Fortnight Publications Ltd.

From Flat Earth to Long-Lasting Foundations?Author(s): Peter RobinsonSource: Fortnight, No. 213 (Feb. 4 - 17, 1985), pp. 5-6Published by: Fortnight Publications Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25547673 .

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_Peter Robinson_

FROM FLAT EARTH

TO LONG-LASTING

FOUNDATIONS? DUP deputy leader, PETER ROBINSON asks what would happen if Sinn Fein became the majority representatives ofthe Catholic

electorate, and stresses that past political structures rejected by one section of the

community provide no viable basis for

building future stability. POLITICAL commentators generally did little to assess the effect of the rise of the IRA's political front, Sinn Fein, on the Protestant

community. That is, of course, apart from the surface observation

that Protestants were angry and resentful that Catholics appeared to support the murderers of their fellow citizens. Most evaluators

see the important factor as being the rivalry for the Catholic vote

between Sinn Fein and the SDLP. But few Unionist politicians (at least those who look beyond today's events) could have failed to read the warning signs and ask themselves 4What if?'

What if Sinn Fein became the representative chosen by a

majority of the Catholic electorate? For the Catholic community to take this step, albeit through the ballot box, would be an

assertion that the politics of force was their option. It would signal that shooting and bombing were not the design of a small minority

within their tradition but were the strategems supported by the

community itself. It would be a declaration of war. Unionist

politicians in such circumstances would give no counsel other than

to urge the Loyalist community into the trenches.

The situation is all the more complex in that the Unionist

perspective of the SDLP is only marginally more generous than

their impression of Sinn Fein. After all they do have the same goal.

They both have publicly given evidence that the 'right to self

determination of the Ulster people' should be undermined. Sinn

Fein are prepared to do it through murder and violence while the

SDLP opt for, and urge, London and Dublin to do the dirty work

for them.

In this climate there are few real tactical or directional

alternatives. The option of doing nothing (usually the first to be

considered) has its attractions. The advocates of this course argue that we should let the Catholic community sort itself out and

prepare ourselves for the consequences. The consequences could

only be either to slide into widespread conflict or trigger govern ment intervention.

I find neither appealing. We have spent years as a people

suffering from the former and paying the price for the latter. The best this choice could offer is to preserve the status quo. Who finds that an attractive proposition? Can we justify doing nothing at the

expense of other people's lives?

Naturally, 'doing something' is no guarantee of avoiding the

consequences of 'doing nothing'. Indeed the more we advance

down the road of political stability the more panic will penetrate into IRA activity. However society may be better able to deal and

cope with such a situation if political stability were achieved. At

any rate a parallel security initiative will be needed.

Yet what are the odds on reaching agreement? The process can

only be worth trying if there is a reasonable chance of success, and

that is dependent upon the will, agility and flexibility of both sides to such negotiations. It's a two way process.

A lot depends on whether the SDLP have a yearning to be saved from Sinn Fein dominance, and whether they act as observers

while Sinn Fein wield the sceptre. Are they prepared to be a real

political alternative or do they prefer to be a pale reflection and

imitation of Sinn Fein bellicosity arid belligerence. Carbon-copy politicians are not likely to be found more attractive than the

pure-product thoroughbred species. The SDLP will dislike this

exposition. It is not intended to be hurtful - however the truth

would become more popular if it did not always state ugly facts.

A first step will be an acceptance of some realities. Let's try a

few. First there is the Thatcher reality, accepted and agreed by Dr Fitz Gerald in the communique after the last Chequers summit.

This is that Northern Ireland shall remain part of the United

Kingdom as long as that is the wish of its people. We all know what that means, but let me spell it out.

Any structures set up in Northern Ireland will recognise Ulster

is an entity within the United Kingdom. This must be accepted without any blurring of the edges, without circuitous and cir

cumventive small print or surreptitious language. In constitutional

law this principle is a legitimate and honourable ordnance, a

self-evident trust, and incontrovertible reality. They call it the

right to self-determination.

Now, flat-earthers swallow hard, because not everyone in the

province identifies with that constitutional actuality. Ways must be found and mutually agreed which encourage and gain their confidence while not endangering the doctrine of consent.

continued overleaf

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FROM YUGOSLAVIA highlights from the

NINTH RIJEKA INTERNATIONAL DRAWING BIENNALE

and KOSOVA ARTISTS PRINTS FEB 7?MAR 2

BEDFORD ST., BELFAST. Tel. 221402. Tues?Sat

10am?6pm_.

Fortnight 4th February 1985 5

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Robinson on talks with SDLP continued from page 5

Then there is the 'cracked foundation'. The structures of the

past rejected by one section of the community or the other present no viable basis for building future stability. We must have the breadth of vision to consider other systems; the preparedness to

explore methods of achieving a strong and durable democrat

ically-based solution which envisages a significant role for

minorities to feel part of the body politic, but does not undermine the majority's position. We must search for a way to safeguard the

human rights of the individual that will not unduly restrict the

rights of society; a way to protect the constitutional dignity of minorities without endangering or offending the constitutional

majority and vice-versa.

While Unionists must attempt to understand the mountains of

history that cause the Republic of Ireland to have an interest, even

concern, for events in Northern Ireland, the Republic must

recognise that there are oceans of reality that assert they have no

internal role or negotiating role in Northern Ireland. This will

essentially be the realm of Ulster's constitutional politicians. Does

anyone out there still want to talk? It sure sounds like a fairly formidable task.

Certainly it's not going to be done without persistance and

determination. If it is to be done it must stick in the community itself

- that means not screwing the other guy for that which he

cannot deliver. The search for a solution has failed before. Such

failure disappoints us all, but should not do so to the extent of

stopping us from trying again. It is a fundamental for success that the British Government

ensure no second front of bargaining exists to dilute the

enthusiasm for negotiation of Ulster's representatives.

Surely in Ulster we can find enough leadership, dare I say statemanship, to face the challenge, and enough courage to meet

the adversity of men who will not wish us well. Recognising the

host of difficulties that we face, I can only state a sincere and

genuine willingness to proceed. It is not difficult to detect the reluctance on the part of the SDLP to embark upon this process. I

cannot assume what remarks of mine could urge the SDLP not

only to come to the conference table but have them reach it with a

mind to do business; but I can say that if I see them there they will meet someone who is prepared to talk and listen, both in a spirit of

goodwill. Most remarks worth making are commonplace remarks.

What makes them worth saying is that we really mean them.

COMING TOGETHER

TO PREVENT THE

riNAL NIGHTMARE Official Unionist general secretary FRANK MILLAR says his party is showing more flexibility and generosity than anyone can

remember, and warns that the demise of the SDLP would have potentially calamitous results for Northern Ireland as a whole.

WHAT IS the state of current unionist thinking? The immediate answer is really quite simple: the Unionists are seated at the

conference table indicating a greater flexibility and generosity than most commentators can remember.

To Unionists therefore it seems more pertinent to ask 'Where

are the Nationalists?' Certainly they are not at the conference

table, and however one might describe their public posture, the

term generous is unlikely to feature.

Should John Hume fail to take charge of his party and lead them back from the wilderness it may be said with near certainty that the

SDLP's decline will continue, and the voice of constitutional nationalism represented by the SDLP will wither and die with

potentially calamitous results for the Catholic community and for Northern Ireland as a whole.

In April of last year I told Unionists in South Down that the

I Frank Millar

demise of the SDLP and the emergence of Sinn Fein as

representative of mainstream Catholic opinion would herald the

beginning of the ultimate nightmare for all the people of Northern Ireland. I have not changed my mind, but a year on I must say that

I am subject to increasing doubt as to the SDLP's ability (and on occasion even their desire) to survive.

They may well have felt the proposals set forth in our discussion

paper The Way Forward' fell far short of their expectations and

requirements. I would have thought nonetheless they merited

some positive response. In short the proposals were -

1. A form of partnership in a devolved administration, admittedly with no guaranteed role for any particular party but with a

guaranteed role for every party committed to the democratic

process; 2. A Bill of Rights in an attempt to meet the apparent inability of

many sections of the Catholic community to identify with the institutions of the State, which subsequently became known as

alienation, and

3. An acknowledgement by Unionists of the legitimacy of the Irish identity and tradition.

So the door was opened and Nationalists might reasonably have

been expected to try and push it a little further. In fairness, the Irish Government warmly praised our publication, but the

leadership of the SDLP behaved as if it hadn't happened and tied themselves instead to the strategy which came a cropper at the

Thatcher/FitzGerald summit. I confess I wasn't unduly troubled by that since it didn't make

sense for John Hume to move before Mrs Thatcher's attitude to

the New Ireland Forum Report was made plain and beyond doubt. However, it didn't make sense either for him to close off all

other means of recovery. One conspiracy theory was that Hume saw the entire Forum

operation as a means to kill off the Irish unity option -

he knows it

isn't on - and thereafter to focus his party's attention on the need

for a new beginning within Northern Ireland itself. But it hasn't

happened and the party of dialogue continues to sit out in the cold,

refusing to even talk to the other parties in Northern Ireland without whom we cannot begin the process of reconciliation.

The SDLP of course have difficulties all of their own, and my party has quite consciously refrained from actions and sentiments

which might compound them. Indeed to put it more positively, as well as more accurately, I have to say that in our modest way we

have sought to ease their position. In a notably conciliatory Christmas message my party leader,

Jim Molyneaux, called for an end to verbal abuse and the digging of sectarian trenches; reminded politicians of their duty to provide 'more than perpetual acrimony and dispute'; and indicated his

readiness, in the context of current controversies, to listen to the

leaders of constitutional nationalism and to join with them in discussion of realities and perceptions'.

Several commentators have noted that Mr Molyneaux's choice

of terms closely resembled those frequently employed by Mr

Hume, and I have no doubt it was Mr Molyneaux's initiative which

paved the way for other more public exhortations to talk.

Regrettably the DUP and SDLP appear locked in dispute as to what may and may not be on the agenda for inter-party talks. Mr

Molyneaux has framed an agenda which will at least enable

dialogue to get under way.

6 Fortnight 4th February 1985

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