit aboriginal rights for justifiable reasons, in thepursuitofsubstantialandcompellingpublicobjectives.
o Settlement–meanslegalvacuumtobefilled.Britishcommonandstatutorylawadopted.o Pre‐existinglaws‐theindigenoussovereignremainedinforce,subjecttomodificationorreplacementby
TheruleofconquestwasappliedtocentralCanada,andtheruleofsettlementtoeverywhereelse.o English‐speaking Upper Canada – Enacted legislation receiving the common law of England as the
thesettledcolony.o Local exceptions and variances were allowed where the received laws would be unsuitable to the
circumstancesofthecolony. Dateofstatutoryreception,isthedateoftheinstitutionofalocallegislatureinacolony(YoungvBlaikie). Dateofreceptionofcommonlawless important–commonlawdecisionsdeclarewhathadalwaysbeenthe law
o FundamentalideasinCLtheory:o (1)Judgesdonomakethelawbutmerelydeclareito (2)Allrelevantpastdecisionsareconsideredevidenceofthelaw,andjudgesinferfromtheseprecedents
o Legalprinciplesestablishedonpastcases‐ foundationalprinciplethat leadtoamorestableandcertainlegalstructure.
o Precedents are principles form previous cases – Ratio Decidendi (reason for deciding) is bindingprecedentonlowercourts.EverythingelseinajudgementisObiterdictaandisnotbinding.
theHumanRightsCode,orthepublicpolicyfoundwithinit,isavailabletoanyfuturelitigant.o Canada Trust Co. v Ontario Human Rights Commission ‐ the judge takes a narrower reading of
Bhadauria, distinguishing the case and constraining it to its facts, in order to allow the claim fordiscriminationinthecontextofatrustclaim.
Equity=thebodyoflawdevelopedbytheCourtofChancerypriortothatcourt’sdismantling.CourtsofChancerywere originally separate from the CL courts. Its original function was to provide a corrective to the perceivedharshnessoftheCL.
ReDeLaurier ‐equitabledoctrineoffiduciarywasinvokedtoprotectthereligiousupbringingofachild.Thecourtusedthe rules of equity, recognizing that the welfare of the child as the predominant consideration, when interpreting thestatutoryprovision.
arewhatmostpeopleencounter.Pinnacleofdomesticlawistheconstitution(bothwrittenandunwritten).o Domesticlawandinternationallawareoftenthoughtofastwodifferentbodies.o B/c of this dualist tradition, an international treaty has no direct effect in domestic law until domestic
legislationispassedtoimplementitintoCanadianlaw.ThisisdonebeanActofParliament.o Theremaybeconfusionaboutwhetheratreatyhasbeenimplementedintodomesticlaw.o Courts are increasingly prepared to view even unimplemented international treaties as important
interpretiveaidsinunderstandingCanadianstatutes.o In Suresh v Canada – the courts established that they are now prepared to seek inspiration from
“Customary rules of international law are directly incorporated into Canadian domestic law unless explicitlyoustedbycontrarylegislation.Sofaraspossible,domesticlegislationshouldbeinterpretedconsistentlywiththoseobligations”(BouzarivIran).
BhadauriavBoardofGovernorsofSenecaCollegeofAppliedArtsandTechnology ‐TheCourtofAppeal,recognizedthat the legislative enactmenthadnot specifically responded to theCL rule.As such, they extended the common law toincludeatortofdiscrimination,basedonpublicpolicyderivedfromthecode.
BhadauriavBoardofGovernorsofSenecaCollegeofAppliedArtsandTechnologyTheSCCheldthatadvancementofthe CLwas foreclosed by the legislative initiativewhich overtook the existing CL inOntario and established a differentregime.The code foreclosesany civil actionbaseddirectlyuponabreach thereof, and it alsoexcludesany common lawactionbasedonan invocationof thepublicpolicyexpressed in theCode.TheCode itselfhas laidout theprocedures forvindicationofthatpublicpolicy,procedureswhichtheplaintiffdidnotseefittouse.
Charter,inamannerthatisnotjustifiedunders.1.• Held:definitionofmarriage is foundatCL.CL issubject toCharter scrutinywheregovernmentactionor inaction is
OtherCasesStHilairevCanada(AttorneyGeneral)• Facts:Ms.St‐Hilairepleadedguilty toa reducedchargeofmanslaughter for themurderofherhusband,whowasa
memberof thePublic ServicesofCanadaanda contributor to the superannuationplan. She claimed theallowancesprescribedintheSuperannuationActasheirofherhusband’ssuccessionandassurvivingspouse.TheTreasuryBoardrefusedherclaimonthebasisofthepublicpolicyrulethatnoonemayprofitfromhisowncrime.
• Issue:TheFederal Court ofAppeal had todetermine the suppletive lawapplicable to the case andwhetherMs. St‐Hilairewas entitled to the benefits of the Superannuation Act. Namely,whether the federal statute in question, theSuperannuationAct,permitsrecoursetothecivillawofQuebectoprovideforitsapplicationtoadisputefromQuebec,orwhetherthecommonlawrulescompletetheActassuppletive law.Theyhadtodeterminetheplaceofprovincialprivatelawintheapplicationoffederallegislation.
• Reasoning:TheConstitutionofCanadaprovidesthat“afederal lawthatresortstoanexternalsourceofprivate lawwill not necessarily apply uniformly throughout the country”. Therefore, it is wrong to associate systematically allfederal legislation with common law.Where a federal enactment is silent concerning the applicable private law, aQuebec litigant “is entitled toexpect thathis civil rightswillbedefinedby theQuebec civil law, even if theadversepartyisthefederalgovernment”.Therightsatissueinthiscasewereofaprivatenature.Thesourceoftheruleisnotfoundinthepubliccharacterofthefederalgovernment.Whentheaffectedpersonsarelitigantandtheircivilrightsareindispute,andhavenotbeendefinedbyParliament,itistheprivatelawoftheprovincethatfillsthevoid(ie.civillaw).Thisissueofeligibilityisoneofcivilrights,andtheapplicableruleisaruleofprivatelaw.
• Outcome:ResortmustbehadtothecivillawofQuebec,andnotthecommonlaw,inordertoapplythefederalstatuteinQuebec, todeterminewhethershewasentitled to thebenefitsprovidedby theSuperannuationAct.Ms.St‐Hilairemadeanattemptonthelifeofthedeceased;sheisunworthyofinheritingundertheCivilCodeandwasnotentitledtoanyofthebenefitsandallowancesprovidedbytheSuperannuationAct.
Re:ResolutiontoamendtheConstitution(PatriationReference)• Facts:TheFed’swanted tobring in amending formula to the constitution (abolitionof theWestminsterParliament
authority over legislation in Canada – referred to as the ‘patriation’ of the Canadian Constitution). Thus, formally
• Issue: Is the agreement of provinces constitutionally (legally) required to amend the constitution? Is there aconstitutional convention that the government of Canada will not seek to amend the constitution without theagreementoftheprovinceswhereitimpactsonprovincialpowers?
• Reasoning: Issue 1 {Majority}Conventions cannot crystallize into law. Provincial consent is not legally required.{Dissent} Relied on ‘federalism’ principle and precedent to support the view that ‘in law’ provincial approval wasrequired.ArguedthatthefederalgovernmentisdoingindirectlywhatitcannotdodirectlybyhavingtheUKamendtheconstitutionwithoutprovincialsupport(Note:TheessenceofFederalismisagreementofprovinces.Can’tdowhatyouwantunilaterally).Issue2–{Majority}Thereisaconventionthatsaystheremustbesubstantialdegreeofprovincialconsentbeforeamending.Constitutionalconventionsarenotenforceablebythecourts.{Minority}Noconventionhasdeveloped.Nostronghistoryofconventiondeveloping.
• Outcome:The SCC affirmed the existence of an unwritten dimension to the Constitution. TheMajority held that aconstitutional convention exists, and amendments to the Constitution require a substantial degree of provincialconsent. However, provincial consent is not legally required for the federal government seeking a constitutionalamendmentwithoutanyprovincialconsent.Thus,conventionshavepoliticalramifications,butnotlegal.
birth to 4 children in Canada. Government ordered her deportation. She brought an application for permanentresidence under the Immigration Act. The immigration officer rejected her application without reasons. Bakerrequested and obtained the immigration officer’s notes. Based on these notes she applied for judicial review of thedecision.
• ShouldtheMinisterfollowthevaluesinaninternationalconvention?• Reasoning: {Majority} International treaties and conventions are not part of Canadian law unless they have been
implemented by statute (Francis v TheQueen). The values reflected in international human rights lawmay aid ininterpretingdomestic law, informthecontextualapproach to judicial review,and influence the interpretationof thescopeoftherightsinCharter(SlaightCommunicationsvKeegstra).
o {Dissent – Iacobucci J} Reference should not be made to the underlying values of an unimplementedinternational treaty in the course of the contextual approach to statutory interpretation and administrativelaw,becausesuchanapproachisnotinaccordancewiththeCourt’sjurisprudenceofinternationallawwithinthedomestic legalsystem.“Theresultwillbe that theappellant isable toachieve indirectlywhatcannotbeachieveddirectly,namely,togiveforceandeffectwithinthedomesticlegalsystemtointernationalobligationsundertakenbytheexecutivealonethathaveyettobesubjecttothedemocraticwillofParliament”.
• Outcome:TheSCCheldthatinthecircumstancesitwouldbeunfairfortheMinisternottoprovidewrittenreasonsforrefusing an applicationwith such significance to an individual. Therewas a reasonable apprehension of bias in theimmigrationofficer’snotes.
DeGuzmanvCanada(MinisterofCitizenandImmigration)
• Facts:DeGuzmanwassponsoredbyhermotherasanunmarrieddaughtertobecomeapermanentresidentofCanada.Whenshelanded,shemisrepresentedherselfasasinglewithnodependants.Sheinfacthadtwosonswhomsheleftwith their father (her husband). She tried to sponsor her sons, andher applicationwas refused. She argued that aperson removed for misrepresentation was only admissible for 2 years, which made it unreasonable to hold thatParliamentimplicitlymadealifetimebanonsponsorshipforthesameconduct.
person (by preventing reunification of parent and child) other than in accordance with the principles offundamentaljustice?
o Iss.117(9)(d)invalidbecauseitrenderstheIRPAnon‐compliantwith“internationalhumanrightsinstrumentstowhichCanadaissignatory?
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• Reasoning: The “construe and apply” provision in s.3(3)(f) does not give priority over the IRPA to “internationalhuman rights instruments”, as they have not been specifically identified in the IRPA, nor subject to parliamentaryscrutiny, andmay not have existedwhen the IRPAwas enacted. There is an expanding role of the common law toincorporateinternationallawintheinterpretationofdomesticlaw.ThissectiondirectsthatIRPAmustbeconstruedandappliedinamannerthatcompliedwithinternationalhumanrightsinstrumentstowhichCanadaisasignatory.AlegallybindinginternationalhumanrightsinstrumenttowhichCanadaisasignatoryisdeterminativeofhowtheIRPAmustbeinterpretedandapplied,intheabsenceofacontrarylegislativeintention.
• HELD: Non‐binding international human rights instruments are intended to be used as persuasive and contextualfactors in the interpretation and application of the IRPA, and not as determinative. The appeal was dismissed.S.117(9)(d)remainsoperativeandisconstitutionalanddoesnotviolates.7oftheCharter.
o Canadasignifiesoneof fewcountrieswhereEnglishCLandFrenchCivilLawcoexistwithinasinglecountryorganizedalongfederallines
o CommonLaw– the rulesof interpretation, thehierarchyof its sourcesand its inductive reasoningseparatethisfromcivillaw
Inductive process – consists of generalizing from common points between distinct cases and thenestablishinglegalcategorieswithvaguefoundationsandflexiblelimits
Ratiodecidendi–istheratioisascertained,thenappliedbywayofanalogyo CivilLawTradition – this systemdisplays theprimacyofwritten laws,hereemphasis ison thewrittenor
codifiedlawwhichistheprimarysourceoflaw(thus,notjudgemadelaw) Deductive approach – proceed from abstract (general) concepts to specific decision, judges reach
o Strong emphasis on bilingualism within the legal system because of differences in translation andinterpretation
o Policy on legislative bijuralism formally recognizes that when reading federal statutes and regulations, thereader, regardlessofhisorher languageor legal system,mustbeable to find the terminologyandwordingthat are respectful of the concepts and institutions proper to the legal system in effect in the relevantjurisdiction
provincial legislatures, according to a division of law‐making powers or jurisdictions set out in theConstitution.
o Statutoryauthority–theexecutivebranchofthestatederivesallitsauthoritytoactfromstatutorygrantsofpower fromthe legislativebranch, saveandexcept forcertainpowersderived from“royalprerogative”andconstitutionalconvention.
o Judicial Independence – the judicial branch of the state must have a sufficient degree of institutionalindependence from the legislativeandexecutivebranchesof the state inorder toperform its constitutionallawfunctions.
o Theconstitutionservesasa“lawtomakelaw”–thegroundrulesforlawmakingandgovernance. Secession Reference – The rule of law is broader than constitutionalism, and is a necessary prerequisite. “The
constitutionalism principle requires that all government action comply with the Constitution. The rule of lawprinciplerequiresthatallgovernmentactionmustcomplywiththelaw,includingtheconstitution”.
o Facts–A pre‐Charter case. The director of the province’s liquor commission, acting under the expressdirectionofPremierMauriceDuplessis, revoked the licenceof aMontreal restaurateurwhohadpostedbailforseveralhundredJehovah’sWitnesses,agroupthatattractedtheparticularanimusofthepremier.Thedirectorpurportedtobeactingunderthecommission’sunqualifiedstatutorypowertocancelpermits“atitsdiscretion”.
o Reasoning – theCourt rejected the idea that any statute coulddelegate suchuntrammelledpower toagovernmentofficial,orthatthepremiercouldmanipulatehisownpowerstopursueapersonalvendetta.“Goodfaith”meanscarryingoutthestatuteaccordingtoitsintentandforitspurpose.
o Held–Statutorypowersmustbelimitedtotheexpressorimpliedpurposesforwhichtheyweregranted,aprincipleenforceablebythejudiciary.
o 1867 – principal achievement was federalism – the division of legislative powers between a nationalParliamentandthelegislaturesoftheprovinces(sections91and92).
o 1982 – principal achievement was the Charter – individual and minority rights; definition of theConstitutionanditslegalstatus(section51(1)and(2)).
SecessionReference[1998]–TheSCCconfirmedthattheConstitutionalsocontains“unwritten”principles.TheunwrittenprinciplesareimportanttounderstandthelegalconstraintsunderwhichpublicpowerisexercisedbytheCanadianstate.TheCourtstatesthattheprinciplesmaybehelpfultoaproperinterpretationofthetext.Theydescribe the unwritten principles as having the force of law and imposing substantive limits on the power ofgovernment.
o “In order to endure over time, a constitutionmust contain a comprehensive set of rules and principleswhicharecapableofprovidinganexhaustivelegalframeworkforoursystemofgovernment”.
o ‘The organizing principles of the Constitution are not defined in isolation from the others and no oneprincipletrumpsorexcludestheoperationofanother’.
o “Theprinciplesassist in the interpretationof the text and thedelineationof spheresof jurisdiction, thescopeorrightsandobligations,andtheroleofourpoliticalinstitutions”.
o Constitutionasa“livingtree”–theprinciplesandconstitutionevolve.o Principlesfillthegapsintheexpresstermsoftheconstitutionaltext(substantiverole)–theprinciplesdo
BCvImperialTobaccoCanadaLtd.[2005] Facts–TheBC legislature enacted legislation creating civil cause of action against tobaccomanufacturerswith
respect to health care costs for tobacco related illnesses resulting frommisconduct of the manufacturers. Thegovernment commence legal action, pursuant to the legislation. The defendant companies challenged theconstitutionalityofthelegislation–arguedthatthelegislationbreachedtheunwrittenconstitutionalprinciplesofjudicialindependenceandtheruleoflaw.
Issue–IstheActconstitutionallyinvalid,inwholeorinpart,asoffendingtheruleoflaw? Reasoning – Unwritten constitutional principles, including the rule of law, are capable of limiting government
actions.Thewrittenconstitutionhasprimacy.Thus,theunwrittenprinciplesoftheruleoflawcannotbetakenasaninvitationtodispensewiththewrittentextoftheconstitution.Otherconstitutionalprinciples(democracyandconstitutionalism) favour upholding the validity of legislation that conforms to the express terms of theConstitution.Theruleof lawrequiresthatcourtsgiveeffect totheConstitution’s text,andapply, legislationthatconformstothattext.
Reasoning – The main purpose of constitutional conventions is to ensure that the legal framework of theconstitutionwillbeoperated inaccordancewith theprevailing constitutionalvaluesorprinciplesof theperiod.Constitutional conventionsarebasedonprecedent and custom, and thusareusuallyunwritten.ThenatureandeffectoftheConstitution,includethefollowing:
o (1)Conventionscomeintoexistenceonthebasisof3factors: apracticeoragreementdevelopedbypoliticalactors arecognitionbypoliticalactorsthattheyareboundtofollowconventions theexistenceofanormativereason(purpose)fortheconvention.
o (2)Conventionsarenotlaw,andassuchcannotbeenforcedbythecourts.Theyarenotjudge‐maderules.Theyacquireandretain theirbinding forcebyagreementandultimately in therealmofpolitics.Courtsmayrecognizeaconvention.
Held – A majority of the court agreed that a unilateral amendment of the Constitution would breach aConstitutional convention. Themajority located a normative reason for a convention of “substantial provincialagreement”inthefederalnatureofCanadiandemocracy.
o (1)Theruleoflawprovidesthatthelawissupremeoveractsofbothgovernmentandprivatepersons–onelawforall.
o (2) The rule of law requires the creation and maintenance of an actual order of positive laws whichpreserveandembodiesthemoregeneralprincipleofnormativeorder.
o (3)Theexerciseofallpublicpowermustfinditssourceinalegalrule. Theconstitutionalismprinciplerequiresthatallgovernmentactioncomplywiththeconstitution.Theruleoflaw
o (1)Aconstitutionmayprovideanaddedsafeguardforfundamentalhumanrightsandindividualfreedomswhichmightotherwisebesusceptibletogovernmentinterference.
o (2)Aconstitutionmayseektoensurethatvulnerableminoritygroupsareendowedwiththeinstitutionsand rights necessary tomaintain and promote their identities against the assimilative pressures of themajority.
o (3) A constitutionmay provide for a division of political power that allocates political power amongstdifferentlevelsofgovernment.
Byrequiringbroadsupportintheformofanenhancedmajoritytoachieveconstitutionalchange,theConstitutionensures that minority interests must be addressed before proposed changes which may affect them may beenacted.
o (1) Hierarchy of Law – Distinction between constitutional and non‐constitutional (ordinary) law.OrdinarylawhasahierarchybetweenstatuteandCL.ThedoctrineofparliamentarysupremacystandsforthepropositionthataruleofCLcanbeoverriddenoramendedbyexpressstatementofthelegislatureinstatute.StatutesarebindingsolongastheyarenotinconsistentwiththeConstitution.
o (2) Adjudication – To effect constitutional supremacy, adjudication is required for inconsistenciesbetweentheConstitutionandordinarylaw.ThejudiciaryinterpretsandappliestheConstitution.
o (3)CounterMajoritarianism–Legislaturesexpressmajoritypreference. Ina systemof constitutionalsupremacy, the power to interpret and enforce the Constitution against majority preferences must bepresent.
o (4)AmendmentbySuperMajority–Constitutionalsupremacyrequiresamendmentoftheconstitutiontoinvolvea“super‐majority”whichbringsinmoreorotherelementsofsocietythatcomprisealegislativemajority.
o (1)Humanrightsandanti‐discriminationlawsareimportanttoindividualrightsinCanadiansocietyandcloselyrelatedtoothercivillibertiesprotectedintheConstitution
o (2)Duetotheirsignificance,humanrightsstatutesdeserveabroadandliberalinterpretationandcanbeusedtointerpretprovisionsinotherlegislation.
VriendvAlberta–VemployeeinChristiancollege.Losthisjobwhenadmittedhewasgay.HecouldnotfilehumanrightscomplaintinAlbertab/c“sexualorientation”wasnotagroundprotectedfromdiscrimination.ItwasclearthatAlbertahadmadeaconsciouspolicydecisiontoleaveitoutofhumanrightslegislation.TheSCCfoundthatthelegislation violated s.15(1) Charter. The Court read in to the list of grounds protected from employmentdiscriminationthephrase“sexualorientation”sotheAlbertastatutecompliedwiththeConstitution.
SeparationofPowers The separation of powers doctrine refers to the division of governmental functions between the legislature,
executiveandjudicialbranchesofthestate. Each branch is defined by its relationship to law – the making of law (legislature), the implementing of law
o (1)Afunctionalpurposeofidentifyingtheinstitutionalhomesofeachofthethreemajorformsofpublicpower,
o (2)Anormativepurposeofprovidinggeneralboundariesfortheoperationofeachinstitution. Legislativedecision‐makingisprospective,broadinimpact,andopen‐endedinrangeofoutcomes. Judicialdecision‐makingisretrospective,localisedinimpact,andnarrowinoutcome. Executiveoradministrativedecision‐makingisinthemiddle.
LegislativePower The legislative branch of the state is divided between the federal legislature or Parliament, and the elected
legislaturesineachprovince. PowertomakelawsderivefromtheConstitution. Division–featureoffederalism. Canada’s federal and provincial legislatures are understood to be the sole sovereign holders of state authority,
subjecttodivisionsetoutinsection91and92. This is thedoctrine of exhaustion of state power – all the power to enact laws belongs to either the federal or
Section33Charter–overrideprovisionthatallowseitherParliamentorprovinciallegislaturestoenactlegislationin contravention of certain Charter rights if the legislation contains an explicit declaration (“notwithstandingclause”).
Facts – the government of Canada sought to rely on a statutory right of non‐disclosure of Cabinet documents,despite thedocumentshavingalreadybeendisclosed in thecourseof litigation.Theapplicantssought to invokeunwrittenprinciplessuchastheruleoflawtosupportanargumentthatdisclosureshouldberequireddespitetheclearstatutorystatementtothecontrary.
Issue – What is the nature of Cabinet confidentiality and the processes by which it may be claimed andrelinquished?
Reasoning – Cabinet confidentiality is essential to good government. Unwritten constitutional principles arecapable of limiting government action. The unwritten principles must be balanced against the principle ofParliamentary sovereignty. Federal Crown privilege is part of valid federal law over which Parliament has thepowertolegislate.
SecessionReference–The SCC stated that the recognition of provincial legislatureswith extensive area of jurisdiction,principallyoverallprivate legalrelationshipsundertherubricof“propertyandcivilrightswithintheprovince”wasthesine qua non of Confederation for the leader and people of Quebec and the maritime provinces. The court recognized‘federalism’ as an unwritten principle of the Canadian Constitution, describing it as the means of recognizing regionalculturaldiversityatthefoundingofCanada,particularlywithrespecttothedistinctnatureofQuebecasapredominatelyFrench‐speakingsociety.
Crowncorporations.Alsoincludesstatutorilycreatedbodiescreatedtocarryoutgovernmentfunctions. In law, the executive branch is subordinate to the legislature. Two important features of the legislative and
o (2)Byconstitutionalconvention,theexecutiveisresponsibletothelegislature.
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JudicialIndependence Sections96to101oftheConstitutionAct1867containsprovisionsonthejudicature. Section96–provides that the federal executive shall appoint the justicesof the country’s superior, county, and
Section101–Parliament isaccorded theauthority tocreatecourts for the “betteradministrationof the lawsofCanada”–understoodtomeanlawspassedbyParliament.
o Withthispower,theFederalCourtsActwaspassed.o FederalCourt’splayarolesimilartothatofprovincialsuperiorcourts.
o Judicial independence is “essential to the achievement and proper functioning of a free, just anddemocraticsocietybasedontheprinciplesofconstitutionalismandtheruleoflaw(MackinvNB).
Issue:TheywenttotheSupremeCourtandaskedthreequestions:o (1)UndertheConstitutionofCanada,couldQuebecseparateunilaterally?o (2) Under international law, is there any precedent existing as to whether they could unilaterally
separate?o (3) In the event of a conflict between domestic and international law, to effect secession from Canada
unilaterally,whichwouldtakeprecedenceinCanada? Reasoning:Theevolutionof theCanadian constitutional arrangementshasbeen characterizedby adherence to
the rule of law, respect for the democratic institutions, the accommodation of minorities, insistence thatgovernments adhere to constitutional conduct and a desire for continuity and stability. There are fourimplicit/unwrittenconstitutionalprinciples:
o (1) Federalism – Political power is shared between two levels of government (Federal/Provincial).Mutuallyinterdependent.Federalismprotectsminorityculture(ie.Quebec)byallowingprovincestohavepoweroverlocalmatters(s.92(16)).
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o (2) Democracy – political system of majority rule. Each of the provincial legislatures and the federalParliament are elected by popular franchise. Democracy means the process of representative andresponsible government and the right of citizens toparticipate in thepolitical process as voters and ascandidates.
o (3)Constitutionalismandtheruleoflaw–RuleofLaw:(1)Onelawforall(lawissupremeovertheactsof both government and private persons). (2) Requires creation andmaintenance of an actual order ofpositive laws which preserves and embodies the more general principle of normative order. (3)Relationship by state and individuals regulated by law (the exercise of all public power must find itsultimatesourceinalegalrule).Theessenceoftheconstitutionalismprincipleisembodiedinsection52(1)ConstitutionAct – “theconstitution is thesupreme lawofCanada,any lawthat is inconsistentwith theprovisionsoftheConstitutionis,totheextentoftheinconsistency,ofnoforceoreffect”.AllgovernmentactionmustcomplywiththeConstitution.Createsanorderlyframeworkwithinwhichpoliticaldecisionsaremade;constitutionalismandtheruleoflawdonotunderminethedemocraticprinciplebutratherareessentialtoit.
o (4)Respectforminorities–Thereareanumberofspecificconstitutionalprovisionsprotectingminoritylanguage,religionandeducation.Theyreflectabroaderprincipleofprotectionofminorities.
“Thepreamble invites the courts to turn to theseprinciples into thepremisesof a constitutional argument thatculminatesinthefillingofgapsintheexpresstermsoftheconstitutionaltext”.Theconstitutionalprinciple’shave“fulllegalforce”andarebindinguponbothcourtsandgovernments.
Outcome:TheSCCsaid“no”Quebeccannotunilaterallyseparate.SecessionrequiresaConstitutionalamendment,whichrequiresnegotiation.Areferendum,whilenotlegallybinding,shouldbeconsideredalegitimateindicationof the need for constitutional discussions among all provinces. However, if there was a clear majority in thereferendumonaclearlyphrasedquestion,CanadacannotdenyQuebecsuccession.TheSCCheldthatQuebeccouldnot seceed under international law. But felt that existing international body of law recognized the right of self‐determinationwhichbelongstoallpeoples,butsinceQuebecoiswerepartofColonialEmpireandweren’tsubjectto alien domination or exploitation, and had ability to participate in government, they weren’t subjugated byCanadasodon’thaveinternationalrighttosecedeunilaterally.
thebasisthathehadawell‐foundfearofprosecutioninhishomecountry.HewasdeniedstatusbytheMinisterofEmployment and Immigration on the advice of the Refugee Status Advisory Committee. S challenged theadjudication procedures under the Immigration Act on the basis that it violated section 7 of the Charter andviolated section 2(e) of theBill of Rights. The government claimed that since they had no status within thecountry they were not subject to the charter. When S applied to the Immigration Appeal Board for aredetermination,Swasnotgivenanoralhearing,astheBoarddeterminedonthebasisofthematerialsubmittedthatSwouldnotbeabletoestablishhisclaimsatahearing.Thestatutoryprocesswasfollowed.
Issue:Didtheprocessviolates.7oftheCharterors.2(e)oftheBillofRights? Reasoning: Ina three to threedecision, theCourt found thatSwasprotectedby theCharter and theirhishad
beenviolated. JusticeWilsonwrote thedecisionbasedonsection7 right to securityofpersonand fundamentaljustice.Shealsofoundthegovernment’sclaimthatgivinghearingtorefugeeswouldbeburdensomewastoomuchofanadministrativeconcerntojustifyinfringingaCharterright.ThesecondhalfoftheCourtalsofoundinfavourofS,but throughsection2(e)of theBillofRights. JusticeBeetz,noted that section26of theCharter states thatrightsoutsidetheCharterarenotinvalid,andhencetheBillofRightsstillhasaroletoplayinCanadianlaw.Hefoundthat in thiscase, refugeeshadbeendeniedhearings,and thus theirsection2(e)right to fairhearingsandfundamentaljusticewereinfringed.
o Parliamentary Sovereignty – The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada (s.52(1)Constitution). Once it is admitted that the Parliament and the provincial legislatures have the power tolegislate, it necessarily follows that they canmake theprivilege absolute. If it is said it cannotbemadeabsolute, this would be a denial of parliamentary supremacy, and would deny Parliament and thelegislaturestheirsovereignpowertolegislateintheirrespectivefieldsofjurisdiction.
o Separation of Powers The Canadian constitution does not insist on a strict separation of powers.Parliamentandtheprovinciallegislaturesmayproperlyconferotherlegalfunctionsonthecourtsandmayconfercertain judicial functionsonbodiesthatarenotcourts. Theexceptiontothisrulerelatesonlytosection96courts.Thusthecourtsmaytakeonanadvisoryroledespiteittraditionallybeingaroleoftheexecutive.
o RuleofLaw–Theruleoflawisnottheequivalentofaguaranteeoftheparamountcyofthecommonlaw.In fact the “actual order of positive laws” in our system makes valid legislation paramount over the
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common law. The rule of law cannot be taken to invalidate a statute which has the effect of allowingrepresentativesoftheCrowntoidentifycertaindocumentsasbeyonddisclosure.
o Independence of the Judiciary – Section 39 Evidence Act in no way interferes with the security oftenure,thefinancialsecurity,ortheadministrativeindependenceofjudges.Section39isjustanotherformofaprivativeclause,andlegislatedprivativeclausescanprecludecourtsfromreviewingfindingsoffactbyatribunalwheresuchfactfindingisdonewithinitsjurisdiction.Thecourtsaresimplybarredbysection39 fromreviewing thedocumentsand thus theambitofCabinetsecrecy.This isapermissibleprivativeclause unless there is an Auditor General’s case, arrived at the constitutional doctrine based on the“fundamental,unwrittenprinciplesof theCanadianConstitution”, thata judicialdecisionmayalwaysbesubstitutedforagovernmentaldecisioninthenameofjudicialindependence.
Facts: The reference was the amalgamation of three different sets of challenges to the impartiality andindependence of provincial court judges inManitoba, PEI, and Alberta. Each of the provinces had in somewayimposed a salary reduction on provincial court judges. The powers of the provincial legislatures to reduce thesalariesof theprovincialcourt judgeswaschallengedasaviolationofsection11(d)Charter–accusedhas theright tobepresumed innocentuntilprovenguilty “ina fairandpublichearingbyan independentand impartialtribunal”.
o InPEI,andManitoba,thesalariesofjudgeswereloweredalongwiththoseofothercivilservantstohelpcombat deficits. In PEI, various challenges to the judges’ consequent independencewere raised by thedefendants, causing the government to bring two reference questions to its Supreme Court. Only onereferenceresultedinafindingofdependence,namelyforlackofadequatesecuritytenure.
o InManitoba,thepaycutwaschallengeddirectlybyaprovincialjudgesassociation.o In Alberta, cuts to judicial salaries were challenged by defendants. Three accused had challenged the
constitutionality of their trials beforeprovincial court judgeswhowere subject toprovincial legislationreducingthesalariesofprovincialcourtjudges.
Issue:Independenceofprovincialcourtjudgeswithinthecontextoftheirfinancialsecurity. Reasoning:TheCourt looked to constitutionalnormsand found that judicial independencewasonesuchnorm
impliedbythepreambletotheConstitution.Thepreamblerevealsthe“basicprincipleswhicharetheverysourceofthesubstantiveprovisionsoftheConstitutionAct1867”andit“invitestheuseofthoseorganizingprinciplestofill out gaps in the express terms of the constitutional scheme”. Three fundamental requirements of judicialindependence:
o (1)Financialsecurityo (2)Securityoftenureo (3)Institutionalindependence–asacourtasawhole.Institutionalindependenceisneededsothatcourts
executive and legislatures. This separates negotiation between the government and judges over salaries. Thisremovesanability for thegovernment tomanipulate judges tomakedecisions in certainways.Civil law judgeshavearighttosalarycommissionbywayofpreamble,astheyhavenorightsundersection11(d).
Judicial independence “flows as a consequence of the separation of powers, because these appeals concern theproper constitutional relationship among the three branches of government in the context of judicialremuneration”.Thedoctrineofseparationofpowerscomesfromthepreambletotheconstitution.
Outcome: TheMajority allowed the appeals in part, stating that therewas constitutional protection of judicialindependenceandimpartialityforalljudges.TheMajorityfoundalljudgesareindependent,notjustsuperiorcourtjudges and inferior court judges concernedwith criminal law, as thewritten constitution stipulates. Unwrittenconstitutional principles were relied upon to demonstrate this, indicating such principles were growing inimportance inconstitutional interpretation.All judges inCanadaareprotectedby theConstitution.TheMajorityestablished that independent compensation commissions are required to help set salaries free of politicalmanipulation.Thejudicialsalaryreductionineachofthethreeprovincesinvolvedinthereferencewerefoundtobeunconstitutionalbecausetheyhadnotbeenprecededbyareportofjudicialcompensationcommission.
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4.BASICARCHEITECTUREOFTHECANADIANLEGALSYSTEMRelationshipbetweenbranchesofgovernment:judicialreview,constraintsonpowerofeachbranch.ExecutiveBranch –Structure,powers(ie.delegatedlegislation);introductiontonatureandroleofadministrativetribunals.LegislativeBranch –StructureandoperationofParliament; legislativeprocess; formationof statuteversus regulations; ethics and accountability.JudicialBranch–Canadiancourtsystem;appointmentofjudges;judicialindependence.
A) ConstituentPartsoftheParliamentofCanadaSection17ConstitutionAct1867–createsa“ParliamentofCanada”consistingof“theQueen,andUpperHousestyledtheSenate,andtheHouseofCommons”.
a. TheMonarchandGovernorGeneral TheMonarch(“Queen”)isCanada’sofficialhead. ManyoftheQueen’spowersareexercisedbythegovernorgeneral(s.10ConstitutionAct). The Canadian head of state isnot elected. Identity depends onbirth (formonarch) andappointment (governor
general).
O’DonohuevTheQueen–Therulesofsuccession,whichidentifythemonarch,andthusCanada’stitularheadofstate,arediscriminatory. The statute bars Catholics from assuming the Crown. However, they are necessary for the properfunctioningofourconstitutionalmonarchyandtheActisnotsubjecttoCharterscrutiny.Canadacannotunilaterallychangetherulesofsuccession.ItwouldbecontrarytothecommitmentintheStatuteofWestminster,andwouldbreaksymmetrysetoutintheConstitution.
Themonarchappointsthegovernorgeneral–apoliticaldecision. By Canadian constitutional convention, the Queen follows the Canadian Prime Minister’s recommendations in
b. Senate Canadahasanunelectedchamberofthefederallegislature. Section24Constitution–expresslyanticipatestheappointmentofsenatorsbythegovernorgeneral. Thegovernorgeneralfollowstheadviceoftheprimeminister–requiredbyconstitutionalconvention.
BrownvAlberta–PrimeMinisterChretiendeclinedtoappointBrown,aso‐calledsenator‐in‐waitingelected in1999.Bsued in Alberta, seeking a declaration that the senatorial appointment provisions of the 1867 Act were contrary todemocraticprinciplessetoutbytheSCCinSecessionReference.
SamsonvAGofCanada–SattemptedtogetaninterlocutoryinjunctiontorestraintheGGfromappointingtotheSenateaqualified person from the province of Alberta, unless that person had been elected pursuant to the provisions of theSenatorialSelectionAct.HELD:claimispoliticalnotlegalinnature.Asaresult,thereliefsoughtmayonlybeattainedinthepolitical arena bymeans of a constitutional amendment. Thus, application fails to establish a serious issue to be tried.Applicationdismissed.
c. HouseofCommons UnlikeSenators,membersoftheHOC’sareelected,anticipatedbys.37ConstitutionAct1867 RepresentationinHOCisbasedongeographicaldivisionsknownaselectoraldistricts–currently308MP’s “FirstPastthePost”–thecandidatewiththemostvoteswinsaseatinHOCandrepresentsthatridingasitsMP Eachpartymayonlyendorseonecandidateperriding,thosewithnopartyaffiliationaretermed‘independents’ Afterelection,partywithmostelectedrepsusuallybecomesgoverningparty,leaderofthispartybecomesPMand
FigueroavCanada –Until recently,CanadaElectionsAct requireda registeredparty to runcandidates inATLEAST50electoraldistricts.SCCstruckthisdownasitinfringesS.3oftheCharter
- Involved more restrictions than only the number of candidates, also stipulates requirements for issuing taxreceipts fordonationsreceivedoutsideelectionperiod, right to transferunspentelection fundsand to listpartyaffiliationonballotpapers
- Providesforeachcitizentoplayameaningfulroleintheelectoralprocess- Held: Parties that nominate candidates in fewer than 50 electoral districts do play a meaningful role in the
electoralprocess- WithholdingthisasperCEAundermineseachcitizensrightstomeaningfulparticipationintheelectoralprocess- Thus,50candidatethresholddoesinfringes.3oftheCharter- Cannot be saved by s.1 ‘government must demonstrate that the limitation is reasonable and demonstrably
• Implicit votes of confidence – involves granting a supply, failure to grant supply isregardedas theestablishedmeansbywhich theHouse candemonstrate its lackofconfidenceintheministry
• ***a singledefeat on a specific estimatewouldnot in itself constitute a voteofno‐confidence. In fact because of multiplicity of votes on all aspect of supply, largelyfallenintodisuse***
ii. Lostvotesonitemscentraltogovernmentpolicy–butnotmademattersofconfidencepriortothevote
iii. Votesonitemsnotattheheartofgovernmentpolicy–obviouslythemostnumerousduringanyparliament
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• Althoughalostvoteonasecondreadingofamajorbillmightfallwithinthesecondcategory mentioned above, a loss on one or more of the many divisions duringcommitteeandreportstageswouldusuallyfallwithinthisclass
B) TheSpeaker–Speakers for thetwohousesofParliament.TheCommonsspeaker isanMPelectedtoSpeaker’spositionbyotherMP’s.Themannerofselectionandmanyofhispowersaresetoutinthe‘standingorders’oftheHOC. Standing orders are internal procedural rules established by the commons pursuant to its parliamentary‘privileges’.ManydutyistomaintainorderindebateandtoapplyandinterpretthepracticesandtraditionsoftheHouse
C) ParliamentaryCommittees – subsets of parliament taskedwithmuchof thedetailedwork inparliament – ie:
HOC delegates most of the detailed study of proposed legislation and the scrutiny of government policy andprogramstoitscommittees
a. StandingCommittees–appointedforthelifeofparliamenttodealwithsubjectsofcontinuingconcerntothe house, mostly parallel government departments whose policy development, program admin andbudgetaryestimatestheyexamine
b. Legislative Committees – created on ad hoc basis to examine bills in detail andmay report on the bill,with/outamendmentstotheHouse
c. SpecialCommittees–sometimesreferredtoas ‘task‐force’,appointedonadhocbasisbyhousetostudyspecificmatters,establishedbymotions
d. Joint Committees – composed of members of both Senate and HOC, may be appointed under standingorderorbyspecialresolution
e. Subcommittees – Standing committees are free to delegate work to smaller groups, and may delegatesomeresponsibilitytosubcommittee
ParliamentaryProcedureA) Sources of Parliamentary Law – the rules determining parliamentary procedure comes from different sources:
• Issue:whetheritisopentotheCanadianHumanRightsTribunaltoinvestigateV’scomplaint• Canachauffeurbecoveredbyprivilegeeventhoughmayonlyplayasecondaryroleinparliament• Applicants failed to establish the privilege in the broad and all inclusive terms asserted, the respondents are
entitled to have the appeal disposed of according to the ordinary employment and human rights law thatparliamenthasenactedwrtemployeeswithinfederallegislativejurisdiction.
ThePowertoPassBadLawsBacon v Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corp. – Government passed laws of the land, which included laws relating tocontractualobligationsasbindingonthepublic(farmersinSaskatchewan)
• Caseinvolvespropertyandcivillawrightswithintheprovince(notCharterordivisionofpowers)• No basis to challenge the validity of the legislation which was used to impose the GRIP 92 contract and to
Turner v Canada – fundamental allegations iterated and reiterated throughout pleadings are that Parliament wastortiously misled to enact the retroactive amendment that the respondent was denied a fair hearing by surreptitiousproceduresadoptedbyParliament.Proceduralfairnessisnotrequiredinalegislativeprocess
o Whenpassing certain legislation, someParliamentarianswill be facedwith conflicts of interestwhere theirpersonaleconomicpositionsmaybebenefitedbycertainlegislationpassed
o Conflictscouldbereal,potential,apparentorinherento Policy:rulesmustnotbesostringentastodiscouragepersonsofabilityandexperiencefromenteringpublic
asdirectororofficerofacompany Outsideemployment:usegovernmentpositiontoaffectemploymentposition Lobbying: Government contracts and activities: towhat extent should Parliamentarians be allowed to ownor
investinbusiness’thathavegovernmentcontracts?
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Gifts and Honoraria: Should legislators be able to accept a free vacation, trips or other gifts fromacquaintances,businessorforeigngovernments?
InsideInformation: SpouseandDependentChildren:
o StatutoryandParliamentaryRules‐mostlyfoundin3statutes:CriminalCode,ParliamentofCanadaAct,andCanadaElectionsAct)
CCmakesitacriminaloffencetoacceptabribe,offencepunishableby14yearsinjailo PublicOfficeHoldersCode:mandates thatwhenyou takeofficeyouare toarrangepersonalaffairs soas to
o By referring a bill to committee before the principle had been adopted by the House, theHousegivesitselfmoreflexibilitytoreviewandfine‐tunethelegislation
o PrivateBillso abilldesignedtoexemptanindividualorgroupofindividualsfromtheapplicationofthelawisaprivatebillo subjecttospecialrulesinboththeHousesofParliament,mostPB’soriginateinthesenatewherethefeesand
o Ministerialresponsibility–requirespresidingministerbeheldpoliticallyaccountableforallmattersarisingwithindepartmentincludingpolicydecisionsofcivilservants
o Politicalneutrality–requirescivilservantscarryouttheirresponsibilitiesloyallytothegovernmentonpowerwithoutregardforcivilservantsownpoliticalviews
o Publicserviceanonymity–bureaucratsshouldbeheldaccountabletotheiroverseers,butarenotanswerabletoparliament
o Thusindependenceincludesboth(i)arequirementofactualindependence;and(ii)conditionssufficienttogiverisetoareasonableperceptionofindependenceonthepartofareasonableandwell‐informedperson
o 3CoreCharacteristics:securityoftenure,financialsecurity,andadministrativeindependenceo 2Dimensions:individualjudge/institutionalorcollective
o Determinetheexactnatureandscopeoftheconstitutionallimits,byinterpretingthewrittenconstitutionanddiscerningunwrittenconstitutionalprinciplesbywhichthelegislaturemustabide
o Decidewhetheragivenstatutehasexceededtheconstitutionallimitsdeterminedthroughinterpretation
o Ifithastheyprovidearemedy–normallythatoffendinglegislationisinvalidandhasnoforceoreffect
o Thus,althoughdecisionsofFederalCourtarereviewablebycourtsundertheCharter,andthegovernmentbearsnodutytoactinaccordancewiththeCharter’sdictates,nodutyisimposedongovernmentbys.7oftheChartertorefrainfrompermittingthetestingofthecruisemissile
o Reason:arguedthatdecisiontotestcruisemissilewillleadtoanincreasedthreatofnuclearwar–government’sactionsimplycouldnotbeproventocausetheallegedviolationofs.7‐thusnodutycanarise
o trialjudgeorderedthegovernmentofNovaScotiatouseits‘bestefforts’tobuildaFrenchlanguageschoolorschoolstocomplywithitsdutiesundertheminoritylanguagerightsprovisionins.23oftheCharter
o Judgeaddedtohisorderarequirementthatgovernmentprovidehimwithperiodicreportsonitsprogressinthisregard
o Five‐judgemajorityconcludedthatthisremedycamewithininasuperiorcourt’sauthorityunders.24
o Minorityarguedthatsuchaninjunctionusurpedtheroleoftheexecutivebyplacingthejudiciaryinthepositionofdirectingtheimplementationoflawandgovernmentpolicy
o S.24(1)oftheCharterrequiresthatcourtsissueeffective,responsiveremediesthatguaranteefullandmeaningfulprotectionofCharterrightsandfreedoms
o Asuperiorcourtmaycraftanyremedythatitconsidersappropriateandjustinthecircumstances
o Reviewingcourtsshouldonlyinterferewherethetrialjudgehascommittedanerroroflaworprinciple
o Issue:isallcurrentlegislationinManitobaofnoforceoreffectbecauseofs.23ofManitobaAct?o ConstitutionrequirestemporaryvalidityandforceandeffecttobegiventothecurrentActsof
o BecausetribunalsallegedlackofindependenceorimpartialitywereembeddedinCanadianHumanRightsAct,itwasnecessaryforappellanttouseaconstitutionalorquasi‐constitutionalargumenttoattacklegislationratherthansimplyadvanceanargumentthatadjudicationbytribunalwouldnotsatisfytheCLrequirementsofproceduralfairness
o Overlapb/wCLandconstitutionalprinciplesofindependenceandimpartiality,court’srulingisultimatelybasedonconclusionthatschemeestablishedbyActisnotunfairtotheappellant
o Notecourtsreluctancetoextendconstitutionalprincipleofjudicialindependenceintoabroaderprincipleofadjudicativeindependencethatwouldembraceadministrativetribunalsaswellascourts
o Held:Bell’sargumentiswithoutmerit,neitheroftwopowerschallengedbyBellcompromisestheproceduralfairnessoftheTribunal,nordoeseitherpowercontraveneanyapplicablequasi‐constitutionalorconstitutionalprinciple–Dismissappealandhavecomplainantsappearbeforetribunal
o BellclaimsthatthetribunalshouldoperateasperCLproceduralfairness,butbecauseindependenttribunal,notheldtosamestandard
o AlsoclaimthatParliamenthasplacedthepowertoformulateguidelines,investigatecomplaintsandactasprosecutorallinonebody–notunusualforatribunaltosharethesefunctions;thus,onitsfacedoesnotgiverisetoareasonableapprehensionofbias
o Ifemploymenthadfallenwithprovincialsphere,asschoolcontended,thentheCanadianHumanRightsActwouldnotapplyandtheCanadianHumanRightsTribunalwouldhavenojurisdictiontoadjudicatethecomplaint
o FederalorProvinciallawtogovern?A:Federal(Federalismdispute)o Council’semployee’sherearesodirectlyinvolvedinactivitiesrelatingtoIndianstatus,rightsand
o Thus,bythetraditionalandfunctionaltest,factsinthiscaseindicatethatthenatureofoperationsofQu’ApelleIndianResidentialSchoolisprimarilyfederalandsubjecttothefederallegislationregardinglabourrelationsandconsequentlytheCanadaHumanRightsTribunalhasjurisdictiontohearthecomplaintagainsttheplaintiff
o Therelationshipbetweensubstantiverightsandthejustificationoflimitsonthoserightsunders.1oftheCharter
o Thelanguageemployedins.13(1)extendsonlytothatexpressiongivingrisetotheevilsoughttobeeradicatedandprovidesastandardofconductsufficientlyprecisetopreventtheunacceptablechillingofexpressiveactivity
theviolationofs.35(1)(thecourtbasicallycreateda“miniCharter”here):o In answer to subissue 1: “Existing” was something that was in place in April of 1982. Therefore, it
o In answer to subissue 2: The court looked at what the band had been doing for a long time andrecognized that salmon isan importantpartof subsistenceandhelda ceremoniesplace.Thecourtalsoheldthatthebandreliedonthisrightfromwhenthebandwascreated(i.e.continuous).TheFisheriesActdoesnotextinguishtheright.“Arightcontrolisnotarightremoved.”It’snecessarytointerprettherightsin favour of Aboriginals. The right will not be seen to have been extinguished unless the Crown wasexplicitaboutextinguishingthisright.BUT,thecourtdidnotgetintothecommercialuseoffish.
o Inanswertosubissue3:YoushouldinterpretinfavouroftheAboriginalsandrecognizethatafiduciarydutyexists.S.35(1)isaconstitutionallyprotectedright,butthereisalsothepossibilityofgovernmentstojustifytheinfringement.
o The fed government must prove a valid legislative objective for infringement (e.g. safety legislation,conservation legislation, and other purposes that are substantial and compelling) and that they’verespected the Crown’s fiduciary obligations (i.e. 1) proving that it has infringed the right as little aspossible in order to obtain the legislative objective; giving priority to the Aboriginals over otherswithrespecttotheresource,2)maymeanpayingcompensation,and3)consultationwiththeAboriginalpeoplearoundtheinfringement‐*HASBECOMEVERYIMPORTANT)
Outcome:The court accepted that fishingwas anAboriginal right. The appealwas dismissed and set aside theconviction. Order for a new trial on the question of infringement andwhether any infringement is nonethelessconsistentwiths.35(1),inaccordancewiththeinterpretationsetouthere.
RvVanderPeet(TestArticulated:IntegraltoaDistinctiveCultureTest) Facts:Aboriginalwomanwascaughtandchargedwithcatchingandtrying tosellcommercially10 fish illegally.
SheclaimedthatshehadanAboriginalright tosell the fish.Thiscase isdif fromtheSparrowcasebecauseof thecommercialaspect.
Issue:Doess.35(1)recognizeandaffirmtherightoftheSto:lotosellfish? Reasoning:Thenewtest, the ‘modifiedSparrow test’, gives thewordexisting anewmeaning, “anelementofa
claimanthasdemonstratedtheexistenceofanaboriginalright3. In order to be integral, a practice, custom, or traditionmust be of central significance to the aboriginal
notrequirethatapractice,customortraditionbedistinct9. The influence of European culture will only be relevant to the inquiry if it is demonstrated that the
practice,customortraditionisonlyintegralbecauseofthatinfluence10. Courts must take into account both the relationship of the aboriginal peoples to the land and the
partofthedistinctiveSto:losocietywhichexistedpriortocontract.Theexchangeoffishoccurred,butitwasnotacentral, significant or defining feature of the Sto:lo society. The appellant has failed to demonstrate that theexchangeofsalmonformoneyorothergoodsbytheSto:loisanaboriginalrightrecognizedandaffirmedunders.35(1)oftheConstitution.Appealdismissedandconvictionofviolationreinstated.
In thepresentcase, thecourtheld that therewasnomarket for fishbeforeEuropeancontact. I.e. if therewasamarketforfish,itonlyhappenedafterEuropeanscame.Therefore,herconvictionstands.
o Buthowcanyousaywhatiscentraltoaculture?Andwhatisincidental?o WhydoesthepracticehavetohavecomeaboutaftercontactwiththeEuropeans?o Haighthinksthisisveryartificialandcheapenscultureanditmakesitdependantonevidence.
ThereasonHaighthinksthiscasemadeituptotheSupremeCourtofCanadawasbecauseoftwoothermajorcasesthatmade it up to the Supreme Court of Canada, Gladstone andNTC, where it was held that legislation could beenactedtolimitAboriginalrightsinthecasewherethereisnoinherentlimit(i.e.youcanintheoryselltoaninfinitenumberofpeople)(Thatis,itisajustifiableinfringement;Sparrow)
Department ofNaturalResources andEnergy.Theywere carrying a loadof freshly cutCrown timber tobeused tobuildP’shouse(withextrastobeusedforcommunityfirewood).
‐ Amonthbefore,twoofficersofthesamedepartmentsawMr.GraycutdownamapletreeonCrownland.AccordingtoG, hewas intending to use the logs tomake his own furniture and flooring. S and P (bothMaliseet) andG (who isMi’kmaq)wereallchargedwithunlawfulpossessionorcuttingofCrowntimberundersections67(1)(c)and67(2)ofNewBrunswick’sCrownLandsandForestsAct. S,PandGadmitted to cuttingandpossessingCrown timberbut, intheirdefence,arguedthattheyhadanaboriginalrighttoharvesttimberforpersonaluse.
to thedistinctivecultureof theaboriginalgroupclaimingtherightprior toEuropeancontact. If itcanbeshownthatthesepracticesareintegralanddistinctivetoaparticularaboriginalcommunity,thensection35oftheConstitutionwillservetoprotectsuchactivitiesasanaboriginalright.
‐ Themain issue iswhether or not the harvesting ofwood for survival purposes (to provide shelter) can be seen ascentraltotheMaliseet’sandMi’kmaq’sdistinctivecultures.Ifso,itwillbeconsideredanaboriginalright.
‐ Theterm“culture”focusesonthepre‐contactwayoflifeoftheMi’kmaqandMaliseet.TheCourtalsoemphasizedtheimportance of allowing an aboriginal right to develop over time. To extinguish aboriginal rights, the Crown mustdemonstrateaclearintenttodoso.JustbecausetheCrowncontrolstheharvestingoftimberonitsland,doesnotimplythattheaboriginalrighttoharvesttimberhasbeenpurposefullyextinguished.
‐ Outcome: The SCC, unanimously agreeing with the New Brunswick Court of Appeal, ruled that S, P, and G hadsuccessfullydemonstratedanaboriginalrighttoharvesttimberfordomesticpurposes.TheSCCruledthatharvestingtimberforthepurposeofbuildingandfurnishingahomewasapracticecentraltotheMaliseetandMi’kmaqwayoflifepre‐contact,andwasthereforedefinedasanaboriginalright–onethatwasnotclearlyextinguishedbytheCrown.TheCrown’sappealsweredismissed.
for huntingmoosewithout a license and unlawful possession of amoose contrary to the Act. They claimed anaboriginalrighttohuntforsubsistence.
Issue:DidPhaveanaboriginalrightunderSection35oftheConstitutionAct1982tohuntforsubsistence? Reasoning: Inorder for this ruling to apply to specificMetispeople, theyhave to show that they established a
communitypriortoEuropeanpoliticalandlegalcontrol.AprecontroltestestablishingwhenEuropeansachievedpolitical and legal control in an area and focusing on the period after a particularMetis community arose andbefore it cameunder the control ofEuropean laws and customs is necessary to accommodate thishistory.ThismeansaslongasaMetisgroupofpeopleestablishedacommunitythatwasdistinctivefromtheAboriginalpeopletheywereassociatedwithandwasnotunderthecontroloftheEuropeansettlersthanitcanbeconsideredtohavespecial rights that are recognised in the Canadian Constitution Act 1982, sections 25 and 35. There was anacknowledgementthattheMetisaroseoutofcontactwiththeEuropeansandAboriginals.
(1) CHARACTERIZATION OF THE RIGHT ‐ For a harvesting right, the term "characterization" refers to theultimateuseoftheharvest.Isitforfood,exchange,orcommercialpurposes?TheCourtsaidthattheMétisrighttohunt isnot limitedtomoose justbecause that iswhat thePowleyswerehunting.Métisdon'thave toseparatelyprovearighttohunteveryspeciesofwildlifeorfishtheydependon.Therighttohuntisnotspecies‐specific.ItisageneralrighttohuntforfoodinthetraditionalhuntinggroundsoftheMétiscommunity.
(2) IDENTIFICATIONOFTHEHISTORICRIGHTSBEARINGCOMMUNITY ‐ A historicMétis communitywas a
groupofMétiswithadistinctivecollectiveidentity,wholivedtogetherinthesamegeographicareaandsharedacommon way of life. The historic Métis community must be shown to have existed as an identifiable MétiscommunitypriortothetimewhenEuropeanseffectivelyestablishedpoliticalandlegalcontrolinaparticulararea.
(3) IDENTIFICATION OF THE CONTEMPORARY RIGHTS BEARING COMMUNITY – Métis community
identification requires two things. First, the communitymust self‐identify as aMétis Community. Second, theremustbeproofthatthecontemporaryMétiscommunityisacontinuationofthehistoricMétiscommunity.
(4) VERIFICATION OF MEMBERSHIP IN THE CONTEMPORARY MÉTIS COMMUNITY ‐ There must be an
objective verifiable process" to identify members of the community. This means a process that is based onreasonable principles and historical fact that can be documented. The Court did not set out a comprehensivedefinitionofMétisforallpurposes.However,itsetoutthreecomponentstoguidetheidentificationofMétisrights‐holders: self‐identification, ancestral connection to the historic Métis community, and community acceptance.DifficultyindeterminingmembershipintheMétiscommunitydoesnotmeanthatMétispeopledonothaverights.
(5) IDENTIFICATIONOFTHERELEVANTTIME ‐ In order to identifywhether a practicewas "integral" to the
historicalAboriginalcommunity,theCourtlooksforarelevanttime.Ideally,thisisatimewhenthepracticecanbeidentified and before it is forever changed by European influence. For Indians, the Court looks to "pre‐contact"time.TheCourtmodifiedthistestforMétisinrecognitionofthefactthatMétisaroseasanAboriginalpeopleaftercontactwithEuropeans.TheCourtcalledtheappropriatetimetestforMétisthe"postcontactbutpre‐control"testandsaidthatthefocusshouldbeontheperiodafteraparticularMétiscommunityaroseandbeforeitcameundertheeffectivecontrolandinfluenceofEuropeanlawsandcustoms.
practice ‐ subsistence hunting ‐ is an important aspect of Métis life and a defining feature of their specialrelationship to the land.TheCourtspecificallynoted that theavailabilityofaparticularspeciesover time isnotrelevant.Soeventhoughthecasemaybeaboutmoosehunting,asitwaswiththePowleys,theissueisreallyaboutthe right tohunt generally.TheCourt found that, for thehistoric Sault Ste.MarieMétis community, hunting forfoodwasanimportantanddefiningfeatureoftheirspecialrelationshipwiththeland.
some evidence to support the claim that the contemporary practice is in continuity with the historic practice.Aboriginalpracticescanevolveanddevelopovertime.TheCourtfoundthattheSaultSte.MarieMétiscommunityhadshownsufficientevidencetoprovethathuntingforfoodcontinuestobeanintegralpractice.
http://www.thelawsofcanadainformation.org 41
(8) EXTINGUISHMENT ‐ The doctrine of extinguishment applies equally to Métis and First Nations claims.ExtinguishmentmeansthattheCrownhaseliminatedtheAboriginalright.Before1982,thiscouldbedonebytheconstitution, legislation or by agreement with the Aboriginal people. In the case of the Sault Ste. Marie Métiscommunity,therewasnoevidenceoftheextinguishmentbyanyofthesemeans.TheRobinsonHuronTreatydidnot extinguish theAboriginal rightsof theMétisbecause theywere, as a collective, explicitly excluded from thetreaty.AMétisindividual,whoisancestrallyconnectedtothehistoricMétiscommunity,canclaimMétisidentityorrightsevenifheorshehadancestorswhotooktreatybenefitsinthepast.
(10) JUSTIFICATION ‐ Conservation, health, and safety are all reasons that government can use to justify
infringinganAboriginalright.Buttheyhavetoprovethatthereisarealthreat.Heretherewasnoevidencethatthemoosepopulationwasunder threat.Even if itwas, theCourt said that theMétiswould stillbeentitled toapriorityallocationtosatisfytheirsubsistenceneedsinaccordancewiththecriteriasetoutbytheSupremeCourtinR.v.Sparrow.Ontario'sblanketdenialofanyMétisrighttohuntforfoodcouldnotbejustified.
Outcome: The SCC determined that Metis communities (those that, in addition to their mixed ancestry, had
HaidaNationvBritishColumbia(MinisterofForests)(DUTYTOCONSULT) Facts:Decision involvedAboriginalswhohad a land claim to a specific area and surroundingwaters. Theprov
Issue:IftheCrownowestheHaidaadutyofconsultationovertheirclaimedland? Reasoning: The degree of consultation depends on the strength of the claim and the severity of the
associated access road. The Tlingit participated in the environmental assessment process and objected to thecompany’splan tobuildaroad throughaportionof their traditional territory.Theprovincegranted theprojectapprovalcertificateandtheFirstNationbroughtapetitionchallengingthatdecision.
Issue: The case raised the issue of the limits on the Crown’s duty to consult with and where indicated, toaccommodate, Aboriginal peoples when making decision that may adversely affect asserted by unprovenAboriginalrightsandtitle.
Reasoning:TheCourtappliedtheprinciplesarticulatedintheHaidadecision.Whereconsultationismeaningful,there is no ultimate duty to reach agreement. Accommodation requires that Aboriginal concerns be balancedreasonablywith the potential impact of the particular decision on those concerns andwith competing societalconcerns. The process engaged in by the Province under theEnvironmental Assessment Act fulfilled its duty toconsult and accommodate. The Tlingit participated fully in the environmental review process, its views werearticulatedbeforethedecisionmakers,andthefinalprojectapprovalcontainedmeasuresdesignedtoaddresstheTlingit concerns. The Province was not required to develop special consultation measures to address Tlingitconcerns,outsideoftheprocessprovidedforinthelegislationthatwastheninforce.
Outcome: The SCC unanimously allowed the appeal and held that the Crown did have a duty to consultmeaningfullywithandaccommodatetheTakuTlingit.HowevertheywereadequatelyconsultedinrespectoftheProjectApprovalCertificate.
These two cases provide welcome guidance on the nature and scope of the Crown’s duty to consult with and, where
Even where “deep consultation” is required, where dealing with asserted but unproven rights, the AboriginalgroupsdonothaveavetoovertheusesofCrownland.
The consultation processmay indicate a need for accommodation, which requires that Aboriginal concerns bebalancedreasonablywith thepotential impactof theparticulardecisionon thoseconcerns,andwithcompetingsocietalconcerns.
The obligation to consult with and, where indicated, to accommodate Aboriginal concerns lies with the Crownalone.Thereisnoindependentlegalobligationonthirdpartiessuchasprojectproponents.
Environmental assessment and regulatory processes that provide a meaningful opportunity to address theinterests and concernsof aboriginalpeopleduringprojectdevelopment candischarge thedutyof theCrown toconsultwithandwhereappropriateaccommodatetheinterestsofaboriginalpeople,eveninthoseareasofCanadathatarenotsubjecttohistoricaltreatiesormodernlandclaimagreements.
TheCourt emphasizes throughout the decisions that the duty to consult and,where indicated, to accommodateflows from the Crown’s obligation to act honorably in its dealings with Aboriginal peoples. A repeated themethroughoutthedecisionsisreconciliationandthebalancingofAboriginalandsocietalinterests.Itishopedthattheguidance provided in these decisions will assist in the process of balancing rights and improve certainty forindustry,government,andAboriginalgroupsinrelationtonaturalresourcedevelopmentinareassubjecttoclaimsforAboriginalrightsandtitle.
bypassed the slowFederalLandClaimsprocess inwhich theBCprovincial governmentwouldnotparticipate.Theyclaimed ownership and legal jurisdiction over 133 individual hereditary territories, a total of 58 sq. km’s of north‐westernBC.Theyusedtheiroralhistoriesasprincipalevidenceinthecase.TherewerenotreatieseversignedinBC,thereforenotreatyright.Britishstylepropertylawreliesonwrittenevidence‐thusthetrialjudgerefusedtoconsideroralhistories.
ofpurposesthatarenotrestrictedtothosethatarethecustoms,practicesortraditionsoftheaboriginalpeople.Itisdifferent from common land ownership, in that it is a Constitutional communal right deeply linked to Indigenousculture.LandgovernedbyAboriginaltitlecanonlybesoldtotheFederalGovernment,nottoprivatebuyers.NOTEaboriginalrightscancontinuebeyondthetreatyland. TESTFORABORIGINALTITLE:
o Theaboriginalgroupassertingtitlemustsatisfythefollowingcriteria:o (1)Landmust have been occupied prior to sovereignty,NOT contact (more certain date). Proof of
butmustmaintaina“substantialmaintenanceoftheconnection”–Maboo (3) At sovereignty, that occupation must have been exclusive (stricter test). Must demonstrate
Tsilhqot’inNationvBritishColumbia Facts:TheTsilhqot’in claimed for aboriginal title and rights on aportionof their traditional territory. The trial
took over 5 years to complete. The trial lasted 339 days duringwhich 29 Tsilhqot'inwitnesses gave evidence,manyintheirnativelanguage.604exhibitswereenteredwithExhibit156alonecontainingover1,000historicaldocuments.TheJudgereceivedabout7,000pagesofwrittensubmissionsfromthelawyersonallsides.
Issue:DotheTsilhqot’inhaveaboriginaltitleandrightsontheClaimedArea? Reasoning: Justice Vickersmade a number of important findings thatwill impact future relations between the
governmentsofCanadaandBritishColumbiaandFirstNations,including:o (1)TheTsilhqot'inpeoplehaveaboriginal rights, including the right to trade furs toobtainamoderate
o (3) British Columbia has infringed the Aboriginal rights and title of the Tsilhqot'in people, and has nojustification for doing so. Forest activities caused habitat destruction andwildlife disturbances that theProvince failed to justify. The consultation efforts of the Province were held to be inadequate, as theyfailedtoacknowledgetheiraboriginalrights.
o (4)Canada'sParliamenthasunacceptablydeniedandavoideditsconstitutionalresponsibilitytoprotectAboriginallandsandAboriginalrights,pursuanttos.91(24)oftheConstitution.Thefederalgovernmentfailedtoextinguishaboriginaltitle.
o (5) BritishColumbiahas apparentlybeenviolatingAboriginal title in anunconstitutional and thereforeillegal fashion ever since it joined Canada in 1871. The province cannot and has not extinguishedaboriginaltitle.
Outcome:TheBCSupremeCourtruledthattheTsilhqot’inpeoplehaveprovenAboriginaltitletoapproximately200,000sq.hectares inandaroundtheremoteNemiahValley,southandwestofWilliamsLake,BC.Thetest forevidenceoftitleweremetinalmost½theareaclaimed.TheCourtgrantedadeclarationthattheyhadaboriginalrights tohuntand trapbirdsandanimals in theClaimedArea, to capturewildhorsesand tradeskinsandpeltsfrom theClaimedArea. Itwasheld that theseaboriginal rightswereunjustifiably infringedby forestharvestingactivitiesauthorizedbytheProvince.TheCourtdeclinedtoawarddamagesforthisinfringementonthebasisthatthe Aboriginals claim for damages had been framed as compensation for infringement of aboriginal title, notaboriginalrights.
Pomquet Harbour, Antigonish Country, Nova Scotia, to fish for eel. They sold the eel. Marshall was arrested andprosecutedforfishingoutofseasonandwithoutlicence.
o Issue:AreMarshall’sactivitiesprotectedbyanexistingaboriginalor treaty right?Specifically, is itprotectedby theMi’kmaqtreatiesof1760‐61?
o Reasoning:CAN’TBEABORIGINALRIGHTASDEALINGWITHEUROPEANSPOSTCONTACT.HowdoesSupremeCourtre‐interpretthetreatyprovisionintoasimpleright? (1)Lookatextrinsicevidence:(i)Toshowwrittendocumentdoesnotincludealltermsofagreement.(ii)Canbe
(2)Howdowedeterminecommonintention?Lookat thehistoricalcontextwhichthetreatywasnegotiated;this says thatBritishwere essentially looking for security. The goalwas that theMi’kmaq remain economicallystabletopreventwarbykeepingthemhappyandrestrictthemfromjoiningwiththeFrenchand;Inordertodosothecrownallowedtheaboriginalstohuntandfishfor“necessaries”.Courtwillimplyacontractualtermonbasisofpresumedintentions inordertoassureefficacyofcontract.Fishwasnot includedintreatyasatthetimefishwasin“limitedproportions”butcantellfromtheirintention,atthetimeofmakingtreaty,thattheyhadarighttoaccessthingstotradeandfishwasoneofthem.
o Extends fiduciary duty to treaty rights. Crown has to act in best interest of aboriginals and failure to do sowouldbreachdutyanditwouldbeunconscionable.ThisisbecausethetreatywaswrittenbytheBritishandtheMi’Kmaq’sinterestshavebeenunrepresented.
o Courtdefined“necessaries”asrighttoamoderatelivelihood,whichismorethenbaresustenanceandincludesfood,clothing,housing,amenitiesbutnotlargescalecapitalism/accumulationofwealth.Iftheygobeyondthis,itisoutsidethetreatyprotection.Theywillbedealtwithlikeeveryotherperson.
o TreatyrightcanbeinfringedandinordertodothisyouneedtoapplySparrowtestofjustification.o Outcome:Appeal allowed and Charges dismissed. The 1970 treaty does affirm the right of theMi’Kmaq people to
continue toprovide for their own sustenanceby taking the right of theproducts of their hunting, fishing andothergathering activities, and trading for what in 1760 was termed “necessities”. There is an aboriginal treaty right tohunt/fishfor“moderatelivelihood”.
RvMarshall(No.2) Facts: AfterMarshall (No. 1) licensed fishermenwere upset because the Aboriginalswere entrancing on their
livelihood.TheMi’kmaqwentfishingforlobsteroutofseasons(ie.duringclosedseason)assoonasthisdecisionwashandeddown.Thefishermenwereupsetthattheyweretakingtheirlobster.Thiswasthecatalysttothiscase.The interveners(the fishermen)requestedarehearingof theappeal,astayof the judgment. (Bizarrecase).SCCallowedit,probablyasawaytoclarifyMarshall(No.1).
Aboriginals want very broad interpretation of treaty right but court narrows it down. Logging does not =necessariesasdefinedbythecourtduetointentionsofparties.
Outcome:Loggingwas not a traditionalMi’kmaq activity, if it was theywould have a treaty right for it. Thus,loggingwasnotallowed.
Issue:Does B’s Indian status given him a right to log on Crown land for commercial purposes, based on rightgrantedinthePeaceandFriendshiptreatiesof1760?
StatuteVI.DistributionofLegislativePowers–PowersoftheParliamentSection91(24)ConstitutionAct1867‐ItshallbelawfulfortheQueen,byandwiththeAdviceandConsentoftheSenateandHouseofCommons,tomakelawsforthePeace,Order,andgoodGovernmentofCanada,inrelationtoallMattersnotcomingwithintheClassesofSubjectsbythisActassignedexclusivelytotheLegislaturesoftheProvinces;andforgreaterCertainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms of this Section, it is hereby declared that(notwithstandinganythinginthisAct)theexclusiveLegislativeAuthorityoftheParliamentofCanadaextendstoallMatterscomingwithintheClassesofSubjectsnexthereinafterenumerated;thatistosay,‐‐24.Indians,andLandsreservedfortheIndians.PartII–RightsoftheAboriginalPeoplesofCanadaSection35ConstitutionAct1982–
(1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized andaffirmed.
(2)InthisAct,“aboriginalpeoplesofCanada”includestheIndian,InuitandMetisPeopleofCanada. (3)For greater certainty, in subsection (1) “treaty rights” includes rights that now exist byway of land claims
