From Aeterni Patris to Fides Et Ratio Draft 2

From Aeterni Patris to Fides et Ratio: towards theological pluralism or a reaffirmation of philosophia perennis?

Candidate number: V42326

CTC401: Catholic identity and its main themes

Assessment Task 3: Coursework essay

From Aeterni Patris to Fides et Ratio: towards theological pluralism or a

reaffirmation of philosophia perennis?

In an obituary that appeared in The Times on July 21st 1903, Leo XIII (1810-

1903) was hailed as ‘… the greatest Pope to have governed the Roman

Catholic Church since the French Revolution.’1 It is true that Leo was deeply

immersed in the cultural life of his own century and that one of the aims of his

pontificate was to make it possible for the Church to engage philosophically

with contemporary thought and to make its own contributions to the

integration of European culture. The way in which this was to be achieved

was set out in his 1879 encyclical Aeterni Patris: scholars were to be

encouraged to investigate and assimilate the scholastic tradition and to use

the ‘perennial’ philosophy and theology of St Thomas Aquinas (1225-74) –

linked to the tradition of the Church Fathers and maintaining an openness to

the best insights of scholars of different philosophical persuasions – to

rejuvenate the continent’s intellectual and religious life, so deeply undermined

by the ‘ravages’ of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. In section 1

I describe the circumstances that led to the rehabilitation of Thomism as a

serious option for nineteenth century Catholic philosophers and its

endorsement in Aeterni Patris; in sections 2 and 3 I explain and comment on

two strains of twentieth century Thomistic interpretation, Aristotelian and

Transcendental Thomism; finally, in section 4, I discuss the apparent

recommendation of a third strain, Existential Thomism, by Pope John Paul II

in his encyclical Fides et Ratio.

1 Quoted in the entry on Leo XIII in the Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia, 1993-2001 Microsoft Corporation.

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1: Developments up to Aeterni Patris (1879)

The ‘story’ that culminated in Aeterni Patris contains some interesting ironies

and coincidences. By the 1750’s, ‘second scholasticism’ (the great revival of

scholastic thought after the Council of Trent (1545-63)) was in serious decline.

The educated elite, influenced by the perceived freshness of modern

Enlightenment philosophy, regarded scholasticism with a thinly-veiled

contempt. The suppression of the Jesuit order in 1722 effectively terminated

the influence of (Suárezian) Thomism on Catholic students in European

colleges. Following the persecution and suppression of the Catholic Church

during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, scholasticism

gradually ceased to be a viable option for Catholic theologians who wanted to

engage with a secular culture that considered all versions of Thomism as

philosophically discredited. Indeed it was to Post-Kantian idealism, rather than

to traditional scholasticism, that the Church (in Germany, at least) turned to

resource itself philosophically in the first half of the nineteenth century. In

Rome, at the Gregorian University (returned to the restored Society of Jesus

by Pope Leo XII in 1824), there was no great enthusiasm for the scholastic

tradition. Luigi Taparelli d’Azeglio, who did favour the philosophy of St

Thomas, was resisted quite vehemently by the resident Jesuit professors

when he tried to introduce a curriculum based on Thomistic philosophy.

By contrast with the Jesuits, the Dominicans did try to maintain the viability of

the tradition of St Thomas during the political and cultural upheavals of this

period. In Italy, the most influential Thomist thinkers were the Dominicans

Tommaso Zigliara (who won the confidence of the Bishop of Perugia,

Giaocchino Pecci, the future Leo XIII) and Alberto Lepidi. Lepidi’s (he was

Regent at the Dominican College of Flavigny from 1868-1873) argumentative

rigour and exacting intellectual standards helped to re-establish Thomism for

many outside his order and certainly had a decisive influence on what would

be Bishop Pecci’s future agenda for the Church. St Thomas’ most influential

disciple in Northern Europe was the Jesuit Joseph Kleutgen. Interestingly, in

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his book, Out of a Kantian Chrysalis? A Maritainian Critique of Fr Marechal,2

Ronald McCamy observes that Gerald McCool3 discerns in Kleutgen’s general

(‘orthodox’) Thomistic position elements of incompatible versions of Thomism

that, in subsequent decades, would indirectly contribute to its demise.4

So much for one of the ironies, but what of the coincidences? These consist

in a remarkable chain of events that leads from two young Italian seminarians

to Leo XIII’s encyclical. The two young seminarians were Serafino and

Domenico Sordi, both students at the Collegio Alberoni at Piacenza. They

were both enthusiasts for the philosophy of St Thomas. Later, after joining the

Society of Jesus, they made a significant Thomist convert of Luigi Taparelli.5

The latter shared his enthusiasm with fellow student and future pope,

Giaocchino Pecci. The Sordis made further converts of Carlo Maria Curci,

Matteo Liberatore and Guiseppe Pecci (Giovanni’s brother and future

cardinal). In 1846 Pope Pius IX felt constrained by the ‘misunderstanding’ of

nature and grace in some non-scholastic theologies to defend the power of

reason to recognise the credibility of revelation and make a reasonable act of

faith. Twinned to this apologetic aim, Pope Pius, through the establishment of

the review, Civilità cattolica (staffed by Jesuits), sought to reach out to and

influence the thinking of the educated classes of Italy. Matteo Liberatore

joined the staff of the review and Joseph Kleutgen was appointed as the

‘German expert’ for the Congregation of the Index. Both were well placed to

promote traditional scholasticism and to undermine efforts to introduce newer,

non-Thomist philosophies. Liberatore was a brilliant writer and polemicist. In

the review he presented Thomism as a compelling, fully integrated and

coherent modern system of philosophy. For his part, Kleutgen presented

wave after wave of persuasive argument in favour of his view that perennial

scholastic theology was far better equipped to expound and defend

2 Ronald McCamy, Out of a Kantian Chrysalis? A Maritainian Critique of Fr. Marechal, Peter Lang 1998.

3 His reference is to Gerald McCool’s Catholic Thought in the Nineteenth Century, New York: Seabury, 1977.

4 The point is developed below on page 9.

5 See p. 2

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Catholicism than the nineteenth century Catholic theologies based on faddish

and ephemeral contemporary philosophy. Both theologians (independently of

each other) rejected the Cartesian return to the subject and the different forms

of idealism that follow in its wake. According to their scholastic Aristotelianism

and epistemological and metaphysical realism, reality impinges on man

through the intensional image, itself abstracted from the phantasm. There is

no a priori intuition of God’s necessary being; God’s existence can be known

only through a posteriori argument from the world of sense experience. This

scholastic synthesis was presented as a modern system, in tune with

common sense, empiricist, informed by centuries’ of reflection on the nature

of rationality, accepting of new insights and capable of coping intelligibly with

serious theological issues such as faith and reason, nature and grace and the

individual and social ethics. All this, in the eyes of Leo XIII, added up to an

irresistible argument for the revival and propagation of scholasticism in the

modern world.

Aeterni Patris laid the foundations for a modern development of scholasticism,

a development that occurred in the twentieth century and that saw

scholasticism assume a number of diverse and distinctive forms. So far the

terms ‘scholasticism’ and ‘Thomism’ have been used without great precision

and almost interchangeably. What is evident from research undertaken by

Étienne Gilson (1884-1978), however, is that a common scholastic synthesis

had never actually existed, despite Pope Leo’s belief in a philosophy ‘common

to all the Scholastic Doctors’. The philosophies of knowledge, being and man

found in the theologies of St Thomas, St Bonaventure and Duns Scotus were,

according to Gerald McCool, ‘irreducibly distinct in their systematic content.’6

Added to this is the fact that the meaning of Thomism is not univocal. The

‘Second Scholasticism’ of the sixteenth century saw the production of different

interpretations of St Thomas, including those of the Dominican Cajetan

(Giacomo de Vio, 1469-1534) and the Jesuit Francisco Suàrez (1548-1617).

Suàrez’s Thomism actually drew on the thought of other scholastic doctors

besides Aquinas. In his interpretation of Thomas’s metaphysics, Suàrez

reduced Thomas’s distinction between essence and existence to a conceptual

6 See Gerald McCool, The Neo-Thomists, Marquette University Press 2003.

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one. Cajetan, however, affirmed that there was an act of existence really

distinct from the essence that limited it. Given these variations it becomes

germane to ask: which version(s) of Thomism/neo-scholasticism were taken

up by theologians at the turn of the century and was the awareness of the

Thomism’s historical character a fillip behind the development of one

interpretation that showed greater openness to the ‘secular’ thought of the

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries?

2: Aristotelian Thomism

Three distinct strains of Thomistic interpretation characterised the twentieth

century Thomistic revival: the Aristotelian, associated with the Dominicans

Ambroise Gardeil (1859-1931), Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange (1877-1964) and

Jacques Maritain (1882-1973); the Existential, associated with Étienne Gilson

(1884-1978); the Transcendental (Transcendental Thomism), developed

principally by Pièrre Rousselot (1878-1915) and Joseph Maréchal (1878-

1944). When epistemology has priority over ontology, what is (reality) will be

characterised in terms of what can be known. Hence philosophies associated

with a turn to the subject (Descartes, Kant) regard the real as something

constructed by the human subject. In all three of the strains of the Thomism

mentioned, ontology has priority over epistemology. All three are concerned

with how the real (which is independently of the human subject) impinges

upon human awareness. Robert Harvanek SJ has suggested that what

distinguishes Aristotelian from Transcendental Thomism is that the former

affirms what is real through the concept, whereas the latter achieves this

through the judgement. The ‘philosophy of the concept’ has become the

mainstay of what he calls the ‘conservative view’. The ‘philosophy of the

judgement’ is the province of the ‘pluralists’.7

In what way is the real appropriated through the concept? To answer this, it

will be necessary to provide a brief account of the Aristotelian-Thomist

7 See Robert Harvanek, Philosophical Pluralism in the New Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol 11, New York: McGraw-Hill 1967, pp 448-451.

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explanation of the nature of knowing.8 Given the independent reality of a

particular object (such as a tree), what is the manner of the subject’s

involvement with (knowledge of) this object? The rather paradoxical answer is

that the subject becomes the object; the knower becomes the thing known.9

All knowing is a kind of grasping, a getting hold of reality and taking it in. This

process begins with the senses; sensible forms are received immaterially

(assuming the truth of Aristotle’s doctrine of hylomorphism) but they are

received under the conditions of matter, hence their particularity and

individuality. In the next, cognitional, stage10 the attentive mind lays hold of

and draws out or abstracts the essential features of the object; it ‘liberates’ it

from the limitations imposed on it by the conditions of matter. The object of

this abstraction (or liberation) – referred to variously as the cognitional image,

the intensional image, the form, or the concept – is capable of existing in more

than one way. By nature, it exists as a physical object (such as a particular

tree); cognitionally it exists as the intensional image. This image is not a copy

of the thing that exists physically. What is known is the real thing existing in

the mode of an intensional image. The locus of reality, then, is the what of the

object. There is no (need for) intuition of existential reality either in the

external world or in the interior of the knowing subject. The what can be in

various ways but it is the concept11 that expresses its nature fully and

exhaustively.

3: Transcendental Thomism

8 The précis I provide is modelled on the kind of summary offered to many seminarians following philosophy courses in the first half of the 20th century, up to Vatican II. I have drawn on a couple of seminary manuals: An Introduction to Philosophy by Msgr Paul Glenn, Herder, 1944 and An Introduction to Philosophy by Daniel Sullivan, Bruce, 1957.

9 See Sullivan, op. cit. p. 65.

10 The authors do not suggest that the act of knowing involves any kind of temporal sequence; the different stages can be identified as a result of logical analysis.

11 The concept has to be distinguished from the term which is the outward expression of the concept (by means of a conventional sign such as a word). Aristotelian-Thomism suggests that the term expresses a concept completely (once its meaning has been fully and competently unpacked). It is also important to emphasise that the proper object of knowledge is the reality, not the concept. The concept is the medium through which the reality of the object is encountered.

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Given this ontological-epistemological position, it is clear that there can be no

plurality of conceptual frameworks. The ‘conservative’ opposition to pluralism

would rest of the following grounds: human minds (regardless of culture or

conditioning) will form the same concepts of reality; concepts are founded in

the formalities of mind-independent reality and move beyond subjectivism to

objective reference; concepts capture the timeless and unchanging natures

that make up extramental reality; given that only one conceptual

representation is adequate to a reality which is what it is, only one

philosophical system is possible. Such a position, clearly, would support the

belief that the concepts used by the Church to express Christian doctrine are

the gateway to what is ultimately real; they are not, by their very nature, tied to

any particular culture or epoch nor is their essential meaning in any way

negotiable or in need of revision or reinterpretation.

I referred above (page 4) to theologians who showed a greater openness to

secular thought. One such theologian (someone who, in Harvanek’s analysis,

would favour emphasis not on the concept but on the judgement12) was

Joseph Maréchal, a Belgian Jesuit, who in 1926 published Cahier cinq of his

monumental Le Point de départ de la métaphysique. In this work, Maréchal

presented an understanding of human cognition that is strikingly at odds with

the Aristotelian-Thomistic account summarised above. Like the Aristotelian-

Thomist, Maréchal fully subscribed to philosophical realism. What is in the

world exists extramentally and independently of human subjectivity. However

human knowing involves, not a reception from real things (by means of

abstraction and formation of an intensional image), but a projection of the

knower upon the ultimately real. His starting point for his own development of

Thomism was his analysis of what he considered Kant’s defective

transcendental reflection on human knowledge as set out in Kant’s Critique of

Pure Reason. In Kant’s thought the object is constituted by means of a static

union of empirical data, the forms of space and time, and the categories of the

understanding. By including the dynamism of the human mind as one of the a

12 See McCamy, op. cit. p 14

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priori conditions of possibility for the speculative intellect’s knowledge of the

object, Kant’s unbridgeable gulf between the subject and the world, between

the phenomenon and the noumenon, and between the human knower and

God, can finally be crossed. When the human knower judges that something

is the case, his innate, a priori dynamism (that Maréchal describes as a

‘torrent’ that swamps the data of sensation) provides the non-finite backdrop

against which the object can be profiled in consciousness as finite and limited.

John Knasas likens this backdrop to an ‘‘intellectual sky’ against which things

can profile themselves as beings of finite perfection.’13 The concept is an

important form of knowledge in its own right, but it occupies on an

intermediate position in the scale of human cognition. Considered in this way,

the concept loses its Aristotelian-Thomistic rigidity and becomes susceptible

to reformulation.

John Knasas has observed that several currents of Thomism (including the

Aristotelian) streamed into Vatican II but, as a matter of fact, only Maréchal’s

Transcendental Thomism emerged with any vibrancy.14 It might be germane

to point out some of the attractions that Maréchal’s reworking of Thomism

would have had for some Catholic theologians working in the pre-Conciliar

period. Maréchal’s implied pluralism avoids any commitment to a single and

definitive metaphysics as the crown of man’s natural powers. The Aristotelian-

Thomist position suggests a view of human nature as being so integrated that

grace appears as irrelevant and superfluous. Maréchal’s human nature, by

contrast, is a dynamism to infinite being, a profound longing that can be

quieted only by God. As already observed (page 4) Étienne Gilson’s historical

studies showed that the thinking of scholastic philosophers is as individual as

fingerprints. The Aristotelian-Thomist position is clearly too ahistorical and the

Maréchalian perspective (concepts forming in the wake of intellectual

dynamism) reasonably accommodates the undeniable pluralism in human

thinking. Finally, as against Aristotelian-Thomism’s unappealingly relentless,

13 See John FX Knasas, The Twentieth Century Thomistic Revival, on www.secondspring.co.uk/archive/knasas.htm. page 2/9

14 See op. cit. p 3/9

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http://www.secondspring.co.uk/archive/knasas.htm.%20page%202/



impersonal, a posteriori approach, Maréchal’s Thomism provides ‘an

engaging portrayal of our inner life as conscious beings.’15 Maréchal rings true

to our sense of ourselves as radically orientated to what is ultimately

worthwhile and caught between a longing for God and a restlessness brought

on by our over-involvement with what is contingent and temporary.

Two of the most original theologians of the twentieth century, Karl Rahner and

Bernard Lonergan, emerged from the tradition of Maréchal and further

developed his thought to show that a philosophical and theological method

based on the finality of the human mind can continue to present a concept of

invariant truth in a theology marked by history and pluralism. As ‘new

theologians’, working in the context of post-Conciliar theology, however, many

have questioned whether their work belongs to the history of the Neo-Thomist

movement. John Knasas goes so far as to suggest that being a theologian in

the post-Conciliar period means, by definition, working outside the Thomist

framework: ‘The history of the modern Neo-Thomist movement, whose magna

carta was Aeterni Patris, reached its end at the Second Vatican Council.’16 In

a telling observation, Gerald McCool noted that the seeds of Neo-Thomism’s

own demise could be discerned, quite ironically, in the philosophy of one of

Aristotelian Thomism’s most vocal advocates, namely Joseph Kleutgen.

McCool is able to detect elements of both traditional and transcendental

versions of Thomism abiding in latent opposition in Kleutgen’s work, two

tendencies that will catalyze later into the ferment of the nouvelle théologie.

As he writes, ‘With Kleutgen … the end is in the beginning.’17 ‘Demise’, of

course, does not mean disappearance; Thomism in its various forms

continued and continues to have its advocates. The demise of Thomism in

this context means the end of its influence as a monolithic philosophical-

theological party line after the Second Vatican Council. This has to be seen as

a corollary of Maréchal’s relativisation of the concept and consequent

15 See Knasas op. cit p. 7/9

16 Knasas, op.cit. p. 7/9.

17 See Catholic Thought in the Nineteenth Century, op. cit p. 3

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legitimisation of different conceptual frameworks that serve as the

philosophical bases of different theologies, theologies that, in the forty years

since Vatican II, have enlarged and enriched themselves with concepts drawn

from existentialism, eschatology, personalism, Marxism and other political

ideologies, praxiology and ecology.18

4: Fides et Ratio and Existential Thomism

The widespread acceptance of theological pluralism in the Catholic Church

conjoined with an ongoing debate about the precise meaning of ‘absolute

truth’ has prompted the present pope, John Paul II, to issue an appeal to

contemporary philosophers and theologians not to despair. His encyclical,

Fides et Ratio, published in September 1998, was addressed to ‘The Bishops

… along with philosophers, scientists and theologians.’ One of John Paul’s

aims (perhaps ironically) is to offer encouragement to (all) philosophers who,

since the Enlightenment, have tended to do their thinking independently of the

Church and who have begun to question the possibility of the attainment of

(universal) truth. He wants to reassure them about the purpose and the

capacity of the human mind with regard to truth: ‘Every truth … presents itself

as universal, even if it is not the whole truth. If something is true, it must be

true for all people at all times … Throughout the centuries, philosophers have

sought to discover and articulate such truth … what inspires them is the

desire to reach the certitude of truth and the certitude of its absolute value.’

(27) It is unusual for encyclicals to endorse particular philosophies or

methodologies and his audience might have expected John Paul to couch his

encouragement and recommendations in a general way. What is striking

about Fides et Ratio is the metaphysical character of his plea. The Pope

provides both an outline of the kind of metaphysics he is recommending and a

more specific characterisation of its essential features. In section 19 he

suggests that the overall philosophical approach will be a posteriori, beginning

with knowledge of ‘the structure of the world and the activity of the elements’

and reaching towards God in causal terms. In 83, he refers to ‘the need for a 18 For a fuller discussion of this see Legitimacy and limits of theological pluralism by Battista Mondin on www.ewtn.com/library/Theology/PLURALSM.HTM.

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http://www.ewtn.com/library/Theology/PLURALSM.HTM



philosophy of genuinely metaphysical range, capable, that is, of transcending

empirical data in order to attain something absolute, ultimate and foundational

in the search for truth.’ In 96 he endorses the use of ‘certain basic concepts

[that] retain their universal epistemological value.’ In terms of the two versions

of Thomism outlined above, John Paul seems to be steering his audience

towards a metaphysical via media that picks up aspects of the Aristotelianism

and Transcendentalism (such as the generally a posteriori context and the

metaphysical rather than natural approach to God) and combines them with

new elements drawn from I have referred to as Existential Thomism.

This is an appropriate point at which to introduce some commentary on the

third strain of Thomistic interpretation which, as I have indicated, is associated

with the French Catholic mediævalist and philosopher, Étienne Gilson.19

Unlike most of the thinkers associated with the twentieth century Thomistic

revival, Gilson was in no sense a ‘cradle Thomist’. He discovered Thomism on

his own and owed no allegiance to any of the traditional schools of Thomistic

interpretation. His interest in Thomism was awakened by his doctoral

research 20 into the scholastic origins of Descartes’ thought. In this study he

became convinced that many of the received ideas about scholasticism were

erroneous. In particular he believed that attempts to disengage mediaeval

philosophy from its Christian theological context were fundamentally

misconceived. When Aquinas did philosophy he did it from within theology.

Christian philosophy was not (secular) philosophy that made reference to

certain Christian beliefs. It was a special way of doing philosophy.

Consequently Gilson took issue with the kind of Thomism found in the

manuals of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These were works that

did too much of their philosophising in reaction to Descartes. In their zeal to

make their Thomism contemporary, theologians and commentators distilled

the ‘philosophical’ content from the works of Thomas and presented it in the

form of ‘theses’ that were intended to from a coherent Thomistic philosophy.

Gilson believed that this adaptation resulted, not only in inauthentic Thomism,

but in ineffective and seriously flawed (Christian) philosophy. One area of his 19 See p. 5

20 Published as La Liberté chez Descartes et la Théologie in 1913.

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research that has particular bearing on this discussion is Gilson’s work on

Aristotelian metaphysics and its relation to Thomism. Being for Aristotle meant

a subsisting essence, whether it was a pure substantial form or linked to

primary matter. (We have already seen, above, in Aristotelian Thomism that

being is associated with an essence that can exist in various ways, physically

and intensionally.) However, for St Thomas, being meant existence, an act

that could not be a form since its function was to confer existence on an

essence that was already formed. Being cannot be known in the manner of an

Aristotelian form, through a process of abstraction. It can be known only

through a judgement that affirmed the actual existence of something known to

the subject through sense experience. God, the final reality, cannot be

construed in terms of a substantial form, however this may be qualified.

Rather, God should be understood in terms of the complete act of existence,

communicating himself to the world by means of a Pure Existential Act. For

Thomas, according to Gilson, reality inheres not in concepts, but in existence

or, as Thomas himself puts it, agere sequitur esse.

In section 115 of Fides et Ratio, the Pope emphasises the value of a

metaphysics of being based on the very act of existence: ‘Set within the

Christian metaphysical tradition, the philosophy of being is a dynamic

philosophy that views reality in its ontological, causal and communicative

structures. It is strong and enduring because it is based upon the very act of

being itself, which allows a full and comprehensive openness to reality as a

whole, surpassing every limit in order to reach the One who brings all things

to fulfilment.’ John Paul is convinced that a metaphysics of being in the form

of (Gilsonian) Existential Thomism is able to ‘go beyond all that presents itself

directly in knowledge as an existing thing … in order to reach “that which

exists as sheer Existing” and also creative Love; for it is this which provides

the ultimate … explanation of the fact that “it is preferable to be than not to be”

and, in particular, of the fact that we exist.’ 21

21 See John Paul II’s Angelicum Address on the centenary of Leo XIII’s encyclical Aeterni Patris, delivered in 1979.

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Concluding remarks

Fides et Ratio, by recommending that the actus essendi as developed in

Gilson’s Existential Thomism be studied by philosophers and considered as

serious option for Catholic thinkers working in the 21st century, clearly breaks

the mould of past papal encyclicals in that specific points of philosophical

doctrine have received official endorsement. John Paul himself, as if to pre-

empt possible criticism states that ‘ … no historical form of philosophy can

legitimately claim to embrace the totality of truth, nor to be the complete

explanation of the human being, of the world, and of the human being’s

relationship with God.’ (FeR, 55) Also, later in 78, he again concedes that St

Thomas is a model and not a requirement: ‘[St Thomas had been acclaimed

by the Magisterium] … not in order to take a position on properly philosophical

questions or to demand adherence to particular theses.’ It would be a mistake

to regard Fides et Ratio as a reaction (knee-jerk or otherwise) to the

philosophical challenges of theological pluralism but the question still remains

about whether, post Maréchal, nouvelle théologie, Rahner, Lonergan and

others working in the very different, post-Aeterni Patris climate of post

Vatican II, there is still a place for a philosophia perennis in the Catholic

Church of the 21st century.

4088 words

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books:

Gerald McCool, The Neo-Thomists, Marquette 2003

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Ronald McCamy, Out of a Kantian Chrysalis? A Maritainian Critique of Fr. Maréchal,

Lang 1998

Mary Michael Spangler, Logic: An Aristotelian Approach, University Press of

America, 1986

John MacQuarrie, Existentialism: An introduction, guide and assessment, Penguin,

1973

Papers from various websites:

John Knasas, Thomist Metaphysics Past, Present and Future, Center for Thomistic

Studies, University of St Thomas, Houston, Texas, USA.

Knasas, Whither the Neo-Thomsit Revival? Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought

and Culture 3.4 (2000) 121-149

Battista Mondin, Legitimacy and limits of theological pluralism,

www.ewtn.com/library/Theology/PLURALISM.HTM

John Ziegler, Transcendental Thomism: Relflections upon a legacy of Decartes, from

Topica Number 1, Sept 2001

Don Boland, Le point de Départ de Maréchal, Topica Sept 2001,

www.cts.org.au/2001/topica/lepoint.htm

Fides et Ratio, John Paul II, on www.ewtn.com/library/ENCYC/JP2fides.htm

John R White, The Neo-Scholastic Revival on

www.catholicsocialscientists.org/Article--White--Ockham--mss.htm

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http://www.ewtn.com/library/ENCYC/JP2fides.htm

http://www.cts.org.au/2001/topica/lepoint.htm

http://www.ewtn.com/library/Theology/PLURALISM.HTM



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From Aeterni Patris to Fides Et Ratio Draft 2

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