Militias and Genocide

8/2/2019 Militias and Genocide

1/33

War

Crimes,

Genocide,

&

Crimes

against

Humanity

Volume2(2006): 133

MilitiasandGenocide*AlexAlvarezNorthernArizonaUniversity

Abstract

* Alex Alvarez is an associate professor in the Department of Criminal Justice at

Northern Arizona University. He is the founding director of the Martin-Springer

Institute for Teaching the Holocaust, Tolerance and Humanitarian Values. His

main areas of study have been in the areas of minorities, crime, and criminal

justice, and the areas of collective and interpersonal violence. His first book,Government, Citizens, and Genocide, was published by Indiana Press in 2001

and was a nominee for the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences book of the

year award in 2002 as well as a Raphael Lemkin book award nominee from the

International Association of Genocide Scholars Book in 2003.

Thispapercomprisesadiscussionoftheroleof

paramilitary groups, such as militias, in

perpetrating genocide. The reliance of many

statesuponparamilitarystyleunitsposessome

potentially important questions about the

nature of genocide and other human rights

violations as well as the governments that

createandunleashthem.Afterbrieflydefining

thesegroups,Ispecificallyexplorethereasons

why genocidal states rely so heavily on

paramilitarymilitiagroupswhentheyalready

havemilitaryandpoliceforcesavailable.Using

ArkansTigersandtheRwandanInterahamwe

militia groups as examples, I explore the

natureandfunctioningofthesegroupsaswell


2/33

2 Alvarez

asthespecificadvantagestousingthesekinds

of units.Also included is a discussion about

thetypesofindividualswhojointhesegroups

andwhattheygainfromparticipation.

Examining different examples of genocide, one finds that

governmentsengaged

in

perpetrating

this

crime

frequently

rely on paramilitary organizations to actually carry out

much of the violence. This is true for the Armenian

genocide,theRwandangenocide,theBosniangenocide,and

inamore limitedsense theHolocaust.Paramilitarygroups

have alsobeen involved inmanyother typesofpolitically

motivated violence such as has occurred in East Timor in

1999 (Parry, 2002; Robinson, 2002; Trowbridge, 2002),

Guatemala in the1980s (Sanford,2003),Brazil in the1980s

(Huggins,HaritosFatouros,andZimbardo,2002),aswellas

inotherlocationssuchasElSalvador,Guatemala,Uruguay,and Haiti (Blum, 1995). Most recently, militias known

collectively as the Janjaweed have been implicated in

genocidal violence in the Darfur region of the Sudan

(Human Rights Watch, 2004). These paramilitary

organizations,often referred toasmilitiasor sometimesas

death squads, are frequently implicated in the worst

excesses of the regimeswhich they serve, includingmass

murder, genocide, rape, torture, and various other human

rightsviolations.

Trained

in

violence,

yet

not

bound

by

formal codes of conduct, these groups are a particularly


3/33

MilitiasandGenocide 3

deadly form of social organization. The reliance ofmany

statesuponparamilitary styleunitsposes somepotentially

importantquestionsaboutthenatureofgenocideandother

human rights violations as well as the governments that

create and unleash them.Why do genocidal states rely so

heavily on paramilitary militia groups when they have

militaryandpolice forcesalreadyavailable?Whygo to the

effortof

creating

these

paramilitary

organizations?

What

are

thebenefitsofusing thesekindsoforganizations?It isalso

importanttolookatthetypesofindividualswhojointhese

groupsandwhattheygainfromparticipation.Thesearethe

particularissueswhichthispresentpaperaddresses.

MilitaryandPoliceForcesTheobviousperpetratorsofgenocidearethemilitary

forcesandthelawenforcementagenciesthatalreadyexistin

asociety.Theyare largeandcapableorganizations thataretrainedandequippedforviolence.Membersofthemilitary,

andtoalesserextentpoliceofficers,allgothroughaperiod

of indoctrination and training inwhich they are taught to

obeyorders,todeferpersonalattitudesandvaluestothatof

thegroup,todeveloployaltytotheorganization,tofosteran

espritde corpswith comrades, and tobe aggressive.They

arealsoconditionedtofallbackontheirtraininginstressful

and violent situations which can result in an almost

mechanicalapplication

of

force

and

violence

(Dyer,

1985;

Grossman, 1995;Keegan andHolmes, 1985).Additionally,


4/33

4 Alvarez

these organizations also have the necessary plans,

equipment, tools, and resources already inplace formany

types of violent activities. These organizations, therefore,

provide a readymade tool for genocide. In point of fact,

however, we should recognize that military and law

enforcement organizations are often the primary

instrumentsofgenocideandduringtheArmeniangenocide,

theHolocaust,

as

well

as

the

Cambodian,

Bosnian,

and

Rwandan genocides, itwas the police andmilitary forces

that, tovaryingdegrees,perpetratedmuch, ifnotmost,of

thekilling.Even for thesewellknown examples,however,

paramilitary forces aided and abetted the killing and in

some cases were the prime agents of the genocides.

Regardlessofwhetherparamilitariesonlyaugmentthework

of the regularmilitary andpolice forces or if they are the

major instruments of killing, paramilitary groups are a

pervasive facet of genocide and of much of the political

violence of the 20th century aswell. Before proceeding, itshould be useful to briefly discuss the nature and

organizationofthesegroups.

ParamilitaryGroupsWhat are paramilitary groups?Often referred to as

militias,theseorganizationsarecreatedinordertoengagein

actsofcollectiveviolence.Theycanvary insizefromjusta

fewmembers

to

several

thousand

and

are

primarily

organized along quasimilitary lines. Typically provided


5/33


6/33

6 Alvarez

the connectionbetweenparamilitaries and thegovernment

tends to be much more obscured. Fourth and last,

paramilitarygroups often act forpersonalgain andprofit,

whilemembersof themilitaryandpolicedonotgenerally

profit personally from their activities. In fact, historically,

military and police forces have often been punished and

even executed for plundering and looting, while militia

groupshave

often

emphasized

these

activities.

One

journalistdescribedtheSerbparamilitarythisway,many

Bosnian Serb militiamen who volunteered to fight their

Muslimneighborssawtheirwarserviceasawaytoenrich

themselves (Gjelten, 1995, p. 137). Paramilitaries were

notoriousforrobbingrefugeesandlootinganythingofvalue

during theviolence inBosnia andCroatia (Malcolm, 1994;

Vulliamy 1994). This is not to suggest that soldiers and

armieshaveneverpillagedand looted,but rather that it is

nottypicallyconsideredthenorm.

In many ways, militias can be seen as a type ofmercenary organization. Historically, mercenary groups

havebeenperceivedasmilitaryforcesthatoperatesolelyfor

pay rather than out of loyalty or affiliation to a specific

cause. Paramilitary groups seem to operate in a nebulous

areabetween the two extremes of puremilitary and pure

mercenary.Membersofmilitiagroups oftenbelieve in the

cause inwhich they serve,be it thatofagreaterSerbiaor

Hutu dominated Rwanda, but also feel no compunction

aboutexploiting

the

situation

for

personal

gain.

James

Davis

writes about private armies and classifies them into the


7/33


following five categories. First are Regular Foreign Units

which are long term organizations such as the French

Foreign Legion. These are typically composed of foreign

volunteerswho serve as a specialized part of a countrys

military. Second are Auxiliary Foreign Units which are

similar in structure to the first category but are more

temporary in nature. The Flying Tigers are an obvious

example.Third

are

Private

Military

Companies

which

fit

the

mold of a classic mercenary organization. These groups,

oftencomposedprimarilyofformermilitarymen,sell their

militaryskillstogovernmentsandorganizations.Fourthare

Foreign Volunteerswho are individualswho serve in the

military of other nations. Fifth, and last, are Freebooters.

Thesegroupsservenotonlygovernments,butdrugcartels,

terroristgroups,andanyoneelsewillingtofinancethem.It

is into this latter category thatmilitia groupsmost closely

belong(Davis,2000).

A closer look at a few specific examples ofmilitiagroups may offer a better understanding of these

organizations. Two of the most notorious paramilitary

groupsof recentyears,ArkansTigerswhichwasactive in

Croatia and Bosnia and the Interahamwe of Rwanda,

illustrate many of the mechanics and methods of the

paramilitaries.


8/33

8 Alvarez

ArkansTigersFormallyknownas theSerbianVolunteerGuard,this

groupwasbetterknownasArkansTigers(Arkanovci)and

itsleaderwasamannamedZelkoRanatovi whowentby

the nom de guerre Arkan. Born in 1950, Arkan was

involvedincrimefromanearlyageandwasoftenintrouble

forsnatching

purses

and

similar

kinds

of

delinquent

behavior (Judah, 1997; Sudetic, 1998). At some point his

father, a military officer, asked the Yugoslav Federal

Secretariat for InternalAffairs (SSUP), the secretpolice, to

helpget theyoungZelkooutof troublewith the law.The

SSUPdid come toArkans aidbecause they evidently felt

that his criminal career had compromised him andmade

him vulnerable to their advances. The SSUPwere able to

successfullyrunArkanasahiredassassinanditisbelieved

thatthisorganizationalsohelpedhimescapefromanumber

of European prisons (Judah, 1997). Never shy about hiscrimes,Arkansometimesboastedabouthisassassinationsof

nationalist Albanian and Croat leaders, including a past

executiveofCroatiasoil company (Sudetic,1998).Healso

engagedinbankrobberiesandinfacthadbeenconvictedof

armed robbery inBelgium,Holland,andGermany.Atone

pointhewasactuallyontrialinSweden,butmembersofhis

gang pulledweapons in court and allowed him to escape

(Sudetic,1998).Hewasalsowanted inItalyfor themurder

ofarestaurant

worker

but

the

SSUP

ignored

all

international


9/33


warrants for his arrests and continued to protect him

becauseofhisservicestothem.In 1986 Arkan became a pastryshop owner in

Belgrade while he continued to work for the SSUP. His

involvement in theparamilitary scenebegan inOctoberof

1990 when he became head of the official fan club of

BelgradesRedStarfootballteam.Hehadbeenaregularat

thegames

of

the

team

and

his

shop

was

located

directly

across thestreet from theRedStarsoccerstadium.The fan

clubwasknownasDelijeandhis involvementas leaderof

the fan clubwas encouragedby theMiloevi government

which wanted to harness the energy, nationalism, and

violence of the young men who made up the club. This

interestonthepartofthegovernmentwasalsomotivated,in

part,byadesiretocounteracttheinfluenceofVojislavSeselj,

a prominent dissident who was later to become a rabid

nationalist and leader of a rival Serbian militia group.

Accordingly,Arkantookoverasheadoftheclubandatthesame time began to surreptitiously set up the Serbian

volunteer guard. The primary members of what were to

become theTigerswere,notsurprisingly,derived from the

most aggressive of themembers of Delije (Sell, 2002). As

Arkandescribesthisgroup:

Wefans...trainedwithoutweapons.Iinsisted

upondisciplinefromthebeginning.Youknow

ourfans,

they

are

noisy,

they

like

to

drink,

to

jokeabout.Istoppedallthatinonego,Imade


10/33

10 Alvarez

themcuttheirhair,shaveregularly,notdrink

andsoitbeganthewayitshouldbe(quotedin

Judah,1997,p.187).

Instilling thebeginnings of amilitary style discipline and

appearancewas the first step in transforming these soccer

fansintoamilitarystyleorganization.

Evenat

this

early

stage

Miloevi

was

planning

for

thefutureandrecognizing theneedtoviolentlycontestthe

comingbreakupofYugoslavia.Theparamilitarieswere an

importantpartofthatstrategy.Arkanwasactuallyarrested

by Croatian police in November 1990 after being caught

withacarloadedwithfirearmsandammunition.Hewasin

theKrajinaregionofCroatiahelpingtocoordinateandarm

Serbs who were interested in fighting against Croatias

independence.Afterbeingconvicted inaCroatiancourthe

wasreleasedpendingalegalappealwhereuponhefledback

toBelgradeandtauntedthatYouwillnevercatchmealive(Judah,1997).

On June 2, 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared

independenceandprecipitated theviolence thatmanyhad

foreseen. One day after the declarations the Yugoslavian

NationalArmy(JNA)movedinandbeganhostilities.While

Slovenia escaped relatively unscathed, the fighting lasting

onlyacoupleofdays,theconflictinCroatiawasmuchmore

prolongedandbrutalandinvolvednotonlyelementsofthe

JNA,but

Serb

militias

as

well,

including

Arkans

Tigers

(Silber and Sell, 1996). During the fighting in Croatia the


11/33


paramilitaries were implicated inwidespread looting and

pillaging. InhomesabandonedbyCroats, for example, the

commandersof theSerbparamilitarieswouldscribble their

names over the door to signify that they had taken over

possession (Silber andSell, 1996).Similarly,whenviolence

broke out in Bosnia after that countrys declaration of

independence, theTigersplayedamajor role in the ethnic

cleansing.Almost

immediately

after

the

Bosnian

declaration

ofindependence,BosnianSerbsdeclaredtheRepublikaSrbska

and began cleansing the territory they controlled of

Muslims.Arkans Tigers entered the town of Bijeljina, for

example,onApril 2, 1992 inwhatwas tobecome the first

case of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.Dressed in camouflage

uniforms with ski masks and armed with automatic

weapons, this paramilitary group rampaged through the

town in a preview of subsequent cleansing actions

throughoutBosnia(BurgandShoup,1999;SilberandLittle,

1995). Bijeljinawas a north easternborder town and hadalreadyseenitsshareofviolence.Therehadbeenanumber

oflethalbarroombrawlsandtheleaderoftheMuslimparty

had alreadybeen assassinated. This, however, was but a

prelude to theviolence thatdescendedupon the town that

AprilmorningwhentheTigersarrived.Rushingfromhome

to home, theybooted in the doors ofmany of Bijeljinas

Muslimpopulation.Theytargetedtheeducated, influential,

wealthy,andprominentMuslimsanddraggedthemoutinto

thestreet

where

they

were

summarily

beaten

and

shot.

Over

twodozenmenandwomenweremurderedinthisfashion.


12/33

12 Alvarez

After installing a Bosnian Serb government, the Tigers

movedsouthtoZvornikwheretheyrepeatedthissignature

violence that would come to be known by the name of

ethniccleansing.ThroughoutthefightingduringBosnias

ordeal,ArkansTigerscontinuedtoplayanimportantrolein

Bosnia.

It shouldbenoted that theTigerswerenot theonly

paramilitarygroup

engaged

in

this

violence.

In

1994

a

UnitedNations report listed 83paramilitarygroups in the

former Yugoslavia. Fiftysix were Serb, 13 Croat, and 14

BosnianMuslim(Judah,1997).Eventhoughhewasindicted

by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former

Yugoslavia,Arkanwasneverputontrialfortheatrocitieshe

helped commit. Often giving interviews to journalists,

especially during the later violence inKosovo,Arkanwas

himself killed when he was shot in the Belgrade Inter

Continental Hotel in January 2000 (Scharf and Schabas,

2002). While the killers remain unknown, some havesuggested that he, along with other paramilitary leaders,

mayhavebeenkilledbymembersof theMiloevi regime

intentuponremovingpotentiallyembarrassingwitnesses.

InterahamweMuchofthekillingduringtheRwandangenocideof

1994was perpetratedby paramilitary groups such as the

interahamwe

(those

who

stand

together

or

those

who

fight

together) and the impuzamugambi (those with a single


13/33


purpose)(Taylor,1998;Melvern,2000).Thereasonfor their

creationrelatestothepoliticalchangessweepingRwandain

the early 1990s. In 1990 Rwanda was invaded by 2500

members of theRwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)whowere

Rwandanexiles.Althoughsmallinnumber,theRPFfighters

werewelltrained,welldisciplinedandprovedaformidable

fighting force.Although theysufferedsomemajorsetbacks

initially,they

began

having

some

success

under

the

leadership of Paul Kagame,whowould laterbecome the

postgenocide leader of Rwanda (Melvern, 2004). In 1991,

President Juvenal Habyarimana, whose National

Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND) held

complete power, conceded to mounting pressure on his

regime and allowed the creation of opposition political

parties,manyofwhichalsocreatedyouthwingsinorderto

defend their partys interests and coerce support. This

development was not to the liking of Hutu extremists

including the inner circle of thePresidentsgovernment, ashadowy group known as theAkazu (LittleHouse)whose

members included his wife and various political and

military leaders who used their influence and power for

personalgainandcorruption(Scherrer,2002).Theextremists

opposed any power sharing agreements and

accommodationwiththeTutsi.

As theRPFbegan gaining some success after initial

setbacks, the Akazu increasingly mounted propaganda

attacksagainst

the

Tutsi

led

RPF

and

the

countrys

Tutsi

population (Edgerton, 2002). Violence, assassinations, and


14/33

14 Alvarez

localizedmassacresalsobegancroppingup throughout the

country.The trainingof themilitiagroupsalso intensified,

the most important of which was formed in 1992 by

President Habyarimana who began providing military

training to young members of his party. This was the

beginningoftheInterahamwe(DesForges,1999).Manyofthe

Interahamwememberswere recruited from soccer fan clubs

andin

this

way

their

genesis

mirrors

that

of

Arkans

Tigers.

Thousands of young Rwandanmen hadbeen leftjobless,

alienated,andangryby theeconomicproblems inRwanda

in the late1980sandearly1990sand they congregated to

thegovernmentandAkazusponsoredfanclubs(Gourevitch,

1998).Membership in themilitiawas appealing formany

youngmenasPhilipGourevitchdescribes,

Hutu power youth leaders,jetting around on

motorbikes and sporting pop hairstyles, dark

glasses,andflamboyantlycoloredpajamasuitsandrobes,preachedethnicsolidarityandcivil

defense to increasingly packed rallies,where

alcohol usually flowed freely, giant banners

splashed with hagiographic portraits of

Habyarimana flapped in the breeze, and

paramilitary drills were conducted like the

latesthotdancemoves.ThePresidentandhis

wife often turned out tobe cheered at these

spectacles,while

in

private

the

members

of

the

Interahamwe were organized into small


15/33


neighborhoodbands, drew up lists of Tutsis,

and went on retreats to practice burning

houses, tossing grenades, and hacking

dummiesupwithmachetes(Gourevitch,1998,

pp.9394).

Eventscontinued toescalateas themilitarysituation

worsenedfor

the

Rwandan

government.

In

January

of

1994,

theheadoftheU.N.missionwarnedthatassassinationlists

werebeingdrawnupofprominentTutsis and thatmilitia

weapons caches had been discovered (Klinghoffer, 1998;

Melvern,2004).Even in the faceof thismountingevidence

ofplannedgenocideandevenwith the increasingvitriolof

the radio propaganda very littlewas done. Conceding to

increasing international pressure and military setbacks,

president Habyarimana was finally forced to go to the

negotiating table in Arusha, Tanzania after which peace

accordswere drawn up and power sharing arrangementsinstituted. On April 6, 1994 as Habyarimana and other

dignitaries,includingthepresidentofneighboringBurundi,

were approaching the Kigali airport, two surfacetoair

missiles hit the plane, causing it to crash and killing

everybodyonboard.Whilenofirmevidenceexistsastothe

identity of the perpetrators, most believe that it was the

Akazu thatwasbehind the assassination, unhappy as they

werewiththeconcessionsHabyarimanahadagreedto.

Themilitias

quickly

moved

into

action

in

Kigali,

rounding up and killing all thosewho hadbeen on their


16/33

16 Alvarez

death lists. Soon the massacres spread throughout the

country as armed groups of paramilitary militias, police

officers,and localpoliticianshuntedout theTutsiand then

killedthem.Roadblockswerealsosetupbythemilitiaswho

wouldcheckgovernmentissuedidentitycardsandthenkill

anyonewhowas listed as aTutsi, aswell as anyone they

deemedsuspicious,orwho,intheireyes,lookedlikeaTutsi

(Gourevitch1998,

Des

Forges,

1999).

At

other

times

they

woulddescenduponcommunitiesorplacesofrefugewhere

Tutsi had gathered and orchestrate massacres, often

encouraging and/or forcing local Hutus to assist in the

killing.They also oftenworked in concertwithpolice and

military groups in perpetrating the mass murder of the

Tutsi. The killings of these paramilitary groups were

particularlygruesomeastheyfrequentlyreliedonmachetes

andclubs,theshaftsofwhichweresometimesstuddedwith

nails (Taylor, 1999). Alcohol and mass rape often

accompaniedthekillingasthebloodsplatteredgenocidairesoftheInterahamweandothermilitiaswentabouttheirbrutal

business.Thekillingsonly ended inJulyof1994when the

governmentfellandtheRPFtookpower.

RelianceonParamilitariesThe twogroupsdiscussedabove, theTigersand the

Interahamwe,aresimplytwoofthemostnotoriousexamples

ofthis

kind

of

genocidal

organization.

They

are

representative ofmany other groups as well and as was


17/33


pointedout earlier, these typesofgroups areaubiquitous

feature of genocidal violence.Governments that use these

groupsdosoforsomeverypowerfulreasons.

Deniability

The first obviousbenefit to relying on paramilitary

groupsis

deniability.

The

military

and

police

forces

of

a

nationarealwaysovertlyanofficialandrecognizablebranch

of the state. There is no concealing the fact that they are

representativesofthegovernmentandtheir involvement in

genocide makes clear the role of the government in the

murderof the targetedpopulationwhich thoseregimesare

often atpains to conceal especially given the international

legal developments of recent years. Increasingly,

governmentofficialsrecognizethattheymay,atsomefuture

time, endup in frontofa tribunalbecauseof theiractions

while in power.Onewriter summarizes the situation thisway:

Today states find themselves under scrutiny

from foreign governments, both allied and

enemy; semigovernmental agencies such as

the World Bank; and a multitude of

nongovernmental organizationsFailure to

meetinternationalnormsofbehaviorcanhave

allsorts

of

serious

repercussions

today,

includinglossofforeignloansandinvestment,


18/33

18 Alvarez

diminutionorlossofforeignaid,lossoftourist

revenue, tradeboycotts, etc.Stateswishing to

use extreme forms of extralegalviolence thus

have every reason to appear uninvolved.

(Campbell,2002,p.13)

Genocidesdontjusthappen.Rathertheyareplanned

attemptsto

remove

apopulation

and

as

such

display

intent,

forethought, and purpose. Genocidally inclined

governments,therefore,areusuallyatpainstodisguisetheir

involvement and paramilitary groups provide them with

what is sometimes termed plausible deniability.

Paramilitary groups are usually affiliated with political

power structures and tend to be funded, trained, and

equipped by that political party even though their

relationshipisoftenintentionallyobscuredanddenied.

Eventhoughtheevidence isclearthatMiloevi had

adirecthandinequippingandtrainingtheTigers,hedidnthesitatetodenyknowingArkanwhenconfrontedaboutthe

actionsof themilitia (DoderandBranson,1999),especially

after1992when internationalpressuremade itprudent for

Miloevi to distance himself from theparamilitaries (Sell,

2002). SlododanMiloevis style as a politician hasbeen

describedinthisway:

Milosevic liked to compartmentalize his

activities,never

giving

any

one

subordinate

too much control or understanding of the


19/33


bigger picture.He took extra care to keep a

formaldistance, tomake it seem as if others,

outsidehis control,were responsible.Hewas

thetypeofpoliticianwholeavesnotraces. ...

His style was conspiratorial. Everything was

movedbyword ofmouth without a paper

trail.(DoderandBranson,1999,pp.102103)

While the linkages are obvious in hindsight,many

accepted thedisconnect.RichardHolbrooke,forexample,a

topAmerican diplomatwho helpedbroker an end to the

fighting in Bosnia, described Arkan as a freelance

murderer and the Tigers as a private army, the

implicationbeingthatArkanandhismilitiawereactingon

theirown(Holbrooke,1999,p.189).

The paramilitaries allowed Miloevi to conduct a

campaignofethniccleansingandostensiblykeephishands

clean.When facing criticism for theviolencehappening inBosnia,Miloevi wasabletoassertthattheseatrocitieswere

the responsibility of paramilitary groups and therefore

beyondhis control.On occasion,he evenpointed out that

paramilitary groups were banned in Serbia. In fact, later

Miloevi was able toportrayhimself as apeacemaker for

beingable tobring themilitias toheelandatonepointhe

even placed amember of a paramilitary group on trial in

order todeflect internationalcriticismandpressure (Doder

andBranson,

1999).

The

truth

is

far

different.

Miloevi

was

clearly responsible for forming, recruiting, housing,


20/33

20 Alvarez

transporting,arming,training,anddirectinggroupssuchas

the Tigers and time has shown that the actions of the

paramilitarieswerecoordinatedwith theJugoslavNational

Armythroughofficialsattheinteriorministryandthestate

securityforces.(DoderandBranson,1999;Sell,2002;Sudetic,

1998).

Not all genocidal states are so concerned about

disavowingthe

linkages

with

paramilitary

organizations.

TheextremistsinRwandamadealmostnoefforttodisguise

their supportof theparamilitarygroupsalthough amemo

from the Belgian military intelligence reveals that

Habyarimana and others denied anymilitarybehavior on

the part of the militia (Des Forges, 1999). President

Habyarimanasdenial aside, theRwandanmilitary openly

trained, armed, and supplied the militias as well as

coordinatedattackswiththeparamilitarygroupsinorderto

maximize their genocidal reach (Melvern, 2004). Clearly,

groups like the Interahamwewere actingonbehalfofHutupower as overt agents of a nationwide campaign of

exterminationagainsttheTutsi.

On the other hand, the situation in Darfur, Sudan,

revealshowgovernmentsoftenrefutetheirrelationshipwith

themilitias. In theDarfur region of the Sudan, one of the

most remote and impoverished regions on earth,

government sponsoredmilitiashave led theway inkilling

andbrutalizingmembersofseveraltribesinappearstohave

allthe

qualities

of

agenocide

(Human

Rights

Watch,

2004).

Beginning in 2003, members of three ethnic groups (Fur,


21/33


Masalit, andZaghawa) formed two organizationswith the

goalofimprovingtheireconomic,political,andsocialstatus

withintheSudan.TheSudanesegovernment,largelyArabic

Muslims,havelongdiscriminatedagainsttheAfricansofthe

Darfurregionandtheyrespondedtothisnewdevelopment

withbrutalityandviolence.Governmentsponsoredmilitias

inconjunctionwithregularmilitaryforceshaveengaged in

wholesalemassacres,

systematic

rape,

and

widespread

looting(HumanRightsWatch,2004).TheseArabmilitiasare

known collectively as Janjaweed. Government

representativeshave responded to internationaloutrageby

asserting that the Janjaweed are outlaws and that the

Sudanese government is working to suppress these

lawless groups or as one report asserts, The more

internationalcriticismthewarinDarfurincurs,themorethe

governmentdeniesany involvementwithorconnections to

theJanjaweed(HumanRightsWatch,2004,p.43).

ForceMultiplier

Another reason why genocidal states often rely on

militias isthattheyprovideaquickandeasyaugmentation

totheregularmilitaryforces.AtthetimeoftheRPFinvasion

ofRwanda in1990, theRwandanmilitarynumbered9,335,

not a large number by any stretch of the imagination

(Melvern,1994).Whileitistruethatthearmyhadgrownto

27,913by

1991,

itis

also

true

that

most

of

these

new

recruits

werepoorly trainedand illeducatedyoungmen. It takesa


22/33

22 Alvarez

great deal of time and resources to create a competent

military force. Paramilitary groups on the other hand, are

muchquickerandeasier to create,especially sincemostof

their activities pit them against unarmed civilian

populations,rather thanagainstanarmedenemy.Thisalso

frees up regularmilitary forces for other duties.Wemust

rememberthatgenocidestypicallyoccurduringcivilwarsor

othertypes

of

conflict

when

most

of

anations

military

forcesneed tobedeployed against the enemy.During the

fighting in Bosnia, theJugoslavNational Army faced the

problemofyoungmenemigratingtoavoidbeingmobilized

intothemilitary.Manyothersrefusedtobecalledupandas

the conflict continued, thearmybegan suffering fromhigh

desertion rates (Judah, 1997;Wilmer, 2002).The increasing

useofparamilitariesduring theconflicthelpedaddress the

personnel shortcomings suffered by the military. So,

paramilitary groups offer states the ability to quickly

generatemoreforcesneededtoaccomplishthegoalsofthatgovernment.While not necessarily up to the standards of

professional military forces, the training and abilities of

paramilitary groups are usually enough to allow them to

achievethegoalssetforthembygenocidallyinclinedstates.

ViolencewithoutLimits

The use of paramilitary militias also allows

genocidallyinclined

states

the

best

and

the

worst

of

military

organizations. Military organizations have as their main


23/33


purpose the application of organized violence against a

varietyofopponentsorasChrisHedgesputsit,Organized

killing is best done by a disciplined, professional army

(Hedges, 2002, p. 9). Their hierarchical structure, their

training,theirethoshavedevelopedovercenturieswiththe

soleaimofmaking themeffective inusing force toachieve

victory over enemies. For a genocidally inclined state, the

militaryin

the

ideal

is

perhaps

the

best

weapon

they

have

to

achieve their destructive goals, but the military is also

sometimeshandicapped in that ability.First, asmentioned

above, they are directly linkedwith the statewhichmay

pose a problem for a government intent upon hiding its

complicity. Second, themilitarymaybe needed for other

tasks,suchasengaging incombatagainstanenemy.Third,

themilitary,whiletrainedtokill,isalsooftenimbuedwitha

code of honor and discipline that may hinder their

willingnesstoparticipateingenocide.

A central theme of much of the training in manymilitary systems involves inculcating recruits with the

proper attitudes, values, and ethos of themilitary culture.

Notionsofindividualandgrouphonorareoftenaparticular

emphasis of this type of instruction and a common theme

withinthesevaluesystemsprohibitsthekillingofunarmed

noncombatants such as women and children. Sometimes

these values are even codified into a military code of

conductwithpotentiallegalconsequencesforviolators.But

noncombatantvictims

are

precisely

the

main

targets

of

genocidalviolenceandmilitary leadersmaybe resistant to


24/33

24 Alvarez

participation in genocide. This is not to say that these

perceptionsofhonorcannotbesubverted.OmerBartov,for

example, illustratedhow thediscipline and training of the

Germanarmybecamehighlypoliticizedduringtheyearsof

theThirdReichandthisallowedthearmytobecomeactive

and willing perpetrators. The ideology of race war and

genocidepreempted traditionalGermanmilitarynotionsof

honorand

chivalry

(Bartov,

1992).

This

is

not

the

only

example as history is replete with examples of military

perpetratedatrocitiesfrommanydifferentnationsincluding

theUnitedStates.Wecannotforgetthatwar is inherentlya

brutalizing process.Nonetheless, as tenuous as it often is,

mostmilitaries are at least nominallyboundby a code of

conduct thatmayactasa curbonexcessesagainst civilian

forceswhilemilitias suffer no such hindrance. It isworth

taking a closer look at the training process and how it

facilitatesviolence.

Paramilitary groups offer governments thebenefitsthat military training brings to an organization without

some of the ideological baggage against attacking the

defenseless.Not only are they taught touseweapons and

explosives,but they are taught the habits and patterns of

obedience,atleastinrudimentaryform,whichisthebasisof

military organization. This is done so thatmembers obey

orders reflexively,without thinking about themeaning of

the behavior. The training that paramilitaries receive,

typicallyfrom

military

instructors,

reinforces

and

strengthens the inherent tendency for conformity to the


25/33


behaviors and ideals of the group. The training also

submergesthevaluesoftheindividualintothevaluesofthe

group,inthiscontext,ahighlyviolentandaggressivegroup.

There is freedom in this: the freedom todo things thatare

otherwiseprohibited.

Everymilitaryorganizationhasan initiationprocess

known asboot camp orbasic training. The experience is

intentionallyintended

to

be

hard,

brutal,

and

degrading

becauseitisintendedtoturnciviliansintosoldierswhoare

able to engage inviolenceon command.After recruits are

brokendownbothpsychologicallyandphysically, theyare

builtbackupintosoldiers,aprocessthatinvolvesinstillinga

senseofloyalty,pride,andobedience.Insum,basictraining

is designed to provide new soldiers with themechanical

skillsofviolenceand to socialize them intoavalue system

that supports fierceness, aggression, and solidarity with

their comrades. For the same reasons, informal military

organizations such as militias employ the same kinds oftraining patterns.While not as lengthy or involved as the

militaryversion,militiasalso receiveasimilarkindofboot

camp.SeveralSerbmilitias,forexample,trainedatamilitary

campnearMountTara,ontheSerbborderwithBosniaand

many,suchasArkansTigers,weretrainedbyregulararmy

officers.InRwanda,theInterahamwemilitiaengagedinmass

rallies with alcohol, speeches, marching, and drill

maneuverstotrainand instilltheappropriateattitudesand

behaviors.This

militia

also

utilized

three

week

indoctrinationsessionsata trainingcamp inMutarawhere


26/33

26 Alvarez

recruitsweretaughthowtousemachetesonhumanshaped

dummies,throwgrenadesandburnhomes.Italsoshouldbe

notedthatthetypeofindividualsrecruitedintomilitiasare

particularlysusceptibletothiskindoftraining.

Militiagroupsare typically recruited from segments

ofa society thatare extremelyvulnerable to indoctrination

into ideologies and practices of violence. Members of

ArkansTigers

were

recruited

from

members

of

asoccer

fan

club in Belgrade. These youngmenmadewilling recruits

into paramilitary violence. Similarly, members of the

RwandanInterahamweweredrawnfromtheranksofsoccer

playersand fan clubs.What is itabout theseorganizations

that made them such a productive source of militia

murderers?First, the individualswhoaredrawn into these

groupsareyoungmen.The literatureonviolentcrime tells

usthatmostviolenceisperpetratedbyyoungmalesintheir

lateteensandearlytwenties.Becauseofhormones,lifestyle,

inclination, and culture, young males are at their mostaggressiveandviolent(Barak,2003;RiedelandWelsh,2002).

This penchant for engaging in violent behavior drops

throughoutthelifecourse.Aspeopleage,theirparticipation

inviolentbehaviortendstolessendramatically.Themilitias

areusually composed ofmenwho are at an age atwhich

theyareparticularlyvulnerable to theattractionsofviolent

behavior.

Second,many of these youngmen also tend tobe

joblessand

poor,

uneducated,

and

unmarried.

In

short

they

fit theclassic imageofdisaffectedandalienatedyouth.The


27/33


militias give these young men a mission and a sense of

purpose that is easily harnessed to a politicalmovement.

Onereasonwhymanyyoungmenareattractedtosportsfan

clubs is that these organizations providemeaning, status,

and a sense of belonging and identity from membership

(Armstrong,1998;Buford,1990;Perryman,2001).Theseare

essentially the samekindsofattractions thatparamilitaries

provide.Eric

Hoffer

points

out

that,

When

people

are

ripe

foramassmovement,theyareusuallyripeforanyeffective

movement,andnotsolelyforonewithaparticulardoctrine

or program (Hoffer, 1951, p. 16). Mass movements are

interchangeable and the energies that youngmen channel

into sports clubs can easilybe transferred tomore violent

outlets,onesthatarepossiblypoliticaland/orgenocidal.Its

no accident thatboth the Interahamwe and theTigerswere

originally recruited from among these ranks. The use of

these kinds of young men in Rwanda and Bosnia is no

different from theways inwhich theNazimovementusedangry and aggressive youngmen in the SturmAbteilung

(SA)todomuchoftheirdirtyworkintheearlyyearsofthe

Nazimovement.Thepower theyderive frombelonging to

theseorganizationscanbe intoxicating,especiallyforangry

youngmenwhoformerlyfeltpowerless.

Third, these young men are a self selected group

attracted to the violence that often accompanies many

groups of sports fans. The phenomenon of sports

hooliganismin

Europe

has

been

especially

well

documented

(see forexampleArmstrong,1998;Buford,1990;Perryman,


28/33

28 Alvarez

2001).Membershipinsoccerfanclubsoftenrevolvesaround

issuesofidentityandterritorythataresometimesdescribed

as a form of tribalism (Campbell andDawson, 2001). In

many ways, these groups are all about particular

conceptions ofmasculinity, competitiveness, and asserting

power or as Campbell and Dawson assert, Hooliganism

and violence are not effects of disordered psyches; on the

contrarythey

are

alogic

of

the

quest

for

personal

mastery

(Campbell andDawson, 2001,p. 72).Theyoungmenwho

are drawn to this kind of organization are those whose

affiliation tomainstream society ismarginalatbest.Chuck

Sudetic, in describing the soccer clubs fromwhomArkan

recruited the Tigers, asserted that they, had become a

magnet for hoodlums and disgruntled, unemployed, and,

veryoften,unemployableyoungmen.Fromtheworstofthis

rawmaterial,Ranatovi formedamilitiacalledtheTigers

(Sudetic,1998,p.98).

ConclusionsMilitias and other forms of paramilitary groups

remain a common feature formany typesofhuman rights

abuses, including genocide. They offer many advantages

and fewrisks tostatesengaged invarious formsofviolent

conflict.Wemust also remember thatwe live in an era in

which international security and military forces are

increasinglybecoming

privatized

(see

for

example

Davis,

2000; Singer, 2003) and conflict andwar are less and less


29/33


about armies fighting traditionalwars internationally, but

more and more about internal conflicts fought

nontraditionally. It isprecisely in thiskindofenvironment

that paramilitary groups thrive and prosper. Unless the

international community is able to act effectively and

decisively topreventstates fromutilizing thesegroups,we

willcontinuetoseegovernmentsrelyingonthem.

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