Groundwater Series #1 Local Groundwater Management:...

Groundwater Series #1

January 2017

Local Groundwater Management: Update on Global Experiences

Groundwater Magazine

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Local Groundwater Management: Update on Global Experiences

Matthijs Kool and Frank van Steenbergen

This Background study was supported by WWF and GIZ under the Water Futures Program

Groundwater Magazine #4

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2. Local Groundwater Management in Andhra Pradesh, India

Andhra Pradesh has pioneered the promotion of Community-Based GroundWater Management (CBGWM) through such projects as APWELL (State Government led and Dutch supported), APFAMGS (UN-FAO supported without direct State Government intervention), and two follow-up World Bank-financed initiatives (APCBTMP and APDAI) (Garduño et al, 2009). In section 2.1 an overview of groundwater use and governance in Andhra Pradesh is given. Local groundwater management initiatives that took place in this region are described in section 2.1.

2.1 Groundwater use and governance in Andhra Pradesh

Nature of resource

The geology of Andhra Pradesh is made up of a patchwork of small water basins. Nearly 85 % of the entire state is underlain by hard rocks: volcanic and metamorphic rocks, mainly granites, gneisses and khondalites. The groundwater-dependent part of the Andhra Pradesh falls almost entirely in this geological category. As a result, the aquifers have limited storage capacity and limited interconnectivity. Dolerite dykes extending from a few meters to a few kilometres cuts across the state at many places (Murali Krishana Rao, 2009).

According to Garduño et al. (2009) two hydrogeological typlogies can be distinguished, which together comprise about the majority of the total land-area:• Typology A is associated with a more favourable

geomorphology where weathering and fracturing form more continuous groundwater bodies with their greatest


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1. Introduction

Faced with challenges of groundwater overexploitation and in the absence of effective central regulation, local groundwater management is often proposed as a solution to remedy the uncontrolled use of the shared invisible groundwater resource, especially in situations where the number of groundwater user is limited.

This magazine is an update on the known local groundwater management initiatives. Subsequently, local groundwater management in Andhra Pradesh (India), Mexico, Yemen, Pakistan and China are discussed in chapter 2 to 6 . The magazine analyses the success and failure factors in these local groundwater management initiatives. The factors looked at in the five case study areas concern:

Context factors • Nature of resource (shallow/ deep; conjunctive;

renewable/ non renewable; salinity levels);• Past, present and expected future use of groundwater

resource (incl type of users);• Nature of land and water tenure;• Overall (ground) water governance;• Support roles of government.

Organizational factors• Access to and source of hydrogeological knowledge;• Composition of the user group (homogeneity, size);• Form of organization (informal/ formal; dedicated or

integrated in larger organizations;• Access to measures and scope for water saving.

This magazine concludes with a review of the examples and a drawing of generic lessons that are useful for the cooperation in groundwater management in Egypt’s desert.

1) These initiatives are reviewed to compare them with the challenges in groundwater management that is taken place at the Moghra aquifer in the Beiheira governorate in Egypt. A partnership of Daltex Corporation, the German supermarket chain EDEKA, four other large-scale farmers of the Moghra aquifer, WWF and GIZ is exploring the scope of sustainable local water management strategies for potato farming

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thickness (typically 15 - 25 m) along lineaments below topographic lows, but with thinning towards topographic highs – these groundwater bodies have useful (although not large) storage and recharge which permits significant dry season irrigation but are prone to depletion through excessive irrigation abstraction (especially in a sequence of poor monsoon years);

• Typology B corresponds to areas where groundwater bodies are more patchy, shallow and thin, which often appear to be related to more schistose bedrock leading to higher clay content on weathering – their groundwater storage is much reduced and can be rapidly depleted by irrigation borewell abstraction.

Past, present and expected future use of groundwater resource

The state of Andhra Pradesh in India is highly dependent on groundwater. Groundwater is used to irrigate an area of 3.17 million hectares, more than half of the total area under irrigation (6.28 million ha) and to meet about 80 % of the drinking water needs of the growing population. During the last three decades, groundwater use from the hard rock areas has dramatically increased leading to falling groundwater tables. Since the 1980s, the number of wells has increased from 800,000 to 2.5 million and the land under groundwater irrigation has almost tripled (Meinzen-Dick et al, 2014). The state is divided into 1,227 groundwater blocks, out of which 300 were at critical or overexploited levels in 2008 and 208 were at semi-critical levels (World Bank, 2012).

Looking at aquifer typology A and B:• Aquifer Typology A, in particular, widely exhibits

a condition of very intensive abstraction and in consequence the groundwater table has declined steadily in many areas from the late 1980s, with only partial (but temporary) recovery in years of exceptional rainfall (there are some indications of recovery in the exceptional monsoons of 2005 -2007). In total there was widely a net fall in ‘pre-monsoon water-level’ of 10 - 15 m during 1995 - 2005, with almost all dugwells then drying-up early during the rabi season and borewell yield reduction/failure becoming commonplace as the water-table passes the critical depth of 15 - 25 m (depending on location and area);

Figure 1: Simplified hydrogeological sketch map of Andhra Pradesh State (Source: Garduño et al. 2009)


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Overall (ground) water governance

The relevant legislation to Community Based Groundwater Management (CBGWM) initiatives, is the Andhra Pradesh Farmers’ Managed Irrigation Systems (APFMIS) Act 11 of 1997. This act provides for farmers’ participation in the management of irrigation systems through Water Users Association (WUA), and considers that all landholders within the delineated command area constitute the members of the WUA. In addition this has been complemented by:• Various instructions issued by the State Government

in 2003 ordering that District Collectors co-opt as WUA members persons having customary rights and who are dependent on water sources for their livelihoods;

• On September 2008 the State Government further instructed District Collectors to co-opt ‘groundwater users, outside the irrigation-canal areas but within demarcated tank influence zones, for Participatory Groundwater Management (PGM) activities’.

The WUA movement in Andhra Pradesh is, however, not without its drawbacks – particularly in the surface irrigated areas the active role of WUAs in water management is poor. Thus using the Society Act to give legal status to groundwater management organizations (as has been done with APFAMGSHUNs) appears more promising.

The key legislation dealing with groundwater is the Water, Land & Trees Act (WALTA) 10 of 2002 (amended 2004), which aims at promoting water conservation, tree cover and regulating the exploitation and use of ground and surface water for sustainability. It envisages formation of authorities at the State, District, Division and Mandal levels – with the Mandal authority nominating the WUA Presidents.

The above acts do not provide much scope for local participatory groundwater management. As a result a number of ad-hoc approaches have been devised in each of the CBGWM schemes discussed above – from informal organizations to relying on village level associations to promote proposals to SG for the formation of Groundwater User Groups & Groundwater Management Committees. The

• The Aquifer Typology B, which has significantly lower available storage, is somewhat different in as much (where intensive exploitation has been attempted) it will be seriously depleted annually except in years of exceptional monsoon rainfall, but in turn replenishment would occur more rapidly (Garduño et al, 2009).

Nature of land and water tenure

The most common tenure types in India are common law freehold and leasehold. Eighty-six percent of arable land is privately owned. Landowners include individuals, corporations, religious institutions, public charitable trusts and the government. Individuals may acquire land in freehold through purchase, inheritance or gift (Martindale Hubbell, 2008).

There are significant restrictions on agricultural land leases. Non-agricultural leases exceeding one year must be in writing. As a result of these legal restrictions, approximately 90 % of leased land is leased informally; such leases are usually oral and are never recorded in the land rights registry. While sharecropping is the predominant form of tenancy, tenancy arrangements vary considerably from state to state (Martindale Hubbell, 2008). Land can be acquired in India through purchase, inheritance and operation of various state land distribution programs (USAID, 2011).

Neither the central nor state governments have laws clearly defining groundwater rights. Under common law, owners and occupiers of a piece of land have the right to collect and use groundwater. It is customarily accepted that landowners own the wells on their land. Others have no right to extract water from these wells or restrict use by the owner. Despite the landowner‘s legal control of all groundwater, in the drier areas of India, communities have historically considered the control of wells to be shared by caste or community groups. Social norms have dictated that all have a right to drinking water, irrespective of caste (Cullet, 2007).


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main provisions of WALTA on groundwater management are:• Water well owners must register their wells by paying a

small registration fee; • Landowners wanting to construct new water wells

must have a license for their electricity connection and a permit from the designated authority (who assess the acceptability of the proposed site in relation to neighbouring wells and the state of resource development);

• Drilling rig operators have to obtain a feasibility certificate from the AP-GWD and cannot charge a landowner for a water well drilling failure.

A shortcoming of this Act is that it does not address existing wells and the situation of overexploitation nor is there any scope for locally-agreed regulations to be endorsed. However, a much bigger problem is that the Act has been cumbersome to implement and that there is confusion on who is responsible for what enforcement – and a systematic assessment of past implementation difficulties together with a review of the powers is required (Garduño et al, 2009).

Support roles of government

The Government of Andhra Pradesh has initiated several programs to restore the balance in groundwater availability. Over the last 10 years it has undertaken several large watershed development programmes, installing a large range of water harvesting and ground water recharge measures: infiltration trenches, contour bunds, gully plugs, percolation tanks and infiltration wells.

Another important response by government to the intensive use of groundwater was the promotion of micro-irrigation through the Andhra Pradesh Micro-Irrigation Project. Under this so-called APMIP project, eligible farmers were provided with subsidized drip and sprinkler systems from recognized manufacturers (Mani et al, miscellaneous). An evaluation of the program however showed that it did not reduce water consumption as farmers increased the area cultivated upon installation of the water saving devices.

However, in overall the government outreach through extension services in groundwater is weak (Garduño et al, 2009). In India, the government has had limited capacity to regulate groundwater use (Shah et al, 2012). The major State regulatory measure consists of restricting the issuance of electricity, connections for pumps within a certain distance of existing wells within blocks that have been declared to use too high a proportion of recharge, or regulating electricity supplies to wells. However, those who can purchase diesel pumps can get around these regulations (Meinzen-Dick, 2014).

2.2 Local groundwater management initiatives in Andhra Pradesh

APFAMGS project

An ambitious experiment in participatory groundwater management was undertaken with FAO support in Andhra Pradesh, a mostly semi-arid state notorious for relentless groundwater overexploitation. From 2003 to 2009, the Andhra Pradesh Farmer Managed Groundwater Systems (APFMGS) project, involving over 700 communities, organised and motivated by a group of grassroots NGOs to regularly monitor groundwater levels, undertook annual community crop planning exercises, and adopted water-saving technologies (Shah, 2014).

The origin of the Andhra Pradesh Farmer-Managed Groundwater Systems (APFAMGS) goes back to the APWELL Project initiated by the Government of India in 1987. Community wells were provided with financial support under APWELL programme, which was discontinued in APFAMGS Project. The APFAMGS Project was implemented in the seven districts, covering 650 habitations in 66 Hydrological Units (HUs) (Reddy, 2014).

The aim was to improve farmers’ understanding of groundwater processes, centred around water-saving techniques, and change cropping patterns to those consistent with the water endowments of each HUN. In


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abandoned the intensive planning – such as the annual crop planning sessions. This does not mean a relapse to a situation of overuse however. In many areas the improved water management practices have been there to stay, though the intensive monitoring and planning did not continue in similar fashion. The APFAMGS project hence may best be considered as a necessary ’injection’ to introduce better groundwater management and reverse degradation.

APDAI initiative

The AP Rain-Shadow Areas Development Department was established to intensify, coordinate and increase effectiveness of disperse government assistance for sustainable development in the drought-prone districts of Andhra Pradesh. Strategic responses to drought need to be planned and implemented at the level of a group of villages with district and state government agencies facilitating the process.

The APDAI Project was being implemented during 2006 - 2009, and undertook a range of pilot projects in Mahbubnagar and Anantapur Districts through a coordinating NGO collaborating with District Collectors, under the oversight of the Principal Secretary of Department of Rural Development. The main groundwater management–related interventions are:• Connecting several individual borewells through a

pipeline network for sprinkler irrigation allowing a larger area to be cultivated with less water, and improving social equity by encouraging non-well owners to make use of the shared system;

• Soil moisture conservation through enhancing soil water retention capacity and drought resilience by promoting increased biomass at farm level with tree planting on bunds, cultivating some green manure field crops and improved composting;

• Promotion of SRI (System of Rice Intensification) – by transplanting rice after 8 days in carefully prepared plots irrigation is provided intermittently every 2 - 3 days instead of paddy inundation, which greatly reduces

community gatherings, village-specific water budgets were discussed to highlight the need for cropping pattern changes, improving water productivity, increasing the use of farmyard manure, and vermi-compost. The expectation was that, equipped with such improved understanding, farmers would reduce water use of their own volition without any coercion or moral suasion. A succession of reviews by the FAO, the World Bank, and several independent researchers has hailed APFMGS as a model of groundwater governance with global ramifications (Shah, 2014). The evidence showed that in all water stressed areas there was a remarkable shift to low water consumption crops and high acceptance of soil moisture conservation and micro-irrigation techniques. As a result water tables that had been falling, restored in all areas. In comparison in non-water stressed area the acceptance of different water conservation measures was not systematic and there was no systematic change in the water tables. See figure 2.

The project closed in 2009. In 2012 Verma et al (2012) suggested that not all but a few communities had


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Figure 2: Trends in cropping patterns over 2005-2008 with hydrological units having positive (a - above) and negative (b - lower) water balances in the first year.

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management can be combined with introducing precision agriculture.

2.3 Conclusions

Andhra Pradesh arguably has more experience in promoting Community Based Groundwater Management (CBGM) than any other Indian state and than almost any other part of the world.

Garduño et al (2009) recommends a support package that includes: facilitating better farmer understanding of the groundwater/crop-planning interrelation to encourage more balanced cropping with less high water-use crops, simple agricultural information and extension directly to farmers promoting well sharing, piped distribution, efficient irrigation and soil-water conservation, implementing a combination of demand management and aquifer recharge measures, increasing the reliability of improvement of rural electricity services and ensuring the coordinated utilization of all appropriate government grants and support.

3. Local groundwater management in Mexico

Agriculture is the largest user of groundwater in Mexico - 18.91 km3/ year of a total of 31.2 km3 / year. By 2000, 100 of the 653 aquifers assessed were declared overexploited. Rapid expansion since the 1960s of poultry, beef, and fresh and processed fruit and vegetables for exports has led to rapid expansion in groundwater irrigation (Shah, 2014). Groundwater is the preferred source of water for export agriculture, as it is supposed to be free of the pollution that surface water faces.

Figure 3 shows the overexploitation of the aquifers in the northern and central parts of the country, where the population is concentrated and most production takes place. The arid climate means that a high amount of water is required for agribusiness. The overuse of groundwater, especially in the agricultural districts of Sonora and Baja California (northern border with the US) has also caused

consumptive water use and weed growth but requires extra agricultural labor.

By December 2008 the 5 shared-groundwater pilots were at various stages of development with one (Chellapur) already operational. In part of this village 5 borewells (developed 3 - 4 years ago after dugwells failed) were joined to a single pipeline to irrigate about 25 ha – the irrigation system by a designated person with operation and maintenance costs equally shared through a common fund. The community itself has agreed on the following regulations and guidelines: • No new borewells to be constructed in next 10 years; • One borewell must be rested every day (for 20 % of

reduction in water/electricity use);• During drought the land under irrigation should be

reduced proportionally;• All shareholders must use water-saving cultivation

methods;• Crop plans must be made for the season, with priority to

food and fodder crops;• Area under paddy need to be reduced, with no paddy

cultivation during rabi season.

Contrary to what might be expected, bringing borewells under common management was not so difficult to implement in Chellapur – and this is facilitating the process in the other pilot areas. One benefit of shared systems is that they make supplementary (protective) irrigation of kharif crops easy – because with the combined pipeline and sprinkler system a large area can be covered. The other immediate result of introducing the shared system has been an increase in groundnut cultivation in the rabi season, since this crop responds very well under sprinkler irrigation which reduces the incidence of fungal infections. The interventions introduced by APDAI, as in APFAMGS, had a ready acceptance. The challenge was to the agency that would promote this on a regular basis, in particular the linking of wells in a shared system, as this involved considerable transaction costs. One major lesson, as also in AFFAMGS, was that many of the water saving measures also lead to crop yield increases and the introduction of groundwater


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was to give teeth to the veda, but in reality new tubewells proliferated, with the CNA issuing licenses even for areas earmarked as over used. Figure 4 shows the progress with licensing of agricultural wells in Mexico in 2001. It has a few years to provide permits to 100.000 wells (Scott & Shah, 2004).

Against this backdrop, Mexico embarked on a country wide experiment in local ground water management through the formation of technical water councils (COTAS). COTAS were to implement a programme of reducing groundwater use through modernising irrigation systems, relocating wells and using treated wastewater, yet they had no regulatory power, as this was vested in the CNA.

3.1 Groundwater Use and Governance in Guanajuato State

This section describes the context of groundwater use and governance in the Guanajuato state in more detail. Guanajuato uses the largest amount of both agricultural energy and groundwater in the country. Groundwater overdraft is estimated at 1.3 km3 annually in this state.

the intrusion of sea water into the aquifers. The most seriously affected states are Baja California Norte (BCN), Baja California Sur (BCS), Sonora, Coahuila and Durango. In this northern state, the overexploitation of the aquifer is fundamentally related to intensive water use for export agriculture and dairy production (Spring, 2014).

In 1948 Mexico introduced a law to restrict groundwater overdraft and curtail the number of wells in prohibited areas, called vedas, in which drilling permits were required. This law was further strengthened in 1972. But its enforcement remained lax. There was an ongoing battle between the need to physically control groundwater abstraction and the politicans’ need to attract farming vote. As a result, veda decrees were announced at the same time as subsidies and credit for drilling, equipment and electricity for new tubewells were given. In 1992, the new Law of the Nation’s Water mandated a National Water Registry of newly created private property right in water. A user could not impound or divert more than 1,080 m3 of water annually, except by obtaining a concession from the Comision Nacional del Agua (CNA - the federal water agency). All existing and new tubewells were to be registered and assigned a quantitative water right in the form of a concession. In theory, this

Figure 3: Agricultural groundwater (volume per municipality per year) (Source: Scott et al, 2011) Figure 4: Percentage of wells titled (Scott & Shah, 2004)

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water irrigation area of the Guanajuato river (Foster et al, 2004).

Past, present and expected future use of groundwater resource

All the aquifers are overexploited with abstraction some 40 percent greater than annual recharge, leading to sustained annual falls in groundwater levels of 1.22 - 3.30 m. Well depths of 200 - 400 m are now common, while depths up to 500 - 1,000 m are reported (Shah, 2014).

The areas where most of the groundwater is extracted are the central Bajío region and the Laguna Seca region in the northeast of the state (see Figure 6). The driving force behind groundwater depletion in Guanajuato has been the large increase in groundwater irrigation, from around 24,000 ha in

Nature of resource

The aquifers of Guanajuato State mainly occur in a series of elevated basins separated by ranges of hills. Figure 5 shows the Silao-Romita aquifer system that comprises a thick sequence of mainly Tertiary alluvial sediments, interrupted by occasional lacustrine clays, overlying a more extensive rhyolite tuff and intruded by Tertiary and Quaternary diabases and basalts. Prior to significant well drilling, groundwater was encountered in this system at shallow depth in a phreatic aquifer extending to 60 m below ground level, but this was rapidly depleted by abstraction. Today the deeper part of the Tertiary alluvial deposits together with the underlying rhyolite tuff provide most groundwater to wells with static groundwater levels locally reaching 100 m below ground level, but perched water-tables occur above the more extensive lacustrine clays, especially along the surface

Figure 5: Schematic hydrogeological cross-section of the Silao-Romita aquifer system (Foster et al, 2004)


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Mexico implemented a large-scale land reform that began after the revolution in 1917 and ended in 1992. The reform distributed more than 100 million hectares from large farms to groups of households organized into ejidos (collective holdings). Indigenous groups also gained rights to their commonly held land during this period, which they organized into comunidades (forms of collective ownership). These comunidades, however, lagged behind the development of privately held farms, and collective owners were more likely to be poor.

In 1992, Mexico fundamentally changed its land regime and allowed privatization and market transfers of ejidal land rights. This reform is now largely completed, though it has been hindered by: inadequate state participation in the land certification and registration process; insufficient protection of women‘s land rights; and lack of credit or marketing mechanisms (USAID, 2011).

The federal government has ownership and jurisdiction over virtually all surface and groundwater, Comisión Nacional del Agua (CNA) is charged with issuing permits including both concessions to private interests and assignments of governmental entities for water (Reed, 2007). Thus recent legal and policy changes led to a more privatized system of water use permits and decentralization of water

1960 to around 250,000 ha in the 1990s. Although irrigation accounts for some 83 % of groundwater extractions in Guanajuato, groundwater is also critically important for industrial and domestic water use: 99.3 of urban and rural water supply is groundwater dependent while industry exclusively uses groundwater (Wester et al, 2011).

Furthermore, Guanajuato State is subject to pressure for water in the upper part of the Lerma-Chapala Basin because of the abstractions of groundwater for Mexico City’s supply, as well as 350 kilometre downstream and to the southeast for the conservation of Chapala Lake and for Guadalajara city’s supply in Jalisco State. There is an apparent deficit of nearly 200 hm3 per year in surface runoff, resulting from the difference between the flow that reaches the state from upstream sources and the downstream flow, which has resulted in a growing conflict within the Lerma-Chapala River Basin among the five states which share its territory (Sandoval, 2004).

Between 1948 and 1962, 10 veda decrees were issued in Guanajato and in 1983, the entire state was put under a strict veda. Yet, the number of wells increased from 2,000 in 1960 to 19,600 by 2000 (Shah, 2014).

Figure 6: Areas of intensive groundwater use (grey) and major cities (black) in the State of Guanajuato, Mexico (Source: adapted from Wester et al, 2011)

Technical experTisesocieTy

(organized waTer users)governmenTal supporT

COTAS

General Assembly

Directive Board

Water Technical Council

Consultive GroupTechnical group

Manager

Administrative support

Technical support

Technical Committee - Guanajuato State’s Trust

for Social Participation in Water Management

(FIPASMA)

Figure 7: COTAS Institutional Model (Source: Sandoval, 2004)

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typically don’t have any technical personnel. Since 1998, the responsibility for the formation and supervision of the COTAS within the Guanajuato state government is in the hands of the State Water Comission (Comisión Estatal del Agua de Guanajuato or CEAG).

Access to and source of hydrogeological knowledge

CEAG, in coordination with the COTAS, developed a groundwater management model in 2002, to focus on concrete actions that would lead to significant reductions in groundwater extractions and foster social participation. The first two elements consisted of extensive aquifer studies and a database on the number and location of groundwater wells. In addition hydrogeological models were developed for 14 aquifers and groundwater quality was characterized (Sandoval, 2004). There was no shortage of data - rather an overkill.

During this process, the CEAG identified more than 15,700 groundwater wells (many of which were not registered by CNA), and this data was transferred to the COTAS who further extended and updated the groundwater wells database. This database contained information on the position, depth, legal status, owner and use of every well, and included other details such as the presence of a volume meter, annual allocated water volume by CNA, and, where possible, extracted volumes (Wester et al, 2011).

Composition of the user group

Only a very small percentage of the users (3 - 10 %) was involved in the creation of the COTAS. The participation of aquifer users, especially farmers, in the formation of the COTAS was restricted. CEAG did not opt for a large-scale convocation of the users but only invited the leaders of diverse organizations to participate in the formation process of the COTAS. In the majority of cases, the representatives of the agriculture sector in the COTAS were commercial farmers or agro-industrialists and the peasant sector (ejidos) was largely bypassed (Wester et al, 2011).

management with the potential opportunity for buying and selling of these permits and concessions.

Overall (ground) water governance

The Mexican authority for water management is the Comisión Nacional del Agua (CNA). In Guanajuato state, groundwater is managed by 14 Technical Groundwater Committees (Comités Técnicos de Aguas Subterráneas, or COTAS) after the CNA instituted the 1992 federal law to address groundwater resource management.

The COTAS (see figure 7), whose boards are comprised of groundwater users, are charged with setting a common agenda within their jurisdictions to monitor and manage groundwater pumping; groundwater use is essentially self-regulated throughout the country (Porse, 2013). Similarly to the HUNs in Andhra Pradesh, the COTAS have no regulatory power, yet they are a platform to channel voluntary compliance.

Although COTAS are government funded they have no legal or official regulatory status or authority, or a clear mandate or structure.

While the original aim had been to formulate aquifer rules and regulations and reduce abstraction, in practice this was limited in the absence of authority over the large number of groundwater users. Hence the focus shifted to promoting water saving measures. Efforts to strengthen the COTAS focused on increasing user participation and formulating groundwater management model plans (Wester et al, 2011).


The development of the 14 COTAS in Guanajuato from 2000 to 2006 strongly depended on the support of CEAG, who continued to pay for their operational costs. The state budget for COTAS reached nearly US$ 4 million, plus another US$ 6 million for research, groundwater modelling and monitoring. COTAS depend financially on subsidies from either the federal or the state governments, and


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adjustment of groundwater concessions with the federal government.

4. Local groundwater management in Yemen

Yemen’s communities have a long engagement with managing land and water resources, demonstrated not only by physical works such as terraces, diversion dams and canals but also by an array of customary institutions for organizing collective action; regulating access to land for cultivation, grazing, and water harvesting; and resolving conflicts by discussion, mediation and arbitration through networks of social relationships (Lichtenthaeler, 2003). Examples are the traditional spate irrigation institutions: established leadership roles and norms for shared contributions; the agreed rights to water and processes for dealing with conflicts (Taher et al, 2012).

However over the last several decades, tubewells and motorized pumps have been used to supply growing populations and extend irrigation. The development of new wells has expanded rapidly and water tables have declined in many areas. The economic boost in the 1970s and the 1980s, in addition to the remittances from workers in Gulf countries (which accounted for billions of US dollars), opened intensive investment in groundwater irrigation. The area under groundwater irrigation in Yemen has increased from 37,000 to 400,000 ha in a matter of 40 years.

The most common results of groundwater depletion felt by the local communities are increased well depths, increased pumping costs and reduced water quality. In response to these problems, local water users in some areas have taken initial steps to prevent further harmful development of water resources, avoid wasteful use, harvest rainwater, replenish groundwater, and ensure access to water for drinking and domestic use. Several communities now require spacing between wells, and some have closed or restricted usage of wells that interfere with domestic water sources. There is slow shift of Individual farmers to (subsidized) efficient irrigation technologies, adjust cropping

However, as a result of the groundwater management model, the number of users that became members of the COTAS rose from 225 in 2000 to 8,610 in 2006 (of an estimated 13,500 - 16,500 well owners), and 20 aquifer monitoring committees were formed (Wester et al, 2011).

Access to measures

Many attempts have been made in Guanajuato to regulate and reduce groundwater use, including user self-regulation and state regulation through pumping bans (vedas), pumping permits and the reduction of electricity subsidies. To date, these efforts have not led to significant reductions in groundwater extractions, urgently needed to stabilize aquifer water levels (Wester et al, 2011).

3.2 Conclusions

While Mexican COTAS have played a useful role in generating information and educating farmers, their effectiveness in managing groundwater overdraft was below the initial expectations. Wester et al. (2011) recommended:• Institutional coordination of efforts to reduce

groundwater use should receive the highest priority and should be integrated into a policy package which bundles the different efforts that are being undertaken by CEAG, CNA and CFE (the Federal Electricity Commission). Coupling groundwater control with energy consumption would give COTAS, CEAG and CNA a strong control measure;

• To further develop COTAS into viable organizations of groundwater users that enable user self-regulation of groundwater extractions, a careful system of checks and balances needs to be developed to ensure accountability, legitimacy and transparency;

• To move forward, groundwater users would need to devise aquifer agreements with substantially lower level of groundwater extractions, either through an adjudication of pumping rights on the basis of mutual prescription or through a negotiated downward

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Past, present and expected use of groundwater resource

Though updated figures are missing, groundwater withdrawals were conservatively estimated at 2.5 BCM/year, which amounts to about 70 % of total water use of the country. The rate of groundwater overdraft is currently twice the recharge rate, and is increasing. Some major aquifers are being depleted even more rapidly. As a result, the annual decline in groundwater levels is typically 2.5 - 4.5 m in many areas, with Sana’a Basin exceeding this and the decline being closer to 6 m/year (Hydrosult et al, 2010).

The World Bank-funded Groundwater Soil Conservation Project completed a study in 2012 related to the assessment of water resources in the important Dhamar Plain and it described the alarming situation of expected groundwater use as follows: • With a growth rate of 2 % in water abstraction, which is

normally expected in a developing economy, the shallow groundwater up to a depth of 200 metres would be exhausted within the next 10 years; and

• Within the next 30 years, all groundwater up to 700 metres would be exhausted with a growth rate of 2 %.


In Yemen, particularly in basin management, land use and land rights are as important as water rights. At present land ownership and tenancy rights are still problematic and land use is not regulated. Another complication is that tenant farmers are often not permitted to make improvements to their farming plots and have other disincentives to make best use of the land they have rented or been given rights to farm. In addition, illegal land seizure have been reported in several parts of the country. While there is no solution to creating more arable and grazing lands, there are a number of legislative and regulatory interventions that could be undertaken to make the best use of the land that is available (MetaMeta, 2013).

patterns, and share in the investment of pipe networks. Subsidies for diesel remain a major distorting factor: they can amount to more than USD 1,000 per hectare, an arrangement that with the severe fiscal crisis in Yemen is no longer attainable. It has been calculated that providing water saving equipment at 50 % subsidy (especially conveyance pipelines) would earn themselves back in 1 - 3 years on the sole strength of reducing the use of subsidized pumping. As depletion of groundwater resources continues at rapid rates, much more may need to be done (Taher et al, 2012) and the experience is that promoting drip/bubbler and improved conveyance systems does not necessarily reduce water consumption as it may trigger land expansion and because in sprinkler and bubbler systems the evaporative losses are high.

In section 4.1 an overview of groundwater and governance in Yemen is given. After that 2 case studies of local groundwater management initiatives are described in section 4.2.

4.1 Groundwater use and governance in Yemen

This section describes the nature of aquifers, the past, present and expected use of groundwater resource, the nature of land and water tenure, overall groundwater governance and supporting roles of the government against groundwater depletion in Yemen.

Nature of aquifers

The aquifers in Yemen, which are distributed throughout the country, consist mainly of alluvial, sandstone, limestone and volcanic formations. Alluvial aquifers which are formed in wadi beds from sand and gravel unconsolidated deposits are the most common (MOMR and TNO IAG, 1995; Shahin, 2006).


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under the Water Law, has offered a source of legitimacy to local initiatives in introducing restrictions and rules (Weshali et al, 2012). Under many water-sector projects - in drinking water supply and in irrigation - WUAs and smaller water user groups (WUGs) are being promoted. The outfall of these organizations however is high. The analysis is that many are primarily project arrangement and are not part of the regular governance. In the recent Irrigation Policy Action Plan.


The intense use of groundwater in Yemen.’s arid environment and the falling groundwater tables triggered several government and donor responses. These include the creation of a National Water Resources Authority (hereafter NWRA), the enactment of a Water Law; the sponsored creation of Water Users Associations (hereafter WUAs) and the implementation of subsidy programs aiming to introduce efficient irrigation techniques. Substantial effort has also gone into creating awareness on groundwater overuse (van Steenbergen et al, 2011).

Furthermore by supporting ‘small works by the communities’, GSCP demonstrated that ‘institutional and technical methods can help to slow aquifer depletion’ (World Bank, 2012) and supporting the rationale of decentralisation and community-managed groundwater systems.

4.2 Examples of local groundwater management initiatives in Yemen

In a substantial number of communities local informal rules have been developed among water users to regulate the use of groundwater locally. Many communities have sought to prevent further harm to existing users, for instance by norms restricting well spacing and banning export of water from their area by tankers. In other cases farmers closed disputed wells, invested in groundwater recharge or connected separate wells by a shared network of pipelines, allowing water to travel from one area to the other. In some

The Republican Resolution Law no.39 of 1991 requires registration of land rights. However, only limited urban lands appear to be registered pursuant to the formal law. Most private rural land rights are documented under customary law. Traditional leaders, usually the sheikh prepares land title documents (basira) and issue land inheritance certificates (fasl). The documentation usually includes a description of the land boundaries, and history of ownership. Land may be titled individually or jointly in Yemen, but the vast majority of land is titled in the name of the male head of household or extended family. Women with individual title to land tend to be wealthy or educated urban residents. Only a small percentage of Yemen’s land (an estimated 10 - 20 %) is registered. 80 to 90 % of land transactions occur by basira or informal documentation. Due to the low level of official registration of land, access to credit has been affected, as all of the loan products of the leading agricultural bank require a land deed to receive even the smallest loan (MetaMeta, 2013).

Landowners have rights to surface and ground water. Landowners with financial resources can create deep tubewells on their land and sell the water extracted from deep aquifers to neighbours and remote purchasers (USAID, 2011).

Overall groundwater governance

The main legal instrument promulgated to manage groundwater is the 2002 Water Law, updated with the 2011 By-Laws. The Water Law spells out licensing requirements for new wells and describes new institutional water-management arrangements such as the Basin Councils and formal water-users associations (WUAs). Even so, many wells continue to be unlicensed. Some communities seeking to stop potentially harmful wells have sought support through local councils, security authorities, courts, and the branches of the National Water Resource Authority. Regrettably, such efforts have often been difficult, time-consuming, and fruitless. Even so, the fact that well development is in principle no longer a ‘free for all’ and needs to be licensed

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Khrabat Muhyab, Bani Matar, Sana’a

The main water source of the Khrabat Muhyab area is the run-off from nearby mountains, which feeds aquifers and springs. Over the years farmers have moved to groundwater irrigation, typically pumping water from wells 150 - 180 m deep. The wells, if only because of their cost, are shared by many families. A typical well may have 17 shares and ownership between 25 - 30 families.

Following a violent conflict in a nearby area over the sharing of water from a dam that was to be built by the government,

cases the agricultural wells were also doubled up as sources of domestic water supply and private village pipe networks were developed (van Steenbergen et al, 2012). Several studies have looked into local water management in Yemen (Bruns & Taher, 2009; Taher et al, 2012; van Steenbergen, 2006; van Steenbergen et al, 2011). From this a list of 24 cases of local groundwater management have been identified. See table 1.

Two of these examples of local groundwater management are described below.

Table 1: Cases of local groundwater management (Source: Taher et al, 2012)

Place Type of local rule

1 Hejraht al-Asham, Jabal al-Sharq- Dhamar Restrict well drilling

2 Wadi Khalaka, Sana’a Restrict well drilling, ban on tankers, well depth

3 Khrabat Muhyab, Bani Matar, Sana’a Restrict well drilling, well spacing

4 Qarwa Beshar, Jahanah, Khawlan, Sana’a Restrict well drilling

5 Hijrat al-Muntasir, Amran Ban on new drilling

6 Wadi al Qarada, Bani Hushaish, Sana’a Restrict well drilling, recharge weirs in wadi bed, well sharing

7 Wadi Akarem, Dhamar Restrict deep drilling in the main wadi

8 Bani Garban, al-Kafr District, Ibb Restrict drilling of new wells

9 Al-Gawaref, Ibb Ban on qat irrigation

10 Wa’alah, Amran Ban on water transport by tankers

11 Bait Sarhan and Alhamrmaly, Amran Ban on water transport by tankers

12 Al Ma’akhad, Amran Ban on water transport by tankers

13 Qa’a Al-Shams, Amran Ban on water transport by tankers

14 Bani Maymoun, Amran Tankers only within village

15 Wadi Dhelaa, Hamdan, Sana’a Well spacing, well sharing, dam development

16 Wadi Al Zabaira in Qadas, Al Mawasit District, Taiz Restrict/ban well drilling, closing disputed wells

17 Al Aroosi, Mehan, Sana’a Closure of disputed wells, agreement on reservoir operation

18 Al Mashra, Damar Ban on drilling

19 Wadi Al-Har, Anss, Dhamar New agricultural wells only if they serve drinking water too

20 Mawia, Taiz Joint WUA to regulate new well development, replacement of qat in some areas

21 Wadi Al Zabaira, Qadas; Al Mawasit District, Taiz Restrict/ban well drilling, closure of disputed wells

22 Hijrat al-Muntasir, Amran Ban on new drilling

23 Al-Wahda, Al-Maafir, Taiz Ban on new wells, non-well owners to share in existing wells

24 Zuberia, Wadi Siham, Hodeidah Prevent new shallow development by referring cases to Local Council and NWRA


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level. However, the water table is declining continuously; a decline of 6 m was observed during the year 2010.

Water and electricity are the cooperative society’s main activities. The cooperative society owns three wells. Water is pumped to four elevated tanks, perched on top of the mountain, and then distributed to homes via a network of pipelines. Approximately 1,900 homes are subscribed to the network. The water is provided for drinking and domestic purposes only; it is prohibited to use water for agriculture. Al-Sinah cooperation association has few remarkable features that earmark it as an outstanding example of local water management. • Democratic structure. Management is elected every

three years with an elaborate structure of 12 election assemblies. There is no traditional local leader. The preference is for people of high integrity. There are no big social and income differences in the community and education is widespread even among women;

• Conditional partnership with public agencies. The Al-Sinah cooperation association systematically liaises with public agencies and has sought specific support for parts of its investment program where public agencies had the right thing to offer. However, the association has refrained from being automatically involved in projects.

The association also plays a role in local groundwater management. Within the area a distance between wells in the range of 500 m is observed. One striking example of the application of this rule was in the mid 1990s, when well drilling in the neighbouring hamlet was thought to threaten the sustainability of the Al-Sinah water supply well field. The association bought up some scattered fields in this neighbouring hamlet, then drilled wells there and subsequently capped the wells. Because local people respect the “500 m between wells” rule, the capped wells prevented any other water development in the area and the Al-Sinah water supply was protected.

The Al-Sinah association also works together with the Taiz branch of the National Water Resources Authority (NWRA). The NWRA is (as of 2005) not issuing any well drilling

farmers decided to regulate the use of water in their area. The establishment of the WUA, called ‘Belad Albustan’, was triggered by seeing the conflict and hardship arising from overuse of groundwater in nearby areas; it was not set up by any project but created at the initiative of concerned farmers. The WUA initially regulated the seven wells in Khrabat Muhyab village. Minimum rules were set on the distance between wells. Wells were to be at least 500 m apart, but depending on the location the distance can be even larger. The minimum distance to a spring, for instance, is 2,000 m.

Whereas the WUA initially covered seven wells in two villages, its usefulness has been recognized and it now covers the area of 58 wells in eight villages. The membership went up from 80 to several 100. The development of new wells in the area is not allowed unless a clear need for a new well (rather than getting water from an existing well) is proven and the minimum distance is observed. Improved irrigation techniques are relatively exceptional in the area and there appears to be a good scope for improving water management on this front too (Taher et al, 2012).

Al-Sinah, Almaafer, Taiz

Al-Sinah area is located 30 km west of Taiz in wadi Alasloom, Almaafer District, Taiz Governorate. The area consists of 12 groups of villages with a total population of approximately 18,000 (2004 census). It is well-known in Yemen for its cooperative society. The story of Al-Sinah cooperative society dates back to the end of 1960s, when the community decided to establish it to start water and electricity projects but also to facilitate education and health improvements. Al-Sinah cooperative society stands out as an example of long-term institutionalized local development and resource management.

Al-Sinah basin contains 35 agricultural borewells, owned by farmers either individually or shared. Most of these wells were developed in the 1970s. The average depth of wells is 260 m, but the water table is found at 96 m below ground

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majority rule - where a majority decision of a WUA general assembly is binding to all users of water - provided the WUA represents two-thirds of the water users in the area. If the percentage of membership in the general assembly of WUAs is two thirds of the total beneficiaries of the joint water source, then any decisions issued by the general assembly shall be obligatory and mandatory upon all beneficiaries of such source.

To strengthen the WUAs will require a number of important steps. Rather than making WUA establishment part of investment projects without a long term vision on their functioning, in general there is the need to:• Prepare a guidance map to roll out WUAs in the different

regions of the country, based on the hydrological sub-units. Based on experience of WUA established earlier the preferred area of control of a WUA is 200 - 1,200 ha of irrigated land, with the larger units in the spate irrigated lowland areas. The hydrological sub-units should be hydrologically interconnected; in the lowland area based on spate branch canals and surface drainage and in the highland on valley topography and related aquifers. The map will serve as a first guidance in the promotion of WUAs, as In the end much is also dependent on local terrain and preferences;

• Based on the irrigated area in the country one may expect the formation of a maximum 1,000 - 2,500 WUAs if full coverage is to be reached. This will have to be scheduled over a 15 years period (medium and long term), starting in areas that (1) classify as black areas, as here the requirements are highest and (2) spate areas where there are major challenges in the operation and management of structures and where the registration of water rights is initiated (Policy action theme 5). At present an estimated 100 - 300 WUAs are functional in Yemen, that may go through the registration process as proposed below;

• As the approach is for farmers to form their own WUAs, a campaign is required to inform farmers on the possibility for setting up WUAs.

• Have a standard compulsory training offered to WUAs on group dynamics, basic understanding of Water Law and

permits without consulting the association and obtaining a written consent from the association. Since 2008 no more well drilling permits had been issued. The association is trying to affirm this rule by declaring the area as a protected zone. Further, to boost groundwater recharge, the al-Sinah association is working with the Social Fund for Development on the construction of a storage dam. The association has obtained the required land with its own resources. In addition the association is working with local councils to maintain and rehabilitate traditional cisterns and ponds (Taher et al, 2012).

4.3 Conclusions

The examples show that various forms of local groundwater regulation are feasible, and yield specific, practical benefits, such as reducing conflicts, assuring priority access to water for domestic use, and providing more equitable and reliable sharing of scarce water. However, local efforts are often constrained by various factors, including lack of technical understanding of aquifers, lack of knowledge about effective approaches, and lack of external support for enforcing rules.

Following the documentation of several cases of local groundwater management, exchange visits were organized with the help of the Union of Water Users Associations. These brought farmers from areas where local regulation was in place to other areas where no local management was occurring. A striking feature was that in some parts of Yemen there have been no local initiatives (for instance Dhamar plains) whereas in other areas there are more examples.

Considerable scope exists to further promote community groundwater governance in Yemen. The recent Irrigation Sector Policy Action Plan endorses the same and emphasizes that WUAs and local groundwater management should be made part of the overall system of water governance. The new 2011 By-Laws of the Water Law also create the legal cover for this:

The provisions in the By-Laws go much further than what was legally possible. A most important provision is the


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crops should concentrate in these areas, so as compensate for the hardships and ensure that special effective measures are undertaken to ensure the livelihoods of the farm population is safeguarded.

5. Local groundwater Management in China (PRC)

5.1 Introduction

The dry northern plains of PRC produce half of the country’s wheat and one-third of its corn. They do so by using groundwater at a rate that largely exceeds the way at which it is replenished. The estimate is that not less than 130 Million people in China depend for their staple food on the unsustainable use of groundwater. Groundwater levels have dropped with a meter a year over large parts of Hebei, Hunan and Shanxi (Qiu, 2010).

Several far reaching attempts at direct regulation of groundwater in China have been initiated, in particular by combining water quota, pricing, combined with the use of swipe cards. There have been some remarkable successes but these are not uniform. The introduction of the quota cum swipe card systems is introduced in a large number of areas. In addition more basic swipe card systems are used though do not use quota but are essentially pre-paid systems.

According to the Water Law (2002), water resource allocation quota in PRC should follow the corresponding ‘river basin plan’ and the ‘water demand-and-supply mid-term plan’. The procedure provided at national, provincial and county levels is shown in figure 8. It can be seen that the planning process is centrally initiated. At county level the Department of Land & Mineral Resources or equivalent should play a role, but there are now usually no groundwater specialist personnel in this agency at county level, so the provision is not fully consistent with reality on the ground (Foster & Garduño, 2004).

By-Laws, community management, local water resources and water saving measures alongside the registration process and financing systems. This training will need to be followed up with farmer to farmer or WUA to WUA exchange within a Sub basin Zone;

• A number of minimum requirements should be formulated with respect to the organization and performance of the WUAs on the duties assigned to them, so that in case of non-performance or mismanagement they can be delisted;

• A registry system should be set up for the WUAs - under NWRA - that keeps record of board members, financial records, and geographical area of work. The records from this registry are required for the WUA to engage in government activities and obtain loans, as well as to keep an overview of their performance and ability to maintain minimum requirements.

In addition it is important to: • Promote awareness and knowledge extension on water

related issues making use as much as possible from farmers own organizations;

• Develop simple groundwater monitoring tools for local water users;

• Combine the phasing out of the perverse diesel subsidies with the promotion of water saving technologies within the context of local controls on new well development and no expansion of cultivated areas.

The Irrigation Sector Policy Action Plans also proposed to place embargos on groundwater development in heavily exploited areas. On the basis of these basin plans embargoed ‘black areas’ should be identified, where no new well development or well deepening is allowed.. The outcomes of the National Dialogue meant to reconcile political factions after Yemen’s spring revolutuon, similarly emphasized the need to call a state of emergency in such areas. These areas should be identified and they should also be prioritized in investment programs that target water saving and recharge. The support to WUAs, awareness building, promotion of water saving measures and conversion to low water demand

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magazine. One case is a pilot in Minqin county in Gansu province. The other case is a pilot in Zhonggao village in Taocheng District of Hebei province (Zhimin and Baojun; Shah, 2014).

5.2 Local groundwater management in Minqin county

Minqin County is located in the delta of the landlocked Shiyang River, which is emerging on the Tibetan Plateau and ending in the Gobi desert. The delta stretches out over

On the other hand, day-to-day groundwater administration in China is carried out at the local level by the County (or District) Water Resources Bureau (CWRB). This decentralization approach is potentially a major asset, presenting opportunity for close interaction with actual users of the resource.

There are several experiments in direct regulation by local governments in the north China plains that appear to have met with success; two cases will be described in this

Figure 8: Planning procedures for groundwater resource allocation in China (Source: Foster and Garduño, 2004)

STATE COUNCIL PROVINCES, AUTONOMOUS REGIONS & MUNICIPALITIES

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Water Use Management & Saving Measures

approves

contributes


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falling water tables and saline groundwater. Pooling capital enabled the farmers to make new investments to reach the falling groundwater table and search for less saline groundwater. Farmers started to grow less wheat and more fennel and melon for the production of melon seeds;

• 1990s - Only a few new wells were drilled, all of which are considered deep wells (>100m). The wells usually replaced non-functional wells and were drilled deeper with the assumption that deeper water would be of better quality. Cotton was introduced as a new crop. In early 2000, when the cotton price increased, cotton was taken up on a large scale by the farmers. Some deep wells were privately drilled. Drilling of private wells was only possible outside the collectively irrigated land. Due to land constraints, very few private wells were drilled. About 15 percent to 30 percent of the population left. Some farm groups were even completely abandoned. The people who stayed behind were mainly elderly.

Groundwater management reform

In 2007 a water policy reform, drafted in the Shiyang River Basin Management Plan, was approved. The objective of the Shiyang River Basin Management Plan is to halve agricultural groundwater use in Minqin by 2020. The Water Resource Bureau of Minqin (WRBM) is the executive authority that has to implement the policy reform (Arnoudse et al, 2012b). As part of the water policy reform, all villages have to form water users’ associations (WUAs) which are assigned to implement the new regulations. These WUAs were found to have the same structure as the existing collective groundwater institutions (Aarnoudse et al, 2012a).

Two main regulation measures were effectively implemented: (1) the closure of wells and (2) a per capita water use restriction. The WRBM was made responsible to select the number of wells which had to be closed per village. The WUAs finally selected through a participatory process the respective wells in the villages. To compensate for the closure of wells, a sum of USD 768 to 4,915 (2007), depending

more than 100 km and declines from 1,500 to 1,300 m above sea level. Low rainfall levels, between 100 to 200 mm per year, make irrigation indispensable for Minqin’s agricultural development (Arnoudse et al, 2012b). The land is underlain by a mosaic of aquifers that is primarily composed of alluvial sediments deposited during the Quaternary Period. Confined and semi-confined aquifers are shaped by beds of cobble gravel, fine sand and clay (Edmunds et al, 2006).

Since the 1960s, the main economic activity in Minqin has been irrigated agriculture. In the 1970s the population started to pump from the easily accessible groundwater. This has led to a drop in groundwater levels from 10 m in the 1970s to 30 - 40 m below surface level today (Arnoudse et al. 2012a). The effect of more than 50 years of groundwater exploitation is described below:• 1950s - Rapid exploitation of surface water in the

upstream part of the Shiyang River Basin has changed the hydrologic situation of the area. Inflow used to be 570 million m³/ year in the 1960s, but decreased to 150 million m³/ year in the 1990s (Wonderen et al. 2008);

• 1960s - The construction of the Hongyashan dam upstream and a canal irrigation system was finalized; however, water supply through the irrigation system was not reliable. Minqin’s population increased from 190,000 in the 1960s to 300,000 in 2000;

• 1970s - The rural population, organized in farm communes and production teams, started to pump from the easily accessible groundwater. In less than ten years five to ten wells were dug and drilled per production team (amounting to about 10,000 wells). Tubewells were originally 50 to 70 m deep and dugwells were up to 20 m deep. With those new wells much barren land was brought into cultivation;

• 1980s - Many ill-constructed wells were abandoned and some wells were replaced by tubewells. Even though de-collectivization and China’s market liberalization were taking place, the former production teams continued to collectively invest in drilling wells. Villages switched from diesel to electricity for groundwater pumping. Particularly in the lower reaches, farmers were facing

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5.3 Local Groundwater Management in Zhonggao village, Taocheng, Hebei

The Taocheng District lies in a region with extreme water scarcity in south-east plain of Hebei Province of China. It covers a total area of 590 km2, of which 31,127 hectares are farmland. The total population reaches 470,000, of which 200,000 are farmers. The annual rainfall of the total region is 513 mm. and the available water resources are less than 60 million m3. Water resources per capita in the district are 120 m3, which is 1/18 of the national average; however, the practical average annual water use reaches to 145 million m3 (of which 69 % for agricultural irrigation) (Zhimin and Baojun, miscellaneous).

Although there are four rivers running through this region, the situation is described as “wherever a river, it is dry out; wherever water, it is polluted”. The surface water is in extreme shortage, most of shallow groundwater is saline, and the domestic and industrial water use has been affected by the overdraft of deep groundwater in many years.

The District is one of the old well irrigation districts, with 2.206 pumping wells supporting an effective irrigation area of 26.620 hectares. In the past decade the average annual agricultural irrigation water was 100 million m3, of which 75 % depends on groundwater overdraft. This has led to a deep groundwater table going down with 2 m per year, and formation of a large cone of depression of more than 6300 km2, of which the maximum ground depth reaches to 98 m. Meanwhile, many serious problems occurred such as ground land subsidence, shallow saline water intrusion to deep fresh water. This led to deeper and deeper well digging (from 30 m to above 300 m), and the cost of irrigation was increasing constantly (Zhimin and Baojun miscellaneous).

Groundwater management reform

In 2002, the Ministry of Water Resources began to set up some pilot water-saving districts. The provincial government selected the Taocheng District as one of the provincial pilots,

on the year of construction, was offered to the well-owning farm group (Aarnoudse et al, 2012b). This was helped by the fact that there is a gradual exodus from farming, with especially young people finding it more expedient to work in urban jobs.

Water use was restricted by the WRBM through a so-called “water quota”. The water quota differs per irrigation district depending on the soil and climatic characteristics as well as suitable crops under these conditions. In the lower reaches the water quota is set at 415 m3 per 0.077 ha per year (equivalent to 620 mm). The water quota is supposed to be controlled through the use of smart card readers at pumping installations. With those readers installed, farmers can only turn on the pump by swiping their smart card. When there is no more water left on their account the pump turns off automatically. The WUAs have the responsibility to issue water permits per household and calculate each household’s water rights according to the water quota (Aarnoudse et al, 2012b).

Impact

Aarnoudse et al (2012a) found that:• A total of 3,000 wells were closed from 2007 to 2010,

which left 4,000 operating wells in Minqin;• Despite a few exemplary cases, not all smart card

machines were installed or kept functioning in the three surveyed villages. Even in the village without smart card readers, farm groups lost their decision making power over the frequency of groundwater irrigation turns. Here the IDB committee had locked the pump houses and kept the key. The farmers could only irrigate when the district bureau allowed them to pick up the keys;

• A reduction of about 40 percent of irrigated agricultural land was realized from 2007 to 2010 in Minqin. The interviewed village leaders estimate that about 38.5 to 69 ha were abandoned in their villages due to the closure of wells (about 15 percent to 35 percent of original cultivated area). Based on the household questionnaires farmers lost about 0.231 ha per household (about 20 percent of original cultivated area).


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Impact

Zhimin and Baojun (miscellaneous) found that:• There was a 20 percent decline in groundwater draft in

the 21 villages that adopted the pilot;• 1 million m3 of groundwater and USD 40,000 (RMB

250,000) of electricity were saved;• The rate of decline in the water table fell from 2 m/year to

1 m/year.

5.4 Local Groundwater Management in Qinxu County, Shanxi

A pilot similar to Zhonggoa was implemented in Qinxu County in Shanxi Province. Qinxu has traditionally been an agricultural county, administered under Taiyuan city. The total population of Qingxu County is 340,000, of which the agricultural population is 250,000. The County has arable lands of 29,000 ha The irrigated areas amount to 24,500 ha, among which 11,300 ha is irrigated with groundwater (Niu Bandong 2013). The economic and agricultural development of the area has led to an annual water shortage of 57.27 million m3. This was compounded by the decline in rainfall in Qinxu, as elsewhere in the Province, and the reduced water inflows from the Fenhe River amd the Xiahe River, the latter having dropped to 25 % of its discharge in 1950.

Until 2005 the groundwater level declined with 1.6 m per year (Li Futian, 2011; Niu Bandong, 2013). Due to the importance of groundwater for the county’s economy and the urgent need to avoid groundwater over-exploitation Qinxu County established an integrated mechanism for water resource allocation, management, evaluation and monitoring of groundwater (Li

The Qinxu Groundwater System was put in place in 2007. What it has done is that it has equipped all 1298 agricultural wells in the county (responsible for 80 % of the water use) with an automatic operating system that a farmer or industrial user will operate with his swipe card. The amount of water that can be used is based on quotas that are given out annually. The same is done for 379 small industrial

and worked out an implementation plan together with the local government and local water resources bureau.

The plan included setting up a water management mechanism for government regulation. The Water Resources Bureau of the districts were responsible for the macro regulation and control and unified management of water resources. Furthermore farmers’ water user associations (WUAs) were set up for the democratic management for the allocated water; applying measures of total quantity control and quota management, as well as measuring water use at each family and encouraging economised users and penalising over-users.

Finally preceded institutional reform, investments were done in modernising groundwater irrigation. Farmers were provided USD 120 - 240 per ha to invest in a piped water supply, land levelling and making some 300 furrows per ha for efficient irrigation.

Quota mechanism

Prior to the irrigation cycle, the water resources bureau determined a fixed quota or amount each farmer could use. If a farmer needed to use more water than he had been allocated, he was allowed to buy water from other farmers who were willing to sell a portion of their quota. The water trading price is determined through a bargaining process.

Based on the quota, the consumer would be rewarded (more than 5 % below the quota) or punished (more than 5 % above the quota). The one who used water within ±5 % of the quota would not be rewarded or punished. See the following table:

Water use less or more than the quota

Water-Saving Rewarding Amount (RMB)

Overuse Penalty (RMB)

less than 10 m3 0.03 0.03

10 – 20 m3 0.07 0.07

more than 20 m3 0.01 0.01

1 RMB = 0.16 USD

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reflects that farmers do care about the quota and the price ladder.

The swipe card transactions are transmitted through internet to the Digital Water Resource Information Centre in the Water Resources Bureau of the county. This centre meticulously records the number of units consumed by each farmer based on his swipe card transactions and prepares annual water use plans. A farmer may use water from more than one neighbouring well. If a card is lost, it can be easily replaced. The Information Centre keeps the records for several years. The Information Centre is also connected to sixty solar powered observation wells that transmit data on groundwater levels on a continuous basis.

Impact

The results have been remarkable. In spite of the tight restriction 70 % of farmers rated the new system as good, the majority in fact as very good. As the swipe cards have to be pre-loaded cost recovery is 100 %. What is even more significant is the effect on the groundwater. Whereas prior to the system being developed (at a cost of ¥ 30 Million (Euro 3.75 Million or USD 326 per hectare) groundwater levels were in heavy decline, this has been turned around and groundwater levels have been increasing with 1.6 to 4.8 meters a year. Also the volume of groundwater consumed was lowered steadily: from 59 Million cubic meters in 2004 to 35 Million cubic meters five years later – a drop of 30 % in a time when the demand for industrial and agricultural water was increasing. The regulated system encouraged farmers to adjust farming practices (Li He 2011): better field preparation (81 %), use of plastic mulch (61 %) and change of varieties (49 %). Awareness on pollution risk from fertilizers and pesticides has also been built from government communication campaigns. Finally, the implementation of the project enhances the efficiency of water use and its benefits, and promotes the sustainable utilization of water resources. The increasing contradiction between the supply and demand of water resources has been alleviated. This was also achieved by complementary investments

users, whereas for 59 larger companies water usage is even recorded by remote metering and monitoring.

The quota are determined first per sector (industry, agriculture, domestic and environmental) and then for each of the 197 villages within the county and finally for each farmer within the village. The quota varies from area to area and depends on the groundwater resources sustainably available. The quota for individual families is based on the land owned, and the number of family members and the livestock owned. If water is used within the quota the price is ¥ 0.41 (Euro 0.05) per unit. If it exceeds it is ¥ 0.55. The unit relates to the electricity units consumed. As some wells are very shallow and others are deep the volume of water against a unit may vary from 500 to 5,000 liters.

Water fees are used to pay the electricity fee for pumping the water, the salary of irrigation management and for maintenance of the irrigation facilities. The over quota water fees are used as to pay any leftover debt of the electricity fee or the salary and then allocated for 50 % of repair costs. The balance of the funds is for developing new water resources (Li He, 2011).

The water price is quite expensive when compared with the cost of planting and the potential profit. This ensures the price signals are effective. In Xihuaiyuan village, the water fee per mu comes down to ¥ 73 (water consumption = 240 m3). According to the national statistics, in 2008, the cost of planting wheat is ¥ 274/mu, and the net income only ¥ 296 /mu; the cost of planting corn is ¥ 232 /mu, and the net income is ¥ 423/mu (Li He, 2011).

Quotas are also traded – between villages and between farmers. There is an upper limit to the price (twice the basic amount) – which cannot be exceeded. Among farmers it is more common to share ‘excess water’ with family members and neighbours than to trade. In general, however allocation of the quota is quite tight for irrigators. According to the quota regulations, any left over water also can be kept for the next year. Even though a farmer does not use up the water quota, he generally prefers to keep it for next year. This


23

determining the penalties for not using the quota. In several systems Water Users Associations have been set in place to facilitate the introduction and co-manage the systems. In some systems a trading system is set in place.

The results in Qinxu and to a lesser degree in Mingin and Zhonggoa are important and impressive. Water use has been curtailed drastically and in Qinxu the decline in water tables was reversed. The swipe card systems provide the opportunity to practically assign water quota to groundwater users and even trade unused allocation betwee them.

There are different approaches for assigning quota to groundwater users. Cards may be given to all existing well users or only to those that use water saving technology. The use of water quota for individual agricultural water users is a most important element of the controlled water demand systems. The overall quota should correspond to the overall quota for the area. To allocate the quota to individual users generally two systems may be used (1) asset-based and (2) reward-based systems. In the reward-based systems the quota are adjusted for the crops grown or the use of water saving techniques. In asset base such considerations are not applied. They are based primarily on farm size. Asset –based quota are recommended, as they give every water user the same starting point in rationalizing his water use. Restriction on water sales – either temporary or permanet – can be considered as the local system required.

Where water fees are used in controlled demand systems in PRC, they usually consist of a fixed basic fee and a water resources and water treatment fee. The fee for the controlled demand systems should:• Be high enough to cover the costs of maintaining the

system;• Include payment for using and maintaining the

groundwater resource;• Discourage low water productivity farming system – so as

not to use water for low value uses;• Encouraging water savings.

in water buffering in the catchment, the phasing out of water-in efficient industrial technology, leakage control, the promotion of water saving devices. In industry for instance the amount of water per required to produce an added value of Y10,000 reduced from 56m3 to 18m3 .The groundwater environment has recovered from continuous worsening (Li Futian 2011).

The Qinxu system through the tiered pricing system, high tariffs and highly efficient ‘swipe card- based regulation also created the incentives for ‘a water conserving society’. The Qinxu model set the stage for farmers to invest in efficient water management – resulting in a considerable water savings, in staple crop areas, for an entire district which is nothing short of impressive Interventions at this scale are also highly necessary and worthy of more support. As the systems is large and require upfront investment in time (intensive discussion with all stakeholders) and money (the investment in the new infrastructure) there is a strong case for governments and international financial institutions to invest in such scaled up models. Regulation such as Qinxu is moreover necessary: without it the introduction of efficient irrigation runs the risk of encouraging an expansion of irrigated area – and with it an increase in water usage.

5.5 Conclusions

The smart swipe card system introduced in different parts of the North China Plain offer some of the most interesting examples of local groundwater management globally, as they go beyond awareness and developing of local rules, but set in place a full controlled groundwater use system. The ICT-card controlled demand systems as in use in PRC and elsewhere vary in detail but they typically consist of the ICT Card Operated Wells and (b) a Central Data Unit. In some cases two elements are added, in particular and (d) Water Quota Trading Systems

The physical systems are complemented by a set of rules that deal with registering water users, determining quota and setting a price for the use of groundwater. but also

24

It is common to have a two-step or even three-step fee systems, whereby if the quota is exceeded a progressively higher cost per unit is charged. There is also the possibility to limit the maximum volume of water used by an individual consumer.

The establishment of WUAs will facilitate and ease the introduction of the controlled water demand systems, including the water pricing. The change to a new system requires careful introduction. The WUA can also play a large role in the promotion of better water management practices. The central control unit will generate data on water consumption per individual user as well as groundwater levels. This data can be shared and discussed.

Figure 9: The change in the ratio of groundwater: surface water irrigated in Balochistan, Pakistan from 1980 to 2009. (Adapted from Khair et al. 2014 as cited in: Government of Balochistan (GoB) 2009 to 2010. Agriculture Statistics of Balochistan. Department of Agriculture Extension, Balochistan, Pakistan.)

Figure 10: Timeline of groundwater governance, tubewell development projects, and policies in Balochistan, Pakistan from 1971 to 2008. (Source: Khair et al. 2014)


25

spring in the piedmont zone or a subsurface flow on the bank of temporary river and convey water over a length of 500 to 3.000 metres before daylight closes on the agricultural command area. The cost of establishing karezes is high and in most cases prohibitive for individuals. The systems were typically constructed on a collective basis. Not only are establishment costs high: kareze maintenance is equally expensive (van Steenbergen, 2006).

In the second half of the 1960s dugwells became a popular alternative to karezes, followed by tubewells in the 1980. Between 1980 and 1990, the Government initiated a number of major groundwater development projects with the assistance of donor agencies such as Kuwait Fund, the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank. These aid projects provided additional strong incentives to further increase the number of tubewells and groundwater extraction to meet increasing demand.

From 1990 to 2000, the increase in tubewells continued as a result of rural electrification and subsidized power supply to electric tubewells (Khair et al. 2014). The history of groundwater development is summarized in Figure 10.

With this development in many valleys of Balochistan, karezes started to collapse. Groundwater fell below the level to which the tunnel section of the karezes could be deepened. This left no choice but to develop dugwells to chase the falling groundwater table. Where these fell dry, the quest for water was continued with tubewells with submersible pumps. The demise of karezes and the proliferation of private wells have often been construed as the victory of the individual over the collective. In this theory, the first to release their share in the communal systems were the larger farmers, who had the resources to develop a private well. The heavy burden for maintaining the drying kareze then fell increasingly upon the smaller farmers. This was true in many cases, but another part of the story is that it was often the have-nots, the farmers that did not have a share in the kareze that were the first to use the opportunities offered by the new technology. At the end of the groundwater rush however, there was a concentration

6. Local Groundwater Management in Balochistan, Pakistan

6.1 Introduction

In Balochistan, Pakistan arid large westernmost province, groundwater accounts for the bulk of water used in agriculture, with over 50 % of the water obtained from groundwater resources. The contribution of groundwater resources is also increasing compared with that of surface water, there has been a continuous increase in the ratio of groundwater irrigated area to total irrigated area, and a corresponding decline in the ratio of surface water irrigated area to total irrigated area, reflecting the relative growth in groundwater development over recent decades (Khair et al. 2013).

Groundwater development in Balochistan has a long history with the development of vertical well systems recorded over centuries. The area is very arid (50 to 400 mm rainfall annually) and has little surface water (van Steenbergen, 2005). The geology of Balochistan region is highly complex due to the convergence of the Indian and Eurasian tectonic plates (Maldonado et al. 2011). Groundwater occurs in a range of geomorophic strata. The main aquifer type is unconsolidated alluvium, recharged by infiltration of precipitation, runoff, and inflow from bedrock aquifers upslope; these aquifers exhibit a high level of hydraulic connectivity across the basin plain. Other aquifer types include bedrock aquifers of limestone (e.g. Shirinab and Chiltan formations) and conglomerates (e.g. Urak formation), which are recharged where these formations are exposed in surrounding mountain areas and highly faulted and fractured serpentinized ultramafic rocks which support aquifers which are significant source of groundwater (Khan et al. 2010).

For a long time, scattered springs, minor rivers, animal-driven Persian wheels and particularly karezes (vertical wells) sustained small residential agriculture. These karezes pick up water from a mother well, either an underground

26

and the Ordinance was hardly ever used, in spite of a dramatic decrease in groundwater tables in many parts of the Province.

An example of dramatic decrease in groundwater tables is Kughlagh, situated in the Pishin Lora Basin, North of Balochistan. By the end of 1990’s and early 2000’s after three decades of intensive use from more than three hundred agricultural wells the groundwater reserves disappeared from the main alluvial aquifer in Kuchlagh.

Farmers and agricultural laborers responded to the collapse of the alluvial aquifer in several ways. Though no steps were taken to undertake groundwater management, by and large a livelihood crisis was avoided. Neither did conflicts occur between obviously competing resource users nor did new forms of cooperation emerge that would have regulated the use of groundwater. Instead farmers ‘dealt’ with the situation and adopted a number of coping mechanisms:

either (1) selling out and seeking non-agricultural livelihoods (2) developing new farms elsewhere or (3) continue farming in Kuchlagh but tapping water from greater depth but under a changed cropping pattern (van Steenbergen et al. miscellaneous)

Two valleys were an exception to the seemingly unstoppable course of events. First was Mastung valley, close to Quetta, the capital of the Province. Karezes had sustained perennial irrigation in Mastung for several centuries. This was changed as elsewhere in the Province when diesel-operated centrifugal pumps were gradually introduced in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Their impact was not immediately felt but, in the mid 1960s after a spell of dry years, the flow of several karezes started to decline. Conflicts between kareze Figure 11: District map Mastung (Source: Government of Balochistan 2011)

of access to groundwater in the hands of rich farmers in several valleys. This happened in particular in the areas where, with groundwater tables having fallen drastically, only deep tubewells can now produce water. The cost of a deep tubewell is in excess of US $10,000. This is a price which only few can afford. No rules existed under customary law or under government jurisdiction to control the decline in groundwater tables and the resulting concentration of access to groundwater (van Steenbergen, 1995).

In response to the crisis, the Government of Balochistan issued a Groundwater Rights Administration Ordinance in 1978. The Ordinance established a procedure for licensing wells. These were to be sanctioned by District Water Committees with the possibility of appeal to a Provincial Water Board. The licensing had to be based on area-specific guidelines. Unfortunately, no such area-specific guidelines were ever formulated. Instead, much was left to coincidence


27

Though the rules were by and large enforced, the tragedy was that they were not strict enough and could not prevent overdraft. From the mid-seventies, the annual decline in groundwater tables was 0.7 metres. With several large karezes beyond rescue, this type of irrigation became more and more derelict. Slowly, also the political clout of the kareze owners eroded. A number of attempts were made to exploit loopholes in the Groundwater Rights Administration Ordinance and get a formal permit to develop wells in the dugwell free zone. This finally happened in the 1990s. It also signalled the end of the karezes in Mastung and the local groundwater use rules. Ironically, the Ordinance issued to facilitate groundwater management signalled its undoing in Mastung (van Steenbergen, 2006). Around 2010 several attempts were made to revive and update the rules. This was triggered by good rain and snow fall years which had revived the shallow aquifers feeding the karezes. This prompted

a new discussion on limiting well development.

The second valley where self-regulating groundwater management came into existence is Panjgur, part of Makran Division. In the past, most of the land was irrigated from trenches (kaurjo) that were dug in the bed of the Rakshan River, the main stream in Panjgur. In recent decades however, these flood-prone systems were replaced with karezes, feeding on the subsurface flow of the Rakshan or the infiltrated run-off from the surrounding low hills. Concomitant with the expansion of kareze irrigation, a rule came into being that put an all-out ban on the development of dugwells and tubewells.

The restriction did not extend to new collectively owned karezes. These could still be built, effectively giving everyone

shareholders and dugwell developers became frequent. A number of local leaders imposed a ban on well development in the area, which was considered the recharge zone of the karezes. Disputes however continued, causing the local administration to formally ask the tribal elders of the area to formulate rules on groundwater use.

In 1969, a meeting was convened. At this time the interests of the kareze owners prevailed, if only because they outnumbered the new dugwell developers. The dugwell free zone was confirmed, yet at the same time it was decided not to allow any new karezes either in this zone. Outside the zone, minimum distances were specified and a permit procedure was agreed. Apart from the rules, a panel of three important elders was nominated to oversee the rules and the permits. They however found little time to devote to their duties and after a few years, the responsibility shifted to the civil administration.

Figure 12: District map Pangjur (Source: Government of Balochistan 2011)

28

response time is long local management has a less fertile ground. An example is the case of Kuchlagh in Balochistan, documented in van Steenbergen et al (forthcoming).

In the context of Balochistan these are the only exceptions to a general trend of the very vital groundwater resource being largely unmanaged, a situation that persist till today (van Steenbergen et al, forthcoming). The severe political disturbance and the wide-spread security problems of the last ten years also have not helped in coming to a system of effective groundwater governance or resource management at all in Balochistan.

7. Comparison of the cases

The cases below are an updated assessment of local groundwater management as introduced in several parts of the world, either spontaneously (Pakistan, Yemen), as part of special projects (Andhra Pradesh) or part of government policy (Mexico and PRC). A SWOT analysis (see table below) is attached to for comparing and summarizing both the potential of local ground water management in five countries and the challenges and contextual factors encountered. The best success was achieved when the results were visible and immediate, i.e. in particular the use of shallow groundwater where the response to reduced use and better recharge is easily visible. All case concern renewable groundwater, but in case of deep groundwater

The examples show that within margins local groundwater management can contribute to sustainable groundwater use, but that its impact is defined by factors that relate to the resource base as well as the general enabling environment. An overview of failure and success factors is given below:

an equal opportunity to access groundwater. The rule came into force after kareze owners in Panjgur had eye-witnessed the rapid decline in the groundwater table in other parts of Makran Division and the disastrous effect this had had on the karezes.

The limitations on the development of dugwells were widely understood, but not precisely formulated. They differ between the villages, but a minimum distance of 5 kilometres from an existing kareze is used in various places. After some upheaval, drinking water supply wells were exempted from the ban. The implementation of the ban is highly informal. Basically, each kareze owner has the moral right to intimidate each potential investor in a dugwell. If this has no effect the local administration is approached, which invariably supports the majority group of kareze owners. The groundwater rules in Panjgur have the character of a social norm. They are not supported by a special organization and no attempt has been made to define individual rights. The rule simply consists of an embargo on certain groundwater abstraction technology and does not discriminate between prior and later users. This has undoubtedly helped to have the norm enforced by social pressure (van Steenbergen, 2006). The rules remain in place and have survived the passage of time, as they have helped maintain the groundwater resources in Panjgur – a precious achievement giving the experiences in surrounding areas.

6.3 Conclusions

It can be concluded that local regulation in groundwater management has been long-lasting in Pangjur, whereas in Mastung it was promising but went off on the wrong foot as the rules where not based on adequate understanding of the resource. The idea however has not died in Mastung and efforts at new attempts are still being made. In both Panjgur and Mastung it is helped by the fact that it concerns shallow groundwater – which is easier to manage as the impact of measures is more immediate. In deep groundwater where


29

Pradesh show. The success of changing water consumption pattern is also related to the gains that can be obtained from precision farming. The use of efficient irrigation techniques often results in higher yield – a pattern that has been observed elsewhere too. The other lessons is that information on the resource is valuable but that it is best collected by the users themselves (as in Andhra Pradesh) and serve as an awareness and monitoring instrument rather than being collated by external experts (as in Mexico).

The Chinese experience was markedly different; external support and graduated sanctions brought results in terms of reduced withdrawals and fully controlled local management systems were created, where implementation was done adequately. The local authority structures and financial prowess enable PRC to introduce the water saving pilots including the administrative procedures in a way that elsewhere cannot be easily emulated, although in Bangladesh there are examples of similar successful systems supported by local NGOs/ development organizations. The technology used in PRC is of high interest and can be applied in many other situations too. It appears that investing in the real-time systems and swipe cards is more meaningful that investing in extensive studies as were done in Mexico, containing more detail than could be processed and used by the direct stakeholders.

In general there is a strong case for moving local groundwater management into the official water governance systems and not let it be spontaneous or project based. Though behaviour can change for goodeven when formal organizational structures that initiated them wean away (as in Andhra Pradesh), it makes more sense to consolidate the efforts in local management and make it a recognized part of the overall governance systems. This is for instance the thrust of the new Irrigation Sector Policy Action Plan in Yemen.

Deep groundwaterShallow groundwater (renewable)

Large number of users Limited number of usersNo understanding of the resource

Shared understanding of the resource

Frontier spiritTradition of management

Hands-off attitude of government, ambiguity

Government supporting local management

No scope for improvement in better water use

Large scope for improved water productivity

Failure Factors Success Factors

In the absence of central regulation local user-based groundwater management is ‘the only show in town’, as in Yemen and Pakistan (Balochistan). The extent of it is limited to places where spontaneous local initiatives emerged. The effectiveness is sometimes by trial and error, in the absence of a good understanding of the resource base. The cases of Yemen and Pakistan show however that agreement between homogeneous groups of users can stand up and persist for a long time, especially when they deliver results in terms of sustained resource use. Particularly when there is a long tradition of local water resource management, for instance in the joint development of water systems, this helps.

A striking feature of the five cases is that security of land tenure does not seems to be a clear success factor nor the absence of it. In fact it may be argued that not having very secure land titles is supportive to local water management as the land rights do not create an automatic access right to the groundwater underneath.

There are similarities between the experience of the HUNs in Andhra Pradesh and the COTAs in Mexico. Both generated a great deal of useful information and contributed to farmers’ understanding of groundwater processes. There was clear evidence of individual farmers behavioural change, especially in Andhra Pradesh. However, in both cases the local organizations were formally not empowered to regulate so the impact was very much on individual farmers decisions. This was still significant, as the result from Andhra

30

Countries Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities ThreatsAn

dhra

Pra

desh

(In

dia)

• Existence of working models (APFAMGS) and very promising pilots (APDAI)

• Existence of substantial number of local NGOs and other organizations with ability to support such programs - many with women in a leading role

• Receptiveness within SG to consider required adjustment of government programs

• Government outreach through extension services is weak

• AP-WALTA legislation is top-down and not effectively implemented

• UP-GWD has history of groundwater data collection and only recently is orientating towards resource management

• Public subsidy system still biased against groundwater management and dry land farming

• Changing rural scenario (higher wages, rural-urban migration and more commercialization)

• Groundwater management need not come at cost of agricultural production and farm income with appropriate irrigation technology

• Much scope to integrate CBGWM with other programs (such as for watershed conservation, drinking water supply, electrical power improvement, etc.)

• Expansion of CBGWM risks public over-expectation and causes capacity constraints

• Continued borewell drilling in several places and very dramatic changes in agriculture in Rajelsima areas

• Expansion of tree horticulture may limit possibilities to expand CBGWM

CO

TAS

(Mex

ico)

• High capacity, reach, and effectiveness of water bureaucracy, access to information

• Perverse incentives in groundwater irrigation (energy and tubewell subsidies)

• Ambiguity of external support and sustained engagement with aquifer communities led to a weakening and the eventual erosion of participatory norms and processes

• Coupling groundwater control with energy consumption would give COTAS, CEAG and CNA a strong control measure against groundwater depletion.

• Low Groundwater’s significance to national food and livelihoods security

Mas

tun

g &

Pan

gju

r (Pa

kist

an)

• Strong self regulation• Groundwater rules in

Pangjur simply consists of an embargo on certain groundwater abstraction technology and does not discriminate between prior and later users

• The norms that developed in Panjgur, Mastung, were all very straightforward and easy to monitor by everyone.

• Low insight in actual groundwater resources – no data sharing

• Weak national and local authority structures

• Low Capacity, reach, and effectiveness of water bureaucracy

• Water use efficiency enhancing measures have been undertaken and areas where groundwater can still be safely developed have been identified

• Continued borewell drilling in several places


31

Countries Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities ThreatsM

inqi

n &

Zh

ongg

ao (C

hin

a)

• Strong National and local authority structures in water allocation

• High Capacity, reach, and effectiveness of water bureaucracy

• Swipe card systems facilitate local management

• WUAs help farmers, in ensuring access to water and in coping better with limited water supplies

• National policies on groundwater management are still rather weak (Aarnoudse et al. 2012)

• Encourage community participation (through WUAs) in water resource management (and water use)

• Promote awareness of water resources issues and need for water savings

• The closure of wells resulted in significant reduction in crop production, which is likely to threaten the economic viability in Minqin County (Aarnoudse et al. 2012)

• Administrative burden of issuing and managing household rights, permits, IC cards

(Yem

en)

• Community-based groundwater management can be considered as an essential strong building block efficient, sustainable and equitable use of groundwater

• Local efforts are often constrained by various factors, including lack of technical understanding of aquifers, lack of knowledge about effective approaches, and lack of external support for enforcing rules.

• Weak national and local authority structures

• There is a strong case to match the enforcement of the water law with participatory local water management and make maximum use of complementarities.

• There is also limited potential to shift the economic incentives driving groundwater exploitation.

32

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