Growing Challenges for America’s Nuclear Deterrence › wp-content › ...Growing Challenges for...

GrowingChallengesforAmerica’s

NuclearDeterrence

GROWING CHALLENGES

FOR AMERICA’S NUCLEAR

DETERRENCE

FredFleitz,EditorMichaelaDodgeEricEdelmanFrankGaffneyJohnHopkinsPeterHuessyRobertJoseph

MatthewKroenigPeterPry

MarkSchneider

Copyright©2020

-

GrowingChallengesforAmerica’sNuclearDeterrenceispublishedintheUnitedStatesbytheCenterforSecurityPolicyPress,

adivisionoftheCenterforSecurityPolicy

February29,2020

THECENTERFORSECURITYPOLICYWashington,DC20006

Phone:(202)835-9077|Email:[email protected],pleaseseeSECUREFREEDOM.ORG

BookDesignbyBravuraBooks

CoverDesignbyMatthewFranklin

Table of Contents

Introduction:GrowingChallengesforAmerica’sNuclearDeterrence--------------------------------------------------------------------9 BYFREDFLEITZ

U.S.NuclearWeapons:WhatIsatStake----------------------------------13 BYMICHAELADODGE,PH.D

MythsofU.S.NuclearWeaponsPolicy-------------------------------------25 BYMATTHEWKROENIG,PH.D

NuclearTestReadiness:WhatIsNeededandWhy?-------------------35 BYJOHNC.HOPKINS,PH.D.

TheUnitedStatesCannotMaintainaSafe,Reliable,andEffectiveNuclearDeterrentWithoutNuclearTesting------------45 BYFRANKGAFFNEY

AnOverviewofForeignNuclearWeaponsPrograms-----------------51 BYPETERHUESSY

NuclearArmsControlandU.S.SecurityInterests----------------------73 BYAMBASSADORSROBERTJOSEPHANDERICEDELMAN

NuclearDeterrenceandLow-YieldNuclearWeapons----------------79 BYMARKB.SCHNEIDER,PH.D.

WhyEMPWeaponsRepresentaGrowingandExistentialThreattotheUnitedStates---------------------------------------------89 BYPETERVINCENTPRY,PH.D.

TheTrumpNuclearPostureReview------------------------------------105 BYFREDFLEITZ

AbouttheAuthors------------------------------------------------------------113

Endnotes-----------------------------------------------------------------------117

Index----------------------------------------------------------------------------127

List of Acronyms

ABM AntiballisticMissileTreaty(1972)ALCM Air-launchedcruisemissileCTBT ComprehensiveNuclearTestBanTreatyDOE U.S.DepartmentofEnergyEMP ElectromagneticpulseGLCM Ground-launchedcruisemissileIAEA InternationalAtomicEnergyAgencyICBM Intercontinentalballisticmissile(rangeover5,500km)INFTreaty Intermediate-RangeNuclearForcesTreatyIRBM Intermediaterangeballisticmissile(rangeof3,000–

5,500km)JCPOA JointComprehensivePlanofAction(2015Irannuclear

deal)KT Kiloton(explosiveyieldof1,000tonsofTNT)LEP NuclearWeaponLifeExtensionProgramMIRV MultipleindependentreentryvehicleMRBM Mediumrangeballisticmissile(rangeof1,000–

3,000km)MT Megaton(explosiveyieldof1milliontonsofTNT)NewSTART MeasuresfortheFurtherReductionandLimitationof

StrategicOffensiveArmsTreaty(2010)NDAA NationalDefenseAuthorizationActNNSA DOENationalNuclearSecurityAdministrationNNSS NevadaNationalSecuritySite,previouslytheNevada

TestSiteNPR NuclearPostureReviewNSC U.S.NationalSecurityCouncilNTS NevadaTestSitePTBT PartialNuclearTestTreaty(1963)RV MissilereentryvehicleSLBM Submarine-launchedballisticmissileSNDV StrategicnucleardeliveryvehicleSSBM BallisticmissilesubmarineSSP StockpileStewardshipProgramSTART ReductionandLimitationofStrategicOffensiveArms

Treaty(1991)TTBT ThresholdTestBanTreaty(1974)WMD Weaponofmassdestruction

9

Introduction: Growing Challenges for

America’s Nuclear Deterrence ByFredFleitz

Our nuclear deterrent is nearing a crossroads. To date, we havepreservedthisdeterrentbyextendingthelifespanoflegacynuclearforcesandinfrastructure—inmanycasesfordecadesbeyondwhatwas originally intended. But these systemswill not remain viableindefinitely. In fact, we are now at a point where we mustconcurrently modernize the entire nuclear triad and theinfrastructurethatenablesitseffectiveness.

GeneralPaulSelva,ViceChairman,JointChiefsofStaff,2017

or decades, the United States has been committed to nuclearnonproliferation and eventually abolishing all nuclear weapons.However, we live in a dangerous world with new and growing

nuclearthreatsfromU.S.adversariesthatrequireournationtomaintainamodern, flexible,andresilientnucleararsenal tosafeguardAmericansecurityandthesecurityofouralliesuntilthedaycomeswhenAmerica’snuclearweaponscanbesafelyeliminated.

IntheColdWarandpost-ColdWareras,theU.S.nucleararsenalhasserved as a deterrent against large-scale conventional and nuclearattacksontheAmericanhomeland,forward-deployedtroops,andallies.ItalsopreventedmanytensesituationsbetweentheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionduringtheColdWarfrombecomingmilitaryconflictsthatcouldhaveescalated intodevastatingwarsandpotentiallya thirdworldwar.

ThemainpurposeofAmerica’snuclearweaponsistodeternuclearattacksbyU.S.adversaries.Butitalsohasthreeotherpurposes:securityassurancestoU.S. alliesandpartners,achievementofU.S. objectives ifdeterrence fails, and the capacity to hedge against unknown anduncertainfuturethreats.

America’s nuclear deterrent is credible because it is robust anddiverse. Under the New START treaty, the United States and Russiaagreed to limit deployed nuclear warheads to 1,550 each. Including

F

GrowingChallengesforAmerica’sNuclearDeterrence

10

weaponsinstorage,Americahasabout6,185strategicnuclearwarheads.Russia’stotalisestimatedtobe6,490.1Althoughthisrepresentsan80%decrease inbothnucleararsenalssincetheColdWar, it isstillenoughweaponstoserveasarobustnucleardeterrent.

America’snucleardeterrent is resilientanddifficult todestroybyenemyattacks because it is diverse, consisting of submarine-launchedballisticmissiles(SLBMs), land-based intercontinentalballisticmissiles(ICBMs),andstrategicbomberscarryinggravitybombsandair-launchedcruisemissiles(ALCMs).Thenucleartriaddeliverysystemsinclude14Ohio-classsubmarines;400single-warheadMinutemanIIImissiles,and46nuclear-capableB-52Hand20nuclear-capableB-2Astealthstrategicbombers.2

Unfortunately, the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent isincreasingly threatened. The United States has neglected its nuclearinfrastructureandcapabilities. Ithas failedtoadaptandmodernize itsnuclearweapons andnuclear policy to keeppacewith a dynamicandproliferating nuclear environment in which old and new actors aredevelopingadvancednuclear capabilities. America’snucleararsenal isfallingbehindtechnologicallyanddeterioratingwhileothersbuild.

Althoughtherehavebeenrecentefforts tomodernizeU.S.nuclearweapons and extend their lives well beyond design limits, thedeterioration of these weapons is so serious that nuclear technicianshavebeenforcedtocannibalizeolderweaponsforparts,sometimesbysalvaging parts from weapons on display in Department of Energymuseums.America’snuclearweaponsexpertiseisalsodeterioratingasU.S.nuclear scientistswhoworkedon thedevelopmentofoperationalweaponsorparticipatedinnucleartestsretireandpassaway.

This represents a serious threat to U.S. national security that isgrowingworsebytheday.

Inthisbook,ninenationalsecurityexpertslookatthescopeofthethreatsfacingtheU.S.nucleararsenalandwhatmustbedonetoarrestits decline and establish a modern nuclear deterrent capable ofprotectingtheUnitedStatesanditsallies.

InChapter2,Dr.MichaelaDodge,aresearchscholarattheNationalInstituteforPublicPolicy,opensthisdiscussionbyexplainingthenatureandsizeoftheU.S.nucleararsenal.DodgediscussesproblemswiththeLifeExtensionProgram(LEP),aprogramtoextendtheusefullifeofU.S.nuclear warheads. Antiquated nuclear warheads present growingchallenges facing all legs of thenuclear triad and illustrate the urgentneedtomodernizeAmerica’snuclearprogram.

InChapter3,Dr.MatthewKroenig,deputydirectoroftheScowcroftCenterforStrategyandSecurityattheAtlanticCouncil,discussespopular

CenterforSecurityPolicyPress

11

mythsaboutU.S.nuclearweaponsandnuclearweaponspolicy.KroenigfocusesonfalseargumentsmadebythosewhowanttodoawaywithU.S.nuclearweapons immediatelyandwho disputewhy theUnited Statesmustmaintainarobust,modernized,anddiversenucleararsenal.

TheurgencyofaddressinggrowingproblemswiththereadinessofAmerica’snucleararsenal isdescribed inChapter4byanexpertwithexceptionalexperienceinthenuclearfield,Dr.JohnC.Hopkins.HopkinsbeganhiscareerasastudentatLosAlamosNationalLaboratoryandisoneofthefewlivingnuclearscientiststoparticipateinatmosphericandundergroundnucleartests.Inhischapter,“NuclearTestReadiness:WhatIs Needed and Why?” Hopkins explains that the United States musturgentlyresumenucleartestingtoensurethereadinessandreliabilityofU.S.nuclearweaponsandhowsuchtestingcouldberesumed.

In Chapter 5, we have reprinted a November 2000 Center forSecurityPolicyDecisionBriefbyFrankGaffney,theCenterforSecurityPolicy’sfounderandformerpresident.ThedecisionbrieftriedtoinformtheincomingGeorgeW.BushadministrationaboutwhytheUnitedStatescould not maintain a safe, reliable, and effective nuclear deterrentwithoutnucleartesting.Unfortunately, theproblemsGaffney raised totheincomingBushadministrationaboutthereliabilityoftheU.S.nucleararsenalwerenotaddressedbytheBushorObamaadministrationsandareworsetoday.Asaresult,thisdecisionbriefremainsasfreshtodayasitwasin2000.

DefenseanalystPeterHuessyprovidesatourd’horizonof foreignnuclear programs in Chapter 6. He contrasts the growth in theseprograms—especiallyRussia’s—withthesmalleranddeterioratingU.S.nucleararsenal.Huessydiscussesthedifficultyofnuclearwarhead“beancounting”andhowthecurrentandfuturesizeofChina’snucleararsenal,theworld’sthirdlargest,is“anexquisitepuzzle.”

In Chapter 7, two distinguished arms control experts—AmbassadorsRobertJosephandEricEdelman—lookatthedifficultyofforgingeffectivearmscontrol treaties thatare inU.S. interests. JosephandEdelmandiscusstheflawsoftheNewSTARTtreaty,whytheTrumpadministrationwithdrewfromtheINFTreaty,andwhyanewsecurityenvironmenthas rendered long-standingassumptionsofnucleararmscontrolobsolete.

Dr.MarkSchneider,inChapter8,discussestheurgencyofupdatingU.S.assumptionsaboutnucleardeterrenceandpolicyinlightofnewandemerging security threatsposed byRussia, China, and other potentialadversaries.SchneiderspecificallycallsfortheUnitedStatestoadaptitsnucleararsenalbydevelopinglow-yieldnuclearweaponsinresponsetochangestoRussianandChinesenuclearstrategies.


12

InChapter9,Dr.PeterPry,aformerCIAanalystanddirectoroftheUnitedStatesNuclearStrategyForum,explainsgrowingnuclearthreatsposed by enemies of the United States—especially states with smallnucleararsenals—fromdevastatingattacksontheU.S.electricgridusingelectromagneticpulse(EMP)weapons.Pryprovidesanin-depthanalysisof this little-knownthreat, includinghowEMPweaponscouldenableastate likeNorthKoreato launchanattackontheU.S.electricgridthatcouldresultinthedeathofupto90%oftheU.S.population.

Andfinally,inChapter10,IreviewhowtheTrumpadministration’sproposalstoaddressgrowingproblemswiththeU.S.nucleararsenalinthe 2018Nuclear PostureReview (NPR). This chapter discusseswhatTrump officials said they will do to update andmodernize America’snuclearprogramandnewprojectsandnuclearweaponsspendingtheyhaveproposedtoimplementtheNPR.

NuclearweaponsareanecessaryeviltoprotectAmerica’ssecurityandfreedomintoday’sworld.However,politicianstoo frequentlysidewith nuclear weapons opponents and refuse to adopt the policiesrequiredtomaintainthereadinessoftheU.S.nucleararsenalandadaptit togrowingand emerging threats. After decades of suchneglect, theAmericannuclear arsenal isnow facing deterioration and our nuclearweaponsknow-howanddoctrinearedangerouslyoutofdate. It isourhopethismonographwillaidtheTrumpadministrationandCongressintakinglongoverdueactiontoensurethereliabilityandvalueoftheU.S.nucleardeterrent.

13

U.S. Nuclear Weapons: What Is at Stake ByMichaelaDodge,Ph.D.

.S. nuclear weapons are unlike any other weapons in the U.S.arsenal. Due to their unique destructive power and lastingconsequences of battlefield use, their deterrent value is

unparalleled.TheyfulfillcriticalU.S.nationalsecuritymissions,includingdeterring large-scale attacks (conventional and nuclear) against theUnitedStatesanditsallies,helpingtoachieveU.S.objectivesifdeterrencefails, and providing a hedge against an uncertain future.3 Because theUnited States provides nuclear security guarantees to over 30 alliesaroundtheworld,thesecountrieshavebeenabletoforgodevelopmentoftheirownnuclearweaponscapabilities.Someoftheseallies,likeSouthKorea and Japan, are located in dangerous neighborhoods. They havehighly advanced industrial bases and access to the expertise andweapons-gradenuclearmaterialtheywouldneediftheydecidedtobuildtheirownnuclearweapons.

This chapter offers a brief discussion of the history of the U.S.nuclear arsenal. It also examines the U.S. nuclear weapons posture,principlesthathaveguided it,andthetypesofnuclearweapons inthecurrentU.S.arsenal. It concludesbydiscussing someof the challengesinvolved in continuing tomake theU.S.nucleardeterrentsafe, secure,andreliableinthecomingdecades.

NUCLEARWEAPONS:ABRIEFINTRODUCTION

Within thenational security community, there is little agreementabout what constitutes a nuclear weapon. Such disagreement carriesimportantpolicyimplications,suchasthefollowing:

U


14

• If theUnited Statesmodernizes nuclear delivery vehicles butdoes not modernize nuclear warheads, how “new” is theresultantnuclearweapon?

• IftheUnitedStatesmodifiesanexistingwarheaddesignatthemargin, is such a modified nuclear warhead a new nuclearweapon and, as the post-Cold War experience teaches us,thereforelesslikelytoobtaincongressionalsupport?

• Howmanycomponents inanuclearwarheadcanbereplacedwithout compromising confidence that the warhead willperformasexpected?

Forthepurposeofthischapter,anuclearweaponisunderstoodtobeanuclearwarheadanditsassociateddeliveryvehicle.Whendeliveryvehiclesrangeover5,500kilometers, it iscommontorefertothemasstrategic.

Thedefinitionofnonstrategicortacticalnuclearweaponsismurkierand generally refers to nuclear weapons with ranges less than 5,500kilometersandhaverelativelysmallernuclearyields.Thisdistinctionisa legacyofarmscontroldiscussionsbetweentheSovietUnionandtheUnitedStatesandhasnothingtodowithhowstrategicanuclearweaponmight be on the battlefield. It is clear that lower-yield, short-range“nonstrategic”nuclearweaponscanachievestrategiceffects ifusedonthebattlefield,whichiswhytheyaresometimesreferredtoasbattlefieldnuclearweapons.

TheUnitedStatescurrentlydeploysthreetypesofstrategicdeliverysystemsandonetypeoftacticaldeliverysystem(SeeFigure1).Thethreetypesofstrategicdeliverysystems,alsoreferredtoasanucleartriad,arebombers(B-52andB-2),ICBMs(MinutemanIII),andsubmarines(Ohio-class)withSLBMs(TridentD5).Thetacticaldeliverysystemsarefighters(F-15,F-16,anddual-capableaircraftthatU.S.alliesintheNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganizationdeploy).

The United States currently deploys seven types of nuclearwarheads:W78andW87forICBMs,W76andW88forTridentD5SLBMs,the B61 family of nuclear warheads for bombers and dual-capableaircraft,B83forbombers,andW80fortheALCMthatcanbedeliveredbytheB-52bomber(seeFigure2).


15

Figure1:CurrentUnitedStatesNuclearWeaponsDeliverySystems

Typeof

Warhead

First

Deployed

Number

Deployed

Estimated

Explosive

Yield

* W78 ICBMH-bombdeployedinMinuteman-III

1979 300 335-350KT

* W87 ICBMH-bombdeployedinMinuteman-III

1986 250 300to500KT

** W76 SSBMH-bomb

1978 3,000 100KT

**** W88 SSBMH-bomb

1989 400 475KT


16

*DepartmentofEnergy/NNSAphotos**Unlessotherwiseindicated,thisinformationhasbeenauthoredbyanemployeeoremployeesof the Los Alamos National Security, LLC (LANS), operator of the Los Alamos NationalLaboratoryunderContractNo.DE-AC52-06NA25396withtheU.S.DepartmentofEnergy.TheU.S.Governmenthasrightstouse,reproduce,anddistributethisinformation.Thepublicmaycopyandusethisinformationwithoutcharge,providedthatthisnoticeandanystatementofauthorship are reproduced on all copies. Neither the Government nor LANS makes anywarranty, express or implied, or assumes any liability or responsibility for the use of thisinformation.***AirForcePhoto.MasterSgt.KenHammond,October4,1989.****WikipediaCommons

** B61 Bomber-deployedH-bomb(gravitybomb)

1968 300 to 400KT

*** B83 Bomber-andfighter-deployedH-bomb(gravitybomb)

1983 1.2MT

** W80 Cruisemissile-carriedH-bomb

1983 5to150KT


17

Figure2:TheU.S.NuclearTriad

NUCLEARTRIAD:ANENDURINGNECESSITY

Each leg of the nuclear triad has unique and mutuallycomplementary attributes thatmake it an essential component ofU.S.nuclear force posture. ICBMs are the most responsive. They can belaunchedwithinminutesofapresidentialorderandreachtheirtargetswithinhalfanhour. ICBMsarenotroutinelyaimedat targets; theyareaimedat oceans to avoid damage in theextremely unlikely case of anaccidentallaunch.

Thislegofthenucleartriadisthecheapesttooperatebutthemostexpensive in terms of defense. Adversaries wishing to destroy it ordefend against ICBMs undergo a complex and expensive process ofdevelopinganddeployingmissiledefensesystems.EachMinutemanIIImissile can carry up to three nuclear warheads, although the UnitedStateshasdecidedtodecreasethenumberofwarheadseachmissilecancarrytoone.Uploadingadditionalwarheadswouldrequireamajoreffortandadditionalresources.

UnlikeotherU.S.nuclearweapons, ICBMscannotbedestroyedbyconventionalattackduetotheirhardenedsilosanddispersalacrosslargeareasoftheUnitedStates.IftherewereanattempttoattackU.S.ICBMs,


18

therewouldbenoquestionthatanadversarywas launchinganuclearattackagainst theUnitedStates.The lossof abomberora submarinemight be more ambiguous, particularly since these platforms can bedestroyedbyconventionalweapons.Also,becauseofthewayICBMsaredeployed,anadversarywouldhavetouseitsownnuclearwarheadstodestroythem,whichmeansthesewarheadswouldnotbeavailable forotherattacks.

U.S. nuclearbombersare themost vulnerable part of thenucleartriadbecausetheydonotroutinelyflyarmedwithnuclearweaponsandare generally more susceptible to an adversary’s defensive measuresthan are ICBMs or submarines. The bombers’ prelaunch survivability,however, can be improved in a crisis by arming them with nuclearweaponsanddispersingthemacrossAirForcebases.TheB-52andB-2bombers can carry up to 20 and 16 nuclear warheads respectively.Nuclearbombersareinvaluableforsignalingandaretheonlylegofthetriadthatcanberecalled.Theirabilitytoberefueledin-flightgivesthemunparalleledduration.

Because they can forward-deploy relatively easily, bombers alsoserveasavisible reminderofU.S.defenseassurances to itsallies. Forexample, theUnitedStates flewitsB-52nuclear-capablebombersoverSouthKoreain2013tosignalU.S.commitmenttothealliancewiththatnation while warning North Korea to refrain from further escalatingtensionson theKoreanPeninsula.4Additionally,bombers canperformimportantconventionalmissionsand inthatsensearea trulydual-useplatform.

Submarines are themost survivable leg of theU.S. nuclear triad.Because they roam vast swaths of the ocean, they are virtuallyundetectable by adversaries. U.S. submarines currently carry morewarheads than any other leg of the triad. To capitalize further onsubmarinesurvivability, theUnitedStatesmaintainsatwo-oceanfleet,withonesubmarinebaseonthePacificcoastandanotherontheAtlanticcoast.

TheU.S. Navy has 12 nuclear-armedOhio-class submarines. Eventhough not all of them are at sea at the same time, this is enough tomaintainacontinuousat-seapresence,strengtheningbothsurvivabilityanddeterrence.Anadditionaltwostrategicsubmarineswereconvertedtoconventional-onlymissionstomaketheUnitedStatescompliantwitharmscontrolreductions.Toalimitedextent,submarinescanbeusedforsignalingpurposes,suchasbyhavingthemvisitforeignports,butthiswouldbeanextraordinarydeploymentforsubmarinescarryingnuclearweapons.


19

Without the nuclear triad, the United States would be less safe.Successive administrations and Congresses have supported the triadbecausewithoutit,thedeterrenteffectofournuclearposturewouldbeundermined.

“I have questioned the triad and I cannot solve the deterrentproblemreducingitfromatriad,”saidformerSecretaryofDefenseJamesMattisafterbeingbriefedon the importanceofU.S.nuclearweapons.5Withoutatriad,adversarieswouldbeabletoconcentratetheireffortsondefeatingtheremainingcomponentsofU.S.nuclearforces,makingeachonemorevulnerabletodisruption.

Inthefuture,theUnitedStatescouldfinditselfeasilysurprisedbynegativegeopoliticaldevelopments.Withoutthesecurityhedgethatthetriad provides, responding to such developments in a timelymannerwithout compromising U.S. and allied security would be incrediblydifficult.

THEENDOFHISTORY?

Today, there isanadditional compelling reason formaintaininganuclear triad: hedging against technological surprise within the U.S.nuclearstockpile.The issue itselfhastodowithadecreasingdiversitywithinthenuclearstockpile,themethodologybywhichtheUnitedStateshaschosentomaintainandreduceitovertime,significantdelaysinthemodernizationofnucleardeliverysystems,andpost-ColdWaratrophyofthe nuclear complex and its perception. To fully comprehend thedifferencebetweenthetwoeras,thissectionelaboratesonapproachestothemaintenanceofnuclearwarheadsanddeliverysystemsduringtheColdWar and contrasts them with approaches the United States hastakeninsubsequentyears.

FollowingthedissolutionoftheSovietUnion,theU.S.refocuseditsstrategy on managing Russia’s transition from an adversary to asignificant but struggling nuclear-armed state with as little generaldisruption as possible. The spread of nuclear weapon technologies,know-how, and materials became amore prominent concern for U.S.nuclearweaponspolicy.TheUnitedStatesundertooklargebilateralandunilateral reductions of both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.Following the first Gulf War, U.S. leadership gave precedence toconventionaloperationssuchasthewarintheBalkansin1990sandinIraqandAfghanistanfollowingthe9/11terroristattacks.Duringtheseconflicts, the United States confronted and has been confrontingadversaries that are significantly inferior to it militarily. In this


20

environment, the urgency with which the United States treats andprioritizesnuclearweaponsissueshaswaned.

During the ColdWar, the United States maintained a robust andvibrantproductioncomplexfornuclearweaponsanddeliverysystems.The country hada largeand diversenuclearweaponsarsenal in bothnuclear warheads and delivery platforms, particularly on the tacticalnuclearweaponslevel.Leadersintheexecutiveandlegislativebrancheswerewell versed on the intricacies ofnuclear strategyand associatedforceposturechoices.NucleardeterrencewastheprimaryfocusoftheDepartmentofDefense,intermsofboththeresourcesandtheamountoftimeitshigh-levelleadershipdevotedtotheseissues.

U.S. nuclear warheadswere designed for about 10-year lifespansandwereregularlyreplacedbynewwarheads.Eachwarheadwasmatedto itsdeliveryvehiclestoensurethat itwouldworkasexpectedunderthe extreme duress of a nuclear exchangewith the Soviet Union. Thenationmaintained a vigorous and active warhead testing program toguarantee that new designs performed as expected and that faultywarheadswerenotintroducedintoastockpile,ashappenedduringtheU.S.testingmoratoriumbetween1958and1962(faultywarheadswerediscovered only after the United States resumed nuclear weaponstesting). These activities positioned the United States to be flexible,adaptive,andresponsivetogeopoliticalandtechnologicalsurprisesinatimelymanner.

Allof today’sU.S.nuclearwarheadsarepast theiroriginalservicelives,generallybyaround10years.TheB61gravitybombhasbeenintheU.S. arsenal since the late1960s.America’snewestwarhead, theW88,wasfirstdeployedin1990.Mostofthepeoplewhodesignedandfieldednuclearwarheadsand tested themundergroundhave left governmentservice,areveryclosetoretirement,orhavepassedaway.

TheaverageageofwarheadsintheU.S.stockpileisabout26years.Thatnumber,however,isskewedbecausetheNationalNuclearSecurityAdministration(NNSA),thegovernmentagencyresponsibleforensuringthatU.S.nuclearwarheadsaresafe,secure,andeffective,resetstheageofanuclearwarheadto“zero”afteritperformsamajormodernizationeffortundertheLifeExtensionProgram(LEP).

TheLEPiscriticalforwarheadmaintenancebutdoesnotresultinnewnuclearweapons.DuringaLEP,anuclearwarheadisdismantledandaged, faulty components are replaced and reassembled, and then thewarhead iscertified foranadditional20–30years.Resettinganagetozero at that point is somewhat misleading because it creates theimpressionthatanewnuclearwarheadisbeingfielded.Thatisnotthecase—andnot all componentsarenecessarily replacedduringanLEP.


21

TheNNSAkeepstrackofeachcomponentofeverynuclearweapon,butthesenumbersareclassified.Despitechoosingmethodologythatmakesthepubliclyavailableaverageagenumberseemlowerthanitactuallyis,theU.S.nuclearstockpilehasneverbeenasoldasitistoday.

AllcurrentlydeployedwarheaddesignspredatetheendoftheColdWar.ThismeanstheyweredesignedtodetertheSovietUnion.ColdWarnuclearwarhead designs, for example,prioritizedminiaturizationandyield-to-weight ratiomaximization over safety features.That does notnecessarilymean that theyare bad designs; however, theU.S. has leftother warhead design options largely unexplored even as it faces astrategicenvironmentthatissignificantlydifferentfromtheoneitfacedduringtheColdWar.

Unlike during the Cold War, the United States currently cannotserially produce plutonium pits, the core components of U.S. nuclearwarheads, except for an extremely limited number in laboratoryconditions. Plans to reconstitute this capability have been delayedrepeatedly. Producing fewer than 80 plutonium pits by 2030 will bechallengingbecauseof thepotential lackof congressionalsupportandfundingtobuildandconvertfacilitiestosupportthismission.TheUnitedStatesfacessimilarproductionissueswithitssupplyoftritiumgas,whichdecaysat5.5%ayearandisacriticalcomponentofhydrogenbombsandboosted-fissionnuclearweapons.

NNSA facilities also are old and in dire need of recapitalization.AboutathirdofthemdatebacktotheManhattanProjectera,andabouthalfareover40yearsold.6TheNNSA’s$10.64billionWeaponsActivitiesbudget for fiscal year 2018 included $2.5 billion for deferredmaintenance, indicating that theproblemwillnotberesolvedanytimesoon.7AgedfacilitiesandU.S.policyprecludingthetestingandfieldingofnew nuclear weapons designs make it harder to attract and retaintalentedpeopletoworkinthisfield.Aseparatebutcomplicatingissueisthe time it takes to obtain the security clearances required for mostnuclearweaponswork.

The 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) addressedsomeoftheseproblemsbyallocatingfundstomodernizeNNSAfacilitiesand $253million to process plutonium and produce pits. Fred FleitzdiscussestheNDAAinChapter10.

The NNSA conducts extensive stockpile surveillance andstewardshipactivitiesandreliesonadvancedcomputermodelsbasedondatafrompreviousnuclearweaponstests.Theseactivities,however,areno substitute for yield-producing experiments and a robust nuclearwarhead testing program. Such a program could benefit thenation inotherways,asdiscussedbyDr.JohnHopkinsinChapter3.


22

If the state of U.S. nuclear warheads paints a bleak picture, thesituation is notmuch better for delivery systems. The firstOhio-classsubmarinewascommissionedin1981,andthelastwascommissionedin1997.Thesesubmarineswillstartretiring inthe2030s; the lastone isscheduled tobedecommissioned in2042.These shipswereoriginallydesignedfora30-yearservicelife.Somewillbemaintainedfor42years.TheTridentD5SLBMservicelifewasextendedtocorrespondwiththeOhio-classsustainmenttimelines.

TheMinutemanIIIICBMhasbeeninservicesincethe1970s,withan originally planned 10-year service life. Concerns over the system’ssurvivabilitypromptedtheUnitedStatestodeveloptheMXPeacekeeperICBMinthe1980s.YettheMXPeacekeeperwasretiredaftertheendoftheColdWar,whileMinutemanIIIisplannedtobeinserviceuntil2030.ThisweaponssystemissooldthatfurtherextensionswouldbeunwisegivenfuturetrendsinRussianandChinesedefenses.

The B-2 bomber, the newest leg of the nuclear triad, reached itsinitialoperationalcapabilityin1997,morethan20yearsago.Whilethebomberisstealthy,thatdoesnotmeanitisinvisibletoadversaryradars.In fact, sophisticated radar technologies make the B-2 “visible” andthereforevulnerabletoadversarialanti-airmeasures.FollowingtheendoftheColdWar,theUnitedStatespurchasedatotalofonly21oftheseaircraft.8

TheB-52bomberswerebuiltinthe1950sand1960s,makingthemsooldthatason,father,andgrandfatherflewthesameaircraft.9That,incombination with the ALCM’s inability to stay ahead of adversarialtechnological developments, makes bombers vulnerable to anadversary’s air defenses. The United States deploys 46 B-52 nuclearbombers.

The B-21 next-generation bomber will be nuclear-capable, butcurrentplanscallfor“nuclearcertificationwithintwoyearsofdeclaringinitial operational capability.”10 The B-21 should be entering servicenuclear-certifiedratherthanwaitingtocertifylater,increasingtheriskthatadditionalandpotentiallycostlymodificationswillbenecessaryinordertomeetrequirementsfornuclearcertification.

The U.S. nuclear deterrent depends on a survivable and resilientNuclear Command Control and Communications system (NC3). Theinformationarchitecturewillhavetobedesignedinawaythatallowsforreliable, timely, and unambiguous information transmission under theextremeconditionsofanuclearwar.ThecurrentNC3architecture isalegacyoftheColdWarthatincludesusingvintagetechnologiesandwillhavetobemodernizedconcurrentlywiththemodernizationofdeliveryplatformsandsustainmentofnuclearwarheads.11


23

TheTrumpAdministration’s2018NuclearPostureReview (NPR)wasdraftedtoaddresstheissuesdiscussedinthischapter.The2018NPRisdiscussedinChapter10.

CONCLUDINGNOTES

Thereisnoshortageofchallengesinthenuclearweaponsfield,noworinthedecadesahead.FromquestionsaboutU.S.policyhamperingthedevelopmentofnuclearwarheadsandskillsets, to theneedtosustainincreasinglyagedwarheadswhilemodernizingdeliveryvehicles,totheneedtoaddressdecrepitnuclearinfrastructureandpotentiallackofkeywarheadparts,aswellascompetitors’andadversaries’robustnuclearweaponsdevelopmentefforts,theUnitedStatesisfacinganewnuclearage—anuclearageforwhichitmaynotbeprepared.

25

Myths of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy ByMatthewKroenig,Ph.D.

ewsubjectsareas importantasU.S.nuclearweaponspolicyandfewareasshrouded inmyth.WhilegettingU.S.nuclearweaponspolicy right is of foremost importance to the U.S. and to

international peace and security, it is also a politically charged issue.Defense policy professionals understand the essential role of nuclearweaponsinU.S.nationalsecurity,butanti-nuclearadvocatesbelievethatnuclearweaponsarethemostdangerousweaponsintheworldandthatall nuclear weapons, including America’s, should be reduced oreliminated.Thislatterviewisreasonableenoughandisanexpressionofacertainsetofpriorities,buttheproblemariseswhenideologuesinventand repeat falsehoods to advance theirpreferredpolicy outcomes. Tomakemattersworse,someof thesemythshavebecometheprevailingview amongmany in the academy, themedia, and the general public.Unfortunately, there is nowa chasmbetween the true role ofnuclearweaponsinU.S.nationalsecuritypolicyandthe(mis)perceptionofmuchoftheeducatedpublic.

The central axis of controversy centers on the proper size andcompositionoftheU.S.nucleararsenal.12Fordecades,theUnitedStateshas maintained a robust nuclear arsenal with thousands of nuclearwarheads,avarietyofdeliveryvehicles,counterforcetargetingpolicies,and missile defenses. U.S. presidents from John Kennedy to DonaldTrump have expressed a preference for nuclear superiority over anypossiblerival.ButcriticsarguethattheUnitedStatescouldmanagewithamuch smaller and simpler nuclear arsenal. They claim that a smallnuclear forceshouldbemorethanenoughtodeteranyadversaryand,moreover,themaintenanceofarobustarsenalcausesmanyproblemsforthe United States. They argue that U.S. nuclear dominance couldundermine“strategicstability”withRussiaandChina,causedangerousarmsraces,spurwidespreadnuclearweaponsproliferation,anddepletethenationalbudget.

Thisraisesapuzzle:AreU.S.policymakerssofoolishastocontinueself-defeating nuclear policies for multiple decades under bothRepublican and Democratic administrations? Or is there a logic to

F


26

American nuclear strategy that critics do not understand or that theydeliberatelyobscuretoadvancetheirideologicalagenda?

FortunatelyforcitizensofU.S.andalliednations,thereisindeedalogic to Americannuclear strategy.Washington does require a robustposture.Unfortunately,thislogicispoorlyunderstoodandshroudedinmyth. This essay attempts to dismantle several of the most commonmyths.

MYTH1:ASMALLARSENALISENOUGHTODETERANYADVERSARY

CriticsofU.S.nuclearpolicyarguethattheUnitedStatesonlyneedsa small nuclear arsenal to deter any adversary. After all, one or twonuclearweaponsgoingoffinBeijingorMoscowshouldbeenoughtoruinanyChineseorRussianleaders’dayandtodeterthemfromattackingtheUnitedStatesoritsallies.Therefore,theyarguethattheUnitedStatescangreatly reduce the size of its nuclear arsenal and still maintaindeterrence.

There are two primary problems with this argument. First, theUnitedStatespracticescounterforce,notcountervalue,nucleartargeting.Inotherwords,theUnitedStatesplanstouseitsnuclearweaponsagainstlegitimatemilitarytargets,notagainstinnocentcivilians.IfWashington’sgoalwastothreatentoslaughtermillionsofinnocentciviliansinBeijingandMoscow, thena few dozen, ormaybeeven two, nuclearweaponswould be enough. But the United States has never possessed acountervaluenucleartargetingstrategy.Rather,intheeventofanuclearwar, the United States plans to use nuclear weapons against enemynucleartargets:nuclearmissilesilos,nuclearsubmarinebases,nuclearairbases,nuclearcommandandcontrolcenters,andsoon.

TheUnitedStatespracticescounterforcetargetingfortworeasons.Thefirstislegalandmoral.ThelawofarmedconflictandJustWarTheoryrequires states to distinguish between civilian andmilitary targets inwarfare.Asademocracy,theUnitedStatescomplieswithinternationallaw,evenwhenitcomestonuclearwar.Otherstatesdonot.Forexample,itisbelievedthatChinapracticescountervaluetargetingand,intheeventofnuclearwar,wouldaimitsnuclearweaponsatlargecitieswiththegoalofkillingasmanyAmericansaspossible.

Tobesure,nuclearweaponsarethemostdestructiveweaponseverinventedandevenacounterforcestrikewouldresultinmuchdeathanddestruction.However,thereisalogical,practical,andmoraldistinctionbetween a strategy that calls for intentionally slaughtering innocentciviliansandonethatattemptstohitonlylegitimatemilitarytargets.


27

The second reason the United States possesses a counterforcetargeting policy is strategic: damage limitation. Damage limitation issimplytheideathatanyenemynuclearweaponswedestroybeforetheycanbeusedisanuclearweaponthatisnotlandingontheterritoryoftheUnitedStatesorourallies.Intheeventofnuclearwar,U.S.leaderswouldnotsimplysitbackandaccept“mutualassureddestruction.”Rather,theywoulddowhateverittakestolimitdamagetotheUnitedStatesanditsallies to the greatest extentpossible, and counterforce nuclear strikesagainstanenemy’snuclearforcesareagoodwaytodothat.

CounterforcetargetingishighlyrelevanttoU.S.nuclearforcesizing.With counterforce targeting, the United States needs enough nuclearweaponstocoverthenuclear-relatedtargetsofitsadversaries.Toknowhowmuchisenough,therefore,onesimplyneedstocountthenuclear-related targets of U.S. adversaries. Moreover, military planners arecautious; it is believed that they allocate more than one offensivewarhead to every enemy nuclear target. The precise number is notknownpublicly,butoutsideanalystsoftenassume,asaruleof thumb,that two offensive warheads will be assigned to each enemy nucleartarget. Indeed, in an unclassified exercise, I did my best to count thenuclear-related targets in Russia, China, and North Korea (America’snuclear-armedrivals).Ithenmultipliedthisnumberbytwotoarriveataround2,000nuclearweapons—whichalsohappenstobetheroughsizeoftheU.S.nucleararsenaltoday.

IfU.S.adversariesincreasethesizeoftheirnucleararsenals(astheSovietUniondidduringtheColdWar)thenWashingtonwouldneedtoexpanditsarsenalaccordinglytobeabletocoverthesetargets.Contraryto myth, the United States did not engage in an irrational arms raceduring the Cold War, building more nuclear weapons than it couldpossiblyneed.Rather,Washingtonwassimplydoingwhatwasnecessarytopursueitsnuclearstrategy.

ThesecondproblemwiththeideathattheUnitedStatesonlyneedsa small arsenal is that it overlooks the requirements of extendeddeterrence. All other nuclear powers, including Russia, China, France,India, and others, use their nuclear weapons to deter attacks onthemselves.Unlikethesecountries,theUnitedStatesdoesnotonlyseektodeterattacksonitself.Rather,itattemptstodeterattacksontheentirefreeworld. TheUnited Statesextends itsnuclear umbrella to over 30formaltreatyallies.The28othermembersofNATO,Japan,SouthKorea,Australia,andarguablyotherstatesdependonU.S.nuclearweaponsfortheirsecurity.Washingtonmadeadealwiththesecountries:Don’tbuildyourownnuclearweaponsandyoucanrelyonU.S.nuclearweaponsforyourprotection.


28

Deterringattacksontheentirefreeworldrequiresarobustarsenal.Nucleardeterrencetheoristsconceptualizenucleardeterrenceasagameofchicken.Whenpoliticalconflictsofinterestariseamongnuclear-armedstates, neither side wants the head-on collision of nuclear war. Butneither doeseither sidewant to capitulate toa rival on an importantgeopolitical issue. Instead, they play dangerous games of chicken, or“nuclearbrinkmanship,”toseewhowillswervefirst.America’sextendeddeterrencepolicy,therefore,isessentiallyapromisefromWashingtontobe prepared every single day to potentially play dozens of games ofnuclear chicken on behalf of weak nonnuclear allies in the face offormidablenuclear-armedfoes.

Ifyouhadtoplaydozensofgamesofchickeneverysingledayandyouhadachoice,wouldyouprefertodriveaHummeroraPrius?ItisnotthattheHummeralwayswins,butIwouldcertainlyfeelsaferandbehavedifferentlybehindthewheelofthemorerobustvehicle.Itisreasonableto expect that the smaller carwill tend to swerve first even if a crashwouldbebadforboth.Indeed,Ihavedemonstratedthatnuclear-superiorstatesarelesslikelytobechallengedmilitarilyandmorelikelytoachievetheirgoalswhentheyarechallenged.Itisnotthatthenuclearbalanceofpoweristheonlythingthatmatters,oreventhemostimportantthing,butitdoeshaveaninfluence.SincetheUnitedStatesextendsdeterrencetotheentirefreeworld,itrequiresamorerobustposturethananyotherstate.ThisfeatureofU.S.nuclearstrategy,morethananyother,explainsAmerica’srecurringinterestinnuclearsuperiorityoverrivals.

MYTH2:THEUNITEDSTATESHASENOUGHNUCLEARWEAPONSTO

DESTROYTHEWORLDMANYTIMESOVER

CriticsofU.S.nuclearpolicysometimesarguethattheUnitedStateshasmorethanenoughnuclearweaponstodestroytheworldmanytimesover. Therefore, the argument logically follows that Washington canaffordtocutitsnucleararsenalatverylittlecosttoitssecurity.Afterall,whyhaveadditionalnuclearweapons ifall theywoulddo ismake therubblebounce?The“destroytheworldmanytimesover”lineisacatchyandcommonlyemployedtalkingpoint(infact,IoncearguedthisoutontheairwithajournalistonMSNBC).13Butitisalsofalse.

Weshouldnotdownplay thedestructivenessofnuclearweapons.They are themost powerful weapons ever invented. A single nucleardetonationinaU.S.citywouldlikelybetheworsttragedyinthecountry’shistory and a full-scale nuclear exchange amongmajor powerswouldchangetheworldasweknowit.


29

Atthesametime,weshouldnotexaggeratethedestructivenessofnuclearweapons.Designinggoodpolicyrequiresaccurate information.Unfortunately,criticsofU.S.nuclearpolicyoftengreatlyexaggeratethedestructivenessofnuclearweapons.

LetusbeginwiththebaselinesizeoftheU.S.nucleararsenaltoday.Accordingtothe limitsagreedto intheNewSTARTTreaty, theUnitedStatesandRussiadeploynomorethan1,550strategicnuclearweaponseach.Isthatenoughtodestroytheworldmanytimesover?

Since 1945, thenuclear powers have conductedmore than 2,000nuclearexplosivetests.Theworldhasnotyetbeendestroyedmanytimesover.

PoliticalscientistJohnMuellerhaswrittenthatanenemyattackwith2,000nuclearweaponswould“directlydemolishlessthanfivepercentoftheterritoryoftheUnitedStates.”14

Arecenttechnicalstudyfoundthat itwouldtake140,000nuclearweaponstopromptlykill100%oftheRussianpopulation.

So, 1,550 nuclear weapons are not nearly enough to destroyeverything.

Indeed, there is a contradiction in critics’ arguments. On the onehand,theyoftenarguethatU.S.nuclearweaponscannothopetodestroyeverysingleRussianorChinese(orevenNorthKorean)nuclearweaponand,therefore,counterforcetargetingandtheassociatednuclearposturearefoolhardy.Ontheotherhand,theyarguethattheUnitedStateshasenoughnuclearweaponstodestroytheentireworld.Clearly,boththesepositionscannotbetrue.

Insum,1,550nuclearweaponsarenotenoughtodestroytheentireworld,notevenonce,tosaynothingofmanytimesover.

MYTH3:AROBUSTU.S.NUCLEARARSENALCOULDUNDERMINE

‘STRATEGICSTABILITY’

AthirdmythadvancedbycriticsofU.S.nuclearpolicyisthatarobustU.S. nuclear posture could upset “strategic stability” with Russia andChina.Accordingtothisidea,itismutualvulnerabilitytonuclearwarthatleadstointernationalpeaceandstability.Therefore,iftheUnitedStateswere to gain strategic advantages through superior offensive nuclearforcesormissiledefenses,thisdelicatebalancecouldbeupset,resultinginnuclearwar.

CriticsworrythatU.S.strategicsuperioritycouldcreate“useʼemorloseʼem”pressuresinRussiaandChina.BeijingorMoscow,fearingthattheirnuclearforcescouldbewipedoutinaU.S.firststrike,wouldhaveincentivetolaunchtheirnuclearweaponsearlyinacrisis.Paradoxically,


30

therefore,theUnitedStatesissaferthemorevulnerableitistoRussianandChinesenuclearweapons.

Thisargumentmayseemplausibleatfirst,butitrestsonacoupleoffallacies.First,theUnitedStatespossessesbothfirststrikeandsecond-strikecapabilities.Earlytheoreticalconcernsabout“useʼemorloseʼem”wereinsituationsinwhichbothsidespossessafirst,butnotasecond,strike capability. If both countries can shoot first and disarm theopponent,thenbothsideshaveanincentivetoshootfirst.Butthatisnotthesituationweareintoday.TheUnitedStatesalsohasasecond-strikecapability. Soeven if Russiaand China fear that their forcesmight bevulnerabletoaU.S. first strike, they cannothopetodisarm theUnitedStatesbystrikingfirst.TheUnitedStateswouldsimplyabsorbtheattackandretaliatewithadevastatingsecondstrike.So,RussiaandChinahaveno incentive to intentionally launch a nuclear war, even if the U.S.possessesnuclearsuperiority.

Second,“useʼemorloseʼem”isafalsedichotomy.Ifthechoiceweretrulybetweenbeingdisarmedinanuclearattackorstartinganuclearwar,thenRussiaorChinamightbetemptedtostartanuclearwar.Butthesearenottheonlyoptionsininternationalpolitics.Stateshaveawidevariety of policies to choose from, including backing down, seekingdiplomaticoff-ramps,andlivingtofightanotherday.Indeed,myresearchhasshownthattimeandagain,statesininferiorstrategicpositionstendtosubmittotheirsuperioropponents.

MYTH4:U.S.NUCLEARMODERNIZATIONWILLCAUSEDANGEROUSARMS

RACESWITHRUSSIAANDCHINA

PerhapsthemostwidespreadmythsurroundingU.S.nuclearpolicyisthatU.S.effortstostrengthenitsdeterrentwillcauseanarmsracewithRussia and China. This is the lazy trope used by many journalistswheneverthereisnewsofnewU.S.strategiccapabilities.AstheNewYorkTimesreportedwhentheUnitedStatestestedanewintermediate-range,conventionally armed missile in 2019, “Are we headed for anotherexpensivenucleararmsrace?”15

Theanswerisno.AnarmsraceassumesthatRussianandChinesedecisionsabouttheirownstrategicposturesaredrivenprimarilybythestrategicposturesoftheUnitedStates.ButRussianandChinesedecisionsabout their strategic capabilities are often made irrespective of theUnited States. The United States tested an INF-range missile becauseChinaalreadyhadhundredsifnotthousandsofmissilesinthiscategoryandbecauseRussiabegantestinganddeployingthesemissilesyearsago.


31

IfthereisanINFarmsrace,RussiaandChinahavecompletedseverallapswhiletheUnitedStatesstretchedonthesidelines.

Similarly, Russia is building severalnewnuclear systemswithoutprompting from theUnited States. Moscow is building a new nuclearsubmarinedroneandanuclear-powerednuclear-armedcruisemissile.FromreadingtheU.S.press,however,onewouldgettheimpressionthatonlyU.S.capabilitiescanstartan“armsrace.”

Arms race arguments also assume that U.S. adversaries have thecapability andwill to engage ina strategic arms competitionwith theUnitedStates,butthisisrarelythecase.TheUnitedStatespossessesthelargest andmost innovative economy on the planet. NorthKorea andChinahaveoptedoutof tryingtomatchtheUnitedStateswarheadforwarhead.Additionally,theSovietUniontriedfordecadesduringtheColdWartokeeppacewiththeUnitedStatesandithelpedtobankrupttheireconomy.

Abasicinternationalrelationstheorylessonwouldalsobehelpful.According to international relations theorists, there are two primarymodelsofarmsracing:thespiralmodelandthedeterrencemodel.Inthespiralmodel,therearetwostatesthatonlywanttobesecure.Onestatebuildsupitsmilitaryforcestoprotectitself.Thisneedlesslythreatenstheotherstate,whichthenneedstobuildupitsforcestoprotectitself,andso on. The result is a spiral of arms buildups, hostility, and possiblyconflictdespitethelackofanyunderlyingconflictofinterest.Thisisthemodelofinternationalpoliticsthatmostjournalistsseemtohaveinmindwhenreportingonstrategicissues.

The second model of international politics, however, is thedeterrencemodel.Inthismodel,thereisanaggressiveor“greedy”state.It is building up its forces to revise the international status quo, gainpower, and possiblyattack itsneighbors. In this scenario, if the otherstatedoesnotbuildupitsforces,thendeterrencewillfail,andthefirststatewillengageinaggression.Inthedeterrencemodel,therefore,armsracingisthebestpolicy.Whenthereisadangerousrivalthreateningyouandyourallies,youneedtobuildforcestodeterconflict.

So,thefirstquestiononemustanswerintherealworldis,areU.S.adversariesgreedyorsecurity-seekingstates?Iftheyaremerelytryingto protect themselves, thena strongU.S. strategic posture can lead tospiralsofhostility.If,ontheotherhand,theyaregreedystateslookingtoaggress against U.S. allies, then improvements to U.S. strategiccapabilitiesstrengthendeterrenceandcontributetointernationalpeace.

Given that Russia and China have both used military force to takecontestedterritoryfromtheirneighborsinrecentyears,itishardtoarguethattheyaremerelysecurity-seekingstates.AfailurebytheUnitedStatesandits


32

alliestobuildsufficientdefenses,therefore,willmostlikelyresultinfurtheraggression. Critics of U.S. nuclear policy often write as if arms racing isinherentlybad,butunfortunately,sometimesitisthebestpolicy.

MYTH5:U.S.NUCLEARWEAPONSSPURNUCLEARPROLIFERATIONIN

OTHERSTATES

CriticsofU.S.nuclearpolicyoftenarguethatunlesstheUnitedStatesmakesdrasticreductions inthesizeof itsnucleararsenal, itwillcauseothercountriesaroundtheworldtobuildnuclearweapons.TheyclaimthatiftheUnitedStates—themostpowerfulconventionalmilitaryforceon Earth—needs nuclear weapons to defend itself, this sends themessagethatother lesspowerfulcountriesalsoneednuclearweaponsfor their security. In addition, they claim that the United States haspromisedtodisarmintheNuclearNonproliferationTreaty(NPT).IftheUnitedStatesdoesnotmakeprogresstowardthisgoal,theyclaim,thentheNPTwillbeweakened,andothercountrieswillwithdrawfromthetreatyandbuildtheirownnuclearweapons.

Again,theseargumentsseempersuasiveatfirst,buttheyareinfactfallacious.Putyourself intheshoesofa leaderthinkingaboutbuildingnuclearweapons, say Iran’s Supreme Leader orKim JongUn inNorthKorea.Whatisonyourmind?Youarelikelythinkingaboutwhether(a)nuclearweaponswouldadvanceyour country’s security, (b)youhavelatent industrial capacity to build nuclear weapons, (c) you can getnuclear assistance from other more advanced nuclear states, (d) theinternationalcommunitywillcrackdownwithtougheconomicsanctionsormilitary strikes, and (e) if the international community does crackdown, you can withstand the pressure. With all these relevantconsiderations on yourmind, where does the size of the U.S. arsenalenter?IsIran’sSupremeLeaderthinking,“Well,iftheUnitedStateshas1,550nuclearweapons,thenIwillbuildmyownnuclearweapons.But,ifWashington cuts its arsenal to 1,000 nuclear warheads, then I willabandonmyprogram”?Thissimplyisnotplausible.

Otherdefendersofthispositionwouldsaythatitisnotthepotentialproliferatorsthemselvesthatwecanaffect,buttheothercountriesweneed for nonproliferation enforcement. When Washington wantscountries like India, South Korea, and Japan to reduce purchases ofIranianoilandgastoputpressureonIran,forexample,theywillbemorelikelytohelp iftheyseethat theUnitedStates iscommittedtonucleardisarmament,includingthroughitsownposturedecisions.Again,thisissuperficiallyplausible,butalsoincorrect.Thesecountries’decisionsonnonproliferationenforcementaredrivenbytheirrelationshipwiththe


33

UnitedStates,fearofU.S.secondaryeconomicsanctions,concernsaboutIran’s behavior, domestic economic dependence on foreign energyimports,andmanyotherfactors.But,onceagain,itisimplausibletothinkthat their decisions are being affected by the size of the U.S. nucleararsenal.

Indeed, I have conducted systematic statistical research showingthatthereisnolinkbetweenthesizeoftheU.S.nucleararsenalandtheproliferationandnonproliferationbehaviorofotherstates.16

Ifanything,arobustnuclearposturestopsnuclearproliferation.Asexplainedabove,theUnitedStatesextendsdeterrencetoover30formaltreatyallies.Withoutthosenuclearsecurityguarantees,itisverylikelythatmanyU.S.allies,includingGermany,Japan,SouthKorea,andothers,would possess nuclearweapons today. In the future, a weakenedU.S.nuclear deterrent could encourage Poland, Taiwan, Vietnam or othervulnerablefrontlinestatestoreconsidertheirnuclearoptions.Indeed,arobust U.S. nuclear posture should be counted among the world’sgreatestbulwarksagainstthespreadofnuclearweapons.

MYTH6:U.S.NUCLEARWEAPONSARETOOEXPENSIVE

The final myth of U.S. nuclear weapons policy is that nuclearweapons are too expensive. In fact, the United States has plans tomodernizeitsnuclearforcesoverthenext30yearsandthenonpartisanCongressional BudgetOffice (CBO) has estimated that the cost of thismodernizationprogramwillcometoover$1trillion.Criticshavearguedthatweshouldnotspendthatmuchmoneyondoomsdayweaponsthatwe will likely never use. Rather, we should spend it on more usableconventionalweaponsor invest in lifeandnotdeath,suchas inroads,schools,andhospitals.

One trillion is certainly a large number, but let us put it inperspective.Overthecourseof30years,thiscomestoabout5%oftheU.S.defensebudget.Moreover, severalpastU.S. secretariesofdefense,including, most recently, Secretary Mattis, have stated that nucleardeterrence is the most important mission of the U.S. Department ofDefense.Is5%ofthebudgettoomuchtospendonthePentagon’smostimportantmission?Reasonablepeoplecandisagree,buttomeitseemslike a good value. Indeed, asObama’s Secretary ofDefenseAsh Carterstated,“Nuclearweaponsdon’tactuallycostthatmuch.”17


34

CONCLUSION

ThisessayaddressedseveralofthemostcommonmythsaboutU.S.nuclear policy. These myths are often invoked by those who believenuclear disarmament should be the primary objective of U.S. nuclearpolicy.TheyusetheseargumentstodiscreditlongstandingU.S.effortstodesignastrategicforcefortheprimarypurposeofdefendingitselfandits allies and deterring international conflict. If the abovemythswereindeedtrue,thenU.S.strategicpolicywouldbefoolhardyindeed.ItwouldmeanthattheUnitedStatesbuildsandmaintainsalargestrategicnuclearforce that provides zero benefits and comes with many unjustifiablecosts.

Asthisessayhasdemonstrated,theseargumentsarewidelysharedbeliefs, but they are not true. U.S. nuclear strategy requires a robustnuclearforceandsuchaforcecomeswithanacceptablecost.

This isnot to say that theUnitedStatesmustalwaysand forevermaintainarobustnuclearposture.IfWashingtondecidedtochangeitsstrategy,thenitcouldalsochangeitsposture.IfWashington,forexample,wantedtoabandonthelawsofarmedconflictandadoptacountervaluenucleartargetingpolicyaimedatslaughteringinnocentcivilians,thenitcouldafford to cut the sizeof its arsenal.Or, ifWashingtonwanted tofollowamore isolationistpolicy,abandonitsallies inEuropeandAsia,andallowformeralliestobuildtheirownnucleararsenals,resultinginwidespreadnuclearweaponsproliferation,itcouldalsocutthesizeofitsarsenal.

SolongastheUnitedStateswantstocontinuetoplayitstraditionalinternationalleadershiprole,upholdinternationallaw,andcontributetogeopoliticalstabilityandinternationalpeace,itwillcontinuetorequirearobustnuclearforce.

35

Nuclear Test Readiness: What Is Needed and Why?

ByJohnC.Hopkins,Ph.D.

nanationalemergency,couldtheUnitedStatessafelytestanuclearweapon tomorrow? Is Nevada still the obvious place to conduct anucleartest?Inthisarticle,Icontemplatethechallengesofreviving—

andpossiblyrelocating—America’snucleartestingprogram.TheUnitedStateshasnotconductedanucleartestsince1992.Iam

one of the dwindling number of people left who participated in U.S.nuclearweaponstests.IparticipatedinfivetestsinthePacificin1962and some 170 tests in Nevada in the 1960s through the 1980s. Iwitnessed another 35 or so nuclear tests. Because I know somethingabout the skills, equipment, facilities, and infrastructure necessary tofieldafull-scalenucleartest,IhavegrownincreasinglyconcernedaboutthesteadydegradationofU.S.nucleartestreadiness—thatis,aboutthecapabilityoftheUnitedStatestotestitsnuclearweaponsshouldtheneedtodosoarise.

Infact,myreviewofassessmentsmadebytheDepartmentofEnergy(DOE)ofU.S.nuclear test readiness leadsme toquestionwhether theDOEhas,afteralmost25yearsofbeingoutofthetestingbusiness,anyrealistic appreciation forwhat nuclear testing involves or how to stayprepared to do it again within 24–36 months, as legally required byPresidentialDecisionDirective15(1993).

STARTINGUPORSTARTINGOVER?

NucleartestingaswediditattheNevadaTestSite(NTS,nowcalledtheNevadaNationalSecuritySite,orNNSS)wasaprofoundlylargeandcomplex endeavor. The 1,375-square mile site sits about 65 milesnorthwest of Las Vegas and was used from 1951–1992 for 928atmosphericandundergroundnucleartests.Backthen,theU.S.nuclearenterprisewas not just a program; it was a nationwide industry thatrequiredmorethan100,000highlytrained,experiencedpeople.DuringtheColdWar,peaktestingyears,weaveragedaboutonetestaweekandNTSemployedmorethan7,000peopleon-site.

AccordingtotheNNSA—theorganizationwithintheDOEobligatedtomaintainU.S.testreadiness—much,ifnotmost,oftheequipmentandtechnology required for nuclear testing in the past has not been

I


36

adequatelymaintained, isobsolete,orhasbeensoldorsalvaged.Moreimportantly, the knowledge needed to conduct a nuclear test, whichcomesonlyfromtestingexperience,isallbutgone.Currently,nofederalfundingdirectlysupportsmaintainingtestreadiness.

In sum, there is essentially no test readiness. The whole testingprocess, whether to conduct one test or many, would have to bereinvented,notsimplyresumed.

If the United States decided tomorrow that it wanted to test aweaponinthenucleartriad,thepathtodoso(safely)wouldbelongandcomplicated,anditwouldlooksomethinglikethis.

WHERECOULDWECONDUCTANUCLEARTEST?

Thisanswerlargelydependsonhowsoonthepresidentordersatestandwantsittohappen.

Inanemergency—suchastheneedtoevaluatethesafety,security,and performance of an existing but questionable nuclear weapondesign—Iassumewewouldtestundergroundandnotabrogatethe1963LimitedTestBanTreatythatbanstestsintheatmosphere,oceans,andouterspace.Ialsoassumewewouldadheretothe1974ThresholdTestBanTreaty,whichlimitsteststoamaximumyieldof150kilotonsofTNT.(Nuclear yield is the amount of energy released, expressed as a TNTequivalent.Akilotonis1,000tons,sothetreatylimitsyieldequivalentstonomorethan150,000tonsofTNT.)

Atfirstlook,theNNSSistheobviousplacetoresumetesting.Butthisis far from certain. More than 800 of the nuclear tests there wereconducted underground in deep shafts (or sometimes tunnels). Morethanadozenshaftsstillexistthatmightbeserviceable.

However,sincethelastundergroundtestin1992,nearbyLasVegashas exploded in population. In 2015, the city had 630,000 residents,360,000 more than in 1990. (In 1951, the year testing began, thepopulation of Las Vegas was about 25,000.) In 2015, the greater LasVegasmetropolitanareahadapopulationofmorethan2.1million—1.4millionmorepeoplethanin1990.

Morepeopleequalmorebuildings.Today,LasVegashasmorethan50buildingsover328feettall(25storieshigh),includingthe1,150-footStratosphereTower,thetallestobservationtowerintheUnitedStates.

Additionalquestionswouldneedtobeansweredbyplannerspriorto an underground test at theNNSS.What is themaximumyield thatcouldbefiredatthetestsitewithoutcausingseismicdamagetoLasVegasinfrastructure and its surrounding communities? Will recentconstructionberesistanttoseismicenergyfollowinga150-kilotonblast?


37

Willfuturemaximumtestyieldshavetodecreaseasthelocalpopulationincreases?

HOWBIGOFATESTCOULDBECONDUCTEDINNEVADA?

Theanswertothiscriticalquestionliesinaccuratelypredictingtheseismic effects of a nuclear test’s yield at NNSS on Las Vegas and thesurroundingcommunities.

DetailedgeologicandsafetyanalysesofthecurrentLasVegasareawouldberequiredtodevelopaprudentestimateoftheupperlimitoftheyield. Ultimately, scientific judgment would play a key role in thisestimate, but that judgment would rely on recommendations comingfromrelativelyyoungscientistsandengineerswhohavenoexperienceinnucleartesting.

Figure3:HeightofNotableStructuresComparedtoDepthofNuclearTesting

DuringtheperiodofundergroundtestingattheNTS,13shotswerefiredatadepthof3,000feetormore;sixofthosewerefiredatleast4,000feetbelowthesurface.


38

Previously, the Atomic Energy Commission (the predecessor totoday’sDOE)hiredanengineeringcontractortoanalyzethestructuralintegrity of buildings in Las Vegas and their vulnerability to groundmotionduetonuclearexplosions.Testreadinessmeansthatbuildings,especially skyscrapers and the greater metropolitan infrastructure,wouldhavetobecarefullyevaluated.Reconstitutingthisprogramwouldrequireamajoreffort.

Throughout the testing period, Las Vegas construction workerswere notifiedwhen an upcoming shotmight cause significant groundmotion.Thereasoningwasthatsuchshakingcouldbeunsafeforworkersinexposedlocations,particularlyathigh-riseconstructionsites.Minesinthe regionwerealsonotifiedof groundmotion thatcould conceivablycausedamageandinjury.Anewplantocommunicateatestingscheduletothecivilianworkforcewouldhavetobedeveloped.

HOWCANSEISMICEFFECTSBEMITIGATED?

“Decoupling”anexplosioncanmitigateseismicenergy.Decouplinginvolves testing the nuclear device in an underground cavity largeenoughtoabsorb—andthusreduce—theforceoftheblast.Higheryieldexplosions require larger cavities. Larger cavities require significantlymoretime,effort,andcosttoexcavate.TheNationalAcademyofSciencesestimates that, depending on geology, a cavity 121 feet in radiusrequiringtheremovalofnearly7.5millioncubicfeetofmaterialwouldbeneededtodecouplea3-kilotontest.

HOWCANANUCLEARTESTBECONTAINED?

The risk of venting, the leaking of radioactivematerials from thegroundintotheatmosphere,mustbeminimized.U.S.undergroundtestsweredesignedtopreventventing.Inthepast,preventingventingwasamajorchallengeforthegeologists,engineers,andconstructioncrewsatthetestsite.

Previously,we selecteda locationanddesigned theemplacementshaft to contain a yield that was usually about 10% larger than theexpected yield. Successful containment depended on studying thegeology at each test location—no two test locations had the samegeology—to see if the shaft could contain the test after successfullystemming(backfilling)theshaft.


39

Figure4:SetupoftheTestingLocation

Gas-blockedcablesareshownherelaidoutinans-shapepriortoanundergroundnucleartest.Thecableswerelowereddown-holealongwithagiantsteel rack that containedthetestdeviceandmultiplediagnosticsensorsusedtogatherdata.Thecablesrelayedthedatauptotrailers(shownhereintheforegroundandparkedatasafedistancefromthedetonation)containingthedatarecordingequipment.Inthebackgroundisa10-storytowerassembledaroundthegiantrackanddirectlyoverthetesthole.Thetowerwasdisassembledandremovedinsectionsafterloweringtherackbutbeforethedetonation.Thetowerwasthenreassembledoverthenexttesthole.(Photo:DOE)

Tobeeffective,stemmingrequiredanexperiencedexperttolayera

special brew of adhesive epoxies (which are no longer available) andvarioustypesandsizesofgravel.Thismixturewasthenpackedaroundspecially designed gas-blocked cables that were used to transmitcommand-signalsdown-holeandsendscientificdatauptothesurface.The cablesweregas-blocked topreventanyventingup through them,andIdoubtwhetherthesespecialcablesarestillavailable. Ifnot, theywouldhavetoberedesigned,tested,andmanufacturedanew.

Eachtest’sstemmingwasunique,varyingwiththetest’spredictedmaximum yield and a thorough study of the geology surrounding theshaft. Stemmingwas both a science and an art, and few expertswithstemmingexperiencecanstillbefound.

Allthegeophysicaltoolsthatwere,overmanyyears,designed,built,tested,calibrated,andfieldedat theNTSspecificallytocollectsamplesandcharacterizethegeologynolongerexist.Thedesignersandoperators


40

are long gone, too. The laboratory analysts who had the skills andexperiencetoevaluatethesamplesforgraindensityandforcompressiveand sheerstrengthare likewise longgone.Today, thekindofdetailedgeologicandsafetyanalysesandyieldpredictionsneededtosuccessfullycontainanucleartestwoulddependuponpeoplewhohavenonucleartestingexperience.

Evenwithstemming,theriskofventingcouldneverbereducedtozero. Dangerous surprises (for example, unknown cracks, caves, ormoisture)mightbe lurkingrightnext totheareaofgeologicsampling.Onedramaticfailurewasthehugeventingfromthe1970Baneberryshot,whichwascausedbyundiscoveredgeologicalproblemsatthetestsite.

To be prudent, we always assumed that massive venting mightoccur.So,wewereintouchwithallofthepotentialdownwindresidentsandhadhelicopters readyandevacuationplans forevery rancheroutmendingfencesandeverysheepherdertendingtohisflock—anyonewhomightbeatriskthedayofatest.

WHATWOULDITTAKETOPLANANDIMPLEMENTEMERGENCY

EVACUATIONSCLOSETOTHENNSSTODAY?

Whataboutstickingtolower-yieldtests?TheNTSwasoriginallychosenfornucleartestinglargelybecauseofitsremotelocationatthattime. Once testing went underground, we soon discovered that,fortuitously,thegeologyisnearlyidealforreducingventingandseismicimpact—thus limitingnegative impacts to theenvironment caused byhigher-yield(morethan10kiloton)tests.

ThewatertableattheNTSisdeep:1,300feetatYuccaFlats,wherelow-yieldshotsweretraditionallyfired,and2,000feetatPahuteMesa,whichwasusedmostlyforhigh-yieldshots.Theoverlyinglayersofweak,porous tuff and alluvium provide dry pore space to trap radioactivegases.Thesite’seasilycrushableporoustuffalsosignificantlyabsorbedtheseismicwavesofourhigher-yieldtests.

Butsurprisingly,andperhapscounterintuitively,low-yieldnucleartestsarehardertocontainatthesite.Inpart,thisisbecausethecrushabletuffdoesn’tcrushaswellfromlower-yieldtests,meaningthattherisksof venting increase. So, risks to theenvironment actually loom larger.Successfullystemmingalower-yieldtestismoredifficult.

Theseriskscanbeaddressedbyburyingalow-yieldtestasifitwereahigher-yieldtest,butthisapproachrequiresaleveloftime,effort,andexpensecommensuratetoconductingahigher-yieldtest.Therefore,thebetterapproachistodesignaneffectivecontainmentplanatthenominaldepthrequiredfortheloweryield,assumingthattheexpertisenecessary


41

todo this is available.Clearly, theassumption that focusingon lower-yieldtestsgetsusanyclosertonucleartestreadinessneedsacloserlook.

WHATALTERNATIVESEXISTFORNUCLEARTESTINGBESIDESNNSS?

IfnotinNevada,thenwhere?IfchallengesprecludeusingNNSS,an alternative testing site would be required. Amchitka Island in theAlaskanAleutianIslandswouldprobablybethenext-bestcandidatesite.Threetestswerefiredthere:Longshot(1965)andMilrow(1969)byLosAlamosandCannikan(1971)byLawrenceLivermore.

However,notmuchinfrastructureisleftontheislandotherthananairstripandperhapstwoholesthatwere,atonetime,meantforfuturenucleartests.Allthebuildingsaregone.Thelackofinfrastructure,greatdistance,andremotelocationmakeAmchitkavastlymoreexpensiveandinconvenient thanworking inNevada. The islandalso hasawretchedclimatewithdensefogandrain.Inaddition,AmchitkaisnowpartoftheAlaskaMaritimeNationalWildlifeRefugeandgoingback there to testwouldcertainlybeconcerningtoenvironmentalistsandNativeAlaskans.

Do other locations exist? Studies of alternative sites have beenmade in the past, but like at Amchitka, political, cultural, and naturalenvironmentshavechangedsincethosestudieswereundertaken.New,costly,andtime-consumingassessmentswouldneedtobedone.Shouldthenationbeactivelysearching?

CRITICALSKILLSANDASSETSREQUIREDFORNUCLEARTESTS

Asmightbe imagined,manyuniqueandcriticalassets—facilities,materials,andequipment,muchofwhichisnotcommerciallyavailable—mustbeavailabletosuccessfullyexecuteanundergroundnucleartest.Tests fired in shafts, for example, involved a nuclear device andexperimental equipment installed inside a tall steel structure called arack,whichwaslowereddown-hole.Theracks,whichweredesignedandfabricatedspecificallyforeachshot,couldbealmost10feetindiameterand more than 100 feet tall. The assembly of all the experimentalequipment required that the rack be surrounded by a tower built ofprefabricatedunitsand largeenoughforthescientificandengineeringstafftoworkon-siteatalllevelsoftherack.

TheLosAlamosrackswerefabricatedatLosAlamosandshippedtoNevada for installation of the scientific equipment. The nuclear testdevicewasinstalledasthelaststepbeforetherackwascarefullylowereddown-holeoncableharnesses,whichwerealsofabricatedatLosAlamos.Livermore’srackswerefabricatedbyacontractorinLasVegasandwereloweredusingdrillpipe,acompletelydifferenttechnique.Prosandcons


42

exist for eachoption.How to revivethese critical, complex,andcostlyskillsforafuturenucleartestmustbeaddressed.

Figure5:EnvironmentalImpacts—SubsidenceCratersatYuccaFlat

Subsistence craters—depressions on the surface that occur when the roof of the blast cavitycollapses into thevoid leftby theexplosion—stillmark the surfaceof Yucca Flat,wheremanyundergroundnucleartestswereconductedattheNTS.Thesizeofsubsistencecratersdependsontheyieldofthedevice,thedepthofthetest,andthegeologicalcharacteristicsofthesurroundingsoil.(Photo:DOE)

THESTAKEHOLDERS

After two decades without testing, who would be the currentstakeholders,andwhatwouldtheirrolesandresponsibilitiesbe?Whatarethechallengestonegotiatingnewandcomplexchainsofcommandand responsibility? The White House, DOE, NNSA, Department ofDefense,andStateofNevadawouldbeamongthekeystakeholders,alongwith more than a dozen other government organizations such as theDefenseNuclear Facilities Safety Board, theDefenseThreat ReductionAgency, the Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Public HealthService,theNationalOceanicandAtmosphericAdministration,theStateDepartment, and Congress. Because the United Kingdom’s nuclearstrategy is closely allied to ours, I presume theU.K.would participatewhereitsnationalsecurityinterestsareinvolved.Imaginethedifficultiesofgettingallthesegearstosmoothlymeshtogether.


43

AlthoughLosAlamos,Livermore,andSandianational laboratorieswouldsupplymuch,ifnotmost,ofthetechnicalstaff,mostofthetestingpersonnel would come from a wide range of outside organizations.Contractors for the NNSA would do almost all construction, relatedlogistics, and other support work. These contracts might includeproviding test diagnostic support (once supplied by Edgerton,Germeshausen, and Grier, Inc., which no longer exists) and thearchitect/engineeringsupport(oncesuppliedbyHolmes&Narver,Inc.,which is still in business). The now-defunct Reynolds Electrical &Engineering Company provided the heavy construction services,includingoperatingcranesanddrillingshafts,someofwhichweremorethan4,000feetdeep.Thetechnologyandexpertisetodrillnew, large-diameter,deep,andstraighttestingshaftswouldalmostcertainlyhavetobe recreated. Significant economicand technological challengeswouldariseifthepre-moratorium-drilledshaftsneedtobecleanedofdebrisorpumped dry of water. Seemingly mundane perhaps, but vital, arerequirements forhousekeepingand security.Currently, a fewof theserequirementsarebeingmetatthesite(toaccommodatestaffconductingsubcritical experiments, for example), but they would have to beexpandedtoaccommodateamuchlargeroperation.Otherservices—forexample, recreational programs and facilities—would have to becompletelyreinvented.

THELABS

Iwouldstronglyurgethethreenuclearweapons labsto formoneunifiedtestprogram,witheachlabhavingwell-definedresponsibilitiesand clear accountability. (Previously, each lab had its own testingprograms.)Iwouldrecommendpullingtogetherasteeringcommitteeofthelabs’keystaff,includingweaponsdesignersandengineers,diagnosticscientists (suchasphysicists and radiochemists),geologists, engineers(civil,mechanical, andelectrical),and logisticsand travelpersonnel.Ascaled-downversionofthistypeoforganizationprobablyexiststodayasa result of the subcritical tests currently conducted in Nevada, but itprobablylacksalltheexpertiseneededtoexecuteafull-scalenucleartest.

I would suggest that the labs’ test program leaders place highpriorityonselectinganarchivist.Perhapsnotobvious,therationaleforthearchivististhis:Indevelopingthetestingorganizationandstructure,therewillbemanyquestionsaboutwhat,how,andwhythingsweredoneinthepast.Laboratoryarchivistscouldmakeansweringthosequestionsmucheasier,assumingthattheoldtestingfilesarestoredsomewhereinthelabsandcanbefound.


44

MAKINGNUCLEARTESTREADINESSAPRIORITY

With every day that passes, theUnited States growsmore out ofpracticeandoutofresources—includingthemost importantresource:peoplewithexperience,whoarecritical tonucleartesting.Thetestingprocess,whetherforonetestorformany,wouldinmanyrespectshavetobereinvented,notsimplyrestarted,whichwouldtakelongerthan36months.Pastpracticeswillhelpidentifywhattodobutnotnecessarilyhowtodoit—primarilybecausescience,technology,politics,andculturehavechangedsodramaticallysince1992.

A resumptionofnuclear testingwould involvea large, expensive,andcomplexprogram.BecausetheUnitedStateshas little left fromitsprevious test program, and essentially no test-readiness program, thetimedelayfollowingthedecisiontoresumetesting—becauseofalossofconfidenceinthestockpileorduetoageopoliticalcrisis—would,inmyopinion,bedangerouslylong.

Let’snotwaittofindouthowlong.

45

The United States Cannot Maintain a Safe, Reliable, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent

Without Nuclear Testing ByFrankGaffney

Editor’snote:ThebelowissuebriefbytheCenterforSecurityPolicy’sfounder and former president Frank Gaffney was published inNovember2000toadvisetheGeorgeW.BushadministrationontheU.S.nuclear posture. Regrettably, Bush officials did not heed Mr. Gaffney’swarnings,whichhaveprovedprescientandstillapplytoday.

CenterforSecurityPolicyDecisionBrief,November29,2000.

One of the early agenda items for the next president will be thematter of what to do about the—an accord that was negotiated andsignedbyBillClintonin1996butconsideredsofatallyflawedthatitwasrejectedbyamajorityoftheU.S.Senatein1999.

TheCTBTwillrequirepriorityattentionevenif,asseemslikelyatthemoment,the43rdpresidentisnotAlGore—whoexplicitlypromised,ifelected,totrytoramtheCTBTthroughtheSenateashisfirstorderofforeignpolicybusiness.GeorgeW.Bush,whoexpressedhisoppositiontothetreatywhenitwasbeingconsideredbytheSenate,mustnonethelessaddressthisaccordassoonaspossiblefortwopressingreasons:

1) Notwithstanding blithe assurances by the Clinton-GoreAdministrationandotherCTBTproponents, theU.S.nucleardeterrentcannotbesustainedindefinitelywithoutaresumptionofnucleartesting;and

2) the administration has stealthily proceeded with the treaty’simplementationasthoughtheSenatehadapproveditsratificationratherthanrejectedit.Asaresult,theUnitedStatesisbeinginexorablydrawnintolegal,technical,andpoliticalarrangementsthatwillmakeitdifficult,ifnotasapracticalmatterimpossible,forthenextpresidenttoresumenucleartestingifandwhenhedecidestodoso.


46

THENEWYORKTIMESCONFIRMSCRITICS’WARNINGSABOUTSTOCKPILE

STEWARDSHIP

Incredibly, the gravity of the problem confronting the nation’snuclear forceswasdocumented ina lengthyNovember28,2000,NewYork Times article.18 The following are among the more noteworthypoints made in the course of the Times documentation of theinadequacies of the administration’s so-called Stockpile StewardshipProgram(SSP).

TheSSPisnotuptothejob.

Since[1992,whentheUnitedStatesbeganaunilateralmoratoriumonnucleartesting],theNationhasevaluatedthethousandsofwarheadsin its aging arsenal in a program called science-based stockpilestewardship, using computer simulations, experiments on bombcomponentsandothermethodstoassesstheconditionoftheweaponswithoutactuallyexplodingthem.

Programofficialshavebeenconfidentthatthestockpileissafeandsecureandthatthestewardshipprogramcanfullymaintaintheweapons.Now, however, some of the masters of nuclear weapons design areexpressingconcernoverwhetherthisprogramisuptothetask.Concernsabout the program take a variety of forms, including criticisms of itsunderlyingtechnicalrationaleandwarningsthattheprogram’sbaseoftalentedscientistsiseroding….

Astewardshipprogramwithnotestingis“areligiousexercise,notscience,”saidDr.MerriWood,aseniordesignerofnuclearweaponryatLosAlamosNationalLaboratory.Dr.Woodsaidthatastheweaponsaged,itwasbecomingimpossibletosaywithcertaintythatthestockpilewasentirely functional. “Ican’tgiveanybodyasafeperiod,”shesaidof thepossibilitythatsomeweaponscouldbecomeunreliable.“Itcouldhappenatanytime.

Dr.CharlesNakhleh,anotherweaponsdesigneratLosAlamos,saiddoubts about the stewardship program were widespread amongweapons designers. “The vast, vast majority would say there arequestionsyoucananswerrelativelydefinitivelywithnucleartestingthatwouldbeverydifficulttoanswerwithoutnucleartesting,”hesaid.

Thearsenalwasbuiltforalimitedshelf-life.

Theprogramisafiendishtechnicalchallenge,andevenitsbackersconcede that science-based stockpile stewardship can never offer thecertaintyofthebigexplosions.Thethousandsofbombsinthestockpilearehighlycomplexdevices.Eachismadeupofaforestofelectronicsand


47

missilecomponentssurroundingasortofatomicfuse,or“primary,”thatholds chemical explosives and a fission bomb containing a fuel likeplutonium. In addition, there is a “secondary,” whose thermonuclearfusionreactionissetoffwhentheprimaryexplodes.

Mostoftheweaponsinthestockpilewerenotbuiltwithlongevityinmind. Itwasexpected that theywould be replaced by a continuingstream of new and improved designs, checked in tests until weaponsproductionabruptlystoppedin1992.Butthebasicdesignofthenewestofthebombs,aversioncalledtheW88,receivedcrucialtestsinthe1970sandfullydesignedbythemid-1980s.Productionoftheweaponendedby1991.Theoldestofthebombsdatefrom1970.

Uncertaintiesabound.

Assessing the changes can be bewilderingly difficult. Thedegradation turns symmetrical components shaped like spheres orcylinders into irregular shapes whose properties are a nightmare tomodelincomputersimulations.Inspectors,whotypicallytearapartoneweaponof eachdesignperyearand less intrusivelycheckothers, findweapons components deteriorating in various ways because thematerialsage,andbecausetheyareexposedtotheradioactivityoftheirownfuel.Eventinychangesinthosematerialscanleadtolargechangesinbombperformance,weaponsdesignerssay.

We’rewhistlingpastthegraveyard.

Supporters of the program say that regular inspections of theweaponswillturnupanyseriousproblemsasthestockpileagesandthatthoseproblemscanbeaddressed.“You’llgetthewarningbellandyou’llknowwhattodo,”saidDr.SidneyDrell,aphysicistattheStanfordLinearAccelerator Center, who led a study in 1995 that underlies thestewardshipprogram.Drellsaidheremainedoptimisticaboutscientists’ability to limit that element of doubt, which he called “genuine andserious.”

But other experts at the nation’s weapons laboratories arechallengingthisview.Designerssaythesensitivityofthebombstoslightchangesmeansthatagecouldmodifythebombssothattheydonotworkas they are supposed to. While program supporters believe thoseproblemscanbe foundand fixed, virtuallyeveryoneagrees that ifanymajor redesign is needed, those new bombs could not be certified asreliableunderthecurrentprogram.

Dr.HaroldAgnew,aformerdirectorofLosAlamos,saidthat“toconsiderputtingthosethingsinthestockpilewithouttestingisnonsense.”


48

Declineisinevitable.

“Inablink, Iwouldprefertogoback to testing,” saidDr.CarolT.Alonso,aweaponsdesignerfor20yearswhoisnowassistantassociatedirector for national security at Lawrence Livermore NationalLaboratoryinCalifornia.

ThomasThomson,aweaponsdesigneratLivermore,saidthatunderthecurrentprogram,“Ithinkyoujustacceptthefactthatyou’regoingtohaveadecline” inthereliabilityofthestockpile.“Youtrytomake itasgradualaspossible,”headded.

Wehavenocomparableexperiencebywhichtobeguided.

Evenwithallthe[advanceddiagnostictoolstheSSPissupposedtoprovide], critics say, crucial questionsabout theperformance of agingbombsmust still beanswereddirectlybydata fromold tests.Becausebombsthisoldwerenevertested,theysay,computersimulationscannotdefinitivelydeterminetheseriousnessofnewtypesofchangescausedbycontinuedaging….

SeriousquestionsabouttheoperationofthestockpileprogramarebeingheardatallthreeofthemajorAmericanweaponslaboratories:LosAlamos,LivermoreandSandia.

Ournuclearprogramissufferingfrombraindrain.

Asa result [inpartof security investigationsat the labsandtheirrepercussions] according to officials at the weapons labs and at theEnergyDepartment,whichrunsthem,therehasbeenaflightofscientifictalentandadeclineoftop-flightapplicants,problemsexacerbatedbyariseinlucrativejoboffersfromtheprivatesector.Weaponsexpertssaythefrustrationovertightersecurityprocedurescomesataparticularlyunfortunatetime,asthescientistswhodesignedandtestedtheweaponsin the stockpile try to pass their knowledge and experience to newcaretakersbeforeretiringordying.“Wehaveafive-yearwindowtomakethistransfer,”Dr.[Michael]Bernardin,[aseniorweaponsdesigneratLosAlamos],said.

Remanufacturingisnotanoption.

Onewaytogetaroundallthesecriticismsoftheprogramandstillavoid testing, some scientists outside the laboratories say, would besimplyto“remanufacture”new,nearlyexactreplicasofexistingweaponsinthestockpileandreplacethemonaregularbasisastheyage.Neitherverymuchsciencenorundergroundtestingwouldbenecessary.

ButDr.JasMercer-Smith,aformerweaponsdesignerwhoisdeputyassociate director for nuclear weapons at Los Alamos, said that was


49

easiersaidthandone,sincemanymanufacturingtechniquesofthepastwerenolongeravailable,andthecopiescouldinrealitybesignificantlydifferentfromtheoriginals.Withoutthesophisticatedscientificanalysisofthestockpilestewardshipprogram,hesaid,nuclearexpertscouldnotbesurewhateffectsthechangesmighthave.

Weneedtomodernizethestockpile.

Dr. Bernardin of Los Alamos said possible new military needs,anythingfrombuildingnuclear-tippedmissileinterceptorstoreplacingan existingweapon completely if it became too old to function, couldsomedayrequireentirelyremadedesignsaswell.

Supportersofre-manufactureinsistthatnonewdesignsareneededbecause thenation’snucleardeterrent is sufficient. If theyareneeded,however,theuncertaintiesandcomplexitiesinvolvedinanynewdesignswould inevitably require underground tests, and not just computersimulations, several weapons designers said. Those complexities, Dr.Wood of Los Alamos said, mean that even existing designs are nowcomingintoquestion.“Ifthiswassomebody’shairclip,Iwouldn’tmindasmuch,”shesaid.“Butit’snot.”

Changingfactsontheground.

In one of the most brazen of its many affronts to the U.S.Constitution, the Clinton-Goreadministration spentmillions of dollarsanduntoldman-yearsontheimplementationoftheComprehensiveTestBanTreatyintheyearfollowingitsrejectionbytheSenate.Thankstothework of U.S. government agencies, official representatives to variousinternationalforumsandspecialinterests,thiscountryhasprovidedcriticaltechnicalexpertiseandotherformsofsupportessentialtotheoperationsofthemultilateralorganizationbeingsetuptobackstoptheCTBT.

PresidentBushwill inevitablybe confronted,asa result,withtheargumentthatthisentityhasbeenestablishedwithU.S.assistanceandrequires its continued leadership in order to function. The temptationwillbegreattogoalongbyavoidingapublicrepudiationofthetreatyandthedomesticandinternationalcriticismsuretofollow.

Itwouldbeaseriousmistaketoaccedetothispressure,though.ThemoretheComprehensiveTestBanTreatyisinstitutionalizedandtheU.S. is implicated in itswork, themore illegitimatewill appearactions by this country needed to safeguard and modernize itsdeterrent forcesbut that contravene the letter and/or the spiritoftheCTBT.Thisback-doorClinton-GoreratificationoftheCTBTmustnotbeallowedtogounchallenged.


50

THEBOTTOMLINE

AslongasU.S.nationalsecuritydependsuponevenasinglenuclearweapon, the nation, and its potential adversaries, are going to haveconfidence that it will work if it is needed to do so—and, no lessimportantly,thatitwillnotworkunderallothercircumstances.Thereisnogettingaround it:Periodic, safeunderground testing is required tohaveandmaintainthatconfidence.

Candidate Bush pledged to conduct a comprehensive review ofAmerica’snuclearposture.InadditiontoweighingcarefullythewisdomoffurtherdeepreductionsintheU.S.arsenalandtheideaofde-alertingsuchweaponsasremain,PresidentBushmustredirectthenation’spolicytowardnucleartesting.

Specifically, he should make clear—as President Reagan and Mr.Bush’sfatherdidinthepast—thatnucleartestingisanecessarypartofmaintaining a credible American nuclear deterrent, not an evil to becurtailed.TheUnitedStateswillnottestanymoreoftenthanisabsolutelynecessary,butitwillconductsuchtestswhentheyaredeemednecessary.

Mr. Bush should, accordingly, renounce the CTBT and secure itsformalremovalfromtheSenate’scalendarofpendingbusiness—theonlyway toestablish that this fatally flawed accordwill not beallowed toundermineU.S.securityinthefuture.

ItwouldhavebeenapublicservicehadtheTimesseenfittoblowthewhistlebeforetheelectionontheinherentinconsistencybetweenapermanent,“zero-yield”banonnucleartestingandtherequirementtomaintain a safe and effective American deterrent for the foreseeablefuture.Still,giventheTimeseditorialboard’svociferoussupportfortheCTBT, however, and its castigation of Republican Senators, many ofwhosecriticismshavenowbeenvindicatedbythisarticle,itislittleshortofamiraclethatthepaperranitatall.

51

An Overview of Foreign Nuclear Weapons Programs

ByPeterHuessy

npopularopinion,theworld’snucleararsenalsareprimarilylocatedintheUnitedStatesandRussia,andassuchthatiswheremostoftheattention is focused. Numerous assessments, from the Stockholm

International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the Federation ofAmericanScientists(FAS),CNNandothersputthesearsenalsatroughly6,500warheadseach,with thenext largestarsenals in the100 to300range, comprisedof thenuclear forcesof theUnitedKingdom,France,Pakistan,IndiaandChina.Thus90%oftheworld’snuclearweaponsareinthehandsoftheRussiaandtheUnitedStates.

Thesebean-countingexercisesaredistorted,primarilybecausetheyassumeU.S.warheadlevelsarecomparabletothoseofRussia,whichtheyarenot.Thisdistortionleadstothreemoreshakyassumptions:(1)theUnitedStateshasanobligationto“stopthearmsrace,”whichithasbeencomplicit in starting; (2) the United States has to show restraint innuclearmodernizationwithaneyetowardimplementingthepolicygoalofmovingtowardnuclearabolition;and,attheveryleast,(3)theUnitedStatesmust remain in the New START strategic arms treaty of 2010,whichischaracterizedastheonlyremainingrestraintonthebuildingofnucleararsenals.

Alloftheseimplied“policy”choicesarecleverlyincludedinmanyofthenewsstoriesaboutsuchnuclearbean-countingexercises,oftenasasubtleremindertotheAmericanpeoplethatitistheUnitedStatesthatmust restrain its own strategic nuclear modernization effort and showleadership, for example, by lessening the role of nuclear weapons in U.S.deterrentpolicy,includingadoptingsuchnuclearpoliciesas“nofirstuse.”

IMPLICATIONOFERRONEOUSNUCLEARBEAN-COUNTINGNARRATIVES

Thecommonlyheldnarrativesorassumptionsabout the sizeandpurposeoftheRussianandChinesenucleararsenalsarewrong,certainlymisleading, and if continued to be accepted, will significantly harmAmerica’snationalsecurity.

Manyoftheseassumptionsarerootedinwishfulthinking,especiallytheoutdatedanderroneousnotionsonceheldaboutdétenteandarmscontrol adoptedby theU.S.nearlyhalfa centuryago,when theSoviet

I


52

Unionpursuedarmscontrolanddétenteasrusestohelpitgainstrategicsuperiority.

Ofmostsignificance is thewidelyheld ideathatRussiaandChinashare theAmericanviewofnuclearweaponsas last-resort, retaliatoryelements only, as opposed to seeing nuclear weapons as everydaydiplomatic instrumentsofcoercionandblackmail tobeusedtosecurethefruitsofaggression.

Nuclear war fighting—as the actual or threatened use of nuclearweaponsisoftendescribed—isinfacttheacceptedpolicyofRussiasinceatleast1999andofChinamorerecently.TheRussianassumptionisthattheU.S.willrigorouslyavoidapossiblenuclearconfrontationandstanddowninthefaceofactualorthreatenednuclearaggression,includingthelimiteduseofnuclearweapons,ratherthancometotheprotectionofouralliesandfriendsandrisktheexchangeofnuclearweapons.

Inthisway,ifsuccessful,RussiaandChinacanillustratetotheworldthattheUnitedStateswillnolongerprotectitsfriends,andassuchcanhardlybeconsideredthe“leaderofthefreeworld.”

NUCLEARDÉJÀVUALLOVERAGAIN

ThisapproachwasexactlytheSovietstrategythroughouttheColdWar, and now it’s back. The election of President Reagan in 1981thankfullyinterruptedtheSovietambitions,butthoseRussianobjectiveshave returned. Meanwhile, at home, American opponents of nuclearmodernizationand realistic approaches towardRussiaandChinahavestaked out policy positions remarkably similar to the Soviet activemeasuresthemesofthe1980sagainsttheReaganbuildup.

TheReaganadministration’snuclearmodernizationsuccessholdsakeylessonfortoday.ThedeploymentofAmericanintermediatenuclearforce(INF)missilesinEuropeandthePeacekeeperICBMdeploymentintheU.S.didupsetSovietplans.DétentesupportersintheU.S.academic,entertainment,andmediacommunitysupportednotReagan’sstrategy,buta“nuclearfreeze,”anideaputforwardbytheU.S.S.R.in1979.

Infact,atPresidentReagan’sfirstWhiteHousepressconference,theinitial two questions were about whether the new administrationaccepted “détente” and whether it would abide by SALT II, the newStrategic Arms Limitation Treaty that former President Carter hadwithdrawn fromSenate consideration following theSoviet invasion ofAfghanistan.PresidentReaganrespondedthathehardlyconsideredtheSALTIItreaty“armscontrol”whenitallowedtheSovietstobuilduptoover10,000deployedstrategicnuclearwarheads,ordétentesinceitwassimply a cover for Soviet aggression. Needless to say, the collective


53

reactivegaspoftheassembledWashingtonpresscorps,audiblewhenthepresident laidouthis “peace through strength”vision,understandablypanickedtheprotectorsoftheconventionalwisdomofdétenteandarmscontrol.Inresponse,amassivedisinformationcampaignbeganopposingReagan’s nuclear deterrent initiatives. Most commonwere very large,almostdailyEuropeancrowdsmarchingagainstthedeploymentofourINFmissilesdespitethecompleteddeploymentofRussianSS-20missilesaimedat Europemeasuring in the thousands ofnewwarheads. Thesedemonstrations were later determined to be largely organized andfundedasSovietactivemeasuresoperations.

However, as it turned out, the Reagan INF and Strategic ArmsReduction Talks (START I) strategies defeated the freeze supporters,upendingtheirattempttoseizethehighgroundofarmscontrol.Reagan’sproposed revolution of reductions of nuclear arsenals, coupledwithacompanionefforttomodernizeourentirenuclearenterprise,flummoxedtheSovietsandtheirallies,whohadassumedarmscontrolcouldbeusedto stop American nuclear modernization. Coupling robust Americannuclear modernization efforts with new energetic missile defenseresearch,ReaganundidSovieteffortstoachievenuclearsuperiority.HeknockedtheSALTprocessintooblivionandendedtheassumptionthatarmscontrolmeantunilateralAmericandisarmamentandfailuretokeepa strong deterrent. Reagan undid Soviet strategy with the successfuldeploymentofthehighlycontroversialU.S.Pershingintermediate-rangeballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) inEurope,andthesimultaneouspushforanalternativezero-zerooptionofeliminating all such American and Soviet INF missiles. These actionswreckedtheSovietcampaigntodivideanddissolveNATOandplayedanimportantroleinspeedingthepeacefulendoftheSovietempire.

However,withtheendoftheColdWaranddissolutionoftheU.S.S.R.,theUnitedStatesrelaxeditswatchfulness.Underbothpoliticalparties,the U.S. fell into a blindness toward Russia that ultimately led to theassumptionthatamorecooperativeRussia,evenunderVladimirPutin,would beavailable topursuea security “reset.”Meanwhile, thepolicyestablishment in Washington simultaneously swallowed the ChinesePolitburo description of Beijing’s growingmilitary power as simply abenign“peacefulrise”withwhichtheU.S.shouldcooperate.

TheresultingAmericannuclearprocurementholiday,inwhichtheU.S.virtuallystoppeditsnuclearmodernization,wasalsocoupledwithaholidayfromnuclearstrategyandpolicyassessments.Asanationwefellinto sloppy thinking about the nuclear balance, particularly that thearsenalsofRussiaandUnitedStateswerecomparable.Weremainnowcaught in this sameenvironment inwhich themedia,Hollywood, and


54

academiaassume that theU.S. is leadinganucleararms race, thatournuclear arsenal needs only, at best, modest modernization, and thatRussia and China are merely reacting to American military pressure,seeking only to counter-balance U.S. conventional superiority andunilateralmilitaryadventures.

ISNUCLEARBEAN-COUNTINGTHATSIMPLE?

Although the Russian and United States nuclear arsenals aremeasurabletothedegreethat“nuclearbeans”canactuallybeverified,todayonlyafractionofthewarheadscanbecounted.TheyarenotsimilarinrangeorscopeandarenotuniformlycontrolledbytheNewSTARTtreatyinwhichsomuchfaithhasbeenplacedasameasurablegovernoroftheRussiannucleararsenal.Asforothernucleararsenals,thissectionbriefly looks at smaller nuclear arsenals except for China’s, which isdiscussedlater.

THEU.K.ANDFRANCE

The nuclear arsenals of theUnited Kingdom and France arewellknownandarenotgrowing.

Francehasapproximately300nuclearwarheads.MostareSLBMsdeployed on French navy vessels. The rest are ALCMs for delivery byfighter-bombers operated by the Strategic Air Forces and the NavalNuclear Aviation Force. French navy fighters carrying nuclear-armedcruisemissilescanbelaunchedfromtheCharlesDeGaulle,France’sonlyaircraft carrier. Frenchwarheads reportedlyhaveyieldsof100to300kilotons(kt).EachFrenchSLBMreportedlycarriesfourtosixwarheads,ormultipleindependentlytargetablereentryvehicles(MIRVs).19

The United Kingdom has an estimated 200 nuclear warheads,believed to be the “W76-1,” a variant of the U.S. W76 warhead, withestimated yield of 90kt. Because the British have significantly scaledbacktheirnucleararsenalanddeliveryvehiclessincetheendoftheColdWartheirnucleararsenalconsistsentirelyofSLBMsdeployedonTridentsubmarines.

INDIAANDPAKISTAN

IndiaandPakistan’snucleararsenalsareassumedtobearound150warheadseach.Bothnationsarelikelyengagedinnuclearmodernizationefforts that are probably intended to increase the number andsophisticationoftheirnuclearwarheads.


55

India’s nuclear arsenal is believed to be composed of plutonium-fueled fission and boosted-fission warheads. It reportedly consists ofgravitybombscarriedbyfighters,land-basedballisticmissilesof12–40ktandsea-basedballisticmissilesof12ktormore.20

ThereisdisagreementoverthesuccessofIndia’slastnucleartestsinMay1998thatwerebelievedintendedtotestboosted-fissionorfusionwarheads. Most experts believe these five tests failed but that Indiaprobablyuseddatafromthemtoperfectatleastaboosted-fissiondesign.

Pakistanreportedlyhas140to150nuclearweapons,believedtobefueled by enriched uranium. All are likely fission or boosted-fissionweapons.Pakistan’sarsenalisbelievedtoconsistofland-basedballisticmissilesof12–40kt,ground-andair-launchedcruisemissilesof12kt,andsea-basedcruisemissilesof12kt.21

PakistanmatchedIndia’sMay1998nucleartestswithfiveofitsownandclaimeditsuccessfullytestedaboosted-fissionwarhead.Thisclaimhasnotbeenconfirmed. Indiahasprobably continued itsnuclearweaponsresearchsince1998,possiblytoperfectathermonuclearwarhead.

NORTHKOREA

North Korea, with a nuclear arsenal estimated at up to 100warheads,maybetheworld’smostdangerousnuclearstate.

Figure5:ComparisonofMostPowerfulNuclearTestsbyCountry(Estimatedexplosiveyieldsinkilotons)

CenterforSecurityPolicygraphic.


56

Figure6:ComparisonofEstimatedYieldsofNorthKoreanNuclearTests

CenterforSecurityPolicygraphic.

The New York Times reported on March 13, 1993, that the CIAbelievedNorthKoreamighthaveproducedenoughmaterial tobuildanuclearweapon.22PresidentClinton’sCIADirectorJamesWoolseygavea similar warning in February 1993 that North Korea might be onlymonthstoayearawayfromproducingitsfirstatomicweapon.DeputyofStateLawrenceEagleburgertestifiedtoCongressonMarch10,1993,thathebelievedNorthKoreahadalreadybuiltanuclearbomb.23

NorthKoreaconductedsixnucleartestsbetween2006and2017.Eachhadincreasingyields,growingfrom0.5ktin2006toanestimated250ktin2017.ItisknownthatmostofNorthKorea’snucleartestswereplutonium-fueled.Somelatertestsmayhavebeenfueledbyenricheduranium.

NorthKoreaclaimsits2017nucleartestwasahydrogenbomb.Expertsaredividedonwhetherthiswasthecaseorifthedevicetestedusedboosted-fission.Therewasnodoubtthatthe2017nucleartestrepresentedamajoranddangerousadvanceforNorthKorea’snuclearprogram.


57

NorthKoreahasalargemissilearsenalandtestedmissilesin2017with ICBM ranges. It also claims to be developing (or has developed)miniaturizednuclearwarheadsforitsmissilesandSLBMs.

North Korea suspended nuclear testing in 2018 in response to adiplomaticoutreachfromPresidentDonaldTrump.Italsosuspendeditsmissile tests, but resumed short-range tests inmid-2019. Therewerefearsinlate2019thatNorthKoreawouldresumetestsoflonger-rangemissiles,possiblyICBMs.However,suchtestsneveroccurred.

IRAN

Many experts believe that, despite its nuclear weapons research,Iranhasnotyetconstructedanuclearwarhead.Butgiventhecountry’scloseandformalcollaborativerelationshipwithNorthKoreainmilitarymatters,itisnotoutofthequestionthatIrannowhasnuclearwarheadsofsomekind.Iran’snuclearweapons-relatedactivitiesweresupposedtohavebeensuspendedbythe2015nuclearagreementwithIran,knownas the Joint Comprehensive Program of Action, or JCPOA. The JCPOA,according to theObama administration, was intended to keep Iran atleast one year away from developing nuclear weapons. However, thisagreementhadveryweakverificationprovisionsandIranhasrefusedtoallow International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) inspectors,whom itagreedtocooperatewithtoverifytheagreement,accesstomilitarysites.There have beenmany credible reports of Iran cheating on its JCPOAobligations. President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018.AlthoughEuropehastriedtoworkwithIrantosavetheagreement,whenthisbookwenttoprint,Europewasclosetoadmittingthatthedealwasdead. On January 14, 2020, France, Britain and Germany formallytriggered the JCPOAdisputemechanism,aprocess that likely result intheir exit from the agreement. President Trump has pledged hiswillingness to negotiate a better nuclear agreement with Iran thataddressesthewholerangeofsecuritythreatsIranposesandissupportedbyregionalstates.Sofar,IranianleadershaverejectedPresidentTrump’sofferanditsbehaviorworsenedoversinceMr.Trump’sinauguration.

THECONTEXT:AMERICANNUCLEARREDUCTIONS

Before we examine the Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals, itshouldbeunderstood that theUnitedStateshas,more thananyothercountry,markedly reduced itsnucleararsenalby tensof thousandsofwarheads from its peak, a reduction of near 90% when theater andbattlefieldnuclearweaponsareconsidered.Incongressionaltestimony,nuclear expert Madelyn Creedon noted that overall the U.S. nuclear


58

inventoryhasdeclinedfrom31,255warheadsat theheightof theColdWarto3,800today, includingdeployedandreservenuclearwarheads,an88%reduction.Thesereductionshavebeenindeployed“inthefield”strategicandtheaterweapons,aswellasinthe“hedge”stockpilewehaveprudentlymaintainedincasestrategicdeterrentrequirementschange.

HOWTOREVIEWU.S.-RUSSIANUCLEARINVENTORY

TheUnitedStatesmaintainsveryclosetothe1,550-warheadlimitoftheNewSTARTagreement,havinganadditional200theaterorshort-rangewarheads deployedwith tactical aircraft in Europe. TheUnitedStatesalsohasasignificantnumberofwarheads—roughly2,800—slatedforcompletedismantlement,thatarenotavailablefordeployment.

Furthermore, there are zero strategic nuclear programs underdevelopmentbytheUnitedStatesthatdonotfitwithinthetermsoftheNew START treaty. On the other hand, Russia has six such strategic-capablenuclearsystemsunderdevelopmentorbeingdeployed.Moscowclaimsthatthesesystemsareoutsidetheparametersofthetreaty.Thesewarheads add appreciably to Russian “niche” nuclear capabilities,probably in the realm of hundreds of additionalwarheads in the nearterm.

Finally, while the popular bean-counting measures may includeRussian theater or short-range nuclear systems, these are probablyseriouslyundercountedandthusafurtherdistortedviewofthenuclearbalanceisoftenpresentedasfact.

Finally,whatpromptedtheU.S.tosuspendandthenwithdrawfromitsobligationsundertheINFTreatyin2019wasnotaRussiantechnicalviolationoraninterpretivedifference,butRussia’sdevelopment,testing,and fielding of a ground-launched cruise missile system specificallybanned by the INF Treaty. For those concerned that our suspensionwould cause Russia to develop these systems further, Russia’s legalobligations under the INFTreaty proved no barrier to its pursuit andfielding of a banned system in the firstplace. To assert that Russia isreacting to our suspension is to ignore the reality of Russia’s conductunder the INF Treaty since at least 2009. “Violations must haveconsequences,”theWhiteHousesaidFebruary2019inannouncing itsintent to withdraw. “Nearly 6 years of diplomacy and more than 30meetingshavefailedtoconvinceRussiatoreturntocompliancewiththeINFTreaty.Enoughisenough.”24


59

NUCLEARBALANCEBASICS

ForRussia, itsdeployed “in the field” strategic long-rangenuclearwarheads(includingbomberweapons)areassumedtonumber,basedinpart on decade-old data, roughly 2,300. The quantity may beconsiderablyhigher,evencountingjustthosesystemsthatcomeunderthe New START treaty of 2010. Figure 7 illustrates U.S. and RussiancommitmentsunderNewSTART.

Figure7:U.S.andRussianLong-rangeNuclearForcesUnderNewSTART

HeritageFoundationChartusedwithpermission.

GiventhesixmajorstrategicweaponssystemstheRussiansarenow

building that fall outside the 2010 New START framework, plus thecurrent strategic force of 2,300warheads,plus theater or short-rangenuclearweapons,RussiacouldhaveatleastthreetimesthenumberofdeployedweaponsthanareofficiallyallowedbytheNewSTART

treaty. In addition, China’s nuclear arsenal is of an unknown size, isbelievedtobegrowing,and isnotsubject toanynucleararmscontrolagreement.

EightpointsneedtobekeptinmindwhencomparingRussianandChinesenuclearweaponstoU.S.nuclearforces.

First, theRussiannucleararsenal ismadeupof strategicor long-rangeplatformsthatcarrynuclearweapons.Moreover,thereareshort-


60

rangeandwhatareoftendescribedastheaternuclearweaponsthatrunthe gamut fromnuclear landmines and artillery shells to lower-yieldgravitybombsandrocketandshort-rangemissilewarheads.

Second, some key elements of the Russian strategic arsenal areboundbythe2010NewSTARTarmscontrolagreement,butmanynewstrategicsystemsarenotcapturedbytheagreementandthushavetobeconsideredwhenprojectingwhattheRussiannuclearthreatmightlooklikeinthefuture.

Third,Russiantheaterortacticalnuclearweaponsarenotcoveredby any arms control agreement. For the past three decades, the U.S.intelligencecommunityhasestimatedRussiantheaternuclearforcesatbetween2,000and5,000warheads,witharecentNationalIntelligenceEstimatecenteredon2,000.

The problem with such theater systems is that they are small,difficulttoverifyusingnationaltechnicalmeans—satellites,primarily—andareeasytohide.Bycontrast,theU.S.has500nucleargravitybombs,ofwhich 300 are in reserve storage. The remaining200 are deployedaboardnuclear-capablefighteraircraftinseveralNATO-alliednations.

Russiahasclaimedthatithasreduceditstacticalnuclearweaponsby70%.Usingopenliteraturesources,suchareductionstillgivesRussiaaremainingnuclearforceconsiderablyabove2,000warheads.

Fourth,manynuclearwarheadsintheU.S.arsenalarescheduledfordismantlement and disposal, meaning that they are not available fordeployingintothedeterrentforce,butthisfactisoftenignoredinvariousassessmentsofthenuclearbalance.

Fifth, it is also usually assumed that because Russian strategicnuclear forces deployed or in the field are contained within theparameters of the New START treaty, they thus do not exceed 1,550warheads,exceptbomberwarheadsthathavetheirownspecialcountingrules.

But insofaras fast flyersare concerned—ICBMsandSLBMs—it isassumed theRussian systemsare nomore than 700 strategicnucleardelivery vehicles (SNDVs) and 1,490 warheads. This assumption islargelybasedona2009Russiandeclaration submittedunderSTART Irules,andsincethenononlypartialinformationprovidedbyRussiabutthatremainsclassified.

Most importantly, New START verification measures are weakerthanthoseoriginallyadoptedunderSTARTI.Furthermore,asMichaelaDodge explained in a Heritage Foundation paper, “the US negotiatedawaytelemetryprovisionsthatwouldallowustogetaninsightintohowmanywarheadscanbecarriedbyRussianmissiles.Moreover,warheadsinmaintenancefacilitiesandsystemsawayfromabaseareoff-limitsto


61

inspectors,furtherdiminishingourunderstandingofthecompositionofRussia’snuclearforces.Inexplicably,theNewSTARTtreatyalsoallowsconcealmentactivitiesonICBMbases.”25

ProponentsofNewSTARTarguethat thetreatyallowstheUnitedStatestocounttheactualoverallnumberofdeployedRussianwarheads.ThisargumentismisleadingbecausethestructureofNewSTARTdoesnot give theUnited States theability to count Russia’swarheadswithmuchconfidence.

First,bombersarecountedasonewarheadregardlessofhowmanywarheadstheyactuallycarry.

Second,asDodgeexplains,“warheadsinmaintenancefacilitiesoronsystemsawayfromabaseatthetimeofinspectionaswellasthemobilelaunchers and warheads within them are off-limits to inspectors,providingaloopholetodeploymorewarheadsthandeclaredunderNewSTART.”26

Third, notes Dodge, “New START does not contain limits on amaximumwarheadnumberdeployedpermissileanddoesnotsetthrow-weight limitations and launch-weight limitations. Russia is alsodevelopingand deployingnewnuclearwarheadsand launchers, somenotconstrainedbyNewSTART.”

If thesenewwarheadsaresmallerthanwarheadsthatRussiahasdeployedinthepast,RussiacandeploymanymoreofthemaboveNewSTART levels with no appreciable risk of being caught during aninspection.

Fourth, as Dodge explains, “for all intents and purposes, Russia’stelemetry regime is all but eliminated for verification purposes sinceRussiadecideswhichdataitwillshare.TelemetryhelpstheUnitedStatesunderstandoneofthekeycharacteristicsofaballisticmissile:itsthrowweight, which helps to determine howmanywarheads amissile cancarry.Itcanalsoshowwhenamissilereleasesare-entryvehicle(RV).”

In New START, Russia rejected what Dodge notes was the moreeffective firstStrategicArmsReductionTreaty“lookalike,countalike”approach and type rules. Under the old regime, each missile wasattributed several warheads it could carry regardless of how manywarheads an inspector saw on it during an onsite inspection. TheRussiansmisledtheUnitedStatesaboutcapabilitiesoftheirmissiles,butnevertheless this approach allowed the United States to betterunderstand a baseline capability of Russia’s missile forces. Takentogether, the limitationsofNewSTARTmeanthateven ifan inspectorfindsamissiledeployingmoreRVsthantheUnitedStatesthinksRussiacandeploy,itdoesnotsaymuchabouthowmanyRVsothermissilesofthe same type in the Russian arsenal carry. Also, it does not provide


62

informationaboutanRVcapacityofmissilesinRussia’sarsenal,makingit verydifficult to charge theRussianswithaviolationofNewSTART.Eventheunique identifiersdonotaddmuchtotheverificationregimeperse;sincetheycanbedecideduponbyeachoftheparties,itisdifficult,ifnotimpossible,todeterminewhethertheyhavebeentamperedwith.

Sixth, it isalsoassumedthat thereservestockpilesof theU.S.andRussiaaresomehowcomparable.However,theAmericanreservehedgeiscriticalbecausetheU.S.hasthroughneglectgivenuptheabilitytobuildnewnuclearwarheads,acapabilitytheTrumpadministrationisseekingtoreestablish.

Russia, on the other hand, can build warheads as fast as a beerfestivalinHamburgcanturnoutsausageandthusdoesn’tneedalargehedgedstockpile.Andinfact,alotoftheRussian“stockpile”ofwarheadshidestheextenttowhichtheRussian“inthefield”or“deployed”forceofwarheadsmaybeconsiderablyabovetheofficial“assumed”NewSTARTlevel.ThereasonisbecauseindividualmissilewarheadloadingsarenotconstrainedinthetreatybutareassumedtohavebeenreducedacrosstheRussianmissileforcestofitwithinthetreatyallowance.

There isalsoanunwrittenrulewithinthe intelligencecommunitythat since 1972, when the first SALT nuclear arms treaty was signedbetween the Soviet Union and the United States, violations of suchagreements,howeveraccuratelydetermined,weretobedealtwithatapoliticallevel,bythepolicyexpertsintheWhiteHouseratherthantheintelligencecommunity.

Thus, theaccountabilityofnuclearweapons isnotan intelligencematter, but a political one.When former President Clintonwas askedabout certifying violations of arms agreements by our adversaries, henoted he would rather not know about such violations because oncemadepublic, therewouldbeCongressionalandotherdemandstotakecompensatoryaction.Thus, theannouncementofandreactiontoarmstreatyviolations isahighlychargedpoliticalproblem.Theresult isweareloathtocalloutRussiaforitstreatyviolationsand,evenifwedo,theonly “remedy” we have is to publicize the violation and either shameMoscowintocompliance,orallowtheKremlintomanipulateourpoliticalsystemtogainitsdesiredresult.

Seventh,theChinesenucleararsenalisalsoproblematic.UnliketheRussianmediaandofficialspokesmen,theChineserevealalmostnothingabouttheirnucleararsenalandnuclearpolicy.Furthermore,allChinesenuclearweaponsgofreeinthesensethatthereisnoarmscontrol agreement of any kind that limits the deployment of anyChinesenuclearsystem.


63

And the argument over the relative size of the Chinese nucleararsenalislargelyanargumentamongforeignobserversofChinesepolicyandmilitaryaction,astherearenopublicsourcesofofficialdatainsideChinaonChinesenuclearmissiles,submarines,bombers,orwarheads.

The Chinese know this and thus engage in a kabuki dance ofobfuscation and denial that their nuclear arsenal is anything but verysmall and their nuclear strategy anything but largely defensive andpacifist.

Eighth, apart from satellite imagery and whatever humanintelligence we can secure, the Chinese nuclear arsenal and itscompanion strategy is largely opaque. The range of estimates of itsarsenal vary from somewhat fewer than 300warheads to asmany as1,800 to3,000,whichbothAmericanandRussian specialistshaveputforward.Thisestimateddifferenceofasmuchas1,000%isdestabilizingandmakesU.S.defenseplanningimpossible.

One key point of departure of this analysis is my willingness tocarefullyexaminetheassumptionthatChina’slowlevelofplutoniumandnuclear fuel capability makes it a foregone conclusion that China’snuclearforcestructureisquitelowwhenweareinfactonlyconsideringthe lowendoftheestimatesof thecurrentChinesestockpile.HeretheassumptionisthatChinahasalimitednuclearforcebecauseitsnuclear-weapons-gradefuelproductioncapacityislimited,anditsfuelcapacityisobviouslylimitedbecauseitonlyhasasmallnucleararsenaldeployed.This circular logic is thenadded toa further assumption that becauseChina has a policy of targeting only American cities with very large,megaton-classwarheads,adeploymentofsuchlargenuclearwarheadsisobviously constrained by China’s limited nuclear warhead fuelproductioncapability.

RUSSIANNUCLEARBEANS

As I haveexplained, the usual inventory estimates of theworld’snucleararsenalsareoftenbean-countingexercisesthatsaynothingofthecapabilityof the force toexpandquickly, thepurposeof the force, thestructure of the force, and the relationship of the force to a country’sstrategicobjectives.

RussianPresidentPutinsaysthatheregardsnuclearmodernizationasthenation’shighestpriorityandisfocusedonprovidingRussiawitha“guaranteednucleardeterrent.”InApril2000,soonaftertakingpower,Putin declared that in a crisis or conventional conflict, Russia wouldreserve the right tousenuclearweapons first, insmallnumbersor inlimitedstrikes,butnonethelessfirst.Andoverthenexttwodecades,he


64

affirmedthebuildingandtestingofsuchtheaternuclearsystemsaswellasdeclaringthatsometimeintheverynearfuture,Russiawillhavefullybuilt and deployed such systems. Meanwhile, Russia produced anddeployed new generations of ICBMs, ballisticmissile submarines andSLBMs, maneuverable ballistic missiles and/or warheads, andhypersonicmissilesagainstwhichtheU.S.hasnodefense.

In addition, during its military operation against Crimea, Russiaraised the alert level of its nuclear forces and issued veiled nuclearthreatstoensuretheWestdidnotintervene.InJuly2017,Putinsignedanew naval doctrine that stated, “under conditions of escalation of amilitary conflict, demonstrationof readinessanddetermination touseforce,includingtheuseofnonstrategicnuclearweapons,isaneffectivedeterrent factor.”27 Later, in his annual state-of-the-nation address onFebruary20,2019,Putin revivedaSovietpolicyof theearly1980sbysaying that if Washington deployed intermediate-range missiles inEuropetocounterwhatRussiahadputinplace,MoscowwouldtargetthecountrieshostingtheU.S.weapons.

ThisnuclearstrategyisdesignedtogettheUnitedStatestostanddowninthefaceofRussianaggression.Thatchallenge,explainedUnderSecretaryofDefenseJohnRoodinJuly2019,istheRussiandoctrinethatseemstobelievethatata“certainleveltheycouldusesmallnuclearweaponsagainsttheUnitedStatesandouralliesandnotfaceasimilarresponse."28

Forexample,shouldRussiainvadeoneoftheNATO-memberBalticrepublics, Putin is counting on NATO failing to invoke the alliance’scornerstoneArticle5formutualdefenseandbeingunwillingtocometothedefenseofaNATOally.Thatfailurewoulddefeattheentirepurposeof NATO, likely leading to the complete collapse of the trans-Atlanticalliance,andwithit,America’sleadershipofthefreeworld.RussiacouldthendeclaretothecountriesofEurope,nowunabletorelyupontheU.S.for itssecurity, that it is timetheymaketheirownsecuritydealswithRussiainwhattheSovietsoncecalleda“commonEuropeanhome.”

Inthiscontext,theRussiannucleararsenaltakesonadifferentcolorthan the common “arms control” disarmament renditions by theStockholmInternationalPeaceResearchInstitute ortheFederationofAmerican Scientists. As former House Armed Services CommitteeChairman and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin once told this writer,“Countingthenuclearbeansisallwellandgood,buttellmewhatthebadguysaregoingtodowiththebeansthatisnotgoodfortheUnitedStates.”

MichaelaDodge’sHeritageFoundationessayonthesubjectexplainsexactly what “no good” the Russians are up to. She writes, “Russia’sprovocativestepssuggestthat itmistakenlybelievesthat itcanexploitgapsatthelowerlevelsoftheescalatoryladderandcontrolescalationof


65

a nuclear conflict to achieve its objectives without risking a strategicnuclearexchangewiththeUnitedStates,evenasitpubliclydeniessuchisthecase.”29

Thus,thequestionofRussia’stacticalnuclearcapabilitiesisnotjustacademic.WritesDodge: “If Russia believes it can exploit gaps on thelower levels of the so-called escalatory ladder, it is more likely tomiscalculateinaconflict.Itcouldalsobemorelikelytopursueaggressiveforeignpoliciesinvolvingconventionalweapons.”

InthatoverallcontextoftheRussiannucleardoctrine,theRussiannuclearinventorycanbebetterappreciatedandanalyzed.

The New START treaty allows each side 700 strategic nucleardelivery vehicles (SNDVs), otherwise known as operational strategicmissiles and bombers. Both sides can have 100 additional SNDVs inreserveabovethe700.

In reality, while the U.S. reduced its SNDVs to meet the treatyparameters,theRussiansbuiltup.Russiaincreaseditsdeliveryvehiclesfrom521to524,whiletheU.S.cutdeliveryvehiclesfrom882to656.Asforwarheads,theU.S.droppedfrom1,800to1,365,whileRussiaclaimsitwentfrom1,537to1,461onthedayNewSTARTwasofficiallymeanttobeimplemented.

Thewarhead levels for theNew START treaty are 1,550 for eachside. But this number of warheads is misleading. Actually, each sidepledgedby2018toreachnomorethan1,490SLBMandICBMwarheads,with60additionalbombers,eachofwhichcouldhavemultiplegravitybombsorcruisemissilesbutwouldonlycountforpurposesofthetreatyasonewarheadperbomber,upto60suchairplanes.

Nowbeforewe list themissilestheRussianshavedeployed—putintothefield—wemustexplaintheverificationrulesadoptedunderNewSTART.Inthefirstarmsreductiontreatyforstrategicweapons,STARTI,it was assumed that each missile carried the maximum number ofwarheads that had been tested on that class ofmissile. That was thenumber of warheads to be inferred by the deployment of a certainnumberofICBMsandSLBMs.

ForNew START, however, the disarmamentadvocateswanted tocounttheexactnumberofwarheadsandadoptanewcountingrule.So,tentimesayear,theU.S.canaskwith24-hournoticetoinspectoneofthe478 missiles in the Russian arsenal. American inspectors can go to aRussianmilitarybase,beshownalistofmissilesdeployedatthatbase,andasktoinspectthemissileofchoice,whetherinasiloormountedonatruck.TheRussianscanthendirecttheAmericaninspectorstotherightmissile. The inspectors can see the missile has only two, four, or sixwarheads, whatever was listed in the declaration, and can then can


66

proceed to tell the American people that the United States officiallyknowsthataRussianSS-18orSS-24orSS-25ICBMatacertainbasehasacertainnumberofwarheads.

Buthereistheproblem.ThatisallwecantelltheAmericanpeople.As SenatorKit Bond told the Senate in 2010, the procedures adoptedunder the New START treaty “do not permit adequate verificationactivitiesneededtomakesuretheRussiansaren’tcheating.”Asaresult,theSenatorexplained,“Icannotingoodconsciencesupportthetreaty.”30

AlltheUnitedStatescandoissaythatoutofthenearly500Russianmissiles,whenwe saw themissiles on the day of inspection, wemayknowthattenmissileshad“x”numberofwarheads—unless,ofcourse,thewarheadsarecamouflagedbyhardcovers.

Now the assumption many observers as well as analysts of thenuclearbalancemakeisthatallmissilesinaparticularcategoryareonlyloadedwithwarheadsasindicatedinadeclaredclassifiedinventorybyRussiathatdoesnotexceed1,490.Afterall,theU.S.inspectorsmightgetlucky and inspect a missile that has warhead loadings exceeding thedeclarationifinfactRussiaischeating.

However,asDodgeexplains,“theNewSTART’sverificationregimeis limited at best and, at worst, tends to provide U.S. politicians andpolicymakerswithafalsesenseofsecurity.TheissueswithNewSTART’sverificationprovisionsaresoseverethattheNewSTARTWorkingGroup,consisting of analysts from The Heritage Foundation and otherorganizations,calledit‘Potemkinvillageverification.’”31

Dodgecontinues:“TherealityisthatnotasingleinspectionallowedunderNewSTARTiscapableofprovingaviolationofNewSTART.Atthetime the treaty was submitted to the Senate’s advice-and-consentprocess,theObamaAdministrationarguedthattheU.S.nolongerneedsasmuchverificationasbefore.”

However, is thatenoughverification inadeal that cannot relyontrust? Unfortunately, one of Senator Bond’s concerns was that everymissileintheRussianinventorycanbeloadedwithasmanywarheadsasthe Russians are physically able to deploy. So, inspecting one or tenmissilesayearisverificationofonlythatmissileatthetimeofinspection,nothingmoreandnothingless.

But,saytreatysupporters,theRussiansaremeanttoreducetheirwarhead loadings to comply with the 2010 treaty, and officialassessmentsfromtheStateDepartment,forexample,claimtheRussiansarecomplying.

ThisisbasedontheStateDepartment’sassumptionthatdeployedRussianmissilesontrucks,insilos,andonsubmarineswouldeasilycarry


67

2,670warheads,saysonelongtimearmscontrolannualassessment,notthelowernumberrequiredbythetreaty.

These 2,670warheadsare deployed aboard 478Russianmissilesand68bombers,rangingfrom318ICBMsonsixdifferentICBMsystemsto 720 warheads on 10 submarines carrying 160 missiles of threedifferent types,plus68bombersof three types—Bear6,Bear16, andBlackjack—carrying786warheads.

Hereisthebigunknown:ItisassumedthatRussiahasdownloadedits 2,670 warheads—considered the normal, day-to-day deployedcapablelevelofweapons,includingbombersnotonalertandsubmarinesin port undergoing a refit or overhaul—to the treaty-compliant 2,276level,whichwould consistof1,490missilewarheadsand roughly786bomberweapons.

Now,iftheRussianswantedtoplaceoneachmissileandbomberthemaximum number of warheads technically possible, and add in theestimatedminimumof1,800–2,000warheadstheyhavefortheaterorshorter-range requirements, then they could deploy in the near term4,700strategicandtheaterwarheadsonaday-to-daybasis.

But as noted earlier, the Russians also have six new nuclear“superweapons,” at least four of which are not restricted by the NewSTARTtreaty,whiletwoareconstrained.

David Trachtenberg, a former Trump administration deputy

assistantsecretaryofdefense,explainedtoCongressinMarch2019:

InMarch2018, only amonth after theUnitedStatesandRussiareachedthelimitsonstrategicsystemsestablishedundertheNewSTARTTreaty,PresidentVladimirPutinannouncedthatRussiaisactively testing five new nuclear weapons capabilities, whichinclude: 1) an intercontinental-range, nuclear armed hypersonicglide vehicle; 2) a maneuverable, nuclear armed air-launchedballisticmissile;3)a long-range,nuclear-poweredcruisemissile;4) a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed underwater unmannedvehicle;and5)anewheavyintercontinentalrangeballisticmissile,calledtheSARMAT.PresidentPutin,duringthissamespeech,alsoannouncedthatRussiadevelopednewlaserweaponssystems“thathavebeensuppliedtothetroopssincelastyear.”32

Someofthesesystemsarerelativelyclosetobeingoperational,withthe RS-28 Sarmat’s (up to 24 warheads) initial operational capabilitybeing2021,theyearNewSTARTiscurrentlysettoexpire.

According to national security expert Mark Schneider, whocontributedachaptertothisbook,theTsirkonhypersonicmissilewas


68

addedin2019tobefullydeployedastheSarmatgoesonduty.Asforthenuclear-powered cruise missile and the Poseidon drone submarine,initialoperationswillsoonfollow.TheAvangardhypersonicboostglidevehiclewas scheduled for deployment in 2019. Toavoid falling underNewSTARTlimitations,saysSchneider,MoscowmayasserttheSarmatmissileversioncarryingtheAvangardpayloadisnotthesamemissileastheSarmatthatcarriesthe24warheads.

Anexcellent2015studyby JamesR.Howeconcluded thatRussiahadthepotentialtodeploy2,664–5,890nuclearwarheadsonitsplannedstrategic ballistic missile force. In another analysis published inSeptember 2019, he says Russia will have between “2,976 WHs[warheads], and a maximum of 6,670 WHs” plus over 800 bomberweapons. He notes that “the 2022 [Russian] strategic nuclear force’s(SNFs)war-head(WH)levelswilllikelysignificantlyexceedNewSTARTlevelsbasedonplannedWHloadings.”

To further understand the dimensions of the Russian nucleararsenal,threeadditionalpointsneedtobeunderstood.First,theRussiannucleararsenallikelywillgreatlyoutpaceAmerica’seveniftheU.S.meetsthe2018NuclearPostureReview’sgoalofproducing80nuclearpitsperyear. (A pit is the trigger for detonating a thermonuclear weapon, orhydrogen bomb. It is a hollow shell of plutoniumand othermaterialssurroundedbychemicalexplosives.)TheU.S.isracingtoproducepitstoextendthelifeofoldernuclearweaponsbecauseofuncertaintyabouttheusefullifeofpits,whichcouldbeaslittleas45years.33Insomeestimates,the Russians will have as high as a 100 to 1 advantage if U.S. pitproductiongetsonlytothe30peryearcalled forbytheHouseArmedServicesCommittee.InDecember2019,CongressapprovedtheTrumpadministration’s request for funding in the 2020 National DefenseAuthorizationActtoresumeproductionofplutoniumpits.(SeeChapter10).

Second, Moscow can add warheads to missiles by making thecurrentwarheadssmallerandthusuploadingmissilestothemaximumtechnicallevel,whichinmostcircumstancesfortheRussians,exceedsthemissiles’assumedcurrentloadings.

Third,theRussiansseenuclearweaponsascoerciveinstrumentsofstatecraft,wheretheiraggressionanduseofmilitaryforceistobeusedto grab territory and geostrategic advantage and not simply as adeterrenttorespondtoaggressionbyanotherstate.


69

CHINA’SNUCLEARINVENTORY

NotasingleChinesenuclearwarheadiscontrolledbyanucleararmstreaty.The currentextentandprojected future sizeofChina’snucleararsenalremainanexquisitepuzzle.

The most common minimalist view of China’s nuclear forcesassumes187land-basedmissiles,48sea-basedmissiles,and20aircraft,with a total of 290 warheads, reflecting a view that most of China’snuclearforceshaveonlyonewarheadpermissile,whilesomehavetwo.A refreshing exception to this “rule” has been Defense IntelligenceAgencyestimatesthatprojectaChinesenucleararsenalin2029from600to800deployedlong-rangestrategicwarheads.Thesenumbersaremoreconsistent with the admittedly sparse information publicly availabletoday on the Chinese nuclear arsenal than they are with the usualminimalistestimatesofChina’snuclearforcesthathavedominatedthelimiteddiscussionofsuchforcesforthepastfewdecades.

BasedonDefenseIntelligenceAgencyprojections, itcouldbethatChina deploys 398 missiles and bombers carrying 606 warheads,reflectinggrowthinwarheadspermissileofuptofourtosixinlimitedcases.Russianintelligencesources,aswellastheformerchiefofstaffoftheRussianStrategicRocketForcesGeneralVictorEsin, conclude thatChina has 2,000 theater-rangemissiles,many ofwhich are dual-use—bothconventionalandnuclear.Thus,itisnotastretchtoconcludethatChina’swarheadholdingsmayexceed1,000intheneartermandreach,accordingtoRickFisher,aprojected2,200in2029.34

ThisanalysisconcludesthatthecommonassumptionsoftheWestunderlying the lower Chinese numbers are as dubious as thosehistorically adoptedwith respect to Russia.Many experts believe thatthatbecauseChinesewarheadsarenotmatedwithmissilesorbomberplatforms,theyareonlyforretaliatorypurposes.ThisishardlytrueiftheChinesearebuildingstrategicsubmarines—unlessChineseofficialsplantosendtheirtroopstoseaandpretendtobeinadeterrentroleastheirassociatedwarheadsareleftonthemainland.

Itisalsofurtherassumed35thatChina’sminimalistanddeclared“nofirstuse”nuclearstrategyispredicated36onaretaliatorydeterrentpolicyofjustthreateningtoblowupAmericancities(acounter-valuestrategy),not a policy of holding at risk U.S. military assets (a counter-forcestrategy),includingournuclearweaponscapabilities.

As such, it had beenassumed37 that Chinese leaders do not haveambitionstobuildabiggerandmoresophisticatednucleararsenalthanacounterforcestrategysupposedlywouldrequire.SuchanassumptionsupposesthatthesimplereiterationofChinesegovernmentpropaganda


70

aboutBeijing’snucleararsenalisperfectlyacceptableastheintelligenceandpolicybasisforongoingAmericanprofessionalassessments.

Missing is a comparison of possible Chinese nucleardeployments not just revealed by American and allied nationaltechnicalmeans,butbyanyanalysisthatevenbeginstoquestionthewidespread acceptance of a minimalist interpretation of Chinesenuclearintentionsandprojectedcapabilities.

Chinacontinuesitsexpansivemilitarymodernizationandisfocusedonestablishingregionaldominanceandexpanding itsability tocoerceU.S.alliesandpartners.Consistentwithamilitarystrategythatstresses“optimizationof itsnuclear forcestructure,”China ismodernizingandrapidlyexpanding itsalreadyconsiderablenuclear forces,with littletono transparency regarding the scope and scale of its nuclearmodernization program. China is the only permanent United NationsSecurityCouncilmember country thathasnotannouncedpublicly thesizeofitsnucleararsenal.BeijinghasalsorebuffedmultipleU.S.attemptstoengageinameaningfulbilateraldialogueonnuclearpostureandriskreductionissues.

China is developing a new generation of mobile missiles, withwarheadsconsistingofMIRVsandpenetrationaids.Inparticular,BeijinghasdevelopedanadvancedballisticmissilesubmarinearmedwithnewSLBMs.Inahugemilitaryparadein2019,onthe70thanniversaryofMaoTse-tung’sproclamationofCommunistChina,theregimeunveiledanewroad-mobile strategic ICBM, the Dongfeng-41 (DF-41), which bearsphysicalresemblancetoRussia’sTopol-Mandreportedlycarriesatleast10nuclearwarheads.

China has also announced development of anewnuclear-capablestrategicbomber,indicatingitsintenttodevelopanucleartriad,andhasdeployed a nuclear-capable precision-guided DF-26 IRBM capable ofattacking land and naval targets. China also tested a hypersonic glidevehiclein2014.

China’s nuclear forces include a mix of strategic-range systemscapableofstrikingtheAmericanhomelandandanyotherpointonearthaswellas theater-rangeforcescapableof threateningallies,U.S.bases,andforcesintheregion.

Theusualbeancounters,havingnoofficialinformationfromChina,adoptthroughinertiathesameminimalistassumptionsusedotherbeancounters,comingupwithasmallChinesenucleararsenalofaround280warheadsandrejectinganyalternativeassessmentofChina’scurrentorprojectednucleararsenal.OfstillgreaterconcernareChina’sfundingandinfiltration of American academic institutions to influence theperceptionsofAmericanintelligenceofficers,coupledwithaggressive—


71

andsometimessuccessful—attemptstoco-optandrecruitU.S.militaryandintelligenceofficersandanalysts.

AdmiralDavidKriete, theDeputyCommanderof theU.S.StrategicCommand, explained, "China is and has been for the last couple ofdecadesonaverycleartrajectorywherethey'reincreasingthenumbersofnuclearweaponsthattheyfield,they'reincreasingthenumberofanddiversity of the delivery systems,” and “contrary to commonassumptions, [will be] expanding its nuclear weapons productioncapabilities.”38

KrietesaysthatChina’snewforcesincludenewmobileland-basedmissiles,includingtheDF-41.BillGertzalsoreportsthatChinaisnearingdeployment of a hypersonic glide vehicle—amaneuvering ultra-high-speedmissilethatcandefeatmissiledefenses.

Another official, Rear Admiral Michael Brookes, director ofintelligence for thePacificCommand, said inAugust2019 thatChina'snuclear forces modernization is a concern, explaining that in the lastdecadeChinahasdoubleditsnuclearforceandplanstodoubleitagaininthenextdecade,evenastheUnitedStateshasbeenreducingitsnucleararsenalduringthatsameperiodoftimebynearly70%throughboththe2002Moscowand2010NewSTARTstrategicarmsagreements.39

InaMay2019speech,LieutenantGeneralRobertP.Ashley,Directorof the Defense Intelligence Agency, called China’s recent nuclearmodernization “the most rapid expansion and diversification of itsnucleararsenalinChina'shistory.”Onekeyaspectisthe3,000milesoftunnelsbuiltbytheChinesetohidetheirballisticmissiles,butdescribedby some as simply a major public works program of no militarysignificance.Ontheotherhand,whentheU.S.determinedthatthecostoftheconstructionifdonebytheWestwouldbenorthof$60billion,itisobviousthatanationwouldnotspendthatkindofmoneyprotectingjustasmallinventoryofnuclearmissilesandwarheads,withmissilesspacedsome15milesapart.

TongZhao,ananalystfortheCarnegie-TsinghuaCenterforGlobalPolicy in Beijing, argued in a March 2019 article that without theextensionofNewSTART,Chinawouldnottrusttheannouncedlevelsofnuclear weapons held by the United States and would developexaggerated threat perceptions, leading to a growing Chinese nucleararsenal. Zhao did admit that China’s nuclear arsenal was alreadyexpandingandbeingmodernized.40

Zhao further explained that arms control agreements providecertaintyaboutthecapabilitiesofthenuclearparties,withoutwhichtheyare only uncertain rules and the “nuclear communities would stoptalking.”


72

UnsaidbyZhaowasanobviouslyunfortunatefailuretoappreciatethefullimplicationsofhisremarks:Chinarefusestobepartofanyarmscontrol agreement that gives anyone certainty about Beijing’s nucleararsenal. But China demands such certainty from the United States, adouble standard that the Trump administration’sproposal for China’sentrance into arms control is meant to address. However, the armscontrolcommunitysideswiththeChineseCommunistPartyasdoestheecho chamber of the U.S. nationalmedia such as CNN, confirming thecentralthesisofthisessaythatthepolicy-drivennuclearinventorybooksareoftencookedandthenuclearnarrativerigged.Aswearefacedwithincreasingnucleardangers,anunflinchingreviewoftheworld’snuclearinventoriesismorenecessarythanever.

CONCLUSION

Contrary to popular belief, the United States and Russia, whilepossessing together over half of all thenuclearwarheads deployed orstockpiledworldwide,donothavearsenalsthatareroughlyequalinsize.

Furthermore,notonlyisRussianowdeployingandnotonlycanitpurposelydeployintothefutureaforceupwardsof500%ofthetotalU.S.deployed or in-the-field warheads, it is now in possession of nuclearforcessomefourtimesthelevelofU.S.forces,duetoboththedeploymentoflong-rangestrategicforcesandmedium-ortheater-rangemissilesandwarheads.Inaddition,theU.S.cannotnowbuildnewwarheadsalthoughthecurrentproposedbudgetcallsforittoregainsuchacapabilityoverthenextdecade.

Notonlythat,butChinahasdeployedanuclearforcethatisbeingrapidlyexpandedtothe600–700warheadlevelandmaybesignificantlyhigher depending upon the warheads one assumes are deployed onChina’sdual-usemedium-rangemissiles.

Finally, thesignificanceof thisassessment is thatbothRussiaandChinaseenuclearweaponsasverysignificanttoolsofpoliticalcoercionand blackmail. In particular, most reckless has been Russia adoptingsometwodecadesagoapolicyofusingnuclearweaponsearlyinacrisisorconflicttoforcetheUnitedStatesanditsalliestosurrender,apolicynowbeinggraduallyadoptedbyChinaaswell.

Addedtoproliferation issues in IranandNorthKorea,thenuclearlandscape is vastly different than that portrayed by the idealisticproponents of nuclearwarheadelimination, especiallywith respect tothe necessity for and stabilizing nature of the United States nucleardeterrentmodernizationeffortnowbeingundertaken.

73

Nuclear Arms Control and U.S. Security Interests

ByAmbassadorsRobertJosephandEricEdelman

Editor’s Note: This article was originally published by NationalReviewOnlinewiththetitle“NewDirectionsinArmsControl.”Ithasbeenexpandedandupdatedforthispublication.

ith the end of the INF treaty, attention has shifted to thequestionofwhethertoextendtheNewSTARTtreaty,soonbetheonlyremainingagreementlimitingthesizeoftheU.S.and

Russian nuclear arsenals. Under its terms, New START will expire inFebruary 2021 unlessbothpartiesagree to an extension of up to fiveyears. Advocates—in the arms-control community, in Congress, andreportedly some in the Trump administration—argue that there is anurgentneedtoendorseextensionnow.Theirprincipalargumentisthatif New START expires, the entire fabric of the ColdWar arms-controlstructurecraftedwiththeSovietUnionwillunravelandigniteanucleararmsrace.ThequestionofextendingNewSTART,however,isfarmorecomplexandmustbeassessedconsideringfundamentalchangesinthegeostrategicenvironmentsincethetreatywasnegotiatedadecadeago.

ThecomplexitiesofthatnewenvironmentwereonfullviewwhenU.S.andRussianofficialsmetinGenevaonJuly17,2019.Atthemeeting,theU.S. reportedlypresenteda vision for a 21st-century arms controlmodel that would include a possible agreement broader than NewSTART,atreatynegotiated20yearsafterthefallofthewallbutbasedonthe bilateral Cold War pattern of strategic arms control agreements.Given China’s emergence as a global power, accompanied by thecontinued expansion of its nuclear arsenal, the U.S.made its positionclear:anyfuturetreatylimitingU.S.nuclearforcescannotbetiedonlytoRussia but must include China. For its part, Russia appears to havereturnedtoitslongstandingdemandthatanyagreementmustcovernotonlyoffensive strategic arms,butalso set limitsonmissiledefenses, apositionthat theU.S.hasconsistentlyrejectedsinceReaganrefusedtoabandon the Strategic Defense Initiative when he met Gorbachev atReykjavik in 1985. The Trump administration’s 2019 Missile DefenseReview states, “the United States will not accept any limitation orconstraint on the development or deployment of missile defense

W


74

capabilities needed to protect the homeland against rogue missilethreats.” Understanding the background of the positions of partiesinvolved is essential to understanding the potential for a future armscontroltreaty.

It is important to acknowledge the logic of the Trumpadministration’sdecisiontowithdrawfromtheINFtreaty.Herethefactsare clear. Russian violations of the treaty—followedby years of faileddiplomatic efforts by both the Obama and Trump administrations tobringRussiaback into compliance—leftwithdrawalas theonlyviableoption. It makes no sense to maintain an agreement that bans twocountries fromaparticularmilitarycapability ifonlyone isabidingbythetermsandtheotherischeating,allwhileChina,NorthKorea,andIranare developing their own formidable arsenals of intermediate-rangemissiles. Failure to impose costs on Russia for its ongoing violationswould undercut prospects for future meaningful arms control byestablishing that there are no consequences for breaching the centralprovisionsofagreements.

Moreover, the security situation in Europe and Asia has changedconsiderablywithRussiandeploymentsofmodernINFcapabilitiesandChina’s large-scale buildup of dual-capablemobilemissiles (i.e., thosethatcancarryeitheranuclearoraconventionalpayload).AstheNationalDefense Strategy suggests, the U.S. deterrent in both regions hasdeteriorated significantly over the past decade. In the absence ofcountervailing U.S. military capabilities, the prospects for deterrencefailureandthe likelihood thatouradversarieswill testU.S. resolvebyusing their capabilities to intimidate and coerce U.S. allies increasedramatically.Whilemost,ifnotall,oftheneededcapabilitiesarelikelytobeconventionalratherthannuclear,thesedeploymentswouldhavebeenprecludedbyremainingintheINFTreaty.

ItisalsoimportanttorevisitthefundamentalflawsofNewSTART.In 2010, both authors testified against ratification, highlighting thetreaty’s shortcomings and providing our prediction, now provenaccurate,thatU.S.forceswouldgodownandRussiawouldbuildupundertheagreement.ThiswasconsistentwithlongstandingSoviettacticsthatconsistentlyusedarmscontrol to limitU.S.nuclear forces inamannerintendedtogainunilateraladvantages.Wealsoemphasizedthefailuretolimit theater nuclear forces, based on the fiction that nuclear attacksemployingweaponswithrangeslessthan5,500kilometers(3,400miles)wouldnotbestrategic.Forthosewhocaredaboutwhetheragreementsactually reduced the number of nuclear weapons on each side, wepointedoutthatthenewbomber-countingrulecontainedinthefineprintofNewSTARTallowedthedeploymentofmorestrategicwarheadsthan


75

the nominal 1,550 treaty limit since it counted each bomber as onewithout regard to theactualweapons load.We alsonoted that Russiawouldlikelydeployoffensivestrategicforcesnotexplicitlyrestrictedbytheagreement,whichithasnowdone.Finally,wewarnedthatthetreaty,inprincipleandpractice,seemedtoacceptatleastsomelimitsonmissiledefensesandconventional,promptglobal-strikecapabilities.

While these flaws were likely fully understood by the U.S.negotiators,theviewoftheObamaadministration,reflectedinits2010NuclearPostureReview,wasthatpreventingnuclearproliferationwasthe overriding priority. The administration asserted that preventingproliferation would be advanced by leading through example, takingstepstowardanuclear-freeworld,includingmeasuresthatamountedtounilateraldisarmament.Therehasneverbeenanyempiricalevidencetosupport this proposition, as a recent study by Georgetown ProfessorMatthewKroenighaspersuasivelydemonstrated.Theadministration’sviewofRussiawasthatwhileitcouldbedifficulttodealwith,itwasmoreofapartnerthanathreatthatneededtobedeterred.ThisbenignviewofRussia would change only with Moscow’s military intervention inUkraineandtheannexationofCrimea.Putin’ssupportforAssadinSyriaillustratedhisdeterminationtochallengetheU.S.ateveryopportunity.

Lookingforward,anynewnegotiationswithRussiamustconsidertherealitiesoftoday’ssecuritysetting.Theseincludethefollowing:

• WithU.S.lossoftechnical,policy,andoperationalcompetencein nuclear weapons, which is only now beginning to berecovered,Russiahas likelysucceeded in itsdetermineddrivetoachievesuperiorityinnuclearforcesatboththetheaterandthestrategiclevel.Moscowhasforyearsinvestedheavilyinitsnuclearmodernizationprogram,developingandnowdeployingnewmobile and heavy ICBMs, new submarine platforms andballisticmissiles,andanarrayofnovelweapons, fromlonger-range underwater drones with megaton yields to air- andground-launchedcruisemissilesbasedonnewtechnologiestoafamily of hypersonic weapons. Russia claims many of theseweapons are not covered under New START, whichdemonstrateseitheranotherfundamentalflawofthetreatyorthe intentionofMoscowtocheatonyetanotherarms-controlagreement—orboth.

• Russia hasmoved to amilitary doctrine that emphasizes thecentralityofnuclearweaponsatalllevelsofconflict,includingnuclear threats inpeacetime to deter theU.S. and coerce our


76

allies, and the use of theater nuclear weapons to prevail inconventionalconflicts.

• WhileRussiatodayhasactiveproductionlinesforawiderangeofplatformsandnewwarheads,theU.S.isonlyslowlymovingforwardtomodernize itsnucleartriadwithuncertain fundingandpoliticalimpediments.ThosewhofearanarmsracewithoutNewSTARTignoretheracethatstartedmorethanadecadeago,whenRussiabeganaggressivelyenlargingandmodernizingitsnuclear forces (evenwithNewSTART inplace)whiletheU.S.largelystoodstill.

According to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency,Russia’snuclearbuildupappearstobeaccompaniedbylow-yieldtestinginconsistentwiththezero-yieldstandardadoptedbytheUnitedStatesasasignatorytotheComprehensiveTestBanTreaty.Whilethetreatyfailstodefinewhatitpurportstoprohibit,Russianlow-yieldtests—usedtodevelop new theater nuclear weapons and to manage the existingstockpile—wouldbeclearlyinconsistentwiththeintentofthetreaty,andthereforeyetanotherviolationofacentralarmscontrolcommitment.

GiventhatRussiatodayisaclearthreattotheU.S.andourallies,andgiventhedetrimentalchanges inthenuclearbalance,anyfuturearms-control negotiations must include all nuclear-weapons types. TheSenate’s2010 ratificationofNewSTARTmade it clear thatany futureagreement with Russia must consider the huge disparity in theatercapabilities.AsRussiahasexpandeditsnuclearforcesatallrangesandinalltheaters,makingthedistinctionbetweenstrategicandnonstrategicweapons increasinglymeaningless, this Senate-imposed condition hasbecome even more important to incorporate into our arms controlposture.ThisisespeciallythecaseforassuringU.S.alliesanddeterringRussiainEurope,whereRussiareportedlyholdsa10-to-1advantageintheatersystems.

China’s nuclear forces must also be included in any futurenegotiations.BeijingandMoscowhavegreatlyexpanded theirdefenserelationships to include larger-scale military exercises and, mostrecently, joint air patrols. In the nuclear area, China has beenmodernizing and expanding its arsenal for the past decade. It hasdeveloped and deployed new, mobile ICBMs and SLBMs and may bebuildinganewheavybomber.Beijingcanno longercrediblymakethecase that its forces are so small—and intended only for a secure,retaliatory deterrent—that they need not be included in arms-controlnegotiations.China, as President Xi hasmadepublic, is determined tobecome a world power. Beijing is challenging theU.S. throughout the


77

Asia-Pacific,andnuclearweaponsareacentralcomponentofitsplans.ChinaincreasinglyposesachallengeforU.S.extendeddeterrenceinAsia.ItisimperativethatifU.S.nuclearforcesaretobelimited,Chineseforcesmustalsobelimited.

Arms-controldiscipleshavelongtreatedarms-controlagreementsasends in themselvesand,oncenegotiated, as sacrosanct,aswith thenowdefunctABMtreaty.Perhapsforthisreason,toooftennegotiationshaveproducedunsatisfactorytreatiesthathavechanneledstrategicarmscompetitioninwaysthathaveproveninimicaltoU.S.securityinterests.We can no longer base our positions on disarmament ideology ormisplacednostalgiaforthefamiliarwaysoftheColdWar.Armscontrolcancontributetoournationalsecurity,butonlyifitreducesthedangersof the current security setting. Arms control must look forward, notbackward—unlike New START, which, although negotiated 20 yearsafterthefalloftheBerlinWall,continuedthetraditionalpatternofColdWartreaties.

Today’s disciples will reject the desiderata described above as“nonnegotiable”whilefranticallycallingfortheimmediateextensionofNewSTART,warning,likeChickenLittle,thattheskywillfallifwedon’tactimmediately.Butthecontraryviewisgainingincreasedsupport.Thenewrealitiesareclearlyrecognizedbyagrowingnumberofobservers,including in the U.S. Congress. Senators Cotton and Cornyn andRepresentativeCheney lastyear introduced legislationthat forbidstheexpenditureofanyfundstoextendNewSTARTunlessbothChineseandRussianweaponsareincludedintheextendedagreement.

TheU.S.needsapragmaticapproachthatconsidersarmscontrolasoneofawidersetoftoolsthattogethersupportabroaderstrategythatencompasses developing the new nuclear and missile-defensecapabilitiesprescribedbytherecentDoDposturereviews.Only inthiswaycanarmscontrolserveournationalsecurityinterests.Thatwemustmovebeyond the tirednostrumsofColdWararmscontrol toaddresstoday’sdangerousnuclearenvironmentshouldsurprisenoone.

79

Nuclear Deterrence and Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons

ByMarkB.Schneider,Ph.D.

heTrumpadministration’s2018NuclearPostureReviewassessedbothU.S.nuclear capabilitiesand the threatsthatRussia,China,andotherpotentialadversariesposetotheU.S.andalliedsecurity.

Among its policy recommendations was the deployment of a smallnumberoflow-yieldnuclearweaponsontheTridentSLBM.TheTrumpadministration’s argument rested on increasing the credibility of ournuclear deterrent, and should deterrence fail, giving the president abroaderrangeofcredibleoptionswithwhichtorespondtoanuclearorWMD attack on the U.S. homeland or on our allies. Opponents ofPresident Trump’s recommendations argue that low-yield nuclearweapons(a)increasethelikelihoodofnuclearwar,(b)areunnecessarybecausehighyieldnuclearweaponsand/orconventionalweaponscandeter low-yield nuclear attack, and (c) will ignite an arms race.Opposition to low-yield nuclear deterrence is often combined withrecommendations to dramatically reduce the size of the U.S. nucleardeterrent.

TobetterunderstandtheTrumpadministration’sdecisiontodeploylow-yield nuclear weapons, it is necessary to examine Russian andChinesenucleardoctrineandtherolethatlow-yieldweaponsplayinit.The arguments set forth by minimum deterrence advocates will beaddressedingreaterdetailbelow.

CONVENTIONALVS.NUCLEARWEAPONS

Maximizing the deterrence of nuclear and other forms of WMDattackmustbe thehighestU.S.militarypriority; failure todo so couldresultinmillionsofdeathsoreventhedestructionoftheUnitedStates,itsallies,andmostoftheirpopulations.ThereisnosubstitutefornuclearweaponstodeternuclearandotherformsofWMDattackbecauseofthedestructiveness ofWMD. Arms control has eliminated theU.S. in-kinddeterrent capability to chemical andbiologicalattackbuthas retainedadversarycapabilitiestolaunchsuchattacks.

Itisincreasinglysuggestedthatprecisionconventionalweaponscansubstitute for nuclear weapons. This is technical nonsense. The yielddifferencebetweenexistingconventionalweaponsandnuclearweapons

T


80

poundforpoundisashighasseveralmilliontoone.41Withevenlow-yieldweapons it couldbethousands toone. In1999,RussianColonel-General VladimirMuravyev, then deputy commander of the StrategicMissileForces,said,“They[nuclearweapons]arecapableofnullifyingthecombat qualities of all modern conventional systems.”42 Russia’sstrategicnuclearweaponsmodernizationsincethattimeshowsthattheapproachremainsactive.

Nuclear weapons have a great psychological impact. It is alwayspossible foranaggressortocomeupwithsometheoryofvictory foraconventionalconflict,butitismuchmoredifficulttodothisinthecontextof nuclear warfare.While it is technically true that a wide variety ofoutcomesarepossibleinanuclearconflict,thisviewisgenerallysubjectto ridicule. The inability of conventionalweapons to attackeffectivelyhard and deeply buried targets (HDBTs) associated with the foreignWMDthreatisacriticallimitationfromthestandpointofassuranceanddamagelimitation.Accuracyisalwaysimportant,butitdoesnotsolveallmilitaryproblemsandGPSguidanceisfragile.

Theargumentthatasmall, inflexible,high-yieldnuclear forcewillsubstantiallyreducethecostofnucleardeterrenceistechnicallyinvalid.Expense is a poor excuse for keeping a small force. As then DeputySecretary of Defense Ashton Carter pointed out in 2013, “nuclearweapons don’t actually cost that much.”43 Even the pro-minimum-deterrence Federation of American Scientists admits that “with astockpile of some 500 warheads, the size and cost of the weaponscomplex would only be a little smaller than what is proposed for astockpile of 3,000 to 3,500 weapons.”44 As retired U.S. STRATCOMCommander Admiral Richard Mies has pointed out, nuclear weaponshaveveryhighdestructivepowerforfivepercentofthedefensebudget.45

THERUSSIANVIEWOFWARANDNUCLEARWEAPONS

The idea of a major war with the West over natural resourcesappeared in the 2009 edition of Russia’s National Security Strategy:“Under conditionsof competition for resources, it isnot excludedthatarising problems may be resolved using military force, and that thecurrentbalanceofpoweronthebordersofRussiaanditsalliesmaybedisturbed.”46Thisbelief is verydangerousbecauseof the lowRussiannuclearusethresholdanditscontinuouslyadvancednuclearcapabilities.

Theyear following issuanceofRussia’sNationalSecurityStrategy,thenFirstDeputyDefenseMinisterColonel-GeneralVladimirPopovkinstated that strategicnuclear forces, includingearlywarning capabilityand aerospace defenses (missile defense, air defense, andASAT)were


81

Russia’sfirstpriorityand“precisionweapons”wereitssecondpriority.47The Russians talk about “precision weapons” rather than “precisionconventional weapons” because all of its precisionmissiles “are dual-capableorhavenuclearanalogs.”48Russianmilitarystrategyisbasedontheview that theU.S. andNATOare theenemyandamajorwarwithnuclear weapons use is possible. In January 2017, Defense MinisterGeneralSergeiShoigustatedRussiawill“continueamassiveprogramofnuclear rearmament, deployingmodern ICBMs on land and sea, [and]modernizing the strategic bomber force.”49 Weeks later, he said thatstrategicnuclear forceswereRussia’s“unconditionalpriority”because“nuclearweaponsguaranteethatRussiacandeteranyaggressionofanyforeignstate.”50

As far back as 1999, Colonel-General Muravyev stated that “thedeterrent actions of strategic forces…[involve] strikes with bothconventional and nuclear warheadswith the goal of de-escalating themilitary conflict,”andRussian forces“shouldbe capableof conducting‘surgical’ strikes…using both highly accurate, super-low yield nuclearweapons, aswell as conventional ones.”51 Also, in 1999, RussianFirstDeputy Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov said, “a ‘newgeneration’of low-yieldnuclearweapons‘canreallybeused incaseofany large-scale military conflict.’”52 In 2001, he supported thedevelopmentof“lowandsuper-lowyieldnuclearweaponsandprecisionweaponswithnuclearwarheads.”53

A now declassified CIA report from August 2000 stated, “SeniorRussian military officers have advocated the use of highly accurate,super-low yield nuclear weapons in Russianmilitary journals such asMilitary Thought and Armeyskiy Shornik.”54 It also said, “Recentstatements on Russia’s evolving nuclear weapons doctrine lower thethreshold for first use of nuclear weapons and blur the boundarybetweennuclearandconventionalwarfare.”55AnotherdeclassifiedCIAreportobserved,“Anumberofarticles[intheRussianpress]suggestthatRussia isdeveloping low-yieldwarheadswithenhanced radiation thatcould be used on high-precision non-strategic weapons systems.”56Russiaisreportedly20yearsaheadofusintheseweapons.

In2002,notedRussianjournalistPavelFelgengauerwrotethat inApril 1999 the Russian Security Council approved a concept fordeveloping and using “non-strategic low- and flexible-yield battlefieldweapons,”andthattheiryieldswouldbetensorhundredsoftonsofTNT.57

Since2003,theofficialpartylineinRussiaisthattheydonothavelow-yieldnuclearweapons. This ispropaganda. Russia has reportedlydevelopedandexercised the use of low-yield nuclearweapons. TherewereseveralRussianpressreportsconcerningRussiannuclearweapons’


82

first use in the Vostok 2010 military exercise. Indeed, the officialnewspaper of the Far EastMilitary District said, “To suppress a largecenteroftheseparatists’resistanceandtoachieveminimallossesoftheattacking troops a low-yield ‘nuclear’ attackwasmounted against theenemy.”58Thisreport impliesathresholdofnuclearweaponsfirstusemuchlowerthanthatcontainedinofficialRussiannuclearweaponsusedoctrine. Felgengauer, writing about the same exercise, reported thatRussia used a nuclear-armed S-300 surface-to-air missile against aground target.59Thiswouldvery likelybea low-yieldnuclearweaponsincetheprimarymissionofthemissileisairdefense,whichrequiresalow-yieldwarhead.

LateintheObamaadministration,theDefenseDepartmentpointedtothethreatofRussianfirstuseoflow-yieldnuclearweaponsagainsttheU.S.In2016,SecretaryofDefenseAshtonCarterstated,“it’sasoberingfactthatthemostlikelyuseofnuclearweaponsisnotthemassivenuclearexchangeof the classicColdWar-type,but rather theunwise resort tosmallerbutstillunprecedentedlyterribleattacks,forexample,byRussiaorNorthKorea to try to coercea conventionally superioropponenttobackofforabandonanallyduringacrisis.”60InDecember2016,areportby the Defense Science Board observed, “Russian doctrine is publiclystatedas‘escalatetode-escalate’basedontheassumptionthatitsfirstuseoflowyieldnuclearweaponsagainstaconventionallysuperiorNATOforcewouldengenderahalttofurtheraggression.”61

The2018U.S.NuclearPostureReviewstated,“Russia’sbelief thatlimited nuclear first use, potentially including low-yieldweapons, canprovidesuchanadvantageisbased,inpart,onMoscow’sperceptionthatitsgreaternumberandvarietyofnonstrategicnuclearsystemsprovideacoercive advantage in crises and at lower levels of conflict. RecentRussianstatementsonthisevolvingnuclearweaponsdoctrineappeartolower the threshold forMoscow’s first-useofnuclearweapons.Russiademonstrates its perception of the advantage these systems providethroughnumerousexercisesandstatements.”62

RUSSIANLOW-YIELDNUCLEARCAPABILITY

In May 1999, Felgengauer wrote that Russia was developing“precision low-yield” nuclear weapons for strikes “anywhere in theworld.”63 InMarch 2002, Felgengauer again reported that Russia wasdeveloping“superlow-yieldweapons,”penetrators,and“clean”nuclearweapons.”64 InDecember 2002, ViktorMikhailov, then director of theSarov nuclear weapons laboratory, stated that “the scientists aredeveloping a nuclear ‘scalpel’ capable of ‘surgically removing’ and


83

destroying very localized targets. The low-yield warhead will besurroundedwith a super-hardened casingwhichmakes it possible topenetrate 30–40 meters into rock and destroy a buried target—forexample, a troop command and control point or a nuclearmunitionsstoragefacility.”65

In2008,actualRussiandeploymentof low-yieldnuclearweapons(withyieldsbetween50and200tonsofTNT)onstrategicSLBMswasreported intheRussianpress, includingthestatemedia(SputnikNewsandRIANovosti). These low-yield nuclearweapons included variable-yieldandlow-collateral-damagedesigns.66

In 2009,ViceAdmiralOleg Burtsev, then first deputy chief of theRussianNavalStaff,saidthattacticalnuclearweaponsmaybethewaveof the futureand“wecan install low-yieldwarheadsonexistingcruisemissiles.”67

In December 2017, Dr. Philip Karber, president of the PotomacFoundation, stated that roughly half of Russia’s 5,000 tactical nuclearweaponshavebeenmodernizedwithnewsub-kilotonnuclearwarheadsforairdefense,torpedoes,andcruisemissiles.

In May 2019, DIA Ashley, director of the Defense IntelligenceAgency,reported,“Russia’sstockpileofnon-strategicnuclearweapons—already large and diverse…is being modernized with an eye towardsgreateraccuracy,longerranges,andloweryieldstosuittheirpotentialwarfightingrole.”68

THEROLEOFLOW-YIELDNUCLEARWEAPONSINCHINESEMILITARY

STRATEGY

China isa communistdictatorship thatpracticesextremesecrecy.Chinese secrecy about its nuclear capability opens the possibility of amajorstrategicsurprise.TheannouncedChinesenuclearstrategyof“nofirstuse”ismainlypropaganda.ThereissubstantialevidencethatChinawillusenuclearweapons first if it is in theChineseCommunistParty’sperceivedinterest.

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review report says that China, likeRussia, hasadded “new types of nuclear capabilities to their arsenals,increasedthesalienceofnuclearforcesintheirstrategiesandplans,andengagedinincreasinglyaggressivebehavior,includinginouterspaceandcyberspace.”69

CHINESELOW-YIELDNUCLEARWEAPONS

EstimatesofthenumberofChinesenuclearweaponsrangefromafew hundred to thousands.70 Most of the information we have about


84

Chinesenuclear capabilities comesdirectlyor indirectly fromWesternand Asian governments. The Chinese government says little, althoughrecentlytherehasbeenatendencytoconfirmthenuclearcapabilityforthe new missile systems. China has deployed a very large force ofprecisionornear-precisionguidedballisticmissiles.71Chineseprecisionballisticandcruisemissilesclearlyhavethepotentialtodeliverlow-yieldnuclearweaponseffectively.Forexample,accordingtothe2018NuclearPostureReview report,China’snewDF-26 IRBM is “anuclear-capableprecision guided…intermediate-range ballistic missile capable ofattackinglandandnavaltargets.”72Anymissilewithsufficientaccuracyto deliver a conventional warhead hasmore than enough accuracy todeliveraneffectivestrikewithlow-yieldnuclearweapons.

WeknowsignificantlylessaboutChinesenuclearcapabilitythanweknowaboutRussia’sbecauseChinaisfarmoresecretive.Evenso,inthenext10years,accordingtoDIADirectorAshley,China“islikelytoatleastdoublethesizeofitsnuclearstockpile.”73Muchofthedisputeoverthesize of the Chinese nuclear arsenal involves the number of itsnonstrategicnuclearweaponsforitstheaterballisticandcruisemissiles.TheHouseofRepresentatives’CoxCommitteereportstatedin1999thatChina stole the design of the U.S. neutron bomb, an advanced low-yield/low-collateral-damage nuclear weapon also known as theenhancedradiationwarhead,andtestedaneutronbomb,whichisalmostalwaysalow-yieldweapon.74

Some of the highest estimates for thenumber ofChinesenuclearweapons come from Russia. Retired Colonel-General Viktor Yesin, theformercommanderoftheRussianStrategicMissileForcesandcurrentlyaprofessoratRussia’sAcademyofMilitarySciences,wrotethat“thereare probably 1600 to 1800 warheads in the Chinese threat missiles,”whichhelistsastheDF-15,theDF-15A,theDF-11,theDF-11A,andtheDH-10 cruise missile.75 General Yesin also says that Chinese fighteraircraft can carry 5 to 20 kt nuclear weapons.76 Under 5 kt is thedefinition of low-yield nuclear weapons contained in the legislationpassed by the U.S. Congress in the 1990s that banned the Americandevelopmentofsuchweapons.77AnotherRussianreportcreditsChina’sDF-15withaneutronbombwarhead.78Reportedly,theChineseneutronbomb test hada yield of 1 to 4 kt.79 A Taiwanese defensepublicationreportedthattheChineseDF-15hasalow-yieldnuclearweaponforthepurposeofanEMPattack.80

In the year 2000, Chinese Major General Wu Jianguo, a formerassociate professor and dean of the Chinese Antichemical WarfareAcademy, reportedlygave “severalproposals fornewkindsofChinesenuclearweapons, includingaground-penetratingnuclearweaponwith


85

anequivalentof10tonsofTNT,anantimissilenuclearweaponwithanequivalentof100tonsofTNT,andaground-to-groundandair-to-groundnuclearweaponwithanequivalentof1,000tonsofTNT.”81

Adeclassified1995NationalIntelligenceDailyreportindicatedthat“China couldbeseekingto confirm the reliabilityofanuclearartilleryshelldesignedinadvanceofanucleartestban”inordertodefendagainstRussianinvasionoranamphibiouslanding.82Nuclearartillerytendstoberelativelylow-yieldtominimizecollateraldamage.

THENEEDFORALOW-YIELDNUCLEARDETERRENT

Minimum deterrence supporters are attacking the modest 2018Nuclear Posture Review program to enhance our deterrent againstRussian,Chinese,andpotentiallyevenNorthKoreanorIranianfirstuseofrelatively low-yieldnuclearweapons.Oneof themcharacterizedthelow-yield Trident as “TheWorld’s Most Dangerous Nuclear Weapon,”completely ignoring the reported Russian deployment ofmuch loweryieldstrategicnuclearweaponsasearlyas2008andRussianviolationsofthePresidentialNuclearInitiatives,begunbyPresidentGeorgeH.W.Bushin1991,whichweresupposedtolargelyeliminatetacticalnuclearweapons.Minimumdeterrenceadvocateshavereinventedsomeof themostfoolishofthe1980sargumentsthatattemptedtoderailtheReaganadministration’s nuclear modernization programs. Had they beensuccessful,therecouldhavebeenamajorwarorevenanuclearwarinthe1980s.Today, thethreat is insomerespectsevengreaterthantheSovietsinthe1980sbecauseofthePutinfactor(nuclearirresponsibility)andwe now face amultipolar threat environment. The risk of war isincreasingbecauseoftheRussianandChinesenuclearbuildupandourlackofacomparableresponse.

It is likely that Russia and China could engage in the first use ofnuclearweaponsiftheybelieveittobeintheirnationalinterests.Itisthejob of the U.S. nuclear deterrent to ensure they do not reach thisconclusion.Theirpotentialnuclearfirstusewillinitiallybeverylikelytoinvolve low-yield weapons, particularly if the vocal U.S. minimumdeterrenceestablishmentmanagestopreventthecreationofaneffectivelow-yieldnucleardeterrent to low-yieldnuclearattack.An inadequatedeterrentexiststodaybecauseofthelackofaclearlysurvivablelow-yieldnuclear capability. A low-yield deterrent based completely upon non-alertbombersandnuclear-capablefighteraircraftisinadequatebecausetheyaremuch toovulnerable to relativelysmallnumbersof low-yieldand/or low-collateral-damagenuclearstrikes.Even if thebombersandfighters were put on alert, their undefended bases are potentially


86

vulnerable to the Russian hypersonic nuclear missiles that are nowbecomingoperational.

Weneedasea-based low-yielddeterrent forthesamereasonsweneedastrategicnucleartriadwithSLBMs.Consideringthewell-knownU.S.aversiontocollateraldamage,whichwebroadcasteverydayinourmilitaryoperations,thethreatofahigh-yieldnuclearresponsetoalow-yieldnuclearattack lacks credibility. That type of deterrence threat isirresponsiblebecauseoftheincreasedriskitwouldentailfornoreasonotherthanideology.Itstandsinstarkcontrasttothelast60yearsofU.S.defensepolicythathasbeenaimedatreducingtheriskofescalationintoanall-outorevenlarge-scalenuclearexchange.Itisideologicallydriven,made worse by the budget-hawk reasoning that low-yield nuclearwarheads are low cost (about $50 million for the low-yield Tridentprogram). Indeed, the marginal cost is probably close to zero whencomparedtothemoneysavedbynotproducingthesamenumberofhigh-yieldwarheads.Itisclearthatweneedbothlow-andhigh-yieldnuclearweapons on every leg of our strategic triad and in our nonstrategicnuclearcapability.

Low-yieldnuclearweapons,particularlysub-kilotonweapons,butevenafiveortenkilotonweapon,ensurethatevenwithaground-burst,lethalfalloutwillbelimitedtoareasclosetothepointofdetonation.Low-yieldweaponsvastlyreducethecollateraldamagefromblastandheat.Withstandardtypesofhigh-yieldnuclearweapons,thereisnoguaranteeoflimitingfallouttoasmallareaand,hence,avoidingthepossibilityoflargenumbersofcollateralcasualties.Withhigh-yieldnuclearweapons,increasing the height of burst sufficiently so that the fireball doesnotcomeintocontactwiththeearthwillgenerallyresultinnolethalfallout.Thekeywordhereisgenerally.Iftheradioactivecloudgeneratedbythenucleardetonationcomesintocontactwitharainstorm,thefallouteffect,whichiscalled“rainout,”couldbewidespreadandverylethal.Evenat5kttheamountoffalloutfromrainoutmightbe1%to5%ofahigh-yieldnuclearbomb.Ifwedeployedsub-kilotonwarheads,thefalloutwouldbeless than 1%, and if we went to a low-collateral-damage design(minimumyieldfromfission),itcouldbevirtuallynothing.Adoptionofanon-optimumhigh-altitudeburstforhigh-yieldnuclearweaponswillreducecollateraldamagefromblastandheatsomewhat,butthedestructioncouldstillbeconsiderable.Moreover,doingthiscanreducethemilitaryeffectivenessof the device compared to a ground or subsurface burst with a low-yieldnuclearweaponagainstsometypesoftargets.

Theargumenthasbeenmadethatthelaunchofalow-yieldTridentwouldsubjecttheTridentsubmarinetoattack.Thisargumentislargelybogus.Thelaunchpointofthemissilewouldnotlikelybelocatedwith


87

highaccuracyandthesubmarinewouldnotbeinthesameplacewhenenemymissilesarrive.Moreover,U.S.missiledefensescouldbeusedtodefendthesubmarineifnecessary.

This alleged concern about the survivability of U.S. missilesubmarines would be touching except for the fact that minimumdeterrenceadvocatesoftenproposereducingthesizeoftheU.S.missilesubmarine force to an extent that would do far more damage to ourdeterrent than any likely Russian missile strike. Moreover, minimumdeterrenceadvocatesarenowdepartingfromtheirstandardargumentthatmissilesubmarinesareinvulnerable,whichtheyusetorationalizetheirargumentforareducednumberofsubmarines.

AccordingtoAmbassadorStevenPifer,“TheRussianscouldnottellwhetheralaunchedSLBMcarriedaW76-2oraW76-1(100kilotons)or,for thatmatter, aW88 (450 kilotons) until theweapon (or weapons)detonated.”83HisapparentassumptionisthattheRussianswouldlaunchahigh-yieldnuclearstrikewhiletheTridentmissile isstill in flight.Healsostates,erroneously, thatRussiacouldnottellwherethemissileormissilesweregoing.Thisissimplynottrueconsideringthecapabilitiesof Russian early warning radars, which are good enough to supportRussianmissiledefense.Hecompletelyignorestheimplicationofwhathe is proposing. If the only U.S. option, as he desires, is a high-yieldballisticmissile response toaRussian low-yieldnuclearmissile strike,theRussianswouldbecertainthattheU.S.Tridentmissilelaunchwouldbe conducting a high-yield attack. Moreover, in the scenario hepostulated (“a few ‘small’ nuclear weapons” used against the Balticstates),alow-yieldTridentresponsewouldbecompletelyunnecessary.Bomberanddual-capable fighteraircraft couldbeused.Thedeterrentvalue of the low-yield Trident warheads would come into play inpreventingtheRussiansfromhavingtheoptionoflaunchingalarger,butstill limited, low-yield attack against U.S. bomber bases and U.S. andNATObasesinordertodestroytheAmericanabilitytoretaliateagainstalow-yieldnuclearattackin-kind.84

The “arms race” argument by arms control enthusiasts is alsoridiculouswhenoneconsidersthatRussiareportedlystarteddeployinglow-yield strategic nuclear missile warheads a decade ago. We areplayingcatchupfromapositionofbeingwellbehind.Moreover,wearedoing nothing about low-collateral-damage nuclear weapons. IfFelgengauer is correct inhis report thatRussianmissilewarheadsarevariable-yield,we couldbegreatlyoutnumberedevenwith theTrumpadministration’slow-yieldprogram.ThesituationwouldbemuchworseifDr.PhillipKarberiscorrectthattheRussiansnowhave2,500low-yieldtacticalornonstrategicnuclearweapons.


88

MostoftheTrumpadministration’sproposalsinthe2020NationalDefenseAuthorizationActtoimprovetheU.S.nucleararsenalinthewereapprovedbyCongressinDecember2019.SeeChapter10fordetails.

CongressionalcutswilllockinVladimirPutin’snuclearadvantage.As Rep. Mike Turner, ranking member of the House Armed ServicesCommitteeSubcommittee(HASC)onStrategicForcesstated, theHASCcuts to the nuclear weapons program would put us at “a significantdisadvantage with regard to Russia by prohibiting funds for thedeployment of a low-yield ballistic missile warhead.”85 This isparticularlytruewhenthelow-yieldwarheadeliminationisseeninthecontext of the HASC’s cuts to other nuclear programs, which couldultimately result in about a 100-to-1 Russian advantage in nuclearweaponsnumbers.

CONCLUSION

The minimum deterrence attacks on the Trump administration’sdecision to deploy a small number of relatively low-yield nuclearweapons are striking in their shrillness against a broadly bipartisandefense policy. The Trump administration’s 2018 Nuclear PostureReview decisions have been endorsed by the senior leadership of theDefense Department and endorsed by the National Defense StrategyCommission.IfBillGertziscorrectinhisreportthattheyieldofthelow-yieldTridentwarhead(W-76Mod2)is5to10kt(6.5ktaccordingtotheUnionofConcernedScientists),theweaponisnoteventechnicallyalow-yield nuclear weapon under the less-than-5-kt definition. Since theargumentsagainstlow-yieldnuclearwarheadsaredisingenuous,itmaybethat thehiddenagenda is topreventanyU.S.nuclearresponsetoaRussiannuclearattackontheU.S.anditsallies.Inlightoftheproclivitiesof President Vladimir Putin—to say nothing of Russia’s still poorlyunderstood propaganda and disinformation strategy to influenceAmericanpoliciesanddecision-making—theimpactofthiscouldwellbefurtherRussiannuclearescalation.Theminimumdeterrenceagendaof“no first use” of nuclear weapons is openly to prevent any nuclearresponsetoachemicalorbiologicalattack,nomatterhowdestructivetheattack.Hence,thehiddenagendaofoppositiontothelow-yieldnuclearTridentdeterrentprogramcouldverywellbethesame regardinganynuclearweaponsattack.

89

Why EMP Weapons Represent a Growing and Existential Threat

to the United States ByPeterVincentPry,Ph.D.

iventhattheUnitedStatesfacesahostofemergingthreatsfromnuclear, biological, chemical, radiological, and enhancedconventionalWMDs,whyshouldtheU.S.bemoreconcerned,oras

concerned,aboutnuclearEMPattacksthantheseotherthreats?86Therearenumerousreasonswhy—andwhyEMPisanattractiveattackoptionforAmerica’sadversaries.

ItisfirstimportanttounderstandwhatEMPisandthegravedamageitcouldinflictontheUnitedStates.

WHATISEMP?

For the purposes of national security, EMP is a phenomenon inwhich a burst of highly charged radio waves—electromagneticradiation—disruptsordestroyselectricalandelectronicsystemswithoutphysicaldestructionofpeople,infrastructure,andenvironment.EMPcancomefromnaturalsources likethesunand lightning,butnaturalEMPcanusuallybeblockedorchanneledandrenderedharmless.

Asanationaldefensethreat,EMPisaproductofanuclearweaponsblast,againstwhichourdefensesarefew.EMPattackscanberelativelysmall and localized through low-altitude or surface-level bursts ofnuclearenergy,orlargeenoughtocovertheentireUnitedStateswhendone from a high altitude. An enemy can inflict EMP damage acrossextensiveterritoryby firingamissile todetonateoneormorenuclearweapons at a very high altitude over the target. The electromagneticradiationreleasedfromthedetonation,notblastandheat,“fries”electricpower and transmission systems and all electronics that are notspecifically hardenedagainst attack, aswell as thousands of low-orbitsatellites that support American defense, communications, andcommerce.

TheUnitedStatesandSovietUnion independentlydiscovered theEMPphenomenonmorethansixdecadesagowhentheybegantestingnuclear weapons and their effects onmilitary equipment and civilianinfrastructure. Localized “source region” EMP (SREMP) was observed

G


90

duringthefirstU.S.ground-burstnucleartest.Electronicinfrastructureinside the source region (typically within 2–5 km of the blast) washarmed by the initial radiation output (gamma, x-rays, neutrons),producing electron currents and air conductivity—sources for theSREMP.

Surface-burstnuclear tests in the1950sand1960sdemonstratedthat SREMP can disrupt and upset electronic systems over 100milesaway and in deeply buried structures. SREMP can even propagatecurrents into and through power lines or telecommunication lines inareaswelloutsideofthesourceregionandintoeverydeviceconnectedtothem.ThismeansthatEMPgeneratedbyevenasurfaceburstnuclearweaponcouldcausewidespread, long-termregional lossofpowerandcommunications.

This is old science. Both the United States and the Soviet Unionunderstoodthatahigh-altitudenucleardetonationcouldproducesimilarelectromagnetic effects as surface bursts. In the 1960s, both nationsconductedhighaltitudeEMP(HEMP)testsandfoundthattheresultinginfrastructure damagewas far worse than originally predicted. ThesetestsrevealedthattheEMPgeneratedbyanuclearweapondetonatedat30kmorhigherproducesasuper-energeticradiowavethathasthreecomponents,designatedbytheU.S.scientific-technicalcommunityasE1,E2,andE3.

E1 is caused by gamma rays emitted by a nuclear warhead thatknock electrons off molecules in the upper atmosphere, causing theelectronstorotaterapidlyaroundthelinesoftheEarth'smagneticfield,aphenomenontermedtheComptonEffect.TheE1componentofnuclearEMPisashockwave,transmittingthousandsofvoltsofenergyinmerenanoseconds of time. E1 EMP has a short, high-frequencywavelengththat can couple directly into small conductors, like transformers,automobiles,andpersonalcomputers.E1isuniquetonuclearweaponsandistoofastandtooenergetictobearrestedbyprotectivedevicesusedforlightning.87

TheE2componentofanuclearEMPiscomparabletolightninginitsenergeticcontentandmedium(milliseconds)frequencyandwavelength.ProtectivedevicesusedforlightningareeffectiveagainstE2.

E3 is causedby the fireball of anuclearexplosionor froma solarflare. The expanding and then collapsing fireball cause the Earth'smagneticfieldtooscillate.Thisoscillationgenerateselectriccurrentsinthevery large conductors that can couple into the low frequency, long(seconds)wavelengthpartoftheEMPthatisE3.TheE3waveformcancouple directly into conductors with at least one dimension of greatlength. Electric power and telecommunications lines that run for


91

kilometers in many directions are ideally suited for receiving E3.AlthoughE3appearstodeliver littleenergycomparedtoE1, justvoltspermeter,thisismultipliedmanifoldbypowerandtelecommunicationslines that are typically many kilometers long. This multiplication ofenergybuildsupE3currentsthatcanmeltextremelyhighvoltage(EHV)transformers, typically designed to handle 750,000 volts. SmallelectronicscanalsobedestroyedbyE3iftheyareconnectedinanywayto an E3 receiver—like a personal computer plugged into an electricoutlet.

Anynuclearweapondetonatedathighaltitude(30kmorhigher)willgenerateapowerfulelectromagneticpulsepropagatingatthespeedof light from the point of detonation to the Earth’s visible horizon,coveringavastregion(about600kmor370miinradiusataburstheightof 30 km) with an energy field that can black out electric grids anddamage unprotected electronics. Higher-yield nuclear weapons cangeneratemorepowerfulandmoredamagingEMPs,butallEMPfieldsaredangerous.NuclearweaponsspecializedforEMPcanbeverylowyieldintermsofblastbutgeneratethemostpowerfulandmostdangerousfields.

TheCongressionalEMPCommissionhasassessedthatRussia,China,andNorthKoreahavesuch“Super-EMP”weapons.88

WHATCOULDEMPDOTOTHEU.S.?

An EMP attack would probably cause more material and costlydamage and affect more Americans than any other attack optionexecutable with one or a few missiles.89 If damage to U.S. civilianinfrastructure is sufficiently widespread, it may not be recoverable.Under these circumstances, compared tootherattackoptions, anEMPattackcouldconceivablykillmostAmericansinthelongrun—possiblyupto90%ofthepopulation—throughthedisruptionofcommunications,logistics,andeconomicactivity.90

An EMP would shut down everything necessary for modern life:cars, trucks, trains,ships,aircraft;electricpower,cellphonesanddatacenters,andallotherelectroniccommunication;hospitals;banksandallelectronicmeans of payment, investment, and commerce; governanceandlawenforcement;andtheproductionanddistributionoffood,fuel,andmedicine.

Incitiesandthemostdenselypopulatedregionsof thecountry,asingleEMPattackcouldresultinmurderoussocialstrifeamongpeoplestruggling to pillage and stockpile food, fuel, and other necessities tosurvive.Thatsocialbreakdownwouldfollowwithtensorhundredsofmillions of people suffering slow and agonizing deaths from mass


92

starvation, exposure, and the diseases and pestilence that accompanyfamineandthedecayoftheunburieddead.

ADVANTAGESTHATEMPOFFERSU.S.ADVERSARIES

AcapabilityofEMPattackoffersnumeroustechnical,operational,strategic,andpoliticaladvantagesoverothernuclearandWMDoptions.Themainadvantageisthatitallowsroguestatestoleveragetheirsmallerand less sophisticated nuclear and missile programs to inflictcatastrophicdamageontheirenemies.

EMPattackcancompensateforthedifficultiesofmasteringcomplextechnical issuesassociatedwithmissile reentry vehicle design, fusing,accuracy,range,intelligenceregardingtargetlocation,collateraldamage,andmissiledefensepenetration.

Strategicallyandpolitically,acapabilityofEMPattackisamongthemostcredibleWMDthreatsofdeterrenceorblackmailbecauseitwouldattackelectronics,notphysicalinfrastructureandpeople.

IncontrasttothelimitedeffectradiusofotherWMDoptions,EMPcanneutralizeentireregionalornationalinfrastructuresthatarevitaltoU.S.military strength and societal survival. It couldalso challenge theintegrityofalliedcoalitions.

AnEMPattackcouldposearetaliatorydilemmafortheUnitedStatessince EMP is an asymmetric threat and more dangerous to theelectronicallyadvancedWestthantounderdevelopedThirdWorldroguestates or Russia and China, whose critical infrastructures are betterprotected.

EMPisalsoaforcemultiplierthat,ifusedinconjunctionwithotherWMDoptions,wouldgreatlyincreasetheireffectiveness.

EMPATTACK:TECHNICALANDOPERATIONALADVANTAGES

IntercontinentalballisticmissilesarmedwithEMPwarheadsdonotrequirethesophisticationthattheywouldneedifarmedwithothertypesofweapons.ThismakesEMP-armedICBMscheaperandeasiertodevelopforrogueregimesorotheractors.

An EMP attack does not face the challenge of atmospheric

reentry,asdootherballisticmissileattackoptions. Inorder tohittargets on the other side of the planet, ballisticmissiles are fired intospace on steep trajectories. During atmospheric reentry, missilewarheads are exposed to intense heat, reaching hundreds of degreesFahrenheit,andtoG-forcesthatwouldstresstheweaponspackageandinternalmechanisms of thewarhead. These are daunting engineering


93

challenges forstateslikeIranandNorthKorea,whichhave littleornoopportunitytoflight-testreentryvehicles.

AnuclearweapondeliveredforEMPwouldbedetonatedatleast30kmabovetheEarth'ssurface,potentiallyhundredsofkilometersintotheatmosphere,dependinguponthedesiredcoverage, fieldstrengths,andothertargetingrequirementsforanEMPattack,eliminatingtheneedforatmosphericreentry.ThissharplyreducestheengineeringchallengesforanEMPattack.

Bycontrast,otherattackoptionsrequirewarheadpenetrationoftheatmosphere,inmostcasestowithinlessthan1kmfromEarth'ssurface.An attack relying on nuclear blast, biological, chemical, or enhancedconventional weapons—such as fuel-air explosive bombs orsubmunition bomblets—requires virtually complete atmosphericpenetration.Roguestatewarheads,expectedtobedeliveredinaccuratelyby missiles with primitive guidance systems, could be rendered evenmore inaccurate bywinds and uneven heat shieldablation.Lightning,storms,hail,andothermeteorologicalconditionscouldalsodamageordestroypoorlydesignedwarheads.

AnEMPattackdoesnotrequiredetonationataprecisealtitude

or ground detonation. Fusing mechanisms for an EMP burst couldtolerateinaccuraciesofmanykilometerswithoutdegradingEMPattackeffectiveness. This would also benefit states with smaller and lesssophisticatedmissileandnuclearprograms.

By contrast,missile attack options requiringatmospheric reentryrequire robust and accurate fusing mechanisms for detonation at adesiredaltitude.

EMP attack does not require precise intelligence about targetlocationandwouldbettercopewithmovingtargets thanothermissileattack options. An EMP’s effective radius can be hundreds or eventhousands of kilometers.Uncertaintyabout precise target coordinatesandmovingtargetssuchasaircraft,ships,andgroundforceswouldnotbeasignificantimpedimenttoasuccessfulEMPattack.91

Bycontrast,becausetheeffectiveradiusofnuclearblast,biological,chemical,andenhancedconventionalattackisseveralkilometersorless,preciseintelligenceabouttargetlocationisrequiredforsuccessfulattackbythesemeans.Roguestatesmaylackadequategeodeticandotherdatatosupportsufficientlyaccuratedeliveryofaweaponagainstevenfixedtargets, let alone mobile targets. Reliable real-time intelligence isrequiredtoattackmobiletargets.Anaircraftcarrier,forexample,couldmovemore than 40mi off missile aimpoint based on relatively freshintelligenceonlyonehourold.


94

Rogue state missiles are expected to have primitive guidancesystems,making them inherently inaccurate.92 Additional inaccuraciesbecauseof inadequate intelligenceabouttarget locationwould furtherdecrease theeffectiveness ofmissile attack options relying onnuclearblast,biological,chemical,orenhancedconventionalweapons.

Bycontrast,anICBMattackemployingnuclearblastorbiological,chemical, or enhanced conventional weapons against U.S. militarytargets, given a missile’s circular error probable (CEP) of 15–30 km,would most likely prove ineffective. (CEP is a measure of a missile’saccuracy.)

Ahigh-valuemilitarytargetintheUnitedStatesthataroguestatemight consider worth attackingwith an ICBM isWhiteman AFB,withrunwayssupportingB-2operationsthatcoveranareaofabout10km2.Thisisoneofthelargest,easiesttohit,mosthigh-valuemilitarytargetsintheUnitedStates.PostulatethataNorthKoreanICBMwithCEP5–30km could deliver a 20 kt nuclear warhead, a biological warheadcontaininganthrax,achemicalwarheadcontainingsarinnervegas,oranenhanced conventional warhead with anti-runway submunitions. TheoddsanyofthesewouldbedeliveredcloseenoughtoWhitemanAFBtoplacealethalradiusonrunwaysislessthan3%.93

Even ifusedasnonmilitary terrorweapons forattacking citiesatintercontinentalranges,nuclearblast,biological,andchemicalwarheadswould be of problematical lethality if deliveredby an ICBMwith verypooraccuracy,aswouldbeexpectedforroguestatemissiles.

An EMP attack would enable missiles to attack targets that

ordinarily,usinganyotherattackoption,arebeyond their range.ThehigheranEMPburstoccurs,thefurtherandwiderthe"horizon"ofeffect.Forexample,anuclearweaponburstat100kmhighwillprojectanEMPfieldontheEarth'ssurfacetoaradiusofroughly1,000kmor600mi. A nuclear burst 300 km high would project an EMP field radiusapproximately2,500kmor1,500mi,meaningthatasingleEMPburstatthat altitude over the central United States would have a devastatingeffectcoast-to-coast.

Because of the great radius of EMP effects,missiles used for thisattackoptioncouldthreatentargetsfarbeyondtheirnormaloperationalrange. For example, a North Korean No Dongmedium-range ballisticmissile (MRBM)withan estimated range of 1,300 km could, in effect,extenditsrangeto2,300km,3,800km,ormoreinanEMPattack.Iran'sShahab IIIMRBM,which cannotquite reachEuropewith its1,300-kmrange,couldreachfarintoEuropeifusedinanEMPattack.


95

Thus,EMPattackofferspotentialadversariesameansto,ineffect,convert short-range ballistic missiles into medium-range missiles,convertMRBMsintoIRBMs,andconvertIRBMsintoICBMs.

An EMP attack would likely pose less collateral risk to the

aggressor in a theater of operations compared to other missile

attack options. Because the attacker knows precisely when it willexecuteanEMPattack,itcantargettheattackandprepareitsownforcesinwaysthatminimizedamagetoitsowntroopsandoperations.Exceptfor damage to electrical systems and dependent infrastructure, EMPattack leaves no persistent aftereffects. The same cannot be said ofnuclearblast,biological,andchemicalweapons.

IntheeventNorthKoreausedWMDsagainstU.S.andSouthKoreanforcesnearthedemilitarizedzone,theNorthcouldseriouslyimpedeitsownmilitaryinvasionoftheSouth.Nuclearblastwouldlikelyblockroadsanddestroybridgesandrailways."Hotzones"ofradiationandbiologicaland chemical contaminants could also impedeNorthKorean offensiveoperations.Radioactive,biological,andchemicalcontaminationcanlastyears,reducingthevalueofconqueredterritory.Windandweathercouldpossiblyreturncontaminationtotheaggressor'shomeland.EMPattackposesfewerornoneoftheseproblems.

Similarly,supposeChinausesnuclearweaponstoopenacorridorforairandnavalstrikesonanAmericanaircraftcarrierbyblastingU.S.shipsandallieddefendinganaircraftcarriergroup.Chinesestrikeforceswould have to operate through the nuclear targeted area in order toattack.Nuclear strikes onAegis cruisersand otherpicket shipswouldposeasignificantriskofcollateraldamagetoChinesestrikeforcesandwould likely impede operations by obscuring targets visually andelectronically.Incontrast,anEMPattackcouldbetimedandlocatedtospare Chinese forces from collateral damage and would create noatmosphericperturbationsthatcouldinterferewithtargetingandstrikeoperations.

AnEMPattackwouldbelessvulnerabletoandmoreeffective

againstmissiledefensesthanothermissileattackoptions.SinceanEMPattackdoesnotrequireatmosphericreentryandcanbeexecutedina way that allows a standoff distance from the target of potentiallythousands of kilometers, such an attack would be able to lessen theeffectivenessofmissiledefensesorperhapselude themaltogether.AnEMPalso posesa significant threat tomissile defenses that are highlydependent upon radars, satellites, and other sophisticated electronicsystems.TheUnitedStatesabandoneditsSafeguardanti-ballisticmissile(ABM)systeminthe1970sinpartbecauseofconcernsthatthesystemwouldbeunabletocopewithEMPeffects.


96

By contrast, missile attack options relying on nuclear blast,biological,chemical,orenhancedconventionalweaponswillhavetorunthefullgamutofU.S.theaterornationalmissiledefensesthatmightexist.Anadvancedadversarymightwellprovide itsnuclearweaponswithasalvage fusing option for EMP attack, just in case the warhead isinterceptedabovetheatmosphere.

STRATEGICANDPOLITICALADVANTAGESOFANEMPATTACK

EMP promises a "bigger bang for the buck" by simultaneouslythreateningallmilitaryelectronicsystemsinabroadregion,potentiallyacrossanentiretheaterofoperations,withoneweapon.Asinglenuclearblast, biological, chemical, or enhanced conventional missile attackwoulddestroyonlyasingle target.AnEMPweaponoffersmuchmorestrategicvaluethanotherWMDs.Anadversarywouldprobablyprefertousean EMPweapon to degrade, disrupt, orneutralizeallU.S.militaryforcesonthebattlefieldandbeyondratherthanuseaWMDweapontodestroya singleairfield but leave overall U.S.war fighting capabilitiesgenerallyintact.

EMP threatens the most valuable U.S. military targets: satellites;command, control, and communications; and high-tech weaponrydependent upon sophisticated electronics. Official unclassified U.S.military doctrine acknowledges that sensors and information systemsare now more important to U.S. military strength than weapons anddeliverysystems.94DestroyingaU.S.militarybaseandkillingU.S.troopswith a nuclear blast, biological or chemical agents, or enhancedconventional weapons might be likened to a body blow in a boxingcontest—ablowthatcanbereturnedmanifoldandmuchharderbytheUnitedStatesas longas itselectronic centralnervous systemremainsintact. An EMP attack, by contrast, constitutes a blow against theU.S.military'scentralnervoussystem.

AnEMPalsopromises"biggerbangforthebuck"inattacking

U.S.society.Anuclearblast,biological,orchemicalattackmightdamageor destroy a U.S. city and promptly kill hundreds or thousands ofAmericans.However,exceptinthecaseofamassiveattackbyRussiaorChina on U.S. cities, the damage to the United States economy wouldprobablyberecoverableandlossoflifecomparativelylimited.AnEMPisprobablythemostdamaginguseofasingleorsmallnumberofmissiles.AnEMPattackthreatensthecivilianelectronicinfrastructures—power,telecommunications, transportation, computers, and informationsystems—thatarethefoundationoftheUnitedStateseconomy,politicalsystem, and social order. An EMP attack would probably cause more


97

materialandcostlydamageandaffectmoreAmericansthananyotherattackoptionexecutablewithoneorafewmissiles.95IfdamagetoU.S.civilian infrastructure is sufficiently widespread, it may not berecoverable. Under these circumstances, compared to other attackoptions,anEMPattackcouldconceivablykillmoreAmericansinthelongrun—possiblyupto90%ofthepopulation,throughstarvation,disease,andsocialstrifethatwouldresultfromthedestructionoftheelectronicnetworks of agriculture, logistics, medicine, finance, commerce, andgovernance.96

ThethreatorfactofanEMPattackuponU.S.forcesorsocietywouldconfronttheUnitedStateswitharetaliatorydilemma.97Perhapsworse,the asymmetrical risk inherent in an EMP threat may confer on U.S.adversariesacredibledeterrent,asduringtheColdWar,butadeterrentthatkeepstheUnitedStates—notadversaries—contained.U.S.militarycommitments toalliesandwillingness toactmilitarilyhas,up tonow,beeninanenvironmentwhererogueandnon-stateactorscouldnotposealopsided,vitalthreattotheU.S.homelandortoU.S.forcesoverseas.ThecrediblecapabilitytothreatentheUnitedStatesasymmetricallythroughEMPattackcouldchangethewholecalculusofriskandbenefit fortheUnitedStates that is the foundation of its current defense and foreignpolicyastheworld’sonlysuperpower.

Because an EMP attack would target electronics, not lives, andprobably cause relatively little immediate loss of life (compared to anuclear or biological attack on a city), theUnitedStatesmay be hard-pressed to justify retaliating with weapons of mass destruction. AnadversarymightcrediblyarguetotheinternationalcommunitythatanEMPattack,deliveredamidagrave crisisorwar, isadesperateactof"politicalsignaling"—awarningshotintendedtopreventorde-escalateconflict and returnparties tonegotiation, lestWMDescalation ensuesthatcauses"real"damageandlossoflife.

ThefirstuseofatomicornuclearweaponssinceNagasakiissuretobe a potent political symbol, greatly elevating the visibility andinternationalsignificanceofanycrisisorconflict.IfanadversaryusesamissiletoblastorcontaminateaU.S.city,itwillinstantlybecomeapariahandbeabandonedbythe internationalcommunityto its fate.But ifanadversary launches an EMP attack that "spares" American lives,especially if accompanied by a "peace offensive," an internationalcommunityanxioustoavoidescalationmightberecruitedpoliticallytotheadversary'sside.

Thus,EMPattackoffersadversariessomeprospect tousenuclearmissilesformaximumcounterforceorcountervalueeffectiveness,whilewrongly being credited by the international community as displaying


98

restraint, and possibly escapingAmerican nuclear retaliation. An EMPattackmaybethenuclearwarequivalentof"havingyourcakeandeatingit,too."98

An EMP threat or actual attack, as part of a sound divide-and-conquerstrategy,canbecredibleagainstallormostofthemembersofanalliedcoalitionbecauseofEMP’sbroadareacoverage.NorthKorea,forexample,coulduseasinglemissiletomakeanEMPattackthatwouldaffect U.S.military forces in the theater, South Korea, and Japan—thealliedprincipalsinaregionalcrisisorconflict.ThecooperationofSeoulandTokyoare indispensable toU.S.militaryoperationson theKoreanpeninsula.Alliedcollectiveand individualpoliticalresolve,not justthepoliticalwillof theUnitedStates,wouldbetestedbyanEMPattack.Acoalitionisonlyasstrongasitsweakestlink.

AnEMPattackwouldprobablyincreasetheeffectivenessofall

otherWMDattackoptions.Forexample,anattackemployingbiologicalorchemicalweaponsagainstoneorseveralU.S.citieswillbelimitedbythe effectiveness of federal, state, and local agencies and emergencyservices in detecting and responding to that threat. EMP, by contrast,woulddisruptpowerandcommunications,paralyzingU.S.capabilitiestorespondtoaWMDbiologicalorchemicalattack,sothatgreaterdamageandmorecasualtieswouldbeproducedwith lessphysicaldestruction.As theUnited States achievesgreater preparednessagainst biological,chemical, and other WMD threats, an EMP attack that disrupts U.S.emergency preparations would be an increasingly valuable yeteconomicalforcemultiplierforallWMDattackoptions.

Finally, no single or several dozen targets could be destroyed bynuclear blast, biological, chemical, or enhanced conventional weaponsthatcoulddecisivelycrippletheUnitedStatesmilitaryorsociety.OnlyanEMPattackcan threaten the indispensablevitalsof theUnited

States society or military so comprehensively and offer some

promise,howeverslim,ofvictory.

EMPSCENARIOS99

ManyofthepotentialadvantagesofEMPattackarewidelyknowntothe general public. EMP scenarios have even been represented, withvaryingdegreesofrealism,inpopularworksoffictionandontelevision.Defenseandacademic threatanalyseshave created scenarios forEMPattack spanning a broader range of military-political conditions thanprobably any other employment option for nuclear weapons. Thisimplies something about the potential wide utility of EMP attack


99

comparedtoothernuclearattackoptionsandmayalsoimplysomethingabouttherelativelikelihoodofanEMPattack.

AnunclassifiedstudybytheU.S.DefenseThreatReductionAgency(DTRA), NBC Scenarios: 2002–2010, postulates a scenario for EMPattack.100

AnunclassifiedDTRAstudypositsseveralotherscenariosofEMPattacks where EMP is either the primary lethal effect or a secondary"bonus" effect. DTRA’s High-Altitude Nuclear Detonations (HAND)Against Low Earth Orbit Satellites ("HALEOS") report warns that anucleardetonationabovetheatmospherecoulddestroysatellitesinlowEarth orbit (LEO) that are commercially and militarily critical to theUnited States: "One low-yield (10–20 kt), high-altitude (125–300 km)nuclearexplosioncoulddisable—inweekstomonths—allLEOsatellitesnot specifically hardened to withstand radiation generated by thatexplosion."101

TheDTRAHALEOSreportsuggestsnumerousgenericscenariosfora high-altitude nuclear attack, including "regional nuclear war," a"nuclear warning shot in a regional conflict," an "effort to damageadversary forces/infrastructure with electromagnetic pulse," or as anattempttosavethewarheadfrommissiledefensesby"salvagefusing"when intercepted. According to DTRA, a high-altitude nuclear attackcouldalsobea"deliberateefforttocauseeconomicdamagewithlowerlikelihoodofnuclearretaliation."Suchanattackmightbeexecutedbya"roguestatefacingeconomicstrangulationorimminentmilitarydefeat"orinorderto"poseaneconomicthreattotheindustrialworldwithoutcausing human casualties or visible damage to the economic system,"accordingtothestudy.102

AcademicliteratureisalsorepletewithplausiblescenariosforEMPattack.Forexample,SeanJ.A.EdwardsarguedlongagothatEMPattackisthebestnuclearoptionforThirdWorldstatesthatmustconfrontthetechnologically superiorU.S. Army of the 21st century.WhereasmostEMPscenariosareaimedatU.S.air,naval,orspaceassets,theEMPattackthat Edwards postulated is aimed atmaking the high-tech U.S. ArmyvulnerabletoThirdWorldconventionalforces:

TherearetwomainreasonswhyanascentnuclearpowerwouldbewillingtouseoneofitspreciousnuclearweaponsforaHEMPattack.First,itisthebestasymmetricstrategicchoiceinaregionalcrisiswhereanadversary'sconventionalforcesarearrayedagainstU.S. forces. The HEMP-conventional attack offers a chance for aquick victory while avoiding any serious risk of U.S. nuclearretaliation.Second, theU.S.Armywillbecome increasinglymorevulnerabletoHEMP….acostlybattlethatinflictscasualtiesonU.S.


100

forces might raise the costs of intervention above a levelconsideredacceptableforAmericans.Thetrickistoachievea“TetOffensive” or “Mogadishu” reaction, not a “Pearl Harbor”reaction.103

Edwards contended a Third World state could combine an EMPattackwithanattackbyitsconventionalforcestoachievevictorywithoutprovokingU.S.nuclearretaliation:

A symmetric strategy like a conventionalattack has no hope forsuccess against a Force XXI Army with information dominance.Asymmetric strategies which directly use weapons of massdestruction (WMD), suchasdroppinga fissionbombdirectlyonU.S. troops, would backfire and anger the American public, andprobably provoke a devastating U.S. nuclear response…. Anadversary'sbestoptionistoavoidusingnuclearweaponsdirectlyon U.S. troops and instead employ them as a sort of massiveelectronicwarfaretooltobeattheUnitedStatesatitsowngame.By integrating a HEMP attack on U.S… [command, control,communications, and intelligence] assets with a conventionalattackontheprojectedU.S. forcesintheregion,aU.S.adversarywouldstandagoodchanceofinflictingheavycasualtiesonadeafand blind American force, ill prepared to fight without itsinformationandcommunicationadvantages.104

The Heritage Foundation’s Jack Spencer assesses in his paperAmerica'sVulnerabilitytoADifferentNuclearThreat:AnElectromagneticPulse105that,likeEdwardsargued,

ThemotivationforaroguestatetouseitslimitednucleararsenalinanEMPstrikeagainsttheUnitedStatesissimple:Itmaximizesthe impact of its few warheads while minimizing the risk ofretaliation.…BecauseEMPattacksarelessrisky…suchattacksarefarmorelikelytooccurinthiseraofnuclearproliferationthantheywereatanytimeduringtheColdWar.106

Elevengeneric scenarios provide a framework for thinking aboutcircumstancesthatmightleadtoanEMPattack:

• AnEMPattackagainstU.S.strategicC3andnuclearforces

todebilitateU.S.nuclearretaliatorycapabilities.ThiswasthechiefscenarioforEMPattackduringtheColdWarandisstillrelevant today. An EMP precursor to massive counterforceattack could prevent or slow execution of U.S. ICBMs andbomberssothattheycouldbedestroyedbeforelaunching.AnEMP


101

couldimpedeoperationofU.S.SSBNsandothernavalforcesatseabydegradingtheirCONUS-basedC3.107

• AnEMPattackagainstU.S.generalpurposeforcesinCONUS.North Korea, Iran, Iraq or another adversary engaged in atheater of conventional war with the United States mightcalculatethatanEMPattackagainstU.S.conventionalforcesinCONUS would be the most effective option, militarily andstrategically.U.S.plansfortheaterwarassumetheU.S.willbeabletoreinforceforwarddeployedground,air,andnavalforcesfromother theatersandespecially from theUnitedStates.AnEMP attack early in a crisis or conflict could paralyze thosemilitary forces or logistical assets—like airlift capabilities—intendedtoreinforcethetheaterfromtheUnitedStates.

• AnEMPattackagainstU.S.andalliedgeneralpurposeforces

in theater. An EMP attack could support a general offensiveagainstU.S.andalliedforcesonthebattlefield.InSouthKorea,theMiddleEast,andTaiwan,U.S.andfriendlyforcespresentarevastlyoutnumberedbypotentialadversaries.Forexample,onthe Korean peninsula, North Korea's million-man army with5,000 tanks is opposed by 37,000 U.S. troops. An adversarymightcalculatethatanEMPattackagainstU.S.andalliedforcesin theater would enable him tomore successfully exploit hislocal numerical preponderance and achieve a quick victory.AdversariesmightalsocalculatethatanEMPattackistheonlywayofachievingabattlefieldvictory,orstalemate,againstthehigh-tech U.S. military after reinforcements have arrived intheater.U.S.aircraftcarriers,viewedbypotentialadversariesasthe backbone of U.S. power projection capabilities, would behighonthelistoftargetsforin-theaterEMPattacks.

• An EMP attack against U.S. civilian infrastructure. EMPattackeffectivenessismostproblematicagainststrategicforcesand C3 (that have received the most hardening), lessproblematicagainstgeneralpurposeforces(thathavereceivedsome hardening), and least problematic against civilianinfrastructure(thathasreceivedtheleasthardening).AnEMPattack against U.S. civilian infrastructure is sure to becatastrophic.108TheobjectiveofsuchanattackmightbetomaketheeconomicanddomesticpoliticalpriceofwartoohighfortheUnited States. An EMP attack might be calculated topermanentlyalterU.S. foreignpolicybyturning theAmericanpeopleagainstthenation’straditionalglobalmilitarypresenceand toward an isolationist "fortress America" mentality.


102

VengeanceshouldnotbeunderestimatedasapossiblemotiveforEMPattackonU.S.civilians.ElitesinNorthKoreaandIranarenot likelytosurvive losingawartotheUnitedStatesandmaywanttoinflictthegreatestpossibleinjury.

• AnEMPattackagainstalliedcivilianinfrastructure.Inawarin which the United States military effort depends upon acoalitionofallies,anadversarymighttrytodividethecoalitionbylaunchinganEMPattackagainstthecivilianinfrastructureofoneormoreU.S.allies.Theobjectivewouldbetoturnoneormorealliesagainstthewarbymakingthecostofcontinuingtheconflict,intheviewofthoseallies,notworththeeffort.Inmostimaginablemajor wars that could occur overseas, theUnitedStateswould require allied political andmilitary support. Anadversarymaybelieve,withsomejustification,thatitiseasiertobreakthewillofU.S.alliesthantotestthewilloftheUnitedStatesitself.

• An EMP attack for salvage fusing. An adversary concernedthat itsmissilesmight be intercepted by defensesmight fusenuclear warheads to detonate upon interception. Sinceinterceptionofaballisticmissileismostlikelytooccurathighaltitude,thedetonatingwarheadwouldproduceanEMPattackthatmight still reach the intended target or other targets ofvalue.SalvagefusingforanEMPattackmightalsobeemployedasabackupoptionshouldthemissilefailformechanicalreasonsduringflightathighaltitude.Suchfailureshavebeenacommonfeature during flight-tests of primitivemissiles deployed andunderdevelopmentbysuchstatesasNorthKoreaandIran.

• An EMP attack "warning shot." An EMP attack could beperformed during a crisis or conflict to exploit U.S. andinternational fear of nuclear weapons in order to achieve afavorable outcome. The democratic international communityperceivesavitalinterestinpreservinglongstandingnon-useofnuclear weapons in war. Confronted with an EMP "warningshot,"manyU.S.allies,andmanyU.S.citizens,mightpreferthattheUnitedStatesyieldinacrisisorwarratherthanriskfurthernuclearescalation.

• An EMP attack miscalculation. A potential adversary maymistakenlybelieve,basedonfalse intelligence, that theUnitedStatesisabouttostrikewithnuclearoradvancedconventionalweapons,andlaunchanEMPattacktopreempttheimpending"U.S.aggression."EMPattackwouldbeaparticularlyattractiveoption if the adversary had some uncertainty about its


103

intelligence indicatingan imminentU.S. threat.AnEMPwoulddisruptU.S.forcesandwarnWashingtonagainstaggression—ifaggression is contemplated—but inflict the least number ofcasualtiesonU.S.forcesiftheintelligenceprovesfalse.

• AnEMPattackasa"bonus"toananti-satelliteoperation.Anadversary might calculate that the most militarily effectiveoption would be to degrade or destroy U.S. low-orbitingsatelliteswithahigh-altitudenucleardetonation.Mostsatellitesare low-orbiting. Under this “bonus” scenario, an EMP attackwouldbesecondarytotheattackagainstthesatellites.Ahigh-altitude nuclear detonation against the satellites would alsogenerate an EMP that could degradeU.S. and allied forces orcivilianinfrastructure.109

• AnEMPattackbetweenotherparties.AnEMPattackduringwar between other nations, not involving the United States,could nonetheless threaten U.S. assets, forces, or allies. Forexample,nuclearwarcouldarisebetweenIndiaandPakistan,China and India, Russia and China, Israel and Iran, or othercombinations.Thedetonationofanuclearweaponinspaceforan EMP could damage or destroy U.S. satellites, eliminatingtrillionsofdollars’worthofinvestmentandcommerce,eveniftheUnitedStatesisnottheintendedtarget.

• An inadvertent EMP Event.Catastrophic failure of a rogue-statenuclearmissile,notnecessarilyaimedattheUnitedStatesorU.S.forces,couldnonethelesstriggeranucleardetonationathighaltitude,generatinganEMPevent injurioustotheUnitedStates,U.S.forcesorallies,andAmericaninvestmentandtrade.

FOREWARNED

Somemay argue state or non-state actorswouldnot dare violatelongstandinginternationalnormsagainstemployingnuclearweapons—evenforanEMPattack—underanyconceivablescenario.

ItiswelltorememberthattheUnitedStates,arguablytheworld'smost humanitarian nation, is also the only nation ever to use nuclearweapons.Today,mostAmericansstillagreethattheU.S.government'sdecisiontodropatomicbombsonHiroshimaandNagasakiin1945was,underthecircumstances,militarilyandmorallyright.

The political norms of North Korea, Iran, China, and Russia are noguaranteeagainstanynuclearscenarioconceivable,includingEMPattack.

105

The Trump Nuclear Posture Review

ByFredFleitz

his monograph discussesserious problems facingAmerica’snucleardeterrent

andproposedstepsbytheTrumpadministrationtoaddresstheminthe 2018Nuclear PostureReview(NPR). This chapter discusses the2018NPRconsideringtheanalysispresentedinpreviouschaptersandprospects for theNPR’sproposalstobeimplementedandsucceed.

InFebruary2018, theTrumpadministration issued anassessment of America’s nuclearweapons arsenal in the NPR. TheNuclear Posture Review waschartered in October 1993 todetermine the role of nuclearweapons inU.S. security strategy and the status of America’s nucleararsenal.TherehasbeenanNPRduringeveryU.S.presidencysincetheClintonadministration.TheObamaNuclearPostureReviewwasissuedin2010.

The Trump administration’s NPR had to address two majorproblemsconcerningU.S.nuclearweapons.

The firstproblemwas undoing thenaïveapproach of theObamaadministration’s NPR, which mostly ignored the state of America’snucleararsenalandinsteadpromotedPresidentObama’s“RoadtoZero”policy:apledgethattheU.S.wouldnotusenuclearweaponsagainstnon-nuclear weapon states, calls for reducing U.S. nuclear arms and notdevelopingnewweapons;andotherrecommendationsthatreflectedtheLeft’shostilitytotheveryexistenceofAmerica’snucleararsenal.

Thesecondproblemismuchmoreseriousandconcernsthefailureof multiple presidents to arrest the deterioration of the U.S. nucleararsenal and update America’s nuclear policies in response to new

T


106

security threats to the United States, including significantly differentthreatsfromthenucleararsenalsofU.S.adversaries.

TheObamaNPRcouldhavebeenworseexceptthatitneededtobeclearedbythenSecretaryofDefenseRobertGates,whohadafarmoreclear-eyedviewofAmericannationalsecuritythanmostofhisObamaadministration colleagues. As a result, this document was largelyaspirational and only delayed action to improve and update the U.S.nuclear deterrent. There were also provisions to maintain the U.S.nucleararsenalandaplantoinvestover$80billiononitbetween2010and2020.

THEOBAMANPR:ASMALLBUTDAMAGINGSTEPBACKWARD

In some ways the 2010 NPR resembled those issued by otheradministrations. It called for preventing nuclear proliferation andnuclear terrorism; maintaining strategic deterrence; strengtheningregionaldeterrence;andsustainingasafe,secure,andeffectivenucleararsenal.TheObamaNPRpurportedtoprovidealong-termstrategytobeconducted by multiple administrations and Congresses to address a“changedandchanginginternationalsecurityenvironment.”

The 2010 NPR said the threat of global nuclear war had becomeremote butalso that the risk of nuclear attacks had surged due toanincreasedriskfromnuclearterrorism.TheReviewcitedagrowingriskofnuclearproliferationthatcouldenableterroristgroupslikealQaedatostealnuclearmaterialsorbuythemontheblackmarket.

Obama’sNPRwas seen bymany as a significant shift frompriorNPRssinceitrenouncedthedevelopmentofnewnuclearweapons.Thisoverruledthe initialpositionof SecretaryofDefenseGatesby freezingU.S. nuclear weapons development, resulting in worsened readinessproblemsfortheU.S.nucleararsenalthathadbeengrowingfordecades.

TheObamaNPRalsoendedthepolicyofambiguityaboutwhentheUnitedStateswouldusenuclearweaponsbypledgingthattheU.S.wouldnot use such weapons against states in compliance with the NuclearNonproliferation Treaty (NPT) even if they attacked theUnited Stateswith biological, chemical, or cyberweapons. At the same time, Obamaofficials offered a confusing qualification to this policy by saying theReview included “the option of reconsidering the use of nuclearretaliationagainstabiologicalattack,ifthedevelopmentofsuchweaponsreachedalevelthatmadetheUnitedStatesvulnerabletoadevastatingstrike,” according to the New York Times.110 President Obama alsorejected demands bymany on the Left that he declare theU.S.wouldneverbethefirststatetousenuclearweapons.


107

Obama officials said there were new options to retaliate againstcyber, chemical, or biological weapons attacks using high-powerconventional weapons. President Obama said such threats could bedeterredwith“aseriesofoldandnewconventionalweapons.”111

At the core of President Obama’s NPR was his commitment to anuclearweapons-freeworldandhisbelief that theUnitedStatesmustleadbyexampletoachievethis.Thatis,iftheUnitedStatesmovedawayfromrelyingonnuclearweaponsfordefense,othernationswouldfollowsuitandbegintoeliminatetheirnucleararsenals.

This was one of President Obama’s many naïve approaches tonational security. Jamie Fly, President of Radio Free Europe/RadioLiberty,saidthisaboutMr.Obama’sapproachina2010NationalReviewsymposiumarticle: “This ispure fantasy. IranandNorthKoreadonotcare how many nuclear weapons the United States possesses, and apromise to use nuclear weapons against them only if they are innoncompliancewiththe internationalnonproliferation regimewillnotcausethemtomodifytheirbehavior.”112

Inthesamearticle,BrianKennedy,chairmanoftheCommitteeonthePresentDanger:ChinaandpresidentoftheAmericanStrategyGroup,tookissuewiththeObamaNPR’s“boldandbizarreassertionthatRussiaisnotourenemy”andnoted that“theRussians continue tobuildevermoreadvancedballisticnuclearmissiles,supplyIranwiththetechnologyandknow-howtodevelopsuchweaponsforuseagainsttheUnitedStatesand Israel, and, with the Communist Chinese, seek tomarginalize theUnitedStatesanditsallies.”

Moreover, the Obama NPR’s intention to reduce the U.S. nucleararsenalanditsnuclearumbrellathatprotectsabout30countriesworkedagainst President Obama’s nuclear nonproliferation goals byencouragingthesestatestodeveloptheirownnucleararsenals.

LikepriorNPRs,theObamaNPRrecommendedmaintainingnuclearwarheadsthroughLEPsandcertifyingtheU.S.nucleararsenal throughtheStockpileStewardshipProgram(SSP).DespitecriticismoftheSSP’slimitationsandagrowingnumberofreportsthatRussiaandChinawereengagedinlow-levelnucleartestsinviolationoftheCTBTtodevelopnewnuclearweapons,theObamaadministrationutterlyrejectedtheideaofresumingnuclearteststomaintainanddeveloptheU.S.nucleararsenalandinsteadcelebratedthe20thanniversaryoftheSSPin2015“asoneofthenation’sgreatestachievementsinscienceandsecurity”andclaimedthat “today, nuclear explosive testing has been replaced by an annualassessmentprocessthatexamineseachweaponssysteminscientificandengineeringdetailinamannerthatisinstilledwithscientificrigorandallowspeerreview.”113


108

President Obama was accused of reneging on his nucleardisarmament pledge in 2013 when he agreed to an $11 billionmodernizationplantoconvert200B61gravitybombsstoredinBelgiumintoguidedweaponsthatcouldbedeliveredbystealthF-35fightersaswellastheF-1andF-15.Armscontrolactivistsfaultedthepresidentfordevelopingnewweaponsbythismove,achargethatObamaofficialsdisputed.OthercriticsaccusedtheObamaadministrationofspendingbillionsofdollarsonnuclearmodernizationtobuyoffmembersofCongress.114

The2013movetomodernizetheB61nuclearweaponreflectedthehalf-heartednatureofPresidentObama’snucleardisarmamentstrategy.Mr.ObamabelievedinhisRoadtoZeropolicybutwasnotpreparedtofightforitorpayanysignificantpoliticalpricetoadvancethisstrategy.Likemanyofthepresident’sothernationalsecuritypolicies,hisnuclearstrategywasmostlyaspirational.

Even though President Obama’s nuclear strategy was not fullyimplemented, deterioration of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and America’snuclearadvantagesmayhaveacceleratedduringtheObamayearsduetoneglectofthiscrucialprogram.

THETRUMPNPR:FIVEMAJORCHALLENGESFACINGTHEU.S.NUCLEAR

DETERRENT

PresidentTrump’s2018NPRrejectedtheapproachof theObamaNPRbymakingacasethatalthoughAmerica’slong-termgoalisaworldwithoutnuclearweapons,becausethereisnoprospectofthishappeningin the foreseeable futureanddue togrowing threats from thenucleararsenalsofotherstates,AmericamustbepreparedfornuclearweaponstoplayanenduringroleinU.S.nationalsecurity.The2018NPRnotedintheintroductionthat“globalthreatconditionshaveworsenedmarkedlysincethemostrecent2010NPR,includingincreasinglyexplicitnuclearthreatsfrompotentialadversaries.TheUnitedStatesnowfacesamorediverseandadvancednuclear-threatenvironmentthaneverbefore,withconsiderable dynamism in potential adversaries’ development anddeploymentprogramsfornuclearweaponsanddeliverysystems.”

MarkSchneidernotedearlier inthismonographthataccordingtothe2018NuclearPostureReview,China’snewDF-26intermediate-rangeballistic missile is “a nuclear-capable precision guided…intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of attacking land and naval targets.”SchneideralsowrotethatRussia’sbelief that limitednuclear firstuse,potentially including low-yield weapons, can provide an advantage isbased, in part, on Moscow’s perception that its greater number and


109

varietyofnonstrategicnuclearsystemsprovideacoerciveadvantageincrisesandatlowerlevelsofconflict.

TheNPRalsonotedotherincreasinglyaggressivebehaviorbyU.S.adversaries, including in outer space and cyber warfare, as well asnuclearprogramsbyNorthKoreaandIran.

TheTrumpNPRexpressedtheadministration’sconcernsaboutanevolvinganduncertain internationalsecurityenvironment,notingthatwhiletheUnitedStateshascontinuedtoreduce itsrelianceonnuclearweapons, other states, includingRussia and China, havemoved in theopposite direction. According to the NPR, there has been a rapiddeteriorationinthethreatenvironmentsincethe2010NPR.Italsoassertedthat “previous U.S. nuclear policies were established amid amore benignnuclearenvironmentandmoreamiableGreatPowerrelations.”

PresidentTrump’sNPRexplicitlyrejectedthebenignviewofRussiaoftheObamaNPR.CriticsoftheReview,suchasAdamMountwiththeFederationofAmerican Scientists, rejected this and other aspects of the Trump NPR asreflectinga“darkandthreateningworld”andclaimeditscalltoexpandU.S.relianceonnuclearweaponsendangersinternationalsecurity.115

Conditions forwhentheUnitedStatescouldusenuclearweaponswasamajorchangeintheTrumpNPRbystatingthattheUnitedStatescouldusetheminresponseto“significantnon-nuclearattacks,”including“attacks on U.S., allied or partner population or infrastructure.” OthercasesinwhichtheU.S.couldemploynuclearweaponsinclude“attacksonU.S.oralliednuclearforces,theircommandandcontrol,orwarningandattackassessmentcapabilities.”

Torespondtoaworldofgrowingnuclearthreats,the2018NPRalsocalledfordevelopingadiverse,flexible,andmodernU.S.nucleararsenal,includingthefollowing:

• Reforms and improvements to U.S. nuclear enterprisepersonnel.

• Development of low-yield nuclearweapons tomatch Russiannuclear strategies, including modifying some submarine-launchedballisticmissileswithlow-yieldwarheads.

• Development of amodernnuclear-armed sea-launched cruisemissile to give the U.S. additional flexibility and diversity indefenseoptionsandtoofferanincentivetoRussiatonegotiateareductioninitsnonstrategicnuclearweapons.

• Modernization of nuclear command, control, andcommunications.

• SignificantnewspendingtoovercometheeffectsoftheeffectsofoldageandunderfundingoftheU.S.nuclearinfrastructure.


110

OUTLOOKFORTHETRUMPNPR

AlthoughtheHouseDemocraticmajorityattemptedtosignificantlyreducefundingtoimplementtheTrumpNPRanddenyfundingforlow-yieldnuclearweapons inthe2020NationalDefenseAuthorizationAct,SenateDemocratssidedwiththeirRepublicancounterpartsinapprovingmostoftheTrumpadministration’sfundingrequestsrelatedtotheNPR,and the final bill, which passed on December 17, 2019 reflected theSenateversion.PresidentTrumpsignedtheNDAAintolawthenextday.The Trump administration’s budgets request for the U.S. nuclearprogram in the 2021 NDAAproposed even high spending to improveAmerica’snucleardeterrent.

The 2020 NDAA approved nearly the entirety of the Trumpadministration’sproposedbudget request forprograms tosustainandrebuild nuclear-armed missiles, submarines, and bombers and theirsupportinginfrastructure,including$2.2billiontobuildafleetof12newballisticmissilesubmarines,$3billiontobuildafleetofatleast100newlong-rangebombers,$558milliontobuildanewICBMsystem,and$713milliontoreplacetheexistingair-launchedcruisemissile.$253millionwasallocatedtoresumeprocessingplutoniumandproducingplutoniumpits.Afurther$12.5billionwasapprovedfornuclearweaponsactivitiesconducted by the NNSA, an increase of $49million above the budgetrequestand$1.4billionmorethanlastyear’sappropriation.

The2020NDAAalsoincludedlanguagebycongressionalDemocratsrequiring additional reports to Congress and justifications for certainnuclearactivities,suchasindependentstudiesonthebenefitsandrisksof aU.S.no-first-usepolicy, the risksofnuclear terrorismandnuclearwar,andtheplantoreplacetheW78ICBMwarheadwiththeW87-1.TheNDAAalsorequiresreportsontherisksofexecutingtheW87-1program,the estimated cost and impact of building a new sea-launched cruisemissilewarhead,andthecurrentstatusandfutureoftheB83-1gravitybomb.

TheTrumpadministration’s2021NDAAbudget request, releasedon February 11, 2020, proposed an additional $46 billion in nuclearweapons spending,a19% increase. This includesanadditional $28.9billion for NNSA and a $17.7 billion increase for nuclear research,development,testingandevaluationprojects,including:

• $4.4billionforColumbia-classsubmarines• $4.2billionfornuclearcommand,controlandcommunications• $2.8billionfortheB-21bomber• $1.5billionfortheGroundBasedStrategicDeterrent


111

• $1.2billionfortheTridentIImissilelifeextensionprogram• $500millionforthelong-rangestandoffcruisemissile• $110millionfornuclear-relatedcostsontheF-35JointStrike

Fighter• $50millionontheB61-12nuclearbombtailkitThe 2021 NDAA also proposes funds for the fivemajor warhead

modernizationprograms:theB61-12LifeExtensionProgram,theW80-4 Life Extension Program, the W88 Alteration 370, the W87-1ModificationProgramandtheW93,anewsubmarine-launchednuclearwarhead.Howthe2021NDAArequestwillfareinCongresswasunclearwhenthispublicationwenttoprint.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration is looking at initiativesbeyondthe2018NPR. ItwithdrewfromtheINFTreaty in2019.SomeTrumpadvisersdonotwanttheadministrationtorenewtheNewSTARTtreatywhen it expires in 2021. There havealso been reports that theTrump administration may be considering preparing to resumeundergroundnucleartestingand“unsigning”the1996CTBT.

FormerObamaNSC official StephenAndreasenasserted this in aJune2019WashingtonPostop-edwhenhewrotethat“Quietlyandundera shadowofuneaseathomeandabroad, theTrumpadministration isopeningthedoortoU.S.resumptionofundergroundnuclearexplosivetestinginresponsetoRussiancheating.”116Suchamovewouldbehugelycontroversial and probably would not be attempted by the Trumpadministrationbeforethe2020presidentialelection.

The Trump NPR could salvage and maintain America’s nucleararsenal.ButitsdiresituationcouldalsoworsensignificantlydependingonU.S.politicaldevelopments.Itisstilltoosoontopredictthesuccessofthe2018NPRandhowmuchitwillimproveAmerica’snucleardeterrent.Thisreviewwillneed8to10yearstobefullyimplemented,whichmeansitisunlikelytohaveasignificanteffectontheU.S.nuclearprogramifMr.Trumplosesthe2020election.America’snucleararsenalwilllikelysufferamajorsetback with a Trump election loss if—as seems likely—his DemocraticsuccessorrevertstoanuclearstrategyliketheObamaNPR.

Itiscrucialthatwemodernizeournuclearweaponsandpursueasoundnuclear weapons policy regardless of who is elected the next presidentbecauseaswesawduringtheObamaadministration,therealworldhasawayofteachingresponsibilitynomatterthecampaignpromises.

113

About the Authors

FREDFLEITZisthepresidentandCEOoftheCenterforSecurityPolicy.Heservedin2018asadeputyassistanttoPresidentDonaldTrumpandchiefofstafftoNationalSecurityAdviserJohnBolton.BeforehisWhiteHouseposition,FleitzwasseniorvicepresidentoftheCenterforSecurityPolicy.HepreviouslyservedinU.S.nationalsecuritypositionsfor25yearswiththe CIA, the DIA, the Department of State, and House IntelligenceCommitteestaff.

DR.MICHAELADODGE is a research scholarat theNational Institute forPublicPolicy.PriortojoiningtheNationalInstitute,Dr.Dodgeworkedatthe Heritage Foundation as a research fellow forMissile Defense andNuclear Deterrence from 2010–2019. She left Heritage to serve asSenatorJonKyl’sseniordefensepolicyadvisor.Additionally,shewasaPubliusFellowattheClaremontInstitutein2011andparticipatedintheCenter for Strategic and International Studies PONI Nuclear ScholarsInitiative Program. Dr. Dodge received a Ph.D. from George MasonUniversity in 2019. She earned herMaster of Science in Defense andStrategic Studies degree from Missouri State University in 2011.AtMissouriState,Dr.DodgewasawardedtheUlrikeSchumacherMemorialScholarship for two years. She received a bachelor’s degree ininternationalrelationsanddefenseandstrategicstudies fromMasarykUniversity,CzechRepublic.

AMBASSADORERICS.EDELMAN retiredasacareerminister fromtheU.S.ForeignService.HeiscurrentlyaRogerHertogPractitionerinResidenceat Johns Hopkins SAIS and Counselor at the Center for Strategic andBudgetaryAssessments.

FRANKGAFFNEY isthefounderandexecutivechairmanoftheCenterforSecurityPolicy,aformerofficialintheReaganDefenseDepartmentandhost of SecureFreedomRadio. Under Gaffney’s leadership, theCenterbecame nationally and internationally recognized as a reputableresource for foreign and defense policymatters. Mr. Gaffney was thedeputy assistant secretary of defense for Nuclear Forces and ArmsControlPolicyfrom1983to1987.FollowingthathewasnominatedbyPresident Reagan to become the assistant secretary of defense forInternationalSecurityPolicy.HeisalsocurrentlythedirectorofSavethePersecutedChristians.


114

DR.JOHNC.HOPKINSbeganhiscareerasastudentatLosAlamosNationalLaboratory.Hereceivedbothhisbachelor’sanddoctoraldegrees fromtheUniversityofWashingtonandreturnedtotheLaboratoryin1960.Heparticipatedin5atmosphericnucleartestsinthePacificandlatersome170testsattheNevadaTestSite.In1974,HopkinswasappointedastheNuclear Test Division leader and he was later appointed as theLaboratory’s associate director for the Nuclear Weapons Program.Throughout his career, he was involved in nuclear policy and nuclearhistoryandhasauthoredbooksandpapersinthesefields.Heservedasan advisor to the Department of Energy and the State and Defensedepartments and has worked with the nuclear weapons programs ofBritain,France,China,andRussia.

PETERHUESSY isadefenseanalystspecializingincongressional,budget,andpolicydevelopmentsonnucleardeterrentpolicy,strategicnuclearmodernization, terrorism, counterterrorism, immigration, state-sponsored terrorism, missile defense—especially U.S.-Israel jointdefenseefforts,armscontrol,proliferation,andspacepower.Heisalsopresident of his own defense consulting firm, GeoStrategic Analysis,foundedin1981,andwastheseniordefenseconsultantattheNationalDefenseUniversityFoundationfor22years.

AMBASSADORROBERT JOSEPH is awell-known arms control expertwhoserved in senior U.S. government national security posts, includingambassadortotheU.S.-RussianCommissiononNuclearTesting,undersecretaryof state forarmscontrol and internationalsecurity,NationalSecurity Council senior director for nonproliferation, principal deputyassistant secretary of defense for international security policy, deputyassistantsecretaryofdefensefornuclearforcesandarmscontrolpolicy,and nuclear policy/planning officer at U.S. Mission to NATO. He iscurrentlyaseniorscholarattheNationalInstituteforPublicPolicy.

DR.MATTHEWKROENIGisthedeputydirectoroftheScowcroftCenterforStrategy and Security at the Atlantic Council and a tenured associateprofessorofgovernmentandforeignserviceatGeorgetownUniversity.In2019,hewasnamedoneofthetop25most-citedAmericanpoliticalscientists of his generation.He is the author oreditor of seven books,including The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy (Oxford UniversityPress, 2018). He previously worked in several positions in the U.S.DepartmentofDefenseandtheintelligencecommunityandasafellowatthe Council on Foreign Relations, Harvard University, and StanfordUniversity.HeisalifememberoftheCouncilonForeignRelationsand


115

holds an M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from the University ofCaliforniaatBerkeley.

DR.MARKB.SCHNEIDERisasenioranalystwiththeNationalInstituteforPublic Policy. Before his retirement from the Department of DefenseSenior Executive Service, Dr. Schneider served in a number of seniorpositionswithintheOfficeofSecretaryofDefense forPolicy, includingprincipal director for forces policy; principal director for strategicdefense,space,andverificationpolicy;directorforstrategicarmscontrolpolicy;andrepresentativeofthesecretaryofdefensetotheNuclearArmsControl Implementation Commissions. He also served in the seniorForeign Service asamember of the StateDepartment Policy PlanningStaff. Dr. Schneider earned his Ph.D. in history at the University ofSouthern California and his Juris Doctorate from GeorgeWashingtonUniversity.HewasadmittedtothebarofWashington,DC,in1977andofMaryland in 1978. He specializes in missile defense policy, nuclearweapons, deterrence, strategic forces, arms control, and arms controlverificationandcomplianceissues.

DR.PETERVINCENTPRY is executivedirectorof theEMPTaskForceonNational and Homeland Security, a congressional advisory boarddedicated to achieving protection of the United States fromelectromagnetic pulse, cyberattack, mass destruction terrorism, andother threats to civilian critical infrastructures on an acceleratedbasis.Dr.Pry is alsodirectorof theUnitedStatesNuclearStrategyForum, an advisory board to Congress on policies to counterweaponsofmassdestruction.

117

Endnotes

1Kristensen,M.,&Korda,M.(2019).Russiannuclearforces,2019.BulletinoftheAtomicScientists,75(2),pp.73–84.https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891

2U.S.DepartmentofDefense.(2018,February).Nuclearposturereview2018.https://dod.defense.gov/News/SpecialReports/2018NuclearPostureReview.aspx

3Ibid.4Lendon,B.(2013,March19).U.S.fliesB-52soverSouthKorea.CNN.https://www.cnn.com/2013/03/19/world/asia/korea-b-52s/index.html(accessedJune7,2019).

5Weisgerber,M.(2017,September13).AtUSnuclearweaponsbase,Mattissignalssupportfortriad.DefenseOne.https://www.defenseone.com/business/2017/09/us-nuclear-weapons-base-mattis-signals-support-triad/140987/

6NationalNuclearSecurityAdministration.(2016,March).Prevent,counter,andrespond—Astrategicplantoreduceglobalnuclearthreats,FY2017–FY2021:ReporttoCongress.U.S.DepartmentofEnergy.https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/09/f36/NPCR%2520FINAL%25203-29-16%2520%28with%2520signatures%29_Revised%25204%252020_Redacted%5B1%5D.pdf

7NationalNuclearSecurityAdministration.(2019,February).Infrastructuremodernization.U.S.DepartmentofEnergy.https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2019/02/f59/2019-02-14-FACTSHEET-Infrastructure-Modernization.pdf

8OneoftheB-2bomberscrashedin2008,leavingtheUnitedStateswith20aircraft.9Hennigan,W.J.(2013,August19).UpgradesaimtoextendB-52bombers’alreadylonglives.LosAngelesTimes.https://www.latimes.com/business/la-xpm-2013-aug-19-la-fi-ageless-b52-bomber-20130819-story.html

10Osborn,K.(2019,May29).B-21stealthbomber:Theairforce’sultimate“black”program(armedwithnukes).TheNationalInterest.https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/b-21-stealth-bomber-air-forces-ultimate-black-program-armed-nukes-59982

11Harvey,J.R.(2019,May24).U.S.nuclearcommandandcontrolforthe21stcentury.NautilusInstituteNAPSNetSpecialReport.https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/u-s-nuclear-command-and-control-for-the-21st-century/

12Formoredetailontheargumentspresentedinthisessay,seeKroenig,M.(2018).ThelogicofAmericannuclearstrategy:Whystrategicsuperioritymatters.OxfordUniversityPress.


118

13Smith,A.(writer),&Brown,B.(director).(2017,February26).Trumpcallsfornucleardominance[TVseriesepisode].InC.Jones,D.Williams,&E.Johnson(ExecutiveProducers),WeekendswithAlexWitt,MSNBC.http://www.msnbc.com/weekends-with-alex-witt/watch/trump-calls-for-nuclear-dominance-885291075918

14JohnMuellerascitedinKroenig,M.(2018).ThelogicofAmericannuclearstrategy,OxfordUniversityPress,p.17.

15Erlanger,S.(2019,August8).Areweheadedforanotherexpensivenucleararmsrace?Couldbe.NewYorkTimes.https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/08/world/europe/arms-race-russia-china.html

16Kroenig,M.(2016)USnuclearweaponsandnonproliferation:Istherealink?JournalofPeaceResearch,53(2),pp.166–179.

17AshtonCarter,ascitedinKroenig,M.(2018).TheLogicofAmericanNuclearStrategy,p.181.

18Glanz,J.(2000,November28).Testingtheagingstockpileinatestbanera.NewYorkTimes.

19Kristensen,H.M.(2019).Frenchnuclearforces,2019.BulletinoftheAtomicScientists,75(1),pp.51–55.

20Kristensen,H.M.,&Korda,M.(2018).Indiannuclearforces,2018.BulletinoftheAtomicScientists,74(6).

21Kristensen,H.M.,Norris,R.S.,&Diamond,J.(2018).Pakistaninuclearforces,2018.BulletinoftheAtomicScientists,74(5).https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1507796

22Jehl,D.(1993,March13).U.S.seekingUNpressuretocompelNorthKoreatohonortreaty.NewYorkTimes.

23Ibid.24WhiteHouse.(2019,February1).PresidentDonaldJ.TrumptowithdrawtheUnitedStatesfromtheIntermediate-RangeNuclearForces(INF)Treaty[Factsheet].

25Dodge,M.(2019,May21).NewSTARTandthefutureofU.S.nationalsecurity.TheHeritageFoundation.https://www.heritage.org/arms-control/report/new-start-and-the-future-us-national-security

26Ibid.27Isachenkov,V.(2019,February20).VladimirPutinwarnsnewRussianweaponswilltargetU.S.WashingtonTimes.

28U.S.DepartmentofDefense.(2019,July21).RemarksbyUnderSecretaryofDefenseforPolicyJohnRoodattheAspenSecurityForum.


30Payne,K.B.(2011,January18).PostscriptonNewSTART.NationalReview.https://www.nationalreview.com/2011/01/postscript-new-start-keith-b-payne/


119


32Trachtenberg,D.(2019,March28).HouseArmsServicesCommitteeSubcommitteeonStrategicForcesHearing:FiscalYear2020PrioritiesforDepartmentofDefenseNuclearActivities.

33Estimatesofpitlifevaryandhavealsobeenestimatedtobeaslongas150years.Foradiscussionofthisissue,seeMedalia,J.E.(2014,February21)U.S.nuclearweapon“pit”productionoptionsforCongress.CongressionalResearchService.https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43406.pdf

34Fisher,R.D.(2019,May14).Breakfastseminarremarks.MitchellInstitute.

35ThismaterialisfromextensiveconversationswithMarkSchneiderofNIPPoverthepastfewmonthsaswellassimilarconversationsandemailexchangeswithJamesHowe;bothputtogetherextensivematerialaboutcurrentandprojectedRussiannuclearweaponsaswellassharingwithmenumerousformalpresentationsandunpublishedmaterialundertheirownnames.

36Ibid.37Ashley,R.P.(2019,May29).RussianandChinesenuclearmodernizationtrends:RemarksattheHudsonInstitute[Transcriptofspeech].https://www.dia.mil/News/Speeches-and-Testimonies/Article-View/Article/1859890/russian-and-chinese-nuclear-modernization-trends/

38Gertz,B.(2019,August1).Stratcom:Chinarapidlybuildingupnuclearforces.

WashingtonFreeBeacon.https://freebeacon.com/national-security/stratcom-china-rapidly-building-up-nuclear-forces/

39Ibid.40Zhao,T.(2019,March).ChinainaworldwithnoU.S.-Russiatreaty-basedarmscontrol.InV.Manzo,Nucleararmscontrolwithoutatreaty:RiskswithoutNewSTART,CenterforNavalAnalyses,Strategy,Policy,Plans,andProgramsDivision,pp.118–125.

41Mies,R.(2012,Spring)Strategicdeterrenceinthe21stcentury,UnderseaWarfare,48,p.16.https://igs.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/files/events/mies831strat.in_21st_century_0.pdf

42QuotedinSchneider,M.B.(2006).ThenuclearforcesanddoctrineoftheRussianFederation.NationalInstitutePress.p.22.http://www.nipp.org/Publication/Downloads/Publication%20Archive%20PDF/Russian%20nuclear%20doctrine%20--%20NSF%20for%20print.pdf

43U.S.DepartmentofDefense.(2013,July18).RemarksbyDeputySecretaryofDefenseCarterattheAspenSecurityForum.http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5277


120

44FederationofAmericanScientists.(2010,July13).DOEplanpromisesadditionalnuclearreductions,butfewcostsavings[Factsheet].http://www.fas.org/press/_docs/fact_sheet.html

45Mies,R.(2012,Spring).Strategicdeterrenceinthe21stcentury.UnderseaWarfare,48,p.17.

46RussianFederation.(2009,May12).Russia’snationalsecuritystrategyto2020(translatedbyrustrans.wikidot.com).paragraph12.LasteditedSeptember17,2012.http://rustrans.wikidot.com/russia-s-national-security-strategy-to-2020

47InterviewwithVladimirPopovkin.RossiyskayaGazeta.http://russiadefence.englishboard.net/t1294-interview-with-vladimir-popovkin,(2010,July12).

48Johnson,D.(2018,February).Russia’sconventionalprecisionstrikecapabilities,regionalcrises,andnuclearthresholds.LawrenceLivermoreNationalLaboratory.p.57.https://cgsr.llnl.gov/

49Felgengauer,P.(2017,January19).KremlinlearningtonavigateWashington’snewunpredictability.EurasiaDailyMonitor,14(3).https://jamestown.org/program/kremlin-learning-navigate-washingtons-new-unpredictability/

50“Developmentofstrategicnuclearforcesisunconditionalpriority–Shoigu.”(2017,February21).Interfax.

51QuotedinHowe,J.R.(2016,February17).ExploringthedichotomybetweenNew

STARTtreatyobligationsandRussianactionsandrhetoric.VisionCentric,Inc.https://www.exchangemonitor.com//wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Thu-9am-Future-Nuclear-Arms-Control-Stacked.pdf

52QuotedinSchneider,M.(2008).ThefutureoftheU.S.nucleardeterrent.ComparativeStrategy,27(4),p.348.http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01495930802358539.

53QuotedinSchneider,M.(2008).ThefutureoftheU.S.nucleardeterrent.ComparativeStrategy,27(4),p.347.

54OfficeofTransnationalIssues.(2000,August30).EvidenceofRussiandevelopmentofnewsub-kilotonnuclearwarheads.CentralIntelligenceAgency.

55Ibid.

56OfficeofRussianandEuropeanAnalysis.(2000,June22).Russia:[Deleted].CentralIntelligenceAgency.http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB200/20000622.pdf

57Felgengauer,P.(2002,March14).Bombermakerstradeunion.MoscowTimes.http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/bomb-makers-trade-union/247805html

58Parker,J.W.(2011,January).Russia’srevival:Ambitions,limitations,andopportunitiesfortheUnitedStates.InstituteforNationalStrategicStudies.p.23.http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a546683.pdf

59Felgengauer,P.(2010,July16).RussiaseekstoimposenewABMtreatyontheUS

bydevelopingBMD.EurasiaDailyMonitor,7(136).


121

https://jamestown.org/program/russia-seeks-to-impose-new-abm-treaty-on-the-us-by-developing-bmd/

60U.S.DepartmentofDefense.(2016,September26).RemarksbySecretaryCartertotroopsatMinotAirForceBase,NorthDakota[transcriptofspeech].http://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/957408/remarks-by-secretary-carter-to-troops-at-kirtland-afb-new-mexico

61DefenseScienceBoard.(2016,December).Sevendefenseprioritiesforthenewadministration.p.23.https://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2010s/SevenDefense_Priorities.pdf.

62U.S.DepartmentofDefense.(2018,February).Nuclearposturereview2018.pp.xi–xii.https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTUREREVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF.

63QuotedinSchneider,M.B.(2006).ThenuclearforcesanddoctrineoftheRussianFederation.NationalInstitutePress.p.15.http://www.nipp.org/Publication/Downloads/Publication%20

64Ibid.

65QuotedinSchneider,M.(2008).ThefutureoftheU.S.nucleardeterrent.ComparativeStrategy,27(4),p.348.

66Formoredetailanddocumentation,seeSchneider,M.B.(2018,March12).DeterringRussianfirstuseoflow-yieldnuclearweapons.ComparativeStrategy.https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/03/12/deterringrussianfirstuseoflowyieldnuclearweapons113180.html.

67RussianFederationwillincreaseroleoftacticalnuclearweaponsonmultirole

nuclearsubmarines.Gazeta.(2009,March23).68Ashley,R.P.(2019,May29).RussianandChinesenuclearmodernizationtrends:RemarksattheHudsonInstitute[Transcriptofspeech].https://www.dia.mil/News/Speeches-and-Testimonies/Article-View/Article/1859890/russian-and-chinese-nuclear-modernization-trends/

69U.S.DepartmentofDefense.(2018,February).Nuclearposturereview2018.p.1.https://dod.defense.gov/News/SpecialReports/2018NuclearPostureReview.aspx

70MinistryofNationalDefense,Taiwan.(2011).Section2PRCmilitarycapabilitiesandthreats.Taiwan:RepublicofChina.http://2011mndreport.mnd.gov.tw/en/info04.html;Yesin,V.(2012).OnChina’snuclearpotentialwithoutunderestimationorexaggeration.AsianArmsControlProject.http://www.scribd.com/doc/98667133/YESIN-China-s-Nuclear-Potential;Arbatov,A.(2012,July8).Russia:ProblemsininvolvingPRCinnucleararmslimitation,transparencytalks.Voyenno-PromyshlennyyKuryerOnline(translatedbyWorldNewsConnection);Chinamayhave1,600-1,800nuclearmunitions–experts.(2012,September28).Interfax-AVNOnline(translatedbyWorldNewsConnection).AsimilarconclusionwasreachedbyU.S.expertDr.PhillipKarber.SeeWan,W.(2011,November29).GeorgetownstudentsshedlightonChina’stunnelsystemfornuclearweapons.WashingtonPost.


122

http://articles.Washingtonpost.com/2011-11-29/world/35280981_1_nuclear-weapons-georgetown-students-militaryjournals

71NationalAirandSpaceIntelligenceCenter.(2013).Ballisticandcruisemissilethreat.NASICPublicAffairsOffice.p.10.http://www.afisr.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-130710-054.pdf.

72Ibid.,p.11.73Ashley,R.P.(2019,May29).RussianandChinesenuclearmodernizationtrends:RemarksattheHudsonInstitute[Transcriptofspeech].https://www.dia.mil/News/Speeches-and-Testimonies/Article-View/Article/1859890/russian-and-chinese-nuclear-modernization-trends/

74U.S.HouseSelectCommittee.(1999,January3).U.S.nationalsecurityand

military/commercialconcernswiththePeople’sRepublicofChina[Report].U.S.Congress,HouseofRepresentatives.http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/hr105851-html/ch2bod.html#anchor4309987

75Yesin,V.(2012).OnChina’snuclearpotentialwithoutunderestimationorexaggeration.AsianArmsControlProject.p.3.http://www.scribd.com/doc/98667133/YESIN-China-s-Nuclear-Potential

76QuotedinNationalInstituteforPublicPolicy.(2014,September).SectionII.Minimumdeterrence:Fragilehopeofaconstantbenignthreatenvironment[authorsredacted].p.48.https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Other/Litigation%20Release%20-%20Section%20II%20Minimum%20Deterrence%20Fragile%20Hope.pdf

77Pincus,W.(2003,February20).U.S.exploresdevelopinglow-yieldnuclearweapons.WashingtonPost.https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/02/20/us-explores-developing-low-yield-nuclear-weapons/3ea99155-18a2-4065-8789-a578eb10e65e/?utm_term=.8d80d4610a11.

78QuotedinSchneider,M.(2009,July1).ThenucleardoctrineandforcesofthePeople'sRepublicofChina.ComparativeStrategy,28(3),p.257.http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495930903025276.

79Ibid.

80Schneider,M.B.(2007,November).ThenucleardoctrineandforcesofthePeople’sRepublicofChina.NationalInstitutePress.p.21.http://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/China-nuclear-final-pub.pdf.

81Ibid.82CIA,NationalIntelligenceCouncil,“China:PossibleNuclearArtilleryTest,”NationalIntelligenceDigest,CPASNID95-0214CX,September14,1995,p.10.PartiallydeclassifiedandreleasedunderFOIAtoNationalSecurityArchive.

83StephenPifer,“Stopthelow-yieldTridentnuclearwarhead,”TheHill,

June8,2019.


123

84Howe,J.R.(n.d.).PotentialmilitaryutilityofRussianemploymentofadvancedtechnologynuclearweaponsinEurope—ImplicationsforUSextendeddeterrence.VisionCentric,Inc.

85“OpeningRemarksofRankingMemberTurner,”HouseArmedServicesCommittee,June4,2019,https://republicans-armedservices.house.gov/news/opening-statements/opening-remarks-ranking-member-turner-3

86ForthebestandmostcomprehensiveassessmentofEMPthreats,seethe2017andearlierunclassifiedEMPCommissionreportsatwww.firstempcommission.org

87EMPCommission.(2004).ReportoftheCommissiontoassessthethreattothe

UnitedStatesfromelectromagneticpulse(EMP)attack,VolumeI:Executivereport,pp.1–3;Graham,W.R.(2008,July10).TestimonybeforetheHouseArmedServicesCommittee[transcriptofspeech],pp.4–7;Smith,G.(1997,July16).Electromagneticpulsethreats.TestimonybeforetheHouseNationalSecurityCommittee[Transcriptofspeech];Wilson,C.(2008,July21).Highaltitudeelectromagneticpulse(HEMP)andhighpowermicrowave(HPM)devices:Threatassessments.CongressionalResearchService.p.7.

88EMPCommission.(2017,July).AssessingthethreatfromEMPattack:Executive

reportandEMPCommissionchairman’sreport.www.firstempcommission.org89ElectromagneticpulsethreatstoU.S.militaryandcivilianinfrastructure:HearingbeforetheMilitaryResearchandDevelopmentSubcommitteeoftheCommitteeonArmedServices,106thCong.(1999),p.78.https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000046309648&view=1up&seq=3

90Threatposedbyelectromagneticpulse(EMP)attack:HearingbeforetheArmedForcesCommittee,110thCong.(2008),pp.8–9.https://fas.org/irp/congress/2008_hr/emp.pdf

91ElectromagneticpulsethreatstoU.S.militaryandcivilianinfrastructure:HearingbeforetheMilitaryResearchandDevelopmentSubcommitteeoftheCommitteeonArmedServices,106thCong.(1999),p.68.https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000046309648&view=1up&seq=3

92NationalIntelligenceCouncil.(1999,September).ForeignMissileDevelopmentsandtheBallisticMissileThreatThrough2015.NationalIntelligenceEstimate.CIA.p.4.https://fas.org/irp/threat/missile/nie99msl.htm;SeealsotheNIEofDecember2001andNationalAirandSpaceIntelligenceCenter.(2017).2017BallisticandCruiseMissileThreatReport.DefenseIntelligenceBallisticMissileAnalysisCommittee.https://fas.org/irp/threat/missile/bm-2017.pdf

93Lethalityiscalculatedastheratioofthelethalareaoftheweaponagainstthearea

ofuncertaintyaboutwheretheweaponmightimpact,asderivedfromthemissile’scircularareaprobable(CEP—theradiusofacirclewhereinthewarheadhasa50%probabilityofimpacting).Forexample,a20ktwarheadwithaCEPof15kmhasa50%chanceofstrikinganywherewithinaradiusof15kmaroundtheaimpoint,anareaofabout700km2.Ifthelethalradiusofthewarheadis3km(abouttherangefor5psioverpressurefroma20ktwarhead),thenlethalareais


124

about28km2,ormerely4%ofthe700km2areaofuncertaintyaroundtheaimpointwherethewarheadmightimpact.SincetheoddsofplacingthewarheadwithintheCEPof15kmis50%,theoddsthatthewarheadwillplaceitslethalareaontargetistheratioofthewarhead’slethalareaagainsttheareaenclosedbythewarhead’sCEP,halved,orabout2%.Thesamecalculationsapplytobiologicalandchemicalweapons.

94DirectorforStrategicPlansandPolicy.(2000,June).Jointvision2020.JointChiefsofStaff.p.3;SecretaryofDefense.(2001,September30).Quadrennialdefensereview.U.S.DepartmentofDefense.p.30;seealsotheNationalDefenseStrategy(2018)thatreplacestheQuadrennialDefenseReview.

95ElectromagneticpulsethreatstoU.S.militaryandcivilianinfrastructure:HearingbeforetheMilitaryResearchandDevelopmentSubcommitteeoftheCommitteeonArmedServices,106thCong.(1999),p.78.https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000046309648&view=1up&seq=3

96Threatposedbyelectromagneticpulse(EMP)attack:HearingbeforetheArmedForcesCommittee,110thCong.(2008),pp.8–9.https://fas.org/irp/congress/2008_hr/emp.pdf

97ElectromagneticpulsethreatstoU.S.militaryandcivilianinfrastructure:HearingbeforetheMilitaryResearchandDevelopmentSubcommitteeoftheCommitteeonArmedServices,106thCong.(1999),pp.79–81.https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000046309648&view=1up&seq=3

98Ibid.,p.68.

99ForamorecomprehensiveassessmentofEMPattackscenarios,seetheEMPCommissionreportNuclearEMPattackscenariosandcombinedarmscyberwarfare(July2017).

100DefenseThreatReductionAgency.(2000,April).NBCscenarios:2002–2010.DTRAAdvancedSystemsandConceptsOfficeandNDUCenterforCounterproliferationResearch.p.vii.

101DefenseThreatReductionAgency.(2001,April).Highaltitudenucleardetonations(HAND)againstlowearthorbitsatellites(“HALEOS”).p.4.https://fas.org/spp/military/program/asat/haleos.pdf

102Ibid.,p.5.

103Edwards,S.J.A.(1997).ThethreatofhighaltitudeelectromagneticpulsetoForceXXI.NationalSecurityStudiesQuarterly3(4),pp.61–80.

104Ibid.,pp.62–63.105Spencer,J.(2000,May26).America'svulnerabilitytoadifferentnuclearthreat:An

electromagneticpulse.HeritageFoundation.https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/americas-vulnerability-different-nuclear-threat-anelectromagnetic-pulse

106Ibid.

107Pry,P.V.(1990).Nuclearwars:Exchangesandoutcomes.CraneRussak.24-27;ElectromagneticpulsethreatstoU.S.militaryandcivilianinfrastructure:HearingbeforetheMilitaryResearchandDevelopmentSubcommitteeofthe


125

CommitteeonArmedServices,106thCong.(1999),p.77.https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000046309648&view=1up&seq=3

108Ibid.,p.78.109Ibid.,pp.67–68.110Sanger,D.,&Baker,P.(2010,April5).ObamalimitswhenU.S.wouldusenuclear

arms.NewYorkTimes.https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/world/06arms.html

111Ibid.

112NationalReviewSymposium.(2010,April7).Nuclearposturing.NationalReviewOnline.https://www.nationalreview.com/2010/04/nuclear-posturing-nro-symposium/

113U.S.DepartmentofEnergy.(2015,October21).In20thyear,StockpileStewardshipProgramcelebratedasoneofnation’sgreatestachievementsinscienceandsecurity[Pressrelease].https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/20th-year-stockpile-stewardship-program-celebrated-one-nation-s

114Borger,J.(2013,April21).ObamaaccusedofnuclearU-turnasguidedweaponsplanemerges.TheGuardian.https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/21/obama-accused-nuclear-guided-weapons-plan

115Mount,A.(2018,February2).Trump'stroublingnuclearplan:Howithastensthe

riseofamoredangerousworld.ForeignAffairs.https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-02-02/trumps-troubling-nuclear-plan

116StephenAndreasen,“Trumpisquietlyleadingusclosertonucleardisaster,”WashingtonPost,June26,2019.

127

Index

A ABMtreaty·77

Afghanistan·19,52

Agnew,Harold·47

AleutianIslands·41

Alonso,Carol·48

Amchitka·41

Andreasen,Stephen·111

Ashley,Robert·71,83,84

Aspin,Les·64

AtlanticCouncil·10

AtomicEnergyCommission·38

Australia·27

Avangardhypersonicboostglide

vehicle·68

B B-2·14,18,22,94

B-21·22

B-52·14,18,22

Baneberryshot·40

Bernardin,Michael·48,49

Boosted-fission·21,55,56

Brookes,Michael·71

Burtsev,Oleg·83

Bush,GeorgeH.W.·85

Bush,GeorgeW.·11,49,50

C Carter,Ash·33

Carter,Jimmy·52,80,82

CentralIntelligenceAgency·12,56,

81,113

1995NationalIntelligenceDaily·

85

Cheney,Liz·77

China·11,22,25,26,27,29,30,31,

51,52,53,54,57,59,62,63,69,

70,71,72,73,74,76,77,79,83,

84,85,91,92,95,96,103,107,

108,109,122

China,missiles

DF-11·84

DF-11A·84

DF-15·84

DF-15A·84

DF-26IRBM·70,84

DH-10cruisemissile·84

Dongfeng-41(DF-41)·70

Clinton,Bill·45,49,56,62,105

CNN·51,72

ComprehensiveTestBanTreaty·45,

48,49,50,76,107,111

CongressionalEMPCommission·91

Cornyn,John·77

Cotton,Tom·77

CoxCommittee·84

Creedon,Madelyn·57

128

D DefenseIntelligenceAgency·69,71

DefenseScienceBoard·82

DefenseThreatReductionAgency·

42

High-AltitudeNuclear

Detonations(HAND)Against

LowEarthOrbitSatellites

Report·99

DepartmentofDefense·20,33,42

DepartmentofEnergy·10,16,35,

114

Dodge,Michaela·10,13,60,61,64,

65,66,113

Drell,Sydney·47

E Eagleburger,Lawrence·56

Edgerton,Germeshausen,andGrier,

Inc.·43

Edwards,Sean·99,100,124

EMP(electromagneticpulse)·12,84,

89,90,91,92,93,94,95,96,97,

98,99,100,101,102,103

Enricheduranium·55,56

EnvironmentalProtectionAgency·

42

Esin,Victor·69

F F-35·108

FederationofAmericanScientists·

51,64,80,109

Felgengauer,Pavel·81,82,87

France·27,51,54,57

CharlesDeGaulleaircraftcarrier·

54

Nuclearweaponsof·54

G Gates,Robert·106

Gertz,Bill·71,88

Gore,Al·45,49

H HeritageFoundation·66,100

Hiroshima·56,103

Holmes&Narver,Inc.·43

Hydrogenbomb·56,68

Hypersonicmissiles·64

I ICBM·15,22,52,57,61,65,66,67,

70,94,110

India·27,32,51,54,55,103

INF·52,53

INFTreaty·11,58,74,111

InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency

(IAEA)·57

Iran·32,57,85

J Japan·13,27,32,33,98

JointComprehensiveProgramof

Action(JCPOA)·57

129

K Karber,Phillip·83,87

Kennedy,John·25

Kriete,David·71

Kroenig,Matthew·75

L LasVegas·35,36,37,38,41

LifeExtensionProgram(LEP)·10,

20

LosAlamosNationalLaboratory·11,

16,41,43,46,47,48,49,114

Low-yieldnuclearweapons·11,40,

76,79,80,81,82,83,84,85,86,

87,88,99,108,109,110

M MaoTse-tung·70

Mattis,James·19,33

Mies,Richard·80

Mikhailov,Victor·81,82

MinutemanIII·10,14

MissileDefenseReview·73

MSNBC·28

Mueller,John·29

Muravyev,Vladimir·80

MXPeacekeeper·22

N Nagasaki·56,103

Nakhleh,Charles·46

NationalAcademyofSciences·38

NationalDefenseAuthorizationAct·

21,110

NationalDefenseStrategy

Commission·88

NationalInstituteforPublicPolicy·

10

NationalNuclearSecurity

Administration(NNSA)·16,20,

21,35,42,43,110

NationalOceanicandAtmospheric

Administration·42

NATO·27,53,60,64,81,82,87

Neutronbomb·84

NevadaNationalSecuritySite·35

Nevadatestsite·35,41,42,43

NewSTARTtreaty·9,11,29,51,54,

58,59,60,61,65,66,67,73,111

NorthKorea·12,18,27,31,32,55,

56,57,72,74,82,91,93,95,98,

101,102,103,107,109

NTS·35,37,39,40,42

NuclearNonproliferationTreaty·32,

106

NuclearPostureReview·12,23,68,

75,79,82,83,84,85,88,105,108

Nucleartriad·9,10,14,17,18,19,

22,36,70,76,86

O Obama,Barack·11,33,57,66,74,

75,82,105,106,107,108,109,

111

RoadtoZeropolicy·105,108

130

P Pakistan·51,54,55,103

Pershingmissile·53

Pifer,Steven·87

Plutonium·21,47,55,56,63,68,110

Plutoniumpits·21,68,110

Popovkin,Vladimir·80

Putin,Vladimir·53,63,64,67,75,

85,88

R Reagan,Ronald·50,52,53,73,85,

113

ReynoldsElectrical&Engineering

Company·43

Russia·9,11,19,25,27,29,30,31,

51,52,53,58,59,60,61,62,63,

64,65,66,67,68,69,70,72,73,

74,75,76,79,80,81,82,83,84,

85,87,88,91,92,96,103,107,

108,109

NationalSecurityStrategy·80

Vostok2010militaryexercise·82

Russia,missiles

RS-28Sarmat·67

SS-18·66

SS-24·66

SS-25ICBM·66

Topol-M·70

S SALTII·52

Selva,Mark·9

Shoigu,Sergei·81

Smith,JasMercer·48

SouthKorea·13,18,27,32,33,98,

101

SovietUnion·9,14,19,20,21,27,

31,52,62,73,89,90

Spencer,Jack·100

STARTI·53

StockholmInternationalPeace

ResearchInstitute·51,64

StockpileStewardshipProgram·46,

107

Super-lowyieldnuclearweapons·

81

T Tacticalnuclearweapons·14,19,20,

60,83,85

Thomson,Thomas·48

ThresholdTestBanTreaty·36

Trachtenberg,David·67

TridentSLBM·14,22,79,86,87

Tridentsubmarine·10,14,18,22,54

Trump,Donald·25

Tsirkonhypersonicmissile·67

Turner,Mike·88

U U.S.DefenseThreatReduction

Agency·99

U.S.DepartmentofState·42,66

U.S.nuclearweapons

B61·14,16,20,108

B83·14,16,110

W76·14,15,54,87

W-76Mod2·88

131

W78·14,15,110

W80·14,16

W87·14,15,110

W88·14,15,20,87

U.S.PublicHealthService·42

UnitedKingdom·42,51,54

W76-1nuclearweapon·54

W WhitemanAFB·94

Woolsey,James·56

Wu,Jianguo·84

X Xi,Jinping·76

Z Zhao,Tong·71

Date post:	07-Jun-2020
Category:	Documents
Upload:	others
View:	2 times
Download:	0 times