Habermas - Some Distinctions in Universal Pragmatics - A Working Paper

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Some Distinctions in Universal Pragmatics: A Working Paper

Jürgen Habermas

Theory and Society, Vol. 3, No. 2. (Summer, 1976), pp. 155-167.

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SOME DISTINCI'IONS IN UN IV ER SA L PRAGMATICS:

A Working Paper

J ~ ~ R G E NABERMAS

One can intuitively distinguish between the objectivity of external nature, the

normative character of society, the intersubjectivity of language, and the

subjectivity of internal nature. If this distinction has any systematic impact,

one should be able to demo nstra te corresponding structures in speech, th at isin the medium through w hich the subjec t realizes those delim itations within

every-day life. This attempt can be made by adopting the viewpoint of a

universal pragmatics, which should rationally reconstruct the general struc-

tures of speech and should thereby exhibit th e communicative com petence of

the adult speaker. From this perspective, the membranes become visible by

which language no t only b ound s itself off from external or objectified nature,

against the normative reality o f society, an d against internal subjective nat ure ,

but also, as it were, opens itself osmotically to them. In what follows I canonly deal summarily with the results of universal pragmatic studies whlch

have been m ore extensively dealt with elsewhere.*

1.1 Speech Act

We regard the speech act as th e elem ent ary unit of speech-i.e. as the smallest

(verbal) uttera nce sequence w hich is comprehensible and acceptable to at

least one other competent actor within a communications context. Universal

Max PIanck Instirut, Sturnberg

Copyright O 1976 by Jurgen Habermas. All rights reserved.

Translated by Pieter Pekelharing and Cornelis Disco.

* "Was Heisst Universal Pragmatik?" in K. 0.Apel, ed., Sprachpragmatik und Philosophie

(Frankfurt alM, 1976 ). pp. 1 74 -27 3, where further references will be found.



pragmatics aims at a reconstruction of the rule systems over which adult

speakers must have mastery in order to use sentences in utterances at all,

regardless of the specific natural language to which the sentence belongs or

the context in which it happens to be embedded. Thus, when there is

mention of speech acts below, abstract utterances are alwzys inten ded; these

do not, like concrete utterances, correspond t o some contingent context, b ut

solely t o a generalized, speech-act-typically limited con tex t. For exam ple, we

will be referring only to those contextual requisites which must in general be

fulfilled in order for a speech act to pass for an assertion instead of e.g. a

promise, a piece o f advice, an order, etc. The empirical impact of this typ e of

analysis is secured in the assumption that context-dependent verbal or non-

verbal utterances without change in meaning can be replaced by speech acts

of an explic it and stand ardize d form . Searle's "principle of expressibiLtyW

does justice to this idea: It is in principle possible th at every speech act which

one performs or could perform is unequivocally specified in a sentence (or a

number of sentences) to the extent that one assumes that the speaker has

expressed his intuition precisely, explicitly , and literally.

1.2 Illocutionary Force

With the successful com pletion of a speech act, an interpe rsonal relation ship

between two competent actors is simultaneously produced and represented.

"Doing things in saying something"-this is wh at Austin saw as the illo-

cutionary force of speech act. It is this which ties down the communicative

role of the uttere d cont ents. We can say of a speech act that i t is successful if

the intended relationship between a speaker and a hearer is brought about

and if H understands and accepts the contents uttered in the communicative

role which is indicated by S; for example, as a promise, an assertion, or an

order. The illocutionary comprehensibility and acceptability of an utterance

depends on whether the general context, required for the particular type of

speech act, holds, and on whether the speaker is prepared to engage in a

specific relationship through his act. This relationship implies the guarantee

that certain conditions will be met as a consequence of his utterance: e.g.

regarding his question as fulfilled when a satisfactory answer has been given;

dropping an assertion when its un tru th becomes apparent; or re-emphasizing

an order when it is not followed. The illocutionary force of the speech act

thus resides in its ability to move the hearer to basing his own actions on the

assum ption t ha t the speaker is making a serious offer.

1.3 Invariance of Propositional Content in Different Speech Acts

The characteristic double structure of every speech act becomes visible in its

standard-form. This form consists of two sentences: a) a sentence charac-



terized by a performative verb in the first-person present tense a nd b) a

dependent clause of propositional content. The illocutiotzary conzporlent is

thus supplemented by a propositional one. This propositional component,

when used in constative speech acts, always assumes the form of a proposi-

tion. In non-constative speech acts the propositional content is not asserted,

but only mentioned ("propositional conte nt" is equivalent t o Frege's Gedan-

ken , or t o what othe rs call "unasserted proposition"). A fundamental

feature of language is exhibited in the abstraction of the propositional

contents from the assertion of a proposition: we can hold the same propo-

sitional con ten t invariant over against changing types of speech acts.

1.4Two Levels of Communication

The uncoupling of illocutionary and propositional components in the for-

mation and transformation of speech:acts is a necessary condition for the

seperation of the two levels of comm unication:

a) the level o f intersubjectivity, on which the speaker and hearer, thro ugh

illocutionary acts, bring a bo ut the interpersonal relationships which allow

them to achieve m utual understanding and

b) the level o f objects in the w orld, or states o f affairs about which they

would want to achieve a consensus in terms of the communicative role as

laid dow n in a).

A speech act can only succeed if the participants fulfill the double structure

of speech and carry o n their comm unication on bo th levels at once: the y have

to unite the communication of a content with meta-communication aboutthe role, in which the communicated content is to be taken. Certainly,

speakers can focalize either the level of intersubjectivity, on which they deal

with interpersonal relationships, or the level of comm unicated conte nts. Thls

differentiates the interactive from the cognitive use of language. In interactive

language use we focalize the type of relationship entered into by a speaker

and hearer, as e.g. a warning, a promise, or an order, while the propositional

content of the utterance is only mentioned. In cognitive language use we

focalize the con tent of the utterance as a proposition about something whichhappens (or could happen) in the world, while we express the type of

interpe rsonal relationships on ly in passing.

1.5Validity Claims

Constative speech acts, following Austin, are those speech acts which are

permissible in cognitive language use. Th ey can be distinguished f rom o ther



speech acts by the fact that they imply an unmistakeable validity claim:

namely, a tru th claim. Of course, ot her types of speech acts also imply at

least some validity claim; but when it comes to demonstrating exactly which

validity claim they imply, we seldom come up against such a clearly

dem arcated and universally acknowledged claim as "tru th" (in the sense of

propositional truth). Gro unds for this are obvious: the validity claims of

constative speech acts are, in a certain sense, presupposed for aN types of

speech acts. The meaning of the propositional content which is expressed in

non-constative speech acts can be made explicit by transforming the speech

act into an assertion and the dependent sentence of propositional content

in to a proposition-the tru th claim the n belongs essentially to the meaning of

the propos ition expressed therein. T hus, tr ut h claims are validity claims of a

sort which are built into the structures of all possible speech. Truth is a

universal validity claim: its universality is reflected in the double structure of

speech.

Of course, truth is only the most conspicuous and by no means the sole

validity claim which is a ncho red in the form al stru ctu res of speech itself. The

illocutionary force of a speech act, which brings ab ou t an interpersonalrelationship between consensually interacting participants, arises from the

binding force of acknowledged norms of action; to the extent that a speech

act is part of consensual interaction it actualizes an already established

value-pattern. The validity of a normative background of institutions, roles,

socioculturally accepted forms of life and so on, is always already presup-

posed. This is in no way limited only to institutional speech acts which, like

"betting," "greeting," "baptizing," "naming," an d so fo rth , dire ctly fulfill

norms of action. In promises, advise, prohibitions, and prescriptions-whichare n ot a b origine regulated by institutions-the spea ker also implies a validity

claim which, for the speech act to be successful, must be in accordance with

existing norms: and tha t means, with the, a t least, factual recognition of the

claim that these norms legitimately exist. Such relations between the validity

claims implicitly made in speech acts and the validity of their normative

bac kgroun d is particularly emphasized in interac tive language use, that is, .in

~ e r f o r m i n g egulative speech acts (like giving orders , permission, m aking

recom me ndation s, etc.). In t he same way, empha sis is laid o n tru th claims incognitive language use and in the performance of constative speech acts. But

even assertions, reports, explanations, etc. also give rise to interpersonal

relationships which, in order to arise at all, must merge with established

value-patterns; this means that they must accord to an existing normative

background. So through the illocutionary force of speech acts, the normative

validity claim-i.e. rightness or legitimacy-is just as universally built in to the

structures of speech as is the tru th claim.



The same goes for the veracity of the speakers. From the moment that a

speaker falls to live up to this claim and thereby loses his credibility,

communicative action can no longer be carried on. Either the participants

shift over to strategic action; or they continue consensual interaction with

different means by entering into argumentation; or they cease communicating

forthwith. Veracity guarantees the transparency of a subjectivity representing

itself in speech. It becomes especially emphasized in expressive language use ,

where neither the interpersonal relationship nor the propositional content,

but rather the intentions of the speaker as such become thematic. Con-

sequently, veracity corresponds t o those representative speech acts allowable

in expressive language use in the same way that truth corresponds to the

constative, and legitimacy to the regulative, speech acts. But even in asser-

tions or promises the speaker expresses intentions with the claim that the

expressed intentions are meant in fact. Thus, the veracity claim too is

universally implied in all possible speech, insofar as the premises of

consensual interaction are not totally suspended. (The same is trivially so for

the claim for the comprehensibility of an utterance. The fulfillment of this

claim is presupposed in every comm unication.)

The modes of language use can only be paradigmatically bounded. I do not

want to say that given speech act sequences can be unambiguously classified

from this viewpoint. I only want to assert that every competent speaker in

principle has the possibility of choosing among one of the three modes of

communication when he unambiguously wants to state a propositional

content as such, stress an interpersonal relationship as such, or express an

intention as such. Correspondingly, we differentiate between the pro-

positional attitude of a non-participating third person, the performativeattitude of a participant conforming with the expectations of a second

person, and the expressive attitude of the first person, presenting himself in

front of o ther persons.

Having introduced several concepts of and assumptions in universal prag-

matics, I would like to undergird the original thesis with three more or lessspeculative suggestions.

2.1 Domain Deliminations

A breakdown of consensus-oriented non-strategic interaction can be avoided,

and speech acts succeed, only under the assum ption tha t the spe aker credibly

raises four validity claims simultaneously: he claims truth for a proposition



(or for the existential presupposition of the propositional coiltent men-

tioned); the n legitimacy with respect to the n orm s or the values which justify

a performatively generated interpersonal relationship in a given context;

further, veracity with respect to the self-presentation of the speaker's inten-

tions; and, finally, comprehensibility with respect t o the semantic con tent of

the senten ces used in an uttera nce. It is possible, of course, for individual

validity claims to be thematically emphasized; whereby the truth of pro-

positional c ont en ts in cognitive, th e legitimacy o f in terpers onal relationships

in interactive, and the veracity of the speakers in expressive language use,

comes to the fore; in every consensual interaction, however, the system of all

fou r validity claims comes in to play-they are universal, that is, they mu st

always be raised simultaneously, even when they cannot all be focalized at

the same time.

This universality of the validity claims which are embedded in the structure

of spe ech can now be explained by m eans of the syste ma tic locus of language.

In speech there is consistent reference t o all fou r domains-external nature ,

society, internal nature, and speech itself. Thus, we grant objectivity to those

experiences which can be expressed explicitly as propositional content.Objectivity is hereby characterized as the mode in which objectified reality

appea rs in speech. "Truth" is the c laim we ma intain with respect to the

objectiv ity of experiences. The societal reality of values and norms en ters into

speech through the illocutionary components of speech acts, as it were,

throug h the performative a ttitude of th e spea ker, while internal nature

manifests itself in speech through the intentions expressed by the speaker. We

have in troduc ed normativity and subjectivity to den ote th e way in which the

domains of a non-objectified society and a non-objectified internal natureappear. Legitimacy and veracity are th e co rrespo nding validity claims. In this

way, the universal structures of speech n ot onl y secure reference to objec-

tified reality, but also allow for the normativity of utterances as well as for

the subje ctivity of uttered intention s. Finally, I use "intersubjectivity" as a

term for the comm unality between co m pe ten t actor s which is brought about

throu gh t he understanding of identical meanings and the acknowledgement of

universal claims to validity. The claim which can be asserted with regard to

intersub jectivity is comprehensibility-this is th e validity claim which isspecific t o sp eech itself.

We can examine each seperate utterance to see if it is true or not, justified or

not, veracious or not, comprehensible or not. This is so because in speech, no

ma tter wh at is emphasized, portions of exte rnal na ture, of society, of internal

nature, and of language itself continually and simultaneously achieve expres-

sion. That this is also the case for language itself arises from the nature of



speech, viz. that it is the peculiar medium in which the means of language are

not only instrum entally applied bu t also mirrored on every occasion of their

use. The reflexive language use of indirect speech (citations, references, etc.)

only makes explicit what is implicitly the case for all speech: in speech,

speech itself stands out from the domains of external nature, society, and

inner nature as a reality sui generis, as soon as the child learns how to

distinguish symbols, meanings, and referents from on e another.

2.2 Pragmatic Universals

By adopting the stand poin t that fo ur domains simultaneously achieve expres-

sion in speech, it may also be possible to order the most important universal

properties of speech.

Each specific language offers a reference system which permits a sufficiently

reliable identification of something in the world abo ut which one would wa nt

to make propositions. In particular languages we observe various realizations

of one single elementary structure, which yields to the fundamental

catagorization of all possible objects. In each language, mechanisms areavailable which allow us to classify, serialize, localize, .and temporalize the

objects of possible experience. The universality of the reference systems

within which we objectify reality arises from the development of cognitive

operations related t o the m anipulation o f physical objects (things a nd events).

The child learns the logic of using denotative expressions through concrete

operations (in Piaget's sense) and not immediately with grammatical func-

tions.

Each specific language offers a system of personal pron ouns and a system of

speech acts with the aid of w hich we can bring a bou t interpersonal relation-

ships. The concern here, again, is with the differing realizations within

particular languages of one single elementary structure, which allows for

communicative experiences within th e performative attitud e (and subsequent-

ly for the objectification of these experiences in a propositional attitude). No

matter which performative verbs and functionally equivalent forms are

distinguishable in a particular language, it is possible, in any case, to con stru ctspeech act typologies from the viewpoint of what is acceptable for cognitive,

interactive a nd expressive mo des of language use.

Each particular language offers a system o f intentiona! expressions for the

self-presentation of subjectivity which, in spite of the degree of variation of

its exp ression in particular languages, reflects th e system of ego-delimitations.

Again, the child does not automatically learn the logic of speech act types



and the use of intentional expressions with its language; this depends, rather,

on his ego development, to which linguistic, as well as cognitive and inter-

active development contributes.

Those properties which emerge from the function of meaning, from the

syntactical organization of signs, and from the phonetic rule system, are of

autochtonic linguistic origin; that is, they are linguistic universals in the

narrower sense. The theory of phonetics has been developed to the point

where it has in principle become possible to specify the rules according to

which any given linguistic sound can be produced by combining a limited

number of phonetic elements.

2.3. Communicative Development

Our concept might stimulate new perspectives for the development of com-

municative competence. I should like to distinguish roughly three general

stages of this development with respect to the degree of differentiation

between speaking and acting as well as according to the degree of integration

of speaking and knowing. In t he first stage the child learns to master sym-

bolically mediated interactions (and the proto-forms of a cognitive language

use which is no t systematically tied in w ith interaction). In the second stage,

the maturing child can not only perform communicative acts in a general

sense, based o n t he already but can choose am ong interactive, cognitive, and

expressive language use, on the basis of an already developed system of

speech acts. In the third stage, the adolescent acquires the ability to pass from

action t o "discourse."

At the stage of symbolically m ediated interaction, speech and action are no t

clearly differentiated: the semantic c onte nt of an utterance is boun d up with

behavioral dispositions. The propositional attitude of the observer has not

yet sufficiently seperated itself from the performative attitude of the par.

ticipant and the expressive attitude of an ego, involved in self-presentation.

We can formally characterize this stage of communication with the help bf

the fundamental (and mutually inter-defming) concepts advanced by Mead:

viz. "the reflexive attitude" and "identical meaning." In symbolicallymediated interaction, A can anticipate the behavioral reactions which his

gestures call ou t in B. Moreover, he know s th at , in turn, B can anticipa te the

behavioral reactions which he would call out in A with corresponding

gestures. With this awareness, A can not only anticipate B's behavioral

reactions, but also his symbolic utterance-regardless of whether t h s is an

immediate social act or whether it is the symbolic expression for the anti-

cipation of a social act. Mead therefore speaks of a reflexive intelligence,



which becomes possible in this stage: “Tile importance of what we term

'communication' lies in th e fact tha t it provides a form of behavior in which

the organism or th e individual may becom e a n object t o himself."

When th e child has gained mastery o f a natura l language, the double structu re

of speech has been developed. The differentiation between the interpersonal

relationship entered i nto b y speaker a nd hearer and th e propositional conten t

about which they communicate, means, on the one hand, that a systematic

connection arises between communicative action and cognition and, on the

other, that speech acquires the sta tus of an indepen dent medium over against

the societal reality of esta blishe d values and norms. T he speech-act

invariance of the pro positional co nt en t has as a consequence:

- the differentiating out of a cognitive language use concentrating on

propositional content.- the linguistic organization of experience, in fact of all cognition, which

makes possible a use of language independent of situational context, by

virtue- of denotations referring t o situa tion s different from the situation of

actua l speech.

The liberation of speech acts from the imperative network of interactions

expresses itself in the differentiation between speech and its concomitant

normative background. This implies:

- a diversity of speech ac t ty pes which presup poses the validity of norms of

action, as well as a diversity o f inten tion al expressions which presupposes

th e validity of cultural values- the differentiation between the understanding of an utterance and the

acceptance of the validity claim th em atize d by the speaker.

The integration of cognition into speech and the differentiation between

speech and action fu rther implies:

- the possibility of objectifying a speech a ct afte r its performance adopting a

propositional a ttitude.- a differentiation of tw o reference system s which, in a nutshell, contain the

pre-scientific ontologies of an objectified reality which is accessible

through instrumental action and of a non-objectified society which is

experienced through comm unicative action. This occurs in such a way tha t

the speakers, through distantiations both from external nature and

normative reality, also achieve a certain remove from their own internal

nature.



The stage of formal operational thought leads to the separation out of pure

discursive speech (or argumentation). Both of the aforementioned develop-

ments, viz. the integration of speech and cognition and the uncoupling of

speech and interaction, terminate herein. Elsewhere I have dealt with

"discourse" as tha t form of com mun ication which is free from the constraints

of the very processes of action and experience, and which allows for an

exchange of arguments on hypothetical validity claims, (whereby truth and

legitimacy may count as discursively redeemable validity claims, while

veracity can only be subject t o a test of consistency over of a period o f

continued interactions).

With the transition t o the fully developed system of speech acts, it beco me s

possible for the propositional cont en t of an utterance to be seperated fro m its

relational aspect and for it t o become thema tized as an utterance in cognitive

language use; nonetheless, the propositional content in this stage remains

embedded in action c onte xts to such an e xte nt tha t the validity claim raised

for it can only naively be accepted or rejected, but cannot be problematized

as such. I t is only with the transition to "discourse" tha t the validity claim of

an assertion or th e claim f or the legitimacy of a com mand, viz. the underlyingnorm, can explicitly be questioned and topicalized in speech itself. The

propos itional co nte nt of a n assertion, in "discourse," is deprived of its

assertive force and is treated as a state of affairs which can either be the case

or n ot (the same goes for the co nte nt of a command , viz norm , the validity of

which we tre at hypoth etically.) This differe ntiating out of discursively

redeemable validity claims in the third developmental stage corresponds to

tha t of propositional conte nts in the second.

With regard to the dimensions of speech and interaction, one might suspect a

development complementary to the stage by stage integration of speech and

cognition. With the transition to the fully developed system of speech acts,

the individual utterance has, on the one hand, seperated itself off from the

normative background of institutions, forms of life, cultural values, and, on

the othe r, from the intent ions of the speaker. Thls occurs in such a way tha t

both the interpersonal relationships and the expressive content of an

utterance can be especially emphasized; neither merges any longer with thepropositional content of an utterance into a meaning-amalgam, as, for

example, in the excla ma tion "Fire!" Nonetheless, the differentiatio n am ong

cognitive, interactive, and expressive language use by no means implies the

exclusion o f speech from co ntexts of comm unicative actio n: even state me nts,

insofar as their validity is naively presupposed, are an immediate component

of interaction.



It is only with the transition to "discourse" th at the action and expe riential

conte xts are relegated to the stat us of marginal preconditions for comm unica-

tion. In a trivial sense, argumentation can still be regarded as a type of

communicative action; what is interesting, however, are the restrictive con-

ditions which underlie the ac tions of the participa nts in "discourse": these

participants, to the exte nt th at and as soon as they wish to enter into

argumentation, must assume:- that the normative validity claims of the speech context remain beyond

consideration in order t o facilitate the cooperative search for trut h- th at th e a ctual process o f ex perien ce (including) the comm unicative

experiences created in the performance of speech acts) is considered

irrelevant and that experiential contents may be brought into "discourse"

from outside, but may n ot be generated within it.

These three tentative and very roughly sketched stages in communicative

development, which is partly based on, partly corresponding with, and

complementary to cognitive development, show that the child learns to

delimit, through the formation of a system of speech acts, the subjectivity of

his own intentions over against the objectivity of objectified reality, the

norm ativity of society, and t he intersu bjectivity of language. But only the

adolescent who is capable of stepping outside of the contexts of com-

municative action from time to time and who can negate not only proposi-

tions and speech acts but also validity claims as such, (i.e. think hypothetical-

ly) learns to master the modalities of being: i e . he learns t o distinguish being

from appearance, is from ought, essence (Wesen) from existence (Er-scheinung), and sign from meaning.

Up t o this point we have defined the syste m of ego delimitations in terms of

domains (external nature, society, inner nature, language) which are experi-

enced or which are "given" in a certain way (objectivity, normativity,

subjectivity, intersubjectivity), whereas the corresponding language use

thematically focusses on specific validity claims (truth, legitimacy veracity,

comprehensibility). As soon as these validity claims can be hypotheticallygrasped and negated, then the individual domains are no longer taken for

grante d in their objectivity, norm ativity, su bjectiv ity, or intersubjectivity, but

become modal. This means that these regions are experienced or expressed

with a view to the possibility of the negation of the form in which they

present themselves. We im put e "being" t o objectified reality in view of the

possibility that ou r experiences may t urn ou t t o be mere "appearance" (and

the corresponding assertions to be untrue). This distinction between "being"



(Sein) and "appearance" (Schein) corresponds t o that between "is" and

"ought" on the one hand, and "essence" (Wesen)and "existence" (Erschei-

nung) on the other . We accept a com mand, backed by a legitimating norm , as

something which I "ought" to do , in the awareness of the possibility tha t the

"ought"-validity of the underlying norm ma y rest on wish-fantasies or on a

purely enforced acknowledgement, i.e., in both cases on mere empirical

processes, on a "being" (so tha t a corres pondin g request in "discourse" wou ld

have t o tu rn ou t as ungrounded). Lastly, it is onl y against the backgrou nd of

his possible un-veracity, that we are convinced that a speaker brings his

intentions "essentially int o existence" in his utterances and that he does not,

thereby, h d e his "essence" (so that, were we t o continue the interaction with

him long enough, we would have to assume his un-veracity at the hand of

inconsistencies).

Th e affirmative mo des of the "is" of an objectifie d reality, the "ought" of a

normatively valid reality, th e "essential existence" of an expressed sub-

jectivity, are defined as the negation of a possible deception: t he y are not

merely appearance, not only seeming validity, not simply a deceptive

existence. Such deceptions, again, arise from a non-intentional confusion ofbeing and appearance (as evidenced in hallucinations and dreams) from the

confusion of is and ought (which shows itself when wish-fantasies distort

societal reality or whe n th e legitimacy of a particular social order is a mere

facade) and, finally from the confusion of essence and existence (manifest in

self-dece ption an d "blindness"). Analogously, we can also relate non-trivial

misunderstandings back to a confusion in modes of being. We are able to

distinguish between "sign" and "meaning" in the sense of th e separability of

semantic contents from a particular symbolic representation or a represen-tation within a specific language. This ability allows us to understand the

meaning of a propositionally structured utterance while remaining conscious

of the fact that this meaning could have been stated in another way (in

another medium, another language, by another expression etc.) or more

precisely (in more exact formulations) or more happily (in more appropriate

formulations). Utterances in which the speaker is mistaken about the public

character of the symbols which are used must lead to misunderstandings,

because the semantic content forfeits its flexibility in a private language, i.e.here, sign and meaning n o longer sta nd in a c onven tional relationship to one

another, but are fused into on e syndrome.

T o the ex tent tha t we can distinguish between being and appearance, is and

ought, essence and existence, sign and meaning, and to the e xtent t ha t we are

capable of perceiving or avoiding the deceptions of mere appearance, of

seeming validity, of false existence, and of misunderstandings, that is, capable



of perceiving or avoiding unintended consequences, we are in a position to

exploit mod al errors i?~tentionall+v.

In literary fiction an d in imitative play we presuppose t ha t a fantasiz ed reality

becomes identified as appearance; simultaneously, however, we intentionally

utilize the confusion of being and appearance because the fantasized reality

of literature, of exemplars, of the theatre, of legends, etc. serves the indirect

communication of an experience which ought consistently to be taken

seriously. With the typification and idealization of actions and situations, we

presuppose that the subjective, in a certain sense seeming, character of these

normalizations (Normiemngen) will be exposed; in spite of this we are still

intentionally making use of the confusion between is and ought, because the

idealizations of reality which are entailed in simplifying it through classifica-

tions, in physical measurem ent, or in entering into argumentational speech

etc. serve cognitive goals which we have to take seriously In symbolic or

allegorical representation, in the use of ironic or metaphorical language, we

presuppose that a hypostasized appearance only seemingly represents a sub-

stantial content, i.e. is identified as an illusion; At the same time, we

intentionally utilize the confusion between essence and existence, because itis precisely the irreality of the appearance of the essence which provides us

with the disclaiming clue that the literal meaning of ironic usage or of a

metaphor, i.e. that which is immediately perceived in an allegorical image,

ought not to be taken literally or directly. Analogously, we can intentionally

employ the confusion between sign and meaning (which, when non-inten-

tional, characterizes pseudo-concrete thought) for the task of formalization,

that is, for the introduction of an algorithm wh ich allows us t o disregard the

specific contents of the operations: meaning, then, shrinks down into theformal optio ns t o use signs within the framework o f a calculus.

These intentio nal modal confusions have one element in common: viz. they

strip illusory phenomena (which primarily serve to denote the insufficient

delimitations of subjectivity from the domains of objectivity, normativity,

and intersubjectivity,) of their subjectivistic chara cter and utilize them as

media of comm unication and of knowledge. Because this intentional employ-

ment of illusory phenomena presupposes the mastery of the mechanism of

illusion, we may, contrariwise, regard the understanding of derivative moda-

lities of play, of idealized constructions, of symbolic imagery, of irony, of

formalism, etc. as a test of th e sta bility of ego deliminations. T he joke lends

itself particularly well as a test case, because the com ic effe ct o f a joke springs

from relief tha t one has no t allowed oneself to be led int o mod al confusions.

meory and Society,3 (1976) 155 -167

Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Amsterdam - hinted in the Netherlands

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Habermas - Some Distinctions in Universal Pragmatics - A Working Paper

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