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General Manager, MLNG Tiga Sdn Bhd, PETRONASGeneral Manager, MLNG Tiga Sdn Bhd, PETRONAS
Senior Project Manager, Foster Wheeler Energy Ltd.Senior Project Manager, Foster Wheeler Energy Ltd.
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BORNEO in the LNG World
BINTULUBINTULU
BRUNEIBRUNEI
BONTANGBONTANG
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•• Introduction / BackgroundIntroduction / Background
•• Mitigation & Lesson LearnedMitigation & Lesson Learned
•• Business Recovery Plan Business Recovery Plan
•• ConclusionConclusion
Train 7 Fire Incident
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•• The PETRONAS LNG Complex is an integrated plant The PETRONAS LNG Complex is an integrated plant consisting of :consisting of :
•• Malaysia LNG S/BMalaysia LNG S/B -- Train 1, 2, & 3Train 1, 2, & 3
•• Malaysia LNG Dua S/BMalaysia LNG Dua S/B -- Train 4, 5, & 6Train 4, 5, & 6
•• Malaysia LNG Tiga S/BMalaysia LNG Tiga S/B -- Train 7 & 8Train 7 & 8
•• With a total production capacity of 23 Mtpa, the complex With a total production capacity of 23 Mtpa, the complex has become the world’s largest LNG plant in a single has become the world’s largest LNG plant in a single locationlocation
PETRONAS LNG Complex
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MLNG Dua MLNG
MLNG Tiga
Aerial View of PETRONAS LNG Complex
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•• MLNG Tiga nameplate capacity is 3.9 Mtpa per trainMLNG Tiga nameplate capacity is 3.9 Mtpa per train
•• MLNG Tiga Train 7 started up in March 2003MLNG Tiga Train 7 started up in March 2003
•• Performance test completed successfully in June 2003Performance test completed successfully in June 2003
•• Fire incident occurred on August 16Fire incident occurred on August 16thth, 2003 in the Waste , 2003 in the Waste Heat Recovery Unit (WHRU)Heat Recovery Unit (WHRU)
Background Information on Train 7
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Main piperack and Air fin cooler (F7Y)
SS 43
FAR 7SS 56
Incident Area
Sulfinol (F7B)
Fractionation (F7A)
Liquefaction South (F7C)
Liquefaction Middle (F7D)
Liquefaction North (F7E)
MR/Propane Compressor
(F7H)
Hot Oil (F7G)
Dehydration (F7F)
South
North
3-D View of MLNG Tiga Train 7
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•• Waste exhaust gas from gas turbine of propane Waste exhaust gas from gas turbine of propane compressor is used to heat regeneration gas for dryers compressor is used to heat regeneration gas for dryers and hot oil system for and hot oil system for reboilersreboilers
•• The exhaust gas passes through the Y piece of the The exhaust gas passes through the Y piece of the WHRU unit where a regeneration coil and 5 hot oil coils WHRU unit where a regeneration coil and 5 hot oil coils are locatedare located
•• The unit is refractory lined and the operating temperature The unit is refractory lined and the operating temperature is above 500is above 500°° CC
Background Information on WHRU
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Location of Incident
Train 7 WHRU prior to incident
COMMON STACK
PROPANE COMPRESSOR GAS TURBINE
FLUE GAS
HTF HEATER (E-95101)REGENERATION
GAS HEATER (E-91303)
Geometry Model of C3 GT Exhaust & WHRU
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•• On 16On 16thth August 2003 at 10.20 pm, following a trip of the CAugust 2003 at 10.20 pm, following a trip of the C33 GT GT (7KG(7KG--91440) in Train 7, a fire occurred in the WHRU91440) in Train 7, a fire occurred in the WHRU
•• Plant emergency response immediately initiated and MLNG First Plant emergency response immediately initiated and MLNG First Intervention Team (FIT) was mobilized to the sceneIntervention Team (FIT) was mobilized to the scene
•• MLNG Automated CallMLNG Automated Call--Out System (ACOS) and Bintulu Out System (ACOS) and Bintulu Emergency Mutual Aid (BEMA) were activated to assist in the Emergency Mutual Aid (BEMA) were activated to assist in the incidentincident
•• The fire external to the exhaust duct of the CThe fire external to the exhaust duct of the C33 GT was extinguished GT was extinguished within half an hour within half an hour
•• No casualties or injuries occurred in the incidentNo casualties or injuries occurred in the incident
Train 7 Fire Incident
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Schematic Arrangement of the Equipment
Waste Heat Recovery Unit (WHRU)
Combined Stack7A-91440Compressor
House
Noise Enclosure
Propane Gas Turbine
7KG-91440
7A-91911HTF Heater, 7E-95101
ExhaustDuct
Exhaust System
Grade
RegenerationGas Heater7E-91303
Acid Gas Incinerator
Fire LocationFire Location
12Close-Up on the Damage of C3 GT Exhaust Plenum (Top View)
PHOTOS: Before & After The Incident (1)
BEFOREBEFORE AFTER
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PHOTOS: Before & After The Incident (2)
Damaged WHRU
Ducting to Stack
AFTERBEFOREBEFORE
View from North-East of WHRU and Exhaust Stack
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PHOTOS: Before & After The Incident (3)
BEFOREBEFORE
Damaged Piping
AFTER
View from South-East of WHRU and Exhaust Stack
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Initial Investigation
•• An investigation Team was immediately setup on 17An investigation Team was immediately setup on 17thth
August 2003 that comprises plant operator, project August 2003 that comprises plant operator, project team, EPCC contractor, GT vendor (NP/GE), and SGSIteam, EPCC contractor, GT vendor (NP/GE), and SGSI
•• Major finding was Major finding was gas leakgas leak due to a crack in a weld at due to a crack in a weld at one of the tube to header joints of the regeneration gas one of the tube to header joints of the regeneration gas coilcoil
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PHOTOS : Crack on the Tube to Header Weld Joint
Photos showing the crackcrack in the weld at one of the tube to header joints of the the regeneration gas coil - 2nd tube
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Incident Analysis
•• Unrelated trip of turbine resulted in fuel gas closing off Unrelated trip of turbine resulted in fuel gas closing off and turbine running to a stopand turbine running to a stop
•• Air drawn through turbine due to slow rotation of rotor Air drawn through turbine due to slow rotation of rotor and chimney effect of hot stack and chimney effect of hot stack –– 0022 content rose from content rose from 14% to 21 %14% to 21 %
•• Regeneration gas coil developed leak at joint between Regeneration gas coil developed leak at joint between tube and headertube and header
•• Plenum/ducting temperature remained high near the Plenum/ducting temperature remained high near the normal operating exhaust temperature of 570normal operating exhaust temperature of 570°° CC
•• There was an auto ignition temperature at 537There was an auto ignition temperature at 537°° C for C for air and natural gas causing an explosion inside the air and natural gas causing an explosion inside the WHRUWHRU
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The Severity of the Damages
•• WHRU ducting was damaged beyond repair WHRU ducting was damaged beyond repair
•• Hot oil coils were damaged Hot oil coils were damaged
•• Gas turbine plenum was extensively damagedGas turbine plenum was extensively damaged
•• Compressor & GT housing was extensively damagedCompressor & GT housing was extensively damaged
•• Compressor was undamaged but needed full Compressor was undamaged but needed full examinationexamination
•• Turbine ancillary equipment was damaged Turbine ancillary equipment was damaged
•• Regeneration coils were not damagedRegeneration coils were not damaged
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Teams Formed for Efficient Recovery Process
•• Incident Investigation Team to find the root cause Incident Investigation Team to find the root cause
•• Business Recovery TeamBusiness Recovery Team
•• Interim Production Study TeamInterim Production Study Team
•• Demolition TeamDemolition Team
•• Engineering & ReEngineering & Re--HAZOP Teams to develop a safe HAZOP Teams to develop a safe redesignredesign
•• Reconstruction TeamReconstruction Team
•• Insurance Claim Group Insurance Claim Group
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Analysis on the Welding Design
•• The welds on the regeneration coil were deficient The welds on the regeneration coil were deficient
•• NDE was very difficult with the original welding designNDE was very difficult with the original welding design
•• Improved welding design with Improved welding design with nipoletsnipolets for for connection were recommendedconnection were recommended
•• Having nipolets provide a stronger connection and Having nipolets provide a stronger connection and allow full radiographic testing on each joint allow full radiographic testing on each joint
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A gap in the root pass of the weld
A small section of the weld that
maintained the connection
Cross-Section Between the Tube and Header of the Original Weld
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Original Welding Design Between the Tubes and Header
Without Nipolets
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Improved Welding Design Between the Tubes and Header
Nipolets
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The Re-HAZOP Analysis
•• ReRe--HAZOP recommended safety valves (existing HAZOP recommended safety valves (existing motorized valves) for isolation of the regeneration gas motorized valves) for isolation of the regeneration gas coil coil
•• The regeneration gas would be blocked and vented The regeneration gas would be blocked and vented from the coil to flare in the following events :from the coil to flare in the following events :––
•• Detection of differential flow across the coilDetection of differential flow across the coil
•• Loss of pressure in the coilLoss of pressure in the coil
•• During the trip of Gas TurbineDuring the trip of Gas Turbine
•• For future designs, it is recommended that the coil For future designs, it is recommended that the coil header and the connection to be located outside the header and the connection to be located outside the WHRU duct WHRU duct
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Regeneration Coil Isolation & Depressurising
Regeneration Coil
Purge Gas To Regeneration Compressor
Purge Gas From Scrub Column Overheads
Regeneration Gas To Drier Beds
Regeneration Gas From Drier Beds
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PHOTOS: Train 7 Rebuild Work
Installation of the new WHRU Ducting
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The Recovery Process
•• Initial estimate was 12 months to restart Train 7 Initial estimate was 12 months to restart Train 7 considering delivery of regeneration & hot oil coils considering delivery of regeneration & hot oil coils
•• Interim production plan was developed to shorten the Interim production plan was developed to shorten the rebuild within 7 months by :rebuild within 7 months by :--
•• Sharing hot oil from Train 8Sharing hot oil from Train 8
•• Using the repaired regeneration coilUsing the repaired regeneration coil
•• Dedicated teams established for rebuild at site and in Dedicated teams established for rebuild at site and in vendors’ worksvendors’ works
•• Dedicated transport arranged to expedite deliveries Dedicated transport arranged to expedite deliveries of of replacement partsreplacement parts
•• Train 7 restarted 3 weeks ahead of the revised target Train 7 restarted 3 weeks ahead of the revised target of 7 months of 7 months –– Early March 2004Early March 2004
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Business Recovery Measures
•• Measures taken to mitigate Train 7 supply :Measures taken to mitigate Train 7 supply :--
•• Replacement cargoes from within theReplacement cargoes from within thePETRONAS LNG complexPETRONAS LNG complex
•• Deferment of cargoes & ETA changesDeferment of cargoes & ETA changes
•• Secured 3 cargoes from other LNG SuppliersSecured 3 cargoes from other LNG Suppliers
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Conclusion
•• Train 7 recovery was done safely and successfully Train 7 recovery was done safely and successfully mainly due to :mainly due to :--
•• Accurate identification of the root cause Accurate identification of the root cause
•• Remedy for the root cause implementedRemedy for the root cause implemented
•• The installation of additional protection The installation of additional protection schemescheme
•• Excellent spirit of teamwork & coExcellent spirit of teamwork & co--operation operation from dedicated teams especially our LNG from dedicated teams especially our LNG Buyers and other LNG SuppliersBuyers and other LNG Suppliers
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Terima Kasih… Terima Kasih… Mila EskerMila Esker… …