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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1969–1976 VOLUME XXV ARAB-ISRAELI CRISIS AND WAR, 1973 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington
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FOREIGN RELATIONSOF THE

UNITED STATES19691976VOLUME XXV ARAB-ISRAELI CRISIS AND WAR, 1973

DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington

Foreign Relations of the United States, 19691976 Volume XXV

Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973

Editors General Editor

Nina Howland Craig Daigle Edward C. Keefer

United States Government Printing Office Washington 2011

DEPARTMENT OF STATE Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs July 2011

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001

PrefaceThe Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the Foreign Relations series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991. Public Law 102138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102138 added a new Title IV to the Department of States Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.). The statute requires that the Foreign Relations series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the Foreign Relations series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the Foreign Relations series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign Relations series that document the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administrations of Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. The subseries presents a documentary record of major foreign policy decisions and actions of both presidents. This volume documents U.S. policymaking toward the Arab-Israeli dispute between January and III

IV Preface December 1973, i.e., the months before, during, and immediately after the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973. Although part of a larger integrated series, this volume is intended to stand on its own. Readers who want a more complete context for U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli dispute during the Nixon and Ford administrations should consult other volumes in the 19691976 subseries of the Foreign Relations series. U.S. policy regarding the dispute during the first Nixon administration is covered in Volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 19691972, while U.S. policy regarding the Jordan crisis of September 1970 is addressed in Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 19691972; Jordan, September 1970. U.S.-Soviet discussions on the Arab-Israeli Disputethe Two-Power Talksis documented in Volume XII, Soviet Union, 19691970, while superpower discussions on the Middle East leading up to and during the Moscow Summit is covered in Volume XIII, Soviet Union, 19701971 and Volume XIV, Soviet Union, 19711972. U.S.-Soviet discussions regarding the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973 are documented in Volume XV, Soviet Union, June 1972August 1974. Readers will find extensive coverage of the oil and energy aspects of the dispute, including the U.S. response to the Arab oil embargo which followed the October 1973 War, in Volume XXXVI, Energy Crisis, 19691974, and Volume XXXVII, Energy Crisis, 19741980. The development of U.S. policy in the aftermath of the October 1973 War, highlighted by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissingers shuttle diplomacy between Israel and the Arab states, is documented in Volume XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 19741976. Lastly, readers interested in bilateral relations with Iran and Iraq during the Nixon and Ford administrations should consult Volume E4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 19691972, and Volume XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 19731976. Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 19691976, Volume XXV The editors of this volume sought to present documentation that explains and illuminates the major foreign policy decisions taken by the administration of Richard M. Nixon toward the Arab-Israeli dispute in the months preceding, during, and immediately following the October 1973 War. Documentation in this volume includes memoranda; records of discussions both within the U.S. policy-making community, as well as with foreign officials; cables to and from U.S. diplomatic posts; and papers that set forth policy issues and options, and which show decisions or actions taken. The emphasis is on the process by which U.S. policy developed, and the major repercussions of its implementation rather than the details of policy execution. This volume covers an important period in the history of the U.S. engagement with the Arab-Israeli dispute. The October 1973 War rep-

Preface V resented not only a renewed clash of Arab and Israeli forces, it ignited an energy crisis brought on by an Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) oil embargo against the United States, and led to the threat of a direct superpower confrontation. The war also prompted the United States to undertake an unprecedented role in the pursuit of a negotiated settlement to the dispute. At the beginning of 1973, the Middle East was in a state of diplomatic and military stalemate. There had been no overt armed clash of Arab and Israeli forces since the August 1970 ceasefire which ended the three-year Egyptian-Israeli War of Attrition and, with the exception of the Jordanian crisis the following month, no major event had occurred that disrupted the regions strategic status quo in over two years. Moreover, efforts toward a diplomatic settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute during President Nixons first term, such as the Jarring mission and the Rogers Plan, had had little success. Even Egyptian President Anwar Sadats decision to expel Soviet advisers from Egypt in July 1972 did not have an immediate effect on the stalemate. During his first term in office, Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, had been preoccupied largely with ending U.S. military involvement in the Vietnam War, the burgeoning rapprochement with the Peoples Republic of China, and pursuing detente with the Soviet Union. Yet both Nixon and Kissinger were aware of the importance of the Middle East to U.S. national securityeconomically, politically, and militarilyand, with the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in January 1973, sought to launch a new diplomatic initiative for peace in the Middle East during Nixons second term. In order for this new initiative to succeed, Nixons foreign policy team needed to confront the legacies of the 1967 war. The first third of this volume, covering January to October 1973, documents the Nixon administrations efforts to break this diplomatic and military impasse while seeking to prevent simmering tensions from instigating renewed hostilities. Within this context, Washington attempted to address Israels continued insistence upon Arab recognition, direct negotiations, and security assurances as preconditions for its withdrawal from the territory it occupied in June 1967, territory which it considered necessary to act as a buffer against future Arab attacks. On the other hand, U.S. policymakers also had to grapple with Arab dissatisfaction toward a status quo that, from the Arab perspective, placed Israel in a dominant position. Indeed, Sadat had concluded by 1972 that military action was necessary to restore Egyptian honor and, more importantly, prompt U.S. diplomatic intervention, all with the ultimate aim of bringing about a peace settlement acceptable to the Arab states. Ultimately, the Nixon administration saw the conflict as part of the Cold War struggle; any move to bring the Arab states and Israel to a negoti-

VI Preface ated settlement needed to take into consideration the Soviet Union, whose role in the region had risen significantly in the years since 1967. The core of this volume is U.S. diplomacy during the course of the October 1973 War itself, the outbreak of which, following the attack by Egyptian and Syrian forces on Israeli positions in the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights on October 6, 1973, presented the United States with a number of profound and, at times, conflicting concerns. In a strictly regional context, the October 1973 War pushed the Nixon administration to weigh Washingtons historic commitment to the security of Israel alongside a desire to avoid an irreparable rift with the Arab world, especially Arab states such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia with which the United States had generally maintained good relations. Concurrently, the Nixon administration was compelled to address mounting concerns that the Soviet Union might exploit the tensions in the region, a prospect that would hamper, if not wreck, its pursuit of East-West detente. Within weeks, the shifting tide of the war against the Egyp tians pushed the superpowers toward a military confrontation of their own. U.S. policymakers sought to prevent the war from triggering a wider, more destructive conflict that would shatter the regional and global power balance. The volume provides extensive documentation of the high level contacts between Washington and officials of the belligerent countries, the United Nations, and the Soviet Union. Due to the increasing impact of Watergate on Nixon and many of his advisors, Kissinger undertook the management of the conflict and efforts to bring about a negotiated ceasefire. The volume also illustrates the actions undertaken to initiate and execute the massive military re-supply of the Israel Defense Forces following the IDFs heavy losses during the early stages of the war, the internal institutional politics of the airlift debate, and the largely unsuccessful diplomatic push to win the support for U.S. policy aims by Washingtons Western European allies. The volume concludes by documenting events during the immediate postwar period. Following the October 1973 War, the quest for peace between Israel and the Arab states became a top priority for U.S. policymakers. Kissingers late October trip to the region, his first as Secretary of State, confirmed the U.S. growing postwar position as mediator in the Arab-Israeli dispute, one which would continue through the remainder of the 1970s. Yet Washingtons decision to actively aid the Israeli military presented a new set of diplomatic challenges. While the OAPEC oil embargo is documented extensively in Foreign Relations, 19691976, Volume XXXVI, Energy Crisis, 19691974, the political dimensions of the embargo and the Nixon administrations immediate response to them are presented here. Editorial Methodology The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversations are placed according to the

Preface VII time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted. Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The original document is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents in the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume. Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed by headings, source notes, and numbers of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the original document are so identified by footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents. The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document. Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record. The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than page numbers.

VIII Preface Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the Foreign Relations series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations. Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act Review Under the terms of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA) of 1974 (44 U.S.C. 2111 note), the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) has custody of the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The requirements of the PRMPA and implementing regulations govern access to the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA to review for additional restrictions in order to ensure the protection of the privacy rights of former Nixon White House officials, since these officials were not given the opportunity to separate their personal materials from public papers. Thus, the PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA formally to notify the Nixon Estate and former Nixon White House staff members that the agency is scheduling for public release Nixon White House historical materials. The Nixon Estate and former White House staff members have 30 days to contest the release of Nixon historical materials in which they were a participant or are mentioned. Further, the PRMPA and implementing regulations require NARA to segregate and return to the creator of files private and personal materials. All Foreign Relations volumes that include materials from NARAs Nixon Presidential Materials Project are processed and released in accordance with the PRMPA. Nixon White House Tapes Access to the Nixon White House tape recordings is governed by the terms of the PRMPA and an access agreement with the Office of Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records Administration and the Nixon Estate. In February 1971, President Nixon initiated a voice activated taping system in the Oval Office of the White House and, subsequently, in the Presidents Office in the Executive Office Building, Camp David, the Cabinet Room, and the White House and Camp David telephones. The audiotapes include conversations of President Nixon with his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry

Preface IX Kissinger, other White House aides, Secretary of State William P. Rogers, other Cabinet officers, members of Congress, and key foreign officials. The clarity of the voices on the tape recordings is often very poor, but the editors have made every effort to verify the accuracy of the transcripts produced here. Readers are advised that the tape recording is the official document; the transcript represents an interpretation of that document. Through the use of digital audio and other advances in technology, the Office of the Historian has been able to enhance the tape recordings and over time produce more accurate transcripts. The result is that some transcripts printed here may differ from transcripts of the same conversations printed in previous Foreign Relations volumes. The most accurate transcripts possible, however, cannot substitute for listening to the recordings. Readers are urged to consult the recordings themselves for a full appreciation of those aspects of the conversations that cannot be captured in a transcript, such as the speakers inflections and emphases that may convey nuances of meaning, as well as the larger context of the discussion. Declassification Review The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12958, as amended, on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws. The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2006 and was completed in 2010, resulted in the decision to withhold 3 documents in full, excise a paragraph or more in 9 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 37 documents. The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate and reliable account of the Nixon administrations policy toward the Arab-Israeli dispute in the months preceding, during, and immediately following the October 1973 War.

X Preface Acknowledgements The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, located at the time of research at the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II), at College Park, Maryland. The editors also wish to acknowledge the Richard Nixon Estate for allowing access to the Nixon Presidential recordings and the Richard Nixon Library & Birthplace for facilitating that access. John Haynes of the Library of Congress was responsible for expediting access to the Kissinger Papers, including the transcripts of Henry Kissingers telephone conversations. Bill Burr of the National Security Archive was helpful throughout the compiling process in pointing to and providing copies of documents in his edited collection on the October 1973 War. The editors were able to use the Kissinger Papers, including the transcripts of telephone conversations, with the permission of Henry Kissinger. The editors would like to thank Rita Baker and Laurie Van Hook for their intellectual contributions to the volume. The editors would also like to thank Alex Wieland for his assistance and contributions in the final stages of producing the volume. The volume was researched, selected, and annotated by Nina Howland and Craig Daigle under the supervision of Edward C. Keefer, former General Editor of the Foreign Relations series. Chris Tudda coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Susan C. Weetman, Chief of the Declassification and Publishing Division. Renee Goings did the copy and technical editing. Do Mi Stauber prepared the index. Bureau of Public Affairs July 2011 Ambassador Edward Brynn Acting Historian

ContentsPreface ................................................................... Sources ................................................................... Abbreviations and Terms ............................................ Persons .................................................................. Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973 ................................... Index ..................................................................... III XIII XXI XXVII 1 1215

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SourcesSources for the Foreign Relations Series The 1991 Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support, cooperate with the Department of State by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (lot files) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Departments Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Departments indexed Central Files through July 1973 have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland (Archives II). Beginning in July 1973, the Department phased out the old subject-numeric Central Files, replacing them with an electronic system, the State Archiving System (SAS), which have been transferred to the National Archives and, as the Central Foreign Policy File, comprises part of the online Access to Archival Databases (AAD). The reader will note a period of overlap of the two systems existed during 1973, which is reflected in the citations found in this volume. The Departments decentralized (or lot) files covering the 19691976 period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred or are in the process of being transferred from the Departments custody to Archives II. The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full access to the papers of President Nixon and other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries and the Nixon Presidential Materials Project include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies including the National XIII

XIV Sources Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nixons papers were transferred to their permanent home at the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, in Yorba Linda, California, after research for this volume was completed. The Nixon Library staff is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Additional materials related to the foreign policy of the Nixon administration can also be found in the National Security Adviser files at the Ford Library. Dr. Henry Kissinger has approved access to his papers at the Library of Congress. The papers are a key source for the Nixon-Ford subseries of Foreign Relations. Department of State historians also have full access to records of the Department of Defense, particularly the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of Defense and their major assistants. The Central Intelligence Agency has provided full access to its files. Research for this volume involved special access to restricted documents at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, the Ford Library, the Library of Congress, and other agencies. While all of the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it has been extracted from still classified documents. The Ford Library staff is processing and declassifying many of the documents examined for this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Sources for Foreign Relations, 19691976, Volume XXV In the preparation of this volume, the editors made extensive use of Presidential papers and other White House records held, at the time of research, at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Archives and Records Administration, in College Park, Maryland (Archives II). These files have subsequently been transferred to the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum in Yorba Linda, California. Within the National Security Council Files, several collections are invaluable. The Kissinger Office Files, especially the country files sub-collection, were critical for documenting the Nixon administrations efforts to manage the Arab-Israeli dispute in the months leading up to the outbreak of hostilities, as well as the administrations efforts to manage the conflict amidst the countervailing pressures of the U.S-Israeli bilateral relationship, relations with the Arab countries, domestic concerns, the Watergate investigations, and the Cold War. This collection yielded a large number of important high-level documents, including memoranda of conversations; correspondence with Soviet and Middle Eastern officials, including backchannel communications; intelligence reports; and extensive documentation related to Kissingers travels to the region during and immediately after the war. Similarly, the

Sources

XV

Country Files, Backchannel Messages file, Harold H. Saunders Files, Presidential Correspondence file, Presidential/HAK Memoranda of Conversations File, Presidents Daily Briefing File, the Presidents Trip Files, and the VIP Visit Files, are rich resources for documenting both the National Security Councils (NSC) role in the crisis and President Nixons communications with the leaders of the Arab states, Israel, and the Soviet Union. Separate from the main NSC Files collection, the NSC Institutional Files, also known as the H-Files, contain records of high-level meetings, requests for studies, and presidential decisions; for this volume, this collection provided the crucial records of the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) meetings held following the outbreak of the war on October 6, 1973. Further NSC documentation can also be found in the NSC Secretariat Files. One of the most important collections for documenting the war period is the Henry Kissinger Telephone Transcripts. As the October 1973 War began while Kissinger was in New York for the annual opening of the United Nations General Assembly, the telcons, produced from notes taken by White House secretaries and from tape recordings, are an essential source for documenting U.S. diplomatic moves taken at the outset of the crisis. In addition to this collection at the Nixon Library, these transcripts have also been made available online by the Department of State and the National Security Archive. Documentation in this volume of the pre-war period is enhanced by the White House tape recording collection. These conversations, transcribed from recordings made by President Nixons secret taping system, in operation until its removal in July 1973, provides an intimate record of both U.S. policy considerations and the candid personal assessments of the situation by the President and his closest advisers. The Presidents Daily Diary, in the White House Central Files, is useful for tracking the Presidents daily schedule. This Nixon Librarys documentation on U.S. decision making before, during, and after the October 1973 War is supplemented by the National Security Adviser Files at the Ford Presidential Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Within these files, two collections were of particular importance to this volume. The Memoranda of Conversations collection covers nearly the entirety of the 19731976 period, making it almost as valuable a resource for research on the Nixon administration as it is for the Ford administration. Additional documentation on the October War can be found in the Scowcroft Daily Work Files. Moreover, the Papers of Henry Kissinger at the Library of Congress proved an important resource for rounding out the administrations handling of the October War. While nearly all of the documentation in the Kissinger Papers related to the policy decisions of the Nixon administration on the Arab-Israeli dispute during 1973 can also be found at the Nixon Li-

XVI Sources brary, the volume benefitted greatly from a number of important documents on the October War, including memoranda of conversations, found only in this collection. In documenting the role of the Department of State in U.S. policy making, a number of sources are important. The Department of State Central Files, located at Archives II in College Park, Maryland, provide a rich repository of telegrams, memoranda of conversations, and intradepartmental correspondence on U.S. policy in the Middle East. For research on the Arab-Israeli conflict in general and the October War in particular, the files within the POL 27 and POL ISRUS subject-numeric headings are the most valuable. However, any researchers working in Department of State files for 1973 should be aware that beginning in July of that year, the Department began to phase out the old subjectnumeric system in favor of the new electronic State Archiving System (SAS). Documents from the SAS system have been transferred to the National Archives and comprise the Central Foreign Policy File. Declassified documents within this collection are available online in the Access to Archival Databases (AAD). This systemic transition occurred over the course of several months. As a result, readers of this volume will see overlapping references to both systems during the last five months of 1973. In addition to the Central Files/Central Foreign Policy File, the Department of State lot files should not be overlooked. With Henry Kissingers appointment as Secretary of State in September 1973, no research on the Departments role in shaping the Nixon administrations handling of the Arab-Israeli dispute would be complete without consulting the Office Records of Henry Kissinger (Lot 91 D 414) and the Transcripts of Secretary Kissingers Staff Meetings (Lot 78 D 443). Research into the Department of States role was enhanced by access to the appointment diaries of Secretary of State William P. Rogers which were made available to Department of State historians with the generous assistance of Secretary Rogers estate. For material on the Department of Defenses contribution to Washingtons policy formulations, two collections stand out. The Diary of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas Moorer, provides an extremely valuable source for documenting the United States airlift to Israel and the military alert of October 2425, 1973. The Moorer Diary also reflects the sharp disagreements between the Departments of Defense and State during the October 1973 War and presents a very different perspective on the conflict from that offered by Kissinger and his staff. The Diary was transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration, where it is held as part of Record Group 218 (Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) at Archives II. Likewise, the papers of James R. Schlesinger at the Library of Congress also provide useful documentation regarding both the airlift and the alert, though these are

Sources XVII far more limited in scope than the Moorer Diary. On the Central Intelligence Agencys role, the Files of the Directorate of Intelligence and the Files of the National Intelligence Council proved the most valuable. It should also be noted that declassified CIA documentation related to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the October War can be found online through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Electronic Reading Room on the CIAs website.

Unpublished SourcesDepartment of StateCentral Files. See National Archives and Records Administration below. Lot Files. For lot files already transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland, Record Group 59, see National Archives and Records Administration below.

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MarylandRecord Group 59, General Records of the Department of State Central Foreign Policy File Central Files DEF 125 ISR POL ISRUS POL 7 JORDAN POL 7 US/KISSINGER POL 27 ARABISR POL 2714 ARABISR POL 2714 ARABISR/UN POL 2715 ARABISR Lot Files Office of the Secretary of State, Transcripts of Secretary of State Henry Kissingers Staff Meetings, 19731977, Lot 78 D 443 Office of the Secretary of State, Office Records of Henry A. Kissinger, Lot 91 D 414 S/SI (Executive Secretariat) Files, Briefing Books: Lot 74 D 416 Record Group 218, Official Records of the Joint Staff Records of Admiral Thomas H. Moorer Diary, October 1973

XVIII

Sources

Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (Now at the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California)National Security Council Files Backchannel Files Country Files, Europe: U.S.-USSR, USSR Country Files, Middle East: Arab Republic of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Middle East (General), Middle East War, Morocco; Secretary Kissingers Trip to Middle East Harold H. Saunders Files: Jordan, Middle East Negotiations Files Henry A. Kissinger Office Files: Country Files Europe, Exchange of Notes Between Dobrynin and Kissinger Europe, USSR Middle East, Dinitz Middle East, Egypt Middle East, Egypt/Ismail Middle East, Jordan/Rifai Middle East, Palestinians Middle East, Rabin/Dinitz Middle East, Rabin/Kissinger (Dinitz) Middle East, Saunders MemorandaSensitive Middle East, Saudi Arabia Kissinger Trip Files Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts Presidential Correspondence Presidential/HAK Memoranda of Conversations Presidents Daily Briefing File Presidents Trip Files Subject File VIP Visits File National Security Council Institutional Files (H-Files) Washington Special Actions Group Meetings Washington Special Actions Group Minutes National Security Council Secretariat Files White House Central Files: Presidents Daily Diary White House Tapes

Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, MichiganNational Security Adviser Files Memoranda of Conversation Scowcroft Daily Work Files

Central Intelligence AgencyFiles of the Directorate of Intelligence Job 79T00861A Job 79T01023A

Sources XIXOffice of Economic Research Files Job 80T01315A Files of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) Job 79R01012A

Library of Congress, Washington, DCPapers of Henry A. Kissinger Geopolitical File Miscellany Papers of James R. Schlesinger

Personal Papers of William P. RogersAppointment Books, 1973

Published SourcesCline, Ray S. Policy Without Intelligence, Foreign Policy, No. 17 (Winter 19741975), pp. 121135. Kissinger, Henry. Crisis: An Anatomy of Two Foreign Policy Crises. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003. Kissinger, Henry. Years of Upheaval. Boston: Little, Brown, 1982. Meir, Golda. My Life. New York: Putnam, 1975. The New York Times Nixon, Richard. RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. New York: Grosset and Dunlop, 1978. Rabin, Yitzhak. The Rabin Memoirs. Boston: Little, Brown, 1979. Sadat, Anwar el-. In Search of Identity: An Autobiography. New York: Harper, 1978. United Nations. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1973. United States. Department of State. Bulletin, 19691973. United States. National Archives and Records Administration. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon, 1973. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975.

Abbreviations and TermsAAA, anti-aircraft artillery addee, addressee AEC, Atomic Energy Commission AID, Agency for International Development Amb, Ambassador APC, armored personnel carrier Aramco, Arabian American Oil Company ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State BAM, (Straits of) Bab al-Mandeb BBC, British Broadcasting Corporation BSO, Black September Organization CBU, cluster bomb CCC, Commodity Credit Corporation CENTO, Central Treaty Organization CIA, Central Intelligence Agency CINCEUR, Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Europe CINCMEAFSA, Commander in Chief, Middle East/South Asia and Africa South of the Sahara CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific CINCSTRIKE, Commander in Chief, Strike Command CJCS, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff COMINT, communications intelligence COMUSFORAZ, Commander, U.S. Forces, Azores COSVN, Central Office for South Vietnam CSCE, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe CY, calendar year DAO, Defense Attache Office DATT, defense attache DCI, Director of Central Intelligence DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission DEFCON, Defense Condition Dept, Department of State Deptel, Department of State telegram Deptoff, Department of State officer DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency DI/OER, Office of Economic Research, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency DirGen, Director General DOD, Department of Defense DOD/ISA, Department of Defense, International Security Affairs DPRC, Defense Program Review Committee DSD, Deputy Secretary of Defense EC, European Community

XXI

XXII Abbreviations and TermsECM, electronic countermeasure EDT, Eastern Daylight Time ELINT, electronic intelligence EmbOff, Embassy officer EST, Eastern Standard Time Exdis, Exclusive Distribution (extremely limited distribution) EXIM, Export-Import Bank FAO, Food and Agricultural Organization FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service FMS, Foreign Military Sales FonMin, Foreign Minister FonOff, Foreign Office FRG, Federal Republic of Germany FROG, Free-Rocket-Over-Ground FY, fiscal year FYI, for your information GA, General Assembly (United Nations) Gen., General GMT, Greenwich Mean Time GNP, Gross National Product GOA, Government of Algeria GOE, Government of Egypt GOI, Government of Israel GOJ, Government of Jordan GOL, Government of Lebanon HAK, Henry A. Kissinger Hakto, series indicator for telegrams from Henry Kissinger Helo(s), helicopter(s) HHS, Harold H. Saunders HUMINT, human intelligence IAEC, Israel Atomic Energy Commission IAF, Israeli Air Force IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross IDA, Institute for Defense Analysis IDF, Israeli Defense Forces INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State IO/UNP, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State IRG, Interdepartmental Regional Group JAA, Jordan Arab Army JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff JCSM, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum K, Henry A. Kissinger KGB, Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti (State Security Committee) (USSR)

Abbreviations and Terms XXIIIKM, kilometer LAW, light anti-tank weapon LIG, Legislative Interdepartmental Group Limdis, Limited Distribution LSE, Lawrence S. Eagleburger LTA, light transport aircraft MAC, Military Airlift Command (U.S. Air Force) MAC, Military Assistance Commission MAP, Military Assistance Program MASF, Military Assistance Service Funded MBFR, Mutual Balanced Force Reduction M.B.P.D., million barrels per day ME, Middle East Memcon, Memorandum of Conversation MFN, Most Favored Nation MIG, A.I Mikoyan i M.I. Gurevich (commonly, the model of Soviet fighter aircraft named for aircraft designers Mikoyan and Gurevich) MG, Major General MilAtt, Military Attache NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State NEA/ARN, Office of Lebanon, Jordan, Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State NEA/EGY, Office of Egypt Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State NEA/IAI, Office of Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State NESA, Near East and South Asia NMCC, National Military Command Center NIE, National Intelligence Estimate NIC, National Intelligence Council NoDis, No Distribution (other than to persons indicated) Noforn, No Foreign Dissemination Notal, not received by all addressees NPT, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty NSA, National Security Agency NSC, National Security Council NSCIC, National Security Council Intelligence Committee OAPEC, Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries OASD/ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs OAU, Organization of African Unity OBE, overtaken by events OMB, Office of Management and Budget OC/T, Communications Center, Bureau of Administration, Department of State OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OPEC, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense PCC, Palestine Conciliation Commission (United Nations) PermRep, Permanent Representative (United Nations)

XXIV Abbreviations and TermsPFLOP, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine PFLP, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine PHOTINT, photographic intelligence P.L., Public Law PLO, Palestine Liberation Organization PM, PriMin, PrMin, Prime Minister POL, petroleum, oil, and lubricants; political PolOff, Political Officer POW, prisoner of war PRC, Peoples Republic of China PRCLO, Liaison Office of the Peoples Republic of China Ref, reference reftel, reference telegram Rep(s), Representatives Res., Resolution (United Nations) RG, Record Group SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks SAM, surface-to-air missile SARG, Syrian Arab Republic Government SC, Security Council (United Nations) SecDef, Secretary of Defense Sec. Gen., Secretary General SecState, Secretary of State Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State septel, separate telegram SIGINT, signals intelligence SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate SOB, son of a bitch (an expletive) SUMED, Suez Mediterranean pipeline SYG, Secretary-General (United Nations) TAC, Tactical Air Command TASS, Telegrafnoye agentstvo Sovetskovo Soyuza (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union), Soviet news agency TDY, Temporary duty telcon, telephone conversation TIAS, Treaties and International Acts Series Tohak, series indicator for telegrams to Henry Kissinger Tosec, series indicator for telegrams to the Secretary of State TOW, tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire command data link, anti-tank missile TS, top secret U, unclassified UAR, United Arab Republic UK, United Kingdom UN, United Nations UNEF, United Nations Emergency Force UNGA, United Nations General Assembly UNRWA, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East UNSC, United Nations Security Council UNTSO, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization US, United States

Abbreviations and Terms XXVUSA, United States of America; United States Army USAF, United States Air Force USCINCEUR, United States Commander-in-Chief, Europe USDAO, United States Defense Attache Office USG, United States Government USIB, United States Intelligence Board USINT, United States Interests Section USN, United States Navy USNATO, United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization USRep(s), United States Representatives USS, United States Ship USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics UST, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations WH, White House WSAG, Washington Special Actions Group Z, zulu time (Greenwich Mean Time)

PersonsAbouhamad, Khalil, Lebanese Foreign Minister until July 1973 Abu Zaid, Salah, Jordanian Foreign Minister until May 1973 Adams, Sir Philip, British Ambassador to Egypt Adham, Kamal, Advisor to the King of Saudi Arabia; Chief of the Saudi Intelligence Secretariat Agnew, Spiro T., Vice President of the United States until October 10, 1973 Akins, James E., U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia from November 1973 Albert, Carl, Democratic Congressman from Oklahoma; Speaker of the House of Representatives Aldrich, George H., Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State Aleksandrov, Andrei M., Assistant to General Secretary Brezhnev Ali, General Ahmed Ismail, Egyptian Minister of War from February 1973 Allaf, Mowaffak, Minister Counselor, Syrian Mission to the United Nations, Geneva Allon, Yigal, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Arafat, Yasser, leader of Fatah and Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization Armstrong, Willis C., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs Asad, Hafez al-, President of Syria Atherton, Alfred L. (Roy), Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Atiqi, Abdul Rahman al-, Kuwaiti Minister of Oil and Finance Azimov, Sarvar, Soviet Ambassador to Lebanon Babenko, Yuri F., Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy in Washington Bakr, Hassan, President of Iraq Ball, George, Under Secretary of State, 19611968 Balniel, Lord (Robert Lindsay), British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Bar-On, Lt. Colonel Aryeh, Aide to Israeli Defense Minister Dayan Barzani, Mustafa, leader, Kurdistan Democratic Party Begin, Menachem, leader, Herut party (Likud, from September 1973) Benhima, Ahmed Taibi, Moroccan Foreign Minister Benites, Leopoldo, President of the United Nations General Assembly Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr., United States Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations General Assembly Bentsur, Eliahu, Aide to Israeli Foreign Minister Eban Bettal, Diyaallah al-, Director, United Nations Department, Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali, President of Pakistan, to August 13, 1973; Prime Minister of Pakistan from August 14, 1973 Bin Shaker, General Zaid, Jordanian army Chief of Staff Boumedienne, Houari, President of Algeria Bourguiba, Habib, President of Tunisia Bouteflika, Abdelaziz, Algerian Foreign Minister Brandt, Willy, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Brett, Major General Devol, USAF, Director, Near East and South Asia Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, until September 1973

XXVII

XXVIII PersonsBrezhnev, Leonid, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Brown, L. Dean, U.S. Ambassador to Jordan until November 1973 Buffum, William B., U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Bunker, Ellsworth, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large; U.S. Representative to the Geneva Middle East Peace Conference, December 1973 Byrd, Robert C., Democratic Senator from West Virginia Caetano, Marcelo, Prime Minister of Portugal Campbell, Richard P., Jr., Staff Member of the Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; thereafter, Special Assistant to Secretary of State Kissinger Casey, William J., Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from February 2, 1973 Ceausescu, Nicolae, First Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party and President of Romania Chamberlain, Neville, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, 19371940 Chou En-lai (Zhou Enlai), Premier of the Peoples Republic of China Clements, William P., Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense Cline, Ray S., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until November 24, 1973 Colby, William E., Director of Central Intelligence from September 4, 1973 Cooper, Charles, member, National Security Council staff Cromer, Lord (George Rowland Stanley Baring), British Ambassador to the United States Cronkite, Walter, U.S. television journalist Cox, Archibald, Jr., Independent Special Prosecutor for Watergate case, May 19, 1973October 20, 1973 Davies, Rodger P., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Davis, Jeanne W., National Security Council Staff Secretary Dayan, Moshe, Israeli Minister of Defense De Gaulle, Charles, President of France, 19581969 DePoix, Vice Admiral Vincent P., USN, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency DiBona, Charles, Consultant to the President for Energy Dinitz, Simcha, Israeli Ambassador to the United States from March 1973 Dobrynin, Anatoli[y], Soviet Ambassador to the United States Douglas-Home, Sir Alec, British Foreign Secretary Dulles, John Foster, Secretary of State, 19531959 Eade, General George J. (Jim), USAF, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command from April 1973 Eagleburger, Lawrence S., Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State from October 1973; member, National Security Council Staff from June 1973 Eban, Abba, Israeli Foreign Minister Eilts, Hermann F., U.S. Ambassador-designate to Egypt and Principal Officer at the U.S. Interests Section in Cairo, November 1973 to February 1974 Elazar, General David, Chief of Staff, Israel Defense Forces Eliot, Theodore L., Jr., Executive Secretary, Department of State Erian (Iryan), Abdallah el-, Egyptian Ambassador to France Elizur, Michael, Director, North American Affairs, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Eshkol, Levi, Prime Minister of Israel, 19631969 Evron, Ephraim, Deputy Director General, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, Saudi Interior Minister and Second Deputy Prime Minister

Persons

XXIX

Fahmi[y], Ismail, Egyptian Foreign Minister from October 1973 Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, King of Saudi Arabia Farhi, David, Adviser to Israeli Defense Minister Dayan Farouk I, King of Egypt, 19361952 Fattal, Diyallah El-, Director, Office of United Nations Affairs, Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ford, Gerald R., Vice President of the United States from December 3, 1973; previously, Republican Congressman from Michigan and Minority Leader in the House of Representatives Frangie, Suleiman, President of Lebanon Friedheim, Jerry W., Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, January 20, 1973April 13, 1973; Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs from April 13,1973 Fulbright, J. William, Democratic Senator from Arkansas; Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Gamasy[i], Major General Mohammed Abdel Ghani al-, Chief of Operations of Egyptian Armed Forces until October 1973; Chief of Staff from October 1973; Egyptian representative at Kilometer (KM) 101 talks Garment, Leonard, Special Consultant to the President Gayler, Admiral Noel A., USN, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command Gazit, Mordechai, Director, Office of the Prime Minister (Israel) Ghanem, General Iskandar, Lebanese army Commander-in-Chief Ghanim, Muhammad Hafiz, Political Adviser to President Sadat Goodpaster, General Andrew, USA, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Graham, Pierre R., Charge dAffaires, U.S. Embassy in Amman, from November 1973 Grechko, Marshal Andrei A., Soviet Defense Minister and Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Greene, Joseph N., Jr., Principal Officer, U.S. Interests Section in Cairo, until July 1973 Gromyko, Andrei, Soviet Foreign Minister Gur, General Mordechai, Military Attache, Israeli Embassy in Washington; Head of Israeli delegation, Egyptian-Israeli military working group, Geneva Middle East Peace Conference, December 1973 Habbash, George, Secretary General, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Haig, Major General Alexander M., Jr., USA, Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, January 1973August 1973; White House Chief of Staff from August 1973 Hannah, John A., Administrator of the Agency for International Development until October 7, 1973 Hassan II, King of Morocco Hassan bin Talal, Crown Prince of Jordan Heath, Edward, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Helms, Richard M., Director of Central Intelligence until February 2, 1973; thereafter, Ambassador to Iran Hillenbrand, Martin J., U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany Hoskinson, Samuel, National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East and Islamic World, Central Intelligence Agency, from 1972 Hoveyda, Amir-Abbas, Prime Minister of Iran Howe, Commander Jonathan T., USN, member, National Security Council staff Huang Hua, Permanent Representative of the Peoples Republic of China to the United Nations Huang Zhen (Chen), Head of the Liaison Office of the Peoples Republic of China in Washington

XXX PersonsHummel, Arthur W., Jr., Acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, MayDecember 1973 Hussein I, ibn Talal, King of Jordan Hyland, William, member, National Security Council Staff Idan, Avner, Minister, Israeli Embassy in Washington Ismail, Hafiz, Egyptian Presidential Adviser for National Security Affairs Ismail, Mohammed Zakariya, Syrian Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Jackson, Henry M. (Scoop), Democratic Senator from the state of Washington Jamieson, J. Kenneth, Chairman of the Board, Exxon Corporation Jarring, Gunnar, United Nations Special Representative for the Middle East Jobert, Michel, French Foreign Minister from April 1973 Johnson, Lyndon B., President of the United States, 19631969 Johnson, U. Alexis, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until February 1973; Ambassador at Large from February 1973 Jones, Curtis F., Director, Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State Kalb, Marvin, U.S. television journalist Katushev, Konstantin, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Kaylani, Haytham, Syrian Permanent Representative to the United Nations Keating, Kenneth, U.S. Ambassador to Israel from August 1973 Kennedy, John F., President of the United States, 19611963 Kennedy, Colonel Richard T., member, National Security Council staff Khaddam, Abdal-Halim, Syrian Foreign Minister Khalid al Hassan, Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee, Palestinian National Council Khammash, Amer, Minister of the Jordanian Royal Court Kidron, Mordechai, Director General, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kissinger, Henry A., Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; also Secretary of State from September 1973 Korn, David A., Country Director for Lebanon, Jordan, Syrian Arab Republic, and Iraq Affairs, Department of State Kornienko, Georgi M., Head of the USA Division, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kosygin, Alexei N., Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Kraft, Joseph, U.S. newspaper columnist Kubisch, Jack B., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from May 29, 1973 Kuznetsov, Vasily V., First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (Soviet Union) Laird, Melvin, Secretary of Defense until January 29, 1973 Le Duc Tho, Member of the Politburo of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Special Advisor to the DRV Delegation at the Paris Peace Negotiations, 19721973 Leor, General Yisrael, Special Assistant to the Israeli Prime Minister Lindsay, John, Mayor of New York City Lord, Winston, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from October 12, 1973 Love, Governor John, Director of the White House Energy Policy Office and the Presidents Assistant for Energy; previously, Governor of Colorado Luns, Joseph M.A.H., Secretary General, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Magdoub, General Tabra el-, Head of Egyptian delegation, Egyptian-Israeli military working group at Geneva Middle East Peace Conference, December 1973

Persons

XXXI

Mahon, George H., Democratic Congressman from Texas Mailliard, William S., Republican Congressman from California Maitland, Sir Donald, British Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 19731974 Makarov, Vasily, Counselor to the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Malik, Yakov A., Soviet Permanent Representative to the United Nations Mansfield, Mike, Democratic Senator from Montana Mark, David E., Deputy Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State McCarthy, Colman, U.S. journalist McClellan, John L., Democratic Senator from Arkansas McCloskey, Robert J., Ambassador at Large from February 1973 Mclntyre, Sir Laurence, Australian Permanent Representative to the United Nations; President, United Nations Security Council, October 1973 Meir, Golda, Prime Minister of Israel Miskovic, Colonel General Ivan, Special Advisor to the Yugoslav Presidency for Security Affairs until June 1973 Moore, George C., Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Khartoum until March 2, 1973 Moorer, Admiral Thomas, USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mufti, Zahayr Mahmud al-, Jordanian Ambassador to the United States until June 1973 Naffa, Fuad, Lebanese Foreign Minister after July 1973 Nasser [Nasir], Gamal Abdel, President of Egypt, 19561970 Newsom, David D., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Nguyen Van Thieu, President of the Republic of Vietnam Nixon, Richard M., President of the United States Noel, Cleo A., Ambassador to Sudan until March 2, 1973 Noyes, James H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Odeen, Philip, member, National Security Council staff ONeill, Thomas P. (Tip), Democratic Congressman from Massachusetts; Majority Leader in the House of Representatives Parker, Richard B., Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Rabat Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza, Shah of Iran Podgorny, Nikolai V., Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Pompidou, Georges, President of France Popper, David H., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, June 25, 1973January 2, 1974 Porter, William J., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 2, 1973 Primakov, Yevgeny, Deputy Director, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Academy of Sciences of the USSR Quandt, William B., member, National Security Council staff Qabus (Qaboos) bin Taymour, Sultan of Oman Qadhafi (Kaddafi), Muammar al-, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council (Libya); also Libyan Defense Minister Rabin, Yitzhak, Israeli Ambassador to the United States until March 1973 Reston, James (Scotty), U.S. newspaper journalist Riad, Mahmoud, Secretary-General of the Arab League; formerly, Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 19641972

XXXII PersonsRibicoff, Abraham A., Democratic Senator from Connecticut Richardson, Elliot L., Secretary of Defense, JanuaryMay 1973; Attorney General, MayOctober 1973 Rifai, Abdul Munim, Jordanian diplomat; Prime Minister of Jordan, MarchAugust 1969 and JuneSeptember 1970 Rifai, Zaid, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Jordan from May 26, 1973 Rodman, Peter W., member, National Security Council staff Rogers, William P., Secretary of State until September 1973 Ruckelshaus, William D., Deputy Attorney General, July 9, 1973October 20, 1973; Acting Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, April 30, 1973July 9, 1973; Director, Environmental Protection Agency, until April 30, 1973 Rush, Kenneth, Deputy Secretary of State from February 1973; Acting Secretary of State, September 3September 22, 1973 Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State, 19611969 Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah, Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sadad, Farid al-, Jordanian Finance Minister until May 1973 Sadaqa, Najib, Director General, Lebanese Foreign Ministry Sadat, Anwar al-, President of Egypt Salah, Abdullah, Jordanian ambassador to the United States from June 1973 Sapir, Pinchas, Israeli Finance Minister Saqqaf, Omar, Saudi Foreign Minister Saunders, Harold H., member, National Security Council staff Scali, John A., Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations from February 1973 Scheel, Walter, Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany Schlesinger, James R., Director of Central Intelligence, February 2July 2, 1973; Secretary of Defense from July 1973 Scott, Hugh D., Jr., Republican Senator from Pennsylvania; Senate Minority Leader Scott, William L., Republican Senator from Virginia Scowcroft, Major General Brent, USAF, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Scranton, William W., Governor of Pennsylvania, 19631967 Selassie, Haile, Emperor of Ethiopia Shalev, Mordechai, Deputy Chief of Mission, Israeli Embassy in Washington Shawar, Majid Abu, Political Commissar, Al Asifa (military wing of Fatah) and Secretary, Revolutionary Council of Palestine Liberation Organization Shultz, George S., Secretary of the Treasury Siilasvuo, General Ensio, Commander-designate of the United Nations Emergency Force, October 1973 Simon, William E., Deputy Secretary of the Treasury until May 1974; Secretary of the Treasury, May 1974January 1977 Sirri, Umar, Minister, Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sisco, Joseph, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Smith, Richard W., Counselor, U.S. Interests Section, Cairo Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, member, National Security Council staff Stackhouse, H.H., Director, Office of Israel and Arab-Israeli Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State Stennis, John C., Democratic Senator from Mississippi; Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Services Sterner, Michael, Director, Office of Egypt Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Persons XXXIIIStoltzfus, William A., U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait Stratton, Samuel S., Democratic Congressman from New York Stukel, Lieutenant Colonel Donald, member, National Security Council staff Sukhodrov, Viktor M., interpreter, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sulzberger, Cyrus L., II, U.S. newspaper journalist Sumner, Major General Gordon, Director, Near East and South Asia Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, from September 1973 Symington, W. Stuart, Democratic Senator from Missouri; Chairman, Subcommittee of U.S. Security Arrangements and Commitments Abroad, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Tanaka, Kakuei, Prime Minister of Japan Taqi al-Din al-Sulh, Prime Minister of Lebanon from June 1973 Tarr, Curtis W., Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Issues until November 25, 1973 Tekoah, Yosef, Israeli Permanent Representative to the United Nations U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, 19611971 Vavilov, Andrei, official, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs Veliotes, Nicholas, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv Vest, George S., Special Assistant for Press Relations to Secretary of State Kissinger from October 1973 Vinogradov, Sergei, Soviet Ambassador to Egypt; Soviet Representative to the Geneva Middle East Peace Conference, December 1973 Von Staden, Berndt, West German ambassador to the United States from April 1973 Vorontsov, Yuli M., Minister Counselor, Embassy of the Soviet Union in Washington Waldheim, Kurt, Secretary General of the United Nations Walters, General Vernon A., USA, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Warren, Gerald L., White House Deputy Press Secretary Weinel, Vice Admiral John P., USN, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Westmoreland, General William C., USA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 19681972 Wiley, Marshall W., Counselor, U.S. Interests Section in Cairo Yaariv, Major General Aharon, retired head of Israeli military intelligence; Israeli representative at the KM 101 talks Yamani, Ahmad Zaki, Saudi Petroleum Minister Yost, Charles, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, 19691971 Young, Milton R., Republican Senator from North Dakota Zahedi, Ardeshir, Iranian Ambassador to the United States Zayid bin Sultan Al Nahyan, Shaykh, Emir of Abu Dhabi and President of the United Arab Emirates Zayyat, Mohamed Hassan el-, Egyptian Foreign Minister until October 1973 Ziegler, Ronald, White House Press Secretary Zurhellen, Joseph O., Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, until June 1973

Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 19731. Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidents Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1 Washington, January 2, 1973.SUBJECT Secret Jordan-Egyptian Negotiations

At Tab A2 is a memorandum from Director Helms conveying detailed information on secret negotiations between a representative of King Hussein and President Sadat which took place on 17 December. The key item is Sadats assertion that he has decided Egypt must launch a war of attrition against Israel. Zayd Rifai represented King Hussein at the talks which took place in Cairo. In essence, the King proposed that Egypt and Jordan resume diplomatic relations and that they work together through political efforts to force a settlement on Israel. Rifai stated that the Arabs cannot risk another full scale war with Israel. He argued that the Soviets, having reached an understanding with the U.S., do not wish to do anything that might jeopardize their newly-established working relationship with the Americans. Thus, according to Rifai, the United States is the only country in a position to break the present impasse and force the Israelis to withdraw from occupied Arab territories. Rifai informed Sadat that it is for this reason that on King Husseins last visit to Washington3 he attempted to take the problem out of State Department channels and bring it to President Nixons office. (CIA deleted this sentence from the version of this report sent to State and Defense.) Sadat expressed pleasure at Husseins initiative in sending an emissary to meet him. He denied having any direct contacts with Presi1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 168, Geopolitical File, 15 May 19727 May 73. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. 2 Attached, but not printed. 3 King Hussein visited Washington March 28, 1972.

1

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Foreign Relations, 19691976, Volume XXV

dent Nixons representatives but he said that he had received letters from President Nixon, all of which he had answered. (This information was also deleted from the version of the report sent to State and Defense.) Sadat told Rifai that he disagreed with Hussein on the Soviet role in the Middle East, asserting that Moscow does have a role to play in bringing about a solution to the Middle East problem, even though it is secondary to the role played by the United States. Sadat informed Rifai that his major disagreement with Husseins views is in regard to the question of war versus political pressure on Israel. Sadat stated that he is absolutely convinced that the only way to force Israel to surrender the occupied territories is by renewing a war of attrition. He said that he had carefully calculated the cost to Egypt of starting such a war and he believes that it can be sustained. By hitting hard and deep inside Israel and by inflicting a sizeable number of civilian casualties on a regular basis, Egypt could force Israel into deciding that it is better to surrender the occupied territories. Sadat also told Rifai that under no circumstances should Jordan in any way become involved in Egypts war of attrition because the Israelis would quickly overrun the East Bank and destroy the Jordanian army. Sadat also pushed aside Rifais question about resuming normal diplomatic relations between Jordan and Egypt. Sadat closed by telling Rifai that he would have some thoughts to convey to Hussein on what he could say to President Nixon about Egypt.4 At Tab B is a report of King Husseins 22 December comments [less than 1 line not declassified] regarding Sadats plans for a war of attrition.5

4 King Hussein met with President Nixon on February 6 during his February 57 visit to the United States. See Document 14. 5 Attached, but not printed. Hussein said he thought that Sadats plans for a war of attrition would be a foolish course to follow and that the Israelis would certainly retaliate with a massive attack that would inflict heavy material and human casualties on Egypt.

January 2October 5, 1973 2. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidents Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

3

Washington, January 11, 1973.SUBJECT Military Assistance for Jordan

You will see from the attached memo2 that a brief message from the President to King Hussein is recommended to reassure him that our military assistance program remains on the rails.3 [1 line not declassified] The question for you is whether you would be interested in sending a private word of reassurance [less than 1 line not declassified] to supplement the Presidents formal message. Recommendation: That you authorize [less than 1 line not declassified] the following message to King Hussein [less than 1 line not declassified]: Your Majesty: The President has already responded to Your Majestys message of concern on the US military assistance program. I would simply like to add informally that our firm commitment to completion of Jordans military modernization program remains unchanged and that what is being discussed is only some relatively small adjustment in delivery schedules to meet problems created by our appropriations. I hope that any misunderstandings raised by this recent presentation on our ongoing program can be cleared up before your visit to Washington so that we may use that occasion to discuss impor-

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 757, Presidential Correspondence, 19691974, JordanKing Hussein. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. 2 The attached January 11 memorandum from Saunders to Scowcroft and Kennedy urged immediate approval of a brief message from President Nixon to King Hussein. Telegram 7545 to Amman, January 12, transmitted the message which reads: Your Majesty: I have your message on our military assistance program which was transmitted by Ambassador Brown on January 7. Let me assure you that there has been no change in our very firm intention to honor our commitments to assist Your Majestys Government. As I have said on previous occasions, Jordans continuing security remains a matter of important interest to us. I am very much looking forward, as always, to discussing all matters of concern to both of us when you and members of your party are here in February. Sincerely, Richard Nixon. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 76 from Amman, January 7, transmitted a message from King Hussein to Nixon expressing the Kings concern over delayed delivery of U.S. military equipment promised to Jordan. Hussein complained that 8 months had elapsed since his government had concluded its negotiations with the U.S. Government on MAP and FMS for 1972/1973 and that most of the major and important items included in those programs, such as the M60 tanks and the F5E planes, had not yet come. He noted that Jordans plans for its armed forces were based on a meticulously studied and timed schedule starting July 1, 1972, which included the equipment specified in those programs. (Ibid., Box 617, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan)

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Foreign Relations, 19691976, Volume XXV

tant future policies and programs. Of course, there will be ample opportunity to discuss with our experts any problems that remain, but I would hope that most of your basic concerns will have been allayed. I look forward to seeing you in early February and wish to convey to you my warmest regards. Henry A. Kissinger.4

4

Kennedy initialed approval for Kissinger.

3.

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1 Washington, January 15, 1973.

SECRET HIGH-LEVEL TALKS BETWEEN THE EGYPTIAN AND UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTS CONCERNING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST Summary: The holding of secret talks between the Egyptian and U.S. Governments at the level of the offices of the presidencies was first suggested informally in April 1972 [less than 1 line not declassified] in Cairo. Dr. Kissingers initial reaction was favorable, but President Sadat then demurred. In July Dr. Kissinger renewed the proposal, and in September President Sadat accepted. It was agreed that these exploratory talks would be held in the U.S., in strict secrecy, for the purpose of determining what useful role the USG could play in implementing UN Resolution 242.2 In October a four-man Egyptian delegation was named, and both sides hoped to get talks started by the end of October. Complications in the Vietnam negotiations then intruded to cause unexpected and protracted delay. The Egyptians have shown patience and understanding of the other demands on Dr. Kissinger, while repeatedly restating their interest in moving forward on the talks as soon

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 131, Country Files, Middle East, Egypt/Ismail, Vol. II, January 1February 23, 1973. Secret; Sensitive. The paper was forwarded to Kissinger under cover of a January 16 memorandum from Helms who wrote that the enclosed resume of the proposal to conduct secret talks between the United States and Egypt at the level of the offices of the presidencies as well as a more detailed chronological summary of the exchanges between the two governments might prove useful. 2 UN Security Resolution 242, adopted November 22, 1967, called for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied during the 1967 war and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area.

January 2October 5, 1973

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as possible. The Egyptians in the meantime have requested a change of venue from the U.S. to Europe and have said they want to issue a public statement at the conclusion of the first round of talks. Dr. Kissinger has not yet responded on these two points. He has assured the Egyptian Government that after settlement of the Vietnam war, the USG will give the highest priority to the Middle East problem, and has invited the Egyptian Government in the interim to submit, [less than 1 line not declassified], any preliminary views it may wish to offer relative to the talks.3 [2 lines not declassified] [Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

3 On January 15, Kissinger received a message from Ismail suggesting that the proposed first round of talks take place in London during the month of February. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Scowcroft Daily Work Files, Jan. 1116, 1973, Box 1)

4.

Backchannel Message From the Presidents Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Egyptian Presidential Adviser for National Security Affairs (Ismail)1 Washington, undated.

Thank you for your message of January 15.2 We have also received the message that Mr. Ismail plans to be in London around February 19. We regret that concluding the Vietnam negotiations has occupied so much of Dr. Kissingers time, both because of the extended negotiating sessions and because of the time needed for preparations for them. We are prepared to start these discussions soon and we agree that the end of February offers a good opportunity. If Mr. Ismail could arrange to come to New York from London, under any pretext, private meetings could certainly be arranged in New York at that time. There is some possibility that Dr. Kissinger could arrange to be in London for a day and a half on February 2223. Given the uncertainties in the current Indochina situation, Dr. Kissingers schedule could be subject to unex-

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 131, Country Files, Middle East, Egypt/Ismail, Vol. II, January 1February 23, 1973. No classification marking. The message is attached to a January 23 memorandum to Kissinger, marked Secret; Sensitive, that states that the January 21 message to Ismail had been passed to the Egyptian Government on January 22. 2 See footnote 3, Document 3.

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pected changes. This danger would be much smaller for a meeting in the U.S. In either case the U.S. would prefer no publicity. We agree that technical representatives should begin discussing the arrangements as soon as a date and venue are mutually decided. [less than 1 line not declassified] The U.S. side awaits an Egyptian proposal. The U.S. side again expresses its appreciation for the patience of the Egyptian side. We agree also to the Egyptian suggestion of January 4 that U.S. messages can be transmitted in the form of unsigned notes.33 A January 25 memorandum from Scowcroft to Kissinger transmitted Ismails reply agreeing to meet in London February 2223, or in New York if Kissingers schedule were subjected to unexpected change. An attached memorandum noted that it would be much easier to keep the meeting secret if it were held in New York rather than London. Kissinger wrote on the top of the page that he would strongly prefer N.Y. and that it would be almost impossible for him to arrange a pretext for his absence. He added: Strongly recommend February 2324 in U.S. Would take him to Camp David. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 131, Country Files, Middle East, Egypt/Ismail, Vol. II, January 1February 23, 1973)

5.

Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State1 Amman, January 22, 1973, 1030Z.

384. Department pass Cairo, Beirut, Tel Aviv. 1. Summary. Palace is still hopeful it can accomplish something dramatic with Syria and Cairo before Kings trip to Washington. What King would like to be able to do is to say he is speaking for Assad and Sadat as well as himself. He thinks this would add urgency to his statements that a ME solution must be found this year and that USG must take over leadership in getting it nailed down. 2. King hopes his exchange of views with Sadat and Assad will lead to restoration of diplomatic relations. He would like to follow this up with quick flight to Cairo just beforeor perhaps on wayto Washington, thus seizing headlines and making dramatic entrance.1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 618, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, IX, JanuaryOctober 1973. Secret; Nodis.

January 2October 5, 1973

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3. It may be that King could pull this off. Both Assad and Sadat could see advantages in having the Arab friend of US carrying message that conditions are desperate and complete ME settlement is vital now. What is doubtful is that they will give King much more of a mandate than that. Subsequent to Washington meeting, they may well back away from anything King accomplishes. Two things seem sure in Middle East: No Arab nation will let any other speak for it; each is ready at any time to denounce the other. 4. Timing is also important. It is most doubtful anything will happen before Arab Defense Council which meets in Cairo starting Saturday.2 What Qaddafi and Sadat agreed toif anythingis unknown. Also unknown is what Assad and Sadat have been saying to each other about Husseins initiatives. 5. All this gives impression of over-hasty patchwork. It is all being done in greatest secrecy here in Amman. Prime Minister knows only what he reads in An-Nahar. Foreign Minister has been pushed out of picture to his great unhappiness. Long-range implications have not been considered. What is being aimed at is two-fold: (1) political protection for Jordan should war of attrition break out and Jordan not join; and (2) a dramatic cover for Kings trip which will give it international coverage and eclat. 6. Comment: I have been taking line here with King, Rifai, and others in palace that there is some value in covering Jordans flanks diplomatically. Time is short, however, and Jordan should be sure it knows for whom it is speaking. What the common understandings are, and what public support its actions will be given before it gets itself so far out on a limb which others can saw off with a word. Brown

2

January 27.

8 6.

Foreign Relations, 19691976, Volume XXV Conversation Between President Nixon and Army Vice Chief of Staff (Haig)1 Washington, January 23, 1973.

Nixon: The point, though, is this: Lets take a problem like the Mideast. Now, you know very well that on the Mideast, while Henry talks about it in terms of the Soviet thing and the rest, he goes up the wall about Sisco, that Henrys filibustered the Mideast for almost four years, too, because he is totally attacking what the Jewish agenda wants. Now, he really is. He really is. What I am trying to say is this: That weve got to take it. We cant let State handle the Mideast; theyll screw it up. But, we have got to handle it here, but I just cant see Henry doing it. Now, I told him and practically choked right after the election. I said, Henry, the time has now come that weve got to squeeze the old woman.2 [unclear] 38 percent of the vote, but I said, Screw the vote. I said, Were doing this for the United States. Do you agree or not? Haig: Well, I agree. [unclear] I think right now we could stir up a hornets nest there. Nixon: Screw them. Toto squeeze theMrs. Meir? What do you mean? Shes going to attack? Haig: Well, were in a situation now where with Sadat hes in deep trouble. We are going to have to do something, but I think that we should [unclear] very careful [unclear]. Sadat may not survive this one. [unclear] more conservative [unclear]. State has carried out two times in past four years what they were [unclear]. Nixon: Yeah. Oh, I know that. I have no confidence in State. Im just saying, too, though, Henry has somewhat of a blind spot here, because he doesnt want to do anything with the Israelis except reassure them and get them more arms. Well, now, the Israelis need a little restraint here, too, Al.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 4046. No classification marking. According to the Presidents Daily Diary, Nixon met with Haig in the Executive Office Building between 9:29 and 9:50 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editors transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume. 2 Golda Meir.

January 2October 5, 1973 7. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidents Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

9

Washington, January 24, 1973.SUBJECT Middle East PolicyGetting a Hold on Decision-Making

The attached cable2 brings to attention the practical question of how you want to proceed toward decisions on next steps on the Arab-Israeli issue. I am sending you separately a memo on the substance of the decisions ahead.3 The problem today is the procedural one of how to assure fundamental decisions on real alternatives in the weeks ahead. The cable that State has just sent to Cairo without clearance here represents their view of how to proceed. Our minister in Cairo is instructed to explain to the Egyptians on an informal basis the following views: Washington is not satisfied with the present situation in the Middle East and believes we must continue efforts to make progress toward a peace settlement. There is a general consensus in the USG that an interim Canal settlement is the best way to proceed. This is the only proposition in sight that offers prospects of real progress at the present time. While the terms of a final peace settlement cannot be predetermined now, we do not think that our concept of an interim agreement is in its essentials at variance with President Sadats. The USG views an interim agreement as an integral part of a negotiating process for the full and complete implementation of Resolution 242. While these instructions break no new ground, the mere reiteration now of the point that pursuit of an interim agreement is the only hope of movement will be read in Cairo as reflecting a decision that has not yet been made. Sadat is expecting a new US initiative and, since Greene has just been in Washington, the Egyptians are quite likely to conclude that this is the beginning of it.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 638, Country Files, Middle East, Arab Republic of Egypt, Vol. IX, JanuaryOctober 73. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. 2 Telegram 12943 to Cairo, January 23; attached, but not printed. 3 Document 8.

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We do not yet have a formal recommendation from Secretary Rogers, but one can deduce from the things that have been said over recent weeks and from past style that his recommendation will contain the following elements: a new formula for getting proximity talks started and a formal approach to the Israelis, probably backed by a letter from the President putting this formula to the Prime Minister for discussion. We do not know how or when the Secretary will present his proposalwhether he will send a memo to the President or bring it to him personally. States probable proposal represents one option, but since our next step will set the tone and approach for some time it should be considered carefully against other alternatives before we move. For one thing, we must consider that Sadat himself seems now to have concluded that the interim idea, which he himself raised, is a non-starter. We increasingly hear that he feels he made a serious mistake in offering a partial Canal agreement in early 1971. For another, we must be very careful in approaching the Israelis now so that we can keep them with us over the four-year course ahead. Repeating the style of past State Department initiatives may not be the best way to do this. There is an alternative to the probable State approach which deserves a serious hearing. This alternative approach would differ in two main respects from the State approach: 1. Style: State will probably propose going to the Israelis with a fully worked out formula and then ask to discuss it. The alternative would be to go to the Israelis with a proposal to work out a formula, stating in general terms the main elements we feel would have to be included. We would then work with them to reduce the general proposition to writing in ways that meet Israeli concerns as much as possible. We would begin with quiet private talks, either with the Prime Minister or her representative, and would avoid publicizing a new US initiative. The objective of this style of approach to the Israelis would be to avoid confrontation by not presenting a finished formula while still engaging in substantive discussion at the outset. This is principally a difference in style, but how we deal with Israel will be of great importance in determining whether we can contribute anything to a negotiating process. The argument for States approach is that Israel has responded in the past only when confronted by a hard US position backed by the President. The argument for the alternative is that the hard approach has tended to produce confrontation (as in DecemberJanuary 196970 and August 1970) and that perhaps a lower key approach would enhance the spirit of consultation and lessen the appearance of our trying to force something of our


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