Gard Loss Prevention Circulars

Gard Loss Prevention Circulars

2

© Gard AS, December 2013


3

Compilation of Loss Prevention Circulars IntroductionThe Gard loss prevention updates that are regularly sent to Members and clients are divided into three different categories:

• Gardalerts-whichcontainimportantandtimelyinformationrelevanttothemaritimeindustries,mostlyprovidedbyexternalpartiessuchascorrespondents,localexpertsanddifferentinternationalorganisationsandauthorities.

• Losspreventioncirculars-thatcontainimportantlessonslearnedforthemaritimeindustries,mostlybasedoninternalknowledgegainedbyGard’sclaimsdepartments,andbasedontrendsandclaimscases.

• Casestudiesforonboardsafetymeetings-thesedescribetypicalincidentsonboardavessel.ThecasestudiesarebasedonactualcasesfromtheGardclaimsdatabase,andfocusonriskassessmentandidentifyingthecontributingfactorsthatledtoanincident.

ThisbookletcontainsacollectionofGard’sLossPreventioncircularsinEnglish.ItisacompilationofwhatGardconsiderstobethemostimportantandrelevantcircularspublishedduringtheperiod2000toDecember2013.TheyarereproducedhereforMembersandclients,tobereadaspartofourongoingeffortofknowledgesharingandlossprevention.

Thecompilationmaybeusedforindividualstudies,aspartoftrainingschemes,orcoveringindividualtopicsinsafetymeetings,onboardriskassessmentsoreducation.AdditionalcopiesfordistributiontoshipsortrainingcentrescanbeobtainedfromGardAS.

Thiscompilationisupdatedonaregularbasis.Theaimistoorganiserelevantcircularsinapracticalandusefulformat.Inthisregard,wewelcomecommentsandsuggestionsfromourreaders.

Foracompletelistofallourlosspreventioncirculars,pleasevisitourwebsiteatwww.gard.no.

FormoreinformationregardingGard’slosspreventionprogramme,pleasecontact:

VicePresidentTerjePaulsen,tel:[email protected],or SeniorLossPreventionExecutiveMariusSchønberg,tel:[email protected],orLossPreventionExecutiveKristinUrdahl,tel:[email protected].

TerjePaulsenVicePresident,LossPreventionGardAS

4



5

NavigationNo.03-11VoyageDataRecorders(VDR)........................................................................................................ 8No.12-10Limitationsofavessels’anchoringequipment............................................................................ 9No.09-10Oceantowageofnewbuildinghull............................................................................................10No.16-09AnchoringwithinMalaysianwatersoffSingapore...................................................................11No.11-09DangerousanchoringintheSingaporearea..............................................................................12No.06-09Damagetofixedobjectswhenmanoeuvringinconfinedwaters............................................13No.14-08Anchoringanddeterioratingweatherconditions...................................................................... 14No.13-08Mooredvesselsbreakingoutfromtheirberths......................................................................... 16No.02-06NavigationthroughtheentrancestotheBalticSea.................................................................. 18No.02-04WinterseasoninthenorthernBalticSea.................................................................................... 19No.10-01Operationsinextremelycoldclimates........................................................................................20

MachineryNo.04-13Improperimplementationofmanufacturers’serviceletters.....................................................22No.02-13Oilcontaminationofmarineboilers............................................................................................23No.07-12Dangersofpower-operatedwatertightdoors.......................................................................... 25No.06-12FixedCO2fire-extinguishingsystems-consequencesofdelayedrelease.............................. 27No.05-12Fuelhandlingandtreatmentonboard...................................................................................... 29No.03-12UseoftemporaryequipmentonboardMobileOffshoreDrillingUnits.................................31No.02-12Firepreventioninenginerooms.................................................................................................33No.05-11BunkerSampling........................................................................................................................... 35No.04-09Areyoupurifyingorjustpumping?............................................................................................. 36No.03-09Slowsteamingon2-strokeengines............................................................................................ 37No.02-11Exhaustboilerdamages............................................................................................................... 38No.14-10Lossofship’srecordswhenchangingownershipormanagement......................................... 39No.15-09Lowsulphurfuelchangeover...................................................................................................... 40No.14-09Lay-upofshipsandthemarineinsurancecover........................................................................ 42No.11-08Liftinggear–isyourshippreparedtoavoidaccidentsoccurring?.......................................... 43No.11-06Firesafetyintheengineroom..................................................................................................... 44No.06-06MarpolAnnexVI–Challengesinoperatingonlowsulphurfuel............................................ 45No.02-03Piratepartsusedonrotatingmachinery..................................................................................... 46No.08-01Effectsofoff-specbunkers........................................................................................................... 47No.03-01BunkerQuality............................................................................................................................... 49No.01-01Turbochargerdamages................................................................................................................ 50No.03-00MainEngineDamageDuetoContaminatedLubricatingOil................................................... 52No.02-00MainEngineMediumSpeedCrankshaftDamage.................................................................... 54No.01-00MainEngineDamageDuetoIgnitionDelay.............................................................................. 55

Piracy and maritime securityNo.7-09Master’sbriefbeforeenteringhighriskpiracyareas................................................................... 56No.03-10USCustomsregulations–ImporterSecurityFilingsandAdditionalCarrierRequirements

(10+2Rule)................................................................................................................................................. 57

Pollution and the environmentNo.13-07USCoastGuard–FormalpolicyonvoluntarydisclosureofMARPOLviolations................... 58No.07-01Oilywaterseparationanddischarge:Dischargeofoilprohibited........................................... 59No.06-01Oilywaterseparationanddischarge:Riskofoilpollutionversusvessel’ssafety................... 61

Contents

6


Crew, passengers and other persons on boardNo.08-12Lookafteryourbackduringmanualwork.................................................................................. 63No.04-12Malariaanddengue-precautionstobetaken.......................................................................... 65No.14-11Theimpactofdietonperformanceandhealth......................................................................... 67No.13-11Dangerstocrewduringin-transitfumigationofcargo............................................................. 69No.12-11Reviewandnewapprovaloflifeboathooks............................................................................... 71No.13-09Refugeesandmigrantsrescuedatsea....................................................................................... 72No.9-09Lifeboatlaunchesduringabandonshipdrills.............................................................................. 73No.01-09UnitedStates–Responsibilityforstevedores............................................................................ 74No.02-08Lifeboataccidentswithon-loadreleasehooks.......................................................................... 75No.03-04Accidentsinvolvingcrewandstevedoresduringcargooperations......................................... 77No.04-02Master’sResponsibilityforSafetyofSurveyors.......................................................................... 78

CargoNo.01-13Floodingofcargoholdsoncontainervessels............................................................................ 80No.03-13Preventionofsoyabeancargoclaims......................................................................................... 81No.01-12Liquidbulkcargosampling–collectingevidence..................................................................... 84No.08-11Clearingofshorepipelinesfollowingcargooperationsatterminals....................................... 86No.01-11Damagetocargoesofwindturbineblades............................................................................... 88No.08-10Liquefactionofcargoesofironore............................................................................................. 90No.06-10Thedangersofhotworkoncargosecurings............................................................................. 91No.08-06Update:Containerlossesfromvesselsusingfullyautomaticcontainerlocks......................... 92No.07-03ThedangersofcarryingDirectReducedIron(DRI)................................................................... 93No.02-02Manifoldmonitoringwhilstloadingliquidcargoes................................................................... 94

Bills of ladings and other legal issuesNo.11-11Drydocking-responsibilitiesandcontractualissues................................................................ 95No.01-10LOI,LOUandBLG–Confused?.................................................................................................. 97No.08-09Measurestopreventdrugsmuggling......................................................................................... 98No.06-03Straightbillsoflading–Doyourbillsuseclearwords?(PartII)................................................ 99No.13-02Straightbillsoflading–Delivery–Doyourbillsuseclearwords?.........................................101No.05-01BillsofLading:Istheshipper’sstowagerequestalwayscompulsory?..................................102


7

8


Loss Prevention Circular No. 03-11

Voyage Data Recorders (VDR)

IntroductionGardMembersandclientsundoubtedlyknowthestrengthandcapabilitiesofVDRtechnologyanditsassuranceofpreservationofship’sdata.However,GardexperienceanumberofcaseswherevesselshavebeenunsuccessfulinbothsavingandretrievingvitalVDRinformation.FailuretobeabletoproduceVDRinformationmayleadtocounterparty allegations that might have been prevented and/or proceeded against in a less costly manner had it notbeenforthelackofVDRevidence.ThepurposeofthiscircularistohighlighttheimportanceofknowingtheVDR’scapabilitiesandlimitations,sothatMembersdonot lose essential documentation and crucial evidence connectedtoanincident.Thiscircularalsoaimstoproviderecommendationsonfamiliarisation,drills,serviceanddescriptionintheSMSonwhenandhowtousetheVDRs.

Data saving and retrieving challengesInonerecentcasealargecontainervesselranaground.Ongrounding,the“save”buttonontheVDRwaspressedinaccordancewiththeprocedures,butthreedayslater,whenashoretechnicianwascontractedtoextracttheVDRdatarecordings,itwasfoundthatthedatahadneverbeensaved.ItalsoturnedoutthatthemasterwasnotfamiliarwiththeVDRandthathehadneversaveddatabefore.TherelevantVDRdatafromtheincidenthadbeenlost.1

IngeneralGardhasexperiencedthatlackofunderstandingandlimitedin-depthknowledgeoftheequipmentoftenleadtolossofVDRdataevenwheretheequipmentisinfullworkingorder.WheretheVDRinformationhasbeensuccessfullypreserved,theretrievinganddownloadingofthedataoftenoffersachallenge.MostVDRsrequireamanufacturer’stechniciantoattendinordertodownloadthedata.Thefactthattherearenumerousmanufacturersandvariousmodeltypesrequiringdifferentsoftwareversionstobeabletoviewthedatamakeitdifficulttoretrievetheinformationanddata.VDRsystemsalsohaveabuilt-inalarmfunction that is automatically triggered in the event of a malfunctionofthesystem,however,insomecases,wehaveexperiencedthattheVDRalertfunctionwasnottriggeredbythehardwaremalfunction.

TheVDRloopfunctionmayofferanoptiontoretaindatafromalongerperiodoftimethanthe12hourwindowrequiredbytheIMOperformancestandard.Byadjustingthisdefault the Master has an increased opportunity to preserve thedata.Mastersshouldberemindedthattherecordswillbeoverwrittenwithintheimplementedtimeframeifthedata is not promptly saved2.

RecommendationsRegularservicebyapprovedservicecompany.ToensurethattheVDRisinfullworkingorder,testsshouldbeconductedregularly by an approved service supplier to verify the accuracy,durationandrecoverabilityoftherecordeddata.The contact details of technicians and manufacturer should beeasyavailable.VDRSoftwareshouldalsobeavailableatrelevantlocationonboard/ashore.

Planforonboardfamiliarisationanddrills.Onboarddrillsshouldbeundertakenregularly,ideallyincombinationwithabovementionedregularserviceoftheVDRunit,toverify

thatthebridgeteamisfamiliarwiththeproceduresandtheVDRequipment.Savingofdatashould be a part of the emergency response procedures and emergencydrills.

Description of when and how to use-Itshouldbeclearlystatedinthecompany’sprocedureswhichtypesofincidentsandnear-missesthatshouldbepreserved for securing of evidence and sharing of lessons learnt.Owners/managersarealsorecommendedtoincludesuch information in the emergency response section of the vessel’sSafetyManagementSystem(SMS).-AposteronthebridgepositionedneartheVDRequipmentsettingouttheprocedures,suchaswhenandhowtousetheVDR(bothsavingandretrievingdata),rolesand responsibilities by the bridge team and a short user description.-Thedatawilloftenbesavedinaformatthatisnotreadilyaccessibletoathirdpartywithoutthenecessarysoftware.Ownersshouldcheckwhethertheinformationontheirequipmentcanbereadilydownloadedorwhetheramanufacturer’stechnicianwillbeneeded.Ifatechnicianisrequired,heshouldbeputonstand-bytoattendacasualtyassoonaspossibleafteranincidenttoextractthenecessaryevidence.However,theemphasisshouldbeonstoppingtheVDRoverwritingdata.Retrievalcanalwaysbedoneatalaterstage.

FailuretoretrieveVDRinformationmayleadtocounterpartyallegations that might have been prevented and/or proceeded against in a less costly manner had it not been forthelackofVDRevidence.3OnevesselmayretrieveVDRdata and might be in an advantageous position should theothervesselhavenone.Mastersandtheirbridgeteamshouldthereforebefamiliarwiththepracticalitiesofdatasavinganddataretrieving,bothwithregardstoadvantagesandlimitationsaswellastheimportanceofcorrectstorageofdata.

Footnotes1SeeGardNews191,August/October2008:VDRdata–Lostbeforeitisfound?Îmore2VDRsarerequiredtomaintainarecordofalldataforaminimumof12hours,althoughClassoftenrequires24hoursandmanymanufacturersprovidealongerperiod,afterwhichtimetheinformationwillbeoverwritten.


9


Limitations of a vessels’ anchoring equipmentGard has seen an increasing number of cases involving lost anchors,andfromclasssocietieswelearnthatasmanyasoneanchorper100shipsislostannually.Thereasonsforlossofanchorsandchainaremany,andincludelackofseamanshipandinadequatemaintenance,butalsoinstancesofthechainandanchorbreaking,leavingaquestionmarkastothequalityofsuchpartsasprovidedbythemanufacturers.

InGard,aboutonein200shipsayearhasananchorrelatedclaim.Mostoftheseareduetothelossofanchorsatdesignatedanchorageswheretheauthoritiesrequirethelostitemstoberemoved,thusresultingina“wreckremoval”case.Themoreseriousandverycostlycasesarewhenavesselstartsdraggingitsanchorinbadweather,andwherethisleadstocollisionswithothervessels,groundingsandlossoftheship,ortodamagetocablesandpipelinesontheseabed.

StrengthandlimitationsofanchoringequipmentTherulesforanchoringequipment,thegrade,lengthandsizeofchain,numberandweightoftheanchors,thestrengthofthechainstoppersandthepoweroftheanchorwindlassesandthebrakes,areestablishedbytheclasssocieties.Theycanbefoundintherulesoftheindividualsocieties,orintheunifiedrulesofIACS,theInternationalAssociationofClassSocieties.Itisimportanttobeawarethattheseareminimumrequirements,andtoknowtheassumptionsmadeinthecalculations.

ForeachvesseltheclasssocietywillcalculateanEquipmentNumberbyusingaformula,wherethedisplacementofthevessel,thebreadthoftheshipandtheheightfromthesummerloadwaterlinetothetopoftheuppermosthouse,aswellastheprofileviewareaofthehull,superstructuresandhousesabovethesummerloadwaterlineareincluded.Thus,theforcesontheshipbycurrentandwindfromboththefrontandthesidesaretakenintoaccount.Theformulais based on an assumption that the speed of the current mayreach2.5m/sec,andwindspeedof25m/sec,whichrepresentquitehighforces,butitisalsoassumedthatthevesselcanuseascopebetween6and10,thescopebeingtheratiobetweenlengthofchainpaidoutandwaterdepth.However,largeshipsatdeepanchoragesdonothavesufficientchainonboardtoreachscopesofsuchmagnitude.

Ifashipisatanchorinballastcondition,theMastershouldalsobearinmindthatwindforcesactingonhisshipmaybe much larger than the calculations have accounted for,aslargershipsideareasarenowexposed,whilethemeasurementsenteredintheformulawastakenfromthesummerloadwaterline.Vesselsinballastwillalsobemorevulnerableiftheyhavetomoveawayinbadweather,asboththesteeringandthepropulsionmaybeaffected.

Classsocietiesmakeitclearthattheuseoftheanchoringequipmentisonlyforthetemporarymooringofavessel,withinaharbourorashelteredarea,whenawaitingberth,tide,etc.Itisparticularlyemphasizedthattheequipmentisnotdesignedtoholdashipoffafullyexposedcoastinbad

weatherortostopavesselfromdrifting.Theanchoringequipment,asdesignedinaccordancewiththeclassrules,willonlyholdthevesselingoodholdingground,whiletheholdingpowerissignificantlyreducedinpoorholdingground.

RecommendationIfavesselisanchoredinanareaexposedtoweather,itisnecessarytohaveapolicyastowhentoleave.TherehavebeencaseswhenMastershavebeenundercommercialpressurenottoleavetheanchorage,anddisastershavehappenedbecausetheMasterwastempted“towaitandseeuntilthemorning”,althoughtheweatherforecastwasbad.Inmakinghisdecisionwhethertostayortoleave,theMastershouldalsobeawareofthelimitationsofhisanchoringequipment.SomeMastersmaynothavefullknowledgeoftheselimitations,however,theyarelaiddownbytheclasssocietiesintheirrulesforcalculatingthedimensions,weightsandstrengthsoftheanchoringequipment.

Withthementionedlimitationsinmind,itcanbeseenfromcasesofshipsdragginganchorsinbadweatherthatMastershaveattimesplacedtoomuchtrustintheirvessel’sanchoringequipment.Today’sweatherforecastsareusuallyvery reliable and Masters should more often choose to weighanchorsandgoouttoseaintimeifheavyweatherisforecast.

Thefulltextoftherulesforanchoringequipmentcanbefoundinthedocument“Requirementsconcerningmooring,anchoringandtowing”,bysearchingthewebpagesoftheInternationalAssociationofClassificationSocieties:www.iacs.org.uk,ordirectlyinwww.iacs.org.uk/vdunifiedrequirements/ur_a_pdf148.pdf.

10



Ocean towage of new building hull

Introduction Gard has seen an increasing number of incidents occurring duringoceantowageofhullsfromconstructionyardtooutfittingsite.Theincidentsaremainlycausedbythelossoftowageconnection,1followedbyaninabilitytore-establishthetowbeforeperiloussituationsariseandconsequentialstrandingoccurs.Wehaveoccasionallyseenthatalackofexperience,combinedwithincompleteriskassessmentsandplanning,togetherwithpressuretotransportthehulltotheoutfittingsiteasquicklyaspossible,haveresultedindecisionsbeingmadewhichhaveleadtothenecessaryprecautionsnotbeingtaken.Wintertowmayinvolveadditionalproblemsanddelay,e.g.wintertowsiniceconditions.Thewarrantytowagesurveywithregardstoweatherandensuringsafetowagearealsoattimesdisregardedtohastendelivery.

Responsibilities and commandWhoisincontrolofcontractingthetug;theowner,sub-contractororinsurer?Thepartycontractuallyobligedtotransportthevesselwillmostlikelyberesponsibleforcontractingthetugandwillberesponsibleforanyliabilitiesarisingoutofthetow.Ashipbuilder’sallinclusivepriceforavessel implies that it carries the contractual liability for delivery tothefittingoutsite.2

Eventhoughthetowmaybeconsidereda“deadship”,theMasterofthetugisalwaysincommandandhasthefinalwordinrespectofthesafetyofthetugandtow.Owners’representativescannotoverridethedecisionsofthetugmaster.Linesofcommunicationshouldbeestablishedwithcontractors/insurersandanyinformationregardingthetow,communicatedtothem.

Contractors and yard issuesInourexperiencetherearedifferingpracticesamongtugoperators,andtheseshouldbeconsideredwhenselectingacandidateforthetowageoperation.Thetypeofcontract3 entered into could also affect the outcome of any incident arisingduringthetowageoperation.Thetugmaster’sandcrew’spreviousexperienceofoceantowingisessential.

Gardhasalsoseenthatyardsfrequentlyplaceadditionalequipmentandsectionsonboardvessels,henceadditionaltimemustbeusedonrepeatsurveys,fasteningandrecalculationofstability.Dueconsiderationsshouldalsobegiventoanypossiblesub-contractorsthatmaybeinvolvedinthewayofsteeragetugs,harbortugs,etc.inordertoconductthevoyageinasafemanner.

Warranty survey4 AWarrantyClauseshouldbeinsertedinthecontractwiththetugoperatorwithpreferablyoneorseveralnamedsurveyorswhoshouldbeentrustedtoundertakethewarrantysurveyfortheintendedtowage,asurveywhichshouldincludethetug,thetowandtheequipment.Thewarrantysurveyorisappointedbytheinsurerbutthecoststhereofarecoveredbytheassured.

Thewarrantysurveymustbecompletedpriortodeparture,andany recommendations given by the surveyor must be carried outbeforetheconvoyisallowedtodepart.Ifanythinghappenstotheconvoyenrouteandaportofrefugeisrequested,thewarrantysurveyorshouldrevisittheconvoyinordertoreconfirmtheconditionofthetugandtow.Anydeviationfromorshortcomingsfromtheobservationsmadebythewarrantysurveyormayinfluenceinsurancecovertotheextentthatinsuranceisvoid.

Risk assessment and planning considerationsWhenconductingtowageduringadverseweathertugpower,endurance(bunkercapacity),theneedforsufficientbollardpullandpower,weatherrouting,reportingandpassageplanning–includingaportofrefugeplan–shouldbeconsidered.Itisimportanttoselectatugbasedonsize(lengthanddisplacement),especiallyduringwintertowing.Bollardpullisnottheonlycriteria.

Considerationshouldalsobegivenastowhethertheequipmentonboardthetugisold,whetherallcertificatesarewithindate,thatthetowingwireandshacklesetc.areingoodconditionandthattheemergencytowingwireisinanacceptableconditionandcorrectlyinstalled.

Fortheunmannedtow,safeaccesstotheobjectisimportantandmaintainingthesameand,whenpossible,inspectthetowforherstructuralintegrity(noaccumulationofwater).Inordernottoloosetheobjectwhenatowispartedfromthetugatranspondercouldbeconsideredputonboardthetow.Inaddition,thetowshouldbewelllitandwhenpassingarea’swithheavynavigationitisadvisabletobroadcastnavigationwarningswithinformationaboutthelengthbetweentugandtow.

Thetowshouldbetrimmedbysterntoimprovecoursestability,andtheruddershouldbesecuredamidships.Amongtheshaftproblemswhichmayariseareshaftnotconnectedtomainengine,bracketfastening,lubricationofthesterntube,shaftalignmentandsecuringofpropeller.Thetowtobeequippedwithemergencytowinggear/bridleforuseifmaintowinggearbreaks.

RecommendationsWhenadeadshipistowedthereisno-onepresenttorepresenttheowner,thusifanymishapoccursthereisanurgentnecessityto dispatch a member from the management to look after the owners’interests.Thoseinvolvedshouldalsoensurethatthewarrantysurveyor’srecommendationsaremetandthatanyrecommendedweatherconditions/windowisadheredto.

The choice of tug operator and tug may have a future impact onthebottomline,andowners/builders(contractors)shouldensurethatprudentchoiceismadeasfarasmanning,pastrecord,andpresenceinthemarketisconsidered,tonameafewoftheissues.Compliancewithrecommendationsmadebythewarrantysurveyorshouldbeadheredtoforthwith,includinguseofexternalassistancesuchasadditionaltugs,pilot,orridingcrew.

1Reasonsforwiredamagecouldbe(1)wireswerenothandledwithcare,(2)wiressnappedduetochafingonthesternofthetugs,(3)thewiresandwire-protectorswerenotwell-monitored,(4)thecrewwastoolaterefreshingthetouchpointofthewireonthestern,(5)lackofknowledgeofslackingofthewireinrelationtothewaterdepth,(6)thewiresweretouchingtheseabedwhichwascoveredwithobstructions,(7)thecrewfailedtohaulinthewiresontime,socontactwiththeseabedcouldnotbeavoided,and(8)crewsweretoolatepayingoutthetowingwireorreducingspeedwhenexcessiveforcescameonthewire(weather,tug).2Classisnotconcernedwiththetowingprocessunlessspecificallyinstructedtoundertakea“Warrantysurvey”.Membersshouldthereforebeawareofthedifferentrolesandresponsibilitiesoftheclasssurveyorandthewarrantytowagesurveyor.EventhoughthehullisfullyapprovedbyClass,watertightness,leakingvalves,hatches,tanksetcismaynotinspectedbyClass.3BIMCOTowHireorTowconandsimilar.4Warrantytowagesurveyisasurveytoascertainthattugandtowareequippedandmannedfortheintendedvoyageandshortcomingshavetobeattendedtobeforedepartureisgranted.


11


Anchoring within Malaysian waters off Singapore EarlierthisyearweaddressedtheproblemsofanchoringincongestedareasoffSingapore.1InthiscircularweaddresstheproblemsencounteredwhenanchoringwithinMalaysianwatersoffSingapore.Sofar,threevesselscoveredbyGardhavebeenarrestedandfinedfornothavingnotifiedMalaysian authorities of their arrival and anchoring outside theouterportlimitsofTanjunPelepasandJohorportsandfornon-paymentoflightdues.

Itiswellknownthatthereareno“internationalwaters”outsideSingaporewaters;shipsareeitherinSingapore,MalaysiaorIndonesia.WhenanchoringoffMalaysia,itshouldbeborneinmindthatMalaysianterritorialwatersextend12nauticalmilesfromthebaseline,ifnotlimitedbyotherStateboundaries.

AmendmentstoTheMerchantShippingOrdinance19522

Section491BoftheMalaysianMerchantShippingOrdinance1952stipulateswhichshipsmustnotifytheDirectorofMarineofactivitieswithinMalaysianwaters.TheDirectormay impose terms and conditions including fees on the activitiespermitted.Theowner,masteroragentoftheshipmaybefoundguiltyofanoffence,aswellasriskingafineofMYR100,0003orimprisonmentforuptotwoyears,forcontraveningtheordinance.

The Marine Department of Malaysia has recently amended theMerchantShippingOrdinancetoalsoincludevesselsengaged in activities such as:

a. Layingupb. Weldingandotherhotworksc. Anchoringinnon-anchorageareasd. Anyformofunderwateroperations

The Marine Department of Malaysia advises4 that notificationtotheDirectorofMarinecanbemadeatthenearestportofficeduringnormalworkinghours.

AsforthepaymentofLightDues,thisisregulatedbyAct250,FederationLightDuesAct1953,5whichstatesthat“everyshipwhichinthecourseofavoyageentersanyportorplacewithinPeninsularMalaysia,otherthanshipsexempted,shallpaylightduesasprescribed.”6

Risk of finesItshouldbenotedthatoncevesselshavebeenarrestedfornon-paymentoflightdues,itcanberatherexpensivetoobtaintheirrelease.ArateofRegisteredNetTonnagexMYR0.20X10hasbeenleviedasapenalty.AuthoritiesmayrequestabondofMYR50,000issuedbyalocalregisteredbank,priortoreleasingthevessel.TheMarineDepartmentappearstoprefertodealwithalocalregisteredshippingagentratherthanwithaP&IClubrepresentative,andwillonlyacceptaLetterofUndertakingfromshippingagentswhilewaitingforsecurityguaranteestobeissuedbyabank,whichmaytakeuptofiveworkingdays.

RecommendationsFinesfornon-paymentofharbourduesetc.arenotcoveredbyGardRule47andarethereforeoutsidetheP&Icover.Ouradvice to Members and clients entering Malaysian Territorial WatersistoarrangefornotificationofarrivalandthepaymentofduesthroughaMalaysianshippingagent.

Footnotes1GardLossPreventionCircularNo.11-09:DangerousanchoringintheSingaporearea.2MDCLegalAdvisers,“TheMerchantShippingOrdinance1952”,MDCPublishersPrinters,1996.3MYR=MalaysianRinggit.4MarineDepartmentMalaysia,MalaysianShippingNoticeMSN15/2009,dated13Oct2009.5LawsofMalaysia,Act250,FederationLightDuesAct1953,reprint2006.6AdditionalinformationcanbefoundatMarineDepartmentMalaysiawww.marine.gov.my/

12



Dangerous anchoring in the Singapore area

TheMaritimeandPortAuthoritiesofSingapore(MPA)recentlycalledameetingwithrepresentativesoftheP&IClubstodiscussparticularproblemsofdangerousanchoringintheSingaporearea.

VesselsnotanchoringwithinSingaporeportlimitsare,forcommercialreasons,optingtoanchorinouterportlimitareas(OPL).TheEastandWestOPLareasusedforanchoringare,however,rathernarrowspacessituatedbetweentheportlimitsandthetrafficseparationscheme(TSS)throughtheSingaporeStrait.Theseareasarebecomingverycongested,beingpopularwithownersforthepurposesofbunkering,takingsupplies,changeofcrew,repairsorjustwaitingforcargooperations.Duetothecongestion,someanchoredvesselsarestrayingintotheTSS,andarethusviolatingtheInternationalRegulationsforthePreventionofCollisionsatSea(COLREG).TheMPAstatesthatvesselsinbreachofCOLREGRule10(g)byanchoringintheTSSarebeingreportedtotheirrespectiveflagadministrations.Itappearsfromthevesselshavingbeenreported,thatSingaporeauthoritiesalsoseemtoreportvesselsanchoredinPrecautionaryAreasforbeinginbreachofCOLREG.

WhenitcomestobunkeringatSingapore,andthetendencytobunkerinOPLareas,itshouldbenotedthattherisksfactorsconcerningbothbunkerqualityandquantityhavebeenconsideredhigherinOPLareasthanfromsuppliersoperatingwithinthemuchmoreregulatedportlimits.TherearealsotwobunkeranchoragesinthewesternsectoroftheSingaporePort,locatedconvenientlyclosetotheTSS,wherevesselsof20,000GTandabove,stayinglessthan24hours,maytakebunkersatreducedportdues.Vesselsotherthangastankersandchemicaltankers,withadraftof11.5metersorless,mayalsobeexemptedfromcompulsorypilotageatthesebunkeringstations.

TheMPAhasalsopointedtoseveralinstancesofdamageto subsea cables by incorrect anchoring and has alerted the P&IClubstothisproblem.Whenavesselisanchoringtooclosetochartedcablesandpipelines,theownersofthecables/pipelinesareinformedofthevessel’sparticulars,toenablethemtomakeaclaimagainstthevessel,shouldanydamageoccur.OPLisa“loose”term,buttheEasternOPLisconsideredboundtothenorthbyJohorePortlimitsandtothesouthbythewestboundTSS.Itshouldbenotedthatthis5milelongareaisverynarrowandthereareseveralsubmarinecablesrunningthelengthofit.

WehavealsobeenadvisedthattheMPAisindiscussionwithMalaysianandIndonesianportauthorities,inordertoreachanagreementforvesselsanchoringintheTSS,ordamagingsubseacablesandpipelines,tobepenalisedbytheStatehavingjurisdictionoverthearea.

TheproblemofcongestionofvesselsoffSingaporeisnoteasytosolve,butthereisalwaysthepossibilityofseekingdesignatedanchoragesinsideSingaporeportlimits.VesselsshouldnotanchorintheTSSorPrecautionaryAreas,andcareshouldbetakennottoanchortooclosetosubseacablesandpipelines.Claimsfordamagecausedbyanchoringinwayofcablesandpipelines,orbydragginganchorsacrosssuchequipmentareverycostlytotheClub.

TherehavebeenanumberofcontactdamagesbetweenshipsatanchorinOPLareasduringrecentmonths,mostlyintheEastarea.Foranchoringincongestedareas,fullalertnessisrequiredandanchoringatnightshouldbeavoidedifpossible.InlocationssuchasthecongestedSingaporeOPLs,windandtidalcurrentsmustbeconsidered;ananchorwatchshouldbekeptatalltimesandtheengineattheready.Forthetimebeing,whenanchoringoffSingapore,thekeymessageisextremecaution.

For further information on anchoring in general please see thefollowingGardpublicationsGardNews193Whatif...?’-Planningfortheunexpectedbefore an emergency developsGardNews177Anchoring-Gettingintoasafehavenorintoapotentialdisaster?GardLossPreventionCircularNo.14-08:AnchoringanddeterioratingweatherconditionsGardGuidancetoMasters,section2.14.3Anchoring.


13


Damage to fixed objects when manoeuvring in confined watersGard has recently seen a noticeable increase in cases involvingsignificantcontactdamagetofixedobjectsbyvesselsmanoeuvringinconfinedwaters,mostlywithinport.Fixedobjectsincludeberths,docks,locksandshoresideequipmentsuchascranes.Thecontactdamagehasresultedin some very large claims for the repair and/or loss of use of suchobjects.Theseincidentsalsoriskharmingpeopleandtheenvironment(e.g.pollutionfrombreachedoiltanks),andtheshipitselfisoftenleftwithexpensiverepairsandlossoftradingtime.

Outlinedbelowarefiveofthemostcommonfactors,inGard’sexperienceincasesinvolvingcontactdamagetofixedobjectsinconfinedwaters.

1. Prevailing and forecast conditions not properly assessedThecumulativeeffectofwind,sea,currentandtidalconditionsontheshipmaynothavebeenfullyappreciated.Asaresultoftheabovefactorsthevesselcanexperiencedifficultiesinmanoeuvringinacontrolledfashionandwithinsafeparameters.Insufficientallowancehasbeenmadefortheforcesactingontheship.Thesecaneasilyturnouttobegreaterthanexpectedandbeyondthecapabilitiesoftheshipand,duetotheunforeseeneffectsoftheprevailingand/orforecastconditions,insufficienttugswouldhavebeenemployedtohandlethevessel.Thereareinstanceswheremanoeuvringsinconfinedwatersshouldbedeferreduntilconditionshaveimproved.Thisalsoincludescasesofreducedvisibility.

2. Unfamiliarity with the ship’s manoeuvrabilityApilotwillknowthelocalwatersbest,however,themasterismorefamiliarwithhisvessel’smanoeuvrability.Duetotherotationofcrew,familiaritywiththeship’sownmanoeuvringsystemscanbelacking,and,astechnologyandcomputerisationisbecomingevermoreprevalent,trainingmaybeneededtoensurethatcrewmembersarefamiliarwiththevessel’ssystems.Itisimportanttoincludeinformationastothevessel’smanoeuvrabilityinthemaster/pilotinformationexchangebeforethecommencementofthepilotage.Theeffectofchangesinthevessel’sdraft,trimandwindagecharacteristicsmustalsobetakenintoconsiderationwhendiscussingthevessel’smanoeuvrability. 3. No agreed manoeuvring planJusthowthevesselwillmanoeuvrewhenincloseproximitytofixedobjectsisoftennotplannedand/oragreedinadvancewithinthebridgeteamand/orwiththepilot.Thisnot only concerns the location that the vessel is proceeding to/from,butalsootherfixedobjectswhichthevesselwillpasswithincriticalcloseproximity.Often,insufficienttimeisinvestedinadvancetoconsiderhowthevesselcanbeexpectedtobehave,givenitsmanoeuvringcharacteristicsandtheprevailingconditions.Theclosestpointsofapproachareoftennotcalculatedasarecriticalbearings,transits and ranges to assist in determining the limits of the safemanoeuvringparameters.

4. Poorly executed manoeuvreEventhebestshiphandlersoccasionallygetitwrong,althoughitisperhapssurprisinghowverywronginsomecases.Excessivespeedisacommonfactorasispiloterror

andthebridgeteamcanbereluctanttointervenewhenthepilotisclearlymakingmistakes.Communicationwithtugs,terminalsandmooringcrewsleadingtomisunderstandingshasalsobeenacontributoryfactor.Evenwhereamanoeuvringplanisagreed,prevailingcircumstancescanrequiretheplantobechangedandtheremaybelittletimetoreacttonewsituations.Inparticular,changesinwindconditions and the movements of other vessels often create problems.Inanumberofcasesitappearsthatabortingthemanoeuvre to try again has not been considered or has been lefttoolate.

5. Loss of manoeuvring capabilityThelossofengines,propulsion,steerage,orthrustersis,perhapssurprisingly,alesscommonfactorthanthosementionedabove.Thereareinstanceswheresuchalosshasoccurred immediately before/after manoeuvring systems havebeen,orareduetobe,repairedoroverhauled.Unfortunately,duringtheseperiodsofincreasedrisk,additionalprecautionsappearnottohavebeentaken.Pre-sailingandpre-arrivalchecksonmanoeuvringsystemsareimportant,especiallyafteralongoceanpassageorstationaryperiod.Lessobviousfactorsinvolvesquatand/orinteraction.Althoughalossofmanoeuvringcapabilitywillinevitablymakecontactavoidancemoredifficult,exercisesanddrillscanbeusedtotestback-upsystems,includinguseoftheship’sanchors.Havingsomethinginreserveisimportant,butbeingabletoputthatreservetoeffectiveuseisequallyimportant.

RecommendationItisbettertoabortthemanoeuvreandmakeasecondattemptthantofailonthefirst.Duringdrills,exercisesandtestsofequipmentpriortoarrival,theMastershouldensurethatthecrewisabletorespondatanytimetoanemergencysituationrelatedtomanoeuvring.Tasksshouldbeproperlydefinedandassignedtoqualifiedpersonnel,and the Master should ensure that the company procedures arefullyunderstoodbyeverybodyinvolved.Effectiveandclearcommunicationisimportant.TheMastershouldclosely monitor the manoeuvres and should not hesitate to comment,giveadvice,orevenabortanapproachifheisuncomfortablewiththesituation.

Seealso“Bumpsandscrapescanbecostly!”fromGardNews183.Someshipownershavesoughttostandardiseequipmentacrossvesselsintheirfleetandtoalwaysassignseniorofficerstothesameclassofvessel.Seealso“Master/pilotexchangeofinformation”fromGardNews154.SeeGuidancetoMasters2.13.4Navigationinconfinedwaters–BridgeResourceManagement.SeealsoLossPreventionCircularno.04-00:Pilotonthebridge-Role,authorityandresponsibility.

14



Anchoring and deteriorating weather conditions

IntroductionGardhasrecentlyseenseveralsevereincidentswhereanchoredvesselshaveendedupdraggingtheiranchors.The purpose of this circular is to highlight some of the issuessurroundinganchoringoperationsinadverseweatherconditions.

Experience from casualtiesItisinevitablethatvesselsmayberequiredtoanchoroffshoreatmoreexposedanchorageswhilstwaitingforaberthtobecomeavailable.Thevesselsmaybeatsuchananchoragefordaysorevenweeksandwillbeexposedtowindandwaves.Oneofthemostimportantfactorsidentifiedduringtheanalysisoftheincidentsistheimportance of making the appropriate decisions in time whentheweatherisdeteriorating.Seafarersareoftentakenbysurprisebydeterioratingweatherandfailtopreparetheirvesselforsuchasituation.Severalimportantlessonscanbelearnedfromthetwoincidentsdescribedbelow.

Collision at anchorageAbulkcarrier(vesselAlpha)recentlycollidedwithanotherbulkcarrier(vesselBravo)whiledraggingitsanchorinstrongwinds.Thetwoshipswereanchoredatanexposedoffshoreanchorage.

Duringthemorninginquestion,asoutherlyweatherfrontcamethroughtheanchorage–changingthewinddirection

fromoff-toonshore.At0900,theOOWonboardvesselAlphanoticedthattheshipwasdraggingtheanchor.Themasterwasinformedandhedecidedtoweighanchoranddeparttheanchorageat0913.

However,vesselAlpha’screwencountereddifficultiesinweighinganchor.DuringtheanchorretrievalprocessthevesseldriftedtowardsvesselBravo,whichwasanchoredtothenorth.

At0935vesselAlphapitchedheavily,resultinginthepropellercomingclearofthewaterandthemainenginebeingshutdownbytheoverspeedtrip.VesselAlpha’smainenginewasrestarted;however,itwastoolatetoavoidacollisionandat0939thevesselcollidedwithvesselBravo.ThetwoshipsmovedapartandthenmadecontactasecondtimebeforevesselAlphafinallymadeitswayclearoftheothervessel.

Thefollowingcausescontributedtothisincident:(1)Theshipsintheanchoragewereanchoredtoocloseto

eachother.

(2)VesselAlpha’sOOWdidnotuseallavailablemeanswhilekeepinganchorwatch.Thisleadtohimfailingtoidentifythechangeintheship’spositionuntil40minutesaftertheshiphadbeguntodragitsanchor.Thedecisiontoleavetheanchoragethereforecametoolate.


15

(3)VesselAlpha’smasterdidnotincreasethescopeofcablelaidout,eitherpriortooronthedayoftheincidentdespitetheweatherreportsandthechangingweatherconditionsattheanchorage.

Grounding following dragging of anchorAstronggalepassedthroughanexposedanchorageinthesouthernhemisphere,producing50knotsoutheasterlywindsand7metrewaves.Thegalecreateddangerousanddifficultconditionsattheanchorage,particularlyforlightlyballastedlargebulkshipswithlimitedmanoeuvrability.

Thedaybeforetheincidentoccurredtherewere56shipsatanchorwaitingtoentertheport.Inresponsetotheforecastgaleforcewindstwoshipsdecidedtodeparttheanchorage.Laterthatdayandduringthenightfurthershipsputouttosea.Bythenextmorningtherewereonly9shipsoutoftheoriginal56leftattheanchorage.Atleast3shipsexperienceddifficultiesinmanoeuvringorweredraggingtheiranchorsduringthatmorning.

Oneshipwasdrivenashorebytheweatherandgrounded.Anotherhadgreatdifficultiesmanoeuvringwhilstonly0.7nmawayfromtheshorelineandnearlyranaground.Athirdshipwasunabletoweightanchoranddraggedtowardstheshoreline.

TheinvestigationundertakenbyTheMaritimeAuthorityofNSWfoundthatthegroundingofthebulkcarrierresultedfromaseriesoferroneousjudgementsanddecisionsmadebythemaster.Themostsignificantbeing:

(1)themaster’sfailuretorealisethepotentialimpactoftheweatherforecastfortheanchorageforthatparticularday;

(2)aninitialdecisiontorideoutthegaleforcewindsatanchor;and

(3)adecisionnottoballasttheshipforheavyweather.

Recommendations and Lessons LearnedAgoodanchorwatchshouldalwaysbemaintainedandmainenginesshouldalwaysbeavailableforusewhenatexposedanchorages.Weatherconditionsmaydeteriorateatshortnotice.

Thefollowingareimportantfactorswhenatanchor:• Regularpositionchecksusingallavailablemeans

includingvisualaids,GPS,ECDISandradar

• Thetimeavailabletoreactbasedonthelimitationsofthe anchorage and nearby hazards

• Theweatherforecast• Communicationwatchandregistrationofinformation

received from shore

• Thelevelofexperienceofthebridgeteam

• Theloadlimitationsoftheanchoringequipment

Intheeventthatrapidlydeterioratingweatherisforecast,theMastermustmaketimelydecisionswhetherto:• takeonheavyweatherballastbeforeconditions

deteriorate• deployanextraanchor• payoutmoreanchorcable• weighanchoranddeparttheanchorage• sliptheanchorcableifnecessary• callfortugassistance• monitorthesituationandletthevesseldragina

controlledmannerthroughtheanchorage.

Recentincidentsindicatethatdeterioratingweatherconditionsareanincreasingchallengetothecrew.Gardwouldliketoemphasisetheimportanceofdetailedplanningandriskassessmentoftheoperationwhenvesselsareanchoring.Knowledgeoftheship’smanoeuvringcharacteristics and the particulars of the anchorage are very important.Itisalsoimportanttocontinuouslyevaluatethechanges in the situation and if necessary to change the initial plan.

16



Moored vessels breaking out from their berths

Introduction/IncidentsGardhasinvestigatedseveralP&IandH&Mincidentsinvolvingmooredvesselsbreakingoutfromtheirberths,followingarecentincreaseinthefrequencyofsuchincidents.Theconsequencesoftheseincidentsrangefrompersonalinjury,significantcontactdamagetothevesselincludingrangingandgroundingdamage,damagetoadjacentvessels,shore/terminalstructurestopollutiondamagetotheenvironment.Themajorityoftheseincidentsoccurredduringperiodsofadverseweather,withhighwindsactingonvesselswithlargewindageareas.

Windspeedsrecordedintheaboveincidentsrangedfrom63km/hto120km/h(Beaufortforce7-12),althoughinonecasetheactualwindspeedwasestimatedtohavebeen much higher due to the funnelling effect of container stacksashore.Inmanycasesadditionalmooringlinesweredeployedinanticipationofhighwinds,ultimatelytonoavail.Inonecasethevesselmooringswereevensupplementedbyshorelineswithloadmonitoring,however,thevesselstillbrokefreeduetoexcessiveloadsonthelines,seeminglyasaresultofabnormaltidalflowcausedbyrestrictedunderkeelclearance.Eventugscouldnotpreventherfromultimatelygrounding.Inanothercase,thevesseldidgettugstoholdheralongsidetheberth,onlytostandthemdownprematurely.Thesecondtimethevesselcameofftheberthshegroundedresultinginsubstantialbottomdamage.

Portsaroundtheworldhavevariousberthlayoutsandmooringfacilitiesandareexposedtodifferentwind,tidalandswellconditions.ItisimportantthattheMastertakesinto consideration the key critical aspects of any given port alongwiththevessel’scharacteristics,inordertoensurethatthevesselisadequatelymooredtowithstandtheanticipatedmooringforces,eveninnormalconditions.ItisequallyimportantthattheMasterisreadytotakeextraprecautionstokeepthevesselalongsideinadverseweather,tidalandswellconditionsandisreadyandabletovacatetheberthsafelywhenconditionsmakeitdifficultformooringstocope.

Risk AssessmentsWhilstincidentsofthisnaturemayinvolvereportsofdefectivemooringequipmentorlackofattentiontomoorings,1 investigations suggest that in many incidents aproperriskassessmentwasnotundertaken.Itisrecommended that appropriate risk assessments are carried out,takingintoconsiderationthevessel’scharacteristics,type,size,tradingpatternandtheprevailingweatherconditions.Factorstobetakenintoconsiderationinclude,butshouldnotbelimitedto,thefollowing:

Examples of wind, tidal, swell and weather related factors• Windloadsexertedontoavessel’ssuperstructure

andhullabovethewaterline,whichcanformalargeproportion of the total load on the mooring system dependingonthemooredvessel’slocationandcharacteristics.

• Waveloadsonavessel,whichcanvarydependingonthevessel’sresponsetowavesofvaryingperiodsandheights.Ofspecialconcernaremooringsinrelativelyshallowwaterdepths,inlowtideandhighwave

conditions.Theseconditionscanleadtoviolentvesselbehaviouratthemoorings(breakingwaves,excessivemotions,snatchloadsetc.)andinextremecases,lossofunder-keelclearanceinwavetroughsforlarger,deeperdraftvessels.

• Forcesresultingfromsteadycurrentsincombinationwithotherloadings,especiallyatlowwaterlevelsinbreakingwaveconditions,whichcanalsoexertsubstantialloadsonaship’smooringsystem.

• Theeffectofwindagainsttideorcurrentandtheeffectofachangeintidedirectiononmoorings.

• Tidalsurgesbefore,duringandafterstorms,whichmaybewellawayfromtheareainwhichthevesselisberthed,causingunusuallylargetidalrangesandlowerthanexpectedwaterlevels.

Examples of port/berth related factors• Characteristicsandhistoryoftheportandberthandany

unusualoccurrences.

• Peculiarfeaturesoftheberthsuchasoverhangingberthingarrangements,obstructionbygantrycranes,windfunnellingeffectsfromshorestructures.

• Design/type,position,qualityandadequacyofshoremooringequipment,includingstormmooringsandfenders,andoftugs.

• Exposureattheberthtowind,tideandswellconditions.

• Delayintheavailabilityofshoremooringequipment,mooringgangs,pilotsandtugsetc.innormalaswellasemergencysituations.

• Proximityofothervesselsandhazardsinthevicinityoftheberth.

• Effectofpassingvesselsonvesselsmooredalongside.

• Availabilityofstormbollards,whichmaynotbeuseableduringcargooperationsifmooringsrestrictworkingontheberth.

• Port/terminalproceduresintheeventofextremeconditionsandtheirsuitability.

Examples of vessel related factors• Size/typeofvessel,notablythewindagearea(including

windageareaduetocargoorcontainersifapplicable)andtherelatedeffectsofthesamewithchangesinwind,tidalandswellconditions.

• Design/typeandconditionofmooringequipment,itslimitationsandweaknesses.2

• Suitabilityofthemooringpattern-numberoflines,lengths,anglesandleadsandtheabilitytomaintaineventensiononthelines.

• Manninglevel/crewavailabilityfornormalaswellasadverseweatherconditions.


17

• Weatherforecastandwarnings-reliabilityandfrequency.

• Readinessofengines,thrusters,anchorsandpowerondeck.

• Availability,conditionandreadinessofadditionalmoorings.

ConclusionItisrecommendthattheMastercarriesoutaproperriskassessment for the different mooring conditions and loadingstosuittheirspecificvesselcharacteristicsandmooringlocationinnormalaswellasadverseweatherconditions.TheMasterisencouragedtobeproactiveinrequestinginformationfromtheport,pilotsandagentsandinestablishinghowwarningswillbebroadcastbytheport.However,heshouldnotrelywhollyoninformationfromotherparties.Intheeventthatdeterioratingconditionsareforecast,theMastershouldmaketimelydecisionsto

ensure that the vessel is brought to a state of immediate readiness.AmongstotherthingstheMasterwillwanttoensurethat,beforeconditionsbecomeextreme,thevesselisfullymanned,isappropriatelyballastedforheavyweather(withdueregardtounderkeelclearanceattheberthandintheport),hasenginesready,andisinclosecontactwiththe terminal and port authorities in relation to timing and availabilityforstoppageofcargooperations,deploymentofadditional(storm)moorings,andfortugs,pilotsetc.Mostimportantly,theMasterwillneedtodecidewhetherto remain alongside or depart from the berth to sea or a safeanchorage.Itisworthbearinginmindthatadditionalprecautionssuchasextramooringlinesmaynotpreventashipfrombreakingfreefromhermoorings.

Last,butbynomeansleast,itisalsoworthrememberingthat mooring stations can be very dangerous places in badconditions,henceanothergoodreasonnottodelaydeparturefromtheberthuntilitisdangerouslylate.

1SeeforexampletheAustralianTransportSafetyBureaureportpublishedinMay2008andfoundat:http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2006/MAIR/pdf/mair232_001.pdf2Forexample,somewinchbrakesaredesignedtorenderunderexcessiveloadtoavoidthedangersofpartinglines.OCIMFrecommendsthatthewinchbreakbesetat60%MBL(MinimumBreakingLoad)ofthemooringline.Ifthewinchstartstorenderthenthedesignconditionsarebeingexceeded.SeeIntertankocommentaryonwinchbrakesettingsat:http://www.intertanko.com/templates/intertanko/issue.aspx?id=40247

18



Navigation through the entrances to the Baltic SeaThis circular is based on a recent letter received from The Danish Maritime authorities highlighting the increased numberofnavigationalaccidentsinDanishwaters,andGard’sownexperiencewithsimilaraccidentsinthesamearea.

Asmembersandclientsareaware,IMOresolutionMSC.138(76)providesrecommendationsonnavigationthroughtheentrancestotheBalticSea,namelytheGreatBelt(RouteT)andTheSound.Therecommendationsincludetheuseofpilotsforcertaintypesofshipsinhightrafficdensitywaters.ThepurposeofIMOresolutionMSC138(76)wastoprovidethoseresponsiblefortheoperationofshipswithrecommendations on safe navigation through the entrances oftheBalticSeawiththeobjectivestoensuresafety,preventhumaninjuryorlossoflife,andtoavoiddamagetotheenvironment,inparticularthemarineenvironment,andtoshipsandtheircargoes.

InalettertotheInternationalGroupofP&IClubs,theDanishMaritimeAuthorityhasdrawntheshippingindustry’sattentiontoIMOresolutionMSC.138(76)andindicatingthatanumberofshipsaredisregardingtherecommendations.AccordingtoasafetystudyconductedbytheDanishMaritimeAuthority,duringtheperiodfrom1stJanuary2002to30thJune2005alone,22shipsgroundedintheGreatBeltandnoneoftheseshipshadapilotonboardatthetime.

TheDanishMaritimeAuthorityletterillustratesandemphasises that it is highly recommended to utilise the expertiseandlocalknowledgeofpilots,andthatasaminimum,vesselssailingthroughtheGreatBeltorTheSoundfollowIMO’srecommendationonnavigationthroughtheentranceoftheBalticSea.

DenmarkhasalsolaunchedaprocedurewherebyallvesselsenteringDanishwaterswithoutorderingapilotinaccordancewiththeIMOrecommendationwillbecontactedinordertodrawtheirattentiontotherecommendationsontheuseofpilots.Whenashipdoesnotcomply,themasterwillbeinformedthatDenmarkfindsitinconsistentwithsafenavigationpracticesandprocedurestoneglectanIMOrecommendation.Theseshipswillbereportedtothemaritimeauthorityintheship’sflagstate.

Thefollowingdocumentsareavailableatwww.gard.nounderNewsintheLossPreventionsection:

• The Danish Maritime Authority Letter.

• IMO resolution MSC.138(76)

• Intertanko model charterparty clauses in recognition and

support of IMO res MSC 138(76).

GeneralinformationonPilotageintheBalticcanbefoundattheBalticPilotageAuthoritiesCommissionwebsiteat:http://www.balticpilotage.comandhttp://www.pilotage.dk

VesselstowhichtheIMOrecommendationsdonotapplyareadvisedtonavigatewithextracautionthroughtheentrancestotheBalticSea,i.e.theGreatBelt(RouteT)andTheSound.

AguidetonavigationinDanishwaterscanbefoundat: http://www.frv.dk/en/ifm/navigation/navigation_ntdw.htm


19


Winter season in the northern Baltic Sea

The2002/2003winterseasonwastheworstonrecordsincethewinterof1987.Ourstatisticsappeartoindicatethattheprecedingrelativelymildwintersmayhavelulledseafarersintoafalsesenseofsecurity.Howthisandfuturewinterswillunfoldremainstobeseen,butshipownersandoperatorswouldbewelladvisedtoensurethattheirseagoingpersonnelarewellawareoftheplanning,preparationandcarerequiredwhilenavigatinginice.

Approximately30%ofallaverageswhichoccurredinconnectionwithnavigationiniceintheBalticSeaduringthepastwinterseason,werecollisioncases.Thisisasubstantialnumberandleadsustoagainremindshipownersoftheissuesinvolved.

Themostcommoncausewascollisionbetweenvesselsinaniceconvoy.Undernormalcircumstancesblamehasbeenapportionedequallybetweenthecollidingvessels.Otherwise,indeterminingliability,emphasiswasplacedon:– Howthewatchkeeperhadbeenalertedbythevessels

involved,– Howvesselsaheadandabafthadbeenwarnedbythe

vesselwhichwasstuckorsloweddownintheice,– Distanceskeptbetweenthevessels,andofcourse– Theicesituationingeneral.

Insomecollisioncases,andinparticularwhenanassistingicebreakerisinvolved,thecasemaybesettledona“knock-for-knock”basis.Thismeansthatbothpartiescovertheirowncostofrepairs.Thesameprinciplemayalsobeusedoragreeduponbetweentheparties,whentwomerchantvessels,assistingeachotherwhennavigatinginice,areinvolvedinacollision.However,theabove“knock-for-knock”practiceisonlyusedin“standard”casescausedbydifficulticeconditions.Ifgrossnegligenceorothersimilarcausesareinvolved,othermethodsofapportioningblamewillbeused. Analysisofthecollisioncasesshowsthatthevesselsinvolvedareveryoftenblamedfornotcomplyingwiththeapplicablerules;TheInternationalRegulationsforPreventingCollisionsatSea,1972(COLREGS72),andtheFinnish/Swedish“RulesforWinterNavigation”.

TheFinnish/Swedish“RulesforWinterNavigation”areendorsedbyGermany,DenmarkandtheBalticStates.InadditiontodirectingnavigationduringthewinterperiodinFinlandandSweden,theseRulessetthestandardforicenavigationintheBaltic,includingnavigationiniceinconjunctionwithicebreakersinthemajorityoftheBaltic.

Forfurtherdetailsaboutthe“RulesforWinterNavigation”pleaseseetheFinnishMaritimeAuthority’shomepageathttp://www.fma.fi/e/functions/icebreaking/

Navigationwhenthevesselispartofaconvoyisariskyoperation,andthecrewmustbealertandmaintainaproperlookoutatalltimes.Itisessentialthatallrelevantregulationsareproperlycompliedwith.BreachofCOLREGS72,especiallythebelowmentionedrules,appearstobethemost common cause of collisions:

–Rule5–Properlookout–Rule6–Safespeed–Rule7–Riskofcollision–Rule8–Actiontoavoidcollision–Rule13–Overtakingvessel–Rule17–Actionbystand-onvessel–Rule27(a)(i)–vesselnotundercommand(stopped)toshowtworedlights

The Finnish/Swedish “Rules for Winter Navigation” require(a) Strictwatchkeepingbothvisuallyandespeciallyby

radarandimmediatenotificationbyVHFradiowhenlossofspeedisexperienced.

(b) Incaseofstoppage:–Immediatesignallingincaseoffailureofothermeans of communication–Immediateenginemanoeuvring–Immediateruddermanoeuvring

RecommendationWhennavigatinginiceorinthevicinityofice,shipownersmustensurethattheironboardpersonnelarewellawareoftheregulationsgoverningsuchnavigation.Furthermore,mastersmustbeadvisedoftherequirementtoensurepropercompliancewiththegoverningregulationsandalsooftheutmostcarerequiredinordertopromotesafenavigation.

Thiscircularhasbeenproducedwiththevaluableassistance offormerHullClaimsManager,CaptainJohnHammaréninFinland.

20



Operations in extremely cold climates

IntroductionOperationsinextremecoldenvironmentsareperhapsthemost demanding and challenging that a vessel and her crewmayexperience.Theextremecoldreducesthecrew’sefficiencyconsiderably.Inaddition,sensitivedeck-mountedequipmentandpipelinesareoftenatriskofdamageifprecautionsarenottakenintime.Thereisalsotheriskthaticedamagetovesselsmayresultinoilspills.

Damagerelatedtoextremecoldandnavigationiniceoccurseveryyear.Theyaremorefrequentatthebeginningofacoldperiod,andvesselsenteringsuchwatersinfrequentlyaremoreexposedthanothervessels.Extremecoldcausesdamagetocargo,vesselequipmentandinjuriestothecrew,whilenavigationinicecausesdamagetothehull,propellersand/orrudder.

AnarticleinGardNewsissueNo.127outlinedguidelinestopreventcoldweatherdamagestovesselsandtheirequipment.GardServiceshasalsotriedtoobtaininformationbasedonexperiencesgainedbyshipownersoperatinginextremecoldenvironmentsonafrequentbasis.Thefollowinglistisnotmeanttobeexhaustive,butshouldserveasareminder,astemperaturesintheNorthernHemisphereareagainverylow.

Deck mounted equipment• Frozen pipelines are perhaps the most common

damagethatoccurs.Thepipelinesshouldbeproperlydrainedwellinadvance.Donotforgetfirehosesandcouplings,whichinsomecasesmaybecomeinoperativeifnotproperlydrained.Exposedpipingshouldbeinsulatedtopreventfreezingwherenecessary.

• Periodicallypurgeairlinesondecktoremovewatercondensation.

• Freshwaterpipingsystemsareparticularlyatriskoffreezing.Considercirculatingwaterinthefreshwaterpipingsystem.

• Deck-mountedwinchesandothersensitiveequipmentshouldbecoveredtoavoidicingfromfreezingspray.Hydraulicequipmentshouldalsobestartedseveralhoursbeforeuse,inordertoachieveproper oil temperatures on hydraulic hoses before theyareexposedtohighpressure.Insomecasesitisrecommendedtokeeptheequipmentgoingconstantly.

• Considerstowingmooringropesandpilotladdersbelowdecktopreventfreezingandreducethechancesoficebuildup.

• Ifpossible,ballasttanksshouldbefilledwithwaterwithahighsalinity(andconsequentlylowerfreezingpoint).Furthermore,toavoidfreezingoftheairpipes,theballastlevelshouldbedropped.Frozenair pipes may cause severe damage both to tank structureandpumpsalike.

• Allspareelectricityshouldbeusedtoheattheaccommodationandcompartmentsexposedtotheiceandcold(forepeak,etc.).Keepdoorsclosedtoretaintheheat.

• Engineventilatorsmayinsomecasesbeturnedoff(butremainopen)toavoidfreezingofsensitiveequipmentintheengineroom.

• Iceondeckshouldpreferablyberemovedwithwoodenicemallets,toavoiddamagetothehullpaintcoatings.Itisalsorecommendedtokeepsufficientstocksofglycolandsalttoremoveandpreventicebuildup.

• Safetyequipmentshouldbecheckedfrequently,includingsafetyhandlines,ifrigged.

• Move anchors periodically in order to prevent chains andwinchesfromfreezing.

• Alterationsinspeedand/orcourseshouldbeconsideredtoreducetheeffectsoffreezingspray.

• Deck and navigation lights can easily be damaged by thecoldandice,andshouldbecheckedfrequentlytoensuretheyremaininproperworkingorder.

Cargo holdsSeveraltypesofcargoareexposedtocontaminationfromwaterandlowtemperaturesandinsomecasesthismayincreasethecondensationproblem.• Ifcargoventilation(ifinstalled)isused,snowand

moist cold air may lead to condensation and should notbeblownintothecargoholds.

• Whencleaningtheholds,keeptheuseofwatertoanabsoluteminimum.Sweepholdsproperlyinadvanceofusingwater.Usepre-heatedwaterwheneverpossible.Preventdirtywaterfromaggregatingandfreezingbyremovingexcesswaterinlocationswherefreezingcouldoccur.

Crew• Lowtemperaturesreducethecrew’sphysicalability,

effectiveness,andcanimpairjudgement.Properclothing is therefore essentialtomaintaincrewsafetyandawareness.

• Reviewrotationofwatchesforcrewmembersworkinginexcessivelycoldareastoensureexposureiskeptataminimum.


21

Navigation in ice• Aconsiderableamountofinformationonice

conditions and navigation in ice is available on the Internet.Forexample:- http://www.natice.noaa.gov/home.htm

provides global and regional sea ice analyses andforecastsfromtheUnitedStatesNationalIceCenter;

- http://www.cis.ec.gc.caprovidesinformationabouticeconditionsinCanada;and

- http://fram.nrsc.no/CEO_Training/Present.htmprovides general information on ice conditions intheBalticregion.

• Localmeteorologicalstationsaremorethanwillingtoshareimportantinformationwhencontacted.Icechartsarealsoreceivedontheweatherfacsimilereceiver.

• Instructionsfromicebreakersandlocalauthoritiesshouldbecarefullyfollowed.Ifyouaretakingshortcutsandarecaughtbytheiceitmaybedifficulttoreceivetimelyassistance.

• The effect of current on ice should not be underestimated.Ifyouarecaughtintheicewiththecurrentinanunfavourabledirection,thismayexposethevesseltocollision,groundingorothertypesofcontactdamage.

• Reversionofpropellersiniceshouldbedonecarefully and controlled to avoid damage to the rudderandpropellerblades.Itmaybeadvantageoustoruntheenginesaheadtowashawayicearoundthe propeller and rudder before attempting to run astern,whichagainshouldbekepttoaminimumtoavoidtherudderorpropellerbeingexposedtosolidice.

• Especiallyinballastcondition,thecoolingwaterinletsmaybechockedwithice.Thiscansubsequentlyleadtoalossofcoolingwater.Enginecrewmustbeproperlybriefedandmadeawareinordertoavoidsuchsituations.

• Forvesselswithhighairdraftorexposedrigging,icingcanaffectthestabilityofthevessel.Therefore,vesselsmayneedtolaybyeandremoveicewithmalletsorothersuitabletools.

The shipyard• Ifthevesselisattherepairyardordock,thevessel’s

crewshouldcheckallitemsatriskofcolddamage,andnotleavethistotheyardorsub-contractors.

• Ifthevesselisattherepairyardasaresultofdamage,andadditionaldamageisincurredduetoextremecoldwhilstattheyard,theadditionaldamageswillbesubjecttoaseparateclaimandwillinmanycases,bebelowtheapplicabledeductible.This applies to both hull and machinery and loss of hire.

Bunkers• Ifthevesselisattherepairyardordock,itis

imperative that all heavy fuel oil bunkers are kept heated above 20 degrees centigrade to ensure that itretainstheproperviscosity.

• Whilstatportorattherepairyardinlocationswithanextremelycoldclimate,itisimperativethatheavyfuel oil bunkers remain properly heated at all times in order to retain enough viscosity to be pumpable and tobeused.Ifthefueloilisnotkeptatthepropertemperature,itcouldtakedaysbeforeitisheatedsufficientlytobeusedand,willthusdelaythesailingofthevessel.

22



Improper implementation of manufacturers’ service lettersBackgroundOvertheyearsGardhasseenanumberofclaimsthatcouldhave been avoided if instructions and recommendations inmanufacturers’servicelettershadbeenproperlyimplementedinaship’sonboardPlannedMaintenanceSystem(PMS).Insomeofthecasesitappearsthatshipowners’andoperators’shoreorganisationshavenot distributed the service letters to all the ships in their fleet.Inothercaseswefindthatthelettershavebeenforwardedtoallshipsbutsinceaccompanyinginstructionsonimplementationandfollowuparemissing,therequiredchangeshavenotbeenimplementedonboard.Failureto implement changes and recommendations introduced inmanufacturers’servicelettersmayinsomecaseshaveseriousconsequencesforthesafetyofthecrew,theenvironmentandtheship.Thepurposeofthiscircularisthereforetoremindshipownersandoperatorsoftheimportanceofestablishingclearcompanyprocedureswhereallservicelettersarereviewedandrelevantchangesandactionsareenteredinthecompany’splannedmaintenancesystemfortheapplicableships.

Failuretoimplementmanufacturers’instructionsandrecommendationsmayalsoprejudicetheinsurancecover.Consequently,itisimportanttocontroltheimplementationof such changes and recommendations through the ships safetymanagementsystem(SMS).

Gard’s experienceInoneofGard’srecentcasesthecauseofenginedamagewasfoundtobeimpropertighteningofconnectingrodbolts.Duringtheincidentinvestigationitwasestablishedthattheenginemanufacturers’requiredretighteningcheckafter 200 hours of operation had not been carried out by thecrewsincethisinstruction,distributedinaserviceletter,hadnotbeenimplementedintheship’sownPMS.Theinvestigation concluded that the retightening of the bolts wouldmostlikelyhavepreventedtheenginebreakdown.Inanotherrecentcasetheauxiliaryenginesufferedapistonfatiguebreakdownonly120runninghoursafteraroutineoverhaul.Alsointhiscasetheinvestigationrevealedthattheship’sTechnicalManager/ShipownershadnotupdatedthePMStoincludeasetofinstructionsandproceduresissuedinaserviceletterfromthemanufacturers,aletterwhichwasissued and distributed at least one year before the incident occurred.TherepaircostsinthiscaseexceededUSD130,000.

BothoftheabovecasesdemonstratetheimportanceoftheTechnicalManagers/Shipownershavingproperproceduresinplacetotimelyimplementmanufacturers’servicelettersandinstructionsonboard.

Regulatory requirements and implementationTheIMOISMCodestatesthat“development,implementation and maintenance of all instructions and procedures to ensure safe operation of the ship and protectionoftheenvironmentincompliancewithrelevantinternational and Flag state legislation shall be a part of the ship’ssafetymanagementsystem(SMS)”(ISMCodeSection1.4).Furthermore,itstatesthattheshipownerisresponsible

for“establishingprocedurestoensurethattheshipismaintained in conformity of the provisions of the relevant rulesandregulationsandwithanyadditionalrequirementswhichmaybeestablishedbythecompany”(ISMCodeSection10).

Recommendations•GardrecommendstheTechnicalManagers/Shipownersestablishfirminternalproceduresinthecompany’sQualityManagementSystem(QMS)toensurethatallapplicablemanufacturers’servicelettersandinstructionsarereviewedandimplementedintheshipsPMS.Applicablemanufacturers’serviceletter’sandinstructions,includingmanagers’recommendations,shouldalsoformpartofthehandovernotesbetweentheonboardseniormanagement.•Incasethereisachangeofship’sTechnicalmanagement/Shipowner,alwayscontactthemanufacturerstoensurethattheship’sPMSisuptodatewiththelatestchangesandrecommendations.


23


Oil contamination of marine boilers

IntroductionThemalfunctionandbreakdownofmarineboilersarenotnewissuesalthoughitiswellknownthatonlyaverythinlayer of oil on the surface of the boiler tubes can cause local overheatingandpossibledamagetotheboiler.Gardhasrecently seen a number of claims involving boiler damage causedbythepresenceofoilintheboilerfeedwatersystem.Inseveralcases,whereaminoroilleakagehasbeendiscoveredbythecrew,theboilerhasbeenblowndownfromthebottominsteadofsurfaceblowingresultinginaboilertotallycoveredwithoil.Duringcleaningafterrepairs,the oil has not been properly removed from the boiler orfromthefeedwaterpipingsystemwhichagainhasledto cracks and an associated loss of integrity in high heat transferareas.

Manyofthereportedincidentshaveledtoexpensiveandtime consuming repairs including cleaning of the feed watersystemandrenewaloftheboilertubes.Thepurposeofthiscircularisthereforetoremindshipownersandoperators of the importance of proper boiler operation and maintenance,andtohighlighttherelevantcontrolmeasuresforpreventing,andwherenecessaryhandling,oilleakagesintothefeedwatersystem.

Recent casesThe most common sources of oil contamination are leaking heating coils in fuel tanks and fuel heaters or lube oil heaters.Inonerecentcaseitwasallegedthatfueloilhadbeendetectedinthehotwellwhichhadcomefromaleakinthefueloilpurifierheaterafewweeksearlier.Thedefectiveheaterwasreplacedwithanewspareandthehotwellwascleaned.Theboilerswerethenputbackinoperation.Afewweekslaterthecrewnoticedalow-level-alarminthehotwelltankandfurtherinvestigationrevealedwaterleakinginsidethefurnace.Openingoftheboilerrevealedseveralcracksinwayofthefiretubes.

InanothercaseanexcessiveamountofHFOwasdiscoveredinthehotwell.Nooildetectionalarmsoundedsincethealarmhadbeendisconnectedduetoproblemswiththedetectionsystemintheobservationtank.Duringtheinspectionitwasdiscoveredthatthefeedwatersystemwascompletelypollutedbyoil,andasthecommoncirculatingpumpwasrunning,thisalsoincludedtheexhaustboiler.Theinvestigationsalsorevealedafeedwaterleakintotheflamechamber,duetoacrackinthewallpanelintheauxiliaryboiler,andsomebrokenpintubesduetolocaloverheating.ThecauseofthefeedwatercontaminationwasfoundtobeabrokenheatingcoilinoneoftheHFOtanks.Theheatingcoilhadbeenrenewedduringthepreviousdry-docking,andfurther inspections revealed that the coil had been mounted withsomepipeclampsmissingandasaresult,vibrationhadcausedthebreakdownoftheheatingcoil.Theshipownerdecidedtotakethevesseloff-hireforacompletecleaningofthefeedwatersystemandretubingofthedefectivepipesintheauxiliaryboiler.

ConsequencesIssuessuchasdisconnectionoftheoildetectionalarmforthehotwellmayleadtomajordamage.Thebreakdownmayhavebeenavoidedifthealarmhadbeenworkingandthesituationwouldnodoubthavebeendiscoveredatanearlierstage.Themostdangeroustypeofwatercontamination

is heavy fuel entering the steam or condensate from a leakingheatingcoilorheatexchanger.Iftheproblemisnotdiscoveredintime,theboilercanbecompletelydestroyedbyoverheatingduetoreducedwaterflowandminimisedheattransfer/coolingoftheboilertubes.Theimmediateeffectsrangefromfoamingandcarryoverinoilfiredboilerstothemalfunctionofboilerwaterlevelcontrolsandevenprotectiveshutdowndevices.Moresevereoilcontaminationmay lead to a collapse of the heat transfer rate through the boilersteel,whichcontributestoahighermetaltemperaturethanthedesignvalue.1

Preventive actionThefollowingpracticesandpreventivemeasuresshouldbeconsideredinordertoavoidextensivedamageduetooilcontamination:

1.Alarms,monitoringsystemsandautomaticsafetyshutdownfunctionsshouldbetestedregularlytoensurethattheyfunctionproperly.Safetyalarmsandautomaticshutdownfunctionsmustneverbebypassed.

2.Iftheboilerplantis,nevertheless,operatedwithbypassedfaultysafetyshutdownfunctions,acontinuousvisualwatchshouldbekeptonthewaterlevelandanypotentialoilcontaminationinthehotwelltanks.

3.Filtersinstalledinthehotwelltankmustbereplacedregularlyorasrequired.Assmallamountsofoilclingtothefiltermaterial,itisimportantthatthefilteringmaterialiscarefullymonitoredandreplacedasnecessary.

4.Ensurethattheoildetectingdeviceinthehotwelltank(iffitted)isworkingproperly.

Corrective actionsIfthereisasuspectedoilleakageintothefeedwatersystem,carefullyexamineandhydrotestallrelevantheatingcoils,heatexchangersandotherpotentialleaksourcesinthesteam/condensate system in order to identify the origin of theleakage.Beawarethattherecouldbemorethanoneleakage.Thefollowingpracticesandcorrectiveactionsshouldbeconsideredwhenoilisdiscovered;

1.Ifoilisobservedinthehotwellitisrecommendedtocheckwhetheradarkoilyfilmcontaminatestheboilerwaterlevelglassesinside.Ifso,donotblowdowntheboilerfromthebottom;justsurfaceblowseveraltimes.Iftheboileris

24


bottomblown,itwillbecometotallycoveredinoil.

2.Afterrepairs,thepipingsystem,heatingcoils,pumps,hotwellandheatershavetobecleanedofalltheremainingoil.Manufacturers’recommendationsandproceduresforcleaningshouldbefollowed.

3.Theboilermustnotbestartedupagainuntilanoil-freefeedwatersupplyisguaranteed.

RecommendationsTo prevent boiler damage caused by the presence of oil in theboilerfeedwatersystem,Membersandclientsshouldfollowmanufacturers’recommendationsandhighlighttheabovepreventiveandcorrectiveactionsintheirprocedures.Furthermore,itisrecommendedto:

•Encouragethecrewtoreportanyaccidentaldamagesothat it can be inspected and/or repaired as necessary and as soonaspossible.

•Ifrepairsonthesteamandheatingsystemhavebeencarriedoutduringyardstay,properinspectionsshouldbe conducted to ensure that heating coils are properly mountedaccordingtoclassrequirements.

Footnotes1AccordingtoDNV,evenathinfilmofoiloradepositasthinas0.5mmonthewatersidecaneasilyincreasethemetal temperature on the furnace side from a design value of250°Ctowellabove600°Cundernormaloperatingconditionsonanauxiliaryboilerratedat7bar(DNVTechnicaleNewsletter,2October2012,«OilContaminationofMarineBoilers»).


25


Dangers of power-operated watertight doors

Background OvertheyearsGardhasseenseveralaccidentsrelatedtopower-operatedwatertightdoorsonboardships.Suchdoorsarefittedinwatertightbulkheadsofshipslikecruisevessels,ro-ropassengervessels,ferries,largesupplyships,specialpurposeships,etc.,andareelectricallyorhydraulicallyoperated.Onthelowermostdecksdoorsareoftenhydraulicallyoperated,closingwithaforceoftwotons.Peoplehavebeenkilledorseverelymaimedbysuchdoors.There is often an element of fault by the affected person in suchaccidents,asthestrictprocedureforpassingthroughthesedoorsmaynothavebeenfollowed.Otherissueswhichmayaffecttheiroperationarelackofpropermaintenance,thecrewhasnotbeenproperlytrainednorreceivedspecificinstructionsonhowtooperatethedoors,andSOLASregulationsandguidancearenotfollowed.

The purpose of this circular is to stress the importance of the correctoperationofwatertightdoorsinordertomaintainthevessel’ssurvivabilityduringemergenciesinvolvingwateringress,butalsotofosterawarenessoftherisktocrewpassing through these doors during their everyday operation ofthevessel.

Operational requirements for watertight doors Thebulkheadsinwhichsuchdoorsarefittedarerequiredtobewatertightinordertosavethevesselshouldwaterenterthehull,followingacollisionorgrounding.RegulationsforthesubdivisionofshipsarefoundinSOLAS,andsoaretheregulationsconcerningpower-operatedwatertightdoors.

SOLASrequiresasfewwatertightdoorsaspossibleinsubdivisionbulkheads,regardingthemasacertainrisk,butithasbecomerelativelyeasy,dependingonthepolicyoftheflagstate,toobtainarelaxation,soitisnotuncommonforshipstohave30,40,50ormorewatertightdoors.Ifashipisatriskofbeingflooded,thesedoorsmustbeclosed.Doors can be closed from the bridge or they can be opened andclosedonlocation.Whentheshipisatsea,inprincipleallsuchdoorsmustbeinaclosedposition.Undercertaincircumstances,however,somedoorsmaybeallowedtobeopenedatsea.Althoughtheregulationsarequitestrict,thepracticeonboardisoftenfoundtobemorerelaxed,andwehaveseenshipswithanumberofdoorsopenduringvoyage,abadhabit.

Thebridgemayneedtocloseallwatertightdoorsinanemergency,butmustalsobeassuredthatnooneistrappedwithinacompartment.Doorscanthereforealwaysbeopenedlocallyand,ifthevesselsuffersablackout,theremustbestoredenergywithinthedoorforthreemovements.Inaddition,itispossibletopumpthedooropenwithamanualpump.

ThecurrentSOLASregulationsapplytovesselsbuiltafter1February1992.Theregulationsdemandthatanumberofsafety measures be built into the operational system of the doors.Theremustbeadiagramonthebridgeshowingthelocationofeachdoor,withindicatorlampsforopenandcloseddoors:redforopenandgreenforclosed.Thelogicisthatanopendoorrepresentsadangertotheship,thusa

redlight.Theremustalsobeamastermodeswitch,whichhastwopositions:“Localcontrol”and“Doorsclosed”.Thatswitchmustalwaysbein“Localcontrol”mode,unlessthereisanemergencyorthesystemisbeingtested.

Gard’s experience Wehavenotedthatpeopleoftenpassthroughwatertightdoorsbeforetheyarefullyopened,adangeroushabitinitselfandwhichcaneasilyresultinacasualtyifthemastermodeswitchisplacedin“Doorsclosed”.Thedoorwillthenimmediatelystarttoclosewhenthelocaloperatinghandleisreleased.Adoorwillalsogotoclosedpositionifthereisafault,asthesystemwillgiveprioritytothesafetyoftheship.

WehavenotedthatsomevesselsbuiltbeforethecurrentSOLASregulationsenteredinforcedonothaveamastermodeswitchonthebridge,butonlypushbuttonsforopeningandforclosingthedoors.Theremayberedandgreenindicatorlampsforthedoorpositions,butoftennodefinitionofwhatthecoloursmean.Oldervesselsthereforerun the risk of having doors opened in error instead of closingfromthebridgeinanemergency.

Doorshaveaflowvalveinthehydraulicsystemtoregulatethespeedoftheirmovements.TheSOLASregulationsrequirethedoorstocloseinaminimumof20secondsandamaximumof40secondswhenoperatedlocally.Reportsfromaccidentsoftenrevealthattheflowvalvehasbeensetforthedoortoclosemuchfaster,obviouslybycrewmembersfindingthatdoorstaketoolongtoopenandclose.Suchtampering is of course very dangerous and contrary to regulations.Unfortunatelytheflowvalveisnotalwayswellprotectedbutitshouldbe.

RecommendationsSOLASregulationsfor“Subdivisionandstability”andfordoorsinwatertightbulkheadsarefoundinChapterII.PartB-4,Regulation22requiresalldoorstobekeptclosedatsea,butmakessomeexceptions.ForpassengershipstheIMOCircularMSC.1/Circ.1380“Guidanceforwatertightdoorsonpassengershipswhichmaybeopenedduringnavigation”containsausefulchecklistfordeterminingifadoormaybeopenduringnavigation.

26


Insummary,shipmanagementandcrewmembersshouldbearinmindthefollowingconcerningwatertightdoors:

•Beawareoftherisksposedbysteeldoorsclosingwithapowerof2tons.•Knowtheregulationsforsuchdoors,readtheinstructionsandfollowthem.•Foroldervessels,bringthebridgecontrolpanelinlinewithcurrentSOLASregulations.Aredindicatorlampshouldmeananopendoor,anddoorsshouldnotbeabletobeopenedfromthebridge.•Beawareofthedangerstolocalusersifthemastermodeswitchissetto“Doorsclosed”.•Donotwalkthroughadoorinmotion.Ifitemsaretobecarriedorpulledthroughawatertightdoor,askforassistance.•Donottamperwithalarmbells,operatingleversandspeedcontrolsofdoors.•Maintaindoorsingoodcondition,theyaretheretosavetheshipinanemergency.Haveregularservicingcarriedoutbythedoormanufacturer.•Keepdoorsclosedatsea.

GardNews207containsfourarticlesaddressingtheproblemsandrisksassociatedwithpower-operatedwatertightdoors.Anumberofincidentsarereferredtoin the articles and contain useful learning points for ship operators.TheGardNewsarticlesareavailableongard.no.


27Loss Prevention Circular No. 06-12

Fixed CO2 fire-extinguishing systems - consequences of delayed release

IntroductionOneofthemostcommonlyusedfire-extinguishingagentsinships’engineroomsiscarbondioxide(CO2).CO2 gas hasexcellentfire-extinguishingcapabilitiesandisrelativelyinexpensive,butmayposeaseriousrisktopersonnelasitprimarilyextinguishesfiresbyreducingtheavailableoxygenintheatmosphere.Inadditiontoconcernsaboutthesafetyhazardtopersonnel,Gardalsohasconcernsastohowthefinaloutcomeofafirecanbeinfluencedbythetypeofextinguishingsystemused.WithCO2systems,theperiodbetweendetectingafireandreleasingthegasoftenseemsquitelong.Unclearevacuationandmusteringprocedurescombinedwiththecrew’sworriesaboutthelethaleffectsofCO2cancauseunnecessarydelaysinrelease–orasexperiencedinoneofGard’srecentcases,noreleaseatall.Minorfireshavebeenallowedtoescalateandcausesevereandcostlydamagetoshipsandtheirequipment,insomecasesalsoinjuryandlossoflifeduetoextensivesmokedevelopment.

UnlessthecrewfullyunderstandsthefunctionalityofandlimitationsassociatedwithCO2systems,theymaynotbesufficientlyconfidentandpreparedtoprovidetimelyandeffectiveemergencyresponseduringafire.ThepurposeofthiscircularistocreateawarenessoftheinherentrisksoffixedCO2fire-extinguishingsystems;highlightlimitationsintheirmethodofapplicationwhenusedinships’enginerooms;andstresstheimportanceofproperproceduresandtrainingfortheiruseonboard.

Safeguarding against risks to human life1

TheconcentrationofCO2abovecertainlevelsinfire-fightingapplicationsisamajorconcernamongstfiresafetyregulators.SomesafetyregulatorsevenprohibittheuseofCO2asafire-extinguishingagentinspaceswherepersonnelhasaccessduringnormaloperation;onesuchexamplecanbe found in the safety regulations applicable to the offshore oilandgasindustriesinNorway.2TheIMOSafetyofLifeatSea(SOLAS)ConventiondoesnotprohibittheuseofCO2insystemsprotectingaship’sengineroom,orotherspaceswherecrewhasaccessduringnormaloperation.ButtheriskstopersonnelareclearlyrecognizedandSOLAScallsforvarioussafeguards,suchastwoseparateandinterlockedcontrols,pre-dischargealarmsandtime-delays,toprotectpersonnelintheengineroom.SOLASdoesnot,however,allowportableCO2extinguisherstobeplacedintheaccommodationspacesonboardships,duetotheassociatedrisktopersonnel.3

Ensuring timely and effective emergency response during a fireEmergencyresponsetoengineroomfirescanbebetterorganisedandcarriedoutmoreefficientlyifthecrewisproperlytrainedinthesafeuseoftheship’sfire-extinguishingsystems.Thetimeittakestomakeadecisiontoreleasethefixedfire-extinguishingsystemisconsideredto be one of the most critical factors during emergency responseandmainconcernsrelatedtouseofCO2 as theextinguishingagentinships’engineroomscanbesummarisedasfollows:

Delayedrelease:Forthetypicalengineroomfireinvolvingflammableliquids,itisimportanttointroducetherequiredquantitiesofCO2quicklytolimittheescalationofthefire.

Investigationsrevealthatevacuation,musterandheadcountsduringengineroomfiresoftentakelongerthanexpectedbecause“thecrewwasrunningaroundandwasdifficulttocount”.4

Engineroomnotproperlysealedpriortorelease:Theextinguishingcapabilitiesofgascanbecompromisediftheintegrity and tightness of the boundaries of the protected spacearenotsound.Onmorethanoneoccasion,theeffectivenessofaCO2systemhasbeenlimitedbyexcessiveleakageofgasthroughopenorimproperlycloseddoors,ventsorventilationducts.

Limitedavailabilityoffire-extinguishingagent:ThequantityofCO2 gas available on board ships is normally limited to thatrequiredforasingledischargeintoaprotectedspace.Limitedavailabilityoffire-extinguishingagent:ThequantityofCO2gasavailableisnormallylimitedtothatrequiredforasingledischargeintoaprotectedspace.

Prematurere-entryintoandventilationoftheengineroomafterrelease:There-entryintotheengineroomfollowingafirewheregashasbeenusedinvolvesperhapsoneofthemostdangerousaspectsoffirefighting.CO2 has limited coolingeffectandthetemperatureofequipmentandstructuresintheengineroommaybeveryhigh,inparticularifthetimeittooktoreleasethefixedfire-extinguishingsystemwaslong.Firefightersorcrewenteringthespacetoosoon,thusallowingentryofoxygen-richair,cancausethefiretoreignite.

Risk assessmentSOLASallowstheuseoffixedfire-extinguishingsystemsapplyingeithergas,foamorwatertoprotectships’enginerooms.Someagentsperformbetterthanothersinaparticular application and all have some limitations that havetobedealtwithwhenextinguishingfires.Gard’sadvicetoshipownerswithnewbuildingprogrammesisthereforeto carefully evaluate the pros and cons of all commercially availablefire-extinguishingsystemspriortospecifyingthedesiredsystem.ThesafetyofthecrewshouldalwaysbeprioritisedandtheinherentrisksofaCO2system,andthelimitationsinitsmethodofapplication,shouldbetakenintoaccount.Asfarasperformanceisconcerned,systemsusing“equivalentgases”,likehalocarbonorinertgases,orwatermist,areallcomparabletoCO2,butfactorstobeconsidered in the risk assessment and selection process are:

•OtheravailablegassystemsarelessharmfultopeoplethanCO2butsome,e.g.halocarbongases,maycreatelife-threateningby-productsduringthefire.•Allgassystems,notonlyCO2,arevulnerabletotheintegrity/tightnessoftheboundariesoftheprotectedspace;they are usually limited to a single discharge and they have limitedcoolingeffects.•Watermistsystemscanbebroughtintoactionfasterthangassystemssinceitisnotnecessarytocloseopenings,shutdownventilationorevacuatethespacebeforerelease.•Thetimeneededtoextinguishfireswithwatermistcanbelongerthanforgas,butwatermistalsocoolsthespaceandcontrolssmokeintheprocess.Anunlimitedwatersupplyisalsousuallyavailable.•Truegassystemsprovide“three-dimensionalprotection”,whiletheeffectivenessofwatermistsystemscanbeaffected

28


bythesizeofthefire,degreeofobstructionofthefire,ventilationandthelayoutoftheprotectedspace.

RecommendationsForshipownersspecifyingandoperatingCO2systems,Gardstronglyrecommendsfosteringawarenessofthehazardsrelatedtotheiruse-throughdetailedandunambiguousprocedures,propertrainingandprescribedmaintenance.Someshipshaveextensivequalityandsafetymanagementsystemsbutlacksufficientdetailstoassistthecrewindealingwithanemergencysituationsuchasafire.Thefollowingisrecommended:•Regularfiredrillsshouldbeasrealisticaspossible.•Emergencyresponseproceduresshouldcontainsufficientdetailstoassistthecrewindealingwithallstagesoftheemergency and should cover:-actionstobeinitiatedpriortoreleaseofCO2,-instructionsforholding/cooldowntimesbeforere-enteringandventilatingthespace,-linesofcommunication,bothonboardandwithrelevantshoreorganizations.•Evacuationandmusteringproceduresshouldincludeasimplebutreliablesystemforhead-countsinordertoavoidanymisunderstandingconcerningthewhereaboutsofcrew.•Manuals,pipingschematics,instructionplacardsandlabellingoftheCO2systemmustbeinaccordancewiththeactualinstallation.•Thepersontaskedtoreleasethesystemmustbeapersondesignatedinthemusterlist.•MaintenanceproceduresfortheCO2 system should includemanufacturers’recommendationsandshouldbebasedontheIMOguidelines(MSC.1/Circ.1318).•PeriodicservicingoftheCO2 system should be carried outbyauthorisedservicesuppliers.•Regularinspectionsshouldensurethatevacuationroutesandexitsintheengineroomareclearlymarkedandkeptfreefromobstructionsatalltimes.•ThedangersofCO2 must be continuously stressed and trainingandexperiencetransferbetweencrewshouldcreateacommonunderstandingofthefunctionality,limitationsandhazardsassociatedwiththeship’sspecificCO2installation.

CommonforallshipfirefightingsystemsaretherequirementsimposedbySOLASReg.II-2/10statementofpurpose:“tosuppressandswiftlyextinguishafireinthespaceoforigin.”Yet,experienceshowsthattheinherentrisksofafixedCO2fire-extinguishingsystem,andtheneedforevacuationofaship’sengineroompriortodischarge,often cause substantial delays in itsrelease.

Footntoes1 Gard has previously addressed the risks to human life associatedwiththeuseofCO2asafire-extinguishingagentonboardships,seearticle“Lackofair”inGardNews179.2SeeSec.20.4inNORSOKS-001concerningtechnicalsafetyonboardoffshoreinstallations,astandardreferencedbytheNorwegianPetroleumSafetyAuthorities.3SeeSOLASReg.II-2/10“FireFighting”andtheIMOFireSafetySystems(FSS)CodeCh.5“Fixedgasfire-extinguishing”.4Seealsoarticle“Firesafetyintheengineroom”inGardNews170.


29


Fuel handling and treatment on board

IntroductionFuel-relatedenginebreakdownsarenotanewproblem.Betweenstorageandcombustion,thefuelmustbetransferred,heated,filteredandpurifiedinordertomeettheenginemanufacturer’sspecifications.Dependingonthequalityofthefueldeliveredonboard,thiscanbeacomplexprocessandGardregularlyseesenginebreakdownsandoperationalproblemscausedbypoorfuelqualityorpoorfueltreatmentonboard.Thebulkofsuchenginebreakdownsarisesfromtheuseofheavyfueloil(HFO)andthenumberofcaseswhereenginedamageiscausedbycatalyticfinesseemstobeinthemajority.Gardhasalsoseenengineproblemscausedbymixingofincompatiblefuelsandfilterscloggedbysludge.

Thepurposeofthiscircularistoremindshipownersandoperators of important issues regarding fuel handling and treatment on board and to highlight the importance of structuredtrainingofcrewmemberstopreventoperationalproblemsandenginedamage.

Changes in rules and regulations Thedrivetowardstheuseoflowsulphurfueloils(LSFO)1 iscausingfuelrefiningprocessestochange,sometimesresultinginlowerqualityHFObeingdeliveredtoships.More blending of different oil components to optimise sulphurcontentmaycreatesideeffectssuchasinstability,incompatibility,ignitionandcombustiondifficultiesandanincreaseinthelevelsofcatalyticfines.Theneedforfrequentchangeoversbetweendifferenttypesoffuelsclearlyincreasestheopportunityforerrors.Therefore,itisveryimportantthatthecrewbefamiliarwiththepropertiesofthefuelsuppliedandthelimitationsoftheparticularship’sfueltreatmentplant.

Gardhasissuedaseriesofrecommendationspreviouslybut,because of changes in rules and regulations influencing both thequalityofavailablefuelandtheoperatingproceduresonboard,itisimportanttoreiteratesomeofthisguidance.BelowisasummaryofGard’sadviceonfuelhandlingandtreatmentonboard.Itisconsideredespeciallyimportanttoemphasisethisadvicetonewcrewmembersandjuniorengineers.Forfurtherinformationandadditionaldetailsonpracticalcasesandimportantlearningpoints,pleaseseetheLossPreventionCompilation:“Bunkersandbunkering”.

Fuel oil storage and tanks Eveniffueliswithinspecification,problemscanariseattheveryfirststageofstorage.Build-upofsedimentinsidethetankscancausecontaminationofnewfuelandmixingofdifferentbatchesoffuelcanleadtounstablefuel.Importantprecautions are:

•Regularlycleanstorageandsettling/servicetanks.Largeparticleswillsettleinthetanksandtheseparticlescanbewhirledupduringroughweatherandsuppliedtotheseparators,sometimesinconcentrationsabovethelimitssetoutinISO8217.2Cleaningoffueloiltanksisoften only performed during scheduled yard stay and the implementationofroutinesformorefrequentcleaningshouldbeconsidered.

•Regularlydrainsettling/servicetankstoremovewaterandsludge,preferablyonadailybasis.•Placenewbunkersintoemptytankswheneverpossible.Beawarethatmixingoftwostablefuelsdoesnotguaranteeacompatiblemixtureandthesedimentpotentialcanincreasedrasticallyaftermixing.•Ifmixingcannotbeavoided,carryoutteststoensurethatthetwotypesoffuelarecompatible.Useafast,reliableand recognised testing service to analyse fuel samples andavoidusingthenewfueluntiltheanalysisresultshavebeenreviewed.Carefullyadheretotherecommendationsprovidedwiththeresultsfromthetestlaboratory.•Wheretimeisacriticalfactorbuttherearedoubtsaboutthecompatibilityandsedimentpotentialofamixedfuel,carryoutthesimpleon-boardtest(testkitsforthispurposeshouldbeavailableonboard)asaminimum,andavoidusingthemixedfuelduringcriticaloperationsorwhennavigatinginrestrictedareas.•Considerifbunkeringuponenteringaportisanoption(draft,cargo,timing,etc.,permitting)insteadofwhenleavingaport.Thiswillallowanalysisofthenewfueltobeavailablepriortoleavingport,whichofcourseistheidealsituation.

Fuel oil separationEveniftheHFOreceivedcomplieswiththerequirementsofISO8217,operationalproblemscanariseifthetreatmentplantandinparticulartheHFOseparatorsarenotproperlyoperatedandmaintained.Inordertoefficientlyreducethelevelofcatalyticfinesandotherimpuritiespresentinthefuel,suchasrust,sand,dustandwater,separatormanufacturer’srecommendationsshouldbefollowed.Importantprecautionsare:•KeeptheHFOinlettemperatureat98oC.Theefficiencyof the separators is dependent on the inlet temperature ofthefuelandevenasmallreductionintemperaturewillreducethequalityoftheseparation.Somecommonlyobservedcausesoffailuresareleakingheatingcoils,wrongset points for temperature sensors and defective monitoring systems.•Usethecorrectflowratioandgravitydisc.Thelongerthefuelisintheseparator,thebetterthecleaningofthefueloilwillbe.Forseparatorswithoutgravitydiscs,itisrecommendedtoalwaysuseallavailableHFOseparatorsandtoruntheminparallel,withacorrespondingfeedrate.Iftheseparatorsareofthemanualtypewithgravitydiscs,theymustbeoperatedinserieswithapurifierfollowedbyaclarifier,butwiththelowestpossibleflow.Onthistypeofseparators,theuseofcorrectgravitydiscsiscrucialandthediscs have to be changed depending on the density of the fuelused.•Maintaintheseparatorsaccordingtomanufacturer’sinstructionsand,asfaraspracticallypossible,usemanufacturer’sapprovedpartsonly.Inaddition,theseparatorsshouldbecheckedbythemanufacturer’sserviceengineersatregularintervals.Onecommonlyobserved causal factor for failure is incorrect assembly of the separatorsaftercleaning.•Verifytheefficiencyoftheseparatorsandthecleanlinessof the service tank by sampling the fuel in the system before and after the separators and as close to the engines as possible.Sendthesamplesinforanalysisbyarecognised

30


laboratory.Verificationofseparatorsshouldbecarriedoutatleastonceperyear.

Fuel changeoverShipsthattradebetweenareaswithdifferentsulphurlimitationsshouldhavedetailedchangeoverprocedures.Insufficientknowledgeoftheactionsrequiredinagivensituationmayresultinenginefailure,sochangeoverprocedures should be practised before entering restricted waters,especiallyinshipsthatdonotperformfuelchangeoversonaregularbasis.TheriskofincompatibilitywhenmixingHFOandlowsulphurdistillates,orevenmarinegasoil(MGO),canbehighandrequiresincreasedawareness.

ConclusionForthesafetyofthecrew,shipandcargo,andtominimisecostsandperiodsoff-hirecausedbyenginebreakdowns,itisimportantthatshipownersandoperatorsfocusonthequalityoffuelhandlingandtreatmentonboard.Allenginecrewmustreceiveproperandregulartraininganditisparticularlyimportanttoensurethatjuniorengineersbecomefamiliarwiththeship’sfueltreatmentequipmentandhowtoperformregularmaintenance.

Changesinrulesandregulationsmayleadtochangesinproceduressotrainingandfacilitationofexperienceexchangeareessentialforthecrewtobeabletodetectthecauseofafuel-relatedproblemwhenitoccurs,andadjustthe fuel handling and treatment procedures to minimise potentiallosses.procedurestominimisepotentiallosses.

Footnotes1Permissiblelevelsofsulphuroxide(SOx)emissionsareregulatedviaIMO’sMARPOLAnnexVIandvariousdomesticregulations.ThesulphurcontentlimitforLSFOallowedtherefore depends on the location of the ship and the regulationsinforceatthetime.Atthetimeofwriting,themaximumsulphurlimitoffueloilsusedoutsideemissioncontrolareas(ECAs)andotherdesignatedareasis3.5%,whileinsideECAsthelimitis1.0%(ref.IMOMARPOLAnnexVI).IdentifieddesignatedareasotherthantheMARPOLECAsare:EUCommunityports(0.1%),Turkishports(0.1%)andCaliforniacoastalareas(1.0%formarinegasoil(MGO)and0.5%formarinedieseloil(MDO)).2ISO8217specifiestherequirementsforpetroleumfuelsfor use in marine engines and boilers prior to appropriate treatmentbeforeuse.


31 Loss Prevention Circular No. 03-12

Use of temporary equipment on board Mobile Offshore Drilling Units

Background TheGardconditionsurveyprogrammeforMobileOffshoreDrillingUnits(MODUs)hasindicatedaneedforincreasedawarenesswhenusingtemporaryequipment(TE)1 such as cement,HVACandROVunitsprovidedbythirdparties.Gard’sconcernmainlyrelatestothepotentialadditionalignitionsourcessuchTErepresents.WehaveseenincorrectexplosionprotectionofTE’selectricalequipmentfortheselectedlocationonboardandpoormaintenanceofTEingeneral.Systemincompatibilitycanalsopreventproperhook-upoftheTEtotheMODU’sexistingsafetysystemsand,inthisrespect,ofparticularconcernistheimproperhook-uptotheoverallemergencyshutdown(ESD)system.

TheintroductionofTEonboardMODUsmayinterferewithawell-definedandinterconnectedhierarchyofsafetybarriers and may thus influence the overall safety level of theMODUinquestion.ItisthereforeofmajorimportancetoconsiderthelocationonboardoftheTE.2 The purpose ofthiscircularisthereforetoincreasetheawarenessofthepotentialrisksassociatedwiththeuseofTE,andinparticularto focus attention on the risks of introducing additional ignitionsourceswhenTEisplacedonboard.

Ignition source control ThekeyregulatoryframeworkforthecontrolofignitionsourcesonboardMODUsissetbythenationalpetroleumsafetyauthorities(PSA)ofthecontinentalshelfonwhichtheMODUisoperating.Maritimecertificatesissuedbyflagadministrationsandclassificationsocietiesnormallyforman essential part of the overall compliance documentation submittedtothePSA.SomemaritimeauthoritieshaveadoptedtheIMOCodefortheConstructionandEquipmentofMobileOffshoreDrillingUnits3(MODUCode)astheirownruleswhilstothershaveestablishedspecificrequirementsinadditiontotheMODUCode.Chapter6ofthe1989and2009MODUCodescovermeasurestopreventignitionandtheserequirementshavebeendevelopedbasedonthefollowingsafetystrategy:

Althoughdesignandoperationalrequirementsmayvarybetweenthedifferentregulators/authorities,thebasicsafetystrategy as outlined above remains the same and rules and regulationsprovidingasimilarlevelofsafetywillnormallybeacceptedasanalternativetothetechnicalrequirementsstipulatedbytheregulator.

Toensurethatadditionalignitionsourcesareidentifiedandcontrolled using relevant safety barriers and operational/emergencyprocedures,Gardwouldliketostressthefollowingprecautionarymeasures:Riskassessmentandgeneraldocumentation:•EvaluatetheimpactofnewhazardsarisingfromtheTEupon the risk assessments performed for the permanent facilitiesonboardtheMODU.ThehazardandriskassessmentsperformedunderthenormalPermittoWork(PTW)systemmaynotfullyaddressspecifichazardsarisingfromtheintegrationofTEintotheexistingoperatingsystem.•Temporarilyupdateexistingengineeringdrawingsanddocumentstoreflectalloperationalchanges.EstablishsafetybarriersinaccordancewithapplicablerulesandregulationsfortheTE,e.g.newgasdetectors,updatedalarmandESDlogicdiagrams,additionalmeansoffirefighting,etc.ThepotentialbreachofexistingsafetybarriersbyinstallationoftheTEshouldbeidentifiedandcontrolled,e.g.existingdefinedhazardousareazones,escaperoutes,etc.•Carefullyverifydrawingsandspecifications,includingmaintenancereportsandcertificates,documentingthegeneralconditionoftheTEtoensurethattheTEissuitablefortheintendedoperation.Aformal“servicecontainercertificate”isnotinitselfaguaranteethattheTEisingoodconditionassuchcertificatesmaynotinvolveanycontinuousfollow-upovertimebytheissuingauthority.Onboardarrangements:•TheexistinghazardousareaclassificationoftheMODU,thecorrespondingexplosionprotectionoftheTE’selectricalequipmentandthesafetycriticalityoftheTEmustdecideits

Basic safety strategy for ignition source control:

1. Alltheareaswhere,duetothepossiblepresenceofaflammableatmospherearisingfromthedrillingoperations,theuseofmachineryorelectricalequipmentwithoutproperconsiderationmayleadtoafirehazardorexplosion,shouldbeclassifiedasanddividedinto“hazardousareas”zone0,zone1andzone2dependingonthelikelihoodofpresenceofaflammableatmosphereduringnormaloperations.

2. Equipment,electricalandmachineryinstallations,operatedinhazardousareasmustbeofatypeapproved/certifiedforuseinthatparticularhazardousareazone.

3. AnESDsystemshouldallowfortheselectivedisconnectionofequipmentwhichmayactasanignitionsourcewhereanaccidentalreleaseofflammablegasextendsoutsidetheestablishedhazardousareazones.

4. Equipment,electricalandmachineryinstallations,normallyoperatedinanon-hazardousareabutwhichisessentialtothesafetyoftheMODUandiscapableofoperationduringanemergency(afterinitiationofESD)shouldbeofatypesuitableforoperationinhazardousareas.

32


locationonboard.TEequipmentduetobeoperationalinanemergencysituation,e.g.afterinitiationofESD,shouldpreferably be approved for use in zone 1 regardless of location.•Electricalequipmentandcomponentsusedinhazardousareasshouldbecertifiedbyanindependenttestinglaboratoryinaccordancewitharecognizedstandard.OnlyelectricalequipmentwithtemperatureClassT3(maximum200°C)shouldbeusedwhenhydrocarbongasescreatehazardousareas.•Dieselenginesandothercombustiontypeequipmentthat may be an ignition hazard due to flames or hot gases/particlesshouldnormallynotbeinstalledinhazardousareas.Ifthiscannotbeavoided,onlyequipmentforwhichithasbeendocumentedthatsufficientprecautionshavebeentakenagainsttheriskofdangerousignitionshouldbeused.•Wheretemporaryservicecontainersareinstalled,specialattentionshouldbegiventothelocationofaccessdoors,ventilationandotheropenings.Doorsfacinghazardousareasshouldbeself-closingandgas-tightandallventilationintakesmustberoutedtoanon-hazardouslocation.•Verifyandtesttheproperhook-upoftheTEtotheMODUs’existingsafetysystems,inparticulartotheoverallESDsysteminitiatingautomaticdisconnectionofignitionsources.

Crewawareness:•RelevantpersonnelonboardmustbemadeawareofanychangestoexistingsystemsonboardtheMODUandthe“new”safetybarriersestablishedfortheTE.•Identifyandimplementanytemporarytrainingrequirements.

RecommendationsToensurethatuseofTEwillnotintroduceadditionalignitionsourcesonboard,proceduresshouldincludedetailedrequirementsfortheinstallation,removal,testingandmaintenanceofTEandshouldoutlinethemeansofidentification,assessmentandcontrolofanyhazardsassociatedwithitsuse.Responsibilitiesshouldbeallocatedtothepartiesandinterfacesbetweenthevariousparties,e.g.operatorandcontractors,shouldbeclearlydefined.Animportant part of the process is to ensure a controlled return tonormaloperationfollowingtheremovaloftheTE.

Gard recommends that Members and clients highlight the above precautionary measures in their procedures topreventtheincreasedriskofignitionwhenusingTE.Inprinciple,MembersandclientsshouldalwaysseektoincorporatesimilarprovisionsforTEasthoserequiredforpermanentequipmentofasimilartypeandfunctioninthe

samelocationonboard.ProlongeduseofTEcouldberegardedasanabuseofthe“temporaryprinciple”andtheconsequencesmaybeoperationunderanincreasedriskcomparedwithaproperlyengineeredarrangement.

RecommendedsourcesforfurtherreadingandguidancerelatedtouseofTEare:NORSOKZ-015“TemporaryEquipment”,UKHSESPC/TECH/OSD/25“TemporaryEquipmentOffshore”andDNVStandardforCertificationNo.2.7-2“OffshoreServiceContainers”.

Footnotes1Forthepurposeofthiscircular,temporaryequipment(TE)isdefinedas“equipmentintendedforuseonMODUsforalimitedtimeandwhichrequireshook-upand/orisapotentialsourceofignition”.2SeveralofthealreadyestablishedsafetybarriersmaypotentiallybeaffectedbyplacementofTEonboard,e.g.existingdefinedhazardousareazones,ESDsystems,establishedescaperoutes,explosionventpathsmayberestricted,maintenanceaccessmayberestricted,operatingenvelopes(e.g.forcranes)maybelimited,etc.3Thecodewasdevelopedasaninternationalstandardformobiledrillingunits,toachieveasafetylevelfortheseunitsandthepersonnelonboard,equivalenttothatoftheIMOConventionforSafetyofLifeatSea(SOLAS1974withamendments).


33


Fire prevention in engine rooms

Introduction Everyyearfiresonboardshipsleadtolossoflivesandseveredamagetotheshipsthemselves.Themajorityoffireson board ships originate in the engine room and failure in a flammableoilsystemfollowedbyimpingementofoilontoa high temperature surface is the leading cause of engine roomfires.Inaddition,manyengineroomfireshaveanelectricalsource,suchaselectricalshort-circuitsandthermaloverheatingintheswitchboards.

Identificationandprotectionofhightemperaturesurfacesin the engine room is considered to be a very effective measuretopreventengineroomfiresandisalsofairlyeasytoimplementonboard.Thepurposeofthiscircularisthereforetoincreaseawarenessofthepotentialdangersassociatedwithexposedhightemperaturesurfacesinenginerooms.1 Theexistingregulatoryrequirementshavebeenhighlightedtofocusattentiononcompanies’responsibility to ensure that the engine room systems are maintained in a safe condition and in compliance withrelevantregulatoryrequirementsatalltimesduringoperations.

Rules and regulations TheIMOSafetyofLifeatSea(SOLAS)ConventionprovidesthekeyregulatoryframeworkforfiresafetyonboardshipsandCh.II-2/Reg.4coversmeasurestoreducetheprobabilityofoilleaksignitinginenginerooms.SOLASrecognizesthatiffueloil,lubricationoilorotherflammableoilsystemsleak,thechancesofpreventingtheoutbreakofafirewillbegreatly increased if all potential ignition sources have been identifiedandremoved,orproperlyinsulated.Accordingly,thefollowingkeysafetymeasuresbecamemandatorySOLASrequirementsforallshipsfromJuly2003:• jacketed(double)pipesinhighpressurefueloildelivery

lines;• insulationofallhightemperaturesurfaces(>220oC)at

risk of flammable oil impingement after a failure of an oil line;and

• sprayshieldsforflammableoillines(fuel,lubricationandhydraulicoil)locatedimmediatelyaboveornearpotentialignitionsources.2

Compliancewithrulesandregulationsisnormallycheckedbyclassificationsocieties/flagadministrationsandportauthoritiesandfiresafetyingeneralisofcourseoneofthemainissuesduringtheirinspectionsonboard.Butthetime available to complete a full survey on board is often shortandwhenitcomestoverificationoftheintegrity/functioningofmachineryandsystems,itmayappearthatthesurveyors’inspectionisoftenlimitedtospotchecksofknownhighriskareasandhazardsintheengineroom.Classandportstatesurveyorsnormallyattendonboardwhiletheship is in port and the engines are therefore not running at fullload.Hightemperaturesurfacesintheengineroomarenotalwaysdetectableintheseconditions,evenwheremoresophisticatedtemperaturemeasuringtools,e.g.,thermoscanningcameras,areusedaspartoftheinspection.3

Gard’s experience Many companies go to considerable lengths to ensure safe conditions in their engine rooms and some also invest in use oftemperaturemeasuringtoolstoidentifyexposedhightemperaturesurfaces.Atthesametime,Gard’simpression

isthattheeffectsoftheSOLASregulationsimplementedinJuly2003donotappeartohavebeenaspositiveasexpectedandtheinitialstrongfocusontherequiredpreventivemeasuresmayhavediminishedsomewhat.InGard’sexperience,therisksareattheirhighestwhenmaintenanceworkistakingplaceorimmediatelythereafter.Therisksinvolvedwiththeexecutionofaspecificrepairormaintenanceoperationarenotalwaysreadilyidentifiableand are sometimes underestimated due to the perceived simplicityoftheworktobecarriedout.Asaresult,additional safety precautions may not be implemented duringandaftertherepairwork.Typicalexamplesaremissinghot-workpermitsandtheabsenceofafirewatch.Followingaperiodofmaintenance,thetimeavailabletoprepare the vessel and get her back in operation can be limited,andtherefittingofremovedinsulationmatsorsprayshieldsisoftenleftforthecrewtocompleteduringthevoyage.

Recommendations Fire safety in engine rooms is the result of both good designandthecompany’sandcrew’scontinuousfocusonfirepreventionmeasuresonboardtheship.Companiesmustthereforebearinmindthat,althoughcompliancewithfiresafetyrequirementsiscontrolledbyauthoritiesandclassificationsocieties,itisthecompany’sresponsibilitytoestablish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained incompliancewiththeprovisionsoftherelevantrulesandregulations(ISMCodeCh.10)andthatthecrewisproperlytrainedandprovidedwithadequateresources/toolstoperformtheirtasksinaccordancewiththerequiredstandards(ISMCodeCh.6andCh.3respectively).GardwouldliketodrawMembers’andclients’attentiontothefollowingspecificmeasuresrelatedtofireprevention:• Highstandardsofcleanlinessintheengineroomare

essentialforfirepreventionandanyleakagesinfuel,hydraulic,orotherflammableoilsystemsmustbedealtwithpromptly.Thepositionandconditionofsprayshieldsforbothhighandlowpressureflammableoillinesshouldbecheckedregularly,asshouldthedrainagearrangementsforjacketedfueloilpipes.

• Materialsusedforinsulatinghightemperaturesurfacesmay degrade over time and regular checks should becarriedout,bothvisuallyandusingtemperature

34


measuringtools.Measurementsusinginfraredthermoscanning cameras can be very useful to identify surfaces withtemperaturesinexcessof220oCintheengineparts,exhaustductsandelectricalequipment.Regular(e.g.,annual)measurementsarerecommendedtobe taken as part of the standard maintenance and inspectionroutines,undertakeneitherbyspecialistfirmsorbytrainedcrew.

• Particularattentionmustbepaidtofireriskswhenrepairsandmaintenancearecarriedout.Priortotheexecutionofanoperation,therisksinvolvedshouldbeidentifiedandadditionalsafetyprecautionstaken.Specialattentionshouldalsobegiventotheimmediateandproperrefittingofsprayshieldsandinsulationmaterialsuponcompletionofmaintenance.

• RecommendationsinIMOMSC.1/Circ.1321“IMOMSC.1/Circ.1321“Guidelinesformeasurestopreventfiresinengine-roomsandcargopump-rooms”shouldbeconsultedtodefineintegritystandardsacceptableundertheSOLASConvention.Standardscoveringmaintenanceofelectricalsystemsshouldalsobedefined.

Seriousfireshavearisenbecauseoffailuretorecognizepotentialfirehazards,andaboveall,thebestfirepreventionisawelltrainedcrew.Trainingandexperiencetransferbetweencrewshouldaimtocreateacommonunderstanding of all hazards present in an engine room and theirpotentialconsequences.

Footnotes1Seealsoarticles“P&IIncident–Fireinengineroomonboardafullyloadedtanker”inGardNews179,“Fireinengineroomduetomalfunctionofmorayswitch”inGardNews175and“Hullandmachineryincident–Fireinengineroom”inGardNews170.2Potentialignitionsources:“Sourceshavingenoughenergytocauseignition.Theseincludehightemperaturesurfaces,sparksorflamesfrominefficientflangesorjoints,electricaldischargescausedfromelectrostaticatmospheres,orelectricalcontactorfaults.Sourcesoftheseareforexampleexhaustgaspipingofinternalcombustionengines,leakagesfromboilerfurnacejointsandelectricalequipmentwithinoiltreatmentrooms”(quotedfromMSC.1/Circ.1321).3AsfarasGardisawarenoneofthegoverningrulesandregulationsforshipshavemandatoryrequirementsfortheuse of infrared thermo scanning cameras to detect heated surfacesinenginerooms.Suchmeasuresmay,however,berecommended,e.g.,viaclassificationsocieties’optionalclassnotations.Seealsoarticle“Thermographicalexaminationsofenginerooms”inGardNews170.


35


Bunker Sampling

Onesampleshouldberetainedonboardtheship,anothershouldberetainedbythesupplier,andafurthersamplemay be used for analysis purposes and a fourth may be held by a responsible independent party for safe keeping and referenceincaseofadispute.-Bunkerfuelsamplesshouldbesenttothelaboratoryfortestingassoonaspossibleaftercompletionofbunkering.Useafast,reliabletestingservicetoanalysethesamples.Segregateanynewfuelfromthatalreadyheldonboard.Avoidusingthenewfueluntiltheanalysisresultshavebeen considered and it has been established that the fuel is suitable.Maintainaccuratedailyrecordsofthecontentsofandconsumptionfromeachtank.

Off-Spec bunkersIfoff-specbunkershavebeendeliveredandarefoundtobeunsuitableforuse,thebunkersshouldbeoff-loadedandreplacedbynewon-specbunkers.Ifinferiorbunkershavetobeusedorhavealreadybeenusedthefollowingshouldbedone:-Thevesselshouldimmediatelynotifytheshipownerifitisexperiencingproblemswithoff-specfuel.Iftheshipownerpurchasedthefueldirectlyfromthesupplier,heshouldnotifythebunkersupplierandforwardacopyofthetestresult.Thetimelimitforanyprotestvis-à-visthesupplierisveryshort,attimesonly2weeks.-Expertadviceshouldbeobtainedfromareliablefueltestingserviceastohowtoproceedandhowtosolvetheparticularproblem.Contacttheenginemanufactureraswellasthefuelsupplierforadvice.Furtheractionstobetakenwilldependonwhichparameterisoff-specification.

RecommendationsBunkeringprocedures,includingfuel-testingproceduresandcharterpartyrequirementstofuelquality,shouldbereviewedtoensurethatthecorrectproceduresarefollowedwhendealingwithoff-specbunkers.Theshipownersshouldalsofamiliarisehimselfwithanyrecommendationsissuedbyclasssocietiesoranyotherexperts.Thecrewinvolvedshould also be properly briefed on these guidelines and procedures to avoid costly and time consuming interruptions.Gardstronglyrecommendsthatbunkersampling and testing should be carried out in accordance withcorrectprocedures.Thelackoftestingcanleadtoextensivedamagetothevesselsmachinerywhichiscostlyforallinvolved.

Introduction and backgroundGardisfrequentlyinvolvedwithmachinerydamage/claimsrelatedtofuelquality.Thepurposeofthiscircularistoemphasisetheimportanceofthefuelordering,deliveryprocedures,bunkerdeliveryreceiptsandbunkeringsamplesincluding the correct procedures for taking and handling of thesamples.

Reducing the riskToreduceorminimisetheriskofclaimsarisingorbreakdownofmachinery,therearesomemainissuestobeawareofwhenhandlingbunkers.-Fuelsamplingandanalysisisessentialforverificationofthequalityofthefuelreceivedonboard.Proceduresandinstructionsshouldbeestablishedwithinthetechnicaloroperational departments to ensure correct sampling and statingwherethesamplesshouldbesentforanalysis.Itis important to ensure that the engineers on board and technical staff ashore understand the results of the analysis andthelimitationsoftheirequipment.Itisimportantthatthequantityofthesampleislargeenoughfortheappropriateanalysistobeundertaken.-Alwaysbeselectivewhenselectingfuelsupplier.OrderfueltothedesiredISOgrade,anddescribetherequiredgradeinthecharterpartyaswellasintherequesttothesupplier.-Takesamplesatthetimeofdeliveryandobtainconfirmationfromthesuppliersthatthesamplesarerepresentativeoftheentiredelivery.Thesamplestakenmustbeproperlylabeled.Ifthesuppliertakesothersamplesatthetimeofdelivery,trytoestablishhowandwhentheyweretaken.Issueaprotestifyouarenotinvitedtowitnessthesampling.

36



Are you purifying or just pumping?

GardregularlyseescasualtiesinvolvingenginebreakdownsduetoexcessivewearcausedbyabrasiveparticlesinthebunkeredHFO.TherehavebeenanincreasingnumberofHFOdeliverieswithhigherlevelsofcatalyticfines.Thisisthoughttobeduetotheintroductionofthelowsulphurfuelrequirementsinpartsoftheworld,andisprobablyaresultoftheproduction/blendingprocessesusedbytherefineryindustrytosatisfythedemandforsuchlowsulphurfuel.ThecurrentinternationalstandardforHFOtobeusedinmarinedieselenginesandboilersisISO8217:2005.ButevenwheretheHFOreceivedonboardsatisfiestheserequirements,operationalproblemsmayoccuriftheHFOseparatorsarenotproperlyoperatedandmaintained.

HFOcontainscatalyticfinessuchasaluminiumandsiliconoxides,whichareremnantsfromtherefiningprocess.Thesearehardabrasiveparticles,andISO8217:2005regulatestheamountofcatalyticfinespermittedinHFO,expressedasAl+Si,to80mg/kg(ppm).However,duetotheabrasivenatureoftheseparticles,mostenginemanufacturerslimittheamountofcatalyticfinesinthefuelinjectedintotheenginesto15mg/kg.Excessivewearofthecomponentsinthecombustionchamber(pistongrooves,pistonrings,cylinderliners)andofthefuelinjectionequipment(fuelpumpplungerandbarrel,fuelinjectionvalves),willbetheconsequencesofexceedingthelevelofcatalyticfinesof15mg/kg.InorderfortheHFOseparatorstoefficientlyreducethelevelofcatalyticfinesandotherimpuritiesthatcanbepresentinthefueloil,suchasrust,sand,dustandwater,thefollowingprecautionsshouldbetaken:

1. Keep the HFO inlet temperature at 98oCTheefficiencyoftheseparatorishighlydependentontheinlettemperatureofthefuel,andthepreheatersareoftentoosmall,thesetpointiswrong,orthepreheaterisfouledorinotherwaysdefect,resultinginaninlettemperaturewhichistoolow.

2. Use of correct flow ratioThelongerthefueloilispresentintheseparator,thebetterthecleaningofthefueloilwillbe.Sincethe1980’s,separatorswithoutgravitydiscshavebeenmoreorlessstandard,anditisrecommendedtoalwaysuseallavailableHFOseparatorsandtoruntheminparallel,withcorrespondingfeedrate.Iftheseparatorsareofthemanualtypewithgravitydiscs,theymustbeoperatedinaserieswithapurifierfollowedbyaclarifier,butwiththelowestpossibleflow.

3. MaintenanceMaintaintheseparatorsaccordingtothemanufacturer’sinstructionsandusingthemanufacturer’sapprovedsparepartsonly.Regularchecksoftheseparatorsbythemanufacturer’sserviceengineerswillalsoenhancethequality.

4. Check fuel system efficiencyInordertochecktheefficiencyofthefuelsystem,itisrecommended that samples are taken of the fuel oil before andaftereachseparatoratintervalsof4or6months.Thesamples should be sent to an established fuel analysing instituteforanalysis,andtheresultwillprovideanindication

oftheefficiencyoftheseparators.Theanalysiswillbemostaccurateifperformedonceitisconfirmedthatacertainamountofcatfinesarepresentinthebunkeredfueloil.Above25-30mg/kgispreferable.

5. Clean storage, settling and service tanksLargeparticleswillsettleinthestorage,settlingandservicetanks,andovertimetheconcentrationofabrasiveparticlesinthebottomofthetankscanbeexcessive.Duringroughweatherthesecomponentscanbewhirledupandbesuppliedtotheseparators,sometimesinconcentrationsabovethe80mg/kglimit.Hence,thesetanksshouldbedrainedandcleanedatregularintervals.Itisthereforebeneficialtorunallavailableseparators,evenwherethefuelusedinitiallyhasalowlevelofcatalyticfines.

6. Train responsible personnelEnsurethatpersonnelresponsiblefortheoperationandmaintenance of the separators are properly trained and are familiarwiththeequipmentandhowtoperformtheregularmaintenance.Thisincreasesreliability,andreducestheconsumptionofnon-wearparts.

ItshouldbementionedthatcompaniessuchasDNVPetroleumServicesandLloyd’sRegister(FOBAS)offerfuelmanagementservicesthatcanassistshipownersinefficientlyrunningonboardfueltreatmentsystems.

Byfollowingtheabove,thefueltreatmentsystemshouldoperatewithoptimumefficiency,whichwillincreasethelikelihoodoftheengineshavinganacceptablelevelofwear,whichagainwillleadtotheintervalsbetweenoverhaulsbeingasspecifiedbytheenginemanufacturer.


37


Slow steaming on 2-stroke engines

Wehaverecentlyseenthatshipownersandcharters,duetocurrentmarketconditions,seektomitigatemoreexpensivebunkerconsumptionbyreducingthevessels’steamingspeed.(Slowsteaming)

The main engine is designed for continuous operation between80-100%load,andareducedloadisnormallyonlyusedforshorterperiodsoftime,forexampleduringmanoeuvring.

Unlesstheslowsteamingproceduresarewellmanagedtherewillalwaysbeariskomachineryfailure,andseveralfactors must be taken into consideration once it has been decided to reduce the engine load for longer periods of time.

Reducedloadprimarilyresultsinincreasedcarbonisationandlowtemperaturecorrosion.Reducedloadwillalsoaffectthecombustionsystem,andleadtopooratomisationofthefuelnozzles.

Slowsteamingwillalsoleadtoreducedscavengingairpressureandmaximalcylinderpressure.

Theefficiencyoftheturbochargerwillalsobeaffectedresultinginareducedairflow,whichwillleadtoincreaseddepositsandcarbonisationproblems.Seriousenginedamageasaresultofdepositsappearstooccurwhenincreasing the engine back to full load after longer periods ofslowsteaming.

Unlessspecialprecautionshavebeentaken,thethermalloadwillalsoincrease.Thisisdueto:1. Reducedairflowduetoreducedefficiencyofthe

turbocharger 2. Reducedcombustionefficiencyduetoincreasedcarbon

depositsoninjectionnozzles3. Pistonrings’efficiencyhavebeenreducedduetocarbon

deposit 4. Reducedheattransferduetoinsulatedcarbondeposit.

Lowloadwillalsoaffecttheexhaustgastemperature,whichagainreducestheefficiencyoftheexhaustboiler,whichwillincreasetheriskoflowtemperaturecorrosionintheexhaustsystem.

Astheefficiencyoftheexhaustgasboilerisreduced,itmaybenecessarytouseanoilfiredboiler,whichagainwillresultinadditionalcosts.

Recommendations Toreduceorminimisetherisksinvolvedinslowsteamingitisimportanttomaintainthecoolingwatertemperatureonthecylinderunitatoptimallevel.

Avoidcondensationinscaveningairsystemduetolowtemperatures.

Increasingthescaveningairtemperaturewillinfluencethecombustionefficiency.

Keepthecorrectlevelofcylinderoilconsumptionbasedonload.

Theaboveprecautionsareonlyfortemporaryslowsteaming,andonlyforshorterperiodsoftime.Forlongerperiodsofslowsteamingitisimportanttocontact the engine manufacturer to obtain more permanent modificationswhichmayberequired.

Most engine manufacturers have introduced upgrading kitsforslowsteaming,anditisrecommendedthatallmodificationsareundertakeninaccordancewiththemanufacturer’sinstructions.

38



Exhaust boiler damages

IntroductionGardhasexperiencedanincreaseintheseverityofincidentsinvolvingexhaustboilers,andinparticularfiredamages.Thecausesoftheboilerdamagesvary,however,slowsteaming,fuelqualityandthefrequencyofmanoeuvrescanallbeimportantfactors,andcanleadtosootaccumulating.Thiscanincreasetheriskoffireduetosparksfromtheexhaustgasignitingthesoot.

The purpose of this circular is to address the risks involved and toemphasisetheimportanceofpropersootblowing,cleaning,maintenanceandtreatmentofboilerfeedwater.

Problems caused by soot on the exhaust sideThedesignofexhaustboilersiscompactwithverynarrowchannelsandfinsontheexhaustside.Inadditionthedesignofthemainengineexhaustchanneltotheexhaustboileronmanyshipsisrestrictingtheeasyflowofgasthroughtheboiler.Combinedwithe.g.slowsteamingandreducedexhaustgasvelocitytheriskforbuildupofsootdepositswillincrease.Unburneddepositscomingfromthecombustionprocessofthemainengineduetodifferentfuelsanddifferentloadswillcauseignitablesootdepositstobuildupintheboilers.Astheexhaustcontainshighlevelsofoxygen(about14%),theignitionofthesootdepositmaycauseseriousfiredamageifpreventiveactionsarenottakeninduetime.Forlong-strokedieselengine,thelargerlub.oilquantumrequiredwillalsoaddtothebuildupofignitablesootdeposit.Highlubricationoilconsumptioninslowspeedengines–lowergastemperaturesandlargereconomizersincombinationwithlowgraderesidualoilswillincreasetheriskforsootfiresandinworstcaseresultinacompletemeltdownoftheboileroreconomizer.

Thesootblowingequipmentfittedmustbeusedaccordingtomanufacturer’srecommendations,buttheequipmentprovideddoes not necessarily take into account the various design and layoutoftheexhaustchannel.Itisthereforeimportantthattheconditionoftheexhaustsideischeckedfrequentlyinordertoestablishthatthesootiseffectivelyremoved,andifnot,morefrequentblowingormanualcleaningwillhavetobeperformed.Ifthevesseloperatesonareducedload,werecommendincreasingtheloadduringthesootblowing.Itisalsopossibletofitadditionalequipmenttomonitorpressureandtemperaturethrough the boiler/economiser for optimization of cleaning intervals.

Proper treatment of feed waterAsslowsteamingappearstohavebecomemorecommon,theimportanceofregularinspection,waterwashing,blowdownandproperfeedwatertreatmentshouldbeemphasised.Impuritiesinthefeedwatercanresultinincreasedscaling,corrosionandfoaming.Propertreatmentofboilerfeedwateristhereforeanimportantpartoftheboilermaintenanceprogramandwillreducetheriskofpittingandcorrosion.

Toreducethepossibilityofproblemsarising,andtohavecontroloftheconcentrationofdissolvedsolidsinthefeedwater,itisnecessarytocarryout“blowdown”orperiodicallydischargethewaterorinsomecasesreplacethewatercompletely.Surfacewaterblowdownisoftendonecontinuouslytoreducethelevelofdissolvedsolids,whilstbottomblowdownisperformedperiodicallytoremovesludgefromthebottomoftheboiler.Regulartestingandchemicaldosingofthefeedwateristherefore important to reduce the problem of corrosion and pitting.

Normallythefeedwaterisproducedbythevessel’sownfreshwatergenerator;however,itmaybecomenecessarytotopupwithshorewaterwhichwillbeofadifferentquality.Ifthefeedwaterhasbeentoppedupwithshorewater,feedwatertests,chemicaldosingandblowdownareextremelyimportant.

Problems caused by scale on the water sideThe biggest problem caused by scale is overheating and failure oftheboilertubes.Thethermalconductivityofporousboilerscaleissimilartoinsulatingbricks.Thescaleactsasaninsulatinglayerandpreventsanefficienttransferofheatthroughthetubestothecirculatingwater.Thereductioninthermalconductivitymeanslowerboilerefficiencywhichinturnleadstooverheatingandmayresultinsoftening,bulgingorevenfracturingoftheboilertubes.Boilerscalecanalsocausepluggingorpartialobstructionofcirculatingtubesinawatertubeboiler,whichagaincausesstarvationandoverheatingofthetubes.Itcanbenecessarytoplugsomeofthewatertubesfromtimetotime,however,thiswillreducethewatercirculation,andisonlyintendedtobeatemporarysolution.Incaseofalargernumberofpluggedwatertubes,themanufacturer/classsocietyshouldbeconsulted.

RecommendationsWiththenewgenerationofveryefficientenginesthesootcleaningofexhaustgasboilerhasbecomeevenmoreimportantforefficientandsafeoperation.

• Itisthereforestronglyrecommendedthatallsootblowing/fixedwashingsystemsareusedandtestedregularlybyskilledcrewtoensurethattheyarefullyoperational.

• Theimportanceofregularinspection,waterwashing,blowdownandproperfeedwatertreatmentshouldbeemphasised.Acceptancecriteriafortheconditionaftercleaningshouldbeestablishedthroughoutthefleet.Bythis,anyalterationinoperationalconditionsanditsconsequencesfortheboilerconditionswilladdressed.

• Alarmandmonitoringsystemtoberegularlytestedtoensure proper function

The manufacturer to be contacted for further and more detailed instructions,andinparticular-Ifvesselsnormaloperationalconditionsalter.(i.e.suchasslowsteamingorchangeoffuelquality)

Lower side of middle evaporator tubes section with melted metal.


39


Loss of ship’s records when changing ownership or management BackgroundWhenavesselchangesownershipand/ormanager,therulehas generally been that the outgoing technical managers removeallmaintenancerecordsfromtheship,leavingtheincomingcrewandmanagementwithminimuminformationontheconditionofbothshipandmachinery.Thishasevenbeenseenwhereownershipremainsthesame,andthereisasimplechangeofmanagement-theoutgoingmanagementleavesnoinformationbehind,thusputtingtheincomingmanagement at a serious disadvantage and increasing the riskanduncertaintyforbothownersandunderwriters.Inonerecentcaseinvolvingasimplechangeofmanagement,thesuperintendantcouldnotfindanyinformationinthemaintenance system and the previous technical manager wasnotveryco-operative.

Thislackofcontinuitymeansthatthecrewandthenewmanagermuststartfromthebeginningwhentakingoverthevessel.Astheyobviouslyneedtimetoverifytheconditionofeachcomponentandsystem,thereisaclearriskthatsomerequiredmaintenancewillbeoverlooked,and this may result in costly claims arising out of damage to the vessels in the period immediately or shortly after a changeofownershipormanagement.Typicalclaimscanbeabreakdownofmachinery,rudderorcomponentfailures.The purpose of this circular is to highlight the risks and consequencesofremovingship’srecordsandtoprovidesomerecommendations.

Increased risk and consequencesAnewownerand/ormanagerwillhaveareasonableexpectationofmanagingandoperatingthevesselimmediatelyfollowingatakeover.Wherethedocumentationhasbeenremovedbypreviousowners/managersitcantakesomeconsiderabletimebeforethenewcrewandmanagementarefullyfamiliarwiththevessel,hermachineryandanymaintenanceschedules.Thevesselandcrewwillbeexposedtoanincreasedriskofsomethingbreakingdownduringthisperiodoffamiliarisation.

Shouldtherepaircostsresultinaclaimonaninsurancepolicy,allpoliciesexcludedamagecausedbywearandtear,inadequatemaintenanceetc.Thesurveyorattendingonboardonbehalfoftheinsurerwillrequesttoseethemaintenancerecordscoveringthedamagedcomponent.IfnorecordsareavailableonboardthereisnowaytheAssuredcandocumenttherunninghoursofthecomponent,and that the component has received the recommended maintenanceasstipulatedbythesupplierofthecomponent.

Thislackofdocumentationwillnotautomaticallyresultintheclaimbeingrejectedbyaleadinginsuringcompany,butbynot being able to present relevant documentation in a claim situation,theAssuredmaynotbeabletoprovethecauseofthedamageandrecovertherepaircostsfromtheinsurer.Therequirementtopresentrelevantdocumentationisbasicallythesameforasecondhandshipasfortheexistingshipsofhisfleet.

Inordertodocumentthatadequatemaintenancehasbeenperformed,ClassificationSociety’scertificationcannotberelied on as evidence that the vessel has been properly maintainedthroughouttheperiodsbetweenClasssurveys.TherequirementtoestablishprogramsandmaintainrecordstoverifytheconditionoftheshipbetweentheClasssurveysis,however,anintegralpartoftheobjectivesbehindtheISMCode.

WeareawarethatchangeofownershipimpliesnewDOCandISMcertification,butitisaparadoxthatoldrecordsofrunninghoursandperformedmaintenanceshallnotfolloweachship.

RecommendationWestronglyrecommendthatownersincludeintheSales&PurchaseagreementofasecondhandshipthatmaintenancerecordsshouldfollowtheshipinthesamewayasClasscertificatesandshipdrawingsdeliveredwiththeshipnormallyformpartofaS&Pstandardagreement.Wherethemaintenancerecordsarepartoftheoutgoingmanager’sowndevelopedmaintenancesystem,atleastahardcopyoftherecordsshouldbeleftonboard.Thiswillgreatlyassisttheincomingcrewandmanagertofamiliarisethemselveswiththeshipandwillalsoprovideanindicationofwheretoconcentrateanynecessarymaintenanceand/orupgrading.ItwillalsoplacetheAssuredinapositiontodocument that any claim on an insurance policy is not as a resultofwearandtearorinadequatemaintenance.

40



Low sulphur fuel changeover

BackgroundToreduceemissionfromships,variousinternationalregulationsandEmissionControlAreas(ECA)1 have been inforcesince2005.Recently,newandstricterfuelsulphurcontentregulationspromulgatedbyCalifornia2andtheEU3 havebeendevelopedandimplemented.TheCalifornianAirResourceBoard(CARB)hassince1July2009enforcedtheuseofdieseloils(MDO)orgasoils(MGO)inCalifornianwaters.4Inaddition,wheninberthinEUports,vesselsmustasof1January2010usemarinefuelswithasulphurcontentnotexceeding0.1%bymass.

Sincetheimplementationoftheregulationon1July2009,theUSCG11thDistricthasdocumentedamajorincreaseinpropulsionfailuresrelatedtofuelchangeover.5 The SanFranciscoBarPilotshavereportedanecdotallyamarkedincreaseinenginefailures,enginesnotstartingandproblemswithchangesinspeed,whichaffectmanoeuvrability.Thepurposeofthiscircularistosetoutthevariousfuellimitsandtheirdateofimplementation,toprovideinformationaboutthepossiblerisksinvolvedwhenswitchingtolowsulphurfuels,andtogiverecommendationstoownersandvessels.

Marine fuel limits in EU and date of implementation ThefollowingtablelistsmarinefuellimitsintheEU,andtheir dates of implementation:

The risks and possible consequences involvedChangefromHFOtoMGOorMDOonenginesandboilershasoccurredsinceHFOwasinitiallyusedonboardships.However,onedifferenceistheverylowviscosityandlowsulphurMGOorMDOnowcomingonthemarketasaresultofthenewrequirements.Whenchangingtolowsulphurfuel,severalengineproblemscanoccur,oneofwhichisthermal shock in the fuel system due to the rapid change in temperatureandpoorerlubricationqualitiesoflowsulphurfuel.Thiscanresultinsticking/scuffingofthefuelvalves,fuelsuctionvalvesandfuelpumpplungers,whichagainleadtoshutdownofthemainenginefollowedbymanoeuvringproblems.Waterswherefuelswitchingisrequiredareoftenenvironmentally sensitive and contain a number of hazards tonavigationtogetherwithstrongtidesandcurrents.Theincreasedriskoffurnaceexplosionintheeventofflame

Vessel locationSulphur limits all types of marine fuels used onboard from

1 January 2010 1 July 2010 1 January 2012 1 January 2015

ShipsatberthinEUcommunity ports andportsinnon-EUcountries that have adopted directive 2005/33/EC

0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%

InsideECAbutnotatBerth

1.50% 1.00% 1.00% 0.10%

OutsideECA,butnotatBerth

4.50% 4.50% 3.50% 3.50%

failureduringoperationoftheboileronlowsulphurfuelisanothersafetyissue.6

Recommendations to Shipowners and ManagersOwnersandManagersarerequired,bytheISMCode1.2.2.2,toassessthevarietyofrisksthatmaybeinvolvedwhenchangingtolowsulphurfuel,bysystematicallyidentifyingandanalysingpotentialhazardstotheirvessels,personnelandtotheenvironment.Basedonthese,theappropriatemaintenance(ISM10)andoperationalprocedures(ISM7)shouldbedeveloped.

The manufacturers of the engines and boilers must be contactedandtheirrecommendationsonhowtochangeoverandruntheequipmentonlowviscosityfuelmustbepartoftheISMproceduresonboard.Ifthemanufacturer’srecommendationincludescertainrequirementsformodificationtotheequipmentorsystems,thesemustbeimplementedwithClassapproval.Asnotallrequiredmodificationswillbecompletedby1January2010,theremaybeaneedforownerstodocumentthatthenecessarymodificationsareinprogress.

Operational recommendations VesselsthattradebetweenareaswithdifferentsulphurlimitationsshouldtesttheMGOandMDOreceivedonboardastheBunkerReceiptmayonlygivethemax/

minvaluesoftheviscosity.Ifviscositybelow2.5-3cstisreceived,problemscouldbeexpectedastheviscositywilleasilyfallbelow2cstwhenpassingthroughthefuelsystemonboard.7Thefirstproblemswillbethefuelpumps,injectionvalvesandboilerburnerssufferinginternalleakswithmalfunctionandreducedcapacity.

Ifsuchlowviscosityfuelsaretobeused,changeoveronmainengine,auxiliaryenginesandforboilersproducingsteamforpropulsionfromHFOtoMDO/MGOshouldtakeplacesufficienttimebeforearrivalatCalifornianportsto ensure that both the propulsion and manoeuvring are maintained.8Ifdifficultiesareencountered,theenginesmustbechangedbacktotheiroriginalHFO.9SuchproceduresmustbeimplementedbytheAssuredwithreferencetotheISMcodeandemergencyprocedures.


41

Beforestartingthechangeover,watchoutforareductionorincreaseintemperature,observetheviscosityandreducetheengineload.Toprotecttheinjectionequipmentagainstrapidtemperaturechanges,thechangeoverprocessmustbecarriedoutslowlyandinaccordancewiththemanufacturer’sinstructions.ThesamealsoapplieswhenchangingfromMGOtoHFO.

Footnotes1UnderMARPOLAnnexVI,RegulationsforthePreventionofAirPollutionfromShips,countriescanapplytosetupEmissionControlAreas(ECA).MoreinformationaboutECAareasisavailableat:http://i.pmcdn.net/p/ss/library/docs/subscriber/ECAs_2009.pdf.2CARB,“MarineNotice2009-2,RegulationsonFuelSulphurandotherOperationalRequirementsforOcean-GoingVesselswithinCaliforniaWatersand24NMoftheCaliforniaBaseline”,7May2009.3EUDirective2005/33/EC,“AmendmentoftheEULowSulphurDirective”.4Thefollowingregulationsareinforcewhenoperatingwithin

the24nauticalmileregulatoryzoneofftheCaliforniaCoastline:From1July2009,Marinegasoil(MGO)atorbelow1.5%sulphurcontent,orMarinedieseloil(MDO)atorbelow0.5%sulphurcontent.From1January2012,Marinegasoil(MGO)orMarinedieseloil(MDO)atorbelow0.1%sulphurcontent.5HSCoftheSanFranciscoBayRegion,“CARB:Ocean-GoingVesselCleanFuelRegulation”,14Oct2009.6Othersignificantoperationalimplicationsbyusinglowsulphurfuelsmightbereducedlubrication,lowviscosity,flashpoint,acidity,catalyticfinesorignitionandcombustionquality.7DuringthechangingprocessfromHFOtoMGO,itisrecommended that temperature change of the fuel inlet to the fuelpumpsdonotexceed2ºC/minute.8Itisnotconsiderednecessarytotesttheauxiliaryboilersbeforearrivalatport.9IftheMasterofthevesseldeterminesthatcompliancewiththeregulationswouldendangerthesafetyofthevessel,itscrew,cargo,orpassengers,theMastershouldimmediatelytakethenecessarystepstoremedythesituation(CARB,“MarineNotice2005-5,SafetyExemptionInformationandClaimForm”,Sept2009).

42



Lay-up of ships and the marine insurance cover

InorderforGardtomaintaintheinsurancecoverofashipinshortorlongtermlay-uptheAssuredmustpresentalay-upplanwhichmustincludethefollowingitems:

1. Lay-up SiteAdescriptionofthelay-upsitemustbeprovidedwithparticularfocusontheweatherconditions.Thelay-upsitemustalsobeapprovedbythelocalauthorities.Lay-upinhurricaneaffectedand/ortropicalareasmustbethesubjectofparticularconsiderations.

2. Mooring/anchoring arrangementsDescription and maintenance routines of anchoring and mooring arrangements must be provided including distancestoshoreandtootherships.Thearrangementsshouldpreferablybeapprovedbythevessel’sClassSocietyorbyaconsultantappointedbythem,butothercompetentbodiesmayalsobeused.

Informationofseabed,maximumwindforcesanddirection,shoreandonboardbollards,anchorswithsystemsisneededforcalculationpurposes.Theanchorwindlassesandmooringwincheswhichareinuseorunderconstanttensionmustbethesubjectoffrequenttestingandmaintenancetoensurethattheyfunctionproperlyatalltimes.

3. Class StatusGardgenerallyrequiresthattheClassischangedintothestatusof“laid-up”tofacilitateareturnofpremium.AnnualandothermandatorysurveysmustbecarriedoutinaccordancewithClassrules.AsforshipsinnormaltradingitisaprerequisiteforcoverthattheClassrulesandregulationsarefollowedatalltimesalsoduringthelay-up,andanysuspensionofClasswillleadtoterminationoftheinsurancecover.

4. Minimum manningTheFlagState’srequirementastominimumnumberofcrewforthedifferentlay-upsituationsmustbemaintained.Ifwatchmenandroutinemaintenanceasdescribedinthelay-upplanarecontractedouttothirdparties,thesearrangementsmustalsobedescribedinthelay-upplan.

5. Power availabilityThelay-upplanshouldalsoincludetheenvisagedneedforpropulsionpoweranddescribetheavailabilityoftugassistanceinthelay-uparea.

6. Protection against explosions and fireAllcargotanks,pumprooms,cofferdamsandcargolinesmust,asageneralrule,bekeptgasfreeduringlay-up.Inertedtanksmaybeacceptableifapprovedbylocalauthorities.Hotworkisonlypermittedifavalidgasfreecertificateiskeptonboard.

Allfirealarmsystemsmustbefullyoperationalduringlay-up.Theship’snormalfirefightingsystemsmustbeavailableandreadyforuse.Iffixedfirefightingsystemsaredisconnected(CO2tanks)foranyreason,substitutesystemsmustbeoperationalandapprovedbyClass.

7. Precautions against floodingAllseaoverboardvalvesnotinusemustbeclosed.Ifseawatercoolers/condensersetc.areleftopen,theseawaterconnectionsmustbeblankedoff.

Thewaterlevelintheballasttanks,pumproomandbilgesmust be checked regularly and bilge alarms systems forallspacesmustbemaintainedinnormaloperation.Temporarybilgealarmsystemsforcoldlay-upconditionsareacceptable.Allwatertightdoorsandmanholesmustbeclosed.

8. Maintenance of equipmentThelay-upplanmustalsoincludespecificitemsinaccordancewiththemanufacturers’recommendationsastothepreservation,maintenanceandoperationofmachineryandotherequipmenttopreventdamageoccurringasaresultoftheitemsnotbeinginnormaluse.Theplanshoulddescribe the preservation and maintenance of among others:

• Mainenginewithturbocharger,gearandshaftingarrangement

• Auxiliaryengineswithgenerators• Boilers• Rotatingequipmentsuchaspumps,compressorsetc.• Shiptypespecificequipment• Generalrequirementsastoambienttemperatureand

humidity,useofheaters,dehumidifiers,preservationoiletc.

9. Resuming of trading/Breaking of lay-upTheextentofsurveyandtestingwhenbreakinglay-upwilldependontheextentofmaintenanceandotherpreservativemeasureswhichhadbeenundertakenduringthelay-upandthereasonforbreakinglay-up(trading,drydockforre-commissioning,scrap).Gard’srequirementisthatClass’requirementsforre-commissioningarefollowed,andthatthemanufacturers’recommendationsforpreservationandmaintenancehavebeenfollowedduringthelay-upandre-commissioning.

Pleasenote,theseguidelinesaregeneralandshouldnotreplaceanyrequirementsgivenbyclass,authoritiesorflagstate.


43


Lifting gear – is your ship prepared to avoid accidents occurring?IntroductionLiftinggearonboardvessels,suchascargocranes,provisioncranesandotherservicecranes,isanimportantpartoftheoperationalequipmentforcargohandlingandthesupplyofgoods,sparepartsandfood.Faultyperformanceofthegearcaneasilyleadtooff-hireandlossofincomeforthevessel.Theconsequenceofaccidentswhichmayresultininjuriesorfatalitiesismuchmoreseriousandtragicforthoseinvolved.

The current international legislation covering the operation andsafetyofvessel’sliftinggeardoesnotprovidesufficientdetails to ensure consistent enforcement by the various flagstates.ThiscontrastswithotherareasoftheshippingindustrywhereconventionssuchasSOLASorMARPOLcompulsorilyapplyaconsistentpracticewhereadopted.

Thiscurrentsituationrequiresthattheshipownersplayan active part in establishing routines and systems for the inspection and maintenance of lifting gear onboard their vessels.

Experiences from casualtiesOnerecentincidentinvolvedanentirecranecab,includingthejib,separatingfromitspedestalandfallingdownintothecargoholdduringoperation.Onepersonwasseriouslyinjuredanddisabledasaresultoftheaccident.Investigationsrevealedexcessivewearonandimpropermaintenance(greasing)oftheslewingbearing.Themanufacturer’srevisedmaintenanceinstructionswerenotreadilyavailableonboardandthemaintenancewasnotcarriedoutasrecommended.Ananalysisofthequalityofthegreaseintheslewingbearingoraproperwear-downmeasurementwouldhavedetectedabnormalwearandcouldhavepreventedtheaccident.

Anotherrecentaccidentwithfatalconsequenceswascausedby the stevedores manually overriding the safety monitoring system.Duringtheliftingoperation,theautostopmonitoroftheboom/jibinlowerpositionwasdisabledinanattempttoincreasethereachoftheboomforaspecificliftingoperation.Theincreasedloadontheequipmentcausedbythis position of the boomcausedaspanropetobreakandthederrickboomfelldownontojettyandfatallyinjuredpersonnelstandingashore.

RegulationsThe most commonly adopted legislation covering lifting gearisILOconventionno.152;OccupationalSafetyandHealthinDockWorkoftheInternationalLabourOrganisation.CertificationaccordingtotheILO152isadoptedandrequiredbymanynationalauthorities,butitdoesnotcontainadetaileddescriptionofhowtheconventionshallbeenforced.

Theconventiononlyrequiresaperiodicalthoroughexaminationoftheliftinggearwiththeservicetobecarriedoutbyacompetentperson.Ageneraldefinitionofcompetentpersonisprovided,butmanyflagstateauthoritiesleaveittothevessel’stechnicalmanagerstoidentifyandappointsuchpersonnel.Manycompaniesuseexternalinspectioncompanies,butitisnotunusualforchiefengineerstobegiventhisresponsibility,evenwherenospecifictrainingisavailable.InGard’sexperiencethissolutionisofteninsufficient.Consideringthevarietydesign,

make,ageandfunctionalityoftheliftinggear,itrequiresin-depthtrainingtoachievethecompetencerequiredtoperformthisduty.

Basedonthecurrentstatusoftheinternationallegislationitisnotsufficienttorelysolelyontheindividualflagstates’enforcement of the regulations to ensure safe operation of liftinggear.Gardencouragesallshipownertoconsidertherecommendationsbelow.

Recommendations• Maintenanceagreements. Considerestablishingamaintenanceagreementwith

themanufacturerstoexecuteanannualthoroughexaminationand5-yearlyre-certification.Theinvolvementofthemanufacturerswillensurethatserviceinstructionsandoperationalexperiencesaretransferredtothecrewandreflectedintheproceduresonboard.

• Additionalclassnotation Manyclassificationsocietiesareofferinganadditional

notationcoveringcranesandliftinggear.Suchanotationwill,inadditiontotheabovemaintenanceagreement,serveasathirdpartycontrolandprovideasurveyregimeinaccordancewitharecognisedsetofindustryrulesandrequirements.

• Traininganddocumentation Themaintenanceagreementwiththemanufacturers

should include a training package and onboard training forexecutionanddocumentationoftheregularmaintenancetobecarriedoutbythecrew.Akeyissueisforthecrewtogainknowledgeandcompetenceoftheliftingequipmentonboard.Knowingthelimitationsoftheequipmentandbeingfamiliarwiththe necessary safety checks of the lifting gear to be conductedpriortousewillreducetheriskoffailure.Sincetheoperationofcargohandlingcranesareveryoftenlefttostevedoresitisvitalthatthecrewiscapable of ensuring that safety systems are functioning and that the operation instructions as prescribed by the manufacturers are available/posted prior to the stevedoresoperatingtheequipment.

44



Fire safety in the engine room

Mostfiresonboardshipsstartintheengineroom.Thereareanumberofbuilt-insafetyfeaturesonboardavessel,designedtolimittheriskoffireandthespreadofit,andtheofficersandcrewmusthavefullknowledgeoftheseandmaintaintheirintegrity.Thiscircularhighlightsthemainaspectsassociatedwithfiresafetyofenginerooms,based on observations made during condition surveys of vesselsenteredwithGard.ThiscircularisbasedonanarticlepreviouslypublishedinGardNews.

Steel separationsOneofthereasonsfortheengineroomcasingandvariousdecks,bulkheadsandstaircasesbeingmadeofsteelistolimitthespreadofafire.Ifthereisafireintheengineroom,itisimportantthatthefiremaynotreadilyspreadtoaccommodation,bridge,lifeboatstationsandcargoareas.Likewise,afireinthecargoareasshouldnotbeabletogainaccesstotheengineroom,whichis“theheartoftheship”,wheregeneratorsandfirepumps,themeanstofightafire,arelocated.

Therefore,gettingtoknowthebuilt-infireboundariesand maintain the integrity of such separations is of vital importance.Becarefulwhenmakingalterationsonboard,andbeespeciallyawarethatwhennewcablesandpipelinesareinstalled,theirpenetrationthroughsteeldecksandbulkheads,i.ecrossingfirezonesmustbemadeinafire-proofway.

Air controlAirventilationisessentialforgoodworkingconditionsintheengineroom,butsoisalsothecrew’sfullknowledgeoffans,fireflapsandotheropeningstotheengineroomthatmayneedtobeclosedinafiresituation.Belowaresomeimportantareaswerewerepeatedlyhaveseenbreachesofsafety.Theseareasshouldbeaddressedonboard.

– Air ventilator fire flaps which can not be closed and/or secured in closed position.

Solidityoffireflapsshouldbecheckedandtheyshouldbemovedregularlyandmaintainedwithgreasenottofreeze.Thereshouldalsobemeanstosecuretheflaphandles in closed position and the open and closed positionshouldbeclearlymarked.Iffireflapscannotbesecured,thedraftofafireislikelytothrowthemopen.

– Entrances to the engine room that are damaged and allowing passage of an air draft.

Doors leading to the engine room from the accommodationarefittedwithdevicesforautomaticclosing.Doorsillsandcoamingsmaybedamagedbythe moving of machinery parts through doors in the engineroom,causingobstructionsforthefullclosingofthedoor.Doorsshouldbetestedbyreleasingthemfromtheopenposition,toseeiftheyclosefullybytheautomaticdevice,andthereshouldthenbenoopeningsbetweenthedoorandthecoaming.

– Emergency escapes from engine rooms that are obstructed or damaged.

Emergencyescapesmaybearrangedbyshaftsleadingtodeckandwithaccessdoorsatvariouslevels.Thefull

closing of the doors should not be obstructed by the stretchingoflooseelectriccables,hoses,etc.,andalsothesedoorsshouldclosetightlybytheirownautomaticmeans.Itmustberememberedthatsuchashaft,ifnotkeptclosed,willprovideadraftfromtheengineroom.

– Engine room entrances kept open by the fitting of hooks, ropes or wedges.

This is often seen especially on doors leading through thesteeringgearflattothepoopdeck.Inthecaseofafire,suchdoorsmaybeinaccessible,andthehooks,etc.,cannotbereleasedtoclosethedoor.Airtotheengineroomcanthennotbeclosedoff.Likewise,Gardsurveyors often see skylights at the top of the engine room and removable steel panels for the passing of sparepartsbeingkeptopenbysteelwireslings,etc.

Combustible oilOnboardashipthereisfueloil,lubricatingoil,hydraulicoil-allverycombustibleandthemostlikelynourishmentsofanengineroomfire.Gardsurveyorshavemetcrewmemberswhodonotconsiderlubricatingoilandhydraulicoiltobefirehazards,assuchoilsareseentobedifficulttoputonfire.Thatis,however,onlyaquestionoftemperature.Inanoilfireitisthegasabovetheliquidthatburns,andifheatedsufficientlybyafire,lubricatingoilandhydraulicoilalsobecomevolatileandfire-hazardous.

Level glasses on oil tanksOnebreachofsafetywhichGardsurveyorsseeonboardmostvesselstheyinspectisthatthelowervalveofthelevelglassesofoiltanksisforciblykeptopen.Itisclearlystatedinclassificationandstatutoryrulesthatsuchavalveistocloseautomatically.

Normallysuchavalveisspringloadedandthecrewmemberwillhavetobenddownandkeepapressurebyhanduntiltheoilhasriseninthelevelglass.Thickoilmaytakesometimetofillupthelevelglass,andfortheeaseofwork,crewmembersoftensecuresuchvalvespermanentlyinopenposition,bysteelwire,blocksofwood,etc.,orbyingeniouslydesigned“thumbscrew”fittings.DuringconditionsurveysGardsurveyorsfindthisseriousbreachofsafetyonboardmanyofthevesselsequippedwithoiltankswithlevelglasses.Thiscouldincaseofafireleadtoasuddenandinexplicableincreaseinthepowerofafirewhentheglassbreaksandthetankdrains.

Sources of ignitionThesourcesofheatmostlikelytostartafireintheengineroomarehotexhaustpipeandenginesurfaces,bearingsof rotating machinery heating up and faulty electrical equipment.Heatsourcescanofcoursealsobeintroducedbyhumanerror,asbyforinstancedangeroususeofelectrictoolsandweldingequipment.Insulationofexhaustpipesisoftenfoundtobedefective,especiallyinthevicinityofthedieselengines,whereremovalofinsulationisneededduringenginemaintenance.Also,flangeconnectionsandsteelsupportsofexhaustpipesmayoftenbeinadequatelyinsulated,aswellasindicatorsandotherinstrumentsfitted.Lookforsignsofhotareas,suchaspaintdiscolorationandreddishrustsurfaces.Electricalinstallationswillalwaysrepresentacertainriskofsparksandfire,althoughtherisk


45

isreducedbytheuseofqualitysafetydevicesandcloseadherencetovalidregulations.Allrotatingmachinerymayalsorepresentasourceofsufficientheattolightafire,firstofallbybearingsofpumpsheatingup.

General cleanlinessInsomeshipsthereisalargecollectionofusedsparepartsanditemswhichare“nicetohave”.Gardsurveyorshaveseenlargecollectionsofplasticsheets,cardboard,woodenplanks,usedpainttins,etc.,beingstoredinfire-exposedareas.Itisimportanttodiscardcombustiblematerials,removeoutdatedequipmentthatmayhinderaccessinafiresituation.

Drain pipes from gutters to oil collecting tanks should be keptopen,oilyragsshouldbedisposedofinacorrectmannerandenginesandfloorplatescleanedregularly.Oilydepositsinbilgesandinotherareasbelowfloorplatesmayattimesneedchemicalcleaningtoberemoved.

Alertnessandpropermaintenancearethekeywords.Acompetentcrewwiththenecessaryresourcesandsupportfromtheshoreorganizationwillimprovethefiresafetyconsiderablyonboardtheships.

ThiscircularisbasedontheGardNewsarticlewiththesamenamepublishedinGN170andcanbereadinfullatwww.gard.no.


Marpol Annex VI – Challenges in operating on low sulphur fuel BackgroundInternationalregulationstocontrolharmfulemissionsfromships’exhaustsenteredintoforceon19May2005.MARPOLAnnexVIcontainsprovisionsallowingspecial“SOxEmissionControlAreas”(SECAs)tobeestablishedwithmorestringentcontrolsonsulphuremissions.Intheseareas,thesulphurcontentoffueloilusedonboardshipsmustnotexceed1.5%m/m.Alternatively,shipsmustfitanexhaustgascleaningsystemoruseothermethodstolimitSOxemissions.Theregulationrequiresanysuchalternativemethodstobeapprovedbytherelevantflagstate.SanctionsforMarpolviolationsarebecomingincreasinglyseverearoundtheworld,andthereisnoreasontobelieveAnnexVIwillnotbetreatedtothesamescrutiny.

Theregulationallowedfora12-monthperiodfromthedateofentryintoforcebeforethelimitswithinaSECAcouldbeenforced,andtheywillthusbeenforcedfrom19May2006.TheBalticSeaAreaisthefirstareadesignatedasaSECAundertheProtocolandwillpermitamaximum1.5%sulphurcontentinanyfuelusedonboard.In2007,thesecondSECA,coveringtheNorthSeaandEnglishChannel,willbecomeintoforce,requiringsimilarsulphurlevels.

The effects of low sulphur fuelThereareseveralimplicationsofoperatingonlowsulphurfueloralteringbetweenhighandlowsulphurfuels.Theissueslistedbelowaresomeofthemostcommonchallengesthatmustbeconsideredbytheshipownersand operators to avoid problems related to operation and maintenanceoftheshipengines.

Fuel related issues– Incompatibilityofdifferentfuels– Combustioncharacteristicsandimpactonengine

depositsandwear– Varyingfuelviscosity,andimpactonfuelinjection– Lowsulphurfuelhavinglessanti-wearcapability– Supplyandstorageforlowsulphurfuels

Lube oil related issues– MatchingcylinderoilBNfuelsulphurlevelacross

operating conditions– Possibleadditionalstoragetanks– Cylinderlubricationmonitoring– Cylinderoilfeedrate

Operations related issues– Monitoringsulfurcontentinfuel– Engineload– CylinderLinerTemperature– Watercontentinscavengeair

RecommendationsShipownersandoperatorsshouldthoroughlyconsiderallundesiredeffectsofoperatingonlowsulphurfuel.Itis recommended that the engine makers and the lube oil suppliers are contacted to obtain their detailed instructions andguidelines.SpecificallywordedcharterpartyclausesregardingbunkerssuppliedbyCharterersareimportanttoensurethatanyproblemsareavoided.

46



Pirate parts used on rotating machinery

IntroductionManymanufacturersaroundtheworldofferawiderangeofnon-original(pirated)sparepartsforenginesandmachineryingeneral.Althoughthesepartsmaybemadeinaccordancewiththeoriginalmanufacturer’sspecifications,theyareusuallynotofthesamequalityastheoriginalparts.Importantcharacteristicssuchasrawmaterialandstrengthmaybeunsuitablefortheintendedpurposeandcondition.Rotatingpartsareespeciallyvulnerabletopotentialdamage.Theincidentdescribedbelowillustratestheneedforprudencewhendealingwithship’sspareparts.AmoredetailedarticleonproblemsexperiencedwithsparepartswillbepublishedinGardNewslaterthisyear.

Course of eventsAreefervesselrecentlyexperiencedabreakdownofoneoftheauxiliaryengines.Therequirementformaximumpoweris,dependingonthecargosituation,oftencriticalforthistypeofvessels.Inthisparticularinstance,thevesselwasforced to deviate from its original course and enter port for a damageassessment.Italsohadtohireaportablegeneratorto ensure maintenance of the appropriate cargo carriage temperature.

Later,duringthedamageassessment,itwasfoundthattheboltsofconnectingrodno.6hadparted,dislocatingtherodfromthecrankshaft.Thepiston,liner,bearings,cylinderblockandbedplatewereseverelydamaged.Theextentofdamagewassubstantialandtherepaircostswereestimatedtoequalthecostofareplacementengine.Adecisionwasmadetorepairtheengine,and,inadditiontotherepaircosts,expenseswereincurredrelatingtotheuseofaportablegeneratorsetandthevessel’stwoweeksoffhire.

Thecauseofthedamagewerefoundtobethefailureofoneoftheconnectingrodbottomendboltsinunitno.6,whichappeartohavebrokeninnormaloperationalconditions.Thecrewhadfittedtheboltinquestionduringanoverhaulonly15dayspriortothecasualty.Itturnedoutthatthebolthadnomarkings,whilstaccordingtothemanufacturer;theseboltsshouldhavealogostampedonthehead.

Threebolts(thebrokenbolt,anon-originalboltaswellasanoriginalbolt)weresenttotheclassificationsocietyfor

metallurgicalanalysis.Theresultsofthisanalysisshowedquiteclearlythatthetwonon-originalboltswereoff-speccomparedwiththemanufacturer’srequirementsfortensilestrengthandelongation,andalsohadaconsiderablylowerproofstrength.Notsurprisingly,theresultofthematerialanalysis also revealed that the material composition of the non-originalboltsweredifferentfromthatoftheoriginalbolt.

Lessons learnedThis incident could easily have been avoided by using manufacturerapprovedsparepartswhenoverhaulingtheengine.Thesparepartspurchaseddirectlyfromtheequipmentmaker,ortheirlicensedsub-contractorsmaybemoreexpensivethannon-originalsparepartsavailableinthemarket.However,itcanbestatedwithsomecertaintythattheuseofmanufacturerapprovedspareparts,andinparticularwhenusedinconnectionwithcriticalcomponents,will,inthelongrun,bemoreprofitable,bothbydurationandreliabilityofserviceintervalsandasignificantreductionintheriskofprematurebreakdownswithensuingexpensiveconsequentialdamages.

The origin of the production and delivery of spare parts mayattimesbeuncertain.However,thisplacesfurtherresponsibility on the receiver to ensure that the spare parts areofanappropriatequalityandinaccordancewiththeclassificationsociety’sandmanufacturer’srequirements.

Forfurtherguidancewithregardtotherisksinvolvedinusingnon-originalsparepartsforturbochargers,wealsorefertotheGardServicesLossPreventionCircular01-01,Turbocharger damages ontheGardServiceswebsiteatwww.gard.no.


47


Effects of off-spec bunkers

IntroductionTakingonboardoff-specbunkerscancausesignificantdisruptiontoavessel’sabilitytotrade.Inaddition,itcreates problems in recovering from the insurers costs incurredduetoalackofand/orlimitationincover.Thiscircularisintendedtoprovideanexampleoftheproblemasexperiencedbyshipowners.Thecasedescribedbelowrelatestoapassengership,butappliesequallytoalltypesofvessels.LossPreventionCircularNo.08-01isthenextinstalmentinaseriesofcircularsproducedbyGardServicesdealingwithdamageassociatedwithbunkersandbunkering1andoutlinesproblemswhichmayarisewhenpassengershipshavetodealwithoff-specbunkers.

Passengershipoperationsareverysensitivetooperationaldisruptions.Costsofdisruptioncanoccurintheformofhullandmachinerydamages,damagesandcompensationtopassengersandcrewaswellasdamagetoreputationthatmayinfluencefuturebookingsandearnings.Compensationto customers beyond the initial costs due to commercial considerations can easily fall outside the scope of cover of hullandmachinery,lossofhireandP&Icover.

Course of eventsUponarrivalinSingapore,thevesselwasfirmlysecuredtothepierat0550hrs.At0800hrs,abunkerbargecamealongsidetodeliverbunkerstothevessel.Thebargecommencedbunkeringat0810hrsandcompletedtheoperationat1255hrs.Thebunkerdeliverystatementnotedthat90metrictonnesofsupposedlyIFO180cstwassupplied.Fuelsamplesweretakenfortestingbyacrediblebunkerqualitytestingcompany.However,theresultsfromthisbunkertestwouldnotbeavailableforanother2–3days.

ThevesseldepartedSingaporeforThailandatapproximately1745hrsonthatsameday.At2215hrsthatevening,thevesselexperiencedatotalblackout,includingthelossofallnavigationalequipment.Powerwastemporarilyrestoredat2217hrs.Asecondblackoutoccurredat2218hrsresultinginthevesselnotbeingundercontrol.Althoughpowerwasfinallyrestoredat2220hrs,thevesselwasonlyabletocontinueathalfspeed.

TheChiefEngineerobservedthatthebunkerwhichhadbeensuppliedinSingaporethatday,hadahighdegreeofcarbonresidue,cloggingthecompletefuelsysteminthemainandauxiliaryengines.TheMasterinformedtheownersoftheproblemandthedecisionwasmadetoreturntoSingaporeduetosafetyconsiderations.

At1100hrsthefollowingday,fuelsamplesweretakeninthesettlingandservicetankswherethebunkershadbeenloadedandthevesselbegandischargingtheoff-specbunkersat1200hrs.ArepresentativefromtheSingaporeMaritimePortAuthorityinformedthevesselat1230hoursthattheywerebeingcautionedduetotheemissionofblacksmoke–apparentlytheresultoftheburningoftheoff-specbunkers.Anenginerepaircontractorboardedthevesselat1600hrsanduponsurveyingthesituation,indicatedthatrepairswouldtakeatleasttwodaysprovidednoextensivedamagewasfound.Afterconsultationswiththeowners,theMasterdecidedtoabortthecruise.

At0630hrsthefollowingday,thedebunkeringoperationwascompleted.AnotherbunkerbargebeganloadingafreshsupplyofIFO180cstat0810hrsandtheoperationwasconcludedat0945hrs.Allpassengersweredischargedfromthevesselat0945hrs.Asecondagencywasusedforthesampling of the second bunkers taken and a different bunker testingcompanywasusedtoanalysethesecondbunkers.Theresultsofthetestsofthefirstandsecondbunkersindicatedhighash,waterandtotalsedimentpotential(TSP)content.Inaddition,highsodiumtowatercontentwasalsoreported,indicatingthepresenceofseawaterinthebunkers.

However,thebunkerbrokersadvisedthecompanythatthesampleshadnotbeentakenatthebunkerbargeasrequiredbytheSingaporeStandardCP60:1996.Furthersamplesweredrawnatthebarge’smanifoldandsealedwithabargeseal.

Damage to machineryThe damage to the main engine as a result of using the off-specbunkerwasabrasivewearmarksonallfuelnozzles,abrasivewearonallfuelpumpbarrel/plungerassembliesaswellasheavyfoulingofallturbochargers.Theturbochargerimpellerswerenotedtobeheavilyfouled,thelabyrinthsealsonthegassideswerechokedwithcarbondeposits,andthebearingbusheswereworn.Inaddition,theboilerburnerunitwasalsoheavilyfouled.Uponreviewoftheenginelogbooks,therewasnoevidenceofanyproblemswiththeenginespriortotakingontheoff-specbunker.Therunninghoursofthemainandauxiliaryengineswerenotedtobewellwithinacceptablelimitsforoverhauls.

Inthiscase,therewasnoindicationthatthevesselhadreceivedtheresultsfromthefirstfueltestpriortosailing.Inaddition,thevesselhadapparentlyaverylimitedamountofbunkersonboardpriortoloadingthefirstoff-specbunkers.Therefore,thevesselhadtocommenceusingthenewbunkerspriortoreceivingthetestresults.Inthiscircumstance,thevesselwasnotabletocreatea‘buffer’byusingtheexistingbunkerswhileawaitingthetestresults.Hadthisbeenthecase,thecompanymayhavebeenabletodischargetheoff-specbunkersandtakenonreplacementbunkers.

What types of damages are actually covered?Inthistypeofcase,shipownerscanfindthemselvesinasituationwhereinsurancecovercanonlypayaportionofthecostsincurred.Forexample,inthisinstancethecostofrepairstothedamagetothemachinerywasbelowthedeductible.Forlossofhire,thevesselwasoffhirebutwithintheoffhiredeductible.TheP&IentrycoveredtheMember’s“liabilitytopaydamagesorcompensationtopassengersonboardtheShipinconsequenceofacasualty”asperRule28(b)ofGardP&IClub’sStatutesandRules.AsstatedintheGardHandbookonP&IInsurance2:“‘compensation’relatesonlytotheMember’slegalliabilitytothepassengersand cannot include any claim by the Member in respect of paymentsmadetopassengerstoprotecttheMember’scommercialreputation.”P&Icoverthus,doesnotincludeadditionalcompensationtopassengersabovetheMember’slegalliabilitymadetofostercustomergoodwill.

48


Theshipownersisthereforelefttobearasignificantcostforbusinessdisruptioninthesetypesofinstances,whereonlylimitedinsurancecoverwouldbeavailableunderhullandmachinery,lossofhireandP&I.Dependentuponthecircumstances,demurragemayalsoneedtobechargedandthuscreatingproblemfortheshipowner.

Lessons learnedThelessonslearnedfromthiscaseapplytoalltypesofships.However,thepassengershipindustrycanbemoresensitivethanmostindustries.

Fuel testing1. Bunkeringprocedures,includingfuel-testing

procedures,shouldbereviewedtoensurecorrectprocedureswhendealingwithoff-specbunkers.Thecrewinvolvedshouldalsobeproperlybriefedontheseprocedurestoavoidcostlyandtime-consuminginterruptions.IntheDetNorskeVeritasAnnualReport2000,itisstatedthatonly40percentoftheworldfleetperformsfueltesting.3 This lack of testingcanleadtoextensivedamagetothevessel’smachinerywhichiscostlybothtotheownerandinsureralike.

Ontheotherhand,therearecaseswherethereis a company fuel testing procedure but due to commercial or other reasons the results of the tests are neither received in time nor actions taken to adjustthefuelequipmentandenginesaccordingly.Theimproperuseofoff-specfuelcancausesignificantdamagetothevesselanditsabilitytotrade.Inthecaseoutlinedabove,thecostswereconsiderableandwereonlypartiallyrecoverablefrominsurers.

Taking on bunkers2. Everyprecautionshouldbetakentoensurethat

adequatebunkersuppliesareavailabletoallowforthepropertestingbeforeuseofanynewbunkerstakenon.Itisimperativethatpassengerships,aswellasothervesselsontightcharterschedules,areabletodealwithsituationswhereitisnecessarytousebunkerswithoutthetestresultsbeingavailable.Thismayinvolvecomplexcontingencyplanninginordertoproperlyevaluateandensurethata‘buffer’exists.Forexample,someshipownersmaintainaquantityofmarinedieseloil(MDO)onboardforsituationswhereoff-specbunkersneedtobedischargedandonlylimitedIFOisavailable.

Footnotes1. GardLossPreventioncircularsrelatedtobunkersare:LossPreventioncircular01-00(MainEngineDamageDuetoIgnitionDelay),LossPreventioncircular03-01(BunkerQuality),andLossPreventioncircular04-01(Charterer’sLiabilitiesandBunkers).ThesecircularscanbefoundontheGardwebsiteatwww.gard.no.2. Gard Handbook on P&I InsurancebySimonPolandandTonyRooth.PublishedbyAssuranceforeningenGard.Arendal,Norway1996.ThishandbookcanalsobefoundontheGardServiceswebsiteatwww.gard.no.3.DetNorskeVeritasAnnualReport2000canbeaccessedviatheirwebsiteatwww.dnv.com.


49


Bunker Quality

IntroductionThesecuringofbunkersofanacceptablequalitydependsonavarietyoffactorssuchasavailability,demand,area,choiceofsuppliersetc.Theproblemshave,toacertaindegree,fluctuatedwiththebunkerprices.Themarkethasseenfuelscontaminatedwithwastechemicalsdetrimentaltothehealthofthecrewaswellasdamagingtotheshipsengines.Formanyyears,ithasbeennormalincertainareasoftheworldtodisposeofusedautomotivelubricantsinbunkers,thuspossiblyaddingtoengineoperatingproblems.

High-densityfuels,whichfarexceedthecapabilitiesoftheonboardfueltreatmentplants,arebeingdeliveredtovessels.Waterinthefuelsisnotuncommon,resultinginemulsifiedfuelsandfuelsthatcannotbetreatedinshipboardfueltreatmentplants.Someoftheproblemsmentionedresultindamagesthatareinsuredagainst,butinmostcasestheassociatedcostsfallbelowthedeductible.Occasionally,blendingcontaminatedfuelwithgoodqualityfuelmaysolvetheproblem.Inotherinstances,thedamagesintheformofwearandtearofmovingpartsaresogreatthatthevesselhastodiverttoanemergencyportformajorrepairs.

Primary problemsWeseemainlythreeproblems:1. Catfines,aluminiumandsiliconresultingfromthe

refinerycrackingprocesses,areveryabrasivetoship’smachinery,unlessproperlyremoved.TheendresultcanbemachinerydamageunlesstheCatfinesareremovedtoanacceptablelevel(contactyourenginemanufacturer)througheffectivefueltreatmentonboard,i.e.optimumuseofthecentrifuges.Themodeofcentrifugeoperationmustbediscussedwiththemanufacturer as the type and year of manufacture of the separatorsisofsignificance.

2. Astheglobaldemandforpremiumproductssuchasgasoline,jetfuel,heatingoilsandgasoilshasincreasedsharply,theuseofrefineryconversionprocessinghavemarkedlyinfluencedthequalityoftheendproduct,theresidualcomponentwhichisthemajorcomponentusedforblendingIntermediateFuelOil(IFO)forships.Theresultisfuelswithhigherdensity,carbonresidue,sulphuretc.Practicallyeveryparameterhasincreasedsignificantlythroughouttherefineryprocessing.

Shipsfittedwitholdercentrifugesareunableto

effectivelytreatsuchfuels,particularlythe“highdensity”products,i.e.fueldensitiesof990Kg/m3 and above.Centrifugemanufacturersofferedupgradekitsforthe“old”separators,butfewoperatorsinvestedinthesekits.

3. Poorignitionqualityisanotherproblemthathasarisenrecently.Thestandardlaboratorytestsdonottesttheignitionquality,anditisnotapartoftheISO8217FuelStandards.Theproblemisnormallyassociatedwithlowviscosity/highdensityfuels.Ifavesselreceivesthistypeoffuel,theshipshouldkeeptemperaturesashighaspossible,thusavoidinglowloadoperation.GardServiceshasseenanumberofclaimsinthelastfewyearswherethevesselhashadtobeassistedtoan

emergencyport.Theuseofinferiorignitionqualityfuelsmaywellresultinmajorrepairstothevessel’sengine(s).

RecommendationsOwnersshouldbeawarethattheincreaseddemandfromshore side industries for premium products has resulted in a deteriorationofIFOusedinmarineengines.Compoundingtheproblemisthedemandfromshipownersforhighperformancelighterengines.

1. IFOusedasbunkersshould,asaminimum,meettherequirementsofthespecificationssetoutinISO8217,latestissue.BunkertestingagenciessuchasDnVPetroleumServices(DnVPS)andLloyd’sRegister’sFOBASaresetuptomonitorthatthisisthecase.

2. IfthevesselhasperformancedifficultiesandpoorignitionqualityissuspecteddespiteasatisfactoryCCAIvalue,afurthertestfortheignitionqualityshouldbeperformed.Fueltech,FOBASandDnVPScanperformtheseservices(seeGardServicesLossPreventionCircular04-01,CharterersLiabilitiesandBunkers).

3. IfthevesselisintheunfortunatesituationofhavingreceivedahighCatfinesfuel,andhastousethefuel,ownersshouldbepreparedforasuccessionofreplacementsofplungers,nozzlesandothermoveableengineparts.Anormalfullsetofsparesmaynotbesufficienttoseetheproblemthrough.Thefueltestingserviceprovidershouldalsobecontacted,togetherwithyourcentrifugemanufacturerandfuelsupplierforadviceanddecision-making.

4. Separatorsmustbeinprimeconditions.Considerationsshould be given to replacing separators manufactured priorto1984/1985.

5. Ifthevesselhasbeenonextendedlay-up,Catfinesand other impurities may settle in the bunker tanks if a sufficientamountofbunkersremainonboardduringthelay-upperiod.Whensubsequentlyre-commissioned,theseCatfinesandimpuritiesarelikelytobestirredupinheavyseasandcausedamagetotheengine(s).Therefore,considerationshouldbegiventothecleaning of bunker tanks prior to bringing a vessel out ofanextendedlay-uptopreventtheoccurrenceofthistypeofproblem.

ThesettlingofCatfinesisacontinuousprocesstakingplaceonboardeveryseagoingvessel.Asarule,fueltanksshouldbecleanedregularly.Settlinganddailyservicetanksshouldbecleanedatleastonceayear.Thismessy,butimportanttaskwouldsaveshipoperatorsalotofproblems.

Forfurtherinformationonbunkerquality,testingandotherrelevantinformationcanbefoundonwebsitessuchaswww.bunkersworld.com,www.dnvps.com,andwww.lrfobas.comandwww.fueltech.no.

GardwouldliketothankandacknowledgeMr.KjellHaugland’sassistanceinpreparingthiscircular.

50



Turbocharger damages

IntroductionTurbochargers are among the most technologically advanced enginecomponentonboardship.Impellerbladesofamediumsizedturbochargerregularlyrotateatasmuchas400revolutionspersecond.Theouteredgesoftherotorbladesthusmoveat1.5timesthespeedofsound.

Intheprocess,theturbochargerdigestscontaminatedexhaustgasesofupto700degreescentigrade.Thus,theturbochargerisaverysensitivepieceofhigh-speedmachinery continuously serving in harsh conditions and under extremestrain.Beingonthereceivingendofgasflows,turbocharger damages are often caused by the failure of variousupstreamcomponents.

Asshipownersandshipmanagersareaware,damagetomainengineandauxiliaryengineturbochargershaveasignificantimpactonthevessel’sabilitytotrade.Damagescanleadtocostlyrepairs,significantreductioninspeedwhileatseaandcanbeaconsiderablesafetyhazard.

ThesedamagesarecostlytoshipownersandshipmanagersaswellastoGardServices.ForshipsinsuredforHullandMachinerythroughGardServicesintheperiod1996and2001,therehavebeen192incidentsofturbochargerdamageswithtotalgrossclaimsofUSD24.7million.Takingintoaccountdeductibles,theseturbochargerdamageshavecostshipownersandshipmanagersinexcessofUSD25million.Additionalcostsareaccruedbyshipownersandshipmanagersforturbochargerdamagesthatfallbelowthedeductiblelevels.Asaresult,thiscircularbeenhavepreparedasanassistancetotheMembersandClientsinthepreventionof such costly damages to this critical part of the machinery system.

Some major contributors to turbocharger breakdowns1. Late maintenance and overhauls.Inmanycases,

theservicelifeofmajorcomponentsisdisregarded.Notonlybearings,butalsocompressorwheelsandturbineblades/discscanhaveservicelifelimitations.Compressorwheels,forinstance,canbelimitedtobetween50,000and100,000workhoursdependingupontheuseandconfiguration.Thisisequivalentto7.5to15yearsofusebetweenexchangeintervals.Duetooperationalandfinancialconstraints,overhaulsareoccasionallypostponeduntildry-dockingratherthanoverhaulingwhiletheshipisinservice.

Obvioussignalsindicatingthatthereareproblemswillattimesbedisregarded.Surgingoftheturbochargercanpointtoacloggedaircoolerorfoulednozzlering.Continuedsurgingatfullloadmightcausebreakdownbyitself.Further,risingexhaustgastemperaturesmayindicatethataninspectionfollowedbyserviceisrequired.

2. Non-manufacturer parts used in place of manufacturers parts. Toreducethecostsofmaintenanceandparts,ownerswilluse‘pirate’or‘alternativesource’partsinplaceofmanufacturer’sparts.Duetotheroughserviceenvironmentofaturbocharger,inferiorqualitypartswithslightdiscrepanciesinmaterial,designanddimensionscaneasilyleadtodamages.

ABB TPL TurbochargerPhoto courtesy of ABB.

3. Maintenance not performed by manufacturer. Maintenancecostsforturbochargerscanbesignificant.Maintenanceundertakenbythecrew,shipyardorotherpersonnelnotqualifiedbythemanufacturertoperformsuch servicing can lead to improper maintenance and servicing.Belowarelistedafewexamplesofsmallmistakeswhichmayeventuallyleadtototalbreakdowns:

– Failuretoobservetherightfittingsequencemaypre-damagecomponents.

– Failuretoexchangekeywearpartsmayleadtolossoffunctionality,forinstancetolossofbearinglubrication.

– Failuretoobservethecorrectclearancesoftheassemblyandtoadjusttherighttruerunofrotorsmayleadtorubbingoftherotorwithconsequentialunbalance.

– Impropercleaningofcoverringscanleadtobladerubbingandconsequentbladefailurewheninstallingoverhauledrotors.

– LackoforImproperbalancingofarotormaydamagebearings.(Duetothehighspeed,tolerancesareextremelylow).

4. Missing service letters.Whenthereisachangeofownershipofavessel,theservicelettersandlogbooksfortheturbocharger,aswellasothercriticalpiecesofmachineryandequipmentcanbemissing.Thisbreakininformationdoesnotallowthenewownersor shipmanagers the opportunity to assess the maintenanceandservicesneedsoftheturbochargers.

5. Inappropriate use.Dependingupontheship’stradeandoperation,enginesandturbochargersaresometimesspecifiedfor‘slowsteaming’.Whenincreasedloaddemandsaremadeonsuchequipment,somecomponents may need to be replaced to match the newoperatingconditions.Ifdisregarded,operationalproblems and/or reduced lifecycle of the rotating parts oftheturbochargerduetoelevatedspeedmayresult.

6. Actual turbocharger is not appropriately matched to engine. Duringvesselconstruction,turbochargersareratedforspecifiedoperatingconditions.Engineconversionsandchangestoincreasethe


51

poweroutputplacesagreaterloaddemandonthe turbocharger and thus reducing the reliability andservicetimeofturbochargerturbinewheel,compressorwheelandbearings.

7. Upstream maintenance resulting in damage to the turbocharger.Inmanycases,damagestoturbochargersoccurswhenmaintenancehasbeenconducted on other machinery components or systemsupstreamoftheturbocharger.Sincetheturbochargerisdownstreamofmostotherenginemachinery,anyforeignobjects,looseparts,forgottenequipmentorpiecesofmachineryequipmentthat may have not been properly reassembled mayeventuallymovedownstreamtodamagetheturbocharger.Suchitemsincludeloosebolts,injectionnozzlefragments,compensatorbellowbits,weldingelectrodestumps,wrenchesandscrewdrivers,ragsoranyotherforeignobjects.Duetotheextremeservicespeedofaturbocharger,evenminuteparticlesmaydamagevitalpartsandleadtoseveredamage.

8. Improper operation and maintenance by the crew. Impropermaintenanceandoperationbythecrewcanleadtodamagetotheturbocharger.Thefollowingisa list of some of the types of causes and events that canleadtomoreseriousdamages.– Dirt on compressor and turbine blades –

Improperlyimplementedorneglectedwashingroutines can let dirt accumulate on both compressorandturbineblades.Thiswillleadtoimbalancesintherotor,andconsequentiallyitcancausebearingdamagesandeventotalbreakdown.

– Improper lubricating oil – The use of lubricating oils not recommended by the manufacturer or contaminatedoil,canleadtoreducedperformanceandeventualdamagetothebearings.

– Improper cleaning and maintenance of filtration rings – Theintakeairqualitycanbeaffectedwhenairfiltersarenotproperlycleanedand/orchanged.Acloggedfiltermayleadtosurging.Insomecases,ithasbeenobservedthatthecrew,tokeepfromhavingtomaintainandcleanthefilters,haveremovedthefiltrationrings.

– Turbocharger over-speed –Duetoincorrectmaintenanceoroperationalactivities,turbochargersareinsomecasesover-sped.Whencontinuouslyover-spedbyonlyafewpercent,thisquicklydamagesturbochargercomponentsandreducestheirservicelife.Anover-speedof30-40%islikelytoblowuptheturbochargerinstantly.

Recommendations– Only qualified manufacturer approved

maintenance personnel should perform maintenance to turbochargers.Inmostcases,themostqualifiedpersonneltoperformmaintenanceand overhauls are the manufacturers themselves whererepairscanbeperformedwhiletheshipisinserviceoratdry-dock.Somecompaniesandshipyardsarewillingtoperformturbochargermaintenanceandoverhaulata‘cheaper’costthanthemanufacturer.Thesereducedcostscanbeattractivetoshipownersandshipmanagers.

However,thiscostcanbebasedona‘falseeconomy’ifdamagesoccurduetoinadequatemaintenanceanditcan,intheend,beverycostlytotheownerandunderwriterinsettlingaclaim.Whereas,whenqualifiedpersonnelperformthemanufacturer’swork,workmanshipismorethanlikelyunderwarranty.

– Use the correct manufacturers replacement parts. Theturbochargerisahighlyloaded,hightechnologyenginecomponent.Therefore,itisimperativetomaintainandoverhaulthemwiththecorrectparts.Aswiththemaintenancework,thepartswillalsomorethanlikelybeunderwarranty.

– Ensure that proper records of turbocharger service documents and letters are obtained and kept. This is to ensure that proper maintenance andservicecanbescheduled.Incaseswheretheservice documents and letters are not available uponsaleoftheship,theequipmentmanufacturercanoftenhelpwithproperdocumentationandsometimesevenwiththeturbochargerservicehistory.

– Operate the turbochargers within the operational design parameters. Damages arising due to improperusecanbeveryexpensiveandleadtooperationsatreducedspeeds,atotalbreakdownof the turbocharger or loss of hire due to the need formaintenanceandrepair.Therefore,importantparameters such as turbocharger speed and exhaustgastemperaturesshouldberoutinelymonitored and if possible used as input to trigger alarms.

– Ensure proper care and maintenance of the turbocharger. Turbocharger care and maintenance arerequiredatregularintervalsandshouldbeinaccordancewiththemanufacturersrecommendations.Ifindoubt,contacttheequipmentmanufacturerforinformationoncomponentservicelife.Propercareandmaintenance include:

1. Watercleaningofcompressorsandturbinesto remove dirt and other residual material fromtherotortoensureproperbalance.

2. Regularcleaningandchangingofairintakefilterstopreventforeignobjectsenteringanddirtandresiduebuildupontherotorblades.Furthermore,contaminationofairintakefiltersresults in a higher inlet restriction and may causeturbochargeroverspeedorsurging.

3. Incaseofturbochargerseparatelubricatingsystem:Regularchangingoflubricatingoil(consultmanualforapprovedoil)andcleaningofcentrifugesaswellasfilters.

4. Regularinspectionofturbochargerparameterswhileinoperation.

AcknowledgementsGardisgratefultoABBTurboSystemsLtdofBaden,SwitzerlandandtheturbochargerservicestationinOslo,Norwayforprovidingvaluableinformationtoassistinthepreparationofthiscircular.

52



Main Engine Damage Due to Contaminated Lubricating OilShip Type: Bulk carrier (85,000 dwt, built 1981)

Course of EventsTheabove-mentionedvesseloperatedformorethan1yearwiththemainenginelubrication(lube)oilcontaminatedbyfreshwater.Duringthesameperiodthelubeoilpurifierswerenotoperatedonaregularbasis.Occasionallythevesselusedthedieseloilpurifierforcleaningthelubeoil.Thelubeoilsumpwascleanedonatleasttwooccasionsandseveralthousandlitresoflubeoilwerefullyorpartlyreplaced.Ononeoccasiontheengineroomwasfloodedwithsandywateroutsideariverreefbarrierwherewaterenteredtheenginesumpthroughthethrustbearing.Lubeoilsamplingduringthatyearshowedawidevariationofresults.Sometimesitwaswithinacceptablelimits.Atothertimes,thelubeoilwascontaminatedwithupto30%watermakingthetexturesimilarto“wholemilk”and“creamyandmudlike”.

Atalltimesthevesselwasinclosecontactwiththeshoreoperation.Requestsforsparesforpurifiersandreplacementsforlubeoilwerefrequentlymade.Theshoresuperintendents did not appreciate the lube oil problem forthevessel.Therefore,requestsfromthevesselwerenottakenseriously.Thisledtodelaysindeliveryand/orininsufficientquantitiesofcriticalspareparts.Fewactionsorinitiativesweretakentocorrectthesituation.

Exceptforthefloodingincident,noconclusionwasmadeas to the source of the continuous contamination of fresh waterinthelubeoil.However,possiblesourceswerecondensation,lubeoilcoolersand/orthepurifiers.Inaddition,thevesselwasmainlyemployedinafreshwaterrivertrade.Finallytheshipoperator’stechnicaladvisorsrequestedtheattendanceofaserviceengineerfromtheenginemakerandextensivedamagetotheenginewasrevealed.

Extent of the DamageExcessivewearwasdiscoveredtoallenginemain,crankpin,crossheadandcamshaftbearings,plusdamageandweartootherlubricatedpartsoftheengine.Thevesselstayedoff-hirefor125daysfortherepairsthatresultedinaLossofHire(LOH)claimofUSD$5,000,000.TheParticularAverageclaimtothehull&machinery(H&M)underwritersisnotknowntous,butisestimatedtobeapproximatelyUSD$2,000,000.

Probable CauseThelubeoilpurifiershadbeenoutoforderduringoperation.Wheninoperation,theywereactingmoreastransferpumpsinsteadofpurifiersduetoincorrectoperationthatincluded:(1)alackofpartsinthediscstack,(2)incorrectgravitydiscs,and(3)alowoperationtemperature.

Thelubeoilsumphadonlybeenpartlyreplaced.With15,000litresofcontaminatedoil,itisnotsufficienttoreplace10,000litrestoeliminatethecontamination.Theremaining5,000contaminatedthenewoil.

Waterhadenteredthecrankcasethroughthethrustbearingonatleastoneoccasionwhenthevesselsufferedapartial

engineroomflooding.Itwasreportedthatthelubeoilinthesumpwasreplacedonthisoccasion,butitisuncleartowhetherthepipingandengineinternalsweresufficientlycleaned.

Alackofpropercontrolandfollow-upfromvesseloperatorswhousedpersonnelwithouttheproperqualificationsandknowledgetotakethenecessaryactionsinensuringtheproper maintenance and operation of the vessel despite being continuously kept informed of the lube oil system problems.Evenafterthetopmanagementhadbeenmadeawareoftheproblemwiththemainengine,theyforcedthevesseltocontinueserviceforseveralweeks.

Technical & management lessons to be learnedThe lessons to be learned from this incident are among the following:– Oilsamplingmustbetakenatfrequentintervalsand

recordedasbestrecommendedpractice.– Itisveryimportantofcorrectandcontinuous

operationofthelubeoilpurifiers.Thegravitydiscmustbeselectedtoobtaintheoptimumoil-waterinterfaceatamaximumtemperaturecloseto90degCdependingonspecifications.

– Thelubeoilfeedsystemtothepurifiersshouldbeevaluatedinordertoensuretheoptimumflowratebetweenthepurifier’scapacityandfeedpump.Olderlubeoilfeedsystemdesignsuseadirectdrivepumpthathastoohighcapacitywithrespecttotherecommendedflowthroughthepurifiers.

– Ifheavycontaminationofwaterispresentinthesystem:(1)thelubeoilinthesumptankmustbetransferredtoasettlingtank,(2)thesumptankshouldbecleaned,and(3)freshoilfilledtotheminimumlevelrecommendedbytheenginemaker. The contaminated lube oil can be drained and circulatedthroughthepurifiersandthefutureuseoftheoilcanbeassessedafteranalysis.

– Ifithasbeendeterminedthatsolidparticlesarepresent,youshouldalsoconsidercleaningofthepipingsystemandflushingtheentireengine.

Thisincidentalsoshowstheimportanceofresponsibleandqualifiedshoremanagement.Inthiscase,thepersonatthemanagementofficeindirectcontactwiththevesseldidnothavetheproperqualificationsrequiredtoeffectivelyassist the vessel or take the necessary actions in case of an emergency.Therewaslittleunderstandingofthecontinuousrequestforsparepartsoroftheseriousnessofrunningthemainenginewithcontaminatedlubeoil.

Impact on vessel’s LOH and H&M policiesInsurance conditionsThevessel’sH&MinsurancewassubjecttoInstituteTimeClausesHulls(ITCH)PortRisksincludingLimitedNavigation(20.7.87).TheITCPerilsClauseincludes,interalia,thefollowingwording:“This insurance covers loss of or damage to the subject matter insured caused by negligence of master, officers, crew and pilots….provided such loss or damage has not resulted from want of due diligence by the assured, owners or managers.”


53

Furthermore,thevesselwasinsuredforLOH,andthepolicywasbasedontheSP40BLossofCharterHireForm(August1961),amendedtocoverlossordamagecausedbyaperilinsuredagainstundertheITCHPortRisksincludingLimitedNavigation(20.7.87).Consequently,theaboveperilsclausewouldalsogoverntheLOHpolicy.

Cause allegationTheassuredmaintainedthatthedamagewasproximatelycausedbyanactoractsofnegligencebyvessel’sengineersinfailingtoensurethatthemainenginelubeoilwasproperlypurified.Therefore,thiswouldbea“primafacie”claimundertheabovestatedperilsclause.

Coverage issuesWhilstitmightappeardifficulttodisregardtheassured’sallegation,itseemsclearthatthelackofpropersupervision/supplyofsparesetc.byshore-basedpersonnelsignificantlyinfluencedthedamage.

Withreferencetotheperilsclausequotedabove,itshouldbe noted that the cover of loss or damage caused by negligenceofthemaster,officers,crewandpilotsissubjectto a proviso that the loss or damage has not resulted from wantofduediligencebytheassured,ownersormanagers.

Therefore,thecrucialquestionstoconsiderinthistypeofcase are: (a) Whetherthelackofpropersupervision/actionsby

shorepersonnelamountsto“wantofduediligence”,andifso,

(b) Whethertheloss/damagewasaresultofthewantofduediligence,and

(c) Whetherthosewhocouldbeblamedforwantofduediligencecouldbeidentifiedwith“theassured,ownersormanagers”.

Iftheanswerstoallquestionsareaffirmative,thereisnoclaim.TheITCHPortRisksaresubjecttoEnglishlawandpractice.However,thenumbersofEnglishcasesthathaveconsideredthewordingoftheduediligenceprovisohavebeenratherlimited.

Weproposehoweverthefollowingcommentstothequestionsabove:(a) Thereappearstobelittledoubtthatthelackof

proper supervision/actions by shore personnel amountsto“wantofduediligence”.

Thereisnodoubtthatthewantofduediligencebyshorepersonnel has been an important factor in the development ofthedamage.Ontheotherhand,onecaneasilyarguethatthevessel’sengineershavecommittedseveralactsofnegligence have also contributed to the damage

54



Main Engine Medium Speed Crankshaft Damage

Ship Type: Panamax bulk carrier (built 1981)Course of EventsWehaverecentlyexperiencedtwosevereconsequentialdamages to main engine crankshafts after failure to big endconnectingrodbearings.Thesequencesofeventshave,inbothcases,beenthesame.Alarmsweregivenfortheoilmistdetectorfittedinthecrankcaseindicatingoverheatingofinternalparts.Theenginewassloweddownandcontinuedrunningonreducedloadforaperiodbetween20to45minutesbeforeitwasfinallystopped.Thecrankcasewasthenopenedforinspectionofcrankshaftandbearings.

Clearevidencewasfoundofadamagedbigendconnectingrodbearingthathadrotatedinsidetheconnectingrod.Inordertoreachasafeportthepistonwithconnectingrodwasdismantledandcylinderblankedoff.Preparationwasmadetogrindthecrankpinin-situtoremovethescoresandtofitanundersizeconnectingrodbearing.

Extent of DamageThecrankpininbothcaseswasfoundwithconsiderablescoresandsmallcracks,butthesecouldhavebeenremovedbyin-situgrindingofthecrankpin.SeriousdamagewasdiscoveredwhentestingtheBrinellhardnessofthecrankpin.Thelongperiodwithrunningtheenginewithadamagedbig end connecting rod bearing had transferred such amount of heat to the crankpin that the steel had hardened toanunacceptablelevel.Tofullyrestorethecrankpin,thediameterhadtobereducedbymorethan8mm.Consequently,theenginewouldhavetobede-rated.

Thiswasnotacceptablefortheshipowner.Theresultinbothcaseswasacompletedismantlingoftheengineandfittingofnewcrankshaft.

TheapproximatecostsforeachoftherepairswereaboutUSD1,800,000.andtotaloff-hiredaysexcludingslowsteamingortowingtorepairyard,about2monthsdependingondeliverytimefornewcrankshaft.

Incomparison,hadthemainenginebeenstoppedafterthealarmsindicatedtheoverheating,thedamagescouldhavebeenlimited.Thetotalcostsforanormalin-situgrindingofthecrankpinincludingnewundersizeconnectingrodbearingandotherspareswouldhavebeenintherangeofUSD$50,000.

Cause of DamageIthasnotbeenpossibletoestablishthecauseforthebreakdownofthebigendconnectingrodbearings,butitis most likely to be related to the cleanliness and/or supply oflubricatingoil.Smallscorescouldbeseenonothermainjournalsandcrankpins.

Lessons to be Learned– Whenoverheatingisdetectedand/ortheoil

mistdetectoralarmissounding,stoptheengineimmediatelyifpossible.

– Theengineshouldnotberestartedbeforethereasonfortheoverheatingisidentifiedandcorrected.

Keepthelubricatingoilascleanaspossibleusingcontinuouslythelubricatingoilspurifieratthemaximumrecommendedtemperature(normallyabove90deg.C.).Maintainthelubricatingoilfiltersincleanandproperconditionbyfrequentdailyroutinesorasnecessary.


55


Main Engine Damage Due to Ignition Delay

Ship Type: Panamax bulk carrier (built 1980)Course of EventsInaGulfofMexicoport,thevesselreceivedheavyfueloilIFO180accordingtoISOcategoryRME25withadensityof989,6kg/m3andaviscosityof172Cst.ThebunkerreceiptinformationandthefollowingDNVPSanalysiscoincidewithrespecttotheseparameters.

Basedonthedensityandviscosityinformation,theignitionqualitiesofthisfuel(CCAI)werecalculatedto860whichisacceptableforslowspeedengines.Thevesselisequippedwitha16-cylindermediumspeedmainengineofEuropeandesign,andthisfuelisonthelimitofwhereoperationalproblemscouldbeexpectedformediumspeedengines.Asaresult,thechiefengineeronboardandtheshipmanagementofficewereinformedbyDNVPSthat precautions should be taken to ensure satisfactory combustion.

The chief engineer on board and the ship manager ashore didnotpayanyattentiontothefuelanalysis.TheydidnotconsideredthespecificrecommendationsissuedbytheenginemakerorDNVPS’sprecautionsforoperatingthemainenginewithfuelwithinferiorignitioncharacteristics.Tocompoundtheproblem,thevesselwassenttoareasfortradingincludingdayswithriverpassagewithvariableloadsonthemainengine.Thismadeitdifficulttomaintainmaximumcombustiontemperatureandthusmadeitvirtuallyimpossibletofollowtheoperationalrecommendations.

The delayed combustion resulted in increased combustion pressure,combustionclosetothecylinderwallsandtheconsequentialfailureofthelubricationofthepistonsandliners.

Extent of the DamageTheresultwasacompletebreakdownofallpistons,cylinderlinersandcylinderheadswithrelatedparts.Duetolackofavailabilityofsparepartsonboardship,onlypreliminaryrepairsweremade.Thus,thevoyagetothedischargeportwasmadeatreducedspeed.Meanwhile,thecompanyhadtomakearrangementsatthedischargeporttoacquiresparepartsandmakepreparationforfinalrepairs.Thevesselwastakenoff-hireuponarrivalatthedischargeport.

Asaresultthetotalcosttorepairisapproximately$530,000USDandthetotaltimeoff-hireisapproximately45days.

Probable CauseThe ship manager and/or commercial operator of the vessel madetheerrorinbelievingthatalowerviscosityfuel(180Cst)wasofbetterqualitythanahighviscosityfuel(380Cst).Thisiscommonlyseenwhenafuelsupplierlowerstheviscosity by adding lighter components that may seriously altertheignitioncharacteristics.

The ship manager had arranged for sampling and analysis offuel.However,theshipmanagerhadnotensuredthattheirchiefengineerswereprovidedwithproperprocedures

and instructions to take the necessary precautions against damagesthatcouldbeincurredbyinferiorqualityfuel.

Theresultwasthatthevesselleftthebunkeringportwithnopreventiveactionsandprecautionsonhowtodealwithasituationwithafuelonboardwithinferiorcombustioncharacteristics.

Lessons to be LearnedThe importance of fuel sampling and analysis is essential forverificationofthequalityofthefuelreceivedonboard.Thereishoweverlittlevalueincompaniesspendingmoneyon sampling and testing if shipboard engineers are not properlytrainedtounderstandthefuelqualityanalysisandprovidedwithproceduresandinstructionsonhowtoadjustthefuelequipmentandenginesaccordingly.

Procedures and instructions should be established in the technical or operational departments on how to:

– establish requirements for fuel quality depending on the fuel treatment equipment and engines on board

– follow-up the vessels’ bunkering schedules, ensure cor-rect sampling and where to send samples for analysis

– ensure the engineers on board and technical staff ashore will understand the analysis and the limitations for their equipment, and

– in the event of having taken on fuel of inadequate qual-ity, establish communication with the engine makers and fuel analysing company in order to provide proper instructions to the vessel.

56



Master’s brief before entering high risk piracy areasPiracyiscurrentlyoneofthemajorconcernstoshipping.Inordertopreparetheshipproperly,itisimportantthattheentirecrewhasafullunderstandingofthesituationandthetaskstobecarriedout.AMaster’sbrieftothecrewpriortoenteringtheareaisthereforerecommended.ThebelowlistcontainsitemswhichshouldbeconsideredwhenpreparingaMaster’sbrief.

Area of operation•Chartofthehighriskarea.• Designatedrouteandtimespentwithinthehighriskarea.•Weatherforecast.

Situation and risk assessment• Currentpiracysituationinthearea.

o Thepirates’knownmodeofoperationandtheirexpecteduseofforce.

o Thenumberofpirateswhichcanbeexpected.oThepirate’shistoricalsuccessrate.

• Maritimesecuritysituation.o Othercivilianvesselsinthearea.o Dedicated military or civilian armed escort and/or

assistanceavailable.o Authoritiesandorganisationswhichwillbeinformed.o Navalrescueresourcesinthearea.

• Shipowner’spolicy–briefoverview.•TheMaster’soverallriskassessment.1

o Crewsafety.o Freeboard.o Speed.o PrevailingWeather.o Timeoftransit.o Recentpiracyactivity.o Identificationofsoftspotsandstrengtheningmeasures.

• Physicalmeasuresavailableonboardtodiscoveranddelaypirates–e.gbarbedwire,waterhoses,cameras,radarwatchoperatingondifferentscales(e.g3nmand12nm),dedicatedlookouts,additionalguards(armed/unarmed–Shipowner’spolicy),internalcommunications,nightvisiongoggles.

Mission• Executepreparationsandimplementstrengthening

measures in vulnerable areas in order to prepare the ship fortransitthroughahighriskpiracyarea.

•Conducttrainingandexerciseplannedhijackingprocedures.

Execution of the Ship Security Plan• General

o Prepareclose-downofship.o Onlypersonnelondutyhaveaccesstothebridgeor

outsidearea.o Watchroutinesandescalationtriggers.

• Planproceduresforthefollowingscenarios:o Notificationofasuspiciousvessel.

– Descriptionofvessel/boat.– Distanceanddirectionoftravel.– Numberofpeopleonboard.– Additionalinformation(weaponsobserved).

o Threatening/attackingvesselsapproaching.– Immediatelynotifythebridge.– Activatepiracyalarmwithadditionalinstructions.

– ActivateSSASandAIS(ifturnedoff).– MakeemergencycalltoUKMTO,orotherregional

reportingservices.– Signaltheattackersthattheyhavebeendetected.– Implementfinalphysicalbarriers,ifnotalreadyin

place.– Evacuatecrewtodedicatedarea.– Activationofremotecontrolledsecuritymeasures,

suchasfirehoses.– Evasivesteeringandmaximumspeed.

o Hostileboardinginprogress.– Ifnecessaryandpossible,controlshipfromengine

room.– Masterandmanagementshutdownbridgeand

evacuatetosaferoom.– ReportonVHFchannel16(8).

Communications• Allpersonnelondutytocarryaradio.•VHFchannel16(8)onthebridgeandinsaferoom.•Identifytherelevantcontactinformationthatshouldbe

availableonthebridge.Thiscouldinclude:MTODubaiHotline,owncompany,MSC-HOA,CJTF-HOF,Rescuesources,othershipsandnavalshipsnearby.2

•Testofallcommunicationequipment.

Other• Preparesaferoomwithsupplies,foodwater,medical,

communicationsequipmentandVHF.•Asfaraspossible,protectalloutsideequipmentsensitive

tofireandsmallarms.•Removealloutsideequipmentthatcanbeusedtogain

entryorcausedamagetotheship.

ThisCircularhasbeenpreparedwiththeassistanceofBestiaRiskConsulting,Oslo.

1details,see:OCIMF,PracticalMeasurestoAvoid,Deter,orDelayPiracyAttacks2ContactdetailsforGoA,HornofAfrica,see:OCIMF,PracticalMeasurestoAvoid,Deter,orDelayPiracyAttacks



US Customs regulations – Importer Security Filings and Additional Carrier Requirements (10+2 Rule)TheUnitedStatesBureauofCustomsandBorderProtection(CBP)hasrecentlybegunenforcementofregulationsthatrequiretheelectronictransmissionofadditionaldataelementstobeprovidedasadvanceinformationwithrespecttocargodestinedforimportationintotheUnitedStates.Thisinformationmustbeprovidedpriortoloadingofsuchcargoonvesselsatforeignseaports.TheseregulationswerepromulgatedunderTheUnitedStatesSecurityandAccountabilityforEvery(SAFE)PortActof20061 and the MaritimeTransportationSecurityAct2002,2 by publication ofafinalruleon25November2008,ImporterSecurityFilingandAdditionalCarrierRequirements,commonlyknownasthe“10+2Rule”intheFederalRegister(73FR71730).Thefinalrulecameintoforceon26January2009andincludedadelayedcompliancedateof12months.Asof26January2010,CBPisenforcingthe10+2Rule.

Importer Requirements (The “10” of the 10 + 2 Rule)The10+2Rulerequiresimporters,includingowners,purchasers,consignees,oragentssuchaslicensedcustomsbrokers,tosubmitfullImporterSecurityFilings(ISF)totheCBPforcargo,otherthanforeigncargoremainingonboardavesselandcertaingoodstransportedinbond,nolaterthan24hoursbeforethecargoisloadedonboardavesseldestinedfortheUnitedStates.ISFsmustbemadeelectronicallyviatheAutomatedBrokerInterfaceortheAutomatedManifestSystem(AMS).Importersneedonlysubmitfiveelementsforforeigncargothatremainsonboardand goods intended to be transported in bond as an immediateexportationortransportationandexportationshipment.3

The Carrier requirements4 InadditiontosubmittingthecargomanifestinformationelectronicallytotheCBPbywayofitsAMSs,5 the carrier is nowrequiredtoalsoelectronicallysubmittwoadditionaldataelements;aVesselStowPlanandContainerStatusMessagestotheCBPforallcontainerisedoceanvesselshipmentsinboundtotheUnitedStates.

AVesselStowPlanmustincludeinformationonthephysicallocationofthecargo,inparticular,dangerousgoodsandotherhigh-riskcontainerisedcargo,loadedonboardthevesseldestinedfortheUnitedStates.TheCBPmustreceivethestowplannolaterthan48hoursafterthecarrierdepartsfromitslastforeignport.Ifthevoyageislessthan48hours,theCBPmustreceivethestowplanpriortothevessel’sarrivalatitsfirstU.S.port.Thevesselstowplanmustinclude standard information regarding the vessel and each containeronboardthevessel.AccordingtotheCBP,thevesseloperatingcarrier,nottheNVOCC,isresponsibleforfilingthevesselstowplan.Forbulkandbreak-bulkcarriersshippingpartcontainercargo,theCBPrequiresthecarriertosubmitavesselstowplanforallcontainerisedcargoaboardthevessel.

ContainerStatusMessages(CSM)reportcontainermovementsandchangesinstatus,e.g.whetherfullorempty.IfacarriercurrentlycreatesorcollectsCSMsinanequipmenttrackingsystem,thatcarriermustsubmitCSMstotheCBPregardingcertaineventsrelatingtoallcontainersdestinedtoarriveinaU.S.portbyvessel.CarriersmustsubmitCSMselectronicallyviathesecurefiletransfer

protocolnolaterthan24hoursafterthemessageisenteredintothecarrier’sequipmenttrackingsystem.AswiththeVesselStowPlan,theCBPrequiresthevesselcarrier,nottheNVOCC,tosubmitCSMs.

EnforcementAccordingtotheCBP,enforcementin2010willbegradualandprogressivedependingonthecircumstances.6Inthefirstquarter,CBPintendstoconcentrateitsenforcementmeasuresonimporterswhohavenotmadeanISFdespitehavingimportedproducts,orwhohavemadeinaccurateoruntimelyISFs.AlthoughtheCBPdoesnotintendtoassessliquidateddamagesorissue“DoNotLoad”orders(DNLs)duringthefirstquarter,instancesofnon-compliancewillbereviewedonacase-by-casebasispotentiallysubjectingnon-compliant operators to penalties.7

Inthesecondquarter,theCBPintendstouseholdsoncargo and other security approaches as a means to compel compliance.However,theCBPhasadvisedthatitdoesnotplantoassessliquidateddamagesorissueDNLsduringthisperiod.Inthethirdandfourthquarters,theCBPintendstobeginassessingliquidateddamagesonISFwithdataorfilingproblems,includingtimeliness.Bythefourthquarter,CBPwillbeinfullenforcementmode.

RecommendationsEventhoughenforcementwillreportedlybegradual,carriersandimportersshouldensurethattheyarecomplyingwith10+2requirements.Importersandcarriersshouldtakethisopportunitytoreviewtheirproceduresforcompliancetoavoiddelaysattheborderortheimpositionoffines.

Footnotes1SecurityandAccountabilityforEvery(SAFE)PortActof2006(sec203).2TradeActof2002asamendedbytheMaritimeTransportationSecurityAct2002(section343a).3SeealsoFederalRegister,Vol.73,No.228.25November2008.pg71731-71733.Forcertainlimitedpurposes,theoceancarriermaybedeemedanimporter,forexample,withrespecttoforeigncargoremainingonboard(FROB),andisresponsibleforsubmittingthefivedataelementstoCBPbeforethecargoisloadedonthevessel,althoughitisnotarequirementthatsuchnoticeissubmitted24hoursbeforeloading.4Exemptfromthecarrier’sadditional“2”reportingrequirementsare:(1)Bulkandbreakbulkcarriersthatareexclusivelycarryingbulkandbreak-bulkcargoand(2)carriersofgoods(includingcontainerisedcargo)arrivingviavesselintoCanadaorMexicoandafterwardstruckedorrailedintotheU.S.5SeeFederalRegister19CFRParts4,103andGardMemberCircularNo07/2003.6SeeAmericanAssociationofExportersandImporters,“ISFEnforcementStrategy”(Jan.20,2010),availableathttp://www.aaei.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=UlCAz3wrz5A%3d&tabid=36.Furtherinformationconcerningtherequirementscanbeobtainedathttp://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/carriers/security_filing/.7TheCBPwillimposefinesofatleastUSD5,000foreach

58



US Coast Guard – Formal policy on voluntary disclosure of MARPOL violations

TheUnitedStatesCoastGuardhasissuedaformalpolicyonvoluntarydisclosurethatappliestoMARPOLviolationsthatmayresultincriminalprosecutionofownersandoperatorsofforeignflagvesselsintheUnitedStates.ThepolicyissimilartoexistingpoliciesofotherU.S.governmentagenciesandtheUSJusticeDepartmentindescribingthefactorsthatwillbeconsideredinevaluatingaviolationforpossiblecriminalinvestigationorprosecution.

Thesepoliciesrequirecompaniestohaveinplaceacompliancemanagementsystemtoprevent,detectandcorrectviolationsofenvironmentalregulations.Ifimplemented,theShippingIndustryGuidanceonEnvironmentalCompliancepublishedbyInternationalChamberofShipping(ICS)andInternationalShippingFederation(ISF)wouldappeartomeetalltherequirementsfor a compliance management system as set out in the USCGpolicy.Theshippingindustryguidancecanbedownloadedat:www.marisec.org/environmental-compliance

TheUSCGvoluntarydisclosurepolicystatesthatifacompany promptly and voluntarily discloses a violation discoveredwithinthecompany’senvironmentalcomplianceplanincludingshipauditstotheCoastGuard,andthedisclosureotherwisemeetstherequirementoftheCoastGuardpolicy,theCoastGuardwillnotrecommendprosecutionofthecompany.However,itisimportanttonotethatsuchdecisionswillbecase-specific,andultimatediscretiononwhetherornottoundertakeacriminalinvestigationstillrestswiththeUSCoastGuard.TheCoastGuard investigates violations and can refer matters to theJusticeDepartmentforfurtherinvestigation,typicallythroughtheuseofaGrandJury.TheCoastGuardpolicynowmakesitclearthattheCoastGuardmayrecommendleniency in certain cases before the matter goes to the JusticeDepartment.

Otherimportantrequirementsstatedinthepolicyare:• Theviolationmustbediscoveredandidentifiedbefore

theCoastGuardoranyothergovernmentagencylikely wouldhaveidentifiedtheproblemeitherthroughitsowninvestigativeworkorfromtheinformationreceivedthroughathirdparty;

• Theviolationmustbereportedinwritingwithin21daysofdiscovery;

• Theviolation(orarelatedviolation)hasnotoccurredpreviouslywithinthepastthreeyearsinvolvingthesamevesselandhasnotoccurredwithinthepastfiveyears as part of a pattern involving multiple vessels ownedoroperatedbythesameentity.

UnderUSlaw,foreignflagshipownersandoperatorscanbeandoftenareprosecutedforentryintoUSwaterswithafalseoilrecordbookthatconcealsdischargesofoilywasteswhichhavetakenplaceoutsideofUSwaters.DischargesinviolationofMARPOLininternationalwatersareviolationsthataresubjecttothelawoftheflagstatebuttheUnitedStatesdoesnothavejurisdictiontoprosecuteforeignflagoperatorsforthedischargeitselfbecausethevesselswereoutsideofUSwatersatthetimeofthedischarge.AccordingtotheIndustryGuidanceonEnvironmentalCompliance,“non-compliancewithMARPOLregulationsshouldbe

reportedtothevessel’sflagadministration.Intheeventofthediscoveryofevidenceofintentionaldischargesofwaste,theflagadministrationmustbenotifiedimmediatelyandarequestforaninvestigationshouldbeinitiated”.

IfthevesseltradestotheUnitedStates,thevesselowneror operator may also consider reporting the discovery and the correction of any false entries in the oil record book totheCoastGuardinadditiontotheflagstate,inordertocomplywiththevoluntarydisclosurepolicy.IndecidingwhethertoreporttotheCoastGuard,prudencesuggestsforeignflagownersandoperatorsshouldseekimmediatelegaladvicefromalawyerfamiliarwiththeCoastGuardandJusticeDepartmentpolicyguidelinesandMARPOLcriminalprosecutionsingeneral.

Theofficialdocumentcanbefoundat:www.uscg.mil/foia/docs/CH-4%20Appendix%20V.pdf



Oily water separation and discharge: Discharge of oil prohibited

IntroductionAspartofouroveralllosspreventionactivities,GardServicesregularlymonitorsportStatedetentionsfromtheParisMemorandumofUnderstanding(MoU),TokyoMoUandUnitedStatesCoastGuard(USCG).In2000,therewasatotalof131detentionsofshipsenteredintheGardP&Iportfolio.Oilywaterseparationanddischargerelateditemswerethesinglemostfrequentdeficiencycited.SimilarresultswerealsoobservedinthedetentionofvesselsenteredintheGardMarineportfoliofor2000(147detentionsandthesecondmostciteddeficiency).Wearenotsatisfiedwiththesefigures.Asaresult,webelieveitisnecessarytorevisitthisissueforGardServicesMembersandClients.

This circular includes updated adaptation of the article “Dischargeofoilprohibited”,whichappearedinGardNewsissueNo.152(December1998/February1999)warnedagainst the implications of pumping oil and oily bilge wateroverboard.Thisisthesecondinaseriesofcircularsproducedonthismatter.GardServicesLossPreventionCircular06-01entitled,“Oilywaterseparationanddischarge:Riskofoilpollutionversusvessel’ssafety”alsoaddressessafetyandenvironmentalmattersrelatedtothissubject.WehopethatthiscircularwillassistourMembersandClientsinstayingvigilantinlightofthepotentialcostsofnon-compliancewithregulationsrelatingtooilywaterseparationanddischarge.

Bilge water problemsOnvesselsinoperationbeforetheimplementationofMARPOL73/78,itwascustomarytopumptheoilyengineroombilgewaterstraightoverboard,evenifanoilywaterseparatorwasinstalled.Pipesystemswerearrangedsovariouspumpscouldbeusedasstand-byforeachother,interconnectedbyvalvesandblindflangedconnections.WhentheengineroompipesystemsofexistingshipswereinspectedforcompliancewithMARPOL73/78andissuanceofthevessel’sfirstInternationalOilPollutionPreventionCertificate,such‘useful’connectionshadtoberemovedorblindedoff.Tomaintainthepossibilityofanemergencydischargeconnection,carefulChiefEngineersfittedchainsandpadlockstovalvehandles.Withtime,illegalshipsidevalveconnectionsdisappearedorwereblankedoffpermanently.

A useful pre-entry condition surveyDuringaninspectionofa16yearoldcargovesselof4,000GTwhichhadbeenpurchasedbyoneofourMembers,wediscoveredthatthewaterdischargelinefromthevessel’soilywaterseparatorwasjoinedattheshipsidevalvebyanunmarkedpipewhichcamefromthelowerpartoftheengineroom.Followingthetwoinchpipelinefromtheoverboardvalve,itconnectedonefloorlowerdowntoafourinchlubeoilpipe,endingupinablindflangeonthedeliverysideofthemainenginestand-bylubeoilpump.Thefour-inchpipehadprobablyoncebeenpartofapipelinetodeck,forthepurposeofdischargingthemainenginelubeoilsumptanktoashorerecipient.

Fromtheblindconnectionatthestand-byoilpump,therewasafurtherbranchlinetothevessel’sbilgepumpandbilgewatertank.

The oily water separator. “Fine 5000” placard is in place.

Thisvesselcouldthuspumpoilybilgewateroverboardbybypassingtheoilywaterseparator.Byremovingablindflangeatthemainenginelubeoilstand-bypump,thevesselcouldalso,ifneeded,pumptheentiremainenginelubeoilsumptankoverboard!Theweldingworkoftheunauthorisedpipeconnectionwascrudelycarriedoutsoiteasilycaughtasurveyors’attention.Itwasdefinitelynotanewinstallation,andoildepositssmearedtheshipsidevalve.StrangetothinkthatanumberofIOPPsurveyshavebeencarriedoutovertheyearswithoutdetectingsuchanobviousdefault.

OurMember,whohadjustpurchasedthevessel,wasthankfulforourdetectingtheby-passoftheseparatorandtheAssociationwaspleasedtoseeitremovedimmediately.ThisvesselhadbeensailingintheWestIndiesandoccasionallyvisitingUSports.OurMemberwastousethevesselinthesamearea.

A warning outdatedOnmostvesselsinspected,theAssociationfindsthatwarningsoffinesuptoUSD5,000arepostedinenginerooms,increwquartersandonthebridge.UndertheUSFederalCleanWaterActanowner,operatororpersoninchargeofanonshoreoroffshorefacilitycouldbefineduptoUSD5,000foroildischargedfromsuchfacilityaffectingUSwaters1.PrudentownersorMastershaveobviouslyusedthethreatofaUSD5,000fineasatooltopreventthecrewfromdischargingoiloverboard,andthe“Fine5000”warningshavespreadtoshipsnevervisitingUSwaters.

AftertheentryintoforceoftheUnitedStatesOilPollutionActof1990,the“Fine5000”stickersbecameobsolete,andmaymisleadthecrewinrespectoftheimplications

60


ofdischargingoiloverboardinUSwatersandelsewhere.Todayshipownersnotonlymaycarryunlimitedresponsibilityfortheclean-upoperationandthedamagecausedbyanoilspillinUSwaters,butarealsofacedwithstrictcriminalpenaltiesforviolationsofUSlaw.ByspillingoilaffectingUSwater,theoffenderriskscriminalprosecutionforspillingthe pollutant and for failing to notify the government of thespill.Bothindividualviolatorsandorganisationsmaybepenalised;individualsmayevenbeimprisoned.Fornegligentviolations,themaximumfineisUSD50,000perday and one year imprisonment2.For“knowingviolations”3 theimprisonmentmaybeuptothreeyears.

UndertheAlternativeFinesActthemaximumfineforanindividualisUSD100,000(negligent)andUSD250,000(knowingly).Foranorganisationthefinesaredoubled.Ifanindividual or an organisation derives pecuniary loss to a third party,thefinewillbeuptotwicethegrossgainorloss,which,dependingonthecircumstancescouldruntomillions.

The text of the new warningUSregulationsrequireeveryshipabove26feetinlengthtohaveaplacardofatleast5x8inchesmadeofdurablematerialfixedinaconspicuousplaceineachmachineryspace,oratthebilgeandballastpumpstation,withthefollowingmessage,inalanguageunderstoodbythecrew:

“Discharge of Oil ProhibitedThe Federal Water Pollution Control Act prohibits the discharge of oil or oily waste into or upon the navigable waters of the United States, or the waters of the contiguous zone, or which may affect natural resources belonging to, appertaining to, or under the exclusive management authority of the United States, if such discharge causes a film or discoloration of the surface of the water or causes a sludge or emulsion beneath the surface of the water. Violators are subject to substantial civil penalties and/or criminal sanctions including fines and imprisonment.”

Oldwarning-placardsmaybeleftinplace,butnewonesshouldbeaddedandallcrewmembersshouldbeinformedthatthetimeofamaximumUSD5,000fineisnowhistory.Thereshouldbenoexcusefornotusingthenewplacard,asitmaybeobtainedeasilythroughshiphandlers.

Some good advice1. AcopyofMARPOL73/78shouldbekeptonboard.

Thecrewmembersshouldbemadefullyawareoftheregulations.

2. EnsurethevesselhasavalidIOPPcertificateatalltimes.3. TheOilRecordBookmustbecorrectlyfilledin.Port

Stateinspectorswillinspectthebookandmaycheckthevessel’ssludgetanks.Ifthevesselhasnosludgeonboardandhasnorecordofdelivery,theMasterandChiefEngineerarelikelytobefined.

4. Theoilywaterseparatorinstalledonboardmustbeofanapprovedtypeandfunctionwell.

5. Theoilcontentmeter,themonitoringdeviceandthealarm/automatic-stoppingdevicemustfunctioncorrectly.

6. Whenpurchasingasecondhandvessel,visuallycheckalllinesfromsludgeandoilybilgewatertankstoverifythatnooilybilgewaterlineorsludgelinemaydischargedirectlyoverboard.Ifonesuch

The overboard valve for clean water discharge from the separator. The pipe from the left leads to the main engine sump tank and to the oily bilge water tank.

connectionisfound,removeitimmediately.Ifindoubt,consultthevessel’sClassificationSociety.

7. Theplacardwithwarningagainstthedischargeofoil overboard must reflect the true penalty situation facedbythecrewandoperator.

8. Reducetheoilleakagestothebilgesbycollectingoilindriptraysandguttersleadingtoawasteoiltank.Besurethedrainpipesfromtheguttersarenotcloggedbydepositsandrags.

9. Oilsludgefromengineroomsisnottobepumpedoverboard.Ifnotdisposedofinanincinerator,theoil must be contained on board until discharged to shore-basedreceptionfacilities.

P&I CoverMembersshouldbeawarethatRule47oftheAssociationsRulesdoesnotincludecoverfortheMember’sliabilityforfinesresultingfromnon-compliancewiththeprovisionscontainedinMARPOL73/78.

Footnotes1.ItseemstobelessknownthatthesameActallowedfinesuptoUSD250,000fordischargesbeingaresultofnegligenceorwilfulmisconduct.2.ThefineiscomposedofamandatorycivilpenaltyforuptoUSD25,000perdayofviolationorUSD1,000perbarreldischarged,andafurtherUSD25,000adayorthreetimesthecostsincurredbytheOilSpillLiabilityTrustFund,forfailingtocleanup.Twoyearsimprisonmentforanegligentviolationmayoccurifitisthesecondorsubsequentoffence.3.“Knowing”requiresonlygeneralintent,notspecificintenttoviolatethelaw.



Oily water separation and discharge: Risk of oil pollution versus vessel’s safety

IntroductionAspartofouroveralllosspreventionactivities,GardServicesregularlymonitorsportStatedetentionsfromtheParisMemorandumofUnderstanding(MoU),TokyoMoUandUnitedStatesCoastGuard(USCG).In2000,therewasatotalof131detentionsofshipsenteredintheGardP&Iportfolio.Oilywaterseparationanddischargerelateditemswerethesinglemostfrequentdeficiencycited.SimilarresultswerealsoobservedinthedetentionofvesselsenteredintheGardMarineportfoliofor2000(147detentionsandthesecondmostciteddeficiency).Wearenotsatisfiedwiththesefigures.Asaresult,webelieveitisnecessarytorevisitthisissueforGardServicesMembersandClients.

Thearticle“Dischargeofoilprohibited”,whichappearedinGardNewsissueNo.152(December1998/February1999)(alsoreproducedasGardLossPreventionCircular07-01)warnedagainsttheimplicationsofpumpingoilandoilybilgewateroverboard,andwasfollowedbyanotherarticleonthesametopicinGardNewsissueNo.155(September1999/November1999),titled“Riskofoilpollutionversusvessel’ssafety”.Thepresentcircularcontainsasummaryofthatsecondarticle,whichwehopewillassistMembersandClientsinstayingvigilantinlightofthepotentialcostsassociatedwithanincident,fines,portStatedetentionsandthesafetyimplicationsrelatedtooilywaterseparationanddischarge.

Environmental and safety mattersDuringconditionsurveysofvessels,theAssociationnormallynotesthatMastersandChiefEngineersenforceastrictpolicyregardingpumpingofbilgewater,inordertoavoidanyoilspill.PortStatecontrolofficersinspectengineroompipelinesandoilywaterseparatingequipmenttoensurecompliancewiththeMARPOLregulations.Finesanddetentionsarenotpopular.Toguardagainstaccidentallypumpingoverboardengineroombilgewaterwhichhasnotbeencleaned,shipsidevalvesaresometimeschainedandpadlockedorlinesareevenblindflanged,allinanefforttoreducetheriskofanoilspill.Attimes,suchremediesarerequestedbyportStatecontrolofficers,andarewillinglyinstalledbytheship’screw.

Oily water separatorAlleffortstoavoidpollutingtheseasandcoastalareasareappreciated,ofcourse,butitshouldbenotedthatthereis also an overriding issue involved: the safety of the vessel inanemergencysituation.Incaseofwateringressandfloodingoftheengineroomorthecargoholds,thevesselneedsafullyworkingandreadilyoperationalbilgepumpingsystem.Therefore,theoverboardconnectionsfromthebilgepumpshouldnotbeblockedbylockedhandwheels,blankflangesorbyremovedspoolpipes.ItshouldbenotedthatSOLAS,ChapterII-1,Regulation21,aswellasrelevantClassrules,requireavesseltobeequippedwithabilgepumpingsystem that should be operational under all practical conditions.Incaseofasuddenfloodingoftheengineroom,thebilgepumpingsystemmustbeabletobestartedwithoutunduedelay.

SoisthereaproblemincomplyingwithbothMARPOLandSOLAS?Notreally,ifonekeepsinmindthattheMARPOL73/78regulationsaremeantfornon-emergencyoperational

Oily water separator.

situations.InAnnexIofMARPOL73/78,Regulation9dealswiththecontrolofoildischargeandRegulation10coversmethodsforpreventionofoilpollutionfromshipswithinaspecialarea,butRegulation11providesexceptionsfromboth,inthecaseofanemergency.TheexceptionsunderRegulation11arethefollowing:“Regulation9and10shallnot apply to:

Oily water separator (a) thedischargeintotheseaofoiloroilymixturenecessary

for the purpose of securing the safety of a ship or saving lifeatsea;or

(b) thedischargeintotheseaofoiloroilymixtureresultingfromdamagetoashiporitsequipment:(i) providedthatallreasonableprecautionshave

been taken after the occurrence of the damage or discovery of the discharge for the purpose of preventingorminimisingthedischarge;and

(ii) exceptiftheownerorthemasteractedeitherwithintenttocausedamage,orrecklesslyandwithknowledgethatdamagewouldprobablyresult;or

(c) thedischargeintotheseaofsubstancescontainingoil,approvedbytheAdministration,whenbeingusedforthepurposeofcombatingspecificpollutionincidentsinordertominimisethedamagefrompollution.Anysuchdischargeshallbesubjecttotheapprovalofany

62


Governmentinwhosejurisdictionitiscontemplatedthedischargewilloccur.”

Overboardlineforcleanedbilgewaterfromtheoilywaterseparator.Thehandwheelhasbeenchainlockedbythevessel’sChiefEngineerattherequestofportStatecontrolauthorities.Asealhasalsobeenfittedtothechain.

InviewofRegulation11,MARPOLandSOLASarenotinconflictwitheachotheranditisimportantthatallauthoritiesinspectingavesselforcompliancewithMARPOLunderstandthis.Blockingtheoverboardpipefromthemainbilgepumpsshouldneverbedone,asthiswouldseriouslyaffectthesafetyofthevesselandwouldbeinconflictwithSOLASandClassrequirements.IntheinterestofthecoastalStates,attimesportStatecontrolofficersseemtopaymoreattentiontotheMARPOLregulationsthantothecorrespondingSOLASregulations.Aconflictofinterestmayoccurwhenthebilgepumpofavesselisalsousedforballastwaterandinsomecasesevenforemptyingasumptank.Oilremainsinthepipelinemaynotbelargeinquantity,butwillputharbour authorities on full alert if inadvertently pumped overboardwithballastwater.InsomesuchcasesportStateauthoritieshaverequiredblanksinsertedinthepipelineorthelockingofvalvehandles.Thismaysecureagainstoilpollution,butaspointedout,mayreducethesafetyoftheshipinanemergencysituation.

Ontheotherhand,thereshouldbenoexcuseforpumpingoiloverboardthroughpumpsservingadualpurpose.Itshouldalwaysbeensuredthatallpipelines,whetherusedforcleanbilgeorballastwater,arefreefromoilcontaminationprior to using the bilge/ballast pumps for direct overboard discharge.Suchverificationshouldbeincludedintheoperationalprocedures.

Itshouldalsoalwaysbecleartoavessel’screwthatsludgetanks,wasteoiltanksandoildraintanksarenotallowedtohaveanydirectconnectionoverboard(MARPOL37/78AnnexI,Regulation17(3))andthatthecontentofsuchtanksmust be discharged to reception facilities ashore through thestandarddischargeconnectionrequired(MARPOL37/78AnnexI,Regulation19),ifnotdisposedofinanincineratoronboard.Ifrequiredbyharbourauthorities,pipelinesfromsuchtanksmaybeclosedofftopreventoilpollution,butnottheoverboardpipelinefromthemainbilgepump.

IncaseMembersfaceconflictingrequirementsfromvariousauthoritiesconcerningtheissuesaddressedabove,theyshouldalwaysconsultthevessel’sClassSociety,whichhasapprovedthevessel’sbilgepumpingsystemandnormallyhasalsoissuedtheInternationalOilPollutionPreventionCertificate.Inanycase,allchangestoavessel’sbilgesystemshouldalwaysbeinformedinadvancetothevessel’sClassSociety,forproperapproval.

Overboard line for cleaned bilge water from the oily water separator. The hand wheel has been chain locked by the vessel’s Chief Engineer at the request of port State control authorities. A seal has also been fitted to the chain.


63


Look after your back during manual work

BackgroundEveryyear,seafarersareinjuredthroughincorrectlylifting,carryingandpullingloads.Backinjuriesareoneofthemostcommontypesofinjuriessufferedbyships’crewandcan have serious implications for both the seafarer and theshipowner.Aninjuredseafarermayfindthathisabilitytodohisjobisaffectedandthathislifestyleingeneralmayhavetochange.Shipownersontheotherhandmayhavetobearsubstantialcostswhenaninjuredseafarerisunabletoperformhisdutiesonboard.Sincemostbackinjuriesarepreventable,primarilybytheuseofproperliftingtechniques,thepurposeofthiscircularistoremindshipownersandcrewoftheimportanceofadheringtothe proper instructions for lifting and manual handling of loads-regardlessofthetypeofworkandthetimescheduleinvolvedineachparticulartask.

Gard’s experienceCrewclaimsinGardarethoseclaimsoriginatingfromillness,injuryordeathamongstships’crew.AreviewofallsuchcrewclaimsregisteredwithGardoverthelast10yearsshowsthatcrewinjuriesmakeupquiteasubstantialpartofallGard’sP&Iclaimscosts.Overthisperiod,closeto10%ofGard’stotalP&Iclaimscostsweregeneratedbycrewinjuresalone.Furthermore,backinjuryisbyfarthemostexpensiveinjurytype,representingsome25%ofallofGard’screwinjuryclaimscosts.Areviewoftheinjurycasesregisteredasoccurringinaspecificlocationonboardindicatesthatalmosthalfofallbackinjuriesoccurduringworkondeckorintheengineroom.Itisnotpossibletoconcludethattheageofthecrewmembersinvolvedinbackinjurycasesisacontributingfactor.

InoneofthecaseshandledbyGard,aseafarercomplainedofpaininhislowerback,radiatingtohislowerextremities,afteraworkoperationinvolvingliftingofthegangway.Ashissymptomspersisted,adoctoronshorewasconsultedandtheseafarerwasmedicatedandrepatriatedtohishomecountryforfurtherevaluationandtreatment.Theseafarer’sdisabilitygradewasassessedtobehighand,astheinjuryappearedtohaveincurredduringhisworkonboard,hewasgivena100%disabilitycompensation.Thetablebelowpresents costs that potentially can be involved in any back injurycase.Therecanalsobeadditionalcostsnotlisted,e.g.related to possible voyage deviations and/or legal fees in caseofdisputes.

Worthnoticingisthatthecostofeachelementmayvarydramaticallybetweendifferentgeographicallocations,e.g.medicalexpensesintheU.S.caneasilyamounttoUSD200,000inasinglecaseandevenhigherifhospitalintensivecareisrequiredasdailyhospitalratesintheU.S.canbeoftheorderofUSD25,000.EarlynotificationbyMembersisparticularly important in cases involving medical costs in the U.S.asthiswillallowGardtoevaluatethecaseandmakearrangements for proper medical case management services andvettingofmedicalbills.

Back injuries - contributing factorsSomeofthemostcommoncontributingfactorstoacutebackinjuryrelatetobadbodymechanics,inotherwords,howwelift,push,pull,orcarryobjects;poorphysicalcondition;poordesignofjoborworkstation;heavyliftingand/orpoorunderfootsurfacessuchasslipperyfloors.Itcanbeparticularlychallengingtocarryoutmanualworktasksinasafemanneronboardships.Shipscanbequitehazardousworkingenvironmentsandharshweatherconditionsandmovements of the ship are factors that must be taken intoaccount.Deckscanalsobeextremelyslipperywhencontinuouslywashedbythesea.Anotherchallengerelatedtoshipoperationsistime.Withtimebeingacriticalfactor,crewmaysometimesfeelpressuredtotakeshort-cutsanduseunsafeworkingpracticestoachievetheplannedsailingschedule.

The operation of a ship naturally involves a lot of physical activityandliftingofheavyloadsbycrewmembersandtheconsequencesmaybeagradualdevelopmentofabackdisorderovertime.Signsofapotentiallyseriousinjuryareoftenignoredbecausethepainisperceivedas“normal”andbearable.Therefore,whileanacutebackinjurymayappeartohavebeencausedbyasinglewell-definedincident,weakeningofthemusculoskeletalsupportmechanismthroughyearsofincorrectworkingactivitiesisinsteadtherealcauseoftheinjury.

Employer and worker dutiesHealthandsafetyonboardshipsisregulatedbythelawsofeach flag state and an important document in this respect is theILO’sMaritimeLabourConvention(MLC)whichwillenterintoforceinAugust2013.Regulation4.3oftheMLCdealswithhealthandsafetyprotectionandaccidentpreventionbutdoesnotspecifydetails.InsteadtheMLCstipulateswhatshouldbeaddressedbytheflagstates’regulations.Variousinternationalandnationalstandardsdefinetheacceptablelevelsofexposuretoworkplacehazardsaswellashowtodevelopandputintopracticeaship’soccupationalhealthpolicy.1

Itisimportanttoemphasizethatshipownershaveadutytoputsuchregulationsintopracticebutthateachcrewmemberhasanobligationtocomplywiththespecificstandardsandpoliciesapplicableonboardtheirship.Crewmembersmusttakereasonablecareoftheirownhealthandsafety and that of others on board that may be affected by their activities and must immediately report incidents and near-missestotheappropriateofficer.

Typicalcosts(USD)involvedinanon-invasivebackinjurycase

Repatriation 1,000

P&Icorrespondent 9,000

Substitute 3,000

Medicalexpenses 17,000

Sickwages 5,000

Disability compensation 130,000

Totalcost(USD): 165,000

64


Recommendations – prevention of back injuriesFortunately,mostflagstatesandshipownerstakeprideinprovidingtheirseafarerswithgoodworkingconditions.However,withtheentryintoforceoftheMLCin2013,Gard’sMembers and clients have a clear regulatory responsibility toensurethatthecrew’sworkenvironmentonboardshipspromotesoccupationalhealthandsafety.Mostoccupationalaccidentsandbackinjuriesoccurwhilstperformingdailyroutine duties and preventive measures should therefore focusonworkplaceinstructionsforallimportantfunctionson board and not only for high risk tasks such as mooring or repairworkinenginerooms.Itisrecommendedto:

Regularlyassesstherisksassociatedwitheachworktaskandimproveproceduresandequipmentifnecessary.Liftingandworkequipmentprovidedmustbesuitableforitsintendeduse.

Planjobstoeliminateorminimisetheneedforworktobeperformedinawkwardpositions.

Customisetrainingforeachworkgroup.Includebasicinstructions in anatomy and focus on the risk factors associatedwithpoorbodypositioning.

Drawattentiontothecorrectmethodsofbending,liftingand carrying at every opportunity such as during safety meetingsand“toolboxtalks”.Awarenesspostersandinstructionsalongwithgraphicillustrationsofmanualhandlingtechniquesshouldbepostedatimportantlocationsonboard.2

Stresstheimportanceofteamwork.Workwithapartnertoshare a load and obtain mechanical assistance for heavy and/oroversizedloadswhennecessary.

Encourageearlyreportingofsymptomssuchasneckor

backpains.Ifindividualswithreducedrobustnesscanbedetected,acutebackinjuriescanbepreventedbeforetheycanhappen.Earlyreportingcanoftenmakethedifferencebetweenarelativelyshorttreatmentandrecoveryperiodandlongtermpermanentdisability.

Promoteexercise!Awell-tonedbodycantakeunexpectedstresses or strains better than one suffering from lack of exercise.

Gard’sstatisticaldataindicatethatbackinjuriesaloneaccountforasignificantamountofhumansuffering,lossofproductivity,andeconomicburdenoncompensationsystems in the maritime industry and clearly demonstrate that personnel health and safety is of utmost importance onboardaship.Byprovidingasafeandsecureworkingenvironmentonboard,includingopportunitiesfortraining,shipownerscanfacilitatethepossibilityforeachindividualworkingonboardtotakecareoftheirownandfellowcrew’spersonnelsafety.

Footnotes1ExamplesofstandardsaretheILOcodeofpractice“Accidentpreventiononboardshipsatseaandinport”andtheUKMCA’s“CodeofSafeworkingPracticesforMerchantSeamen(COSWP)”.2SeesampleillustrationsincludedinanAnnextoUKMCA’sCOSWPCh.19“ManualHandling”.


65


Malaria and dengue - precautions to be taken

BackgroundManyoftheworld’smosquitospeciescantransmitanumberofdiseasesofwhichmalariaanddenguearethemost common today and the ones most likely to affect seafarers.Fromtimetotime,Gardisnotifiedofcaseswhereseafarersfallillfromsuchdiseases,sometimeswithseriousconsequencesasmanyofthemosquito-transmitteddiseasescanbefatal.Fallingillfarawayfromhomecanbeaverydifficultsituationfortheseafarerandhis/herfamilyandachallengefortheremainingcrewandtheshipoperator.Acrewmemberunabletoperformhis/herdutiesduetoillnessmayneedtobesentashore;thevesselmayhavetodeviate from its original voyage plan in order to disembark thepatientanditwillbenecessarytofindreplacementcrewatshortnotice.

Thepurposeofthiscircularistoincreaseawarenessamongst seafarers and to describe the risks and precautions tobetakenwhencallingatportsinmalariaanddengue-affectedareas.Itisalsoimportantthatshipownersandoperatorsarealwaysawareofthesituationintheportscalledatbytheirvessels,thattheyassessthechangingrisksand facilitate implementation of the necessary preventive measuresonboard.

Key facts about malaria and dengueMalariaisnotanewconcernforseafarersbutaccordingtothe“WorldMalariaReport2011”,theestimatedincidence

ofmalariagloballyhas,fortunately,declinedby17%since2000andmalariamortalityrateshavedroppedby26%.Incontrast,theglobalincidenceofdenguehasgrowndramaticallyinrecentdecadesandaccordingtotheWorldHealthOrganization(WHO),abouthalfoftheworld’spopulationisnowatrisk.

Useful sources of informationTheriskofbeinginfectedwithmalariaordenguemayvarywithinasinglecountryandwiththeseasons.Itisthereforeimportanttocheckthecurrentofficialadviceeverytimeavesselisdestinedforareaswherethereisapotentialriskofmosquito-transmitteddiseases.Linkstosomeoftherecommendedsourcesofofficialadvicearefoundbelow.

TheWorldHealthOrganisation(WHO,www.who.int),isthedirectingandco-ordinatingauthorityforhealthwithintheUnitedNationssystemandtheirwebsitecoversbothmalariaanddengueaspartoftheirhealthtopics(malaria:www.who.int/topics/malaria;dengue:www.who.int/topics/dengue).

TheUnitedStatesCentersforDiseaseControlandPrevention(CDC,www.cdc.gov),isoneofthemajoroperatingcomponentsoftheUSDepartmentofHealthandHumanServicesandprovidesgeneralhealthinformationtothepublic.Dedicatedpagesonmalariaanddenguealsoincludelinkstointeractive“healthmaps”thatcanbeused as a guide for the assessment of malaria and dengue

MalariaSource:WHOFactsheetN°94,April2012

Dengue/SevereDengueSource:WHOFactsheetN°117,January2012

Cause Causedbyaparasite.Therearefoursub-typesofparasitesandthemostdangeroussub-type(PlasmodiumFalciparum)isfoundmainlyintropicalAfrica.

Causedbyaviralinfection.

Transmission Transmittedtohumansbythebiteofthe‘malariamosquito’(Anopheles)whichisactivemainlybetweenduskanddawn.

Transmitted to humans by the bite of the Aedesmosquitowhich,incontrasttothemalariamosquito,isactivealsoduringdaytime.

Incidence Mostmalariacasesanddeathsoccurinsub-SaharanAfrica;however,Asia,LatinAmericaandtoalesserextenttheMiddleEastandpartsofEuropearealsoaffected.

Dengueisfoundintropicalandsub-tropicalclimatesworldwide,mostlyinurbanandsemi-urbanareas.Dengueisendemicinmorethan100countriesinAfrica,theAmericas,theEasternMediterranean,South-eastAsiaandtheWesternPacific,thelattertworegionsbeingthemostseriouslyaffected.

Symptoms Likeregularinfluenza:fever,headache,chillsandvomiting.Ifnottreatedwithin24hours,themostseriousformofmalaria(Falciparum)canprogresstosevereillnessoftenleadingtodeath.

Likeseriousinfluenzaormalaria:highfever,headache,musclepainandpossiblyrash.‘Severedengue’isapotentiallydeadlycomplicationduetoplasmaleaking,fluidaccumulation,respiratorydistress,severebleeding,ororganimpairment.

Incubationperiod Symptomstypicallyappear7daysormore,usually10–15days,aftertheinfectivemosquitobite.

Symptomstypicallyappear4–10daysaftertheinfectivemosquitobite.Signsofseveredenguetypicallyappearsome3–7daysafterthefirstsymptoms.

Prevention Avoidmosquitobites.Inhighriskareas,antimalarialdrugsshouldbetaken.Novaccineisavailable.

Avoidmosquitobites.Novaccineisavailable.

66


riskthroughouttheworld(malaria:www.cdc.gov/malaria/;dengue:www.cdc.gov/dengue/).

Inaddition,safetyalertsconcerningseasonaloutbreaksofthediseasesmaybepublishedonnationalgovernments’“safetravel”websites,e.g.,bynationalMinistriesofForeignAffairsorHealthMinistries.Relevantinformationcouldalsobe obtained from medical doctors and local vaccination offices.

Recommended precautionsAlthoughthebestprotectionagainstmosquito-transmitteddiseases is to avoid being bitten during a stay in malaria and dengueaffectedareas,measuresimplementedpriortoandafter a stay in such areas can also contribute to reducing the riskofcrewmembersbecomingseriouslyill.Thefollowingguidelines should be considered:

Priortoastayinmalariaanddengueaffectedareas:•Evaluateriskintheportstobevisitedandrememberthattheriskofbeinginfectedwithmalariaordenguevariesbetweendifferentareaswithinacountry.Assessthelengthofstayinknownriskareas,timespentatsea,inport,onrivers,etc.,andplannedshoreleavesbythecrew.•ContinuouslymonitortheWHOwebsiteandsimilarsourcesforofficialadviceasthetypesofdiseasesexpectedwithincertainareasmaychangewiththeseasons.Contactamedicalpractitionerifindoubt.•Informthecrewabouttherisksandtheprecautionstobetakenaswellasactionstobetakenifillnessoccursatsea.Stressthataslightheadache,feverandflu-likesymptomsarealwaysreasonsforcontactingthemedicalofficer.•Evaluate,incloseco-operationwithamedicaldoctorandbasedonthevessel’sexpectedexposuretimeinariskarea,ifthecrewshouldtakeanantimalarialdrug.

During a stay in malaria and dengue affected areas:•Implementmeasurestoavoidmosquitobites:-wearprotectiveclothingwhenoutdoors,e.g.long-sleevedshirts,longtrouserstuckedintosocksandahatifthin-haired,andbearinmindthatdengue-carryingmosquitosareactiveduringdaytime;-useeffectiveinsectrepellentsonskinandonclothingandreapplyatregularintervalsasprescribed;-stayinair-conditionedscreenedareaswhenindoors;and-arrangeforundamaged,impregnatedbed-netstobeusedinsleepingareasnotproperlyscreenedorair-conditioned.•Ifcrewmembersaretakingantimalarialdrugs,implementa method of control to ensure they take the medication at theprescribedtimes,e.g.,viaalogbook.

Afterastayinmalariaanddengueaffectedareas:•Seekmedicaladviceovertheradioifmalariaordengueissuspectedonboard.Normallythevesselisinportonlyforashorttimeandwillmostprobablybebackatseawhensymptomsarenoticedduetoanincubationperiodofseveraldays.•Placethepatientundercloseobservationandundertaketherequiredon-boardtreatment,preferablyincloseco-operationwithamedicaldoctor.Evacuationmaybetheonlysolutionifthepatient’sconditiondoesnotimprovedespitetheproperon-boardtreatment.

Inordertocreateasenseofsafetyonboardtheirvesselswhennavigatinginregionswithahighriskofmalaria,dengueorothermosquito-transmitteddiseases,Membersandclientsareadvisedto,asfaraspracticable,tailormaketheirownstrategiesfordealingwiththerisk.Theaboveguidelines,aswellasadviceonpreventivemeasurespublishedbyotherofficialsources,liketheWHO,shouldbetakenintoaccount.


67


The impact of diet on performance and health

additional effort for those involved and can in an already criticalsituationfurtherendangerthecrewmembers.

Recommendations for meals onboardFood habits vary a lot across the globe and the type of food served on board a vessel depends on the geographical locationofthevessel,accesstofreshingredientsandthenationalities,culturesandreligiousbeliefsofthecrew.Itisthereforedifficulttogiveauniversalpracticalguidetohealthyeatingonboardallvesselsbut,ingeneral,ahealthyandnutritiousdietmustconsistofaselectionoffoodthat,incombination,providesthebodywiththenutrientsitneeds:proteins,carbohydratesandfatsaswellasaselectionofvitaminsandminerals.Abalanceddietforseafarersmustalsotakeintoaccountthefactthatsomeoftheworkperformedonboardcanbeextremelyphysicallydemanding.

Avarieddietisimportantandasgeneraladvice,hotandcold meals onboard should primarily be based on the followingbasicingredients:

Breakfastcerealslowinfatandsugar,buthighinfibre

Foodsfullofsugarsandfatsbutwithoutimportantnutrients,e.g.sugarysoftdrinks,cakes,biscuitsandsimilaritems,should only constitute a small part of the food selection onboard.Toohighanintakeofsuchfoodswillreplacetheintake of other healthy foods and/or be in addition to such foodswhichwouldleadtotoohighanenergyintake.

Animportantpartofahealthydietistoencouragegoodmealtimeroutines,i.e.theintakeoffoodandenergyshouldbeevenlyspreadthroughouttheday.Theadvantagesaremany:improvedconcentration,fewerhungerpangsbetweenmeals,moreenergyandabilitytowork,stablebloodsugarlevelsand,notleast,abettermood.

Summary and adviceItisvitalforthehealthandwellbeingofthecrewandthesafetyofthevesselthatindividualcrewmemberslookaftertheir bodies to reduce the potential for illness and chronic disease but also to stay alert and thereby promote onboard safety.Thecrewonboardwilldependonhavingagoodvariety of foods available to be able select a healthy diet andthefollowingadviceshouldbeconsideredbyGard’sMembersandClients:

BackgroundOvertheyearsGardhasseenthatthemedicalstatus‘notfitforduty’andrepatriationsduetoillnesshaveincreasedinfrequency.Workingatseainvolveslongshiftsofphysicallychallengingworkandfrequenthighlevelsofstress.Tocopewiththeirworksituationandmanagetheirdaytodayroutine,seafarersmustmaintainboththeirmentalandphysicalhealth.

Anutritiousdietisconsideredtobeoneofmanyfactorsinfluencinganindividual’smentalandphysicalhealth;regularexercise,adequaterestandsleep,goodhygiene,protectionfromworkplacechemicalsandnoise,andapositiveworkclimateingeneralarealsoimportant.However,manychronicdiseasesdevelopasadirectconsequenceofpooreatinghabits,particularlywhereobesityisinvolved.Althoughconditionedbybackgroundandgeography,obesity is generally recognised as an increasing problem amongseafarers.In2010,theInternationalMaritimeMedicalAssociation(IMMA)warnedthat“seafarerhealthmustbemade a priority to tackle the rising tide of obesity among seafarers”,whiletheInternationalCommitteeonSeafarers’Welfare(ICSW)feature“OverweightPrevention”asaseparatetopicintheirHealthInformationProgramme.TheIMO’sInternationalLife-SavingAppliances(LSA)Codehasalsoupdatedtherequirementsforlife-savingappliancestoreflectanincreaseinaveragebodymass.

The purpose of this circular is to highlight the importance ofahealthyselectionoffoodonboardvessels,primarilyasa means of reducing the potential for illness and chronic diseasesdevelopingamongstthecrew,butalsotokeepthecrewalertandtherebypromotesafetyonboard.

Potential consequences of poor eating habitsPooreatinghabitscanleadtolackofsleep,digestiveproblems,depressionanddifficultyinstayingawakeandalertwhilstonduty.Thesecanalsoleadtoobesity,diabetes2andheartproblemsinthelongerterm.Ifaseafarerbecomesillhemaybeunabletoperformhisduties,mayhavetobeabsentfromthevessel,andtheremaybedelaysordiversions,costlymedicalclaims,repatriationfees,possiblelitigationandsettlementcosts.Tofallillfarawayfromhomecanalsobeaverydifficultsituationfortheseafarerhimselfandhisfamily.

Theconnectionbetweenfatigueandnutritionaldeficiencyiswellknownandeatinghabitsmaythereforeindirectlyhaveanimpactonthevessels’safetyandworkperformanceingeneral.Humanerrorisoftenseenasthecauseofaccidentsandmaytypicallyberelatedtopoorjudgment,misunderstandings,communicationfailures,andfailuretofollowprescribedstandards–allofwhichmaybelinkedtothecrew’sabilitytoconcentrateandperformworktasksoveranylengthoftime.

Wehavealsoseenotherconsequencesofpoorphysicalconditionandobesity.Itiscrucialthatthecrewonboardavesselisabletoactquicklyinanemergencysituationanditmaybecomeasafetyissueifcrewmembersstrugglewithemergencyresponseandrescueoperationssuchassearchingsmoke-filledareas,enteringconfinedspacesordonningsurvivalsuitsinanevacuation.Rescueofoverweightpeoplefromtheseaorusingastretcheronboardwillrequire

Basicingredientsforhealthyfoodoptions

Breakfastcerealslowinfatandsugar,buthighinfibre

Wholemealbreads

Vegetable oil based products,e.g.forsandwichspreads

Brownriceandwholemealpasta

Fish,shellfish,poultryandotherlowfatmeatandcoldcuts

Nuts and seeds

Lowfatdairyproducts(milk,cheese,yoghurt,etc.)

Fruit,vegetablesandberries

Lowfatsaladdressingsandsauces

Fruitjuiceswithoutaddedsugar

Coldandcleandrinkingwatershouldbereadilyavailableonboard

68


•Shipownersshouldcarefullyplanandbudgetforsuppliesof fresh ingredients to ensure variation in the food offered onboard.Ahealthymenuisnotnecessarilymoreexpensivethananunhealthyone.

•Withrespecttomealsonboard:-goodmealtimeroutinesareimportanttoensureanevenintakeofenergythroughouttheday;-healthyfoodoptionsshouldbeavailableatallmealsandhealthydrinksandsnacksshouldbeavailablebetweenmeals;and-safedrinkingwatershouldbereadilyavailableatalltimes,especiallyforcrewperformingworkinhotenvironmentssuchastheengineroom.

•Seafarersengagedasship’scooksmustbetrained,qualifiedandcompetentforthepositionandshouldalsobeinvolvedinthemealplanningprocess.

•Everycrewmemberhasaparttoplayinestablishingahealthyfood“culture”onboardand,assuch,thecrewmustbe given the necessary information and training in healthy nutrition.

Inotherwords,theshipownershouldtakeresponsibilityforprovidinginformation,creatinghealthyeatinghabitsandensuringthatthereisalwaysgood,healthyandsafefoodavailabletothepeopleonboard.Wheretheshipownerencouragesandfacilitatesahealthylifestyle,thepeopleonboardmaybetterlookaftertheirownmentalandphysicalhealth.

WewouldliketothankMonaKleivenatVolvatMedicalCentreinNorwayforherassistanceinthepreparationofthiscircular.


69


Dangers to crew during in-transit fumigation of cargoBackgroundAfumigantisachemicalwhichundercertainconditionswillenteragaseousstateandinsufficientconcentrationswillbelethaltopestorganisms.Fumigantsarecommonlyused for killing insects in bulk cargoes like grain and other cereal products but are also used for cargoes like cocoa in bags,timberandforplantsandfoodstuffinsidecontainers.Intheolddaysfumigationwouldtakeplacewiththevesselinportandwiththecrewstayingashore,buttodayin-transitfumigationisthemostcommonpractice.In-transitfumigation is very convenient for the shippers but poses a certainrisktothecrewmembersonboard,asthegasescanalsobedeadlytohumans,eveninverylowconcentrations.

OvertheyearsGardhasseenmanycaseswherecrewmembershavebeenexposedtodangerousconcentrationsoffumigantgases,someendinginfatalitiesandothersendangeringtheentirecrew.ThepurposeofthiscircularisthereforetoalertMembersandClientstotherisksinvolved,andtheirresponsibilityforthesafetyoftheircrew,whencarryingoutin-transitfumigationofcargoholds.

Fumigation in generalHydrogenphosphide(PH3),commonlycalled“phosphine”,isnowthemostcommonfumigantinusefordisinfestationofdryplantproductsloadedinbulk.Phosphineisrelativelyeasy to handle as it is manufactured in a solid formulation ofeithermagnesiumoraluminiumphosphide,oftenintheshapeoftablets.Thesetabletsarespread,usingvariousmethods,withinthecargoorontopofitandwillreactwhenincontactwithmoisture.Thehydrogenphosphidegasesreleasedareheavierthanairandareefficientinkillinginsectswithin,forinstance,abulkcargoofgrain.Themostfavourable conditions for the complete release of phosphine fromthetabletsareintropicalandsubtropicalclimates,wherefourtofivedaysaresufficient.Incolderclimatesorinverydryatmospheres,moretimeisneeded,insomecasesmorethanamonth.

Fumigation must be carried out by a professional fumigator whosejobstartsbyinspectingthevessel,togetherwithtrainedrepresentativesoftheMaster,todecidewhetherthevesselissuitableforfumigation.Itmustbepossibletomakecargoholdssufficientlygastighttopreventleakageofthefumiganttothevessel’saccommodationarea,engineroomsandotherworkingspaces.Verysmallcorrodedholesmay act as sources of leaks of fumigant gases and can cause gastoseepintospacesoccupiedbythecrew.Inoldervesselsitisthereforeimperativethatallboundariesbetweencargoholdsandlivingquartersandenclosedworkspacesarethoroughlyexamined.Ventilators,conductpipesforelectricalcables,rubbersealsandotherdeckandbulkheadpenetrationsshouldbegivenparticularattention.Engineroomventilationsystemsmayhavesufficientexchangeofairtopreventanybuild-upofdangerousconcentrationsofgases,butpeoplewithintheaccommodationareascanbemoreexposed,especiallyifextractionfansfrombathroomsandtoiletsareinusecreatingaslightunder-pressure.

Fumigation in transit should be carried out in accordance withstrictproceduresandonlyatthediscretionoftheMaster.TheIMOhasissuedrecommendationsonhowtocarryoutfumigations,“Recommendationsonthesafeuseofpesticidesinships”,andwerefertoMSC.1Circ.1358

forgeneralrecommendationsandtoMSC.1Circ.1264andMSC.1Circ.1361forsafetyrecommendationsrelatedtofumigationofcargoholdsandcargotransportunits,respectively.Thefumigator,thevessel’smanagementandtheMasterandstaffonboardmustbefullyfamiliarwiththeIMOrecommendationswhenestablishingaprocedureforhowthefumigationistobecarriedoutandtheprocedureshouldbefollowedtotheletter. Thevesselmustbeequippedwithadequaterespiratoryprotectiveequipmentandgasdetectionequipment;however,itisimportanttobeawareoftheequipment’sshortcomings.Respiratoryprotectionequipmentnormallyconsistsofgasmaskswithasupplyoffilters,butgasmasksmayleakandfiltersneedtobeoftherighttypeandbereplacedonaregularbasis.Individualswhounderstandthe dangers of phosphine gas are likely to prefer breathing apparatuswithairbottlesiftheyhavetoenteraspacecontaininggas,astheoverpressureintheairsupplywillpreventgasleakingthroughthemask.Itisimportanttoemphasize,however,thatentryintoaspaceunderfumigationshouldnevertakeplaceexceptintheeventofanextremeemergency.

Withrespecttodetectionequipmentmadeavailableonboard,itisimportantthatthecrewhassufficientknowledgeofhowtousetheequipment.Gasconcentrationsafety checks should be carried out at regular intervals throughoutthevoyageandasaminimumevery8hourasrequiredbytheIMOatallappropriatelocations(accommodationarea,engineroomsandotherworkingspaces).Readingsshouldberecordedintheship’slogbook.Apermanentlyinstalledgasdetectorwithanalarmintheaccommodationareawouldlowertherisksthecrewmembersareexposedto,butsuchinstallationsarenotcommononboardships.Warningsignsshouldbeprominentlydisplayedinrelevantareasonboard.

Potential consequences for the crewTheIMOdocumentsmentionedabovelistthesymptomsofinhalationofphosphinegasesas“nausea,vomiting,headache,weakness,fainting,chestpain,cough,chesttightnessanddifficultybreathing”.Ifsomeoneonboardavesselcarryingcargounderfumigationbecomesill,itis important to consider that the person may suffer from poisoningbythetoxicfumigantgas.Therearecasesofcrewmembers thought to have been suffering from seasickness orfoodpoisoningandtoldtogotobed,nevertowakeupagain.Ifthereisagasleakintotheaccommodationarea,theworstplacetostaycouldbethecabins.Thereisnoantidotetophosphinepoisoning.Treatmentconsistsofsupportofrespiratoryandcardiovascularfunctions.Inanemergencyonboardashipitisimportanttogetthevictimsintofreshair.

Summary and recommendationsFumigation of cargo for killing insects is normally carried out withtheuseofgasesthataretoxicanddeadlytohumans.Asin-transitfumigationisthemostcommonpracticetoday,MembersandClientsshouldbeawareoftherisksinvolvedandcarefullyplantheoperationtopreventcrewbeingexposedtothetoxicgases.

70


•Fumigationmustonlybecarriedoutbyaprofessionalfumigator.SpecificproceduresforthefumigationoperationmustbeestablishedandmustbeapprovedbytheMaster.IMO’s“Recommendationsonthesafeuseofpesticidesinships”mustbeadheredto,includingaformalwrittenhandover of the responsibility for maintaining safe conditionsonboardfromthefumigatortotheMaster.

•Theshipshouldbeinspectedpriortothefumigationtodeterminewhetheritissuitableforfumigation.Allboundariesbetweenthevessel’scargoholdsandaccommodationareas,engineroomsandotherworkingspaces must be inspected to ensure that there are no openings that can act as sources of leaks of fumigant gases andcausegastoseepintospacesoccupiedbythecrew.

•Adequaterespiratoryprotectiveequipmentandgasdetectionequipmentmustbeavailableonboardandthecrewshouldbewelltrainedinhowtousethespecificequipment.Warningsignsshouldbedisplayedinrelevantareas and gas concentration safety checks performed at regularintervalsduringthevoyage.

•Incaseofillnessamongcrewmembersduringfumigationoperationsonemustneverexcludethepossibility that the individuals may be suffering from poisoningbythetoxicfumigantgas.

More information on the risks involved in fumigation on boardshipscanbefoundinGardNewsno.204andno.173.Fortheproblemoftoxicgasesincontainers,werecommendthehandbookontoxicgasesandvapoursincargo“Don’tgetcaughtbysurprise”byDonaldSuidman(editor),FeicoHouwelingandJacquesBonewit,whichcanbefoundonwebpagewww.tgav.info.


71


Review and new approval of lifeboat hooks

BackgroundOn-loadreleasehooksinlifeboatsbecamemandatoryinshipsbuiltafter1July1986andhaveledtomanyaccidentsduringlifeboatexercises.Deathsandseriousinjurieshaveresulted from these accidents and Gard has played a role in asking for improved hook designs and a solution to the problem.

In2001aprocessstartedattheIMOtoimprovethesafetyoflifeboatswithon-loadreleasehooks,andatthemeetingoftheIMOMaritimeSafetyCommitteeinMay2011(MSC89)newrequirementswereintroduced.

ThepurposeofthisCircularistoremindourMembersandclientsofthenewrequirements,andoftheneedtoactwithinthedeadlinesgiven.

NewrequirementsforreleaseandretrievalsystemsThenewrequirementsarefoundinIMOCircularMSC.1/Circ.1392,”Guidelinesforevaluationandreplacementoflifeboatreleaseandretrievalsystems”(availableonlineathttp://www5.imo.org/SharePoint/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=30629&filename=1392.pdf).InthenewIMOtextsthewording“on-loadrelease”isnotused,thetermnowbeing“ReleaseandRetrievalSystem”,comprisingthehookassemblyandtheoperatingmechanism.AllexistingReleaseandRetrievalSystemshavetobereviewedandtestedagainstthenewrequirementsnotlaterthan1July2013.Systemswhichdonotcomplywiththenewrequirementswillhavetobereplacedormodifiednotlaterthanthefirstscheduleddrydockingafter1July2014,butnotlaterthan1July2019.Amendmentstothe1974SOLASConventionbyanewRegulationIII/1.5willenterintoforceon1January2013,aswillamendmentstotheLSACode,byarevisedChapterIV.

Evaluation process for existing lifeboatsMSC.1/Circ.1392containsaflowchartfortheevaluationprocessforexistinglifeboatReleaseandRetrievalSystems,whichstartswithaself-assessmentandapossibledesignmodificationbythemanufacturer.Themanufacturerhasthentosubmittheself-assessmenttogetherwiththenecessarydocumentationtotheAdministration,beingtheflagadministration(s)ora“recognisedorganisation”,normallyoneoftheinternationalclasssocieties.IftheAdministration’sdesignreviewispositive,aperformancetestwitnessedbytheAdministrationmustbecarriedoutbythemanufacturer.Finally,ifthemanufacturerobtainsanapprovalforhishooksystem,thereisanon-boardverificationofthesystemtobecarriedoutforeverylifeboat.This“overhaulexamination”istobecarriedoutnotlaterthanthefirstscheduleddrydockingafter1July2014,byarepresentativeofthemanufacturer.SeeAnnex1tothe“Measurestopreventaccidentswithlifeboats”,MSC.1/Circ.1206/Rev.1.

HooksystemswhichdonotpasstheevaluationandtestwillbereportedtotheIMObytheAdministrationandsuchhooksystemswillhavetobereplacedinalllifeboats.

Forashipowner,theprocesswillstartbyestablishingexactlythe type of hook systems in use in the lifeboats on his ships and then contacting the manufacturers of the lifeboats to checktheapprovalsituation.Thehooksystemsmaynothave been produced by the manufacturer of the lifeboats and there may be different types of hooks in boats by the

samemanufacturer,dependingonyearofproduction,etc.”Type”isdefinedinMSC.1/Circ.1392as“anidenticallifeboatreleaseandretrievalsystemofgivensafeworkingload,makeandmodel(thusanychangetothematerialsofconstruction,designarrangementordimensionsconstitutesachangeoftype)”.Bearinginmindtheabovedefinitionof“type”,somemanufacturersofolderhooksmayovertheyearshaveproducedmore“types”thantheymaybeaware.

RecommendationsItistodayuncertainhowquicklymanufacturerswillbeabletoobtainthenewapprovalsoftheirvarioushooksystemsandthenumberofhooksthatwillhavetobereplaced.Inordertoavoidcongestion,werecommendMembersandclientstocommencetheprocesswithoutdelay.

Ifhookshavetobereplaced,therewillbeavarietyofnewhookstochoosefrom.

Itwouldbeaconsiderableadvantagetotheseamenifanownerusedthesametypeofhooksystemonboardallhisships.Itwouldgreatlyreducetherisksofaccidentsifallseamenwerebettertrainedandfullyunderstoodtheworkingofthehooksystemtheyaretooperate.

Whenreplacingthehooksysteminanexistinglifeboat,theoriginal“typeapproval”ofthelifeboat/hookassemblyisbreached.MSC.1/Circ.1392pointstothisin“Procedureforreplacementofnon-compliantlifeboatreleaseandretrievalsystems”.Theregulatorsappeartopreferthatnewhooksareselectedincooperationwiththeoriginalmanufacturerofthelifeboat,butmayalsoaccepthooksystemsbyanothermaker.TheretrofittinghastobeapprovedbytheAdministration.Itisassumedthattheseapprovalsinmostinstanceswillbeundertakenbytheclasssocieties.

72



Refugees and migrants rescued at sea

The1982UnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSeaandthe1974InternationalConventionfortheSafetyofLifeatSea(SOLAS)placeadutyoneveryshipmastertorenderassistancetoanypersonindistressatsea,irrespectiveoftheirnationality,statusorthecircumstancesinwhichtheyarefound.Thisisalongstandingmaritimetraditionandthe obligation has been enshrined in international and humanitarianlawthroughtheseinternationalconventions.

This loss prevention circular aims to provide a summary of someoftheprocedurestofollowshouldthevesselfinditselfinarescuesituation.

Planning and executing the rescueTheMastershouldrefertoproceduresintheEmergencyContingencyPlanandthevessel’sSSPwhenencounteringrefugeesatsea.Oncerefugeeshavebeenspottedatseathefollowingactionsshouldbetaken.• Contactthenearestand/orresponsibleRescueCo-

ordinationCentre(RCC),and,ifneeded,nearbyshipswhomaybeabletoassistyou.ClarifywhethertheRCChasanyguidelinesfortherescueoperation.

• Establishaplanfortherescuepriortoitscommencement.Thisplanshouldalsoincludeanysafetyand/orsecurityissues.

• Assessthesafetyofthecrewandpassengersshouldpersonsbroughtonboardbecomeaggressiveorviolent.Aseachrefugee/migrantisbroughtonboard,heorsheshouldbesearchedandanyweaponsordangerousobjectsconfiscated.

• Thecrewshouldobtainasmuchpersonaldatafromeachindividualaspossible.

• Establishwhetheroneoftherefugeesisabletocommunicateinacommonlyunderstoodlanguage.Appointoneoftherefugeestomanagethegroupandbetheirspokesperson.

• Toavoidthepotentialspreadofdiseaseorsicknessonboardthevessel,considerusingglovesandotherpersonalprotectionequipment.

Treatment of people rescued at sea – health and safety concernsTheshipmastershoulddoeverythingpossible,withinthecapabilitiesandlimitationsoftheship,totreatthesurvivorshumanelyandtomeettheirimmediateneeds.• Considerwhetherthevesselhassufficientfoodand

provisionsonboardforthecrewandrefugees,aswellasmedicalequipmentshoulditbeneeded.Ifnot,stepsshouldbetakenimmediatelytorectifythesituation.

• Providesufficientaccommodationonboard.Setasideaprotectedareafortherefugeestostay,includingblanketsandbeds.

• Provideforthebasichumanneedsoftherefugees(food,water,shelterormedicalneeds).Establishwhetheranymember of the refugees needs immediate medical assistance.Seekmedicaladvicefromashoreifnecessary.

• Ifpossible,informthesurvivorsofyourintentionsandtheirarrivalataplaceofsafetywheretherescueoperationareconsideredtoterminateonshore.

NotificationTheMastershouldinformtheCompany,theRCCandtheP&Iinsurerofthepresenceofrefugeesonboard.IfitisnotpossibletocontacttheRCCresponsiblefortheareawheretherefugeeswererecovered,attemptsshouldbemadetocontactanotherRCCoranyotherGovernmentauthoritythatmaybeabletoassist.• ContacttheCompanytoadvisethemofthesituationas

wellasyourintentions.• ContacttheP&IClubforfurtheradvice.• InformtheRCCresponsiblefortheregionofthe

conditionsonboard,assistanceneededandactionstakenor planned for the disembarkation:

• Nameoftheship,flagandportofregistry.• Nameandaddressoftheowner’sagentatthenextport.• Positionofthevessel,nextintendedportofcall,

continuingsafetyandcurrentstatuswithadditionalpersonsonboard.

• Numberofrefugeesonboard,name,age(ifpossible),gender.

• Apparenthealth,medicalconditionandspecialmedicalneeds.

• ActionscompletedorintendedtobetakenbytheMaster.

• Master’spreferredarrangementfordisembarkingthepersonsrescued.

• Anyhelpneededbytheassistingship,duringoraftertherecoveryoperation.

• Anyotherfactors(e.g.prevailingweather,timesensitivecargo,etc.).

DisembarkationThe coastal states are obliged to assist the Master in the disembarkationprocess.Onceadecisionhasbeenmadetolandtherefugees,thefollowingactionsshouldbetaken:• InformtheCompany’sagentandthecorrespondentin

theportofdisembarkation.• ComplywithanyrequirementsoftheGovernment

responsiblefortheSARregionwherethesurvivorswererecovered,andseekadditionalguidancefromthoseauthoritieswheredifficultiesariseincomplyingwithsuchrequirements.

• Disembarkationofrefugeesandasylumseekersrecoveredatseainterritorieswheretheirlivesandfreedomwouldbethreatenedshouldbeavoided.

• Forthetypeofevidencetobecollected,seeGARDGuidancetoMasters,para3.13.4.

Ifthepeoplerescuedatseaclaimasylum,alerttheclosestRCCandcontacttheUNCHR.


73


Lifeboat launches during abandon ship drills

Lifeboataccidentscontinuetooccurduringlifeboatdrillsonboardship.

Inanefforttominimisetherisktotheseafarerstakingpartinsuchdrills,theIMO’sMaritimeSafetyCommitteehasdecidedtoclarifytheapplicationofSOLASregulationIII/19.3.3.3whichgovernsthelaunchoflifeboatsduringabandonshipdrills.

Theregulationrequireseachlifeboattobelaunchedandmanoeuvredinthewaterbyitsassignedoperatingcrewatleastonceeverythreemonthsduringanabandonshipdrill.However,CircularMSC.1/Circ.1326statesthatalthoughtheregulationrequiresthelifeboattobelaunchedandmanoeuvredaspreviouslyindicated,itdoesnotrequirethattheassignedoperatingcrewbeonboardthelifeboatwhenitislaunched.

TheCommitteehasthereforeagreedthattheassignedoperatingcrewisnotrequiredtobeonboardthelifeboatduringlaunching,unlesstheMaster,havingtakenintoaccountallsafetyaspectsandinaccordancewiththeauthorityconferredtohimbyparagraph5.5oftheISMCodeconsidersthelifeboatshouldbelaunchedwiththeassignedoperatingcrewonboard.

Duringtheperiod1Septemberto30November2009thePortStateControl(PSC)regionsofParisMOUandTokyoMOUwilllaunchaConcentratedInspectionCampaign(CIC)onlifeboats.ThePSCoftheregionsofIndianOceanMOUandBlackSeaMOUwillalsoparticipate. TheclarificationprovidedinMSCcircular1326shouldalsobeobservedbyPortStateControlofficersinvolvedintheCIConlifeboats. Gard’sgeneraladvicetoMembersisthatcrewmembersshould not be on board the lifeboats in the course of loweringandhoistingduringexercises,untiltheIMOhasprovideddetailednewrequirementsforsafeon-loadreleasehooks,anduntilexistinghookshavebeencertifiedtocomplywithsuchnewrequirements.

GardalsoreferstoLossPreventionCircularno.02-08:Lifeboataccidentsduringdrills,issuedinFebruary2008whichprovidesgeneraladviceonhowtodealwiththisproblemonboard.

74



United States – Responsibility for stevedores

IntroductionGard continues to see stevedore incidents occurring during loadinganddischargeoperationsintheUnitedStates.ThiscircularhighlightsthedutiesowedbytheshiptothestevedoresunderUSlaw.

Legal ResponsibilitiesTheLongshoreandHarborWorkersCompensationAct(LHWCA)placesprimaryresponsibilityforthelongshoreman’ssafetyonthestevedoringcompanyasemployer.However,theUSSupremeCourtinthecaseofScindiaSteamShipNavigationCo.v.DeLosSantos,451U.S.156,1981AMC601(1981)hasheldthattheshipownermaybecomelegallyliableifhedoesnotexerciseduecaretowardsthestevedoreswhileonboardhisvessel.

Thedutyofcarecanbesplitintothefollowingfivedutieswhichthevesselowesthestevedores:

1. Turnover Duty of Condition:Thevesselmustexercise”ordinarycareunderthecircumstancestohavetheshipanditsequipmentinsuchconditionthatanexpertandexperiencedstevedorewillbeable,bytheexerciseofreasonablecare,tocarryonitscargooperationswithreasonablesafetytopersonsandproperty.”

2. Turnover Duty to Warn:Thevesselmustwarnthestevedoreofanyhazardsontheshiporwithrespecttoitsequipmentthatareknowntothevesselorshouldhavebeenknowntoitintheexerciseofreasonablecare,thatwouldlikelybeencounteredbythestevedoreinthecourseofhiscargooperations,andthatarenotknownbythestevedoreandwouldnotbeobvioustooranticipatedby him if reasonably competent in the performance of his work.

3. Active Involvement Duty: The vessel may be liable if it actively involves itself in the cargo operations and negligentlyinjuresalongshoreman.

4. Active Control Duty:Thevesselmaybeliable”ifitfailstoexerciseduecaretoavoidexposinglongshorementoharmfromhazardstheymayencounterinareas,orfromequipment,undertheactivecontrolofthevesselduringthestevedoreoperation.”e.g.thegangway.

5. Duty to Intervene:Ifastevedore’sjudgmentis”obviouslyimprovident”,andiftheship”knewofthedefect”inequipment,andthestevedorecontinuestousethedefectiveequipment,andtheshipshouldhaverealisedthattheuseofthedefectiveequipmentpresentedan”unreasonableriskofharmtothelongshoreman,”thevesselhasadutytointerveneandhavetheequipmentrepaired.

RecommendationsEnsurethatyourQualityManagementSystemsandSafetyManualslistthefivedutiesofcare.Theyshouldalsobedistributedtotheseniordeckofficers.

Inspectandtestanyequipmenttobeusedbythestevedorepriortoturnover.

HaveawalkthroughwiththestevedoreforemanandChiefMatebeforeoperationsbeginandattheendofoperations.Promptlyaddressanyproblemsorunsafesituationsunderthevessel’scontrolthatareuncovered.

Useasign-offsheettoshowthatthestevedoresaresatisfiedwiththeconditionofthevesselpriortohandover.

Thedeckofficerondutyshouldperformfrequentroundsonthevesselduringthecargooperations.Notesshouldbetakenandincludedinthedecklogbook.

Thedeckofficershouldcarryadigitalcameraandtakepicturesofanythingamiss.

Haveanalertandwelltrainedgangwaywatchmakingnoteofanyunusualactivity.Keepagangwaylogwhichaccuratelyrecords the name and employer of all persons on and off the vessel.

Notifythestevedoringcompany,inwritingifpossible,ofanydangerousworkpracticesobservedduringthecargooperation.

Ineveryinstanceofastevedorealleginginjurytheincidentshould be promptly reported to Gard so that a proper investigation can be undertaken to protect the interests ofthevesselandmitigateanypotentiallosses,ifpossiblebeforetheshipsailsandachangeofcrewhastakenplace.


75


Lifeboat accidents with on-load release hooks

Forthelast20years,accidentsduringmandatorylifeboatdrills have been an ongoing issue in the discussions of the safetyofseafarers.Thiscircularprovidesgeneraladviceonhowtodealwiththisproblemonboard.

BackgroundThelifeboataccidentsareassociatedwiththeon-loadreleasefunctionsofthelifeboathookswhicharemandatoryunderIMOregulationsforallshipsbuiltafter1June1986.Onshipsbuiltbeforethisdatetherearegenerallyoff-loadhooks that cannot be released unless the lifeboat is fully supportedbythewater.

The number of accidents and the number of people killed or injuredrunsintothehundreds.However,therearenoofficialrecords for the total numbers and the lack of such records maybeoneofthereasonswhytheregulatorshavenotmanagedtochangethesituation.Theendresultisreducedconfidenceindavitlaunchedlifeboats.

Gardhaswarnedabouttheon-loadreleaseaccidentsformanyyearsandhostedaconferenceinOctober2007todiscusstheseaccidentswithrepresentativesofflagstates,lifeboatmanufacturers,P&IClubs,classsocietiesandvariousotherinternationalorganisationsattending.Forthepurposesofthisconference,wereviewedGard’slossesover

theyears1992-2007.Atotalof37accidents,resultingin13peoplekilledand87injuredhadbeenregisteredduringthisperiod.Inaddition,therewillalsohavebeenlifeboatsaccidentswithoutinjuriestopersonnelandthusnotresultinginnotificationtotheP&Iclub.

During2007,Gardregisteredtwoaccidentsresultingin1deathand6peoplebeinginjured.Comparedtoothertypes of accidents on board ships and in relation to the 6,200vesselsenteredwithGard,onemayconsiderthesefigureslow.Thedilemmais,however,thattheaccidentswithlifeboatsdonotoccurinnormalworksituationsonboard,butduringmandatorydrillswiththevessel’slifesavingequipment.Duetothemanyaccidentswithlifeboats,IMOregulationsnolongerrequirepeopletobeonboardthelifeboatsduringloweringandhoisting.Thecrewmemberscanbeplacedintothelifeboatsbyothermeansafterlaunch,suchaslifeboatladdersortaxi-boatsinport.

Accidentswithon-loadreleasehooksarefoundtooccurduetolackofmaintenance,lackofknowledgeorpoordesign.WhencomplyingwiththeIMOrequirementsforhookstohavebothoffloadandon-loadcapability,ithasproveddifficulttodesignsufficientbarriersagainsttheeffectsofpoormaintenanceandhumanerror.

76


General adviceDuetotheincreasedattentiontotheproblemofon-loadreleasehooks,wehavereceivedmanyquestionsfromMembersaboutwhattodo.WhileGardcannotrecommendonemanufactureroveranother,wewillinthefollowingattempttoprovidesomegeneraladvice.

1.Itisveryimportanttoknowthetypeofhookreleasesystemwhichisinstalledonyourlifeboats.Whileitwouldbe natural in a shore based industry to have such an importantitemstandardised,theGardConferencelastautumnrevealedthattherewere72differentsystemsinuse,andthenumberisstillgrowing.

2.Ensureyouhaveclearandcorrectmanualsandinstructionsabouthowtohandlethehookreleasesystemon board and that such material is made available to thecrew.Ensurethatanyonewhooperatesthelifeboatreleasegearhasbeentrainedonthatparticularsystem.

3.Donotallowanyonenottrainedintheoperationofyourvessel’sparticularhooksystemtooperateit.Ifyourcrewisnottrainedintheoperationofthesystem,sendthemforspecifictrainingoraskaspecialistinthatparticularsystemtoconducttrainingonboard.Uptillnow,mostseamenhaveonlyreceivedmandatoryshore-basedtraininginthe launching of lifeboats during their education and very rarelyanytrainingontheexacttypeofreleasegearfoundonboard.

4.Giveprioritytothemaintenanceoflifeboats.Usestronghanging off pendants to secure the boat to the davit arm beforeanyworkisdoneonthehookreleasesystem.Forinstance,theAustralianMaritimeSafetyAuthority(AMSA)nowrequiressuchrestraintstobepresentbeforetheirsurveyorscanenteralifeboat.Forthemaintenanceofhookreleasesystems,engageservicepeoplefromorapprovedbythemanufacturer.

5.Donothaveanypeopleonboardthelifeboatduringloweringandhoisting,unlessyouknowyourhookreleasesystemiswellmaintainedandthatthecrewonboardboth understands the mechanisms of the system and the risksrepresentedbyhumanerror.TheIMOregulationsrequirethehooksystemtobecapableofreleasingtheboatwiththetotalloadofboat,equipmentandafullcrew.However,iftheboatisreleasedbeforereachingsealevel,peopleonboardmaybeseriouslyinjuredorevenkilled.

6.Free-falllifeboatsshouldbeconsideredfornewbuildings.Ifdavitlaunchedlifeboatsareselected,reviewthehookrelease systems available in the market and insist on the safestsystemavailable.

SummaryAlothasbeenlearnedfrom20yearsofaccidents,andtherearetodayon-loadreleasehooksinthemarketwhicharefarsaferthanthefirstgenerationofhooks.Wesuggestthattheoldhooksystemsarereplacedwithnewimproveddesigns.

Sincelifeboatswithmodernon-loadreleasehooksystemsare still capable of being accidently released before they

areloweredonthewater,Gardstronglyrecommendsthatallownersandshipmanagersaddressthisissuewithintheirrespectivecompaniesandensurethatadequatetrainingisprovidedtothecrewonthespecifichooksystemswithintheirfleet.

TheIMOSub-committeeonDesignandEquipmentisdiscussingtheproblemoflifeboataccidentsandwillbemeetinginBonnon18February2008.Itishopedthatthisimportantmeetingwillresultinnewregulationstoreducethenumberofaccidentsandinjuriesoccurring.


77


Accidents involving crew and stevedores during cargo operationsFatalorseriousaccidentscaneasilyoccurwhencrewandstevedoresstandontopofmovingobjectsduringcargooperations.Regrettably,thisiswide-spreadbehaviour,particularlyduringliftingoperationsinvolvingcontainers,thoughitisnotunknownforpersonneltostandontopofgangwaysorbasketsduringloadinganddischarging.Thisisclearlyahazardouspracticesincethecranewirecansnap,hookscancomeloose,andotherfactorscancausethesuspendedobjecttofallormove.

GardP&Ihasbeennotifiedofseveralcasesinvolvingsuchpractices,resultinginfatalitiesorseriousinjuriesandhighliabilityexposure-particularlyintheUS.

Recent casesLIFTINGCONTAINERSAfatalaccidentoccurredataportinThailandduringdischargeofemptycontainers.Thevessel’scranewasbeingusedtogetherwithamanuallyoperatedspreader.Twostevedoreswerepositionedontopofthecontainertolock/unlockthecontainerspreaderwhenlifting,andthenagainwhenthecontainerhadbeendischarged.Whilethestevedoreswerestandingonthecontainer6to7metersabovethewharf,therunnerbroke,andthecontainerfellontothewharfseriouslyinjuringthestevedores,oneofthemhassubsequentlydied.

LIFTINGAGANGWAYAvesselwasunderrepairinaUSdockyard.Ashipyardworkerwasstandingonagangwaythatwasbeingliftedontothevessel,whenthecranewirebroke.Thegangwayandyardworkerfelldowntotheground.Theyardworkerwasseriouslyinjuredanddiedseveralmonthslaterwithoutregainingconsciousness.TheclaimwassettledintheUSforaverysignificantamountofmoney.

LIFTINGABASKETAtaportinGermany,twostevedoreswerepositionedinabaskettobeliftedonboardthevessel.Thehooksattachedtothebasketloosenedandthebasketfelldownontothe

wharf.Oneofthestevedoreswaskilledandtheotherwasseriouslyinjured.

RecommendationsMembers are recommended to introduce instructions on boardtheirvesselsregulatingthisbehaviour.Crewmembersand stevedores should be clearly advised of company policy andproceduresregardingthispractice.Ifstevedoresfailtocomply,awrittenprotestshouldbeissuedandsenttothestevedoringcompanyinordertoprotecttheshipownerincaseofaccident.

78



Master’s Responsibility for Safety of Surveyors

IntroductionArecentjudgmentoftheHighCourtoftheHongKongSpecialAdministrativeRegionhighlightedtheresponsibilityofMastersforthesafetyofsurveyorsboardingtheirvessel.The dangers of entering enclosed spaces have previously beenhighlightedinGardNews154andintheGard Guidance to Masters,paragraph2.8.5.7(seetheGuidancetoMastersontheGardServiceswebsiteatwww.gard.no).Nevertheless,surveyorscanbeatriskwhilstperformingsurveys aboard ship and every effort should be made to preventtheirinjuryordeath.Thiscircularhighlightsthisand particular steps that should be taken by a Master to protectsurveyors.AmoredetailedreportofthiscaseandassociateddecisionappearsinGardNews167.

The course of eventsAbulkcarrierenteredwithanInternationalGroupP&IClub(notAssuranceforeningenGard)calledattheportofChiwan,Chinain1997todischargeacargoofbulksoyabeans.Theshipownersappointedasurveycompany(‘theSurveyCompany’)tocheckthecondition,qualityandquantityofthecargoandthesealsoftheholds,forthepurposeofprotectingthemagainstpossibleclaimsbythecargoownersfordamageorshortdelivery.TheSurveyCompanywasbasedinHongKongandoneoftheirmarinesurveyors(‘theSurveyor’)attendedonboardduringafternoonfollowingthevessel’sarrival.TheMasterofferedhimtheassistanceofthevessel’sChiefOfficertocarryouthisinspectionbuttheSurveyoradvisedthatthiswasnotnecessaryandthatheonlyneededthehelpofanAssistantBosun.TheMasterthereforedelegatedthedutyABtoaccompanytheSurveyor.

ThehatchcoversoftheNo1holdwereopenedandtheSurveyorwasobservedtakingphotographsofthecargoinsidetheholdfromthedeck.ThehatchcoversoftheNo1holdwerethenclosed.ThehatchcoversoftheNos2and3holdswereopenedandtheSurveyorwasobservedtaking photographs of the cargo inside these holds from the deck.Followingthisinspectionthehatchcoversoftheseholdswereleftopen.ThedutyABthenadvisedtheMasterbyportableradiothatheandtheSurveyorwouldbetaking

samplesfromtheforwardholds.Therewerenowitnessestowhattranspiredthereafter.

At4:00pmthatafternoontherewasachangeofwatchwiththeChiefOfficerandadifferentABtakingover.Some20minuteslatertheChiefOfficeradvisedtheMasterthattherelievingABhadnotbeenabletolocatethedutyABwhentakingoverthewatch.TheMasterorderedthecrewtosearchfortheSurveyorandthedutyAB.ShortlythereaftertheSurveyorandthedutyABwereobservedlyingatthefoot of the ladder leading to the access hatch of the No 1 hold.Bothofthemhaddiedasaresultofoxygendepletion.

The judgment on this caseFollowingtheaccident,theadministratorsoftheestateoftheSurveyorinstitutedproceedingsintheHighCourtoftheHongKongSpecialAdministrativeRegionagainsttheSurveyCompany,astheemployersoftheSurveyor,for breach of the contract of employment and negligence andagainsttheshipownersandbareboatcharterersofthevessel(‘theShipowners’)forbreachofstatutorydutyundertheOccupiers’LiabilityOrdinanceandnegligence.TheShipownersbeforetrialsettledtheclaimoftheadministratorsandthejudgmentwasconcernedonlywiththeapportionmentofliabilitybetweentheSurveyCompanyasemployers,theSurveyor(contributorynegligence)andtheShipowners.

Althoughtherewasnodirectevidenceofthis,theassumptionwasthattheSurveyorhadrequestedthedutyABtogodownintoNo1holdfirstinordertoobtainsamplesandthat,afterthedutyABhadcollapsedduetooxygendepletion,theSurveyorhadfollowedthedutyABintotheholdandsufferedasimilarfate.ItisunlikelythattheSurveyorwasthefirstonetoentertheholdas,ifhehaddonesoandhadcollapsed,thedutyAB,whowasinpossessionofaportableradio,wouldmostprobablyhavereportedtheincidenttothebridge.

TheevidencewasthattheSurveyorhad14yearsexperienceatseafollowedby6yearsworkingasamarinesurveyorfortheSurveyCompany.HeheldanumberofCertificatesofCompetency,includingaCertificateofCompetencyasChiefOfficerandatransitionalCertificateofCompetencyasMaster.ThelatterdocumentwasissuedbyPanamaandmostoftheotherdocumentswereissuedbyLiberia.NoevidencewasproducedoftheexaminationssatandpassedbytheSurveyortoobtaintheseCertificatesofCompetency.TheevidenceoftheSurveyCompanywasthattheSurveyorhad carried out numerous surveys on their behalf based on whichtheyweresatisfiedastohiscompetence.

ThecourtfoundthatitwasnotsufficientmerelyfortheSurveyCompanytorelyontheCertificatesofCompetencyproducedbytheSurveyorasevidenceoftraining.Theyshouldhavedonemoretoensurethathewaskeptuptodatewithinformationaboutdangersonboardship,wasfullyawareofsuchdangersandknewhowtodealwiththem.

AsfortheSurveyorhimself,thecourtfoundthathemusthavebeenawareofthedangersofenteringenclosedspaces,particularlywhendealingwithcargoessuchassoyabeansthatcauseoxygendepletion,andhewas


79

thereforetosomeextenttheauthorofhisownmisfortune.NotwithstandingthesefindingsagainstboththeSurveyCompanyandtheSurveyor,thecourtapportionedtheirdegree of blame for the accident at only 30 per cent and 20 percentrespectively.

AharshercriterionwasappliedtotheconductoftheMasterwhowasfoundtobe50percenttoblame.Thecourtstarted from the premise that the Master is in overall charge of the vessel and responsible for the safety of all persons on board,includinglawfulvisitors.Therelevantsafetycodesprovidedforaplannedentryintoanyenclosedspacewithacompetentofficerorotherpersonappointedspecificallyforthatoperation.Therewasnosuchoperationplannedinthiscase.ThefactthattheMasterhadofferedtheservicesoftheChiefOfficerwhosepresencemighthaveavoidedtheaccident,andthattheSurveyorrejectedthisoffer,didnotdetractfromtheoverridingresponsibilityoftheMaster.

ThemostimportantfindingofthecourtwasonthequestionofwhethertheMasterwasentitledtoassumethattheSurveyorwasqualifiedandcompetenttocarryoutthetasksexpectedofhimandtofollowsafetyprocedures,inparticularthoserelatingtoentryintoenclosedspaces.ThecourtheldthattheMasterwasnotinpossessionofsufficientinformationtomakeadecisionabouttheabilityoftheSurveyortodealwithanydangeroussituationthatmightarise.TheMastercouldmakenoassumptionsinthisrespect.

ThisjudgmentconfirmsthegeneraltrendofcourtseverywheretoimposemoreresponsibilityontheMaster.ShipownersandMastersshouldbeguidedaccordingly.

RecommendationsItsclearlyimpracticalfortheMastertocheckthequalificationsandtrainingofeverysurveyorwhocomeson board his vessel and satisfy himself that the surveyor is competenttocarryoutthetasksexpectedandfollowsafetyprocedures.TheMastershouldmakenoassumptionsaboutthequalificationsandtrainingofasurveyornomatterhowexperiencedasurveyormayappearorclaimtobe.Insomecaseshemaynotevenholdthequalificationclaimed.Therefore:(1) wheneverpossible,theMastershouldinsiston

surveyors being accompanied at all times by a deck or engineroomofficer,dependingonthetypeofsurvey.

(2) beforecommencementofthesurvey,thescopeofthesurveyandaplantodealwithanypotentiallydangeroussituations,suchasenteringenclosedspaces,shouldbeagreedwiththesurveyorandtheappropriatesafetyequipmentprovided.

Whilstshipownershavenocontroloverthechoiceofsurveyorsappointedbycharterers,cargointerestsandotherthirdpartiestoattendonboardtheirvessel,thesameisnottrueofsurveyorsappointedbytheP&IClub,thehull&machineryinsurersortheircorrespondents.Therefore,itisrecommended that:

(3) beforeselectingasurveycompanytoperformworkonbehalfofMembersorinsureds,correspondentsshould ascertain from that survey company not only

thequalificationsandexperienceoftheirstaffbutalsowhatongoingin-servicesafetytrainingisprovided.

(4) thesafetycultureofasurveycompanyshouldbeoneof the criteria applied by correspondents in deciding whichsurveycompanytoappoint.Itisnotsufficientmerely that surveyors have in the past undergone trainingassuchmattersneedconstantreminders.Itshouldberequestedofthecorrespondenttoascertainthisinformationfromsurveycompanies.

80



Flooding of cargo holds on container vessels

IntroductionApproximatelyonethirdofallGard’sP&Iclaimsassociatedwithcontainervesselsarecargo-related.Typesofsuchclaimsvarybutgenerallyinvolveshortage,deterioration(e.g.offoodstuff),physicaldamage,wetdamageorlossoverboard.Gardhasrecentlyseenanincreaseinthenumberofwetdamage cases resulting from flooding incidents in the cargo holds;incidentswhichhavethepotentialtogiverisetosubstantialclaims.Thepurposeofthiscircularistoreviewthe main causes of such flooding incidents and to increase awarenessonmeasurestopreventsimilarincidentsinfuture.

IncidentsInonecase,avesseldevelopedanunexpectedlisthalfanhourintoballasting,whichwasthenstopped.Thecargoholdswerecheckedimmediatelybutnothingwrongwasfound.Ballastingwasresumedandcompletedsomehourslater.Itwasonlythenthatfloodingwasdetectedinoneoftheholds.Some20containerswereimmersedinseveralmetresofballastwater.Followingcleaningoperationsitwasdiscoveredthatballasthadleakedthroughamanholecover.Thisincidentgaverisetosignificantcargoclaims.

Inanotherballastingcaseacrackedvalveintheballasttanksystemcausedleakageintothecargohold.Theleakagewasonlydetectedduringsoundingofthecargoholdsmanyhoursaftertheballastoperationwasstarted.Floodingoftheholdaffectednumerouscontainers,againgivingrisetosignificantcargoclaims.

Causes of floodingAstheaboveincidentssuggest,floodingofcargoholdsmostcommonlyoccursduringballastoperations.Inthecaseconcerningthemanholecover,cleaningworkwithinthe ballast tank had been completed immediately prior to loadingandthemanholecoverwasnotclosed/tightenedproperly.Othercaseshaveinvolvedcracksinbulkheadstoadjacentballasttanks,corrosiononballasttankventpipesordefectivenon-returnvalves.Itcanalsobesaidthatacontributingcausetofloodingandcertainlytotheextent/impact of flooding is the delayed detection of the flooding whichmaybeduetoinadequatemonitoringroutinesoramalfunctioninthecargoholdbilgealarmsystem.

Prevention•Checksshouldbemadetoensurethatballastwaterisflowingintothedesignatedtankandtoensurethatballasting is stopped in a timely fashion in order not to over pressuriseoroverflowballasttanks.

•Checksshouldalsobemadetoensurethatballastwaterisnotleakingintoanyothertankorintoacargoholdthroughaleakingmanholecover.

•Ballasttanksfittedwithautomaticsoundinggaugesshould be regularly fully tested for accuracy of monitoring systems.Spotchecks/manualsoundingsshouldbetakentoensureaccuracyofthegauges.

•Cargoholdbilgealarmsandgaugesshouldberegularlyinspected,maintainedandtested.Evenifthevesselisfittedwithcargoholdbilgealarmsandautomatedsoundinggauges,thesecannotalwaysbereliedontofunctionproperlyandspotchecksshouldthereforebemadewithmanualsoundings.Itisalsoprudenttoundertakeregularvisualinspectionofthecargospaces.Theeffectivenessofthenon-returnvalvesforbilgeejectorsystemsshouldalsoberegularlytestedandverified.

•Allmanholecovers(ballast,fueletc.)incargoholdsshould be regularly inspected and properly closed/tightened aftereverytankinspection.


81


Prevention of soya bean cargo claims

BackgroundMostsoyabeancargoesaresafelycarriedinbulk,withminimaldeteriorationinquality.However,fromtimetotimesuchcargoesaredamagedduringthecourseofavoyage,resultingindegradingorotherlossinquality.Soyabeansare considered a valuable commodity and it is not unusual to seesubstantialcargoclaimsbeingmadeagainstthecarrier–evenwhereinherentviceisrecognisedasthemostprobablecauseofthedamage.1 The purpose of this circular is thereforetoraiseawarenessofthemainriskfactorsinvolvedin the carriage of soya beans and to stress the importanceof securing evidence of the carriage conditions to defend expensiveclaims.

Inherent cargo conditions affecting safe carriageThemainfactorsaffectingthequalityofsoyabeansinbulk during storage and carriage are moisture content (MC),temperatureanddurationofstorage.Unlesstheseparametersarecontrolled,theconsequencesmaybeexcessivegrowthoffungi/mouldandheatdamage.

Duringstorage,moisturewithinthesoyabeansreachesequilibriumwiththesurroundingair,i.e.,theairintheinterstitialspacesbetweenthebeans.Forsafestorageofsoyabeans,theinterstitialairequilibriumrelativehumidity(ERH)mustgenerallybebelow70%.Belowthislevelmostmicrobesaredormantandgrowthoffungiwillberestricted.TheidealwouldthereforebetomaintaintheenvironmentinwhichsoyabeansarestoredatanERHbelow70%atalltimes.However,astheventilationsystemsforcargoholdsonbulkcarrierscannotensureanenvironmentally-controlledatmosphere,thecargo’sMCatthetimeofloadingnormallyserves as an important parameter for determining the potentialforcargodeteriorationduringavoyage.A13%MCiscommonlyassumedtoconstitutetheupwardlimitforsafecarriageofsoyabeans.Belowthislimit,theriskofdeteriorationofthecargowhileonboardisconsideredtobelow.ButtheequilibriumMCforsoyabeansisnotaconstantvalue.Soyabeansinstoragearestill‘live’andcanabsorbmoisturefromthesurroundings,and,sincewarmairholdsmorewatervapourthancoldair,thetemperatureofthecargoloadedisequallyimportantinordertoassessacargo’sbiologicalstabilityatitsdeclaredMC.Attemperaturesabove25°C,theMCmustbelowerthan13%forsafecarriage,whileattemperaturesbelow25°Citcanbehigher.Table1intheAnnextothiscircularillustrateshowtheequilibriumMCofsoyabeansvariesatdifferenttemperaturesandrelativehumiditylevels.

Althoughmoistureandtemperatureareprobablythemostimportantfactorsaffectingthequalityofsoyabeansduringcarriage,factorslikeage,pre-shipmentstorageconditions,bean soundness and the presence of foreign material can alsoinfluencefungalgrowthwhileonboard.Fungiaremorelikelytooccurifthesoyabeansarebrokenorsplit.The presence of foreign material may prevent proper air circulation during storage and can create local pocketswherefungiorinsectscangrow.Becausesoyabeans’MCandtemperaturehaveacloserelationshipwiththeirsafestorageperiod,asoyabeancargothathasbeenhandledand stored under unfavourable conditions prior to loading (e.g.,veryclosetotheupperlimitforsafestorage)mayhavea drastically reduced safe storage time and an increased riskofdeteriorationwhileonboard.AsillustratedbyTable

2intheAnnextothiscircular,asoyabeancargowith13%MC,storedfor35daysat21°Cpriortoloading,couldhave reduced its safe storage time by half already before commencementofthevoyage.Hence,theriskofcargodeterioration during a normal voyage cannot be completely eliminatedevenifthedeclaredsoyabeanMCatthetimeofloadingisaslowas12%.

VentilationAsoyabeancargocanabsorbandreleasemoistureduringavoyage,butdamagecausedbymoistureabsorptionismoreprobable.Suchdamageisoftenencounteredwhenavesselwithsoyabeansloadedinawarmandhumidclimateenterscolderwaters.Vapourwillleavethecargoandunlesstheholdisproperlyventilated,condensationmayformonthesteelworkofthecargohold(shipsweat)andexposethecargosurfacetomoisture.Properventilationinthiscasemeansreplacingwarmmoistairreleasedfromthecargowithdrieroutsideair.Thedecisionwhethertoventilateornotwillbe made based on regular and appropriate measurements oftheairconditionsoutsideandinsidetheholds.2 Natural ventilationasfoundonboardmanybulkcarriersis,however,noteffectiveincontrollingspoilagedeepwithinthehold.Itthereforefollowsthattheconditionofasoyabeancargo,withtheexceptionofitssurfacelayers,willbealmostentirelydependent on the condition of the cargo at the time ofloading.

Gard’s experienceThemajorityofGard’sclaimsinvolvingsoyabeandeteriorationfallwithinthecategory’moisturedamage’,characterised by general caking and discolouration of beans inahold,oftenwithanunpleasantmustyodour.Commonallegationsbyclaimantsinsuchcasesarethatthevessel’sventilation practices resulted in the development of ship sweatorthatfueloilintanksadjacenttothecargoholdswasoverheated.Itis,however,notuncommonforsingleparcelsofsoyabeansloadedtohaveMCsoramountsofforeign material and broken/split beans much higher than theaveragevaluesdeclaredforthecargoaswhole.Thiscancreate‘unevenconditions’inthestowandleadtomoisture migration from one region of the hold to another duringthevoyage.TheresultisincreasesinlocalMCswithintheholdthatcanserveas‘hot-spots’forgrowthofbiologicalorganisms.Theconsequentialdamageinsuchcasesistypicallyidentifiedasscatteredareas/layersofcakedbeansatelevatedtemperatures,notonlyatthesurfaceaswouldnormallybethecasefordamagecausedbyshipsweat,butatdifferentdepthswithinthehold.Incaseswhereoverheatedfuelindoublebottomtanksisthecauseofdeterioration,damageisnormallyidentifiedasdiscolourationofbeansimmediatelynexttotherelevanttank.Abovethis,therecanbealayerofcakedbeansasaconsequenceofmoisturebeingdrivenupwardsbytheheatfromthefuel,but,fromexperience,itisnotusualtoseesuchdamageextendingmorethanametreortwoupwardsintotheholdawayfromthefueltank.And,significantoverheatingofthefuelisnormallyrequiredinordertocausedamage.

Evenifindependentsurveysandinvestigationsconcludethata)theinherentconditionofthesoyabeansatthetimeofloadingwasthemostprobablecauseofthedeterioration,andb)theship’sventilationpracticewouldhavehadno

82


effectondeteriorationwithinthestow,thecarrieroftenfindsitdifficulttodefendclaims.TheHagueVisbyRulesincludeaninherentvicedefencebutitisthecarrierwhobearstheburdenofprovingthecauseofthedamagetothecargo.Andwithoutevidence(e.g.,intheformofrecordsshowingadherence to proper ventilation practices during the entire voyage)thishasshowntobeachallenge.Ifdetailsofventilation practices are missing or if available records could beinterpretedasevidenceofbadorinsufficientventilationpractices(e.g.,ifventilationhasbeenperformedonlyindaylighthours),itcanbedifficulttoarguethatreasonablecarewastakenbythecarrierandthattheeffectivecauseofthelosswasthenatureofthecargo.

RecommendationsGard’sMembersandclientsinvolvedinthecarriageofsoya beans in bulk should carefully evaluate their strategy forpreventionofcargoclaimsandconsiderthefollowingadvice:

Attheloadport:•Makesurecargoholdsarecleananddryandverifythewatertightnessofallcargoholdopenings,e.g.,soundingpipes,hatchcoversandassociatedaccesspoints.•Asfaraspracticablypossible,secureallavailableinformationaboutthecargo’sconditionandhistory,e.g.,dateofharvesting,storageconditionsandqualitycertificates.•Performodourandvisualchecksofeachindividualparcelloadedtodetectabnormalconditions,e.g.,germination,presenceofinsects,lumping/caking,changesincolourandrequestthatshippersreplaceanyobviouslymouldedorlowqualitycargowithsound.•BeparticularlycarefulduringchecksifthedeclaredcargoMCisclosetoorexceeds13%,especiallyifloadinginwarmclimates.•Considermeasuringthecargotemperatureinordertoassess the biological stability of the cargo at its declared MC,e.g.,bymeasuringandrecordingthetemperatureacrossthesurfaceofthestowandatadepthof1maftercompletionofloading.•Ifindoubtastowhetherthecargoisfitforshipment,considerobtainingassistancefromanexperiencedsurveyororcargoexpert.•Ensurethatthecharterpartydoesnotprescribeventilationrequirementswhichmaybedifficultorevenimpossibletocomplywith.Wherethevesselisfittedwithnaturalventilationonly,itcouldbeusefultoobtainwrittenacknowledgmentfromtheshipper.

During the voyage:•Makesurethattheengineroompersonnelunderstandthe character of the cargo carried and operate the fuel oil heatingsystemwithinnormaloperationallimits.•Ventilatethecargodayandnight,unlesstheoutsideairhasanunsuitabledewpointoradverseweather/seaconditionsareimminent.•Dulyrecordtheventilationcontrolmeasuresimplementedforeachhold.Airandseatemperaturereadingsshouldberecordedtogetherwiththetimeofcommencing,ceasingorresumingventilation,andreasonsfordoingso.Alsorecordvisualinspectionsofhold,e.g.,anysweatobserved.

•Takeandrecordbilgesoundingsasthesetoocanbeevidenceofmoisturewithinahold.

Atthedischargeport:•NotifyGardimmediatelyifthereisanysuggestionbythereceivers that all or a substantial part of the cargo in a hold is damagedbyfungiand/orheat.Theimmediateappointmentofacargoexperttoobservethepatternofdamageinthehold and to take samples for analysis could be crucial in ordertodefendthecarrierincaseofaclaim.


83

Annex: Relationship between soya beans’ MC, temperature and safe storage period Thetablesbelowdemonstratetheimportanceofunderstandinghowvariationsinmoisturecontent(MC)and temperature can affect the potential for deterioration ofasoyabeancargo.Theremaybeindividualdifferencesbetweentypesofsoyabeans.Thenumbersmusttherefore

not be considered as conclusive for all soya bean cargoes loaded under all conditions but merely as an illustration of thesoyabeansvulnerabilitytovariousparametersovertime.“Safestorage”hereinmeansstoragewithoutlossinquality.Table1EquilibriumMCofsoyabeansatdifferenttemperature and relative humidity levels

84



Liquid bulk cargo sampling – collecting evidence

Introduction and backgroundDisputesrelatingto“off-spec”orcontaminatedliquidcargoes are a recurring problem and Gard is often involved incaseswheretheshipownerhasnoindependentevidenceastothecauseofanallegedcargocontamination.Thesource of the problem could be in the shore tank at the load port,intheshorepipelineduringloadingoronboardthevesselitself.Thecargocouldevenhavebeenmanufacturedoutofspecificationpriortodeliverytotheterminalforshipment.Butifthecargoisfoundtobe“off-spec”whenthe vessel arrives at the discharge port and there is no evidenceofcontaminationfromtheloadport,thevesselcouldbefacedwithapotentiallylargeclaim,evenifthevesselisnotatfault.

Samplesshowingthattheconditionofthecargohasnotchangedbetweenloadinganddischargeprovidethebestdefenceagainstanycargoclaims.Thepurposeofthiscircularistodrawshipowners’attentiontotheimportanceofimplementingproceduresfortaking,andretainingonboard,own(duplicate)samplesfromallcargoesloadedonthevessel.Itisalsoimportanttoinvolvecompetentcrewinthesamplingprocess.Anexperiencedofficermaybeabletoidentifyapoorqualitysamplebyvisualinspectionalone,andearlyinterventionmaypreventanexpensiveproblemarisinglater.

Gard’s experienceAlthoughsubstantialresourcesareusedonboardthevesselin the preparation and cleaning of tanks and lines prior to loading,samplesarealltoooftennottakenbythevesselatthestartofloading,oriftheyare,theyarenottakenproperlyorarediscardedbeforetheycanbeanalysed.InonerecentcasehandledbyGard,achemicalcarrierarrivedattheterminalwithitscargotanksandlinescleanedandpreparedforloading.Thevesselwasinspecteduponarrivalandfoundtobesuitableforthecontractedcargo.Theloadinghosewasconnectedandloadingcommencedbutnomanifoldsamplesweretakenatthestartofloading.Ashorttimeintotheloadingoperation,thecrewrealizedthattheyhadnotfollowedcompanyproceduresandimmediatelytookafirst-foottanksampleofthecargo.Uponanalysisofthesamplethecargowasfoundtobeoff-specandtheloadingwasstopped.Thevesselwasheldresponsibleforcontaminatingthecargo.Thecargoalreadyreceivedbythevesselwaspumped back to the terminal and the vessel instructed to leavetheterminalinordertocleanhercargotanksandlines.Valuabletimewaslostandacargoclaimwaslodgedagainstthevessel.

Inthisparticularcase,thevesselreturnedtotheterminalfollowingcleaningoperationsandloadingwasresumed.Amanifoldsamplewastakenandanalysedandeverythingfoundtobeinorder.Whenthefirst-footsamplewiththecontaminatedcargohadbeenanalysedfurther,itbecameclearthatthecauseofthecontaminationwasmostprobablydeposits or remains from previous content of the shore tanks andlines.Fortunately,inthiscasethecontaminationsourcecouldbeidentified.Inmanycasesitmaynotbepossibletodeterminewhetherthecontaminationoriginatedfromtheshiporshore,hencetheimportanceofamanifoldsample.

Cargosamplesnecessarytoprotectthevessel’sinterestsThe transfer of custody of the cargo from the terminal to the

vessel,andviceversa,normallytakesplacewhenthecargopassesthevessel’spermanenthoseconnections.Amanifoldsampletakenatthestartofloadinganddischargecan,inprinciple,determinewithwhomtheresponsibilityforcontaminationofacargorests.Butevenwherevesselprocedures are in place and a manifold sample is taken at thestartofloading,Gardoftenseesthatthereislimitedunderstandingamongstcrewoftheimportanceofcargosampling.Itisnotunusualforthecrewtodisposeofasampletakenoftheveryfirstproductloaded,the“firstdrop”sample,ifitdoesnotappeartobeoftheexpectedquality.Whatcanoftenmakemattersworseistothendrawanewsampleoncethecargoqualityappearsasexpected,andthisthenbecomesthemanifoldsample“onrecord”ashavingbeentakenbytheshipatfirstloading.Thismaymean that the only evidence available indicates that sound cargowasloadedandtheevidenceshowingthatthecargohadbeencontaminatedashoreislost.

Inadditiontomanifoldsamples,first-footsamplesshouldbetakentoascertainthatthevessel’ssystemsandpipesareclean,inparticularifsensitiveand/orexpensivecargoesareloaded.

Thiswillalsoreducetherisksassociatedwithcontaminationoftheentirecargoparcel.

Takingafinaltanksampleaftercompletionofloadingandpriortocommencementofdischargewillfurtherenablethe vessel to determine the actual cause of any potential contaminationonboard.Itcanalsobepotentiallyusefulfortheofficerinchargetorequestspecimensofsamplestakenbytheterminal’ssurveyorattheterminalpiermanifold.Samplesfromtheshoretankandshorelinemightalsoberequested.Ifthequalityofthecargosamplesfromtheshipandshoreappeartobedifferent,loadingshouldbestoppedinordertoinvestigatefurther.

Allsamplesshouldbetakenincompliancewiththeapplicableandrecognisedindustrypracticesand,ifpossible,inthepresenceofarepresentativeoftheshipperorterminal.Cleansamplingequipmentandbottlesshouldalwaysbeused.Closedsamplingsystemsshouldbeusedwithcautionasresiduesofpreviouscargoesmayberetained,alsoscaleorrustcouldcontaminatesamples.Allsamplestakenshouldbesealedandproperlylabelled(includingvesselname,berth,cargodescription,samplesource,nameofsampler,dateandtimeandsealnumber).Anoteofwhereandwhenasamplewastakenaswellasits seal number should be recorded in the cargo log book toensuretraceability.Ifspaceallows,samplesshouldberetainedforatleastoneyearaftercompletionofdischarge,stored in a designated place on board or delivered to appropriatestoragefacilitiesashore.Sufficientsampleamounts should be secured as it may be necessary to test thesamplemorethanonce.

RecommendationsInordertoensurethebestpossibledefenceofacargoclaimagainstthevessel,itisstronglyrecommendedthatshipownersfosterawarenessofproblemsrelatedtoimpropersamplingandhaveinplacewrittenproceduresdescribingthesamplingprocessindetail.Theproceduresshouldincludeandemphasisethefollowingpoints:


85

•Cargosamplesshouldbetakenwiththeparticipationofthevessel’screwduringloadinganddischarge.SufficientcrewcompetencemustbeappliedwithrespecttocheckingandverifyingthequalityofthesamplestakenandtheChiefOfficershouldpreferablybeinvolvedinallcargosampling.Animpropersamplingmethodcanresultinapoorqualitysamplebeingtakenandasamplewhichisnotnecessarilyrepresentativeofthecargoitself.

•Thefollowingindependentcargosamplesshouldbetakenbythevessel’screw:

Atloading:-Manifoldsample,takenatthevessel’smanifoldatthestartofloading,preferablywiththemanifoldvalveinaclosedposition.Spotchecksshouldbecarriedoutatthemanifoldduringloadingwheneverpracticable,e.g.,aftershorestopsand/orchangeofshoretanks.-First-footsamples,inparticularifsensitiveand/orexpensivecargoisloaded.-Finaltanksamples,aftercompletionofloading.Atdischarge:-Tanksamplespriortocommencementofdischarge.-Manifoldsamples,takenatthevessel’smanifoldatthestartofdischarge.

•Byfarthemostimportantsampleisthe“firstdrop”manifoldsample:asampletakenoftheveryfirstproductloaded.Vesselproceduresshouldbespecificallyformulatedtoavoidanymisunderstandingswhenitcomestoensuringthatthis“firstdrop”manifoldsampleisneverdisposedofduringslopping,regardlessofitsapparentquality.Thissampleshouldpreferablybespeciallymarked,e.g.,“FIRSTDROPSAMPLE”,butotherwisetreatedasaregularmanifoldsample.

•Ifloadingistakingplacebyuseofthevessel’shoseandnottheterminal’shose,samplesshouldideallybetakenatthe hose connection as a manifold sample in this case may havelessvalueasevidencetodefendthevessel.

•Cleanandsuitablesamplingequipmentshouldbeusedandthesamplestakenshouldbeproperlylabelled,sealedandstoredindesignatedareas.Sufficientsampleamountsmust be secured and the samples should be retained for at leastoneyearaftercompletionofdischarge.Recordingsshouldbemadeinthecargolog-booktoensuretraceabilityofsamplestaken.

Itisalsorecommendedthatshipownersinstructtheirofficersthatwhenevertheyareindoubtastotheapparentqualityofaliquidbulkcargo,theyshouldensurethatexpertadviceissoughtandsamplesanalysedattheloadingport.

Foradditionalinformationoncargosampling,pleaserefertothearticles“CargoSampling”inGardNewsNo.153,“Theimportanceoftaking(andkeeping)samples”inGardNewsNo.169andtoSec.2.12.3.5“LiquidBulkCargoes-CargoSamples”oftheGardGuidancetoMasters.

Footnotes1Seealsoarticle“SoybeanclaiminChina”inGN172(2004)2Forinformationonproperholdventilationpractices,seearticle“Don’tworkupasweat”inGN173(2004)

86



Clearing of shore pipelines following cargo operations at terminalsIntroduction and backgroundOvertheyears,Gardhasseensomeextensivestructuraldamageincidentsasaresultofoverpressureintheliquidcargotanksduringloadingoperations.Suchdamagesresultintimeconsumingandcostlyrepairsandunfortunately,forreasonsunknown,thefrequencyofsuchincidentshasincreased,despiteshipproceduresaddressingtherisksinvolved.

InGard’sexperiencesuchincidentsoftenoccurduringtheloadingoperationphasewhenshorepipelinesarebeingcleared,eitherbylineblowingorbypigging1.Inonesuchincident,failuretomaintainclosecommunicationwiththeterminalandalackofshippersonnel’sattentiontoandawarenessofthehazardsrelatedtoanunattendedopenmanifold valve during shore pipeline clearing operations seemtobethemaincauses.Afterthecompletionofloadingofonetankandinitialclearingoftheline,theterminalrequestedthere-openingofthemanifoldvalveforfurtherblowingofthecargoline.Thelinewasthenleftopenandthe ship reportedly did not receive any further information fromtheterminal.Somefivehoursaftertherequestforthere-openingofthemanifoldvalve,a“bang”washeardondeckandcargowasseenemittingfromthetankvent.Theresultsweresignificantdamagetothetransversebulkheadsbetweenthetanksandcargomixingbetweentanks.

The purpose of this circular is therefore to highlight the main issues involved in order to minimize the risk of pollution and damage to the cargo tanks during cargo operations involvingclearingofshorepipelines.

ReducingrisksrelatedtoshorepipelineclearingoperationsThe immediate causes of any damage are gas being supplied at a too high pressure compared to the capacity of theship’stankventsystemarrangement;orthattheamountofcargobeingpushedintotheship’scargotankistoolargecomparedtothetankullageavailable,orthecargocomingattoofastarate.Therootcausesare,however,oftencomplexandmayinvolvelackofdetailedplanningoftheoveralloperation,lackofcommunicationbetweenthepartiesinvolvedduringtheoperation,andpersonnelhavingalackoftrainingandawarenessofproceduresapplicabletotheactualoperation.

Theprocedureforclearingshorepipelinesbetweentheshoretankandtheshipmanifoldwilldependonthefacilitiesavailableateachterminalandthetypeofcargoloaded.Shipandterminalprocedureswilladdressallrelevantaspectsofthe cargo and line clearing operations but it has become evidentthatenforcementofgoodcommunicationbetweenthe involved parties prior to and during the entire operation isakeyfactorinordertopreventincidents.Thefollowingshould therefore be observed:

Planning and responsibilitiesAllcargooperationsmustbecarefullyplannedanddocumentedwellinadvanceoftheirexecution.Thedetailsoftheplansmustbediscussedwithallpersonnel,bothontheshipandattheterminalandthemannerinwhichresponsibilityistobesharedbetweentheshipandterminalmust be agreed2.

TheMasterorResponsibleOfficershouldensurethatship’spersonnel assigned duties during the cargo operation are madeawareofthehazardsassociatedwithpipelineclearingoperations.

Apre-cargooperationmeetingbetweenpersonnelresponsible for the operation from ship and terminal should confirmallcriticalinterfaceparameters,includingthoseimportant in the pipeline clearing operations3.

Specifichazardsthattheship’spersonnelshouldbeawareofandrelatedinterfaceparameterstobediscussedwiththeterminalduringthepre-cargooperationmeetingarelistedbelow.

Hazards to be aware of Parameters to be discussed in pre-cargo operation meeting:

- pressure surges in line- tank overpressurization- dramatic increase in the filling rate- cargo tank overflow due to excess cargo- cargo tank overflow due to entry of compressed gas

- stages at which the line clearing will be carried out- notice period required by the ship prior to line clearing operations- propelling medium to be used- length and size of the shore line- time required for a pig to travel along the line- pressures and venting capacity of the ship’s reception tank- volume of residual cargo in the line and the amount of ullage space available in the ship’s reception tank- capacity of the vapour return line to shore- amendments to the cargo operation plan as a result of pipeline clearing operations, including volumes available for topping off- communication routines during the entire operation


87

Precautions and proceduresAtthecommencementofloading,andateachchangeofwatchorshift,theResponsibleOfficerandtheTerminalRepresentativeshouldeachconfirmthatthecommunications system for the control ofloading is understood by them and by the personnel assigneddutiesduringthecargooperation.

Precautionsandproceduresrequiringspecialawarenessbytheship’spersonnelarepresentedbelow.Duringtheoperations,thereshouldbecontinuousanddirectcommunicationbetweentheterminalandtheshipuntiltheoperation has been completed and all valves have been closed.

RecommendationsProceduresforcargooperationsshouldbereviewedtoensurethatthecorrectproceduresarefollowedwhendealingwithshorepipelineclearingoperations.Akeyissue in order to prevent incidents is the enforcement of goodcommunication,bothpriortoandduringtheentireoperation.

-Hazardstobeawareof:Priortothecommencementofthecargooperation,andinordertoraiseawareness,specifichazardsassociatedwithpipelineclearingoperationsshouldbecommunicatedtotheship’spersonnelwhoareassigneddutiesduringtheoperation.

-Parameterstobediscussedinthepre-cargooperationmeeting:Throughthepre-cargooperationmeeting,theresponsibilities,timeframesandcriticalinterfaceparameters,includingthoseimportantforlineclearingoperations,shouldbeagreedbetweentheResponsibleOfficerandtheTerminalResponsible.Specificcommunication routines to be adhered to during the actual operationsshouldbeestablished.

Precautions and procedures requiring special awareness by the ship’s personnel:

-avoidusingtanksthatthatareloadedcloseto98%asreceptiontanksforlineclearing-addasafetymarginwhenestimatingrequiredullagesforreceptiontanks,thistotakeaccountofthepotentialforinaccuratelydeclared“piggingquantities”-considertoincludeprovisionsforastandbycargotanktobelinedupandreadytobeopened-keepmanifoldvalvesclosedduringidleperiods-ensurethatthevapourreturnlinetoshoreisopenduringtheoperation(whenavailable)-throttlethemainmanifoldvalveasrequired-monitorthemanifoldpressureclosely-monitortheavailableamountofcargotankullagespaceandpressureintank-duringfreezingweatherconditions,inspecttankvents(P/Vvalves)atregularintervals-closemanifoldvalvesimmediately(inagreementwiththeterminal)onceapighasreacheditsreceiver/trap,thistoavoidcompressedpropellinggasenteringaloadedcargotank-reportimmediatelyanyabnormalitiesordeviationsfromexistingprocedures

-Precautionsandproceduresrequiringspecialawarenessbytheship’spersonnel:Precautionsandproceduresduringcargo operations should ensure that all ship manifold valves arekeptclosedunlessspecificoperationsthatrequireopenvalvesareongoing,thateachoperationiscontinuouslymonitoredbyresponsiblepersonnel,andthatthereisdirectcommunicationbetweentheterminalandtheshipuntiloperations have been completed and all valves have been closed.

Gard strongly recommends that only properly trained andexperiencedpersonnelisassigneddutiesrelatedtooperation of ship manifold valves during pipeline clearing operations.

Footnotes1Piggingisaformoflineclearinginwhichanobject,mostoften in the form of a rubber sphere or cylinder andknownasa“pig”,ispushedthroughthelinebyaliquidorbycompressedgas.Apigmaybeusedtoclearthelinecompletely,inwhichcaseitwillusuallybepropelledbycompressedgas,ortofollowapreviousgradetoensurethat

88



Damage to cargoes of wind turbine bladesIntroductionAsaresultoftheincreasingnumberofshipmentscontainingwindturbinebladesGardhasrecentlybeeninvolvedina number of cases of alleged damage to turbine blades stowedbothonandunderdeck.Amongthemaincausesofsuchdamagesarepoorweldingofstoppers,handlingofthebladesandpoorstowage.Thepurposeofthislossprevention circular is to provide information on the risks involvedandincreasetheawarenessneededwhenhandlingturbineblades.

Causes of damage1.WeldingInarecentGardcasethebladeswerestowedbelowdeckintheholdsinstackstwoorthreebladeshigh.Atthedischargeport,thestowintheholdcollapsedcausingseveredamagetoboththecargoandthebulkhead,whichledtothevesselhaving to call at an intermediate port for relashing/securing ofthecargo.Onlyoneweldedstopperoutofnineteenwasfoundtobestillinposition.Thesurveyorwasoftheopinionthatthecollapseofthestowwasduetopoorweldingofthestoppers.Gard’sexperienceisthatpoorweldingoperations1 carriedoutbybothship’screwandthirdpartiesappointedby the charterers/shippers is one of the main causes of loss ofordamagetowindturbines.

2.Handlingdamageduringloading/discharge.The grouping of the blades and the size of blades varies betweenmanufacturers.Thebladesarepackedindifferentwaysdependingontheirdesign,somecompletelypackedwithinasteelframe(Figure1),whileothersareshippedwithframesattherootendofthebladeandaframesomewhereattheoppositeendofthegravitypoint.

However,thecargodeliveredforshipmentisoftenunpackagedandstowedeitherondeckorbelowdeckintheholds.Theturbinebladesaremadeofpolyesterandarethereforeparticularlyvulnerabletotransitdamage,althoughrepairiseconomicallyfeasibletoacertainextent.

Gardhasexperiencedthatstrongwindsduringloadinganddischarge operations is a contributing factor for handling damages.Anotherfactoriswrongdeterminationofthestructureliftingpointsandthecentreofgravity;specialattention should be given to the lifting points and the centre ofgravityontheliftneedstobeverifiedtoavoidthebladesbecoming bent or touching other obstacles during these operations.

3.Poorstowageand/orinsufficient/impropriatesecuringOneincidentinvolvedthecollapseofastowofturbine

blades,packagedin40’ISOframesandstowed3highand5widebothondeckaswellasinthecargoholds.Inmostcasesthebladeunitswillbestowedondeckinlongitudinaldirection.Thecargoisrelativelylightweightbutvoluminousandthereforesusceptibletowindforces.Theforceofthewind,whichincreasesproportionallywiththeheightofthestow,shouldbetakenintoconsiderationwhencalculatinglashingcapacity.

Preventing damageClearlythestowagepositiononboardshipsdependslargelyon the size of the holds and the length of the blades to be carried.Theheightofthestowdependsonthestrengthofthe designed frames or cases or other manner of packaging oftheblades.Thepreparationofthevesseltoproperlyload/stowandsecurethecargoisthereforeoftheutmostimportance.Thebookingnoteshouldcontaininformationinrespectoftheweight,themannerofpackaging,unitweight,dimensionsofthebladesandmaximumallowablestowageheight.

Calculationsshouldbemadepriortothecommencementofloading,basedonthevessel’srelevantcharacteristics(suchaslength,speed,GM,stowagelocationonboard),thecargo(dimensionsandweight)andthelashingmaterialtobeused(containerlashingmaterial,chains,wires,belts,etc.).Theunitshavetobehandledwithextremecareasstrongwindsduringloading/dischargingcreatedifficultieswhenliftingtheblades.

Wedonothereintendtodiscussthevariousissuessurroundingthecalculationofstabilityaspectswhenloadingaship,however,duringheavyweatherwithhighseasexcessiveinitialstabilitywillresultinrapidandviolentmotionwhichwillimposelargeslidingandrackingforcesonthecargocausinghighstressingonthelashings.Themastershould take into consideration the stability information obtainedfromtheship’sstabilitymanual.

RecommendationsMembers should pay particular attention to the allocation of contractualresponsibilityfortheloading,stowage,securinganddischargeoperations.Ifthememberhasresponsibilityforanyoftheseoperationstheymaywishtoconsiderappointingacompetentsurveyortoassistwithensuringthattheoperationisdoneproperly.Ifthecargoistobecarriedondeck,itisessentialthatthisisclearlystatedinthecontract,asitwillhaveasignificantimpactonthetermsandconditionsonwhichthecargoiscarried.Particularattentionshouldbepaidtotheweldingstoppersensuringthatweldingoperationshavebeenproperlyperformed.

Figure 1 - Blades packed in steel frame

Figure 2- Frames at root end


89

Thevessel’sCargoSecuringManualshouldbeapprovedbytherelevantFlagStateauthorityordirectlybytherelevantClassSociety,ifsuchauthorityforapprovalhasbeentransferredtotheClassSocietybytheFlagStateAuthority.Aswindmillbladesarenotmentionedinthelistofcargoesunderthesection5.3fornon-standarisedstowageandsecuringinTheCodeofSafePracticeforCargoStowageandSecuring,2003edition,anannexdescribingthegeneralnatureforthestowageandsecuringshouldbeworkedoutandapprovedbytherelevantFlagStateauthorityorClassSociety.Vigilanceisthereforevitaltoensurethatstowage/lashingsandsecuringofthecargoisincompliancewiththeapplicableannex.

WithrespecttosoftwareproductsrelatingtolashingprogramstherelevantClassSocietymaybecontactedforadvice.Regardlessofthemannerofunitising,thestowage,lashing and securing of the units of blades should be in accordancewithTheCodeofSafePracticeforCargoStowageandSecuring,edition2003.

1WithrespecttohotworkstobeperformedonboardthevesselwewishtorefertoourpreviousLPcircularNo.06-10:Thedangerofhotworksoncargosecurings.

90



Liquefaction of cargoes of iron ore

BackgroundMembersmaybeawareoftheproblemsthathaveariseninrecenttimeswithrespecttotheliquefactionofcargoesofironorefinesoriginatinginIndiaandloadedatIndianports.1 However,similarproblemshavebeenexperiencedinthepastwithsimilarcargoeselsewhereintheworldand,assuch,thesecargoesmustalwaysbetreatedasliabletoliquefyregardlessoftheirorigin.

Liquefactionofmineralores,resultingincargoshiftandlossofstability,hasbeenacauseofsomemajormarinecasualtiesformanydecades.However,aspateofincidentsleadingtoseverallossesinrecenttimesinvolvingironorefinesloadedinIndianportshasleadtoconsiderablefocusonthelackofcompliancewiththerequirementsforsafecarriageofthiscargo.2 There have also been incidents involving cargoes of nickelorefromIndonesia,thePhilippinesandNewCaledonia.

TheSouthwestMonsoongenerallyprevailsfromJunetoSeptemberandmainlyaffectsIndia’swestcoast.TheNortheast Monsoon generally prevails from December to MarchandmainlyaffectsIndia’seastcoast.TheadventoftheSouthwestMonsoongivesusgoodreasontorevisitthissubjectthroughthiscircular.

Main causes of casualtiesThe main cause of the casualties and near misses appears to bethepoorcomplianceofsomeshipperswiththetestingandcertificationrequirementsthatarerequiredunderSOLASandtheIMSBCCode2009anddesignedtoensurethatcargoesareloadedonlyifthemoisturecontentissufficientlylowtoavoidliquefactionoccurringduringthevoyage.Indianironorefinestendtobeleftintheopenpriortoshipment,andasaconsequence,areentirelysubjecttoweatherconditionsduringthisperiod.Theproblemsrelatedtowetcargoanditsmoisturecontentparticularlyworsenduringthewetmonsoonseasons.

IncargoesloadedwithamoisturecontentinexcessoftheFlowMoisturePoint(FMP),liquefactionmayoccurunpredictablyatanytimeduringthevoyage.Somecargoeshaveliquefiedandcausedcatastrophiccargoshiftalmostimmediatelyondeparturefromtheloadport,someonlyafterseveralweeksofapparentlyuneventfulsailing.Whiletheriskofliquefactionisgreaterduringheavyweather,inhighseas,andwhileunderfullpower,therearenosafesailingconditionsforacargowithunsafemoisturecontent.Liquefactioncanoccurunpredictablyeveninrelativelycalmconditionsonavesselatanchorageorproceedingatlowspeed.

Giventhisunpredictability,itisofutmostimportancethatthelengthofvoyageandprevalentandforecastedweatherconditions do not serve to encourage the carriage on ships of cargoespronetoliquefactionwithaTransportableMoistureLimitinexcessofthatwhichisacceptedassafeforcarriage.ItisforthesereasonsthatSOLASandtheIMSBCCodeincorporate provisions intended to ensure that only cargoes withsufficientlylowinherentmoisturecontenttoavoidliquefactionareloaded.Strictadherencetotheseprovisionsistheonlysafewayofcarryingthesetypesofcargoes.

Preventive measuresBasedonpreviousexperienceswithrespecttocargoesofiron

orefinesloadedfromIndia,Membersareadvisedtoexerciseextremecautionwhenloadingsuchcargoontheirvessels.Itisimportantthatcargoesofironorefinesunsuitableforshipmentareidentifiedandrejectedbeforecomingonboardthe vessel and proper measures are taken to ensure that the cargoloadedonboardcomplieswithSOLASandmeetstherequirementsoftheIMSBCCode.Additionalsamplingwillberequiredifthecargoissubjecttosourcesofmoistureduringloading.

AlthoughtheIMSBCCodeplacestheburdenofcertificationontheshipper,inmanycasestheinformationcontainedinthecertificatesmaybeincorrect.Thismaybeduetofailuretocorrectlyanalysethesamples,oruseoffacilitiesnotgearedtoproperlytestthesamples,orthetestsamplesnotbeingproperlyrepresentativeofthecargotobeloaded.Itisthusextremelyimportantthattheshipownerandmasterascertainthatthecargoissuitableforseatransport.

Althoughexposuretomoistureisheightenedduringthemonsoonseasons,shipownersshouldensurethatthesamelevelofcautionisexercisedwithrespecttotheloadingofironorefinesirrespectiveofthetimeoftheyear.TheAssociationstrongly recommends Members to contact the local correspondentortheAssociationingoodtimetoassisttheminengagingtheservicesofacompetentandexperiencedsurveyortoactontheMember’sbehalftoassistthemasterboth before and during loading operations in order to ensure thatthecargoisloadedincompliancewithSOLASandthattheIMSBCCodeisadheredto.

Freight disputes3 AlthoughnotdirectlyconnectedwiththesafetransportofironorefinesfromIndia,thisseemslikeanopportunetimetohighlightthisissue.

WeunderstandthatsomeChineseportsdonotallowthedischargeoflowgradeironorewithoutanimportpermit.This can cause considerable delay of vessels and disputes concerning,e.g.freight,demurrageordeadfreightmayariseinrelationtoironorefromIndia.

Weunderstandthat“ChinaChamberofCommerceofMetalsMineralsandChemicalsImportersandExporters”and“ChinaIron&SteelAssociation”notifiedtheirmembersinAprilofthisyeartostopimportingironorewithanIron(Fe)contentbelow60%.ThishasmadeitdifficulttoobtainimportpermitsfromthegovernmentthroughthesetwoAssociations.

ItisthereforerecommendedthatbeforetransportingIndianironoreorironorewithlessthan60%FecontentfromothercountriesintoChina,shipownersshouldcheckwiththeCharters/Shippers/CargoReceiversiftheChinesebuyershave obtained the import permit so as to avoid unnecessary disputesoverfreight,demurrageanddetentionofvessels.SimilarcautionshouldalsobeexercisedwithrespecttospotcargoesoflowgradeironoreintoChina.

1SeeGardLossPreventionCircularNo.10-07:LoadingofironorefinesinIndia.2LiquefactionofcargoesofIronorehasalsobeenaddressedinGardNews197(Feb/April2010)“Liquefactionofunprocessedmineralores–Ironorefinesandnickelore”,byDr.MartinJonas,BrookesBell,Liverpool.ThearticledescribestheSOLAS/IMSBCCodeRegulations,CertificationofTML/moisturecontentandprinciplesofliquefaction.3Wearegratefulto“HaiTongandPartners”ofBeijing,ChinaforprovidingtheinformationwithrespecttotheFreightdisputes.


91


The dangers of hot work on cargo securings

IntroductionGardhasseenaspateofincidentswhereshipfireshaveresultedfromhotworkoncargosecurings.Mostcasesinvolvedproject/heavyliftcargoes,whichoftenrequireadditionalsecuringstobefittedonthevesseltodealwiththeexpectedadditionalforces.Insomeinstances,thecargoitself,oritsframework,maybeweldeddirectlytotheship.Inarecentcaseitwasfoundthattheship’screwhadinadvertentlystartedafireinthecargoholdwhileusingoxy-acetylenecuttingequipmenttoremovesteelbracketsfromthehatchcover.Thebracketshadbeenusedtosecureaheavyliftcargoonthehatchcover.

Gard’s experienceGard’sexperienceisthatfireshaveresultedfromhotworkperformedbybothship’screwandshorecontractors.Ontheonehand,shorecontractorsmaynotbefullyfamiliarwiththefirerisksonboardashipandontheother,theship’screwmaynotbefullycompetenttooperatethehotworkequipment.Inspiteofalltheavailableformsandchecklists,proceduresarestillnotalwaysfollowed.InGard’sexperiencemostfireshaveoccurredwhenfixtureshavebeenremovedtodischargethecargoortoreturntheshiptoitspreviousstate.Manycaseshaveinvolvedhotworkondeckwithsparksandmoltenmetalfallingintocargospacesbelow.

Guidance to the crewTheship’ssafetymanagementsystemshouldprovideguidancetothecrewonhotworkoperations.Regardlessofwhoistoperformthework,thefollowingfactorsareworthbearing in mind:

Ariskassessmentshouldbeundertakenbyaship’sofficerinchargeofthehotworkoperation;identifyingallhazards,howeverremote,enablingthenecessaryprecautionstobetaken.Considerationshouldbegiventothebesttimeandplacetoperformthehotwork,preferablywhenfireriskscanbeminimisedandfireresponsecapabilitiesareoptimal.Forexample,itwouldbeprudenttodeferhotworkondeckuntilcompletionofdischargeofholdcargoalongsidetheberth,especiallyifcargoisdangerousorhighlycombustible.Ifsparksfallintoaloadedcargohold,theycanfindtheirwayintoapartofthestowwherefiredetectionandfirefightingisextremelydifficult.Oneofthecriticalpointswhichshouldnotbeoverlookedistheheatgeneratedbyhotwork.

APermittoWorkshouldbecarriedoutbytheofficerinchargeofthehotworkandreferenceshouldbemadetothe risk assessment for any additional precautions to be taken.Ahotworkpermitwilloftenberequiredbytheshoreauthoritiesandmustbeobtainedastheymayrequirespecificprecautionstobetaken.However,apermitdoesnotrelievethe ship of responsibility to take the necessary precautions onboard.

Theofficerinchargeshouldbecompletelysatisfiedastothecompetenceoftheperson(s)performingthehotworkandusingtheequipment–anumberoffireshavebeencausedbyholescutthroughtoadjacentspaces.Atoolboxmeetingledbytheofficerinchargeandinvolvingallindividualswitharoleinthehotworkoperationshouldbeheldbeforetheworkiscommenced.Onlyoncetheofficerissatisfiedthatallparties,particularlynon-crewmembers,understandthehazards,precautionsandemergencyproceduresinvolved

shouldthePermittoWorkbesignedoffbyallparticipants.

Intermsofprecautionstobetaken,particularattentionshouldbepaidtothefollowing:1

1. Thefirehazardsintheimmediatevicinityoradjacentspaces,especiallythosenotimmediatelyapparent,e.g.combustiblegases/vapours.

2. Hotworkshouldbeprohibitedinthevicinityoftanksorventstotankscontainingflammableliquids/residues,unlesscompletelygasfreed.

3. Ifcombustiblematerialcannotberemovedfromthecargobeingsecured,theimmediatevicinityoradjacentspaces,itshouldbeshielded,preferablywithfireretardantmaterial.

4. Theneedforaconstantfirewatchinthevicinityoftheworkandinalladjacentspaces,bearinginmindthatsparks can travel some distance and fall into openings whichcannotbeclosed.Screensshouldbeusedtoconfinesparkspray.Agenerousapplicationofwaterwillbeneededtocooldownthesurfaces/moltenmetal.Havingagoodfirewatchmeansthattheearlyapplicationofwateronthehotsparks/slag/surfacescanpreventthefirespreading.

5. Theneedtocontinuouslysupervisetheindividualsperformingthehotworktoensurethattheydonotundertakeanyhotworkoutsidethepermittedareawhereprecautionsmaynotyetbeinplace.Ifsupervisionisinterruptedtheworksshouldbesuspended.

6. Theneedforgoodcommunicationbetweenthefirewatchandtheofficerincharge.

7. Theimmediatereadinessoffirefightingappliances,suchasextinguishersandchargedhoseswhichshouldbelaidout,andbepositionedclosetohotworkandwithineasyreachforthoseonfirewatch,eveninadjacentspaces.

8. Firedetection,alarmsystemsandfixedfirefightingsystemsmusthaveundergonerecenttesting.

9. Theneedtomaintainafirewatchforatleasttwohoursafterthehotworkhasbeencompleted.

RecommendationsAriskassessmentshouldbeundertakenbyaship’sofficerinchargeofthehotworkoperation.TheMastershouldneverallowweldingincargocompartmentswherecargoisalreadyloadedwithoutallnecessaryprecautionshavingbeentaken and the operation being continuously monitored by a responsibleandcompetentperson.Followingcompletionoftheweldingwork,afirewatchmustbemaintainedtomonitorthesituationandpreventanysubsequentoutbreakoffire.

Charterersaswellasownersneedtobeawareofthedangersofhotwork,asthecharterermaybecontractuallyresponsibleforstowage/securingofthecargounderthecharterparty.

1Theguidelinestothecrewaregeneralyetusefulandshouldnotinanywayconflictwithcompanyproceduresorpolicy.

92



Update: Container losses from vessels using fully automatic container locksBackgroundAsaresultofseveralcontainerlossesfromlargecontainershipsinthepastsixmonths,theshippingindustryhastakentheissueoffullyautomaticcontainerlocks(FATs)veryseriously.VariousinvestigationsofthepotentialproblemswithlashingarrangementsinvolvingFATshavebeeninitiatedtoclarifywhatmeasuresmaybenecessarytoavoidfuturelosses.Thiscircularhighlightssomeofthecurrentactivitiesinthisrespectintheindustry.

Gard’s Member surveyAsapartofourinvestigationofthecontainerlosses,Gardconductedasurveyamongstsomeofitsmembers.Thesurveyhasrevealedthatthelossesexperiencedbythe members of Gard seem to be limited to one type of FATsavailableinthemarket.OurrecommendationinLossPreventionCircularNo.05-06tocontacttherespectivesupplierofsuchlockstoseekclarificationofanylimitationsisthereforestillvalid.IthasbeensuggestedtoholdameetingofInternationalGroup’s“ShipTechnicalCommittee”onthisissue.Itisexpectedthatthismeetingwilltakeplacethisautumn,whenmoreevidenceisavailablefromthepartiesmentionedbelow.Theintentionistoalsoinvitetheclassificationsocietiestoattendthismeeting.

Actions by Classification societiesInaletterfromGermanischerLloyddated16March2006,thepotentialproblemwashighlightedandfuturelimitationsintheuseofFATswerediscussed.However,intheirletterof27April2006,GermanischerLloydclarifiedtheircurrentposition: The letter states that the approved container stowageplans,withtheirrespectivestowagesystems,continue to be valid unconditionally and that a general and type independent recommendation for the substitution of FATsshouldnotbeissued.GL’stestsalsoconfirmedthatFATswithaflangeandsufficientlydimensionedlockingnoseobtainedgoodresults.Accordingtothepress,GLhasat a recent seminar also pointed to other factors such as theplacementofheavycontainers,inadequatecontainerlashings and the age of the containers as potential causes fortherecentlosses.Noneoftheotherclassificationsocietieshavesofarconcludedinthisissue.

Actions by the industryOwners,suppliers,authoritiesandresearchersarejoiningforcesinatwoyearprojectinvestigatinglashingloadstoimprovesafetyandefficiencyofcontainer,Ro-Roandheavylifttransportation.TheJointIndustryProject,namedLashing@Sea,wasinitiatedbytheMaritimeResearchInstituteNetherlands(MARIN).Theprojectisaimingtoimprovethesafetyandefficiencyoflashings.Thiswillbeachieved by investigating the mechanisms of lashing loads andidentifyingthekeyparameters.FATswillbeoneofmanytechnologiesinvestigatedbythisprojectgroup.

Actions by the manufacturersOneofthemajormanufacturersoflashingequipmenthaschosentorecalltheirFATsfromthemarket.Initspressrelease,thismanufacturerstatedthattheydidthisasaprecaution despite the fact that they had not received reportsofequipmentfailure.WehavebeeninformedthatatleastonemajormanufacturercontinuestosellFATssubsequenttoadditionaltestingandapprovalbyGermanischerLloyd.Accordingtothemanufacturer,nocontainer losses have been reported due to using their type ofFAT.

No implication on the P&I coverThe use of fully automatic container locks does not have anyimplicationonthescopeofP&Icover,aslongasthelocksusedareclassapprovedandthecontainerstowagecomplieswithapplicableregulations.

RecommendationGardisstilloftheopinionthatitisprudentforshipownerstoseekfurtherinformationfromtheapprovingclassificationsociety and container lock manufacturer/supplier concerning thesuitabilityandconditionsforuseofthespecifictype(s)offullyautomaticcontainerlock(s)thatarebeingusedorareintendedtobeusedonboardtheirships,inordertominimisetheriskoffuturelosses.


93


The dangers of carrying Direct Reduced Iron (DRI)

SincetheInternationalGroupofP&IClubs’CircularonDirectReducedIronpublishedin1982,thedangersofDRIhavesomewhatdisappearedfromthelimelight.GardP&Ihasrecentlybeeninvolvedinseveralcases,whichhave served as a stark reminder of the dangers involved in carryingthishazardousbulkcargo.

Types of DRIDRIistherawmaterialusedintheproductionofsteelinelectricarcfurnaces,whichformthemajorityofthesteelproductionfacilitiesworldwide.DRIcanbesplitintotwodistinctsub-groups;coldmouldedpelletsorhotmouldedbriquettes.TheIMOBulkCargo(BC)Codedealwiththesetwotypesseparately.HotmouldedDRIbriquettesareamorerefinedproduct,formedbythefurtherprocessingofcoldmouldedpellets.BothformsofDRIareconsideredhazardouswhencarriedinbulkandspecificcarriagerequirementsarelistedintheBCCode.

DRI properties and dangersDRIineitherformissimilartoothersteelstructuresinitssusceptibilitytorust(re-oxidise)inthepresenceofoxygen.Therateofoxidisationisdependant,toagreaterorlesserdegree,onthemoisturecontentoftheDRIandtheatmosphereinwhichtheDRIiscarried.Theoxidisationprocessgeneratesheat,whichinbulkcargoesofDRIcanbesignificant.Theprocessofoxidationisacceleratedinthe presence of moisture and is substantially increased if thewatercontainsdissolvedchlorides,asisthecasewithseawater.Thesponge-likestructureofDRIalsoinhibitsthedissipationofheatandDRIinbulkcanthereforeheatrapidlyinisolatedpockets.

Hotironwhenincontactwithwatercancauseachemicalreactionresultingintheproductionofhydrogen,whichishighlyexplosiveinthecorrectquantities.ThegenerationofhydrogenisthemostdangerouspropertyofDRIandhasledtoseveralfatalexplosions.Insomemanufacturingprocesses,theDRIundergoesoneoftwoprocessescalledeither‘passivation’,wherebythebriquettesarecoatedwithsodiumsilicateor‘ageing’inwhichthebriquettesareallowedtoformanironoxidecoating.Theseprocessesareintendedtoreduceorinhibittheoxidationprocessduringtransit.ThisadditionalprocessisdealtwithspecificallyintheBCCode.

Carriage RequirementsCarriagerequirementsaresetoutintheIMOBCCode.ReferenceshouldalsobemadetothelatestpublishedadviceandcarriagerequirementsapprovedbythelocalCompetentAuthorityandissuedbytheshipper.TheBCCoderecommendsthattheshippersshouldprovidespecificinstructionsforthecarriageofDRI,andtheseshouldeitherbe:

1. Thatthecargospacesbemaintainedinaninertcondition,withtheatmospherecontaininglessthan5percentoxygen.Thehydrogencontentofthecargospaces should be maintained at less than 1 per cent byvolume,OR

2. ThattheDRIismanufacturedortreatedwithanoxidationinhibitingprocesstothesatisfactionoftheCompetentAuthority.

Iftheatmosphereisinerted,theinertingagentmustbenitrogen.Carbondioxideshouldnotbeused,primarilybecauseitcanproducecarbonmonoxide,whichisbothtoxicandflammable.Evenonshortseavoyagesitisrecommendedthatthecargobefullyinerted.Passivationhasbeenshowntoeffectivelyreduceoxidation,fromfreshwatercontamination,intheshortterm,but,overtime,theeffectiveprotectionisreduced.Itshouldbenotedthatthereis little protection from the rapid reactions caused by the ingressofsaltwaterintothecargospaces.ItisthereforerecommendedthatthecarriageofDRIshouldalwaysbeundertakenunderanitrogenblanket.Theship’screwshould carry out effective monitoring of the atmosphere in thecargospaces.Recordsshouldbekeptofthelevelsofhydrogenandoxygenineachcargospace.

The condition of the cargo should be monitored during loading.Cargothatishotordampshouldnotbeloaded.Itisalsorecommendedthatthetemperatureofthecargoduringloadingshouldbemonitored.Ifthecargotemperatureisabovetheambienttemperature,adviceshouldbeobtainedfromthelocalCompetentAuthority.However,cargowithatemperatureinexcessof65oCshouldneverbeloaded.Itisusualfortemperaturethermocouplestobeplacedwithinthecargoholdsduringloadingforthemonitoringofcargotemperaturesduringcarriage.Itis important that these thermocouples are tested prior to beingpositionedwithinthecargoandtheirlocationwithinthecargorecorded.

Itisalsorecommendedthatthecargoshouldbeproperlytrimmed in order to reduce the amount of surface area exposedtotheatmosphere.Trimmingalsohelpsreducethe“funnel”effectbyreducingtheamountofvoidspacesinthecargowherehotgasescanmoveupwardswhiledrawinginfreshair.

IfthevesselhasanydoubtsaboutanyparticularDRIloadingit is recommended that independent advice be obtained fromanexpert.TheAssociationisonlytoohappytoassistinthisregard,andinanyotherwayitcan.

94



Manifold monitoring whilst loading liquid cargoesIntroductionTankersandterminalsareexposedtonumerouscontrolswiththeaimofensuringincident-freevisitstoportsbyshipsengaged in the transport of cargoes dangerous to both healthandenvironment.Nonetheless,avoidableincidentscontinuetooccur.Thefollowingincidentillustratestheneedforcarefulplanningandmonitoringofalloperationsinport.Complacencyisnotacceptableandcouldveryeasilyleadtolossofbothlifeandproperty.

Course of eventsRecentlyachemicaltankerwasloadingacargoofethylalcoholinaBrazilianport.Thevesselalsotookbunkersinthisport.Theloadingofbunkersfromabargeandloadingofcargofromtheshoreterminaltookplacesimultaneously.Bunkerswereloadedwithoutincident.However,asparkfromthefunnelofthetug,whichwasstandingbytoassistthebunkerbargeinmanoeuvring,causedafireatthevessel’scargomanifold.Thishappenedduetocollectionofethyl alcohol in the manifold drip tray from a leaking loading hose.

Fortunatelythevessel’screwdealtwiththefirequickly,but,unwisely,loadingwasre-startedassoonasthefirewasputout,apparentlywiththeblessingoftheterminal,throughthesameleakinghoseandwithoutcheckingforhotspots.Theresultwasthatthepresenceofahotspotcausedre-ignitionoftheethylalcoholinthemanifold.Onceagain,theship’screwswiftlyextinguishedthefire.

Thesecondincidentresultedintheterminalandlocalfirebrigaderequiringthatalldamagedhosesbereplacedandthatalltracesofcargoberemovedfromthediptray.Thiswasfollowedbyajointinspectionofthevesselbytheterminalandlocalfirebrigadepriortothevesselbeingallowedtoresumecargooperations.Duringthisperiodofrectificationandinspection,avesseldischarginggasataneighbouringberthwasalsorequiredtosuspendcargooperations.

Lessons learnedAsmentionedpreviously,thisincidentwasclearlyavoidable.Itismostsurprisingthattheloadingofachemicalcargowasallowedthroughaleakinghose.Somefundamentallessonsto be learned from this case are:

1. Itiscommonpracticeandarequirementbymost,ifnotall,tankercompaniesandterminalsthatacheckis carried out on commencement of loading to ensure that,amongstotherthings,noleaksarepresentinthetransferofcargo.Thispracticeshouldalwaysbefollowed.

2. Anyleaksmustberectifiedpriortoresumptionofcargooperations.Unfortunately,thisisasimplerulethatwasignoredinthecaseinquestion.

3. Inaddition,themanifoldmustbecontinuouslymonitored.Whatismostsurprising,though,isthefactthatinthepresentcaseloadingwasallowedtoresumethroughaleakinghoseaftertheoccurrenceofthefirstfire.

Cargo manifold and drip pans.

4. Safetyconsiderationsneedtobetakenintoaccountforloadingofbunkersconcurrentwiththeloadingofcargo.Many,withgoodreason,frownuponthispractice.Thepresence of the bunker barge produces additional risks that may not be readily appreciated or may simply be beyond the control of the relatively limited manning requirementsofpresenttimes.

5. Loadingofbunkersduringcargooperationsmaybeacceptablewhenloadingfromashoretank,orifthebunker barge is occupying a berth at the terminal and a shorepipelineisutilisedforthetransfer.Thisremovesthe additional risks present due to the presence of the bargealongsidethevessel.Ofcourse,itstillrequirestwooperationstobeefficientlymonitoredatthesametime.Forobviousreasons,itisadvisabletoprohibitsimultaneousbunkeringandcargooperations,wherethenatureofthecargorequiresmaindeckscupperstobekeptopenduringcargooperations.Thisnormallyappliestogastankers.

Fortunately,intheabove-mentionedcasethevesselwasluckytoescapewithjustfiredamagetosomecargohoses,scorchingofmaindeckpaintinthevicinityofthefireand13hourslostinrectifyingthesituation.Thingscouldhavebeenmuchworseas,atthetimeofthefires,thevesselhadonboardparcelssuchasEthylAlcohol,Voranol,CarbonTetrachloride,PolyethyleneglycolUSP,andEthyleneDichloride(EDC).


95


Dry docking - responsibilities and contractual issuesIntroductionGardhasseenthatquestionsrelatingtoresponsibility,authority and contractual issues can be complicating factors whendamageoccurswhilstavesselisatarepairyardorindrydock.Thequestionsaremostlyrelatedtowhoisresponsible for the damage occurring and the resulting repaircosts.Isitthevessel’sownersortheyard?Insomecases,ownershavenotevenbeenawarethattheyardhaslimiteditsliabilityinthecontract.

The purpose of this circular is to address the importance ofclearlyallocatingresponsibilityinthecontractwiththeyard/dry dock for any damage caused during the docking operation.Thecircularalsohighlightstheimportanceofensuring that both parties have a common understanding of whatwasagreedinthecontract.

Gard’s experienceInarecentcaseavesselwasscheduledfordrydockingtoperformasubstantialoverhaul,refitandconversionworks.Duringtheinitialdockinspectionofthevessel’sflatbottom,itwasdiscoveredthatlargepartsoftheductkeelplating had been dented and deformed over almost its entirelength.Itwaslaterestablishedthattheoverloadofthevessel’skeelstructurewascausedbyacombinationofa)theownerssubmittinganoutdateddockingplan;andb)theyard,whenunabletousetheavailabledockingplan,repositionedthekeelblockswithoutperformingadditionalcalculationsorconferringwiththeowners.Theresultwasextensiverepaircosts,delaysanddisputesbetweentheownersandyardastowhowasliable.Properplanningof the docking process and a clear and concise contract betweentheownersandyardareimportanttohelpavoidsuchdisputesarising,andwillprotectowners’interestswhenliabilityisanissue.

PlanningandpreparationstobeundertakenpriortodockingMuch of the dispute related to the case described abovecouldhavebeenavoidedwithgoodplanningandpreparations focusing on the critical steps and tasks in the dockingprocess.

•Allnecessarydocumentationrequiredtocompletethedockingoperationandtheexpectedworkloadattherepairyard,includinganupdateddockingplan,shouldbeforwardedbyownerstotheyardwellbeforetheworkisduetocommence.Aproperanddetailedrepairspecificationmade available to the yard in advance could save both time andmoney.

•Dockingblocksshouldbearrangedinaccordancewiththelatest/approveddockingplanandtheyard’sresponsibility for checking the correct positioning of the docking blocks should be clearly stated in the formal contract.

•Meetingsbetweentheowners’representativeandtheyard/docking master should be held prior to the vessel enteringthedock.Priortothemeetingtheownersofthevessel should carry out a proper risk assessment based on thescheduledscopeofworkinordertoidentifycritical

stepsandtasksinthedockingprocess.Duringthemeeting,measurestocontroltheprocessshouldbedefinedandagreed and the documentation can be discussed and any uncertaintiesclarified.

•Clearcommunicationlinesbetweentheyardandtheowners’representativeshouldbeagreedinthecontractatacorrespondinglevelofauthority.Normallytherepairmanager at the yard and superintendent of the vessel representtheparties.Themaincorrespondenceduringthevessel’sstayattheyardshouldbethroughthesepartiesandany deviations from this procedure should be agreed and documented.

•Ownersandyardsrespectivelynormallybasetheirworkandrequirementsongeneraltermsandconditions.However,theydonotnecessarilycorrespondwitheachotherandcanvarysubstantiallyfromoneyardtoanother.Disputescommonlyarisebecauseownersandyardsbelievetheirtermsandconditionsapplyandnottheotherparty’s.Itisthereforeprudentforvesselownerstoreviewthetermsandconditions of the yard to identify potential areas of dispute priortocommencementofanyworkanditmaybenecessarytonegotiatesomeofthem,suchasthelimitationliabilityamountanddelayeddeliverypenaltyclause.

Use of sub-contractorsThereisanincreasingtrendtouseexternalsubcontractorsduringworkatayard,bothbytheyardandvesselowners.Ifthecontractualrelationshipsbetweentheyard,subcontractorandownersareunclear,thismayleadtoverycomplexliabilityissuesintheeventofanydamagecausedbytheyardoroneofthesubcontractors.

Forsubcontractorsengagedbyownersdirectly,itisimportant to ensure that they are thoroughly briefed on owners’standards(safetyandother),onthecontentofthedetailedrepairspecificationandontheagreedcontractualtermsandconditions.Whenitcomestosubcontractorsengageddirectlybytheyard,theyshouldbetheresponsibilityoftheyard,sotheowners’maincontractwiththeyard/repairerwillgovernthematterifadisputeshouldarise.

Workattheyardinmanycaseswillbecarriedoutbyacombinationoftheyard’spersonnel(includingtheirsubcontractors)andowner’sdirectlyengagedsubcontractors.Itisthereforeimportanttohaveagoodunderstanding of the various applicable contractual liabilities betweenthepartiesinvolvedpriortothecommencementofanywork.

Summary and recommendationInsummary,beforeandafterarepairyardhasbeenselected:

•Properplanningandpreparationsfocusingonthecriticalsteps and tasks in the docking process is important to avoid damageoccurringandclaimsarising.

96


•Toavoiddisputesifdamagesoccur,itshouldbeensuredthat everyone has a clear understanding of all the agreed contractualtermsandconditionsbetweentheownersandtheyard.Ownersshouldbepreparedtonegotiatecontractual terms and conditions in order to achieve more favourabledivisionofliabilityandcompensationprovisions.

•Wheresubcontractorsareusedbyowners,responsibilitiesbetweensubcontractorandownersshouldbeclarifiedbetweentheparties.

Additionalrecommendations:

•Useofadditionalowners’personneltofollow-upduringthe yard stay should be considered as a preventive measure inordertoavoidunforeseendamage,extrarepaircostsanddelays.Extracostsforsuperintendantsorotherowners’representativesmay be covered by insurers depending on the terms of the policy.

•Finaltestingandcommissioningaftercompletedrepairworkbytheyard/subcontractorisoftensupervisedorevenperformedbyowners’representatives.Animportantissueforownerstobeawareofinthiscontextisthepotentialtransfer of liability for damagesoccurringduringand/oraftertestingandcommissioning.


97


LOI, LOU and BLG – Confused?

BackgroundWhendealingwithliabilityclaimsinshippingoneoftencomeacrossterminologyunfamiliartothosenotworkingwithclaimsonaregularbasis.

Theaboveabbreviationsaretypicalexamplesoftencausingconfusionandmisunderstandings.Theyareoftenregardedasnamesfordocumentsneededwhenthingsgowrong,butmanyhavenoideawhattheycontainorwhicheffecttheyhave.Itisalsooftenthecasethatthecontentofsuchdocumentscanbelegalisticanddetailed.

ThisCircularexplainswhatthesedocumentsareforandthekindofcontenttheyshouldcontaininordertoprotectone’sinterests.

LOI – Letter of IndemnityWhenonepartywantstheothertodeviatefromanormalorregulatedpractice,itmaybenecessarytogiveanindemnity.ALetterofIndemnityisadocumentwhichpurportstogiveapartyarightofrecoveryagainsttheLOIissuerforanyliabilities,losses,costsorexpensesarisingfromfollowingthespecificrequests/orderscontainedwithintheLOI.

Atypicalshippingexampleisacharterer’sordertoacarriertodischargecargoatadischargeportwithoutthereceiverprovidinganoriginalbillofladinginexchangeforthegoodsbeingdeliveredtohim.Inthesecircumstances,thecarrier’sconsequentialliabilityforfollowingsuchanorderisexcludedfromitsP&Iinsurance.TheInternationalGroupofP&IClubshas,however,draftedastandardformLOI,underwhichanindemnityiscreatedinfavourofthecarrier.TheissueofinsurancecoverremainsunchangedbuttheLOIgivesthecarrieranexpressrightofrecourseagainstthecharterer.

ALetterofIndemnityshouldnormallyinclude:-reasonforissuewithadescriptionofthecircumstances,-indemnityforalistofspecificrisks,-agreementtoprovidefundstodefendclaims,-agreementtoprovidesecurityifvesselorassetsarearrested,-fulllistofpartiesjointlyliableundertheLOI,-lawandjurisdictionoftheLOI.

ItisimportanttorememberthatLOIsarenotafix-allsolutionforanykindofproblem.Equallyimportant,someLOIsareunenforceableatlaw,forexampleanLOIreceived in return for issuing a clean on board bill of lading despitethefactthatthedocumentwasknowntocontainanincorrectdescriptionofthecargooritsquantityoritscondition.Furthermore,anyLOIisonlyasgoodasthepartyprovidingit.Hence,acceptinganLOIdoesmeanariskofincurringanuninsuredloss.

LOU – Letter of UndertakingWhiletheLOIisadocumentwherebytheproviderpromisesthereceiverofittoreimbursehisfinanciallossforcarryingoutcertainactions,aLetterofUndertakingisadocumentwherebytheproviderpromisesthereceiverofittoreimbursefinanciallossincurredasaresultofashippingincident.

AnLOUisaguaranteeoftenissuedbyaP&IClubonbehalfofitsMembertoaclaimantwhoallegedlyhassuffereda

lossforwhichtheMemberisliableandcoveredunderitsP&Iinsurance.Inmostcases,aClubLOUisissuedonthethreatofarrestordetentionofavessel.ThetermsofaClubLOUwillincludethat,onceacceptedbythereceiverassecurityforhisclaim,hemustreleasetheshipfromarrestordetentionandpromisenottore-arresttheshiportakeanyaction against other assets to obtain security for the same claim.

ThemainadvantagesofaClubLOUfromtheMember’sandClub’sperspectivelieinitseaseofissueandflexibilityregardingcontent.Onceasecuritydemandisputforward,aClubLOUcanbeissuedassoonitstermshavebeenagreed,formulatedandsigned,thenfaxedore-mailedaroundtheglobeinminutes.ThemainadvantageofaClubLOUfromtheclaimant’sperspectiveisthatheobtainsarighttorecoverhisclaimdirectlyfromtheClub.ItisimportantthataClubLOUbalancestherespectiveinterests,i.e.securingtheclaimwithoutjeopardizingthedefendant’srightsanddefences.

AClubLOUshouldnormallyinclude:-identityofparties,-detailsoftheclaim,-reasonforissue,-referencetothecontractorcircumstancesunderwhichitisgiven,-maximumamountofsecurity,-triggersforpayment,-provisionpreservingMember’srightsanddefences,-lawandjurisdictionfortheclaimandforanyenforcementoftheLOU.

Normally,thetriggerforpaymentunderaClubLOUisasettlementagreementbetweenthepartiesorafinalandenforceablecourtjudgmentorarbitrationaward.

Importantlimitationstokeepinmind:P&IClubshavenoobligationtoprovideLOUs,theyarepurelydiscretionary;ClubLOUsmaynotbeacceptedinsomejurisdictionsorbytheclaimant;andtheclaimmaybeoutsideP&Icover.

BLG – Bank Letter of GuaranteeBankGuaranteeshavealongtraditionforsecuringclaims.Aswithanyformofsecurity,itisimportantthatthetermsincludedareinlinewithourrecommendationsforClubLOUs.DuetothecostsandtimeinvolvedinissuingBankGuarantees,especiallywheremorethanonebankisinvolved,therearemanyadvantagesinhavingaClubLOUissuedratherthanaBankGuaranteewherepossible.Itshould also be remembered that banks are not immune from financialfailureandthataBankGuaranteeisnotnecessarily“better”security.

SeeGardNewsissues162and155forfurtherinformation.

98



Measures to prevent drug smugglingGeneralDrug smuggling constitutes a very serious crime almost anywhereintheworld.Affectedpartiescanexpectextensiveinvestigations,interrogation,detentionandpossiblycriminalprosecution,convictionandimprisonment.Moreover,assetsmaybeseizedassecurityforheftyfinesandpenaltiesandultimatelyconfiscatedand/orsold.

Gard has recently seen an increase in the number of reported drug detection incidents involving merchant ships callingatportsinVenezuela,ColombiaandEcuador,aswellastheCaribbean.Itisbelievedthatthelatterisincreasinglybeingusedasastagingpostfordrugtrafficking,withnoshortage of volunteers due to the decline in traditional industries.ItissuspectedthatthedrugswereboundfortheUS,Europeand/orRussia.ThepurposeofthisCircularistoalertMembersandClientstotherisks,andsuggestmeasurestopreventsimilarincidentsoccurring.

Measures to prevent drug smuggling The general aim in all instances is to prevent the illegal substancesfromcomingonboardthevesselinthefirstplace.Thefollowingaresomegeneralguidelinesforprecautionarymeasurestobetakenbeforeentryintoport,whilstinportandafterdeparture.

Before entry• Crewgoingashoreshouldbeinformedoftheriskthat

possibledrugtraffickersmayseektobefriendtheminordertoachievetheirco-operationtosmuggledrugs.Thecrewmustunderstandthat,apartfromviolatingcompanypolicy,thiscouldbepotentiallydangerousforthemselves,theirfamilies,fellowcrewmembersetc.Moreover,localauthoritiesarelikelytoactforcefullyagainstanycrewmemberwhoisconsideredtobeassociatedwithdrugtraffickers.

• Warningpostersdescribingtherisksinvolvedinthecarriage of drugs should be clearly displayed at the pointoftheentry/exittothevesselandwithintheaccommodationareas.

• Theshipshouldkeepaccuraterecordsofallactivitiesobservedandtheactionstakenbylocalauthorities,stevedoresandothershore-basedpersonnelandcrewbeforeentryintoport,duringthestayandimmediatelyafterdeparture.

Whilst in port or at anchor • Themasterandcrewmusttakeallpossibleprecautions

to limit access to the vessel and monitor the surrounding areaadjacenttothevesselwhilstinport.Individualswhohavenolegitimaterequirementforbeingonboardmustnotbeallowedonboard.Thecrewshouldkeepalogatthepointofentry/exit,andtheMasterorChiefOfficershouldbeinformedifthewatchisuncertainastowhetheranindividualhaslegitimatereasonstobeonboard.

• Apermanentwatchmanshouldbepresentinareaswherestevedoresorrepairtechniciansareworkingonboardtheship.Duringhoursofdarknessallareasshouldbewelllitinordertofacilitatevisualmonitoringofactivities.AnysuspiciousactivitiesconductedbythirdpartiesonboardshouldbereportedtotheMaster.Attentionshouldbe paid to small boats approaching the ship and any

suspiciousactivityinthevicinityoftheshipwhichmaywarrantfurtherinvestigation.Theuseofasearchlightduringthehoursofdarknessshouldbeconsidered.

• Thecrewshouldperformregularshipboardinspectionsthroughoutthedurationoftheportcall.Inportsparticularlypronetodrugsmuggling,itshouldbeconsidered to employ additional security guards from anapprovedsupplier.Whenbroken/missingsealsforcompartments,lockers,containersetc.,arediscoveredan investigation should be conducted and if nothing is foundthesealsshouldbereplacedbythecrew.Arecordshouldbemadeinthelogbooktogetherwithanoteofthe outcome of the investigation/search and the relevant sealnumbers.

• Oncecargooperationsarecompleted,thecrewshouldperformafullsearchofthevessel.Inadditiontolookingforillegalsubstances,thecrewshouldbeonthelookoutforstowaways.Ifthereareanysuspicionsthatdrugsmayhavebeenplacedonboard,theMastershouldrequestacomprehensivevesselinspection,includinginspectionofthevessel’shullbelowthewaterline,beforedeparture.Themostcommonmeasureistheanti-smugglingsub-aquaticsurveytoascertainthatnoillegalsubstancesareattachedtothevesselbelowherwaterline.

After departure• Oncethevesselhassailedandtheoutboundpilothas

disembarked,athoroughsearchofallcompartmentsshould be conducted and the results recorded in the logbook.

Action to be taken if drugs are found onboard IfdrugsarefoundonboardtheMastershouldimmediatelytakestepsassetoutinthevessel’sEmergencyContingencyPlan(aspertheISMCode)and/ortheShip’sSecurityPlan(aspertheISPSCode),oneofwhichshouldincludestepstobetakenwithregardtonotificationtothelocalauthorities.Thefollowinggeneralguidelinescanalsobegiven:• Thedrugsmustnotbetouched.• Photographorvideotheareaoftheshipwherethedrugs

werefound,butleaveituntouchedandsealitofftopreventanyunauthorisedaccess.

• InformtheP&Iinsurer,thelocalP&Icorrespondentandtheshipowner/manager.


99


Straight bills of lading – Do your bills use clear words? (Part II)IntroductionSinceGardServicesLossPreventionCircularNo.13-02waspublishedinDecember2002,thecasereferredtoatfootnote4ofthatcircular–theRAFAELAS–hasbeenappealedintheEnglishCourts.TheCourtofAppeal’sjudgment1 contains some very important and useful guidanceonhowtheEnglishcourtshave,inthepast,andnowoughttoviewstraightbillsofladingunderEnglishlaw.ThecasealsomadereferencetotheVossPeercasementionedinCircularNo.13-02andtoleadingdecisionsinthecourtsofothercountries,suchasGermanyandtheNetherlands.

AlthoughtheRAFAELASmostlydealtwiththequestionofwhetherstraightbillsoughttobeconsidered“documentsoftitle”forthepurposesoftheHague/HagueVisbyRules2,thecaseclarifieshowEnglishlawoughtnowviewthecarrier’sdeliveryobligationsundersuchbills.Onecanalsodetectfromtheappealacertainamountofcriticismtowardscarriersforambiguouswordingsintheirownbillofladingformsandfornotusingwaybillsinsteadofstraightbills.Itisparticularlyimportanttonotethefollowing:

Printed words requiring surrender of a bill of lading to take deliveryReferencewasmadeinCircularNo.13-02toprintedwordscommonlyappearingonthefaceofmostbillsoflading,andwhichintheRAFAELASwere:

“In witness whereof the number of Original Bills of Lading stated above [viz 3] all of this tenor and date, has been signed, one of which being accomplished, the others to stand void. One of the Bills of Lading must be surrendered duly endorsed in exchange for the goods or delivery order”.

Atfirstinstancethesewordswereinterpretedtoapplyonlywhenthebillwasnegotiable.TheCourtofAppealhoweverdisagreedandwerepersuadedthatthebetterviewwasthatthewordsreflectedarequirementbythecarrierthatanybill presented should apparently entitle the holder to claim delivery(aswithabearerbill).TheleadingjudgeintheCourtofAppeal(LordJusticeRix)wentontotosay:

“…I do not regard it as a happy matter that the omission of adding words “or order” in the consignee box in this case (or the omission to add a notify party in the form used in the CHITRAL3), either of which could have happened without deliberation at all, should have the effect of transforming a contractual document which in every respect looks and reads like a bill of lading into a sea waybill, when a sea waybill commonly takes a totally different form”

“If it had been intended that it [the printed paragraph containing the above words] should not apply when the bill was used in non-negotiable form, then it could very easily have said so. Against the background of common forms of sea waybills, it is truly remarkable that it does not say so”

“Everyone seems to be agreed that if a straight bill expressly provides, as it commonly does, that its surrender is required for delivery to take place, then it is a document of title”

Therefore,ifwordssuchasthosementionedaboveappearinastraight(andthereforenon-negotiable)billtheywillbeinterpretedunderEnglishlawasgivingthebillthefunctionofdocumentoftitleandwiththatarequirementfortheproductionofanoriginalbilltotakedelivery.

The absence of printed words requiring surrender of a bill of lading to take deliveryWhilstitwasnotnecessarytodoso,LordJusticeRixwentontotogivetheview(obiter)thatastraightbillofladingwas,inprinciple,adocumentoftitleevenintheabsenceofanexpressprovisionrequiringitsproductiontoobtaindelivery.Rixwentontosay:

“A shipper needs the carrier to assist him policing his security in retention of the bill. He is entitled to redirect the consignment on notice to the carrier, and although notice is required, a rule of production of the bill is the only safe way, for the carrier as well as the shipper, to police such new instructions. In any event, if proof of identity is necessary, as in practice it is, what is wrong with the bill itself as a leading form of proof. This is of course an inconvenient rule where the carriage is very short ... and that is why sea waybills are used in such trades. But it is clear that straight bills are used in intercontinental carriage and therefore the inconvenience argument fails”

Therefore,regardlessofwhetherwordsrequiringproductiontotakedeliveryappearinastraight(andthereforenon-negotiable)bill,suchabillislikelytoberegarded,atleastinprincipleunderEnglishlaw,tobeadocumentoftitleandwiththattherewillbearequirementfortheproductionofanoriginalbilltotakedelivery.

Words permitting delivery without surrender of a bill of ladingItissomewhatdisappointingthattheCourtofAppealdidnotgoasfarastoconsiderthepositionwhenastraight(andthereforenon-negotiable)billdoesexpresslyprovidethatdeliverycantakeplacewithoutsurrenderofanoriginalbilloflading,muchinthesamewayasawaybilldoes.TheCourtofAppealonlywentsofarastosay:

“…it seems to be common ground that a document which does not have to be presented to the carrier to obtain delivery of the goods cannot be called a document of title”

“…whatever may be the position as a matter of principle and in the absence of express agreement, [our emphasis] the practice appears to be that a straight bill of lading, unlike a mere sea waybill, is written in the form of an otherwise classic bill and

100


requires production of the bill on delivery, and therefore transfer to a consignee to enable him to obtain delivery”

“If it had been intended that it [the printed paragraph containing the above words] should not apply when the bill was used in non-negotiable form, then it could very easily have said so. Against the background of common forms of sea waybills, it is truly remarkable that it does not say so”

ThereisnothingintheRAFAELAScase,whichsuggestsanyintentiononthepartoftheEnglishCourtstodeviatefromproperlyconstructingacontractasagreedbetweentheparties(i.e.acarrierandashipper).Inanothernotablerecent“packagelimitation”case–TheKapetanPetkoVoiveda4 -theCourtofAppealrecognisedthatshippershavetheoptiontonegotiateacceptablecarriageterms.Thereisnoreasonwhythisshouldnotextendtoanyrequirementforthe production of an original bill of lading under a straight (andthereforenon-negotiable)bill.Accordingly,theremarksuggestedinCircularNo.13-02tobeinsertedinastraight(andthereforenon-negotiable)billofladingoughttominimisetherisk,underEnglishlaw,ofacarrierbeingfoundliableformisdeliverybydeliveringcargowithoutproductionofanoriginalbill.

GeneralLordJusticeRixconcluded:-

“I am not unhappy to come to these conclusions. It seems to me that the use of these hybrid forms of bill of lading is an unfortunate development and has spawned litigation over the years … Carriers should not use bill of lading forms if what they want to invite shippers to do is to enter into sea waybill type contracts. It may be that ultimately it is up to the shipper to ensure that the boxes in these hybrid forms are filled up in the best way that best suits themselves, but in practice I suspect serendipity prevails. In any event, these forms invite error and litigation, which is best avoided by a simple rule”

1CaseNo.A3/2002/0909.2Ifastraightbillwerenotdeemedadocumentoftitle,theHague/HagueVisbyRuleswouldnotapplyunderEnglishlawandthecarrierwouldbefreetocontractontermsmorefavourablythansuchRules.IfthoseRuleshadnotappliedintheRAFAELASthemoreliberalpackagelimitationundertheUSCarriageofGoodsbySeaActwouldhaveapplied.3[2000]1Lloyd’sRep529.4DaewooHeavyIndustriesandAnotherv.KlipriverShippingLtd&NavigationMaritimeBulgares(“KapetanPetkoVoiveda”)EnglishCourtofAppeal:LordsJusticesAldous,JudgeandLongmore:[2003]EWCACiv.451:3April2003.

SummaryWhilsttherecommendationsinCircularNo.13-02stillstandgood,thejudgmentoftheCourtofAppealintheRAFAELASmustbeconsideredastarkwarningtocarriersdeliveringcargounderstraight(andthereforenon-negotiable)billswithoutproductionofanoriginalbill.Anagreementbetweenthecarrierandshippertodosowillberequired,alongthelinessuggested,inordertominimisethecarrier’sexposuretoclaimsformisdelivery.

Thecasealsosupportsafirmrecommendationtocarriersandshipperstousewaybillsinsteadofstraightbillsincircumstanceswherethefunctionsofdocumentoftitle(withthesecuritythatgivesfortheshipper)andnegotiabilityarenotneeded.

AccordingtoRule34of Gard’s Statutes and Rules cover is excludedfor“… liabilities, costs and expenses arising out of the delivery of cargo under a negotiable Bill of Lading without production of that Bill of Lading by the person to whom delivery is made except where cargo has been carried on the Ship under the terms of a non-negotiable Bill of Lading, waybill or other non-negotiable document, and has been properly delivered as required by that document…”


101


Straight bills of lading – Delivery – Do your bills use clear words?IntroductionTherehaverecentlybeenanumberofcourtcasesquestioningthestatusandfunctionsofastraightbilloflading.Astraightbill of lading is generally accepted to be one completed insuchawaythatdeliveryistobemadetothenamedconsigneeonly.Accordingly,itisnotatransferableornegotiabledocumentoftitle,whichcanbeusedtotransfertitle(therighttopossession)tothegoods,coveredbythatdocument.Billsofladingthataremadeout“toorder”are,byendorsement,negotiabledocumentsoftitle.Bearerbillsofladingarenegotiablewithoutendorsement.

Thecommonlyheldviewisthat,whilstdeliveryunderanegotiable bill of lading should only be against production ofanoriginalbill,suchproductionisnotnecessaryunderastraight(non-negotiable)billoflading,i.e.,deliveryneedonlybemadetotheproperlyidentifiednamedconsignee.AsmentionedinGard’sGuidance on Bills of Lading,however,andinlightofrecentcaselaw,thatviewisover-simplisticandindeeddangerous.Ifcareisnottaken,thecarrierrisksfacingclaimsformisdelivery.

The problemInarecentcasebeforetheEnglishcourts,THEHAPPYRANGER1,thebillofladingappearedtobeastraightbill-theconsigneeboxshowedonlyanamedconsigneeanddidnotcontainthewords“toorder”orotherssimilar.However,thefaceofthebillcontained,inanotherbodyoftext,theprintedwords“consignee or to his or their assigns”andtheseweretheonlywordsonthefaceofthebillindicatingnegotiabilityorotherwise.Sincethosewordsareacceptedtomean“to order”,thecourtdecidedthatmadethebillnegotiable.

Whilstthiscasedidnotconcernamisdeliveryclaim,itneverthelessdemonstratesthat,iftheintentionistoissueastraightnon-negotiablebill,clearwordsmustbeused(andotherwordsshouldnotconflictwiththem)toshowthatthebillisinfactastraightnon-negotiablebill.Ifnot,thebillwillprobablybedeemedtobenegotiableandthecarrierwillbe obliged to deliver the goods only against production of anoriginalbill.Inanotherrecentcase,whichdidconcernmisdelivery,thecarrierhaddeliveredthecargowithoutproductionofanoriginalbill.Theshipperhadretainedtheoriginalbills(allthree)becausethebuyer/consigneehadnotyetpaidinfull,andwhenhefailedtodoso,theshippersuedthecarrier.Thecase, Voss Peer v. APL Co Pte Ltd2,wasbroughtbeforetheSingaporecourts.

Thebillofladingformwas,asisincreasinglycommonplace,designedforvariouscircumstancesincludingwhenthebillistobenegotiableandwhenitistobenon-negotiable.Itwasacceptedthatthebillwasastraightbill3.Notably,thebillofladingcontainedprintedwordselsewhereonitsface

“Upon surrender to the Carrier of any one negotiable bill of lading, properly endorsed, all others to stand void”.UnderEnglishlaw4suchwordswererecentlyinterpretedtoapplyonlywhenthebillwasnegotiable.Byimplicationtherefore,under

1[2001]2Lloyd’sRep.530and[2002]2Lloyd’sRep.357.2[2002]3SLR176andCivilAppealNo.18of2002.3Itcontainedtheprintedwords“(non-negotiableunlessconsignedtoOrder)”andthewords“toorder”didnotappearinthebillthatwasissued,eithernexttothenamedconsigneeorelsewhere.4SeeforexampletheRAFAELAS[2002]2Lloyd’sRep.4035Seawaybillsexpresslystatetheyarenon-negotiableandthatdeliverydoesnotrequireproductionofanoriginalseawaybill.

astraightnon-negotiablebill,thecarrierwasnotpreventedfromdeliveringthegoodswithoutproductionofanoriginalbill.TheSingaporeCourtsdisagreedanddecidedthat“clear words were required”toreflecttheintentionofthepartiestocontractoutofdeliveringthegoodswithoutproductionofanoriginalbill.

Asaresult,theSingaporecourtsfoundthecarrierliableforthemisdeliveryclaim.LessrecentEnglishcaselawsuggeststhattherequirementforclearwordsmaybecorrect.Carriersshouldthereforeensurethat,wherethebillisastraightnon-negotiablebill,itcontainsclearwordspermittingthecarriertodeliverthegoodswithoutproductionofanoriginalbill.

RecommendationsInconsiderationoftheaboverecentcourtcases,GardServicesrecommendsMembersandclientsto:– Checktheirstandardformbills,particularlythose

designedforvariouscircumstancesincludingwhenthebillistobenegotiableandwhenitistobenon-negotiable.

– Ensurethatprintedwordsinthebillmakeitclearinwhatcircumstancesthebillwillbeastraightnon-negotiablebill.Forexample,useofthewords“(B/Lnotnegotiableunless“orderof”)”intheconsigneebox.

– Ensurethatotherprintedwords,particularlyonthefaceofthebill,suchasthoseinTHEHAPPYRANGER,donotconflictwithabillwhichisintendedtobenon-negotiable.Ifthosewordscannotbedeleted,orothersmoreappropriateused,itshouldbemadeclearthattheyonlyapplywherethebillisnegotiable.

– Thedocumentissuedshouldofcourseproperlyreflectwhathasbeenagreedwiththeshipper.Ifanon-negotiabledocumentissufficient,aseawaybillwillusuallybemostappropriate.Ifaseawaybill5 can notbeissued,itissuggestedthatthestraightbillshouldalsocontainwords(handwrittenorstampedtogivepreferenceoverprintedwords)suchas“wherenontransferable/negotiable,thecarrierisentitledtodeliverthegoodstothenamedconsigneewithoutsurrenderofanoriginalbilloflading,andisobligedtodosounlesstheshipperrequestsotherwisebeforedeliverytakesplace”.

– Whereitisagreedthatanon-negotiabledocumentistobeissued,that,togetherwiththecarrier’sdeliveryobligationsthereunder,shouldpreferablybereflectedinbookingconfirmations.

– Incaseofdoubt,cargounderstraightbillsshouldnotbedeliveredwithoutproductionofanoriginalbill,unlessanduntilwrittenconsenthasbeenobtainedfromtheshipper.

GardwillbehappytoreviewMembers’billsofladingandtoprovideguidanceinlightoftheabove.Amorein-depthcommentaryonthecasesreferredtointhislosspreventioncircularappearsinGardNews169(February2003).

102



Bills of Lading: Is the shipper’s stowage request always compulsory?IntroductionBillsofladinginawordingwhichmayseemharmlessuntilaclaimarisescancreateproblemsforshipownersonwording.Thiscircularoutlinesonesuchcasewherethebillofladingwasclausedtoincludeaparticularrequestforstowageofcontainers.Forfurtherinformation,pleaserefertotheGardGuidanceonBillsofLadingwhichcanbefoundontheGardServiceswebsiteatwww.gard.no.

Course of eventsAttheportofNewYork,9containerssaidtocontain(s.t.c.)18coilsofaluminumsheet(2coilspercontainer),wereloadedonboardacontainershipforcarriagetoSantos,Brazil.Thebillofladingwaswordedsuchthat,intheeventofhavingtodeterminethecarrier’sliabilityfordamageorlossofthecargo,eachcoilwasconsideredapackage.

Theshippersofthecargorequestedthatthecontainersbestowedbelowdeckandaclausestating“belowdeckstowagerequested”wasinsertedonthefaceofthebilloflading.Afterthestowagearrangementswerefinalised,itturnedoutthat4ofthecontainersstuffedwithaluminumcoilswereloadedondeck.ThevesselencounteredbadweatheronroutetoBrazil.Asaconsequence,2ofthecontainerscarriedondeckaswellasthecoilsinsidethecontainers,sufferedextensivedamage.Aftersurveyingthealuminumcoilsthecargoreceiversrejectedtheminfull,arguingthatthealuminumwasnotusefulfortheintendedpurpose.Afewmonthsaftertherejectionofthecargobythereceivers,theshipownerreceivedaclaimfromthecargounderwritersintheamountofUSD184,000.

Thecargounderwritersarguedthattheywereentitledto100percentoftheamounttheyhadpaidtotheirassured.Theystatedthatthecarrierhadnotcompliedwiththetermsoftherelevant bill of lading as the cargo had not been carried under deckasrequestedbytheshippers,andthereforewouldnotbeentitledtolimithisliability.ThecargounderwritersthreatenedtostartlegalproceedingsintheUnitedStatesastheshipmentoriginatedinNewYork.Atsomestage,cargounderwritersofferedtosettletheclaimatthelevelof70percentoftheUSD184,000claimed.

Theshipownerhadapotentiallydifficultcase,ashehadnotstowedthecargobelowdeckasrequestedbytheshippers.Theaffectedcontainerswereeffectivelyloadedondeck.Theshipownercontinuedsearchingforthebestsolutiontotheclaim.AshewasfacedwiththecargounderwriterslookingtocommenceproceedingsintheUnitedStates,heconsideredpiecesoflegislationwhichmayhelphimresolvethematter.

TheshipownerdiscoveredadecisionmadeinapriorcaseInsurance Company of North America v. Blue Star (North America) Ltd.,whereasimilarsituationhadarisen.IntheBLUESTARcase,aforty-footcontainerwasloadedonthedeckofacontainershippursuanttoabillofladingstating“belowdeckstowagerequested”.ThecasewasheardattheSouthernDistrictofNewYorkandthecourtconcludedthatthe

“stowageondeckofacontainershipisnotanunreasonabledeviation”.ThisdecisionofthecourtmeantthatthecarrierwasentitledtoalltheexceptionsandlimitationsprovidedbyU.S.CarriageofGoodsbySeaAct,1936(COGSA).USCOGSAapplies to all inbound and outbound cargoes to and from the UnitedStates.

Furthermore,thecourtwentontoanalysethemeaningoftheclause“belowdeckstowagerequested”andconcludedthatthe“billofladingdidnotrequirebelow-deckstowage”,astheword“request”hadbeenusedinthebilloflading,and“request”wasinterpretedtomean“askingorpetition”.Therewasnocontractasonlyapetitionhadbeenmadeand“inorderfortheretobeacontract,theremustbemutualassent”.

AcopyofthisdecisionoftheSouthernDistrictofNewYorkwasforwardedtothecargounderwriterswithanoffertosettle the claim based on the package limitation according toUSCOGSA,i.e.USD500/package.Sincethebillofladingstatedthatthepackagesweretheindividualcoils(2lostpercontainer),anofferofUSD2,000wasputforward.Afterconsideration,thecargounderwritersacceptedtheshipowner’sofferandthecasewasamicablysettledforUSD2,000.

Recommendations1. Shipper’sinstructionsregardingthestowageofcargoon

boardshouldbefollowed.However,ifforanyreasonthecarriercannotfollowtheinstructions,heshouldensurethatthebillofladingisproperlyclausedtoprotecthisposition.

2. Thewordingoftheclausestampedonthefaceofthebillofladingbenefitedtheshipowner.Byusingtheword“request”asopposedto“mandatory”,“compulsorily”,“required”etc.,theshipowner’sliabilitywassignificantlyreduced.Thisreinforcestheneedtoexerciseconsiderablecarewhenclausingabillofladingeventhoughthe“request”oftheshippersisthesame.

3. Theshipowner’sbillofladinghadaclauseonthereverseside giving the carrier the liberty to carry the containers on orbelowdeckbysaying:

“Goods, whether or not carried in containers, may be carried on deck or under deck without notice to the Merchant or any annotation on the face hereof...”

Theshipownershouldensurethatanybillofladingusedby containerships in the liner trade includes this clause or similarwording.

4. Allpreventiverecommendationsshouldbeadheredtoasaprecautionarymeasure. The Insurance Company of North America v. Blue Star (North America) Ltd.casewasofassistancetotheshipownerinthisinstance.However,itwasalowercourtdecision.Thepossibilityofhighercourtdecisions in the future may lead to a different result that doesnotfavourtheshipowner.

Lingard LimitedTrott & Duncan Building17A Brunswick StreetHamilton HM 10Bermuda

Tel +1 441 292 6766Email [email protected]

Gard ASP.O. Box 789 StoaNO-4809 Arendal Norway

Tel +47 37 01 91 00Email [email protected]

Gard AS SkipsbyggerhallenSolheimsgaten 11NO-5058 BergenNorway


Gard AS Støperigt 2, Aker Brygge NO-0250 Oslo Norway


Oy Gard (Baltic) AbBulevardi 46FIN-00120 HelsinkiFinland


Gard (Greece) Ltd2, A. Papanastasiou Avenue185 34 Kastella, PiraeusGreece

Tel + 30 210 413 8752 Email [email protected]

Gard (HK) Ltd Room 3505, 35F The Centrium, 60 Wyndham Street CentralHong Kong

Tel +852 2901 8688Email [email protected]

Gard (Japan) K.K. Kawade Building, 5F1-5-8 Nishi-ShinbashiMinato-ku, Tokyo 105-0003Japan

Tel +81 (0)3 3503 9291Email [email protected]

Gard (Japan) K.K. Vogue 406, 3-9-36 Higashimura, Imabari-City, Ehime 799-1506, Japan


Gard (North America) Inc.40 Fulton StreetNew York, NY 10038USA


Gard (Sweden) AB Västra Hamngatan 5 SE-41117 Gothenburg Sweden


Gard (UK) Limited 85 Gracechurch StreetLondon EC3V 0AA United Kingdom


Gard Marine & Energy- Escritório de Representação no Brasil LtdaRua Lauro Muller 116 – Suite 2405Botafogo, 22290-160, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil

Tel +55 (21) 3544-0046Email [email protected]

Emergency Telephone Number+47 90 52 41 00

www.gard.no

CONTACT DETAILS FOR GARD’S GLOBAL NETWORK

Date post:	11-Feb-2017
Category:	Documents
Upload:	ledan
View:	239 times
Download:	3 times

Gard Loss Prevention Circulars

Documents