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gG E O P O L I T I C SgSCRUTINYPLUGGING THE LEAKSAs the Mayapuri radiation incident in Delhi reveals, there exists a glaring gap between themagnitude of radioactive materials used in the country and the security arrangements inplace. SITAKANTA MISHRAanalyses

MANAGING CRISIS: Police personnel handling the radioactive material recovered from the Mayapuri scrap market

Photoby:H.C.Tiwari

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AS ANY incident involving nuclearfacility or material expectedlyinvites media attention and pub-lic concern, the radiation leak inDelhis Mayapuri area has raised

a serious question with regard to the nuclearsafety and security in India: Are we preparedto safeguard radioactive sources and tackleradiation disaster? The International AtomicEnergy Authority (IAEA), while demandingan explanation from India, called it themost serious global instance of radiationexposure since 2006. But, a deeper under-standing of the issue would reveal that theincident was not owing to the lack of our reg-ulatory or technological competence, butbecause of the inevitable gap between the

knowledge and technology we possess andthe magnitude of challenges on the ground.

Given the interest generated in thesubject, the moment appears right to take aserious look at some relevant issues. First ofall, Cobalt-60, used in the Chemistry Depart-ment of Delhi University irradiator receivedfrom Canada in 1970, is an excellent gammasource, much more penetrating than alphaor beta radiation and has a much longerrange. One microcurie of Cobalt-60 has a lifespan of more than one decade and emits1332.5 KeV of energy. This is used for variouspurposes in fabrication work, especiallysteel welding, in radiotherapy for treatingcancer, for food irradiation, in industrialradiography such as nucleonic gauges forthickness measurement, in well-loggingoperations, in research laboratories, etc.

In India, use of ionising radiation sourcesfor various applications in different areas hasregistered phenomenal growth. Radioactivematerials used for industrial and medicalapplications are estimated at over 12,000units which include 300 telecobalt therapyunits, 100 accelerators, over 2,000 computedtomography scan units, 150 nuclear medi-cine centres, 1400 industrial radiography

cameras, 8000 nucleonic gauges and 14 gam-ma radiation processing plants. Many moreacademic and research institutions mighthave unaccounted radioactive devices pro-cured before the Atomic Energy RegulatoryBoard (AERB) was formed. Generally facili-ties and equipments that use radioactivematerials including Cobalt-60 requirelicense or authorisation by the AERB. InIndia, Cobalt-60 is supplied by the Board ofRadiation and Isotope Technology and isimported under strict licensing process. Anyreplacement of Cobalt-60 used equipmentneeds AERB consent and must be returnedto the original supplier. But security arrange-ments at facilities that use these materials do

not essentially accord adequate attention.According to one viewpoint, physical protec-tion at these sites is rather lax, at best com-parable to the protection provided at a jew-eller shop.

It is easy to point fingers towards theAERB as it has no inventory of radioactivematerials sourced from abroad prior to itsown existence. But, as per the end-useragreement, the onus is on the supplier toensure return of the defunct radioisotopes. At best, the user could have taken theresponsibility of their safekeep or disposal.All these years, the BARC has been collectingthe materials from the users for disposal.

How the gamma cell irradiator of Delhi Uni-

versity was overlooked is undoubtedly amatter of serious concern. First, the facilitiesthat received such materials before the AERB was established have been unac-counted by it subsequently. Second, thepersonnel in charge of these materials inDelhi University have retired and since theirradiator was not in use for 25 years, it wascompletely forgotten by the subsequentstaffs in charge that it contained radioactivematerial. Third, neither is the scrap marketequipped with radiation detection devicesnor have the scrap workers any radiationawareness. So there exist serious gaps ateach level, starting from the suppliersresponsibility to the users onus, from wastedisposal to the public awareness.

This does not mean that India has nocapability to safeguard its radioactivesources or to quickly respond to radioactivedisaster. In fact, Delhi Police could promptlytrace the source of supply and BARC couldeffectively contain the situation. Also themedical team responded efficiently in savinglives. But what is worrisome is our compla-cency and callousness about possibleaccidents like this, which no one has everimagined. Considering the magnitude of

radioactive materials used in the countryand the security arrangements in place,there would be no guarantee that a Maya-puri-like incident will not happen again.

Indian vendors get large scrap consign-ment from distant places. They are trans-ported to ship recycling yard or industrialareas in the country that receive consign-ments from other countries. In India, Alangin Bhavnagar district of Gujarat recycles halfof all the ships salvaged around the world.Even some scrap recovered after the collapseof the twin towers in the US is claimed tohave come to Mayapuri. Dealers in this mar-ket get scrap metals from across the world,and mostly from China.

According to the National Hazardous Waste Management Strategy (2009) esti-mates, there are about 30,000 industries gen-erating hazardous waste of the order of 6million tonnes per annum in the country. Asper the Hazardous Waste regulations, indus-tries are required to store hazardous wastefor a period not exceeding 90 days. The wastecould either be recycled or disposed off incaptive or common Treatment, Storage andDisposal Facilities (TSDF) available in everystate. In this case, how this scrap from DelhiUniversity slipped into the market is a mat-ter of speculation. As far as control over suchmaterial is concerned, Section 17 of the

Atomic Energy Act 1962, specifically referred

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I A legislation to co-ordinate central andstate government responsibilities in man-aging the radioactive resources, their safe-

keep and guidelines for prompt response

in case of a disasterI All its sea-ports in India should be made

Container Security Initiative (CSI)-compli-

ant

I A national Nuclear Information Manage-ment (NIM) programme to address mis-conceptions regarding radioactive materi-als

I Extensive installation of Radiation moni-toring Systems at major check points

I Strengthening the readiness of our med-ical establishment , especially in industrialcities

I A comprehensive inventory of facilitiesthat received radioactive materials prior to

AERB

Steps needed:

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to ensure safe use of radiation generatingplants. Before the AERB was set up in 1983,the Directorate of Radiation Protection(DRP) was responsible for radiation protec-tion programme including radiation surveil-lance in hospitals, industries and researchinstitutes. It suggests that the coordinationbetween the DRP and AERB was absent afterthe former was established.

However, the AERB protocol prescribesstrict regulations for their supply, mainte-nance, and disposal. It recommends thedesign, transport packaging, surveillanceprocedures through the Review Committeefor Applications of Radiation (SARCAR) forall non-DAE installations. To receive andoperate a radiotherapy machine, the mini-mum requirement prescribed with fixationof responsibilities (Atomic Energy Rules2004) are (a) hospital the owner, (b) alicensee - head of the institution, and (c)radiation safety officers (RSOs). High-inten-sity sources such as teletheraphy units,

accelerators andr a d i a t i o n

processingu n i t s

require an RSO at Level III (most qualified),diagnostic nuclear medicine applicationsrequire an RSO at Level II and simple diag-nostic radiography units need to employ anRSO at Level I. Any other facilities that useradioactive material require individuallicense or authorisation by the AERB. TheSARCAR recommends granting of authorisa-tions for disposal or radioactive wastes gen-erated in medical, industrial, agriculture andresearch applications under the AtomicEnergy Rules 1987. Particularly, the Radio-logical Safety Division (RSD) is responsiblefor carrying out regulatory inspections of allnon-DAE radiation facilities. The gammaradiation processing plants are inspectedonce a year while radiotherapy units areinspected once in three years. Surpriseinspections are also conducted periodically.Any unit that fails to carry out its duties asper AERB stipulations is asked to surrenderits authorisation certificates, and radiogra-phy sources are recalled.

A large number of radioactiveconsignments, nearly 80,000 per year, con-taining radioactive materials are being trans-ported within, and many more also transitthrough, the country. A Committee on SafeTransport of Radioactive Material (COS-

TRAM) therefore has been constituted inMay 2003 to review safety aspects of

the transport of these materials.However, there is always

scope for

improvement given that there may be gapsin actual application. The existing safety andsecurity arrangements seem to be focussedmore on nuclear power plants. So far, disas-ter involving any Indian nuclear plants is nil,probably owing to stringent security andsafety arrangements in and around the facil-ities. In the same way, security of radioactivematerial used in other facilities requires tobe given equal attention. Unfortunately, thelevel of public awareness about radiologicalmaterials is abysmally low. Regular trainingcourses are arranged by nuclear powerplants for the public of surrounding area butno curriculum on radiation awareness is pre-scribed in schools or in other institutions inthe area. Also there is lack of adequate num-bers of trained police and medical personnelto carry out prompt detection and action inthis regard. Perhaps the scientific-politicalleadership is extra cautious to avoidunnecessary public panic as the popularperception on anything radioactive isblurred. Therefore, the DAE and AERB face adual challenge of dealing with risks involvingthe safety of nuclear materials and inade-quate public perception.

In spite of all regulatory-technicalarrangements in place, it can never be said

with utmost certainty that incidents likeMayapuri may never recur. Our systems,even though efficient, have not been able tomonitor the circulation of thesematerials laterally. Firstly, thetask of monitoring each andevery material used in

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VOICING CONCERNS: IAEA has taken a serious note of the Mayapuri radiation incident

July 2010

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innumerable places scattered across thegeography is stupendous. For example, by

2008, only the number of diagnostic X-rayunits registered in the country stands at50,000 approximately. Secondly, with limitedresources at Indias disposal, sustained out-reach and individual monitoring of each andevery unit is difficult. Thirdly, high level ofilliteracy persists particularly among theworkers involved in the unorganised sector.Outreaching to train them all would be diffi-cult as they shift often to other sectors.

As India is preparing for a giant step innuclear energy production and more nuclearmaterials would be used in the decades

ahead, more innovative ways of reaching outto the gaps in our system of monitoring,

response and damage control will have to befound. Some of recommendations towards aconcerned approach are as follows:

Firstly, from the legal point of view, Indianeeds legislation of a national Nuclear Tech-nology Management Act, coordinating cen-tral and state governments responsibilitiesin managing the radioactive resources, theirsafe-keep and guidelines for promptresponse in case of a disaster. Though theDisaster Management Act 2005 embodiesprovisions for managing nuclear disasters, adedicated policy framework with supportinginfrastructure for managing radiologicalemergency would be preferred. The WMD Act2005 though an overarching and integrated

legislation incorporating all possible ways ofcontrolling the radioactive material pilferage,does not clarify the responsibilities of differ-ent states implementing such provisions.

Secondly, to control and monitor effec-tively the export-import and transit ofradioactive material, India may considermaking all its sea-ports CSI-compliant. Theautomated container screening and infor-mation exchange provisions of the ContainerSecurity Initiative (CSI) arrangement wouldhelp in intercepting the movement of suchmaterials. At present, only the JawaharlalNehru Port Trust (JNPT) at Mumbai is part ofthe initiative.

Thirdly, it is imperative now to frame a

national Nuclear Information Management(NIM) programme to address mispercep-

tions and panic among the public. A firstaction manual with Dos and Donts pre-scription, needs to be catered to them.

Fourthly, extensive installation of Radia-tion Monitoring Systems at major chockpoints across the country with necessarytechnical training of the security personnelmay be considered to monitor the move-ment of these materials.

Fifthly and most importantly is strength-ening the readiness of our medical establish-ment. Hospitals in different cities are neededto be equipped for handling radiation emer-gencies. At the fire brigade stations, firstresponse teams need to be created and keptin readiness, especially in industrial cities.

Also, medical centres where radiologicalmaterials are used need to be staffed ade-quately as they could become easy targets ofnon-state actors.

Lastly, what is urgently required is acomprehensive inventory of facilities thatreceived radioactive materials prior toAERB. The Mayapuri incident is simply awake-up call for all not to resort to blamegames; rather a concerted approach by theauthorities concerned, civil society and themedia would help in avoiding such inci-dents in future.

(The author is a research scholar at

Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi)

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THERE ARE ABOUT30,000 INDUSTRIES

GENERATINGHAZARDOUS

WASTE OF THEORDER OF 6

MILLION TONNESPER ANNUM IN THE

COUNTRY.

HECTIC INSPECTION: The scientific team examining the samples of radioactive scrap

Photoby:H.C.Tiwari