Georg Simmel - How is Society Possible

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How is Society Possible?Author(s): Georg SimmelSource: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Nov., 1910), pp. 372-391Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2763090 .

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HOW

IS SOCIETY

POSSIBLE?'

GEORG SIMMEL

University

f Berlin

Kant

could propose nd

answer hefundamental

uestion f

his philosophy, ow is

naturepossible?,

nly becausefor him

nature was nothingbut

the

representationVorstellung) of

nature. This-

oes not

mean merely hat"the world s

my rep-

resentation,"hatwe thuscan speak of nature nly so far as it

is a content f

ourconsciousness,ut hat

whatwe callnature s a

special way in

whichour intellect

ssembles, rders, nd

forms

the

ense-perceptions.

hese

"given"

perceptions,

f

color,

aste,

tone,

temperature,esistance, mell,which

n the

accidental e-

quence of

subjective xperience ourse

through

ur conscious-

ness, re in

and of themselves ot yet

nature;" butthey ecome

"nature"

hrough heactivity f themind,

which

ombines

hem

into objectsand seriesof objects, nto substancesnd attributes

and into causal

coherences. As

the

elements

f

the

world

are

given o us

immediately,here oes not

exist mong hem,ccord-

ing to Kant,

that oherenceVerbindung)

which lone

can make

out of them

the intelligible egular

(gesetzmissig)

unity of

nature; or

rather,which signifies

recisely he

being-nature

(Natur-Sein)

of those

n

themselves

ncoherently

nd

irregularly

emerging

world-fragments. hus the

Kantian

world-picture

grows nthemostpeculiar eflectionWiederspiel). Our sense-

impressions

re for this process purely

subjective,

ince

they

dependupon

the

physico-psychicalrganization,

hich

n

other

beingsmight

be different,ut theybecome

objects"

since

they

are taken up by the forms

of our

intellect, nd by

these

are

1

This

is

a translation of the

passage entitled,"Exkurs ulberdas Problem:

Wie

ist

Gesellschaft

m6glich?"

in

Simmel's

Soziologie

(pp.

27-45).

Although

have often argued (e. g.,

General Sociology, pp.

I83-85, 504-8, etc.) that the

term

"society"

is

too vague to

be made into an instrument f precision, I

am glad to assist in getting a hearing for Simmel's efforts o prove the con-

trary.

I

have thereforedone

my

best to

render his

essay literally

as far as

possible, and in all

cases

faithfully.

A. W.

S.

372

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HOW

IS

SOCIETY

POSSIBLE?

373

fashionedntofixed

regularities

nd

into a coherent

icture f

"nature." On theother

hand,however, hoseperceptionsre the

real "given,"the unalterablyccumulatingontent f theworld

and the

assuranceof an

existence

ndependent

f

ourselves,

o

that

now

those

ery

ntellectual

ormings

f

the

ame

nto

bjects,

coherences, egularities,ppear as

subjective,

s

that

which

s

brought

o

the ituation

y

ourselves,

n contrast

ith

hat

which

we havereceived

rom

he

externally

xistent-i.

e.,

these

form-

ings

appear s the functionsf the ntellecttself,

which

n

them-

selves

unchangeable,ad

constructedrom

nother

ense-material

a naturewith nother ontent. Nature s forKanta definiteort

of

cognition, picture

growingthrough

nd

in

our

cognitive

categories.

The

question

then,

How

is nature

possible?,

.

e.,

what are the

conditions

which

must be

present

n order that

a

"nature"

may

be

given,

s

resolved y

him

through iscovery

f

the forms

which

onstitute

he

essence f

our

intellectnd

there-

with

bring

nto

being

nature"

s

such.

It

is at once suggested hat

t s possible o

treat n an analog-

ous fashion hequestion f theaprioristiconditions n thebasis

of

which ociety s possible. Here

too individual lements re

given

which n a certain

ense lwaysremain ntheir iscreteness,

as

is the

casewith he

sense-perceptions,

nd

they ndergo

heir

synthesis

nto the

unity

f a

society nly through

process

of

consciousness hichputs

the

ndividual

xistence

f

the several

elements

nto

relationship

ith hat f theothers n

definite orms

and

in

accordancewithdefiniteaws. The

decisivedifference

between heunity f a society nd thatof nature,however,s

this:

the latter-according o the

Kantianstandpoint ere pre-

supposed-comes to existence

xclusively

n

the

contemplating

unity

Subject), it s produced xclusively y thatmind

pon and

out of the

sensematerials

which are not in

themselvesnter-

connected.

On thecontrary,

he societary nity s realizedby ts

elementswithoutfurther

mediation, nd with

no need of an

observer, ecause hese

lements re consciously

nd synthetically

active. The Kantian theorem, onnection Verbindung) can

never

nhere

n

thethings,

ince t is only

broughtnto existence

by the mind

Subject), is not true of the

societary onnection,








374

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

which

s rather

mmediately

ealized

n the

"things"-namely,

in

thiscase the

ndividual ouls.2

Moreover,

his

societaryon-

nections synthesis,emainsomethingurely sychicalndwith-

out parallels

with

space-structures

nd theirreactions.

But

in

the

societary nstance

he

combining

equires

no factor

outside

of

its own

elements, ince

each of

these exercises

he

function

which,

with

respect o

the

external,

he

psychic

nergy

f the

observer

upplies.

The

consciousness

f

constituting ith

the

others

unity

s the

wholeunity

n

question n

the

ocietary

ase.

This

of

course

means, n

the

ne

hand,

not he

bstract

onscious-

nessof theunity oncept, utthe nnumerable

ingular

elation-

ships, he

feeling

nd

knowing

bout

this

determining

nd

being

determined

y the

other,

nd, on the

other

hand,

tquite

as

little

excludes

n

observinghird

partyfrom

performing

n

addition

a

synthesis,

ith

ts

basis

only n

himself,

etween

he

persons

concerned, s

between

pecial

elements.

Whatever

be

thetract

of

externally

bservable

eing

which s

to

be

comprehended

s a

unity, heconsummationccursnotmerely yvirtue f its im-

mediate nd

strictly

bjective

ontent,

ut t is

determined

ythe

categories

f the

mind

Subject)

and

from

ts

cognitive

equire-

2

Whether

this

point

is

material to

anything

ociological

or

not, I

cannot

refrain

from

pointing

out that

Simmel

makes

a

distinctionhere

where

there is

no

difference.

Adoptingfor

the

nonce

the

Kantian

position,

what is

true of a

section of

"nature"

confined n

a

test

tube or

filling the

visible

heavens

is

equally

true of

any phenomenon

which

occurs

in

the mind.

So far

as

cognition

of it

is

concerned,

t

makes no

difference

hether

t is the

coherence

of the

par-

ticles that make up a piece of rock, or the obsession by which we are the

products

of a

Zeitgeist, the

reconstruction

f it

is

certainly

no

less a

mlatter

of the

mind

arranging t under

its

forms

n

the

latter

case

than in

the

former.

Indeed,

in

certain

of

their

phenomena at

any

rate,

we

may say

that the

more

"society"

there is in

Simmel's

sense,

the more

impossible

it is

for

"society"

to

exist

in

a

sense

analogous with Kant's

nature

theorem. The man

who

is

most

completely

domineered

by

"society"

is the

one

to

whom

the

thought-thing

society

is

most

nearly

non-existent.

The

fact

that

I am

in

a certain

mental

state because

some

other

person

is

in

a certain

mental

state no

more

insures

my

thinking

hat

relation than

the

fact that

my

heart

and

my

lungs

have

cer-

tain connections nsures my thinking hose connections. That is, in terms of

a

mental

philosophy

not in all

respects

obsolete,

a

"subject-object"

has to

be

mentallyconstructed

s

much

as

an

"object-object."

"Society"

is

no

more

and

no

less

a

mental construction

han

"nature."-A.

W.

S.








HOWY

IS SOCIETY

POSSIBLEf

375

ments. Society, owever,

s

the

objective nity

which

has no

need

of theobserver

ot

contained

n

itself.

The things nnature re, on theone hand,morewidely epa-

rated than souls.

In

the

outward

world,

n

which

each entity

occupies pace which annot

be

sharedwith nother, here

s

no

analogyfor heunity

f one man with nother, hich onsistsn

understanding,n love,

n commonwork. On theother

hand, he

fragmentsf spatial

xistence ass into unity n

the conscious-

ness of the observer, hich annotbe attained y

community

f

individuals. For, on

account of the fact that the

objects

of

the societary ynthesisre independent eings,psychic entres,

personal nities, heyresist hat bsolute

merging

n

the

soul

of

another

erson,

o which

he

elflessness

Selbstlosigkeit)

f

soul-

less thingsmustyield. Thus a collection f men s

really unity

in

a muchhigher,

more deal sense,yet n

a much ower

degree

thantables, hairs, ofa, carpet nd mirror onstitutethe furni-

ture

of a room,"or

river,meadow, rees,

house,

"a

landscape,"

or in

a paintinga

picture."

In quite differentense from hat n which t is trueof the

external

world,

s

society myrepresentation"Vorstellung), .e.,

positedupon the

activity f consciousness. For the

soul of an-

otherhas for

me the same

realitywhich myself ave, a reality

which

s

very

differentrom

hatof a material

hing. However

Kant nsists hat bjects n spacehave preciselyhe

amecertainty

as

myown existence,n

the atter ase only he

particular ontents

of

my ubjectiveife

can

be meant;for hebasis ofrepresentation

in general, he feeling f the existing go, is unconditionalnd

unshakableo a

degree ttained y no singlerepresentationf a

material

xternality.But thisverycertaintyas for

us, justifi-

ably

or

not, lso the factof the

thou;

and

as cause or as effect f

thiscertainty e feel the thou s somethingndependentf our

representation,

omething hich s just as really or tself genau

so fiur ich st) as our own existence. That

this

for-itself

f the

other

neverthelessoes

not

prevent

s

from

making

t into

our

representation,hat omething hich annot e resolved ntoour

representingtill

becomes

he content,

nd

thus

the

product

f

our

representation-this

s

the

profoundestsychologico-episte-








376

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL

OF SOCIOLOGY

mological

attern nd problem f

socialization. Within urown

consciousness e distinguish eryprecisely etween he funda-

mentality f the ego (the presuppositionf all representation,

whichhas

no

part

n

the never

wholly uppressible roblematics

of its

contents) nd these ontentshemselves,hich

s

an

aggre-

gate, withtheir oming nd going, their

dubitability

nd their

fallibility,lways present

hemselves s

mere

products

f

that

absolute ndfinal nergy nd

existence f our psychic eing.

We

must

arry verto

the

other

oul,

however, hesevery onditions,

orrather

ndependencef conditions,

f our own ego,although n

the astanalysiswe must epresenthat oul. That other ouil as

forus that

ast degreeof realitywhich ur own self

possesses n

distinctionrom ts contents. We

are sure thatthe case

stands

the same

way with he other oul and its contents. Under

these

circumstances,he question,How

is Society possible?,has a

wholly ifferent ethodological

earing rom he question,

How

is nature

ossible? The latter uestion s to be answered

y the

forms

f

cognition,

hrouglh

hichthe mind synthesizes iven

elementsnto nature." The formeruestions answered ythe

conditions esiding priori

n

the elements

hemselves,hrough

which

they

combine

themselves

ctually

into the

synthesis

"society."

In a certain ensetheentire ontentsfthis

book,

s

developed n the

basis

of

theprinciple nnounced,may

be re-

garded as

the material oranswering his question.

The

book

searches utthe

procedures,

ccurring

n

the ast

analysis

n

indi-

viduals,

which ondition

he existence f the ndividuals

s soci-

ety. It does nottreat heseproceduress temporallyntecedent

causes of

this

result,

but

as

partial

processes

of the

synthesis

which we

comprehensively

ame

"society."

But

the

question

must be understood

n

a still more

fundamental

ense.

I

said

that the

function f

achieving

he

synthetic nity,which with

reference

o

nature esides

n

the

observingmind,with

reference

to

society asses

over

to

the

societary

lements

hemselves.

The

consciousness

f

constituting

ociety

s

not

to

be

sure,

n

the

abstract, resent

n the

individual;

but

everyone lways

knows

that heothers

re

connected ith

himself,lthough

his

knowing

about

the

other s the

associated,

his

recognizing

f

the

whole








HOW IS SOCIETY

POSSIBLE?

377

complex

s

a

society sually

occurswith

reference o

particular

concrete ontents.

erhaps,

owever,

he ase s notdifferent

rom

thatof "theunity f cognition" die Einheitdes Erkennens),

according o whichwe

proceed ndeed

n

the

processes

f

con-

sciousness,rranging neconcrete

ontent

ith

nother, etwith-

out

having

separate onsciousnessf

the

unitytself, xcept

n

rare ndlate

abstractions.

Now, the questions: What

ies

then,

universallynd a priori t the

basis,what

presuppositions

ust

be

operative,n

orderthatthe

particular

oncrete

rocedures

n

the

ndividual

onsciousnessmay actually

be

processes

f

sociali-

zation; what elenmentsre contained n themwhich make it

possible hat

heproduct f the

elements

s, abstractly

xpressed,

the

constructiont

f the

ndividual nto

a societary nity?

The

sociological priorities ill

have the

same doublesignificance

s

those

"whichmakenature

ossible;"

on

the one hand they

will

moreor

lesscompletely

eterminehe

actualprocesses f

social-

ization, s

functionsr energies f the

psychical

ccurrence,n

the

otherhandthey re the

ideal logical

presuppositionsf

the

perfect-althoughn thisperfection everrealized-society. A

parallel s the use

of the aw

of causation. On the

one hand

it

lives

and works n the actual

cognitive

rocesses. On the other

hand

it

builds

up

the

form

f

the

truth

s

the

ideal

system

f

completedcognitions, rrespective

f whether

that truth

is

realizedor not by

that

temporal, elatively

ccidental sychical

dynamic,nd

irrespectivef

the greater r lesser

pproximation

of

the

truth

ctually

n

consciousnesso

the deal

truth.

It is a merequestion f termswhethernvestigationf these

conditionsf

the

ocializing

rocess hall

be

called

pistemological

or

not,

since that

structure

hich

arises

from

hese

conditions,

and

which

has

its norms

n

their

forms,

s

not cognitions

ut

practical

rocesses

nd realsituations.

Nevertheless

hat now

have in

mind, nd

what mustbe tested s

thegeneral

oncept f

socialization y itsconditions,

s somewhat

pistemological,

iz.,

the consciousness

f

associating

r of

being

ocialized.

Perhaps

itshouldbecalleda knowing atherhan cognizing besserein

Wissenals

ein

Erkennen).

For in

this case the

mind

does

not

immediatelyonfront

n object of

which

t

graduallygains

a








378 THE

AMERICAN JOURNAL

OF SOCIOLOGY

theoretical icture, ut thatconsciousness

f

the socialization

s

immediatelyts vehicle or inner

significance.

The matter n

question s the processes f reciprocation hich ignify or the

individual he factof beingassociated. That is, the fact s not

signified n the abstract o the individual,

ut it

is capable

of

abstract xpression. What formsmust

be at the basis,

or

what

specific ategoriesmustwe bring long, o to speak, n order hat

theconsciousness ayarise, nd what

onsequently

re the

forms

which heresultingonsciousness-i.e.,

ociety

s a

fact

fknow-

ing-must bear? We maycall this heepistemologicalheory

f

society. In what follows, am trying o sketch ertain f these

a

priori effectiveonditions

r forms

of

socialization.

These

cannot, o be sure, ike the Kantiancategories, e designated y

a

singleword. Moreover, present hem

nly

s

illustrationsf

the

method f nvestigation.

i.

The picturewhich

ne

man gets

of

another rom

ersonal

contact s determinedy certain istortions hich

re

not

simple

deceptions rom ncompletexperience,

efective ision, ympa-

thetic r antipatheticrejudice; hey re rather hanges n prin-

ciple n the composition f the real

object. These are,

to

begin

with, f two dimensions. n thefirst lace

we

see

the

other

arty

in somedegree eneralized. This maybe

because t is notwithin

our

powerfully o representn ourselves n

individuality

ifferent

from ur own. Every reconstruction

Nachbilden) of

a soul is

determined y

the

similarity

o

it,

and

although

his

s

by

no

meansthe onlycondition f psychical

ognition sic)-since

on

theone handunlikenesseems t the ame time equisite,n order

to gain perspectivend objectivity,n theotherhand there

s re-

quired n intellectualapacitywhichholds tself

bove ikeness r

unlikeness

f

being-yet complete ognitionwould nevertheless

presuppose completeikeness. It

appears s though veryman

has in

himself

deepest

ndividuality-nucleushich cannotbe

subjectivelyeproduced y anotherwhosedeepest ndividualitys

essentially ifferent.And

thatthis

requirement

s

not

logically

compatible iththat distance nd objective udgment n which

the

representation

f

another

therwise

ests, s provedby

the

merefact hat omplete nowledge f the

ndividuality

f

another








HOW

IS SOCIETY

POSSIBLEf

379

is

denied ous; and

all

interrelationsf

men

with

ne another

re

limited y

thevarying egrees

f

this

deficiency.Whatever

ts

cause maybe, tsconsequencet all events s a generalizationf

thepsychical

icture

f the

other

erson,

dissolving

f

theout-

lines,which

dds to the

singularity

f this

picture

relationship

with thers.

We posit very

man,

with

specialbearing ponour

practical

ttitudeowardhim, s

that

type

of man

to

which

his

individuality akeshim

belong.

We think

him, long

with

all

his

singularity,nlyunder he

universal

ategorywhichdoes not

fully over him

to be sure, and

which

he

does not

fully

over.

This latter ircumstance arks hecontrast etweenhis ituation

and

thatwhich xists

betweenhe

universal

dea and

the

particu-

larwhich

elongs nder

t.

In order

o

recognize

he

man,

we do

not

see

him

in his

pure

individuality,

ut

carried,

xalted,

or

degraded by

the general type

under

which we

subsume

him.

Even whenthis

transformation

s so slight hatwe

cannot

m-

mediatelyecognize

t, or even

f all the usual cardinal

oncepts

of

character ail

us,

such as moral or

immoral,

ree or

unfree,

domineeringrmenial, tc.-in ourownmindswe designatehe

man

according o

an

unnamed ype

with which

his

pure

indi-

viduality oes

notprecisely

oincide.

Moreover his

eads a step

fartherown.

Precisely

rom he

complete

ingularity

f a personality

e form picture f

it

which

s

not

identical

with

ts

reality, ut still

s not

a

general

type. It is rather he

picture

which heperson

would

present f

he

were, o

to speak, ntirely

imself,f

on thegood or

bad side

he realizedthepossibility hich s in everyman. We are all

fragments,ot only

of the

universalman,but

also of

ourselves.

We

are

onsetsnot

merely f

thetypehuman

eing n

general, ot

merely f

thetype

good, bad,etc.,but

we are

onsets f thatnot

furthern

principle

ameable

ndividualitynd

singularityf our

own

selveswhich

urrounds

ur perceptible

ctuality s

though

drawn

with

deal lines. The

vision of

our neighbor,

owever,

enlarges his

fragmento that

whichwenever re

completelynd

wholly. He cannot eethefragments erely ideby sideas they

are

actually

iven,but as we

offset he

blind pot n our

eye so

thatwe are

not

conscious f it, n like

mannerwe make

of these








380 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

fragmentary

ata the

completeness

f

an

individuality.

The

practice

f life

s

more

nd

more nsistenthat

we

shall

form

ur

picture fthemanfrom herealdetails lone whichwe empiric-

ally

know

about

him;

but

this

very

practice

rests

upon those

changes nd

additions, pon

the reconstruction

f those

given

fragments

nto he

generality

f

a

type

nd

into

he

completeness

of

this deal

personality.

This

procedure,

hich

s in

principle

ttempted,

lthough

n

reality

t

s seldom

arried

hrough

o

completeness,

perates

nly

within

he

already

xisting

ociety

s

the

apriori

f

the

further

reactionswhichdevelopbetweenndividuals. Within a sphere

which

has

any

sort

of

community

f

calling

r

of

interests,

very

member

ooks

upon

every

ther,

ot

n a

purely

mpirical

ay,

but

on the

basis of

an

apriori

which his

sphere

mposes

upon

each

consciousness hich

has

part

n it. In

the circles

f

officers,

f

church

members,

f

civil

officials,

f

scholars,

f

members f

families, ach

regards

he

otherunder

he matter f

course

pre-

supposition-this

s a

member f

my

group.

From

the

common

basisof lifecertain uppositionsriginate nd people ookupon

one

another

hrough

hem s

through

veil. This

veil

does

not,

to

be

sure,

imply onceal

he

peculiarity

f

the

ndividual,

ut

t

gives to

this

personality

new

form,

ince ts

actual

realitymelts

in

this

typical

ransformation

nto a

composite

icture. We see

the

other

erson

not

simply

s

an

individual,

ut as

colleague

or

comrade

or

fellow

partisan;

n

a

word, nhabitant f

the

same

peculiar

world;

and

this

unavoidable,

uite

automatically

per-

ativepresuppositions oneof themeansof bringing isperson-

ality

nd

realitynthe

representationf

another

p

to the

quality

and

form

emanded f

his

sociability

Soziabilitat).

The

same s

evidently

rue

of

members

f

different

roups n

their

relations

with

one

another.

The plain

citizen

who

makes

the

cquaintance

f

an

officer

annot

ivest

himselff

the

hought

that

this

ndividual s

an

officer.

And

although

his

being

an

officer

ay

belong

o

the

given

ndividuality,

etnot

n

just the

schematic ay nwhich tprejudgeshispicturentherepresenta-

tion

of the

other

erson.

The like

s

thecase

with he

Protestant

in

contrastwith

he

Catholic,

he

merchant

ith

the

official,

he








HOW IS SOCIETY POSSIBLE? 38I

laymanwith he

priest,

tc.

Everywhere

here ccur

veilings

f

the

outline f

reality ythe social

generalization.

This in

prin-

cipleprohibits iscoveryfthatrealitywithin groupwhich s

in a

high

degree

ocially

differentiated.

ccordingly

man's

rep-

resentation

f

man

s

thrown ut

of

true

by

dislocations,

dditions

and

subtractions

rom ll these

ategories,

hich xert

n a

priori

influence,

ince

the

generalization

s

always at the same

time

moreor

less than

the

individuality.

That is, the individual s

rated

s in

some

particulars

ifferentromhis

actualself by the

gloss

mposed pon

him

whenhe s

classified

n

a

type,

when

he

is

comparedwith n imagined ompletenessf hisownpeculiarity,

whenhe

s

credited

ith

he haracteristics

f

the

ocial

generality

to

whichhe

belongs.

Over

and

above all

this here

ways,

s

the

principle

f

interpretationn

cognition,he

thought

f

his

real

solely

ndividualquation;

but

ince t appears s

though

etermi-

nation f this

quationwould

be the

onlyway of

arriving

t

the

precisely

ounded

elationship

o

the

individual,

s

a

matter f

fact

hose

hanges nd

reshapings,

hich

reventhis

dealrecog-

nitionof him,are precisely he conditions hroughwhichthe

relationshipshich

we

know s the

trictly

ocial become

ossible

-somewhat

as

withKant

the

categories

f

reason,

which

form

the

immediately

iven into quite

new

objects,

alone

make

the

given

world knowable

ne.

2. Another

ategory

nderwhich

men

Subjecte)

viewthem-

selves

and one

another, n

order

that,so

formed, hey

may

produce

mpirical

ociety,

maybe

formulatedn

the

seemingly

trivialtheorem:-Each element f a groupis not a societary

part,

but

beyond

that

something

lse.

This fact

operatesas

social

apriori n

so

far as the

partof the

ndividual

which s

not

turned

owardthe

group,

or is not

dissolved

n

it,

does not

lie

simplywithout

meaningby

the

side of his

socially

significant

phase,

s

not

a

somethingxternal

o

the

group,

for

which t

nolens

volens ffords

pace; butthe

fact

hat he

ndividual,

ith

respect o

certain

idesofhis

personality,s not

an

element f

the

group,constituteshepositive ondition orthefactthat he is

such a

group

member n other

spects of

his

being.

In

other

words,

he

sort

of his

socialized-being

Vergesellschaftet-Seins)








382 THE

AMERICAN JOURNAL

OF SOCIOLOGY

is determined

r partially

etermined

y

the sort of

his not-

socialized eing.

The

analysis

o

follow

will

bring

o

ight

ertain

types whose sociological ignificance,ven in theirgerm and

nature, s fixedby the

fact thatthey

re

in

some

way

shut

out

from he verygroup for

which

heir xistence

s

significant;

or

instance n the case of

thestranger,heenemy, hecriminal,nd

eventhe pauper. This

applies,however, ot merely n

the

case

of suchgeneral

haracters, ut n unnumbered odificationsor

every ort of

individuality.That everymoment indsus

sur-

rounded y relationships

ithhuman eings, nd that

hecontent

of everymoment'sxperiences directly r indirectlyetermined

by thesehuman eings,s no contradictionf the

foregoing. On

the contraryhe social

setting s such affects eingswhoare not

completely oundedby

it.

For

instance,we know

thatthe civil

officials not merely n

official,he merchant otmerely

mer-

chant, he military fficer ot

merely

n officer.

This

extra-

social being,his temperament

nd the

deposit

f

his

experiences,

his interests nd the

worth

of his

personality,

ittle

s

it

may

change he mainmatter f official, ercantile, ilitaryctivities,

gives the individual

till, n every nstance, or everyonewith

whomhe

is

in

contact, definite

hading,

nd

interpenetrates

is

social

picture

with

extra-social mponderabilities.

he

whole

commerce f

men

within he ocietary ategorieswould

be differ-

ent,

f each

confrontedhe other

only

n

that

character

which

belongs

o him n

the

role

forwhich

he

is

responsible

n the

par-

ticular

ategory

n

whichhe appears t themoment. To be sure,

individuals,ike callings nd social situations, re distinguished

by

the

degree of that n-additionwhich theypossess

or admit

along with heir ocialcontent. The man n love or in

friendship

may

be

taken s marking

heone pole of this eries. In this itua-

tion, hatwhich he ndividual eserves orhimself,

eyond hose

manifestationsnd

activitieswhichconverge pon theother, n

quantity pproaches hezero

point. Only a single ife s present,

which, o to speak,may be regarded r is lived from

wo sides:

on theone hand from he nside, rom he terminus quo of the

activeperson;then n the otherhand as the quite

dentical ife,

contemplatedn the

direction f the belovedperson,underthe








HOW

IS SOCIETY

POSSIBLE?

383

category f his terminus d quem,

which

t

completelydopts.

With

quite

another

endency

he Catholic riest resentsn form

the same phenomenon,n that his ecclesiastical unction om-

pletely overs nd swallowshis being-for-himself.

n

the

former

of these xtreme ases,the n-additionf

the

ociological ctivity

disappears,

ecause ts content as

completely

assed

over

into

considerationf the otherparty; n the

second ase, becausethe

correspondingypeof contents as in

principle ltogether is-

appeared. The oppositepole is exhibited y the phenomena f

our moderncivilization s they are determined y money

economy. That is, man approaches he ideal of absolute ob-

jectivity s producer, r purchaser

r

seller,

n a

word as a

performerf some economicfunction. Certain ndividuals

n

high places excepted, he individual ife, the tone of the total

personality, as disappeared rom he

function,he persons re

merely he vehiclesof

an

exchange

of function nd counter-

function ccurring ccording

to

objective

norms, and every

thingwhichdoes not fit nto this heer

hingnessSachlichkeit)

has also as a matter f factdisappeared rom t. The In-addition

has fully aken p into tself hepersonality

ith ts special

olor-

ing, ts irrationality,ts inner ife, nd

it has leftto those

ocie-

tary activities nly those energies,

n

pure abstraction,

hich

specificallyertain o theactivities.

Between heseextremes he social individualsmove in such

a

way

that the

energies

nd characteristics

hich

are

pointed

toward

the innercenter

lways show

a

certain

ignificance or

the activities nd inclinations hich ffectheir ssociates. For,

in the marginal case, even

the

consciousness

hat this social

activity

r

attitude

s

something

ifferentiated

rom

he rest

of

the

man,

and

does

not

enter

nto

the

sociologicalrelationship

alongwiththat whichhe otherwise s

and

signifies-even his

consciousness as quitepositive

nfluencepon

the

attitude hich

the subject ssumestowards

his fellows

nd

they

owards

him.

The apriori of the empirical ocial life is

that the life is -not

entirelyocial. We form ur interrelationshipsot alone under

the

negative

eservation

f a

part

of

our

personality

hich

does

not enter nto hem; hisportion ffectshe social occurrences

n








384 THE AMERICAN

JOURNAL OF

SOCIOLOGY

the

soul not

alone

through

eneral

psychological

ombinations,

but

preciselyhe

formal act hat

nfluence

xerts

tself

utside

f

thesedetermineshenature f this nterworking.

Still

further,

ne

of the

most

mportant

ociological

forma-

tions

rests

n thefact

hat he

societary

tructures

re

composed

of

beings

who are

at the

sametime

nside

nd outside

f

them:

namely hat

between

society nd its

individuals

relationship

may xist

ike

thatbetween

wo

parties-indeed hat

perhaps

uch

relationship,

pen

or latent,

lways

exists.

Therewith

ociety

producesperhaps

the most

conscious, t

least

universal

on-

formationf a basictypeof life n general:thatthe ndividual

soul

can

neverhave a

position

within

combination

utside

f

which

t

does not at the

same timehave a

position,

hat t cannot

be

insertednto

an

orderwithout

inding

tself t

thesame time

in

opposition o

that

order. This

applies

throughouthe whole

range

from

hemost

transcendental

nd universal

nterdepend-

encies

to

the most

singular nd

accidental.

The

religiousman

feels himself

ompletelyncompassed

y

the divine

being,

as

thoughhe weremerely pulse-beat f thedivine ife; his own

substance s

unreservedly,nd even

n

mystical

dentity, erged

in that

f

theAbsolute. And

yet,

n

order

o

give

this ntermelt-

ing

any meaning t

all,

the

devotee

must

retain

ome sort

of

self

existence,

omesortof

personal eaction, detached

go,

to

which he

resolutionnito he

divine

All-Being

s an

endless

ask,

a

process

only,which

wouldbe neither

metaphysically

ossible

nor

religiously eelable

f it

did not

proceed

from

self-being

on thepart

of the

person:

the

beingone

with

God

is

conditional

in its

significance

pon

thebeing

other

hanGod.

Beyond

this

converging

oward he

transcendental,

he

relationship

o nature

as

a

whole

which

the human

mind

manifests

hroughout

ts

entire

istory

howsthesame

form. On the

one

handwe

know

ourselves

s

articulated

ntonature,

s

one of its

products, hich

stands

longside f

every

ther s an

equal

among

equals, as

a

pointwhichnature's tuffnd energies eachand leave,as they

circle

through

unning

water and

blossoming

lants. And

yet

the soul has

a

feeling f a

something

elf-existent

eines

Fur-

sichseins)

which

we

designate

with he

ogically o

inexact on-








HOW IS SOCIETY POSSIBLE?

385

cept

freedom,

ffering

n

opposite

ein

Gegeniiber

nd

Parol)

to

all that

energy

n element

f

whichwe ever

remain,

which

makes toward the radicalismwhich we may express in the

formula,

ature s

only

representation

n thehuman

oul.

As,

however, n

this

conception, ature

with

all

its

undeniable

e-

culiarity

Eigengesetzlichkeit)

nd

hard

reality

s still

ubsumed

under he

concept f the

ego,

so

on

the otherhand

this

ego,

with

all its

freedom

nd

selfcontaining

Fiirsichsein),with

ts

uxta-

position o

"mere

nature,"

s still

member

f

nature.

Precisely

that

s

the

overlapping

atural

orrelation,hat

t

embraces

ot

alone "merenature,"but also thatbeingwhich s independent

and

often

enough

hostileto

"mere

nature,"

that this

which

according

o the

ego's

deepest

eeling

f

selfishnesss

external

o

the

ego must still

be the

element

f the

ego.

Moreover,

his

formula

holds

not

less

for

the

relationship

etween

he indi-

viduals

nd the

particular

ircles

f

their

ocietary

ombinations;

or

if

we

generalize

these

combinations

nto

the

concept of

societary-nessn the

abstract,

or

the

nterrelation

f

individuals

at large. We knowourselves n theone side as products f

society. The

physiological

eries

of

progenitors,heir

dapta-

tions

nd

fixations,he

traditions

f

their

abor,

heir

knowledge

and

belief, f

the

whole

pirit f

the

past

crystallized

n

objective

forms-all

these

determine

he

equipment

nd the

contents ,f

our

life,

o

thatthe

question

might

rise

whetherhe

ndividual

is

anything

more

than

a

receptacle

n

which

previously

xisting

elements

mix n

changing

roportions;

or

although

he

elements

were also in the last analysisproducedby individuals, etthe

contribution

f

each s a

disappearing

uantity,

nd

only

hrough

their

generic

nd

societary

mergingwere

the

factors

produced

in

the

ynthesisf

which n

turn he

ostensible

ndividuality

ay

consist.

On the

other

handwe

knowourselves

s a

member f

society,

oven

with ur

ife-process

nd its

meaning

nd

purpose

quite

as

interdependentlynto

its

coexistence

Nebeneinander)

as in the

other

view

into ts

succession

Nacheinander).

Little

as we in ourcharacters natural bjectshave a self-sufficiency,

because

he

ntersectionf

the

natural

lements

roceeds

hrough

us as

through

ompletely

elfless

tructures,

nd

the

equality

before

the

laws of

nature

resolves

our

existence

without

re-








386 THE AMERICAN

JOURNAL

OF SOCIOLOGY

mainder

nto a mere example

of

theirnecessity-quite s

little

do we

live as societary eings

round n

autonomous

enter;

but

we are frommoment o moment omposed ut of reciprocal ela-

tionships

oothers, nd we are

thus

omparable ith

he orporeal

substance

which

for us existsonlyas

the sum

of many mpres-

sions

of

the senses,

but

not

as

a

self-sufficientntity.

Now,

however,

we feel

that thissocial diffusion

oes

not completely

dissolveour personality.

This is

not because

of the reserva-

tions

previouslymentioned,

r

of

particular ontents

whose

meaning

nd development

est from

he outset nly n the ndi-

vidual oul, ndfinds o positiont large nthe ocialcorrelation.

It is not only because

of

the moldingof the

social contents,

whoseunity s individual

oul

is not tself gain

of social

nature,

any more than the

artistic

form, n which the

spots of color

merge

pon the canvas,

canbe derived

rom he

chemical ature

of thecolors themselves.

t is rather hiefly ecause the

total

life-content,

owever

ompletelyt

may be applicable

from he

social antecedents

nd reciprocities,

s

yet at

the same timecap-

able of consideration nder he category f thesingular ife,as

experience

f the

ndividual nd completely

rientedwithrefer-

enceto

this

experience.

The

two,

ndividual nd experience,

re

merely

ifferent

ategories nderwhich

the same

content alls,

just as the ame

plantmay

be regarded ow with

reference

o the

biological

conditions f

its

origin,

gain with

reference

o its

practicalutility,

nd still

again withreference

o its aesthetic

meaning. The standpoint

romwhich

he existence

f the

ndi-

vidualmaybe correlatedndunderstoodmaybe assumed ither

within

r without he

ndividual;

he

totality

f the

ife

with

ll

its sociallyderivable

ontentsmay

be

regarded s

the centripetal

destiny

f

its

bearer, ust

as

it

still

may pass,

with

all the

parts

reserved o

the credit f the

ndividual,s product

nd

element

of the social ife.

Therewith,herefore,

he

fact

f

socializationrings

he ndi-

vidual

nto the double ituation

romwhich

started:

viz.,

that

the ndividual as hissettingnthesocializationnd at thesame

time s in antithesis ith t,

a

member f its organismnd

at the

same time closedorganicwhole,

n

existenceSein)

for t

and

an existence

or

itself. The

essential

hing,however,

nd the








HOW

IS SOCIETY

POSSIBLE?

387

meaning f the particular ociological priori

whichhas its

basis

herein, s this,that between ndividual nd society he

Within

and Without re not two determinationshichexist alongside

of each other-although heymay occasionally evelop n that

way,

and

even to

the

degree

of

reciprocal

nmity-but

hat

hey

signify he whole unitary osition f the

socially ivinghuman

being.

His existences not

merely,

n subdivision

f the

contents,

partially ocial and partially ndividual,

ut it standsunder

the

fundamental,ormative,

rreducible

ategory

f

a

unity,which

we

cannototherwise xpress han through

he synthesis r the

contemporarinessf thetwo logically ntitheticaleterminations

-articulation nd self-sufficiency,he ondition

f beingproduced

by, and contained n, society, nd

on the otherhand,

of

being

derived ut of and moving round ts own

center. Society on-

sists

not

only,

s

we

saw

above,

of

beings

that

n

part

are

not

siocialized, ut also of others hatfeelthemselveso be, on

the

one hand,completelyocial existences,

n

the

otherhand,while

maintaining

he same

content, ompletely

ndividual

xistences.

Moreover hese re not two unrelated ontiguoustandpoints,s

if, for nstance, ne considers he same body

now withreference

to its

weight

nd

now with

reference

o

its

color;

but

thetwo

compose hatunitywhichwe

call the

social

being, hesynthetic

category-as the concept

of

causation

s

an

aprioristic nity,

although t includes he two, n content, uite

differentlements

of

the causingand of the effect. That this

formation

s at

our

disposal,

his

ability

o derive

from

beings,

ach

of which

may

feel tself s the terminu,ztsquo and as the terminusd quemof

its developments,estinies, ualities, he very

oncept f society

which

reckonswith

those

elements,

nd to

recognize

he

reality

corresponding ith he concept Society) as the terminus quo

and

the

termin-usd quem

of

thosevitalities

nd self-determin-

ings-that is an apriori f empirical ociety,hatmakes ts form

possible s we know t.

3. Society

s a structure

f

unlike

elements.

Even

where

democratic r socialisticmovementslanan "equality," ndpar-

tially

ttain

t,the thing

hat

s really

n

question

s

a like valua-

tionof persons, f performances,f positions, hilean equality

of

persons,

n

composition,

n

life-contents,nd

in

fortunes









cannot ome ntoconsideration.And where,

n the

other

hand,

an enslavedpopulation

onstitutes

nly

a

mass,

as in

the

great

orientaldespotisms, his equality f each alwaysconcerns nly

certain ides

of

existence, ay

the

political r

the

economic, ut

never hewholeof the same,thetransmittedualities, f which,

personal relationships,xperiences,

ot

merelywithin

he sub-

jective aspect of

life

but also

on

the side of its reactionswith

other existences,will unavoidablyhave a certain sort of pe-

culiarity nd untransferability.f we posit society

s

a

purely

objective cheme, t appears s an ordering

f

contents

nd

per-

formances hich n space, time, oncepts, alues are concerned

withone

another,

nd as

to

whichwe

may

n so far

perform

n

abstraction rom he personality,rom he Ego-form,

which s

the vehicleof

its

dynamic.

If that

nequality

f the

elements

now presents veryperformancer equalitywithin

his order

as individually arked nd in its place unequivocallystablished,

at the ame time ociety ppears s a cosmoswhose

manifoldness

in being nd in movements boundless,n which,however,

ach

point an be composed nd can develop tself nly nthatparticu-

lar

way,

the

structure

s not to

be

changed.

What

has

been

asserted f the structure f the world n general,viz., that no

grainof sand could have another orm r place from hatwhich

now belongs o it, exceptupon the presuppositionnd withthe

consequence f a change of all being-the same recurs n the

case of the tructuref society egarded s a web of qualitatively

determinedhenomena.An analogy s

in

the ase of a miniature,

greatly implifiednd conventionalized

stilisiert),

is to be found

forthe

picture

f

society hus onceived s a whole,

n a

bodyof

officials, hich s such consists f a definite rdering f "posi-

tions,"

f

a

preordinationf performances,hich, etached rom

theirpersonnel f a givenmoment, resent n ideal correlation.

Within he

ame, very ewcomer

inds

n unequivocallyssigned

place, whichhas waited for him, s it were, nd withwhichhis

energiesmustharmonize. That which n this ase is a conscious,

systematicssignmentf functions,s in thetotality f society f

course n inextricableangleof functions; hepositions n it are

not given by a constructive ill, but they re discernible nly

through he actual doing and experiencingf individuals. And








HOW

IS SOCIETY POSSIBLE?

389

in spiteof this enormous

ifference,

n

spite

of

everythinghat

is irrational,mperfect,

nd from he viewpointf evaluation o

becondemned,n historicalociety,tsphenomenologicaltructure

-the

sum and

the

relationship

f the sortof existence

nd

per-

formances ctually

presented y

all

the

elements

f

objectively

historical ociety is an order of elements,

ach of

which

occupies

an

individually etermined lace,

a co-ordination

f

functionsnd of

functioningenters,

hich

re

objective

nd

in

their

ocial significance

ull

of meaning

f

not always

full

of

value. At the same time,

he

purelypersonal

spect,

he sub-

jectivelyproductive,he impulses nd reflexes f the essential

ego

remain entirely ut

of consideration.

Or, otherwise

x-

pressed,

he ife of society uns ts

course-not

psychologically,

but

phenomenologically,

egarded urelywithrespect

o

its

social

contents-as though

each elementwere

predetermined

or

its

place in

thiswhole. In thecase of everybreak n

the harmony

of

the dealdemands,

t

runs

s though

ll the members

f

this

whole

stood

n a

relation

f

unity,

which

relation, recisely

e-

cause each member s his particularelf,refershimto all the

others

nd all the others o him.

From

thispoint, hen,

he

apriori s visiblewhich houldbe

now in

question, nd which ignifies o the

ndividual founda-

tionand a "possibility" f

belonging o a

society. That each

individual, yvirtue f his

own quality, s automaticallyeferred

to a

determinedositionwithin is

social milieu,

hat hisposition

ideallybelonging o him is

also actuallypresent n the social

whole-this is thepresuppositionromwhich, s a basis, he ndi-

vidual leads

his societaryife, and whichwe

may characterize

as theuniversal alue of the

ndividuality. t is

independentf

the fact

that t works tself

up towardclear conceptional on-

sciousness, utalso of the

contingentossibilityf

finding eali-

zation

n the ctualcourse f

life-as theapriority f the aw of

causation, s one of the

normative reconditions

f all cognition,

is

independentf whether

he consciousness

ormulatest

in

detached oncepts, nd whether he psychologicaleality lways

proceeds

n

accordancewith t or not. Our

cognitive ife rests

on the

presupposition

f a

pre-established

armony etween

ur

spiritual

nergies, venthemost ndividual f

them, nd external









objective xistence, orthe atter emains lwaysthe

expression

of

the immediate henomenon,

hether

r not

it

can be traced

back metaphysicallyr psychologically

o

the

production

f

the

reality ythe ntellecttself. Thus societary

ife

s

such

s

posited

upon

the

presuppositionf

a fundamental

armony

etween

he

individual nd the social whole, ittle

s this

hinders he

crass

dissonances f the ethicaland the

eudaemonisticife. If

the

social realitywereunrestrictedly

nd

infallibly iven

by

this

pre-

conditional rinciple, e should

have the

perfect ociety-again

not in the sense of ethicalor eudaemonistic

ut

of

conceptual

perfection.More fully xpressed,we shouldhave,so to speak,

not the perfect ociety, ut the perfect ociety. So

far

as

the

individualfinds, r does not find,realization

of

this apriori

of

his

social

existence,

.

e.,

the

thoroughgoing

orrelation

f

his

individualbeing with the surrounding ircles,

he

integrating

necessity f his particularity,etermined y

his

subjective

er-

sonal

ife,

for he ifeof

thewhole,

he

ocialization

s

incomplete;

the

society

has

stopped

hort

f being

that

gapless

reciprocality

which tsconcept oretells.

This stateof the case comes o a definite ocuswith

he cate-

gory

of the

vocation Beruf). Antiquity,

o

be

sure,

did not

knowthisconceptn the senseof personaldifferentiationnd

of

the

ociety

rticulated

y

division f

labor.

But what

s at

the basis of this conception as in

existence

even in

antiquity: iz.,

that

the

sociallyoperative oing is the

unifiedxpression

f the

subjective ualification,hat

the whole

andthepermanentfthesubjectivityracticallybjectifiestself

by

virtue

f

its

functions

n the

society. This

relationship as

realized

hen n the

averagemerely

n

a less highly

ifferentiated

content.

Its

principle merged

n

the

Aristotelian ictum

hat

some

were

destined

by

their

nature to

8&orro'etEv,

othersto

gOVXEEVe.

With higher development f the concept

t shows

the

peculiar tructure-that n

the

one hand thesociety egets

and offers

n

itself position Stelle) which n content

nd out-

line differs romothers,which,however, n principlemay be

filled ut by many, nd therebys, so to speak, omethingnony-

mous; and that this positionnow, in spite of its

character f

generality,

s

grasped y

the

ndividual,

n

theground

f an inner








HOW IS SOCIETY

POSSIBLE? 391

"call,"

or of a

qualification

onceived

s

wholly

personal.

In

order

hat

"calling"

may

be

given,

heremust

be

present,

ow-

ever it

came

to

exist,

that

harmony

etween

he

structure

nd

the

ife-process

f the

ociety

n

the

one

side,

and the

ndividual

make-up nd

impulses n

the

other.

Upon

this as

general

pre-

condition

ests

t last

the

representationhat

for

very

ersonality

a

position

nd

a

function

xistswithin

he

society,

o

which

he

person,ality

s

"called,"

and

the

imperative o search

until t

is

found.

The

empirical

ociety

becomes

"possible"

only

through he

apriori

which

ulminates

nthe

"vocation"

oncept, hich priori

to

be

sure, ike

hose

previously

iscussed,

annot

e

characterized

by

a

simple

hrase,

s in the

caseof

the

Kantian

ategories.

The

consciousness

rocesses

wherewith

ocializationtakes

place-

unity

composed

of

many,the

reciprocal

eterminationf

the

individuals,

he

reciprocal

ignificancef

the

individual

orthe

totality

f the

other

ndividuals

nd

of the

totality or

the

ndi-

vidual-run

their

ourseunder

his

precondition

hich

s

wholly

a

matter

f

principle, hich s notrecognized

n

theabstract,ut

expressestself n

the

reality f

practice:

iz.,

that

he

ndividu-

ality of

the

individual

inds

position

n

the

structure

f the

generality,

nd

stillmore

that

this

tructure

n

a certain

egree,

in

spiteof the

ncalculability

f

the

ndividuality,

epends

nte-

cedently

ponit

and

its

function.The

causal

interdependence

which

weaves

each

social

element

nto

the

being

and

doing

of

every

ther,

nd thus

brings

nto

existence

he

external

etwork

of

society,s

transformedntoa teleologicalnterdependence,o

soon

as it

s

considered

rom he

ide

of

its

ndividual

earers,

ts

producers,

ho

feel

themselves

o be

egos,

and

whose

attitude

grows

outof

the

oilof

the

personality

hich s

self-existing

nd

self-determining.

hat a

phenomenal

wholeness

f

such

char-

acter

accomodates tself

o

the

purposeof

these

ndividualities

which

approach

t

from

without,

o

to

speak,

that t

offers

station

for

their

ubjectively

etermined

ife-process,t

which

pointthepeculiarityf thesame becomes necessarymember

in

the

ife of

the

whole-this,

as a

fundamental

ategory,

ives

to the

consciousness

f

the

individual

he

form

which distin-

guishes

he

ndividual

s a

social

element

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Georg Simmel - How is Society Possible

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