12 RUSI Newsbrief

Iraq’s Shia Militias

his initiative. Hoda Al-Helaissi, a member of the advisory Shoura Council, said that ‘this was the first time we had seen any of our leaders appear on television without a script. Here was a young prince talking directly to the young generation, not talking down to them’.

Two other remarks by the deputy crown prince were significant. Speaking about the plan to sell Aramco shares, he said the move would force the company to open up its books for the first time. ‘People in the past’, he continued, ‘were unpleased with the fact that Aramco’s files and data are undeclared, unclear and non-transparent. Today, it will become transparent’.

Later in the interview, he expanded on this theme. ‘We are living in a society’, he said, ‘where it is difficult not to be transparent, and it is difficult to hide a secret from society in the modern age’. In the view of Saudi sociologist Ali Alkheshaiban this amounted to recognition on the part of the Saudi leadership that they were taking seriously social media criticism of the opaqueness surrounding the distribution of public funds among

members of the ruling family and state bodies. ‘You can’t pretend anymore’, he said, ‘that you can’t hear the comments’. That concept, too, is something close to revolutionary in Saudi Arabia.

With the focus on the huge task of changing the economic direction of the Kingdom at a time when revenue from oil is relatively low, Saudi leaders have started to reassess aspects of their regional policies. Saudis accept that Russian military support for President Assad and the close Russian–US diplomatic co-ordination mean that the rules have changed. The fate of Syria will be decided by Moscow and Washington rather than by any of the other diplomatic players. As a result, Saudi Arabia is starting to back away from its earlier deep involvement in the Syria crisis. While still funding opposition groups and keeping military aircraft and personnel based in Turkey, the Kingdom is no longer talking of its own military engagement in Syria.

As much as Saudi Arabia wants to back away from Syria, it also wants to extricate itself from Yemen, where all sides in the war are bogged down.

While UN-brokered peace talks in Kuwait are making slow progress, Saudi Arabia seems determined to make them succeed. The Saudi leadership has been preparing the public for an end to the war by saying that the goal of stopping a Houthi (and by extension Iranian) takeover of Yemen has been achieved.

The gradual Saudi shift away from direct engagement in the Syrian and Yemeni crises does not herald a softening of attitudes towards Iran. Rather, the focus is moving towards bolstering the security and stability, through generous financial support, of key Sunni Muslim states (Egypt, Jordan and Turkey) in order to shore up a regional alliance with Arab Gulf states to stand firm against Iran. In this respect, Saudi Arabia appears to be reverting to its more traditional diplomatic role in the Middle East.

Gerald ButtFormer BBC Middle East Correspondent, Now a regional analyst, writer, and adviser to Oxford Analytica and Petroleum Policy Intelligence.

How to Deal with Iraq’s Shia MilitiasRanj Alaaldin

Militias must be forced to choose between an institutionalisation process that acknowledges their existence, rights and legitimacy, or an armed confrontation that, in the long run, they cannot win.

Popular demonstrations in Iraq at the end of April led to the

storming and occupation of parliament after Iraq’s radical anti-West cleric, Muqtada Al-Sadr, mobilised hundreds of thousands of his followers against a political system that is widely bemoaned as corrupt, sectarian and dysfunctional. At one point, the protestors forced parliamentarians and other officials to run for safety,

in some cases out of Baghdad and the country entirely.

However, popular demonstrations will have little positive impact unless Iraq’s Shia militias are reined in, and that includes those controlled by Al-Sadr, who is not the solution but part of the problem.

Al-Sadr’s Peace Brigades militias (a re-branded version of his Mahdi Army), like Iraq’s other Shia militia

groups, have been complicit in sectarian atrocities, they are heavily armed and they continue to challenge the state. They create the space in which Daesh and other militias can flourish: without a strong state or political representation, and faced with the threat of sectarian Shia militias, Iraq’s Sunnis are left to protect themselves in a militarised environment by joining Daesh or other militant groups.

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Some of Iraq’s Shia militias have extensive support bases and legitimacy, as shown by the forces that Al-Sadr commands. Some are autonomous, while others are aligned with – and heavily entrenched within – the state. In some cases the leaders of such militias hold ministerial posts. For example, the head of the Badr Brigade, Hadi al-Ameri, was previously Iraq’s Transport Minister. A senior Badr Brigade official currently heads the Interior Ministry. Some militias have extensive ties to the religious establishment, which can provide them with considerable legitimacy.

After the collapse of the Iraqi army in 2014, Shia militias filled the security vacuum and are now seen by many Iraqi Shias as integral to their survival, particularly because of their battlefield success against Daesh. These militias were also helped by Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani’s fatwa, which called on all able-bodied men to defend Iraq. Although this called on all Iraqis, and not just Shias, it was a force of 100,000 Shia fighters that amalgamated to form what is now known as the Hashd Al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilisation Force, or PMF).

Iraq cannot survive if power reverts to the patrimonial networks that allow Shia militias to operate and thrive

Al-Sistani’s fatwa inadvertently provided a religious mandate to hardline and powerful Shia militias that have functioned over the past decade with almost complete impunity. These groups, such as the Iranian-backed Asaib Al-Haq, the Badr Brigade and Ketaib Hezbollah, along with the Mahdi Army, have been accused by various human rights groups and other organisations of being complicit in sectarian atrocities. They were marginalised prior to Daesh’s emergence, but are now dominant political and social players. Based on interviews I have conducted with religious and lay Shias, their rise is believed by some to be the precursor to the return of Imam Mahdi, the twelfth

and final imam who, according to Shia eschatology, will unite Muslims and restore justice to the world.

These political, social and religious characteristics of the militias make the challenge of dealing with them even greater. Shia militias cannot be defeated militarily – no matter how much might is thrown at them – because they are so deeply entrenched in society and because they have significant financial resources and weapons. They have vested political and economic interests in the current status quo and their leaders have found widespread acclaim as a result of the rise of their militias and the weakening of the state.

Yet Iraq cannot survive if power reverts to the patrimonial networks – based on sect and tribe – that allow Shia militias to operate and thrive. Conceding power to unaccountable militias that do not operate according to any institutional framework will sustain the space in which violence and extremism flourish, with further adverse consequences for social and economic development in the country. But there are options available to Iraq, its moderate actors and their international partners to ensure recent gains made against Daesh do not become long-term costs.

The first step is to redefine the relationship between the Shia militias and the state. The reality is that the militias are too strong and are unwilling to simply give up their power. However, this does not mean their presence cannot be regulated and, therefore, constrained. Institutionalisation has been put forward too often as something that aims to integrate militias into a national army, no matter how implausible. The concept should be redefined so that it does not ask militia groups to give up their guns and, therefore, their power, but instead better defines their role by incorporating the militias into a social dialogue and contract that aims to secure their stake in the Iraqi state and society.

Currently, militias operate in a social and legal lacuna because their precise role and relationship with the state and society remains fluid and ill- defined, especially when it comes to the provision of services. This breeds uncertainty and an unwillingness to engage in dialogue and consensus-based politics. Defining and solidifying their relationship with the state and society will provide a space for dialogue between different components of civil society, as well as providing a stronger link between militias and the state, which

A Mahdi Army fighter stands guard in front of a Shia mosque in 2014. The Mahdi Army has now been rebranded as Muqtada Al-Sadr’s Peace Brigades. Coutesy of Hussein Malla/ AP/Press Association Images.

RUSI Newsbrief

Iraq’s Shia Militias

can in fact co-exist. Iraqi officials and militias routinely work together and can mutually reinforce one another.

The advent of Daesh has undoubtedly undermined the Iraqi state’s significance and legitimacy

Of course, it may be that some militias will not accept institutionalisation or integration into a social contract between them and the state. Powerful militia groups, particularly those backed by Iran, are unlikely to accept proposals that limit their autonomy and the powers of their paymasters. There are also criminal militia groups, autonomous of both the Iraqi state and other hierarchical militias, which may not back down if confronted with a strong national army; they may look to support from outside forces (like Iran), which will likely capitalise on such frictions to further its interests in Iraq.

Yet the Iraqi state is still in a strong position to rein in the Shia militias.

It remains the only actor capable of constructing and shaping the country’s constitutional and legal system. Indeed, some militias, such as Asaib Al-Haq, identify with the state and constantly seek recognition and acceptance from the political process. They are highly dependent on the state’s acceptance to maintain their legitimacy and prospects of remaining relevant in the longer run, even if in the short term they espouse radical sentiments and capitalise on ethno-sectarian polarisation.

The advent of Daesh has undoubtedly undermined the Iraqi state’s significance and legitimacy. But this does not mean that the state is fatally wounded. In 2006 the local population also turned to armed gangs during a sectarian civil war, but once the war had abated and the army had re-organised, Iraqis became increasingly discontented with the militias and pushed them to the margins, leading to the state reasserting itself.

This could happen again, and militias, along with their backers in Iran, have already been weakened by the April protestors, who espoused nationalistic sentiments as opposed to the sectarian discourse on which militias thrive. There was no mention of the

PMF and protestors even called for Iran to leave the country. This undermines the widely made assertion that Iran’s influence cannot be reversed.

Militias must be forced to choose between an institutionalisation process that acknowledges their existence, rights and legitimacy, or an armed confrontation that, in the long run, they cannot win. Moderate Shia actors like Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi do exist, but they need financial and military resources, which should be conditional on reform, a settlement to disputes with the Kurds, and reconciliation with Iraq’s Arab Sunnis.

Al-Sistani is the single-most important figure among Iraqi Shias and he could strike a decisive blow to the militias and Iraq’s corrupt ruling elites

The Iraqi state also has Ayatollah Al-Sistani on its side. As the leading Shia clergyman in the Islamic world, he commands a far greater following and is far more respected than Al-Sadr, leader of the Peace Brigades militias, whose support base does not extend beyond the impoverished Shia underclass, and whose cronies have held ministerial posts and have a dubious record when it comes to combating corruption. Al-Sistani, by contrast, is the single-most important figure among Iraqi Shias and he could strike a decisive blow to the militias and Iraq’s corrupt ruling elites. He could either rescind his June 2014 fatwa, which Shia militias have exploited to establish a mandate for themselves in the messy war on Daesh; or, alternatively, he could issue another fatwa that calls on the PMF to demobilise. More importantly, Al-Sistani could lend his weight to a charge for peace on behalf of civil society that isolates the men with guns and emboldens those with visions and ideas for a peaceful Iraq.

Dr Ranj Alaaldin Specialist in Iraq’s Shia and Kurdish movements at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Shia fighters in Basra in June 2014 carry a poster of Shia spiritual leader Ayatollah Al-Sistani, who had just called on all able-bodied men to defend Iraq. Courtesy of Nabil Al-Jurani/AP/Press Association Images.