EGG-HS-6329 JULY 1983 CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC DiABLO CANYON UNIT 1 (PHASE I) DOCKET NO. 50-275 S. A. Jensen T. H. Stickley idaho National Engineering Laboratory ve.a',ed Dy tne U.S. Ds"„artment ot Energy p H Car&~ P This is an informal report intended for use as a preliminary or working document 8308300861 8308i9 PDR ADOCK 05000275 P PDR Prepared for the U, S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COf6HISS ION Under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-76ID01570 FIN NO. A6457 ~~ ~HZ& Idaho fl
Transcript
EGG-HS-6329JULY 1983
CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTSPACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRICDiABLO CANYON UNIT 1 (PHASE I)DOCKET NO. 50-275
S. A. JensenT. H. Stickley
idaho National Engineering Laboratoryve.a',ed Dy tne U.S. Ds"„artment ot Energy
p H
Car&~P
This is an informal report intended for use as a preliminary or working document
8308300861 8308i9PDR ADOCK 05000275P PDR
Prepared for theU, S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COf6HISS IONUnder DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-76ID01570FIN NO. A6457 ~~ ~HZ&Idaho
fl
EGG-HS-6329JULY 1983
CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTSPACIFiC GAS AND ELECTRICDIABLO CANYON UNiT 1 (PHASE I)DOCKET NO. 50-275
S. A. JensenT: H. Sticktey
Idaho National Engineering Laboratoryc a w ww ini U S M gas ion)aint of energy
fQJ
This is an informal report intended for use as a preliminary or working document
CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTSPACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC
DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1
(PHASE I)Docket No. 50-275
AuthorS. A. Jensen
Principal Technical InvestigatorT. H. Stickley
Publ i shedJune 1983
EG&G Idaho, Inc.Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415
Prepared for theU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-76ID01570FIN NO. A6457
ABSTRACT
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has reeves ed tha all nu"lear
plants either operating or under construe ion submit a response ofcompliancy with NOREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power
Plants." EG&G Idaho, Inc., has contracted with the NRC to evaluate the
responses of those plants presently under cons ruction. This reportcontains EGKG's evaluation and recommendations for ";ablo Canyon Un t
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Diablo Canyon Unit 1 does'ot totally comply with the guidelines ofNUREG-0612. In general, compliance is insufficient in the following area:
o Information on special lifting devices was insufficient to verifycompliance with ANSI H14.6-1978.
, The main report contains recommendations which will aid in bringingShe above item into compliance with the appropriate guideline.
CONTENTS
ABSTRACT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTROOUCT ION
1.1 Purpose of Review ..
1.2 Generic Eackoround
1.0 Plant-Specific Background
2. EVALUATION ANO RECOMMENOATIONS
2.1 Overview .
2.2 Heavy Load Overhead Handling Systems .
2.3 General Guidelines
2.4 in:crim Pro:ection Measures
iOt1C <+C Isa Sva si .+AY
3. 1 Applicable Load Handling Systems
3. 2 Guide 1 inc Recommendati ons
R r ER NCES e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ (
18
22
22
25
TABLES
2. 1 Ca egory 1 overhead handl ing systems
3. 1 NJREG compliance matrix 26
CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NUCLEAR POKER PLANTS
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC
DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1
(PHASE I)
l. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Pur ose of Review
This technical evaluation repcrt documents the EG&G Idaho, Inc.,review of general load-handling policy and procedures at Diablo Canyon
Unit 1. This evaluation was performed with the objective of assessing
conformance to the general load-handling guidelines of NUREG-0612,
"Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants," [1], Section 5. 1. l.This constitutes Phase I of a two-phase evaluation.
1.2 Generic Background
Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 was established by the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to systematically examine
staff licensing criteria and the adequacy of measures in effect atoperating nuclear power plants to assure the safe handling of heavy
loads and to recommend necessary changes to these measures'his~0
activity was initiated by a letter issued by the NRC staff on May 17,
1978 [2], to all power reactor applicants, requesting information'concerning the control of heavy loads near spent fuel.
The results of Task A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, "Control ofHeavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." The staff's conclusion from
this evaluation was that existing measures to control the handling ofheavy loads at operating plants, although providing protection from
cer ain potential problems, do not adequately cover the major causes
of load-handling accidents and should be upgraded.
in order to upgrade measures for the control of heavy loads, ;ne staffdeveloped a series of guidelines designed to achieve a two-phase
objective using an accepted approach or protection philosophy. The
first portion of the objective, achieved through a set o, general
guidelines identified in NUREG"0612, Article 5 . i. 1, is to ensure hatall load-handling systems at nuclear power plants are designed and
opera-ed such that their probability of failure is uniformly small and
ap"ropria e for the critical tasks in which they are employed. The
second portion of the staff's objective, achieved througn guidelines14entified in NUREG-0612, Articles. 5. 1.2 through 5. 1.5, is to ensure
that, for load-handling systems in areas where he'.r failure m',ght
result in significant consequences, either (a) features are provided,in addition to those required for all load-handling sys ems, to ensure
that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a
single-fai'lure-proof crane) or (b) conservative evaluations ofboa"'-hand,ing accidents indicate that the po ential consequences ofany load drop are acceptably small. Acceptabi li y of accident
consequences is quantified in NUREG-0612 into four acciden" analysisevaluation criteria.
The approach used to develop the staff guidelines for minimizing the
po en ial for a load'drop was based on defense in depth and issummarized as follows:
Provide sufficient operator training, handling system
design, load-handling instructions, and equipment inspec ionN
to assure reliable operation of the handling system
Qefine safe load travel paths through procedures and
operator training so that, to the extent practical, heavy
loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe
shutdown equipment
o Provide mechanical stops or electrical in erlocks to preven:
movement of hea'vy loads over irradiated fuel or in proximi y
to equioment associated with redundan. shutdown paths.
Staff guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in
Section 5 of NUREG-0612.
1.3 Plant-Specific Back round
On December 22, 1980, the NRC issued a letter I'3] to Pacific Gas and
Electric (PGEE), the applican: for Diablo Canyon, requesting :hat the
applicant review provisions for handlina and control of heavy loads a-
Diablo Canyon, evaluate these provisions with respect to -he
guidelines of NUREG-0612, and provide certain additional informationto be used or an independent determination of conformance to these
guidelines. On September 24, 1981, PGIKE provided the initialresponse [4] to this request. On September 30, 1982, PGIKE provided a
revised response I'9] to this request. An additional revised response
I 10] o the request was provided by PGKE on Yiay 9, 1983.
. 3
2. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
2. 1 Overview
The following sections summarize Pacific Gas and Electric's review ofheavy load-handling at Diablo Canyon Unit 1 accompanied by EGEG's
evaluation, conclusions, and recommendations to the applicant forbr:'.nging tne facilities more completely into compliance wi h the
in:ent of NUREG-0612. The applican: has indicated the weight o a
heavy load for this facility (as defined in NUREG-0612, Article 1.2)as 1813 pounds.
This section reviews the applicant's list of overhead handling systemswhic'", a. e subjec- to the criteria of NUREG-0612 and a review Gf ';he
jus->fica:ion for excluding overhead handling sys ems from the
above-men;ioned lisw.
2.2.1 Secre
"Repor the results of your review of plant arrangements toiden ify all overhead handling systems from which a load drop mayresul in damaoe to any system required for plant shutdown ordecay heat removal (taking no credit for any interlocks,technical specifications, operating procedures, or detailedstructural analysis) and justify the exclusion of any overheadhandling system from your list by verifying that there issu;ficient physical separation from any load-impact point and anysafety-related component to permit a determination by inspec-ion:hat no heavy load drop can result in damage to any system orcomponen required for plant shutdown or decay hea removal."
A. Summar of Applicant's Statements
The applicant's review of overhead handling systems
identi "ed -he cranes and hoists shown in Table 2. 1 as -hose
which handle heavy loads in the vicinity of irradia;ec fuelor safe shu down equipment.
TABLE 2.1 CATEGORY 1 OVERHEAD HANDLIMG SYSTEMS
Crane
C-140-01
C-140-06
C-140-13
Descri tion
200 Containment Structure Polar CraneT
2T Reactor Head Stud Tensioner Monorail
15T Missile Shield Hoist
AF-140-08
AF-115-04
AF-115-05
AF-115-10
AF-115-11
125 Fuel Handling Area Crane
12 Monorail for RHR Heat Exchangers 1-1, 1-2T
12 Monorail for RHR Heat Exchangers 2-1, 2-2T
2 Monorail for Motor-Genera'.or Set 1-1T
2 Monorail for Motor-Genera-'.or Set 1"2T
AF-1'5-12 3 Monorail for. Mc or-Generator Set 2-1
AF-115- j3
AF-100-06
AF-100-07
AF-85-01
AF-85-09
AF-73-01
AF-73-02
AF-73-03
AF-73-04
AF-73-05
2 Monorail for Motor-Generator Set 2-2
3 Monorail for Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump 1-2T
3 Monorail for Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump 1-1T
1-1/2 Monorail for Safety Injection Pumps 1"1, 1-2T
1-1/2 Monorail for Safety Injection Pumps 2-1, 2-2T
3 Monorail for Component Cooling Water Pumps 1-1, 1-2, 1-3T
3 Monorail for Component Cooling Water Pumps 2-1, 2-2, 2-3T
3 Monorail for Charging Pumps 1-1, 1-2T
3 Monorail for Charging Pumps 2-1, 2-2T
2 Monorail for Containment Spray Pumps 1-1, 1-2, andT
Charging Pumps 1-3
TABLE 2.1 (Continued)
Crane
AF-73"06
AF"64-04
T"140-.01
T"140-02
T-119-05
T"'>o-06
1-'7.5-01
Description
2 Monorail for Containment Spray Pumps 2-1, 2-2, andT
Charging Pumps 2-3
Dual 2 Monorail for RHR Pumps 1-1, 1-2T
Dual 2 Monorail for RHR Pumps 2-1, 2-2
115 Turbine Bui lding Bridge CraneT
115 Turbine Building Bridge CraneT
20 Monorail for Moisture Separator Reheater 1-2AT
3 Monorail for Building Heater Reboiler 0-1T
50 intake Structure Gantry CraneT
The applicant has also identified numerous other cranes thathave been excluded from satisifying the criteria of'hegeneral guidelines of NUREG-0612. The first criteria used
to exclude cranes was physical separation. The applicantdefined physical sepa'I.ation "as horizontal offset between
the load path and any target component a . any elevationunderneath the load, accounting for the width of the load
and the target." Load-handling systems were also excluded"if the only component which could be damaged by the load
drop would already be out of service for repair ormaintenance." Systems carrying loads less than the definedheavy load of 1813 lb were also excluded.
B. EGKG Evaluation
The applicant has used cri eria consistent with the intentof NUREG-0612 to exclude cranes from satisfying the criteriaof the general guidelines.
C. EGM Conclusions and Recommendations
On basis of the information available, EGKG concludes thatthe applicant has included all applicable hoists and cranes
in their list of handling systems which must comply with the
requirements of the general guidelines oi NUREG-0612.
2.3 General Guidelines
This section addresses the extent to which the applicable handling
systems comply with the general guidelines of NUREG-0612,
Article 5.1. 1. EG&G's conclusions and recommendations are provided in
summaries for each guideline.
The NRC has established seven general guidelines which must be met n
order to provide the defense-in-depth approach for the handling ofheavy loads. These guidelines consist of the ollowing criter a from
Section 5.1.1 of HUREG-0612:
,o Guideline 1 —Safe Load Paths
o Guide 1 ine 2—Load-Handl ing Procedures
o Guidel ine 3--Crane Oper ator Training
o Guideline 4—Special Llfting Devices
o Guideline 5—Lifting Devices (not specially designed)
o Gu',deline 6 —'Cranes ( Inspection, Testing, and Yaintenance)
o Guideline 7--Crane Design.
These seven guidelines should be satisfied for all overhe'~d handlingsystems and programs in order to handle heavy loads in the vicinity of;he reactor vessel, near spent fuel in the spent-fuel pool, or inother areas where a load drop may damage safe shutdown systems. The
succeecing paragraphs address the guidelines individually.
"Safe load paths should be defined for the movement of heavyloads to minimize the potential for heavy loads, if dropped, -oimpac. irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and in thespent-fuel pool, or to impact safe shutdown equipment. The pathshould follow, to the extent practical, s ructural floor members,beams, etc., such that if the load is dropped, the structure ismore likely to wi hstand the impact. These load paths should bedefined in procedures, shown on equipment layou. crawincs, andciea. ly marked on the floor in the area where the loaa is to bebanc!ed. Deviations from defined load paths should requirewritten alternative procedures approved by the plant safe;yreview committee."
A. Summar of Applicant' Statements
PGIKE included in their response several drawings showing
load paths for the cranes listed in Table 2.1. The
applicant also stated that. these "load paths were determined
with the objective of avoiding the spen.-fuel pool, ".he
reactor cavity, and other safety-related equipment where
possible." The applicant stated that detailed procedures
will identify areas of exclusion and other administrativerequirements. The lifting procedure(s) will require the
rigger-in-charge to provide visual aid to the crane operator.
B. EGEG Evaluation
PGKE has developed and shown load paths on equipment layoutdrawings for all of the applicable cranes. h'hile marking
the load path on the floor is not mentioned by the
applicant, they have sta ed that visual aid will be provided
by the rigger-in-charge with the help of detailed drawings.
C. EGIIG Conclusions and Recommendations
Procedures and safe load paths for heavy loads atDiablo Canyon Unit 1 are consistent with the intent ofGuideline 1 based on the information provided by PGEE.
"Procedures should be developed to cover load-handlingoperations for heavy loads that are or could be handled overor in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdownequipment. At a minimum, procedures should cover handlingof those loads listed in Table 3-1 of NUREG-0612. Theseprocedures should include: identification of requiredequipment; inspections and acceptance critria requiredbefore movement of load; the steps and proper sequence to befollowed in handling the load; defining the safe path; andother special precautions."
A. Summar of Applicant's Statements
PG&,E uses a general procedure for handling heavy equipment
(PG&E Nuclear Plant Administrative Procedure C-702). They
also stated that additional procedures "identify major
lifts, handling, interlocks, and other administrativerequirements."
B. EG&G Evaluation
The applicant states that, load-handling procedures have been
developed at the Oiablo Canyon Nuclear Plant. These
procedures were also stated to contain the informationspecified in the guideline.
C. EG&G Conc',usions and Recommendations
Qiablo Canyon Unit 1 is consistent with Guideline 2 in thatprocedures have been developed by the applicant to meet the
criteria of this guideline.
2.3.3 Crane Ooera or Trainin Guideline 3. NURFG-0612
Article 5.1.1 3
"Cr ane operators should be trained, qualified, and conductthemselves in accordance with Chapters 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976,'Overhead and Gantry Cranes'5j."
A. Summar of AD'plicant's Statements
PG&E.stated .hat "training courses, operator certifica ion,and procedures to control operator conduct all meet he
requirements of ANSI B30.2-1976 without exception. A
training course for qualifying crane ope. a-ors, "i4"aintenance
Training Course H-21," has been developed as "Nuclear Plan:Administrative Procedure B-?50." In developing courses,
ANSI B30.2-1976 is being followed wi hout exc'eptions.
10
8. EGEG Evaluation
Based on the applicant's response, training co'urses,
operator certification, and conduct are consistent with thisguideline.
C. EGKG Conclusion and Recommendations
Diablo Canyon Unit i procedures and requirements are
consistent with the requirements of Guideline 3 based on theinformation provided.
2.3.4 S ecial Liftin Devices Guideline 4 NUREG-0612
Article 5.1.1 4
"Special lifting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSiN14.6-1978, 'Standard for Special Lifting Devices for ShippingContair ers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for NuclearMaterials'6j. This standard should apply to all speciallifting devices which carry heavy loads in areas as definedabove. For operating plants, certain inspections and load testsmay be accepted in lieu of certain material requirements in thestandard. In addition, the stress design factor stated inSection 3.2. 1. 1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the combinedmaximum static and dynamic loads that could be imparted on thehandling device based on characteristics of the crane which willbe used. This is in lieu of the guideline in Section 3.2. 1. 1 ofANSI N14.6 which bases the stress design factor on only the.weight (static load) or the load and of the interveningcomponents of the special handling device."
A. Summar of A licant's Statements
The applicant identified three special lifting devices thatmust conform with ANSI N14.6 requirements. They were the
reactor vessel head lifting device, the reactor internalslifting device, and the reactor vessel inspection toollifting device.
In their first response, the applicant identified sixspecial lifting devices'. They eliminated several speciallifting devices either because "they do not carry 1'oads oversafe"shutdown components or spent fuel, or ... that no load
drop caused by their failure could adversely affectsafe-shutdown capability or he in egr'ity of exposed fuel."
The applicant has eva':uated the reactor vessel head liftingdevice and the reactor in:ernals lifting device.Conclusions of their evaluation are as follows:
"Item-by-item evaluation of the RPV Head and InternalsLifting Oevices shows that, in general, the rigs meet the
intent of the ANSI N)4.6")978 standard. Some of the
operation and maintenance procedures will be modified tocomply with 'ANSI requirements.
"The resul:s of -he detailed stress evaluation showed 'hatthe computed s resses are, ir. oeneral, well wi hin the A:SC
allowable stresses, and in many cases, these a'e only a
fraction of the ul'timate strength of the material. Tne
stress design factor requirements of'NSI N)4.6-1978 are not
completely satisfied; nevertheless, ~ ~ ~ the rigs are
considered to have safe load-handling capability.
"PGE E plans to contract out the reactor vessel inspection tospecialized contractors, and to require the contractor'sRVIT lifting device to comply with all applicable portionsof ANSI N)4.6."
EGKG Evaluation
The a plicant identified three special lif ing devices. InEG5G's judgment PGKE's evaluation of these three devices isconsistent wi h :he intent of this guideline and the
requirements of ANSI N)4.6 with the followingexception: The reactor vessel head lift'ing device and the
reactor internals lifting device have not been subjected toa test load greater than their rated load. ANSI N14.6
requires a 150% overload test. A test greater than 100% ofrated load should be performed even if the full 1SG;.'s not
possible. A typical test to demonstrate proof ofworkmanship might be in the 120-12S% range.
PGEE evaluation showed that in some cases the stress design
factors of ANSI N14.6 are not satisfied. However, the
design factors in all cases meet AISC allowables. EGKG
feels that for the few cases where ANSI N14.6 stress design
factors are not satisfied, a testing and inspection pr'ogram
with special attention to those parts which have lower
safety factor is consistent with the intent of the
guideline. Also, procedures to reduce the possibility ofimpact 'or dynamic loads snould be used for these devices.Those special lifting devices which are excluded from
ANSI N14.6 evaluation on the basis of redundancy ofequipment over which they operate should be evaluated by
PGE E. Since redundancy in some cases is accomplished by
procedures which may fail because of human or mechanical
failures, and since the requirements of NUREG-0612 are based
on protection in depth, EG5G feels that elimination of some
special lifting devices on the basis of redundancy of system
over which they operate is inconsistent with the intent ofthis guideline.
C. EGEG Conclusions and Recommendations
Diablo Canyon Unit 1 does not now fully comply with the
requirements of Guideline 4 and ANSI N14.6-1978. Compliance
with this guideline should be complete for each special
lifting device before it is used to lift a heavy load near
fuel or safety-related equipment. In order to comply or to
justify noncompliance, EG5G recommends that the applicantperform the following:
13
( 1) Evaluate special lifting devices not evaluated due toredundancy of equipment over which they are used.
(2) Perform an adequate overload test for special liftingdevices to ensure that adequate streng'h has been
attained in the lifting devices.
(3) Reduce he possibility of overs ro ss in the lif ing
devices with low safety factors by r
ducking
the
possibility of impact loads through the use ofprocedures which may use lower crane speeds, load paths
which reduce the possibility of impact, and any otherprocedure which may reduce dynamic load possibilites.
2.3.5 Li ftina Devices Not Soeciall Desianed Guideline 5
N'"~EG-06I2, Ar icle 5.1.1 5
"Lifting devices that are not specially designed should be<nstal led and used in accordance with the guidelines ofANSI B30. 9-1971, 'lings'7] . However, in sel ecting the pr ope.sl',ng, -he load used should be the sum of he static and maximumdynamic load. The rating identified on the sling should be in:erms of the 's atic load'hich produces the maximum s atic anddynamic load. Where this restricts slings to use on only certaincranes, the slings should be clearly marked as to the cranes withwhich they may be used."
n. Summar of Applicant's Statements
The applicant states tha't all slings used at Diablo Canyon
Uni 1 meet or exceed the requirements of ANSI B30.9-1971,
except that approximately naif of the slings were
proof-tested and tagged since they had not been tagged priorto the applicant's initial response. The applicant alsosta es that dynamic loads are accounted for in sling marking
and use.
B. EG&G Evaluation
The applicant's response provides sufficient information forEG&G to state that they are consistent with Guideline 5.
C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommenda.ions
The Oiablo Canyon Nuclear Plant is consistent withGuideline 5.
2 '.6 Cranes Ins ection Testin and Maintenance Guideline 6
NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.1 6
"The crane should be inspected, tested, and maintained inaccordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, 'Overhead andGan.ry Cranes,'ith the exception that tests and inspectionsshould be performed prior to use where it is not practical tomeet the frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for periodic inspection andtest, or where frequency of crane use is less than the specifiedinspection and test frequency (e.g., the polar crane inside a PWR
containment may only be used every 12 to 18 months duringrefueling operations, and is generally not accessible duringpower operation. ANSI B30.2, however,'alls for certaininspections to be performed daily or monthly. For such craneshaving limited usage, the inspections, test, and maintenanceshould be performed prior to their use)."
A. Summar of A licant's Statements
Crane inspection, testing, and maintenance meets or willmeet the requirements of ANSI B30.2 except for certain testfrequencies which cannot be met due to inaccessibility as
noted in NUREG-0612 Guideline 6.
B. EG&G Evaluation
The applicant sta.es that PG&E's crane inspection, testing,and maintenance program is based on ANSI B30.2-1976.
15
C. EGKG Conclusions and Recommendations
The Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant Unit 1 is consistent wi;hGuideline 6. The crane inspection, testing, and maintenance
programs are based on the requirements of ANSI B30.2-1976.
"The crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria andguidelines of Chapter 2"1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, 'Overhead andGantry Cranes,'nd of CMAA-70, 'Specifications fot ElectricOverhead Traveling Cranes'8]. An alternative to aspecification in ANSI 830.2 or CMAA-70 may be accepted in lieu ofspecific compliance if the intent of the specification issatisfied."
A. Summar of Applicant's Statements
Bridce ranes at Diablo Caryon were designed prior to
publishing of .CMAA-70 and Chap er 2-1 of ANSI 30.2-1967.
The main code used in their design was the "Specificationor Electrical Overhead Travelino Cranes for Steel Mill
Service," Association of Iron and Steel Engineers Standard
No. 6 (tentative) dated May 1, 1969. Specific differences,between the design codes used and those required by
Guideline 7, identified by the applicant include the
following:
( 1', Melding on the cranes was done in accordance with AMS
D. 2. 0 rather than Ah'5 D. 14. l.
(2) Impact loading requiremen s are different, but all he
cranes conform to the CMAA 70 specification at theirra ed capacity.
(3) CMAA 70 requires higher moments of incr-ia forlongi udinal stiffeners than zhe-AISE code, bui load
testing has not indicated any problems.
(4) Nominal allowable stresses vary between the
before-mentioned standards. The applicant justifiedsome differences by comparing crane use and loadingcriteria between the standards and by stating thatcranes have been successfully tested to 125 of ratedcapacity.
(5) Mechanical differences in required horsepower,
to!erances for wheels, and clearances between wheels
and rails were also noted and deemed not to be
significant.
Monorai ls and hoists which do not fall into classificationsof which CMAA 70 and ANSI 830.2 apply were compared to othersimilar codes and standards. The monorails and hoists were
stated to sa.isfy the requirement of these standards, except
for five monorails which do not satisfy AISC allowable
stresses. The monorails are being modified to satisfy the ~
AISC requirements.
B. EG&G Evaluation
The cranes at Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant Unil 1 were
procured to industrial s andards of the time. Based on
PG&E's comparison of differences, EG&G would concur that the
cranes which PG&E included in their response meet the intentof Guideline 7.
Monorails and other cranes which do not easily fall into the
classifications for which CMAA 70 and ANSI B30.2 apply were
compared to similar standards, and were stated to comply
with those standards, or that modifications were being done
to ensure compliance.
17
C. EG8G Conclusions and Recommenda ions
Diablo Canyon Unit 1 overhead bridge or gantry cranes are
consistent with Guideline 7 on the basis of compliance toAISE Standard No. 6 criteria. Information available on
design standards for the majority of the cranes listed as
being subject to the guidelines shows that they are
corsistent with standards comparable tc those specif.,:ed by
the guideline.
2.4 interim Protection Measures
The NRC staff has established (NUREG"0612, Article 5.3) six interimprotection measures to be implemented at operating nuclear power
c,lan:s to provide reasonable assurance tha. no heavy loads will be
hand'.ed over the spent-fuel pool and that measures exis to reduce thepotential for accidental load drops to impac on fuel in the core orspen--fuel pool. Four of the six interim measures of the reportconsist cf Guideline 1, Safe Load Paths; Guideline 2, Load-Handling
Procedures; Guideline 3, Crane Operator Training; and Guideline 6,
Cranes ( Inspec:ion, Testing, and Maintenance). The two remainina
in crim measures cover the following: criteria:
o Heavy load technical specifications
o Special review for heavy loads handled over the core.
T:"e applicant s implementation and evaluation of these interimprotec;ion measures are contained in the succeedings paragraphs ofthis sec-ion.
"Licenses for all operating reac-ors not naving a single-failure-proof overhead crane in:he fuel storge pool areashould be revised to include a speci ~ication comparable oStandard Technical Specification 3.9.7, 'Crane Travel
18
~ ~
Spent Fuel Storage Pool Building,'or PWRs and StandardTechnical Specification 3.9.6.2, 'Crane Travel,'or SWRs,to prohibit handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storaoepool until implementation of measures which satisfy heguidelines of Section 5.1."
A. Summar of A licant's Statements
Station maintenance procedures prohibit movement of heavy
loads over the spent-fuel storage pools or the open reactorcavity except under detailed procedures.
B. EGRG Evaluation
Diablo Canyon Unit 1 meets the intent of the requirements ofInterim Protection Measure 1 because the reactor cavity and
the fuel pool area are restricted areas unless a detailedprocedure ha» been written directing or permitting such
action. The applicant should review administrative controlsto ensure that the previous statement is true for all cases.
C. EGEG Conclusion and Recommendations
Diablo Canyon Unit 1 complies with Interim ProtectionMeasure 1, based on the above evaluation and recommendation.
2.4.2 Interim Protection Measures 2 3 4 and 5--AdministrativeControls
"Procedural or administrative measures Lincluding safe loadpaths, load-handling procedures, crane operator training,and crane inspection]... can be accomplished in a short time
~ period and need not be delayed for completion of evaluationsand modifications to satisfy the guidelines of Section 5. 1
of [NUREG-0612]."
A, Summer o f Apo 1 i can . '. s Statements
Summaries of applicant's statements are contained indiscussions of the respective general guidelines inSections 2.3. 1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3, and 2.3.6, respectively.
B; EGEG Evaluations Conclusions and Recommendations
EGEG evaluations, conclusions, and recommendations are
contained in discussions of the respective general
guidelines in Sections 2.3. 1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3, and 2.3.6.
Interim Protection Measure 6—S ecial Reviews for Heav
Loads Over the Core
"Special a. ention should be given to procedures, eouipment,and personnel for the handl.ing of heavy loaves over the core,such as vessel internals or vessel inspection ools. This
.special review should include the following for theseloads: (a) review of procedures for installation of riggingor lifting devices and movement of the load to assure thatsufficient detai 1 is provided and that instructions areclear and concise; (b) visual inspections of load-bearingcomponents of cranes, slings, and special lif.ing devices toidentify 'laws or'deficiencies that could lead to failure of
he component; (c) appropriate repair and replacement ofdefective components; and (d) verify hat the craneoperators have been properly trained and are familiar withspecific procedures used in handling these loads, e.g., handsignals, conduct of operations, and content of procedures."
A. Summar of Apolica'nt's Statements
The applicant has stated that the intent of this action has
been met by the development of detailed procedures. These
procedures require, pre-lift visual inspection of the crareand all special lifting devices. jn addition, pre-li;tmee ings will be held to review the procedure.
20
B. EGEG Evaluation and Conclusion
Oiablo Canyon Unit 1 complies with the intent of interimProtection Heasure 6.
21
3. CONCLUDING SUMYiARY
3.1 Applicable Load-Handl inc S stems
The list of cranes and hoists supplied by the applicant as being
subject to the provisions of NUREG-0612 is adequate (see
Section 2.F 1).
3.2'uideline Recommendations
Compliance with the seven NRC guidelines for heavy load-handling(Section 2.3) are partially satis<'ied at Diablo Canyon Unit 1. Thisconclusion is represented in tabular form as Table 3. 1. Specificrecommedations to aid in compliance with the intent of these
guidelines are provided as follows:
Guideline Recommenda-ion
1. (Section 2.3. 1) a. Diablo Canyon Unit 1 is consistentwith this guideline.
2. (Section 2.3.2) a. Diablo Canyon Unit 1 is consistenwith this guideline.
3. (Sec .ion 2.3.3) a. Diablo Canyon Unit ) is consistenwith this guideline.
(Sec 'on 2.3.4) a. Evaluate special lifting devices
not presently evaluated.
22
'
~
Guideline Recommendation
b. Perform an adequate overload testfor special lifting devices.
c. Reduce the possibility of largeimpact load for the special liftingdevice having low safety factors.
~5. (Section 2.3.5) a. Diablo Canyon Unit 1 slings are
consistent with this guideline.
6. (Section 2.3.6) a. PG&E's crane inspection testing and
maintenance program is consistentwith this guideline.
7. (Section 2.3.7)I
a. Cranes and hoists at Diablo Canyon
Unit 1 are consistent with theintent of this guideline.
The NRC staff has established (NUREG-0612, Article 5.3) that certainmeasures should be initiated to provide reasonable assurance tha
handling of heavy loads will be performed in a safe manner unti'i finalimplementation of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Article 5. 1 iscomplete. Specified measures include the implementation of a
technical specification to prohibit the handling of heavy loads over
fuel in the storage pool; compliance with Guidelines 1, 2, 3, and 6 ofNUREG-0612, Section 5. 1. 1; a review of load-handling procedures and
operator training; and a visual inspection program, includingcomponent repair or replacement as necessary of cranes, slings, and
special lifting devices to eliminate deficiencies that could lead tocomponent failure. The evaluation of information provided by the
23
applicant indicates that Qiablo Canyon Unit 1 complies with -he
staff's measures for interim protection, except as detailed in
conclusions for Guideline 4.
24
4. REFERENCES
1. NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants, NRC.
2. Y. Stello, Jr. (NRC), Letter to all applicants. Subject: Request forAdditional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel, NRC,
17 May 1978.
3. USNRC, Letter to PG&E. Subject: NRC Request for AdditionalInformation on Control of Heavy .Loads Near Spent Fuel, NRC,
22 December 1980.
4. P. A. Crane, Jr. (PG&E), Letter to F. J. Miraglia, Jr. (NRC).
Subject: Response Request for Additional Information, PG&E,
24 -September 1981.
5. ANSI B30.2-1976, "Overhead and Gantry Cranes."
6. ANSI N14.6"1978, "Standard for Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers
Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4S00 kg) or more for Nuclear Materials."
7. ANSI B30.9-1972 "Slings
1
8. .CMAA-70, "Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes."
9. P. A. Crane, Jr. (PG&E), Letter to F. J. Miraglia, Jr. (NRC).
Subject: 'Control of Heavy Loads, PG&E,'0 September 1982.
10. P. A. Crane, Jr. (PG&E), Letter to G. W. Knighton {NRC).
Subject: Control of Heavy Loads, PG&E, 9 May 1983.
AF-64-04 and -05Residual HeatRemoval Pumps(4T Honorail)
s
Heav Loads
Containment spray pumpmotor
Containment spray pump
Reciprocating chargingpump motor
Reciprocating chargingfluid drive
Hotor with impeller
Weightol
Capacity~tons
1.7T
1.35T
o.gsT
Safe LoadPaths Procedures
,C
Guideline 1 Guideline 2 Guideline 3Crane
Operator~Trainin
Guideline 4SpecialLiftingOevices
Guideline 5 Guideline 6 Guideline 7Crane-Test
and~st in s ~lns ection ~Crane Oesi n
T-140-01 and -022-11ST TurbineSuilding SridgeCranes
1. Generator rotor 192T C
(96 each crane)
2. Exciter housing
3. Exciter
LP turbinecrossover tee
5. LP rotor
6. IlP turbine rotor
8.5T
4oT
22T
105T
ssT
lhGLK 3.1 (Cont inue<1)
f<lu 1 p«<en tWeSi nation
T-119-05Hoisture SeparatorReh~ater tlo. I-2A(20 Honora il)
Weav~toa<ls
7. IIP outer cover
8. f .W. pump turbinecover
9. F.W. pump turbinerot.or
10. LP turbine outercover
ll. LP turbinecylinder coverNo. 1
12. LP turbinecylinder coverHo. 2
13. Turbine bearingcovers
14. Turbine bladerings
Hob'ile crane
Condensate pumpmotor
Hain hojst loadblock 3
High pressure tubebundle
Weightnr
<.apac lty~banns
05T
gT
1 9T
70T
20T
s7.sT'T
(max)
4.zsT
20T
s.sT
3T
14. 5T
Safe LoadPaths P< ocedu«'.'s
C
Guideline I Gu I <le 1 ine ? Guideline 3Crane
Wperatorlvain<nn
Guideline 4
SpeciaLLift.ing0 vic"s
Guideline 5
~<<in s
Guideline bCrane-Test
and
Guideline I
Crane Design
LoN< pressure tubebundle
TABLE 3.1 (Continued)
fquip«<entOesi nation
-ll9-06Building iieatingRe-Boiler (3THonorail)
T-J7.5-0150'ntakeStructure GantryCrane
~IIQBV toads.
Tube bundle
1. Circulating waterpump motor rotorand shaft
2. Circulating waterpump motor statorand winding
3. Circulating waterpump shaft andimpeller
4. Circulating waterpump hatch cover
5. Circulating waterdischarge valve
6. Auxiliary saltwater pump motor
7. Auxiliary saltwater motor
B. Auxiliary saltwater pump hatchcover
Weightor
Capacity~tons
34 75T
32.5T
24 ST
7T
B.ST
2.6T
2 6T
1 3T
Guideline l Guid<.'line 2
Safe LoadPaths Procedures
C C
Guideline 3Crane
Operatorra Jff
GuidelineSpecialLiftingDevices
Guideline 5
~Sale s
C
Guideline 6Crane-Test
and~tns ection
Guideline 7
Crane Oesien
IRlil.i. J. I (Lent <n<teti)
Equipntent~nest notion Ileavg Loads
9. Uar racks
10. Circulating watertraveling screens
11. Auxiliary salt watertraveling screens
12. Screen wash pumpmotor
Meight
ol'apacity
@tons}
4 5T
23 OT
13.65T
1 2T
Safe LoadPaths Proce<iures
Gui<iel ine 1 Guideline ? Guideline 3Crane
'Operator~tra inin
Gui<ie1 in<. 4SpecialL iftingDevices
Guideline 5 Guideline 6Crane-Test
and~lns ection
Gu i<le 1 ine /
Crane Desig<
13. Screen wash pump
14. Auxiliary saltwater gates
15. Screen gates
16. Load block
3T
6T
1 7T
C ~ Applicant action compiies with RUREG-0612 Guide)ine.UC = Applicant action does not comply with NUREG-0612 Guideline.R * Applicant has proposed revisions/modifications designed to comply with RUREG.-0612 Guideline.I ~ insufficient information provided by the Applicant.
NRC EoRM 335U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
8 I 8 L I0G R AP HIC DATA SHE ET4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power PlantsPacific Gas and Electric, Diablo Canyon Unit 1
(Phase I) Docket No. 50-275l. AUTHOR(S)
S. A. Jensen, T. H. Stickley9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILINGADDRESS (Include Z(p Code/
EGG-HS-63292. (Lethe Ola)k/
3. RECIPIENT'S ACCESSION NO.
S. DATE REPORT COMPLETEDMONTH
JulyDATE REPORT ISSUED
YEAR1983
1. REPORT NUMBER lASSIPned Oy DDCI
EG&G Idaho, Inc.Idaho Falls, ID 83415
MCNTH
Se tember6 (Leett olenkl
6. (Lette Oltncl
YEAR
!983
12. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILINGADDRESS (Include Zsp Code(
Division of S stems Inte rationOffice of ~ Nuc ear eactor e u a sonU.S. Nuclear Regu atory Comm>ssionWashington, DC 20555
10. PROJECT/TASK/WORK UNIT NO,,
11. FIN NO.
A6457
13. TYPE OF REPORT PE 4 I OO COVE RE D IlneluS see dJ tell
16 SUPP'McNT RY NOTES 14 (LeeYe OlenCI
ABSTR "CT (200 wo<ds or less(
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has requested that all nuclear plants eitheroperating or under construction submit a response of compliancy with NUREG-0612,"Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." EG&G Idaho, Inc. has contractedwith the NRC to evaluate the responses of those plants presently under construction.This report contains EG&G's evaluation and recommendations for Diablo Canyon Unit 1.
Il, KEY WORDS AND DOCUMENT ANALYSIS I lt. OESCRIPTORS
