Hagel, Transnational Actors, Jewish Diaspora,2005

States and Transnational Actors: WhosInfluencing Whom? A Case Study in Jewish

Diaspora Politics during the Cold War

PETER HAGELHumboldt-Universitat zu Berlin, Germany

PAULINE PERETZUniversite Paris I-Pantheon-Sorbonne, France

Transnational actors are often assumed to be autonomous in theirattempts to influence states. But whenever both share commoninterests, opportunities for mutual influences exist and states can try touse transnational actors to further their own objectives. Whereas thetheoretical discussion in IR has largely overlooked this possibility, it isno stranger to scholars of diasporas and nationalism. Informed by thisliterature, we apply our notion of state-influenced non-governmentalorganizations to the field of transnational diaspora politics with itscomplex relationships between diasporas and their homeland and hoststates. Our historical case study demonstrates how Israel, via its secretoffice Nativ, significantly influenced the Jewish diaspora and othertransnational actors in the mobilization for Soviet Jewish emigrationduring the Cold War. States are thus not only targets of transnationalactors they can also influence and even initiate transnationalmovements. In our conclusion, we discuss why such reciprocalrelationships should be generally taken into account in the study oftransnational relations.

KEY WORDS diaspora politics human rights Israel NGOs Soviet Jews transnational relations

Introduction

During the last decade, transnational actors have re-emerged as an importantsubject of International Relations (IR) theory and their impact has been

European Journal of International Relations Copyright 2005SAGE Publications and ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research, Vol. 11(4): 467493

[DOI: 10.1177/1354066105057893]

recognized as an explanatory variable for a variety of international develop-ments (della Porta et al., 1999; Higgot et al., 2000a; Keck and Sikkink,1998; Khagram et al., 2002; Smith and Johnston, 2002; Risse-Kappen,1995a). This new focus is largely trying to avoid the old controversy of astate-dominated versus a society-dominated perspective on world politics.Instead, it puts questions about the interactions between transnationalactors, states and international organizations at the centre of analysis (Risse-Kappen, 1995b; Klotz, 2002). However, most research privileges transna-tional actors as autonomous, treating the relationship between them andstates as one-dimensional. Transnational actors, be they profit-orientedenterprises or non-profit civil society organizations, are studied in theirefforts to influence state actors in order to reach their material or normativegoals. Consequently, models of the interactions between transnational andstate actors (della Porta and Kriesi, 1999: 5; Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 13)usually do not foresee the reverse relationship state actors influencingtransnational actors in order to further their own interests.

This neglect seems to be due to at least three reasons. First, almost allnon-governmental organizations (NGOs) present themselves as independ-ent from states.1 Second, a lot of research in the field still seems to be guidedby the society versus states framework, wherein sympathies frequently sidewith social actors and their role as normative vanguards (Florini, 2000;Smith et al., 1997). Third, this is reinforced by a strong reliance on socialmovement theory, which explicitly theorizes social movements as con-tentious politics, as social action directed against state politics (della Porta etal., 1999; McAdam et al., 2001; Smith and Johnston, 2002; Tarrow, 2001).Yet, manifold opportunities for reciprocal relationships between states andtransnational actors exist, especially whenever they share common interests.States can then try to influence transnational actors in order to realize theirforeign policy objectives. In this article, we will investigate this possibility,and if the phrasing is not not overused, one could describe our aim asbringing the state back into transnational relations.2

Our argument derives from a case study in Jewish diaspora politics duringthe Cold War. The plight of Jews in the Soviet Union and their right toemigrate emerged as an international human rights concern after World WarII. In the early 1960s, non-Jewish human rights activists and Jewishorganizations in various countries started putting the issue on officialpolitical agendas. Transnational links were created to exchange scarceinformation about developments inside the Soviet Union and to enrolsupport for the right of Soviet Jews to emigrate. The US, being both themost powerful state and host of the largest Jewish population, became thecentre of activism. Between 1972 and 1974, the issue entered the Americanpolicy process, leading to the adoption of the JacksonVanik amendment

European Journal of International Relations 11(4)

468

that linked the extension of US economic advantages to the Soviet Union tothe liberalization of its emigration policy.3 This was a major foreign policychange, running counter to Nixons detente.

At first sight, this process can be read as an instance of successful non-statetransnational politics.4 But our research, based on original historical sources,finds that a secret office created by the Israeli government, code-namedNativ, decisively influenced large parts of this activism. Animated by theZionist goal of achieving Soviet Jews immigration to Israel, but careful notto antagonize the Soviet Union, Nativ was responsible for covert action inmany Western countries, initiating and supporting transnational activism forSoviet Jews right to emigrate. While it had no direct impact on the actionsof grassroots organizations, Nativ was a key player behind much of theactions that emanated from Jewish establishment5 organizations in manycountries.

Audie Klotz recently observed that much of the work on transnationalactors in world politics takes the nature of these agents for granted, leavingunanswered questions about differences between types of non-state actorsand relationships between them (Klotz, 2002: 50). Our case study takes upthis challenge and goes beyond it by revealing the ambivalent nature of, andthe diverse relationships between, non-state and state actors in the transna-tional activism to help Soviet Jews. It is an interesting case, because at itscore lie human rights issues, which are often regarded as the domain oftransnational activism against state policies par excellence (Keck and Sikkink,1998; Risse et al., 1999). It is a relevant case, because it concerns animportant foreign policy issue in the context of Cold War detente. Ofcourse, it is also a special case in the sense that the constellation of actorsinvolved is quite unique.

Notwithstanding this caveat, which applies to any case study, our articledemonstrates the potential reciprocity of relationships between transnationalactors and states. Section one reviews the current treatment of transnationalactors in IR and presents a framework for analysis that incorporatesreciprocity with the notion of state-influenced non-governmental organiza-tions. Whereas the theoretical discussion in IR has largely overlooked thispossibility, it is no stranger to scholars of diasporas and nationalism(Brubaker, 1996; Shain, 1999; Shain and Barth, 2003; Sheffer, 1986,2003). Informed by this literature, in section two we apply our framework tothe field of transnational diaspora politics with its reciprocal interactionsbetween diasporas and their homeland and host states. Section three thendevelops our historical case study, which shows in detail how Israelinfluenced its diaspora and other transnational actors in the process to aidSoviet Jews. Finally, the conclusion summarizes our findings, indicates

Hagel and Peretz: States and Transnational Actors

469

similar examples outside diaspora politics and discusses the general implica-tions for future research on transnational actors.

1. States and Transnational Actors in World Politics

While constituting an extremely heterogeneous group, three major cate-gories of transnational actors have received special attention. Business actorsare seen as having relevant influences on international economic relations(Risse-Kappen, 1995a; Higgot et al., 2000a). Epistemic communities arenoticed as contributing to international cooperation wherever expertknowledge is needed (Adler, 1992; Haas, 1992). Normative activists areobserved in their efforts to establish and spread international norms (Keckand Sikkink, 1998; Khagram et al., 2002). Though all these transnationalactors are goal-oriented, they differ with regard to their respective motiva-tions instrumental goals drive business actors, shared causal ideas uniteepistemic communities, and shared principled ideas motivate normativeactivists (Abbott and Snidal, 2002; Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 30).

In the analysis of transnational actors roles in world politics, twoperspectives dominate. A first perspective examines how transnational actorsestablish private international rules to execute non-state governance fortransnational issues, circumventing the need for intergovernmental regimes(Cutler et al., 1999; Ronit and Schneider, 2001; Teubner, 1997). Instancesof this role exist especially in the regulation of international business affairs,but remain less common than international governance provided by andthrough states. Therefore, secondly, the more prominent role of transna-tional actors in world politics is seen in attempts to shape internationalgovernance by influencing states foreign policies, inter-state negotiationsand the international organizations set up by states (Keck and Sikkink, 1998;Klotz, 2002; Willetts, 1996). Directed at public officials and politicians,protests, agenda-setting and lobbying by transnational actors can achievechanges in state perceptions and interests that lead to international policiescloser in line with transnational actors aims. What unites both perspectivesis a dichotomy between transnational actors and states in which therelationship between them is unilateral. Transnational actors are treated asautonomous actors that stand apart from states, either trying to influence orto circumvent them.

This focus probably captures the majority of real world relationshipsbetween states and transnational actors, as many empirical case studiessupporting the theoretical arguments show (Florini, 2000; Klotz, 2002).But it neglects the possibility that states use transnational actors for theirown interests.6 Though Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink foresee theoption that government officials may be part of what they call transnational


470

advocacy networks, they conclude that NGOs will usually play the centralrole (1998: 9). Donatella della Porta and Hanspeter Kriesi also mention thepossibility of external support for social movements by foreign governments(1999: 11), but without integrating it into their general framework.However, instances of a reciprocal relationship can be expected to exist formany international issues, especially whenever the interests of transnationalactors and states overlap. Both can then cooperate to achieve common goals,and both can try to influence each other to further their own interests.

As NGOs have become relevant players in world politics, this issue hasbeen problematized in discussions about so-called GONGOs (Government-ally Organized NGOs), GRINGOs (Governmentally Regulated and Initi-ated NGOs) and MANGOs (Manipulated NGOs) (Higgot et al., 2000b;Hulme and Edwards, 1997). GONGOs and GRINGOs need not be ofconcern for modelling transnational relations. When an NGO is just anextended private arm of public authority, it can be treated as internationalactivity by states. The case of MANGOs is more complicated and goes tothis articles heart of the matter where does manipulation start, and howdoes it work? The assessment of manipulation being a qualitative judgementnot devoid of polemics, it is more useful to conceptualize the relationshipbetween transnational actors and states along a continuum. On one side arepure civil society organizations that operate transnationally without anyparticipation of state actors. On the other side are GONGOs and GRINGOsas state agencies with a private legal standing. In between, any kind ofmutual influences are possible, and NGOs turn into what have been calledMANGOs or we propose this as a more neutral and comprehensive term SINGOs (State-Influenced NGOs; see Figure 1).

To be appealing and to gain influence, state actors have to offersomething. This can be resources information, funding or political power and it can also be a framework of meaning that reaches beyondparticularistic state interests. If interests between states and transnationalactors coincide, cooperation can be conducted openly, as loose interestcoalitions, within advocacy networks or as publicprivate partnerships. Forexample, the US government, US-based multinational corporations and thetransnational NGO Transparency International all wanted an internationallegal instrument against business-diluting corruption and together pushedfor the adoption of the OECD Anti-Corruption Convention (Abbott andSnidal, 2002). Yet, whereas their interests are usually ultimate goals forNGOs, the same interests are sometimes only partial or instrumental goalsfor states. States can join forces with NGOs in order to fight child labour orrain forest exploitation. Whereas NGOs consider such practices as bad perse, states might primarily attach trade interests to them. A governmentmight support an NGO because it shares its humanitarian mission in a


471

foreign country, but also for other overarching foreign policy reasons(Baitenmann, 1990; Cohen, 2003). Thus, a first mechanism for stateinfluence on transnational actors consists of using value interests to achievenon-value goals.7 A second, more sophisticated mechanism is to influencethe normative framework of meaning in a policy area, so that transnationalactivism takes place in a normative context that better suits states interests.Contemporary examples can be seen in states attempts at reshaping thenormative framework of international development by incorporating newconcepts, e.g. conflict prevention or good governance (Duffield, 2001).With both mechanisms, states go beyond mere cooperation on the groundsof common interests, and influence transnational actors to reach their owninterests. Such reciprocal relationships between states and transnationalactors can appear in many policy constellations and hence need to be takeninto account in the study of world politics.

2. Transnational Diaspora Politics

A field in which reciprocal relationships are especially salient is diasporapolitics. The (re-)drawing of international borders and transnational migra-tion movements creates complex relationships between the emigration orhomeland state, the diaspora dispersed in several countries, and theimmigration or host state (Cohen, 1997; Shain and Barth, 2003; Sheffer,1986, 2003). Able to build networks of political activism across borders,diasporas are potential key players in the relations between homeland andhost state, and can be influenced by both. The collusion of interests betweendiasporas and states may take many directions, touching both domestic and

Figure 1Framework for Analysis of Transnational Actors

pure civil society private state agencies

NGOs GONGOs/GRINGOsSINGOs

TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS

STATE ACTORS

influencing

directing

reciprocallyinfluencing

instrumentaluse of value

interests

shaping theframework of

meaning


472

foreign policies (Esman, 1986: 340ff.; Sheffer, 2003: 180201). Yossi Shainand Aharon Barth distinguish between diasporas active and passive roles insuch transnational interactions (Shain and Barth, 2003: 452ff.). In theirpassive role, diasporas become part of the foreign policy objectives of usually homeland states without really being an actor themselves. Maininstances of this role are nation-states ambitions to interfere in other statesdomestic or foreign policies on the ground of taking care of their diaspora.In Central and Eastern Europe, such interactions have been widespread atleast since the 19th century (Brubaker, 1996; Mandelbaum, 2000). As Shainand Barth rightly conclude, analysis of these cases belongs [. . .] to thestandard IR scholarship dealing with foreign policy and internationalbehavior (Shain and Barth, 2003: 453).

For truly transnational politics, diasporas need to assume an active role inthe relations between homelands and host states. Diasporas can try todirectly influence homeland politics from abroad, e.g. by financing specificcauses or spreading their vision of national identity and politics. An earlyexample is the Irish Republican Brotherhood, which, with its major base inthe US, organized mobilization to free Ireland from British dominationsince the second half of the 19th century (Hanagan, 2002). Another optionfor diasporas is to indirectly influence homelands by lobbying host states inorder to affect their foreign policy towards homelands (Shain, 1999; Smith,2000). The foreign policy changes lobbied for can include increases ineconomic aid and military support for the homeland, or the recognition ofthe homeland as an independent state. Both the Jewish and Palestiniandiasporas efforts at affecting the course of the IsraelPalestine conflict areprominent cases in point. Frequently, direct and indirect diaspora influenceson the homeland coincide. Thus, in the above example, the Irish-Americanssuccessfully managed to enlist US support in addition to their own financialand ideological transfers to their homeland.

As long as diasporas act autonomously in their efforts to influencehomeland politics and host state foreign policies, they constitute a subset oftransnational actors that conforms to the standard perspective. But thingsget complicated as soon as homelands or host states approach theirdiasporas with own interests (Sheffer, 2003: 180201). Often, homelandinterests will only concern the diaspora itself. Developing countries, inparticular, have an interest in ensuring flows of money and skilled labourfrom the diaspora back into the homeland. For these purposes, manyemigration states have created special offices to foster material and culturallinks with their diaspora (Gutierrez, 1999). However, when the homelandwants the diaspora to intervene on its behalf with the host state, therelationship becomes delicate. Throughout history, diasporas have beenaccused of being a fifth column of their homeland in host states, especially


473

in times of crisis and war, when diasporas dual loyalty has been questioned(Esman, 1986: 341f; Shain, 1999: 155; Sheffer, 2003: 21938). But beingthere more or less by choice, diaspora loyalties towards the host state willtend to be strong. Even if they lie more at home, the homeland cannotexercise much more than ideological pressure, whereas the host state can useall the disciplinary mechanisms a state possesses against people residing onits territory.

Opportunities for a reciprocal relationship appear whenever homeland orhost states share interests with diasporas. A host countrys government thatwants regime change in a foreign country with authoritarian leadershipmight try to draw on the political refugees of that country to mobilizetransnational opposition among the diaspora against the homeland govern-ment. Relations between the US and Cuba or Iraq show many elements ofsuch a constellation. The issue of minority rights for diasporas is anotherfield in which homeland and diaspora share interests in the design of thehost states regime for minorities. Since the 1990s, for example, the statusand rights of its diasporas have been a key foreign policy objective forHungary (Kovrig, 2000). In our case study, the web of entanglementsbetween diasporas, homeland and host states exhausts almost the wholerange of possible interactions, demonstrating the need for a critical view ontransnational actors autonomy.

3. Transnational Activism to Help Soviet Jews

The black years of Stalinist anti-Semitism already belonged to the past in thelate 1950s, but Soviet Jewry with its nearly 3 million members still suffered,both as a national minority and as a religious group (Decter, 1963). Notonly was Jewish religious practice suppressed during the second part ofKhrushchevs mandate, synagogues and yeshivas were closed but alsoJewish culture the teaching of Yiddish and Jewish history was banned,the memory of the Shoah fought and anti-Semitic literature spread.Simultaneously, Jews were discriminated against numeri clausi inuniversity and state functions were adopted and Jews were convicteddisproportionally for economic crimes. This anti-Semitism calmed downmomentarily after 1964 with Brezhnev coming into power, but startedagain even more brutally three years later when the Israeli victory in the SixDay War gave rise to a violent anti-Zionist campaign that lasted at least until1971 (Govrin, 1998; Pinkus and Frankel, 1984). If Jews could notintegrate into Soviet society, they could not emigrate either, as emigrationwas forbidden for every Soviet citizen.

Except for the fate of those put on trial in 195253, the plight of SovietJews was generally not known abroad. One reason was that until the


474

Leningrad trials of 1970,8 Soviet authorities were extremely careful not toprovoke any event that could make the headlines in the international press.Another reason was that Jews, as all Soviet citizens, had no relations with theoutside world. Contacts between Soviet Jews and world Jewry had been cutoff by the Kremlin during the 1930s. Some information was neverthelesscoming out via diplomats, foreign correspondents and, after the mid-1960s,tourists, but it definitely remained scarce until the early 1970s. To those whoknew what it really was, the situation of Soviet Jews required help andinternational mobilization.

Issue Emergence and Transnational Mobilization

In the late 1950s, the Soviet Jewish issue emerged as an international humanrights concern inside and beyond the Jewish diaspora. In various countries,three types of actors famous public figures, progressive politicians andJewish organizations raised their voices on behalf of Soviet Jews.Intellectuals like Raymond Aron and Mane`s Sperber in France,9 and JoseLuis Romero in Argentina, denounced Moscows policy vis-a-vis Jews (Roi,1991: 110). In April 1963, the British philosopher Bertrand Russell wrote aletter to Khrushchev condemning the overrepresentation of Jews amongpeople sentenced to death for economic offences.10 Three years later, theFrench Jewish survivor and writer, Elie Wiesel, came back from the SovietUnion with an essay, The Jews of Silence, that exposed the repression of Jewsand portrayed them, against all odds, as still attached to Judaism (Wiesel,1994). Conferences of intellectuals dealing with Soviet Jewry were orga-nized in many countries 1961 in Italy, 1963 in Great Britain and LatinAmerica, 1964 in Belgium and 1965 in Scandinavia (Govrin, 1998:21213). Most ambitious was the Conference on the Status of Soviet Jews,which took place in Washington and adopted a declaration calling on theSoviet Union to stop discrimination against Soviet Jews.11

At the same time, progressive politicians started confronting Soviet leaderswith the plight of Soviet Jews. During Khrushchevs 1956 visit to GreatBritain, the leaders of the two main parties approached him with questionson the treatment of the Jewish minority (Levanon, 1999: 75). A few yearslater, he had to answer similar queries coming from Lester Pearson, theCanadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and from Scandinavian PrimeMinisters (Roi, 1991: 107). Some European communist leaders also voicedcondemnations of the Kremlins Jewish policy in the wake of the SovietCommunist Partys XXth Congress. For example, in 1966, a leader of theItalian Communist Party denounced the discriminatory treatment of Jewsby Soviet authorities in a preface to a book devoted to the subject (Morozov,1999: doc. 10).


475

With some delay, Jewish diaspora organizations in various countries alsobecame active on behalf of Soviet Jews. After a first move in the UnitedStates during Khrushchevs visit to Washington in 1959, significant mobil-ization only started during a new peak of Soviet anti-Semitism in 196263.In Canada, the Jewish Labour Committees representatives managed tomeet the Soviet ambassador and complained about Moscows treatment ofits Jewish citizens (Morozov, 1999: doc. 7). In the United States, severalestablishment organizations, mostly those that were anticommunist orZionist, voiced their criticism to Soviet officials and at the United Nations(UN). The American Jewish diaspora was also the first to create a single-issue organization entirely devoted to Soviet Jewry. Its aim was to triggercommunal mobilization and to sensitize government officials and Congressto the situation of Soviet Jewry (Orbach, 1979).

A Driving Force: Israels Office Nativ

Two questions arise when one tries to understand the simultaneity and thesimilarity in this mobilization of seemingly unrelated actors. How did theybecome aware of the plight of Soviet Jews, and what was their source ofinformation? Why did all these actions follow the same pattern? The answerslie in the activities of a secret office code-named Nativ that Israel hadcreated in 1952 and that directly reported to the Prime Ministers Office(Levanon, 1995; Kedmi, 2002; Melman, 2003).12 Although it had alreadyabandoned its policy of non-alignment, Israel did not want to threaten itsfragile relationship with the Soviet Union by raising the question of Jewishemigration. Therefore, the government decided to have two arms dealingwith the Soviet Union the diplomatic delegation pursuing Israels officialstate interest, and Nativ as a parallel organ. Though it was still utopian at thetime, Nativs goal was to ingather the exiles from the Soviet Union, whichhoused the second largest Jewish diaspora, in order to contribute to theaccomplishment of the Zionist goal and to populate the new Jewish land. AsBaruch Gur, former Nativ emissary to Washington and later its vice-director,explains From the very beginning, [. . .] the idea was to bring SovietJews into Israel. It was from the start a Zionist campaign.13 Nativ set up asmall-scale clandestine operation relying on emissaries based in the Israeliembassy in Moscow, trying to get in contact with Soviet Jews. It wanted toencourage their identification with Israel and to trigger their wish toemigrate once it became possible. Results were very limited before theemissaries left the Soviet Union when the SovietIsraeli diplomatic relation-ship broke after the Six Day War in 1967. But Nativ had not waited for thatrupture to expand its activities.


476

In 1955, Nativ had launched an operation called Bar with the aim ofgathering international support for the emigration of Soviet Jews incountries with important Jewish communities (Levanon, 1995, 1999). Toreach this goal, it had devised a strategy to set up a transnational campaignthat would raise the issue of Soviet Jewry as a human rights concern. Nativcould then channel this mobilization into the demand for the respect ofemigration rights. At the outset, international conditions were favourable. Inthe aftermath of the Soviet Communist Partys XXth Congress, the Kremlinhad become sensitive to its image abroad and was willing to enter intopacific coexistence with the West. After 1967, Nativs mission wasfacilitated by the consequences of the Six Day War reviving Zionism inthe diaspora, the new international aura of Israel and growing anti-Semitismin the Soviet Union. To all the countries it had selected, Nativ sentemissaries who worked from within the local Israeli embassy or consulate.Officially, these were diplomats specialized in Soviet affairs, but their realtask was to spread information on Soviet Jews and to provoke public actionon their behalf. In several countries, Nativ also secured the assistance of alocal Jewish intellectual coming from the non-communist Left and who waswell grounded in the political and academic scene, to disseminate literatureprovided by Nativ and to raise consciousness in these circles. The linksbetween the Israeli office and these intellectuals, which created effectivebrokerage mechanisms, remained long concealed (Sheleg, 1992).

Nativs first targets were progressive intellectual figures and politicians,whom emissaries were trying to engage in transnational advocacy networksto publicize the situation of Soviet Jews. Most of them simply shared thegoal of helping Soviet Jews on the basis of human rights concerns withoutknowing anything about Nativ. In September 1960, for example, the Israeliemissary in Paris, Meir Rosenne, organized the first international conferenceon the situation of Soviet Jews, to which he invited 40 prominentintellectuals, Jews and non-Jews from 14 different countries. The outcomewas a call on the Soviet Union to respect the religious and cultural rights ofSoviet Jews.14 Similarly, in December 1963, the Israeli office co-ordinatedthe writing of a collective letter condemning the repression of Jewishculture, addressed to Khrushchev and signed by Nobel prize winners,pacifists and writers.15

The involvement of politicians was more difficult to achieve, with most ofthem regarding their activities as anchored in their national political system.Still, Nativ could count on transnational political organizations of whichMapa, the Israeli governing party, was a member, such as the SocialistInternational. During its eighth Congress in 1963, for example, theInternational condemned Soviet anti-Semitism and advocated the reunifica-tion of families. Nativ also tried to convince statesmen to bring the issue into


477

international arenas such as the Council of Europe and, more often, the UN.From 1961 onwards, representatives of, among other countries, Australia,Canada and the US delivered speeches on the Soviet Jewry issue at the ThirdCommission and at the Subcommission on the prevention of discriminationand the protection of minorities, on the basis of articles 13(2) and 18 of theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights (Roi, 1991: 16578).16

Non-Jewish allies having been found, ensuring a broad support base,Nativ next approached the diaspora to activate its latent solidarity withSoviet Jews. The slowly emerging memory of the Shoah and the diasporasaccompanying feeling of guilt for not having been able to prevent itreinforced the appeal of Nativs aims. In the US, the Jewish establishmentswish to present a clear anti-Communist profile further eased Nativs task inthe beginning. Its emissaries enticed several national Jewish establishmentorganizations to create institutions specifically devoted to Soviet Jewry, suchas the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry (AJCSJ) in 1964, theNational Council for Soviet Jewry in the United Kingdom and the CanadianCommittee for Soviet Jewry in 1971. Interviewed by the American JewishCommittee, Yoram Dinstein, a former emissary of Nativ to New York, statedin 1989 The AJCSJ was essentially our creation.17 Diplomatic docu-ments also show that in 1965, Golda Meir, then Minister of Foreign Affairs,intervened herself to express Israels backing of the AJCSJ and to ask theAmerican Jewish establishment to give higher priority to the Soviet Jewishissue.18 In all the countries where it was active, Nativ provided what Keckand Sikkink call the common frame of meaning (Keck and Sikkink, 1998:7). It persuaded each Jewish establishment organization to abandon therespect of cultural and religious rights for Soviet Jews as their main objectiveand to make emigration rights their first priority.19 Nativ succeeded byhaving a representative attending most of the meetings dealing with SovietJewry and by channelling selected information on Soviet Jews, which theorganizations could not have obtained otherwise.

Once the common frame of meaning had been adopted by Jewishorganizations in various countries, Nativ induced them to work together ina transnational manner after the Leningrad trials. The most visible step inthat direction was the convening, by Nativ, of the first World Conference onSoviet Jewry, which took place in Brussels, in February 1971. It gatheredIsraeli politicians, international Jewish leaders, and 760 delegates from 38countries, representing organizations that had been working with Nativduring the previous years. In the US, Nativs emissaries attended allpreparatory meetings for the conference, making clear what their preferredoptions were. Zvi Netzer, the head of Bar in Tel-Aviv, controlled most ofthe organizational details, and all the background documents had beenprepared by academics working in close contact with Nativ. Another proof of


478

the Israeli offices strong influence was the declaration adopted by theconference, which put most emphasis on emigration. Also, the conferencecalled for closer collaboration among Jewish organizations.20 Under theaegis of Nativ, transnational cooperation between national Jewish establish-ment organizations was institutionalized, allowing for information exchan-ges and harmonization of strategies.

Through Nativ and its emissaries who could count on Jews sense ofkinship and non-Jews attachment to human rights Israel provided theimpetus for the transnational mobilization on behalf of Soviet Jewry. Goingbeyond diaspora politics, it not only relied on Jewish organizations, but alsoformed a coalition of international public figures to condemn the Kremlinstreatment of Soviet Jewry. This proved to be especially clever, since itgathered in advance the allies that Jewish organizations would later needduring the policy-shaping phase. On the continuum we have drawn, all thesetransnational actors fit without doubt much better into the SINGO categorythan into the normal NGO category. Israel provided only information andadvice, and the transnational actors sometimes resisted instructions comingfrom Nativ. Still, Israel significantly influenced them to mobilize for SovietJews emigration, Nativs Zionist goal.

Grassroots Independence

It would be wrong, however, to think that the transnational campaign onbehalf of Soviet Jewry was only Nativ-driven. Conforming to the standardperspective on transnational actors, it was also due to civil society action bygrassroots NGOs situated on the left end of our continuum. In that respect,this mobilization offers an excellent example of the differences betweentypes of non-state actors that can exist within one campaign. In manycountries, Jewish activists who stood in opposition to the Jewish establish-ment also wanted to aid Soviet Jews. They were primarily motivated by guiltfor not having been able to rescue Jews from the Shoah, and a will to takeanother chance to help a persecuted part of the diaspora.21 In theirbackgrounds and methods, grassroots activists strongly differed from theestablishment, which feared the intrusion of these newcomers into diasporapolitics. In fact, Nativs collaboration with the establishment became one ofthe main reasons why the grassroots refused to work with it.

Already in the late 1950s, some individuals had created grassrootsorganizations devoted to Soviet Jewry. In 1958, Maoz was founded in Israelto fill what was perceived as an absolute lack of concern Nativs actionbeing secret (Roi, 1991: 2313). In 196364, grassroots organizationssprang up in the US, such as the Cleveland Council on Soviet Anti-Semitism, and the Student Struggle for Soviet Jews, joined by local councils


479

for Soviet Jewry that federated into the Union of Councils for Soviet Jewry(UCSJ) in 1971. Later, similar groups were formed in Israel the ActionCommittee of Newcomers from the Soviet Union; in the United Kingdom the Women 35s; and in Canada the Toronto Council for Soviet Jews.All these organizations operated on a voluntary basis with very limitedfinancial resources and promoted action through non-establishment means,e.g. interruptions of Soviet cultural events or boycotts of firms doingbusiness with the USSR (Orbach, 1980: 78).

Though these organizations were aware of each others activities, theyonly started working together as a transnational advocacy network in 1969.The trigger was, in August, a petition written by 18 Georgian Jewishfamilies, addressed to the UN Human Rights Commission. It revealed to theWest the existence of Soviet Zionist groups that had been formed in theaftermath of the Six Day War and opened opportunities for the creation ofchannels between Soviet Jews and Western activists. What Keck and Sikkinkcall the boomerang pattern started to take effect at that point and, as theyemphasize, the central role of information explains the drive to createnetworks (1998: 12ff., 18ff.). Soviet activists had no way of influencing theirown government, but they could count on international allies to putpressure on the Soviet Union from outside. This boomerang could onlywork if Soviet Jews were capable of transmitting messages to Westernactivists. For activists who had no access to the information processed byNativ, the costs of getting information were very high a telephone call tothe USSR was still an expensive and hazardous operation, the reliability ofthe mail low, and skills in Russian rare. Consequently, the quest for contactsand up-to-date news triggered cooperation between the grassroots.

Two networks operated simultaneously one linking Western activistsamong themselves, and one connecting them with Soviet Jews. Within thefirst network, grassroots activists gained awareness of actions taken by othergroups and access to information on Soviet emigration policy, as well asnames and addresses of activists and refuseniks. A very good example is theCleveland Council on Soviet Anti-Semitisms cooperation with grassrootsleaders in Canada, Israel and the United Kingdom who were regularlycalling the Soviet Union.22 These frequent contacts led to mutual inspirationand similar styles of activism, but compared to the institutionalizedcollaboration of the establishment organizations, the grassroots networks inthe West remained loose and random. The second network was even morefragile. Its purposes were to provide Western activists with the credibilitythey needed to speak on behalf of Soviet Jews, and to enable the latter toexpress their expectations towards the West, mainly to put a greateremphasis on their right to emigrate. Due to exchanges in this network,American activists in particular could generate information that was reliable,


480

transmit it to political actors and engage in what Keck and Sikkink callinformation politics (1998: 16). The networks created by the grassroots inparallel to those of Nativ allowed them to strengthen their local activities,but their mobilization was never as effective as the establishments.

Agenda-Setting and Policy-Shaping in the United States

Once the transnational campaign had installed the Soviet Jewish emigrationissue as an international concern, it took a decisive political turn in the USthat led to a major change in American foreign policy. Right from thebeginning, Nativ had considered the US as a special actor, because it wasthe only state that could potentially affect the Soviet Unions domesticpolicies. Also, the significance of the American Jewish community called fora key American role it was the most numerous 5 to 6 million Jews the best organized, and the most powerful. Pluralist by nature, theAmerican political system was relatively open to ethnic groups influence,and the US had a tradition of humanitarian intervention on behalf of Jews(Smith, 2000).

For these reasons, Nativs intervention in the United States was the mostsophisticated version of all that had been put into place in other countries.With two emissaries one in New York dealing with Jewish organizations,one in Washington establishing contacts inside the Administration andCongress and with the help of Jewish intellectual Moshe Decter, Nativwas well prepared to carry out its mission. It enrolled wide support highlevel liberals, such as Eleanor Roosevelt, Justices William Douglas andArthur Goldberg; Civil Rights figures like Bayard Rustin and Martin LutherKing, Jr; and members of Congress, some Jewish Abraham Ribicoff(Republican-Connecticut) and Jacob Javits (Democrat-New York) somecoming from a constituency with a large Jewish base most senators andrepresentatives from New York and California some who were old friendsof Israel such as Senator Henry Jackson (Democrat-Washington)(Levanon, 1995: 195210). Nativ also managed to influence the AJCSJ/NCSJ like no other Jewish SINGO in the diaspora. The Americanconditions were just as ideal for pure civil society NGOs, which also hadtheir share in shaping American societys perception of the Soviet Jewryissue, but mainly on a local level. Due to this broad-based mobilization,which intensified during and after the Leningrad trials in December 1970,the Soviet Jewish situation was gaining in popularity as a human rightsconcern. The increasing number of articles published on the issue in theNew York Times after 1969 demonstrates this impact (see Figure 2).

The mobilization succeeded in putting the issue on the US foreign policyagenda. Establishment and grassroots Jewish organizations tried, through


481

national and transnational action, to convince American public opinion andpoliticians to pressure the White House. The Executive was then to compelthe Kremlin to respect its human rights obligations vis-a-vis Jews. Theydiffered in their methods, their (in-)dependence from Nativ and theirpolitical clout. In comparison to the establishments actions, the grassrootsattempts at influencing political actors had limited effects, because they werenot being taken as seriously. Until the early 1970s, the agenda-settingobtained only minor results. The American delegation at the UN raised theissue several times, and members of Congress introduced several resolutionsand bills trying to pressure the Kremlin to comply with international legalnorms, but none of these actions succeeded.23

With the first SovietAmerican detente-summit in May 1972, theAmerican movement entered a fully political phase. Great progress had beenmade through detente negotiations on arms limitation, the resolution ofthe ArabIsraeli conflict and trade relations were taking the right direction,

Figure 2Number of Articles on Soviet Jews Published in the New York Times*

1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1973 197419720

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

USSRAnti-Semitism

USSR Politics(articles on Soviet Jews)

USSR,Immigration

* The classification follows the subdivisions of the New York Times Index. USSR, Immigrationrefers to Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union and Soviet Jewish immigration into theUS.


482

at the same time as the Basic Principles were adopted. The Kremlin neededto get out of its economic isolation, and Washington, still recovering fromthe Vietnam War and noticing the Soviet Unions narrowing of the missilegap, was ready for rapprochement (Garthoff, 1994: 27ff.). Since theinternational condemnation of the Soviet regime that followed the Lenin-grad trials in 1971, the Kremlin had shown its understanding that SovietJewish emigration had become a necessary concession to pursue detentewith the West.24 While emigration had remained very low until then,Moscow now opened its doors and let more than 30,000 Jews leave thecountry in a year. In this context, the adoption, in August 1972, of aneducation tax on would-be emigrants appeared as regression and maderapprochement unacceptable to all human rights defenders. Nixon andKissinger agreed to raise the issue with the Soviets,25 but they refused to linkdetente to Soviet internal affairs. They feared that such a linkage wouldthreaten their foreign policy and were convinced that linkage should be usedonly with regard to international issues.

A few members of Congress some of whom had been approached byNativ and Jewish organizations had another idea of what linkage shoulddo. They proposed linking the extension of economic privileges creditguarantees and most favoured nation status to the liberalization of Sovietemigration policy. Grassroots activists contributed to the formulation of thelinkage proposal, which landed on Senator Jacksons desk.26 It matched hisCold War liberal agenda at a time when he was running as the Democratpresidential candidate it opposed Nixons detente, it would portray himas the defender of human rights and it would surely bring him the supportof American Jews and Labour (Kaufman, 2000). Jackson therefore intro-duced the linkage as an amendment to the EastWest Trade Reform Act on4 October 1972, and later to the Trade Reform Act that included theratification of the Trade Agreement with the Soviets. It united detentesopponents, human rights defenders, progressive liberals and protectionistsopposed to trade with the Kremlin (Stern, 1979). Jewish organizations establishment SINGOs and grassroots NGOs that had previouslycontributed to the framing of this issue were very influential in the lobbyingprocess that led to the adoption of the amendment in December 1974. Atthe local level, by organizing letter-writing campaigns and meetings withrepresentatives; at the national level, by persuading individual members ofCongress to become co-sponsors or to stop opposing the amendment.Establishment organizations, which were counter-lobbied by Nixon whosaw the amendment as a major threat to detente, were successful in resistinghis pressure (Peretz, 2003). Also, both types of organization played animportant role in conveying the support of Jewish organizations from other


483

countries, just like Soviet activists, with whom they were maintaining anongoing liaison the boomerang was fully functioning.

Nativs role in the adoption of the JacksonVanik amendment was limited.Most important, the linkage idea had not originated in its office. It appearedon the congressional agenda approximately a year before the Yom KippurWar, a most sensitive time for Israel, whose first priority had become toobtain Washingtons assistance. Despite Nativs firm backing of the amend-ment, the Israeli foreign ministry hesitated to support JacksonVanik,because it ran counter to Nixons foreign policy and could hence threatenthe American aid Israel badly needed. Finally, Prime Minister Golda Meirdecided that Israel would not try to convince Jewish establishment leaders todrop their support for the amendment (Levanon, 1995: 397401).27 Froma historical perspective, however, Nativ had already fulfilled its goal. In about15 years, the activities of its emissaries had created the context awarenessof the Soviet Jews plight and empathy for them and the conditions issue framing, network-building, agenda-setting that were necessary forshaping a policy that could help Soviet Jews to emigrate. Its men hadprepared the ground that led to the American demand for Moscow torespect Jews emigration rights, and to the creation of a political instrumentthat could have leverage on the Kremlin.28 Nativ was thus responsible forindirectly influencing the foreign policy of a country host to the largestJewish diaspora vis-a-vis a state that housed the second largest part of thediaspora. It had accomplished this long term-goal by fostering a fully-fledged transnational mobilization on behalf of Soviet Jews.

Conclusion

Our case study shows that states are not only targets of transnationalactivism they can also influence and even initiate transnational move-ments, which supports our argument for introducing the category of state-influenced NGOs (SINGOs) into the study of transnational relations. Partof the worldwide mobilization for Soviet Jewish emigration is in line withthe standard perspective on transnational actors. Jewish grassroots organiza-tions established a small-scale cross-border network to help Jews leave theUSSR. In the US, they had the idea of linking emigration with trade andlobbied for the JacksonVanik amendment that would introduce this linkageinto trade relations with Moscow. But their activism alone would not havesufficed to make a political difference. The engagement of more establishedactors with more political weight was necessary for the campaign to achievethe adoption of JacksonVanik, which constituted a major foreign policychange during detente. This mobilization emanated from Israels secretoffice, Nativ, which had pursued a long-term strategy to put the Soviet


484

Jewry issue on the international political agenda, to organize transnationalsupport and to make emigration the principal demand.

To exercise influence on transnational actors, states have to offersomething. This can be resources or a framework of meaning that reachesbeyond particularistic state interests. In our case, it was both. Nativ had theinformation about Soviet discrimination against Jews and commandedpersonnel to spread awareness of it. And it could frame its interest as auniversal human rights concern that was able to attract a wide coalition oftransnational allies. Jewish establishment organizations in many countriesbecame engaged because Nativ activated solidarity among the diaspora.Would establishment organizations not have raised their voice without Nativjust as well? As a counterfactual, this question can only be answered withmaybe. But their diaspora activism would surely have happened later, in aless transnational fashion, and probably without making emigration thepriority issue. This last point is essential because appeals to the Kremlin toend discrimination and to respect the cultural and religious rights of SovietJews would have been other possible focal points of the campaign. AsBaruch Gur emphasizes Nativ could tolerate the diversity of voices, butthey had to have a common denominator: to accept the role of Israel andaliyah [literally ascent to Israel] as a goal; to talk about Jewish culture inthe Soviet Union, but without considering it too seriously.29 Nativsinfluences on the diasporas value interests and the common framework ofmeaning were decisive to achieve Israels non-value interest of gathering theSoviet diaspora in the new state of the ancient homeland.

Similar constellations can exist in many transnational relations, which iswhy we contend that the notion of SINGOs generally needs to be taken intoaccount. Diaspora politics are a primary field for reciprocal relationshipsbetween states and transnational actors because of the variety of interestsboth homeland and host states can have towards their diasporas. But theyare certainly not the only such field in world politics. In our case, Israelsinfluence went well beyond the diaspora when Nativ orchestrated its effortsto have public figures and progressive politicians join the transnationalcampaign, most of whom had no idea about Nativ and its mission.Whenever transnational actors goals overlap with states foreign policyobjectives, opportunities for collaboration arise, particularly if states offerresources for achieving common goals. But while their objectives are usuallyultimate goals for NGOs, they are sometimes only instrumental goals forstates, or at least states can attach other interests to them, like installingregional security and stability, opening up export markets, or mobilizingresistance against an unwelcome foreign regime (Cohen, 2003; Hulme andEdwards, 1997).


485

With the ideological and geopolitical struggles between communism andliberalism, 20th-century history is rich in examples of states influencingtransnational actors on the basis of shared values and goals. After theRevolution, the USSR used the Comintern to spread its version of commu-nism abroad via the control of national communist parties and satelliteorganizations, such as unions, youth movements and intellectual groups.Consequently, the evolution of communist organizations in other countriesreflected both the rivalries inside the Kremlin and Moscows foreign policyobjectives. Until 1928, while being bolshevized, the Comintern imposed aradical restructuring upon them; under Stalin, their autonomy was emascu-lated and they were pushed to adopt the class vs class tactic; and the volte-face towards the Popular Fronts and anti-fascist unity in 1934 was due to theCominterns new leadership and Moscows quest for collective securityagreements (Broue, 1997; McDermott and Agnew, 1996).

After World War II, impressed by the USSRs transnational manoeuvres,the US drew inspiration from the Cominterns practices and used the CIA topromote its views of a liberal and federalist Western Europe among societalgroups and organizations. The USs secret support to the EuropeanMovement (Aldrich, 2001), its efforts to make European trade unions andthe British Left less socialist and more Atlantist (Wilford, 2003) and itsbacking of the Congress on Cultural Freedom (Scott-Smith, 2001) are welldocumented. In all these cases, the CIA channelled funds through Americanintermediaries and helped to create new organizations, select their leadershipand generate mass support for their ideas. Yet, the CIA was never a puppet-master [US] state agencies [. . .] did not control the private spherebut directed it in the pursuit of its strategic vision (Lucas, 2003: 60).

In the expanding area of transnational humanitarian activism, oftensupposed to be politically neutral, states can also influence NGOs byconnecting aid with other foreign policy goals. For refugee and relief workduring the Afghan war in the 1980s, Helga Baitenmann has shown in detailhow most NGOs working cross-border, and most advocacy NGOs wereconscious agents of political interests (1990: 82) Pakistan and the US, inparticular, supported them in sustaining the anti-Soviet Afghan forces. Inthe post-Cold War environment, questions about how states make NGOshumanitarian aid part of their strategic calculations remain just as relevant,e.g. in conflicts in Kosovo, Rwanda or Sudan. Being the donors that fundsubstantial parts of NGOs humanitarian operations, states increasingly wantto make sure that these also contribute to broader development and securityaims (Cohen, 2003; Duffield, 2001).

The apparent independence of some of the major transnational NGOs likeAmnesty International or Greenpeace might be responsible for the wide-spread academic assumption of transnational actors autonomy. Our case


486

study in diaspora politics and the aforementioned considerations about othertransnational relations demonstrate that this cannot always be taken forgranted. Since states can build upon common objectives and use theirresources to influence transnational actors, the latters autonomy can only bea hypothesis that demands careful examination (Tarrow, 2001: 16). Betweenthe operations of GONGOs and pure civil society activism lie a wide rangeof reciprocal influences among states and transnational actors that can becaptured within the category of SINGOs. Exploring this field, futureresearch may further differentiate how and to what extent state influencehappens, particularly with regard to the distinct uses of covert operationsand open collaboration. The mechanisms we identified states instru-mental use of value interests and their strategic shaping of the commonframework of meaning are likely to be employed in other transnationalrelations, too, with probably less need for secrecy than in our Jewishdiaspora case. Considering the creativity states have shown in influencingdomestic actors, subsequent research will certainly expand the variety ofmechanisms at work vis-a-vis transnational actors. In particular, the materialinterdependencies that emerge out of state-sponsored funding for transna-tional actors services present a rich field for more studies on SINGOs.

Notes

We thank Walter Mattli for very valuable advice, three anonymous reviewers and theeditors of EJIR for insightful and beneficial comments, and the participants of theJournees Histoire et Science Politique in March 2004 in Paris for helpfulsuggestions on earlier versions of this article.

1. Therefore, collaboration between state actors and NGOs might often be of aninformal or even secret nature. In our case study, only in-depth research inarchives and via interviews permitted the discovery of the interaction betweenstate actors and NGOs.

2. The definition of transnational relations as regular interactions across nationalboundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate onbehalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organization (Risse-Kappen, 1995b: 3) allows for the involvement of state actors. But, as our casestudy shows, it is not always clear how autonomous non-state actors are.

3. At the time, this was the amendments main objective. Its phrasing, however, ismore general in order to apply to any non-market economy. It was later appliedto Rumania, Bulgaria, China and Vietnam, and is still in effect today.

4. No comprehensive study exists on this issue. Paula Stern (1979) explains theadoption of the JacksonVanik amendment as the sole result of congressionalmobilization, highly underestimating the role of Jewish organizations and totallyignoring that of Israel. J.J. Goldberg (1996) depicts it as the result of Jewishmobilization, but goes too far when he sees it as a founding moment for theJewish lobby. He mentions the influence of Israel in the creation of the American


487

Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry, but fails to understand that it is only onepart of a larger international campaign designed by Nativ. Howard Sachar(1985) succeeds better in showing the international ambitions of the operationdesigned by Israel, but is not able to give a satisfying overview of Nativsactions.

5. The term establishment designates the Jewish community organizationsdirected by a small and self-perpetuating leadership drawn mainly from theJewish elite.

6. We concentrate on the interactions between transnational normative activistsand states. However, our remarks probably also hold true for other transnationalactors and their roles in establishing private governance and influencinginternational organizations. For analysis of how states can influence privategovernance, see Drezner (2004).

7. Our understanding of state influence on NGOs resembles what Payne (2001:446) discusses as strategic framing. To be effective, such cognitive mechanismsneed to be combined with relational mechanisms like brokerage (McAdam et al.,2001: 25ff.). In our case, this happened when Nativ established links with andamong Jewish diaspora organizations and human rights activists, and cooptedsome diaspora activists, in order to frame the issue of Soviet Jewish emigrationaccording to the Israeli states interests. For the general analysis of socialmechanisms, see Hedstrom and Swedberg (1998).

8. These trials imposed death sentences upon Jewish activists who had tried tohijack a plane in Leningrad to leave the Soviet Union. The harshness of thesesentences gave rise to an international condemnation of the Kremlin.

9. Interview with Meir Rosenne (Nativ emissary to Paris and New York, later Israeliambassador to France and the US), Jerusalem, 17 October 2002.

10. 130/4326/7, Israel State Archives (ISA).11. Moshe Decter, 5/2, SSSJ archives, Yeshiva University.12. Also interview with Nechemia Levanon (Nativ emissary to Moscow and

Washington, and head of Nativ, 19721982), Kfar Blum, 24 October 2002. Allinformation about Nativ in this article is firmly rooted in interviews with formerNativ personnel, archives of American Jewish organizations and documents ofthe Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We probably underestimate Nativs realscope of action, because its own archives are still classified.

13. Interview with Baruch Gur, Tel-Aviv, 21 October 2002.14. Conseil Representatif des Juifs de France, Conference internationale sur la

situation des Juifs en Union sovietique, Paris, 1960.15. 130/4326/7, ISA.16. Article 13(2): Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own,

and to return to his country; Article 18: Everyone has the right to freedom ofthought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change hisreligion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and inpublic or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worshipand observance.

17. Transcript of an interview with Yoram Dinstein, Soviet Jewry movement in


488

America, New York Public Library and American Jewish Committee, OralHistory Collection, 1989. See also Peretz (2004). The AJCSJ was reorganizedand renamed National Conference on Soviet Jewry in 1971.

18. Telegram from Avidar to Moshe Bitan, re: meeting between Golda Meir andthe CPMAJO, 8 October 1965, 93.8/6550/12, ISA.

19. Interview with Jerry Goodman (former executive director of the NCSJ), NewYork, 25 April 2002.

20. Brussels Conference on Soviet Jewry, box 44, NCSJ collection, AmericanJewish Historical Society.

21. An important reason for people to create new grassroots organizations was thatthey held the establishment responsible for failing to rescue European Jews fromthe Shoah.

22. Interview with Lou Rosenblum (former head of the CCSA and later of theUCSJ), Cleveland, 18 June 2003.

23. Among them were the Senate resolution on full religious freedom in 1963, theSoviet Jew relief Act of 1971, and the Bill to amend the Export AdministrationAct of 1969 in order to promote freedom of emigration in May 1972.

24. The latest research on the issue in Soviet archives shows that the Kremlin did nothave a coherent policy line (Morozov, 1999). Most of the time, it reacted toexternal pressures, be they American, Israeli or Arabic. Two own interests were emigration as a way to solve internal difficulties (to get rid of activists andunassimilated minorities, to create openings in selected areas of housing andprofessions for the growing Russian middle-class, to get currency), andemigration as a means to have leverage on the international scene (to furtherdetente, to influence both Israel and Arab states).

25. The Nixon Presidential Materials (housed at the National Records and Archivesin College Park, Maryland) show that Nixon did not raise the issue of SovietJewish emigration during the first Moscow Summit in May 1972 despite strongdomestic pressure, but that he could not oppose this pressure any longer afterthe imposition of the education tax by the Soviets (National Security Council,Country files-Europe, boxes 710, 719724 and Country files Europe-USSR,boxes 67, 7172, 7677).

26. Interview with Lou Rosenblum, Cleveland, 18 June 2003, and Rees bill,CCSA archives, Western Reserve Historical Society.

27. Also interview with Levanon, Kfar Blum, 24 October 2002.28. In the end, this leverage failed when the Soviet Union retreated from the trade

negotiations and Soviet Jewish emigration decreased. On the complex reasons ofJacksonVaniks failure to reach its objective, see Peretz (2002). This, however,does not diminish the activists policy-shaping accomplishment.

29. Interview with Baruch Gur, Tel-Aviv, 21 October 2002.

References

Abbot, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal (2002) Values and Interests: InternationalLegalization in the Fight Against Corruption, Journal of Legal Studies 31(2):14178.


489

Adler, Emanuel (1992) The Emergence of Cooperation: National EpistemicCommunities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear ArmsControl, International Organization 46(1): 10145.

Aldrich, Richard James (2001) The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold WarSecret Intelligence. London: John Murray.

Baitenmann, Helga (1990) NGOs and the Afghan War: The Politicisation ofHumanitarian Aid, Third World Quarterly 12(1): 6285.

Broue, Pierre (1997) Histoire de lInternationale Communiste (19191943). Paris:Fayard.

Brubaker, Rogers (1996) Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the NationalQuestion in the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cohen, Robin (1997) Global Diasporas: An Introduction. London: UCL Press.Cohen, Samy (2003) La resistance des Etats: Les democraties face aux defis de la

mondialisation. Paris: Le Seuil.Cutler, A. Claire, Virginia Haufler and Tony Porter (eds) (1999) Private Authority

and International Affairs. New York: SUNY Press.Decter, Moshe (1963) The Status of the Jews in the Soviet Union, Foreign Affairs

42(1): 42030.della Porta, Donatella and Hanspeter Kriesi (1999) Social Movements in a

Globalizing World: An Introduction, in Donatella della Porta, Hanspeter Kriesiand Dieter Rucht (eds) Social Movements in a Globalizing World, pp. 322.Basingstoke: Macmillan.

della Porta, Donatella, Hanspeter Kriesi and Dieter Rucht (eds) (1999) SocialMovements in a Globalizing World. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Drezner, Daniel W. (2004) The Global Governance of the Internet: Bringing theState Back In, Political Science Quarterly 119(3): 47798.

Duffield, Mark (2001) Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging ofDevelopment and Security. London: Zed Books.

Esman, Milton J. (1986) Diasporas and International Relations, in Gabriel Sheffer(ed.) Modern Diasporas in International Politics, pp. 33349. New York: StMartins Press.

Florini, Ann M. (ed.) (2000) The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society.Tokyo/ Washington, DC: Japan Center for International Exchange/ CarnegieEndowment for International Peace.

Garthoff, Raymond L. (1994) Detente and Confrontation: AmericanSoviet Rela-tions from Nixon to Reagan. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute.

Goldberg, J.J. (1996) Jewish Power: Inside the American Jewish Establishment.Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Govrin, Yosef (1998) IsraeliSoviet Relations 19531967. Portland, OR: FrankCass.

Gutierrez, Carlos Gonzalez (1999) Fostering Identities: Mexicos Relations with itsDiaspora, Journal of American History 86(2): 54567.

Haas, Peter M. (ed.) (1992) Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordina-tion, special issue of International Organization 46(1).

Hanagan, Michael (2002) Irish Transnational Social Movements, Migrants, and the


490

State System, in Jackie Smith and Hank Johnston (eds) Globalization andResistance: Transnational Dimensions of Social Movements, pp. 5374. Lanham,ML: Rowman & Littlefield.

Hedstrom, Peter and Richard Swedberg (eds) (1998) Social Mechanisms: AnAnalytical Approach to Social Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Higgot, Richard A., Geoffrey R.D. Underhill and Andreas Bieler (eds) (2000a) Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System. London: Routledge.

Higgot, Richard A., Geoffrey R.D. Underhill and Andreas Bieler (2000b) Introduc-tion: Globalisation and Non-State Actors, in Richard A. Higgot, Geoffrey R.D.Underhill and Andreas Bieler (eds) Non-State Actors and Authority in the GlobalSystem, pp. 112. London: Routledge.

Hulme, David and Michael Edwards (eds) (1997) NGOs, States and Donors: TooClose for Comfort? Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Kaufman, Robert G. (2000) Henry M. Jackson: A Life in Politics. Seattle, WA:University of Washington Press.

Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) Activists beyond Borders: AdvocacyNetworks in International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Kedmi, Yaacov (2002) Nativ: A Clandestine Group that is Dying a Slow Death,Haaretz, 24 December.

Khagram, Sanjeev, Kathryn Sikkink and James V. Riker (eds) (2002) RestructuringWorld Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms. Minneapo-lis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Klotz, Audie (2002) Transnational Activism and Global Transformations: The Anti-Apartheid and Abolitionist Experiences, European Journal of InternationalRelations 8(1): 4976.

Kovrig, Bennet (2000) Partitioned Nation: Hungarian Minorities in CentralEurope, in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.) The New European Diasporas: NationalMinorities and Conflict in Eastern Europe, pp. 1980. New York: Council onForeign Relations.

Levanon, Nechemia (1995) Hakod Nativ [Nativ was the code name]. Tel-Aviv: AmOved Publishers.

Levanon, Nechemia (1999) Israels Role in the Campaign, in Murray Friedman andAlbert D. Chernin (eds) A Second Exodus: The American Movement to Free SovietJews, pp. 7083. Hanover, NH/London: Brandeis University Press.

Lucas, W. Scott (2003) Beyond Freedom, Beyond Control: Approaches to Cultureand the StatePrivate Network in the Cold War, Intelligence and NationalSecurity 18(2): 5372.

McAdam, Doug, Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow (2001) Dynamics of Contention.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McDermott, Kevin and Jeremy Agnew (1996) The Comintern. A History ofInternational Communism from Lenin to Stalin. London: Macmillan.

Mandelbaum, Michael (ed.) (2000) The New European Diasporas: National Minor-ities and Conflict in Eastern Europe. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.

Melman, Yossi (2003) A Tattered Cloak and a Rusty Dagger, Haaretz, 24January.


491

Morozov, Boris (1999) Documents on Soviet Jewish Emigration. London: FrankCass.

Orbach, William W. (1979) The American Movement to Aid Soviet Jews. Amherst,MA: University of Massachusetts Press.

Orbach, William W. (1980) Israel vs Soviet Jewry, Response 38: 720.Payne, Rodger (2001): Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction, European

Journal of International Relations 7(1): 3761.Peretz, Pauline (2002) Des considerations humanitaires a` lheure de la detente?

Ladoption de lamendement Jackson-Vanik par le Congre`s americain(19721975), Revue dhistoire diplomatique 2002(2): 12550.

Peretz, Pauline (2003) The Influence of the Jewish Lobby on American ForeignPolicy Perception and Reality. The Example of the Adoption of the JacksonVanik Amendment, paper presented at the 2003 SHAFR conference, 69 June2003, Washington, DC.

Peretz, Pauline (2004) The Action of Nativs Emissaries in the United States: ATrigger for the American Movement to Aid Soviet Jews, 19581974, Bulletin duCentre de recherche franais de Jerusalem 14: 11228.

Pinkus, Benjamin and Jonathan Frankel (eds) (1984) The Soviet Government and theJews, 194867: A Documented Study. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Risse, Thomas, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds) (1999) The Power ofHuman Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change. Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press.

Risse-Kappen, Thomas (ed.) (1995a) Bringing Transnational Relations Back In:Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

Risse-Kappen, Thomas (1995b) Introduction, in Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.)Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures,and International Institutions, pp. 333. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.

Roi, Yaacov (1991) The Struggle for Soviet Jewish Emigration, 19481967. Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ronit, Karsten and Volker Schneider (eds) (2001) Private Organizations in GlobalPolitics. London: Routledge.

Sachar, Howard M. (1985) Diaspora: An Inquiry into the Contemporary JewishWorld. New York: Harper & Row.

Scott-Smith, Giles (2001) The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress forCultural Freedom, the CIA and Post-War American Relations. London: Rout-ledge.

Shain, Yossi (1999) Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the UnitedStates and their Homelands. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shain, Yossi and Aharon Barth (2003) Diasporas and International RelationsTheory, International Organization 57(3): 44979.

Sheffer, Gabriel (ed.) (1986) Modern Diasporas in International Politics. New York:St Martins Press.


492

Sheffer, Gabriel (2003) Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.

Sheleg, Yair (1992) Conspiracy of Silence, Kol Hair Yerushalayim, 20 Novem-ber.

Smith, Jackie and Hank Johnston (eds) (2002) Globalization and Resistance:Transnational Dimensions of Social Movements. Lanham, ML: Rowman &Littlefield.

Smith, Jackie, Charles Chatfield and Ron Pagnucco (eds) (1997) TransnationalSocial Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State. Syracuse, NY:Syracuse University Press.

Smith, Tony (2000) Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Makingof American Foreign Policy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Stern, Paula (1979) Waters Edge: Domestic Politics and the Making of AmericanForeign Policy. Westwood, CO: Greenwood Press.

Tarrow, Sidney (2001) Transnational Politics: Contention and Institutions inInternational Politics, Annual Review of Political Science 2001(4): 120.

Teubner, Gunther (ed.) (1997) Global Law Without a State. Aldershot: Dart-mouth.

Wiesel, Elie (1994) Tous les fleuves vont a` la mer. Memoires. Paris: Le Seuil.Wilford, Hugh (2003) The CIA, the British Left and the Cold War: Calling the Tune?

Portland, OR: Frank Cass.Willetts, Peter (ed.) (1996) The Conscience of the World: The Influence of Non-

Governmental Organisations in the UN System. London: Hurst and Co.


493

Date post:	26-Sep-2015
Category:	Documents
Upload:	ceraselarizea
View:	225 times
Download:	1 times