ABSTRACT. This paper proposes that managers addan attention to virtues and vices of human characteras a full complement to moral reasoning accordingto a deontological focus on obligations to act and ateleological focus on consequences (a balanced tri-partite approach). Even if the criticisms of virtueethics cloud its use as a mononomic normative theoryof justification, they do not refute the substantialbenefits of applying a human character perspective –when done so in conjunction with also-imperfectact-oriented perspectives. An interactive tripartiteapproach is superior for meeting the complex require-ments of an applied ethic. To illustrate how deficien-cies of a “strong” virtue ethics formulation can beovercome by a balanced tripartite approach, this papercompares normative leadership paradigms (each basedon a combination of virtue, deontology, or conse-quentialist perspectives) and the dangers inherent ineach. The preferred paradigm is servant leadership,grounded in a tripartite ethic. Effective application
of such an ethics approach in contemporary organi-zations requires further empirical research to developa greater understanding of the moral language actuallyused. Meeting this challenge will allow academicsbetter to assist practicing managers lead moral devel-opment and moral reasoning efforts.
What is the appropriate role for an ethic ofvirtues in managers’ moral development andmoral reasoning? An ethic of virtues (and vices)emphasizes the process of personal moral char-acter development. Donaldson and Werhane(1999) note that some philosophers are reluctantto accept fully the “human nature” approach,believing that consequentialism and deontologyexhaust all possible modes of ethical reasoning.
On the other hand, virtue ethics proponentsoften imply that the personal character perspec-tive is more fundamental than act-orientedtheories, favoring a “strong” view of virtueethics. In
An Introduction to Business Ethics (1996),Jackson argues that, of the three basic approaches,only a virtues-based approach is able to makesense of the importance of morality and thus goodpractice. In A Primer of Modern Virtue Ethics(1995, p. 1), Duncan states his objective ofbeginning a full-scale project to reconstructmorality as a whole on the basis of an ethics ofthe virtues so as to present a credible alternativeto the other great traditions in ethics.
Is one of these views preferable? No, according
How Virtue FitsWithin Business Ethics J. Thomas Whetstone
J. Thomas Whetstone, Assistant Professor of Management,Davis College of Business, Jacksonville University,Jacksonville, Florida, teaches MBA and Executive MBAcourses in business ethics and undergraduate courses inmanagement, organization theory, organizationalbehavior, and business strategy. He worked for ten yearsin corporate management in the energy industry. He alsois a Presbyterian minister and public speaker on man-agement ethics and history. His doctoral dissertation is“The Manager as a Moral Person: Exploring Paths toExcellence” (1995). Publications include: “TeachingEthics to Managers: Contemporary Problems and aTraditional Solution” (1998) in C. J. Cowton and R.S. Crisp, editors: Business Ethics: Perspectives onthe Practice of Theory (Oxford University Press,Oxford), and “Ethics and Leadership: Searching for aComfortable Fit” (1997) in G. Moore, editor: BusinessEthics: Principles and Practice (Business EducationPublishers, Sunderland, U.K.).
to Robert Louden (1984). He argues that virtueethics must be included in any adequate justifi-cation of morality, along with deontological andteleological approaches, proposing that his fellowphilosophers
need to begin efforts to coordinate irreducible orstrong notions of virtue along with irreducible orstrong conceptions of the various act notions intoour conceptual scheme of morality. This appeal forcoordination will not satisfy those theorists whocontinue to think in the single-element ofmononomic tradition (a tradition which contem-porary virtue-based theorists have inherited fromtheir duty-based and goal-based ancestors), but Ido believe it will result in a more realistic accountof our moral experience. The moral field is notunitary, and the values we employ in making moraljudgments sometimes have fundamentally differentsources. No single reductive method can offer arealistic means of prioritizing these different values.There exists no scale by means of which disparatemoral considerations can always be measured,added and balanced. The theoretician’s quest forconceptual economy and elegance has been wonat too great a price, for the resulting reductionistdefinitions of the moral concepts are not true tothe facts of moral experience. It is important nowto see the ethics of virtue and the ethics of rulesas adding up, rather than as canceling each otherout (Louden, 1984, p. 191).
Mononomics has not ceased since the 1984publication of Louden’s appeal in the AmericanPhilosophical Quarterly, possibly because ofpresuppositional differences between virtue andact-oriented theories. But as Crisp (1998, p. 19)observes, much of contemporary moral philos-ophy, business ethics included, operates on amistaken scientific model. In business ethics it isnot necessary to explain our actions, as scien-tific models require, but to justify them. One canhave more than one reason for doing something.One can read a journal for pleasure as well as tostay informed; one can attend a dinner to eat andto socialize. But many philosophers have beentempted to think that one must pick one ethicstheory in order to justify a particular course ofaction. Moral reasons can include both the dutyto act and the consequences expected from theact as well as the belief that so acting is charac-
teristic of the kind of person one wants to be.One might refrain from cheating because this isthe right way to act, and because so acting willcreate a better world, and because one is anhonest person. It is not necessary to choose asingle theory and stick with it; it is sometimeseven better to take what seems most plausiblefrom several theories and seek insights from alltheories (Bowie, 1982, p. 7). For proper balance,the theorist needs to add virtue ethics as a fully-equal complement to deontological theories thatfocus on obligations and teleological ones thatplace greatest priority on the consequences ofacts. This is an important thesis that philosophersneed to debate with renewed vigor, but oneneeding much more space (books?) and philo-sophical rigor than is attempted in this paper. AsRosalind Hursthouse (1997, p. 237) admits,defending virtues theory against all possiblecriticisms would be a lifelong task. This paperfocuses on the application of theory by businessmanagers and leaders in terms of moral devel-opment and moral reasoning.
But a rehearsal of Louden’s thesis establishesthe context for the main proposition of thispaper, which focuses on the practical applicationof ethics theory, its role in the moral develop-ment and moral reasoning of managers, ratherthan on the formal philosophical justification ofnormative ethics theories. The proposition of thispaper is that managers need to add virtue ethics,or more precisely an attention to virtues andvices of human character, as a fully-equal com-plement to moral reasoning according todeontological or consequentialist teleologicalformulations.
This paper supports this claim using a varietyof approaches. It begins by noting that principle-based ethics (PBE) alone often has proven inad-equate for practicing managers, who have thusnot adopted it. Virtue ethics has recentlyreemerged among moral philosophers, but its fitin terms of practical application is debatable.Certainly a “strong” virtue ethic, where act-oriented theories are subordinated, is an inade-quate theory (see Boatright, 1995). This paperproposes a complementary approach, using atripartite ethics formulation (balancing characterconsiderations with a deontological focus on
102 J. Thomas Whetstone
obligations to act and a teleological focus on theconsequences of acts) as a more fitting guide forapplying normative ethics theories to decisionmaking and moral development. This balancedformulation enhances the realization of thebenefits identified with the addition of a char-acter perspective.
Indeed, organizational field research finds thatvirtue and vice concepts are necessary to describewhat is meant by an excellent manager; his orher productivity and principled-behavior are notsufficient. Whether the principles are objectiveand absolute or are developed via social-construction within a community, an appliedethic requires normative standards or decisionprinciples in some form to be used to assessbehaviors as right or wrong or good or bad.Applying via negationis, this paper illustrates howdeficiencies of a “strong” virtue ethics formula-tion can be overcome by a more balancedtripartite approach, referring to several norma-tive leadership paradigms (each based on acombination of virtue, deontology, or conse-quentialist teleology ethics perspectives) and thedangers inherent in each. The most balanced andthus favored leadership paradigm is servantleadership, grounded in a tripartite ethic. Thevalue of the complementary or balanced tripar-tite approach is further illustrated using acomplex situation from American literature. Justas it begins with a challenge to continue philo-sophic debate of Louden’s appeal for abandoningmononomic conceptions or ethics theory, thispaper concludes with a challenge to empiriciststo develop a more current descriptive under-
standing of the moral language used by practicingbusiness managers.
The modernist commitment to act-oriented theories
Table I summarizes three ethics theories: conse-quentialist teleology, deontology, and virtueethics, highlighting the fundamental differencesin their perspectives. According to principle-based ethics (PBE), successful managers do notrely solely on either a consequentialist or a deon-tological theory but try to balance the influencesof each of these act-oriented theories, positingthat people have a duty to bring about the bestconsequences. The basic premise is that man-agement and management ethics are primarily acognitive matter of rational decision makingconcerning particular ethical dilemmas. However,some critics claim that North Americanmanagers have not adopted PBE models, cer-tainly not for routine business applications,because such formulations are too abstract anduse philosophical language foreign to the businesscommunity (Stark, 1993; Monast, 1994). A prin-ciple-based ethic by its nature does not focusdirectly on the psychological influences onmotivation, does not always point to clearlypreferable courses of action in the hard cases, andcannot resolve issues in which the recommen-dations of utilitarianism and deontology conflict(Horvath, 1995). It is impersonal and abstract,and draws on an incomplete view of humannature. Nevertheless, business people can use a
How Virtue Fits Within Business Ethics 103
TABLE IThree ethics perspectives
Consequentialist teleology Deontology Virtue
Primary focus: Consequences; Duties: Moral obligations Character developmentCosts vs. Benefits – re the act – for the person– of the act
A right action: Promotes the best Is in accordance with a Is one that a virtuous agentconsequences in which moral principle required is disposed to make in the happiness is maximized by God, natural law, or circumstances in order to
rationality flourish or live well
principle-based ethic profitably to guide ethicalbehavior, if they do so while exercising wisejudgment and demonstrating certain characterqualities in order to act appropriately, given thesituation and cultural context (Larmore, 1987).
The reemergence of virtue ethics
Starting with Elizabeth Anscomb (1958), agrowing number of scholars have now movedtoward a more personal ethic, one requiringserious attention to the human dimension(Niebuhr, 1963; MacIntyre, 1985; Des Jardins,1984; Williams, 1984; De George, 1987; Walton,1988; Mahoney, 1990; Nash, 1990; Goodpaster,1991; Sommers, 1991; Solomon, 1992; Collier,1995; Hartman, 1998). This paper defines avirtue to be a qualitative characteristic, gener-ally considered part of a person’s character,something within the person, although neithermaterially nor biologically identifiable. A virtueis closer to an internal value, something of thespiritual essence of the person. Aristotle’sapproach is more psychological than philosoph-ically abstract and analytical, being meant todiscover how a good person is to act (Barnes,1976, p. 17). What is a fully virtuous act, onethat is done as a virtuous person would do it?According to Aristotle, it must satisfy threeconditions: (1) the virtuous person does the actknowingly, aware of the pertinent facts and thepractical wisdom needed to apply the act so asto fit its appropriate purpose; (2) the motive forchoosing the act must be simply because it isvirtuous, not for personal advantage or othernon-ideal motives; and (3) the act must be as aresult of a steady state of character disposition,not a one-off or impulsive act, but irrespectiveof particular times and persons. A virtuous act isthus a rational act based on a wise, purposefulassessment of the factual situation, chosen for apure motive and consistent with a steady dis-position of the actor’s character.
Whatever the ontology of virtue, it is not asubject for scientific proof, although virtue andvice apply to behavior of biological persons.Virtues and vices dispose one to certainbehaviors in the material world. To have good
character suggests the presence of virtues and theabsence of vices, manifest in the moral behav-iors referred to by Foot (1978). Indeed, the“how” of virtue is more understandable, andmore meaningful, for ethics research andteaching, than is the “what.”
Benefits of a virtue perspective
Adding a virtue perspective as a complement toact-oriented perspectives can expand the scopeand perspectives of ethical analysis and under-standing. This is because an Aristotelian (asopposed to Platonic) ethic of virtue:
1. is personal;2. focuses on the motivations of the actor and
the sources of action, bringing a dynamicto ethical understanding;
3. is contextual, highlighting the importanceof understanding the environment as itaffects both actor and his or her acts; and
4. complements other disciplines addressinghuman behavior.
These potential benefits, each of which are vitalfor moral development and moral reasoning bymanagers and their management of complexhuman organizations, are briefly discussedbelow.
1. An ethics of virtue is personal. If ethics is toanswer the Socratic question of how one shouldlive, it needs to be sensitive to the nuances ofhuman life, to what human nature is really like.Consequentialist and deontological approachestend to be impersonal. Hawerwas (1974),MacIntyre (1985), and Pincoffs (1987) offervariations to virtue theory in order to addthe personal perspective. Moral properties orqualities do not pertain to choices, but morefundamentally to persons, in the interpersonalworld of the moral community. Even if virtueethics proponents tend to overstate the relativeimportance of their position, their argumentslend support to a complementary role for thispersonal perspective.
2. An ethic of virtue focuses on the motivations ofthe actor and the sources of action, bringing a dynamicto ethical understanding. The Aristotelian under-
104 J. Thomas Whetstone
standing of human nature is that the supremegood is the well functioning of the human beingas a human; functioning well is nothing otherthan activity in accordance with virtue(excellence) (Broadie, 1991, p. 57). One markof a good life is harmony between one’s motivesand one’s reasons, values, and justifications.Virtues are not static; they are corrective. Theyhelp guide, motivate, or correct moral delibera-tion and behavior. By promoting and facilitatingmethods of moral education, character develop-ment, and emotional well-being of the actor, anethic of virtue can serve as a framework forimplementing positive change in behavior.
3. An ethic of virtue is contexual, highlighting theimportance of understanding the environment as itaffects both the actor and his or her acts. Virtues andvices are fully understood only by consideringthe overall context of life and work. A virtue isnot merely a principle. The practice of an ethicof virtue requires that a person have perceptiveinsight concerning the context of each act. Whatis most right to do depends on the situation,including recognition of coercive pressures andintentions for acting. Act-oriented approachesalso require consideration of the situationalcontext (O’Donovan, 1986, pp. 137–138), but avirtue perspective enriches such analysis.
4. An ethic of virtue, by requiring the actor to seekto understand himself or herself as a person, comple-ments other disciplines addressing human behavior. Ascritical as culture and environment are, theyconstitute only part of the contextual problem.The perspective of virtue, because it concerns thenature and normative behavior of humans, alsopoints to questions of philosophy and theologybeyond the normally-accepted sphere of socialscience.
Having a good moral character suggests thepresence of virtues or moral excellences and theabsence of vices. The dispositions of charactertermed virtues are beneficial to personal actorsand to the others affected by their acts. They helpto meet holistic needs; some motivate, someguide, some correct moral deliberation andbehavior. The virtue ethics perspective attemptsto help the person as actor understand himselfand develop the moral capacities to live and workwell in all situations, both ordinary ones and
crises. When the discipline of ethics includes theevaluation and development of character, itssubject matter begins to look less impersonal andthe responsibilities of people look less intermit-tent (Kupperman, 1991, p. 12).
A “strong” virtue ethic
Some even claim that virtue ethics should beviewed as being more fundamental or superiorto act-oriented theories (Duncan, 1995; Jackson,1996). Koehn (1995, pp. 536–538) says thattaking virtue ethics seriously will probably meanthat one ultimately must choose one system overthe other, because there are profound differencesin how the various ethical systems understandconcepts of practical reasoning and the trulygood act, and their views may be mutuallyexclusive. Indeed, philosophers still tend toapproach business ethics from only one of thethree perspectives, even if they note the contri-butions of all three (Bowie, 1999). But is areductive, even bifurcating, insistence to choosebetween virtue and act theory the best approachfor ethical practice? Gareth Morgan (1996) showshow using several different paradigms of organi-zations can increase understanding of these socialsystems. Likewise, considering multiple perspec-tives, based on admittedly different, but well-considered, assumptions and worldviews, can behelpful for understanding complex ethical issues.
A virtue ethic does have theoretical problems.Virtue theory’s concept of eudaimonia is difficultand obscure. It is criticized for its culturalrelativism because different people and culturescan consider different character traits as virtues,although Hursthouse (1997, p. 222) notes thatact-oriented theories also have this problem.Indeed, Velazquez (2000) argues against thevalidity of hypernorms for global ethics(Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999) because of thecultural imperialism of Western moral theory.Different virtues sometimes point to conflictingactions, but rule deontology sometimes suffersfrom the same problem. The deontological ruleto preserve life can lead to contradictoryinstructions in some cases, such as that of justi-fying abortion to save the mother’s life.
How Virtue Fits Within Business Ethics 105
If business grows due to entrepreneurial ini-tiative of individuals rather than merely throughsocial evolution, an Aristotelian virtue ethic isinadequate on a stand-alone basis. Boatright(1995) suggests that Solomon’s (1992)Aristotelian approach needs to be supplementedwith a set of fundamental human rights groundedin human nature. It does inadequately creditwhat Nesteruk (1995) calls the creative benefitsof constraints, including laws and rules (also noteGiddens, 1984). More generally, a virtue ethicneeds more than a telos that organizes the set ofvirtues into a concept of the good; it also needsa deontological standard of right and wrongbehavior. Furthermore, to be practical, an ethicapplied to business needs to help the businessmanager solve specific problems in a real time sit-uation and context.
Even if they undermine ready acceptance of a“strong virtue” theory, the serious criticisms ofvirtue ethics as a normative theory do notnecessarily refute the above benefits of applyinga virtue ethics perspective – when done so inconjunction with also-imperfect act-orientedperspectives. Instead, they point to the need foran interactive tripartite approach. Table II listscriteria or guidelines for a comprehensiveapproach. Neither a virtue ethic nor a deonto-logical ethic nor a consequentialist teleology cansatisfy all the postulated criteria, but all are metwhen as Louden (1987) suggests, the perspectivesof virtue and the act-oriented theories are viewedas additive. Moral knowledge is the sort ofknowledge that is to be applied with the mostdelicate and sensitive judgment, somethingacquired from the experiences of life. The
important question for practicing managers is notwhich theory is superior, but what positivebenefits result for personal moral developmentand moral reasoning. But how can a tripartiteapproach be implemented in an organization?
Adding virtue ethics as a full complementto the act theories
A comprehensive tripartite theory combines afocus on cognitive decision making of individualacts simultaneously with the deliberate process ofdeveloping the moral character of actors. To befully tripartite, the deontological principles areobjective, not socially-constructed ones thatemerge from a culture of virtuous people. Sucha theory needs to recognize the tension betweenadherence to universal objective standards and thefree will of people who must interpret and applythose standards in each situation. Donaldson andDunfee’s (1999) concept of hypernorms, as usedto constrain decisions made on the basis of socialcontracts at the local level, is somewhat analo-gous to this formulation. A business manager,properly exercising his or her role at the intuitivelevel of practice, exercises and hones virtues suchas courage, temperance, humility, trustworthiness,diligence, love, patience, and practical judgmentin applying a principle-grounded ethic to work-place decisions.
An ethic of virtue highlights the need for eachperson to seek a social identity and to seek thepurpose for his or her life. People act ethicallyor unethically in the world as they face challengesthat change continuously over time. Because
106 J. Thomas Whetstone
TABLE IIGuidelines for applying ethics to business
An ethics theory as applied within an organization should:
1. Offer normative recommendations that are grounded empirically;
2. Be concerned with forming and developing values and thus with actually changing behaviors;
3. Recognize the importance of the persons who act as well as the acts themselves;
and
4. Consider the context, the environmental situation and cultural milieu, as they affect actors and acts.
improvement and correction of mistakes is morerealistic and ultimately more advantageous thanseeking to optimize each decision and action, thedistinctive perspectives provided by a virtue ethicare needed to complete a practical ethic. Withoutneglecting the need to analyze individual actsone-by-one, a virtue perspective can provide alearning process highlighting the continuousdynamic of action and development of themotivational dispositions of human persons to actwithin the broad environmental and communitycontext. The normative aim is to move towardthe standard set by a concept of the good orga-nization.
The excellent manager overcomes pressures tocompromise even newly acquired values, at timeseven opposing and then changing his or herhabitual behavior. Field research in the SoutheastU.S. found that those managers most admired bypeers and subordinates had successfully rejectedvalues ingrained in them as youths in the periodof racial segregation, adopting new habits oflanguage and behavior toward other races(Whetstone, 1995). As organizations and theiractivities increasingly become more global, thebenefits of a virtue ethics perspective willincrease. Flatter and geographically dispersedorganizations especially need to rely upon themoral character of their managers.
Realistically, a truly virtuous manager is anunrealizable ideal, but nevertheless represents aset of virtuous character dispositions towardwhich a real – and necessarily imperfect –manager can strive. This is an abstract as well asoptimistic description, but one based on empir-ical findings concerning what a specific set ofcontemporary managers envision as their mostadmired managers.
In summary, a complete ethic is person-centered and act-focused, dynamic as well asstatic, developmental and decision-focused, andcontextually adaptable. A Western conception ofmorality requires consideration of the motives ofthe agent, the extent of his or her knowledge ofthe situation, and the conditions under which heor she acted, as well as the rightness or wrong-ness of the act itself (Barnsley, 1972, p. 50). Itmakes more sense for the practical aims of moraldevelopment and moral reasoning if approached
using a complementary tripartite ethics formu-lation.
How virtue ethics fits with other theories
How can a manager, as a leader, incorporate adeliberate character or virtues perspective?Tables III and IV are presented to facilitateengagement of this most practical issue, featuringsome dangers arising from using normative andthus ethical leadership paradigms that put greatestfocus on one, two, or three of the major ethicsperspectives of Table I. Table III includesleadership approaches that subordinate or neglectthe character of the actor. The dangers associatedwith each are meant to represent extremeoutcomes, not necessarily the most likely ones.Whether or not a person must be moral to be aleader (Bowie, 2000), these tables suggest that toonarrow a perspective encourages pressures thatinhibit ethical practice. Each of the leadershipparadigms in Table IV combine a human char-acter focus with either a deontological or ateleological orientation.
Consequentialist teleology
Application of a teleological ethic, whether inthe form of utilitarianism or egoism, tendstoward pragmatism in striving for the goals setaccording to the mission or vision (Friedman,1970; Drucker, 1974). At the extreme, any meanscan be rationalized if the intended end is judgedto maximize the overall good. An example isRost’s (1993, 1995) post-industrial leadershipparadigm, a teleological descendant of participa-tive management approaches. The telos is theprocess of interrelationship defined in terms ofnon-coercive influence and mutuality. Thissuggests that an act is okay, if people can agreethat it is okay. In addition to a measurementproblem, this paradigm’s pragmatic and socialconstructionist orientation denies the meaning-fulness of universal deontic principles and valuesand offers no role for personal virtues.
How Virtue Fits Within Business Ethics 107
Deontology
At least at the extreme, a deontological ethic, onethat places its primary emphasis on behavior interms of obligations, rights, principles, rules orcodes, in application can become legalistic,operating strictly by the “rules of the game”(e.g., Carr, 1968). The rule of law becomes thelaw of rules. Historically, universalist ethics havesometimes led to legalistic practices. Thisoccurred in New Testament biblical times, in theMiddle Ages, and in the seventeenth centuryamong the English and American Puritans, aswell as on contemporary university campuses inthe form of “political correctness.” A personal,relational complement is needed to humanize theabstract.
Principles-based ethics (PBE)
Combination ethics such as the DU Model orJanus-faced ethic (Brady, 1985; 1990), and theU-R-J Model (Cavanagh et al., 1981) have theadmirable aim of combining the benefits ofdeontological and teleological perspectives.However, at the intuitive level of business ethics,their application can lead to moral schizophrenia(Stocker, 1976; Kreeft, 1992) when the indicatedactions conflict (MacIntyre, 1985). Even thoughsuch conflicts may not be frequent (Green, 1994),they do occur, leading to moral dilemmas thatundermine the credibility of business ethicstheory in the eyes of business practitioners (Stark,1993).
But a principles-based ethic can be very usefulwhen applied in proper context by one usingvirtuous judgment. On a prima facie basis,adding a character perspective improves animpersonal ethic. Horvath (1995) even claims
108 J. Thomas Whetstone
TABLE III Leadership risks
– Dangers of focusing too much on a particular act theory
Dangers: Tyranny; Stoicism; Too Subjective; Ignorance of Cultism Pietism; Irrational decisions virtue language;
Legalism Manipulation by those served
that only a person of virtue can successfullyimplement a principle-based ethic. The leader-ship paradigms referenced in the cells of Table IVadd a deliberate character orientation, withgreater focus on the process of personal moraldevelopment.
Virtue and teleology
Virtue ethics involves reevaluation of the natureof a telos (purpose or desired end) for life andbehavior in the business context (Solomon,1992). Such a conception combines the teleo-logical focus on visionary ends with a focus oncharacter formation and motivation for achievingthe vision. Although business people, in the dailypress of activity, may not often stop to reflect ontheir telos (Stewart, 1970; Mintzberg, 1971), theycould benefit thereby (see Hartman, 1996, andWerhane, 1999). To enable such reflection,Moberg and Calkins (1999) propose a disciplinedapproach based on the five hundred years oldSpiritual Exercises of Ignatius Loyola, one offeringrenewal and growth in clear-headedness,meaning, and wisdom to business leaders andemployees at every level. The intended outcomeis for each exercitant to formulate a response –ideally a specific commitment he or she isprepared to make as a result of the process.
Duncan (1995) classifies the ethics of virtueas a non-rule-governed teleological theory, onebeginning with a conception of the best kind oflife for a human. This view allows recognition ofmoral rules, for example the use of casuistry, butis this sufficient for a comprehensive ethic? Someleadership models suggest not, at least pointingto significant risks. For example, transformationalleadership (Burns, 1978; Bass, 1985) incorporatesa joint focus on virtue and teleology, beingconcerned with changing the behavior of peopleby first changing their character. Transforma-tional leadership can be dangerous because it isdeficient in constraints as to personal rights andresponsibilities (Keeley, 1995). The resultingsense of “political correctness” can lead totyranny as Madison and other Americanfounding fathers feared. At the extreme,unchecked transformational leaders can become
dictators or cult leaders with followers who arewilling to go to frightening excess. NapoleonBonaparte, Adolph Hitler, David Koresh of theWaco incident, and Marshall Applewhite or Doe,who led thirty-eight intelligent and skilled pro-fessionals to commit suicide in California, eachexemplify the dark side of transformational lead-ership.
Virtue and deontology
Neglecting or even subordinating the individualor the community visionary perspective also canbe dangerous. Corporations are well-advised todevelop ethics codes, but the companies who relymost on written codes are not always the mostethical (Sorell and Hendry, 1994); they may justwant a document declaring their integrity,without being willing to abide by it ( Jennings,1999, p. 3). A code can beneficially impact theethical culture of the organization provided themoral standards obviously apply to everyone, notjust the personnel at the operating level, andprovided the Board of Directors and CEO addressthe moral problems actually faced by employeesat the divisional and operating levels (Hosmer,1996, p. 150). The code needs to be democrat-ically derived and applied in a virtuous or goodcommunity culture, such as Hartman’s (1996)good organization or Goodpaster’s (2000) ethicalculture.
Stephen Covey’s (1991) principle-centeredleadership paradigm combines a deontic focus onobjective principles for behavior with seriousattention to development of one’s moral char-acter qualities. Instead of the process focus oftransformational leadership, Covey stresses certainuniversal principles – described by him as self-evident, self-validating laws of nature. Eachperson is a product of her choices and, in turn,character and conscience are what matter for herchoices. This leadership approach recalls theworld and life perspective of stoics such asMarcus Aurelius, employing traditional virtuelanguage to describe objective and external prin-ciples, presuming that men and women becomevirtuous through a knowledge that enables themto live harmoniously within their environment.
How Virtue Fits Within Business Ethics 109
But Viktor Frankl (1962) observes that mandoes not behave morally for the sake of havinga good conscience but for the sake of a cause towhich he commits himself or for a person whomhe loves or for the sake of his God. Those whoautonomously have a good conscience as theirmotivation can become legalistic. Principle-centered leadership tends to promote the existingsystem, focusing on “heal thyself ” techniques andinfluencing one’s close circle of relationshipsrather than on addressing the systemic factors ofbusiness (Nash, 1994, p. 30). This may be areason why many corporate managers teachCovey’s philosophy to their employees. A personneeds to be oriented critically toward a mean-ingful corporate or societal telos; otherwise onemay well withdraw into stoicism or pietism orlegalism.
Teleology and deontology and virtue – ascomplements
For a more balanced ethic, all three ethicsperspectives are needed. Servant leadership(Greenleaf, 1977; Spears, 1995) exemplifies thetripartite ethics approach. A servant leader hasthe character of a servant who seeks to leadothers toward a meaningful telos, but onlyaccording to highly principled means. Theantithesis of institutional bureaucracy, servantleadership is characterized by behavioral infor-malities, offering empathetic support for ethicalbehavior, and finding creative ways to do thingsbetter. For example, John Woolman was a servantleader in the eighteenth century, successfullyinvesting over thirty years to persuade otherAmerican Quakers to abandon slavery. Aung SuuKyi of Burma is a contemporary servant leader,displaying an engaging sense of humor alongwith a steely seriousness and deep commitment(Horne, 1997) in spite of the persecutions ofhouse arrest, separation from family, and physicaldanger. The servant leader formulation attemptsto bring together the conceptual and intuitivelevels of ethics, offering a focus on developingpeople fit to make the ethical choices and toimplement them one-by-one – while continuingto improve over time. As Bowie (2000) notes, the
servant leader can be subject to manipulation;he or she thus needs a strong vision, objectiveprinciples, and virtue to minimize this risk.
The advantage of a comprehensive tripartiteapproach is most apparent when one is facedwith the toughest dilemmas, those which mayrequire use of narrative to explore adequately(Nash, 2000; Freeman, 2000). Christiana andFred Sommers (1993) point to the classicdilemma posed in Melville’s novel Billy Budd: dowe punish people for the evil they do or for whatthey are? Does Billy Budd’s exceptionally pureand good character excuse or even mitigate hisact of accidentally killing an evil man? This is aclash between the military duty to execute acapital offender and the moral obligation to showcompassion to a virtuous man caught up in tragiccircumstances. In the novel, the virtuous man,Billy Budd, is convicted and hanged withoutopportunity for appeal. Does the deontologicalmorality prevail over virtue ethics in this case?Or is Budd’s character enhanced with greaterhonor than ever before? Both questions can beanswered “yes.”
The reality of complex issues suggests a needfor developing a practical, user-friendly decisionmodel combining act-oriented approaches withattention to the virtues and vices of humancharacter. Several that move in this direction havebeen proposed, including Hosmer’s (1994)multiple analysis that asks the decision-maker toconsider ethical problems from the various per-spectives of ten principles, including virtue;Cavanaugh, Moberg, and Velasquez’s (1995)utility-rights and duties-justice-caring model;and DeGeorge’s (1999) “Steps of a GeneralMoral Analysis.” This is a positive trend thatwill help managers committed to enhancingmoral development and moral reasoning, espe-cially as the following challenge is successfullyaddressed.
The need for relearning the language ofvirtues and vices
Adding an attention to the virtues and vices ofhuman character as a full complement to rea-soning according to deontological and conse-
110 J. Thomas Whetstone
quentialist teleological formulations can offerbenefits in terms of moral development andmoral reasoning. However, the traditionallanguage of virtue, going back to the ancientGreeks and medieval scholastics, may no longerbe adequate for contemporary business people.Deciding upon what values are most importantand what personal character qualities are neededby actors is thus essential at the intuitive level ofethical practice. But MacIntyre (1985, p. 244)observes that since the Enlightenment, there hasbeen an inability even to agree upon a catalogueof virtues and, even more fundamentally, aninability to agree upon the relative importanceof virtue concepts within a moral scheme inwhich notions of rights and utility also have akey place.
However, the perceived inadequacy oflanguage presents a challenge rather than aroadblock for scholars interested in businessethics. Indeed, field observation and interviewsof managers in their workplaces, food stores inMississippi, Tennessee, and Arkansas in 1993 and1994 (Whetstone, 1995), disputes the view thatpeople in the workplace are “morally mute”(Bird and Waters, 1989). The food storemanagers interviewed use a moral language ofvirtues and vices freely and articulately. However,this language is not that of abstract deontolog-ical or teleological philosophy or even the samevirtue and vice language, after translation, ofclassical Greece and medieval Europe.
What Bird and Waters (1989) found is thatcontemporary managers, perhaps because theyare educated to be, or to pretend to be, morallyneutral, treat almost as taboos the use of “right”and “wrong” and “good” and “bad” in assessingpersons. Taboos of language are not necessarilydescriptive of reality, however. Ancient Germanpeoples did not have a word for “bear” becauseof their fears and Victorians were enculturated toavoid sexual references, even substituting “limb”for a piano’s “leg” (Dooling, 1999). But theGermans killed bears and the Victoriansreproduced.
The implication is that business leaders canindeed encourage “good conversation,” althoughas Trevino and Nelson (1995, p. 212) observe,explicit use of terms such as “moral” and
“ethical” is not always well received. Managersas leaders can be bold in speaking in moral terms,and can more openly acknowledge the factthat people in organizations have valued moralorientations. The problem for contemporarybusiness leaders is not primarily the lack ofarticulation of moral concerns (Maclagan, 1998,p. 6), but that of understanding the languagepeople actually use. A message and challenge forbusiness ethicists is that more research is neededon the subject of contemporary virtue and vicelanguage as well as on developing further helpfulways of combining the application of virtueand act-oriented perspectives by practicingmanagers.
Conclusion
How does virtue ethics fit within business ethics?Robert Louden’s thesis is that virtue ethicstheory should be included in any adequatejustification of morality. It fits very well if addedas a full complement to both deontological andconsequentialist teleological act theories. Thispaper does not claim to prove Louden’s thesisaccording to formal philosophical argument, butfocuses on the practical application of ethicsperspectives by business managers and leadersseeking to promote moral development andmoral reasoning. It proposes that businessmanagers need to add virtue ethics, or moreprecisely an attention to virtues and vices ofhuman character, as a fully-equal complementto moral reasoning according to a deontologicalfocus on obligations to act and a teleologicalfocus on the consequences of acts. There arebeneficial reasons for doing so.
Adding a virtue perspective as a complementto act-oriented perspectives can expand to scopeand perspectives of ethical analysis and under-standing. This is because an Aristotelian virtueperspective is personal; focuses on the motiva-tions of the actor and the sources of action,bringing a dynamic to ethical understanding; iscontextual, highlighting the importance ofunderstanding the environment as it affects bothactor and his or her acts; and complements otherdisciplines addressing human behavior.
How Virtue Fits Within Business Ethics 111
Even if the criticisms of virtue ethics success-fully cloud its use as a mononomic or “strong”normative theory of ethical justification, they donot refute the above benefits of applying a virtueethics perspective – when done so in conjunc-tion with also-imperfect act-oriented perspec-tives. Instead, they point to a need for aninteractive tripartite approach in order to meetthe complex requirements of an applied ethic interms of human moral development and moralreasoning concerning specific behavioral deci-sions. In practice, a complete ethic needs to beperson-centered and act-focused, dynamic as wellas static, developmental and decision-focused,and contextually adaptable. Without neglectingthe need to analyze individual acts one-by-one,a complementary virtue perspective can providea learning process highlighting the continuousdynamic of action and development of themotivational dispositions of human persons to actwithin the broad environmental and communitycontext. The fully complementary formulationdoes not eliminate the risk of relativism some-times attributed to virtue ethics because itinvolves subjective judgments informed bycommunity culture, but minimizes relativism byrelying on objective deontological principlesapplied with phronesis.
To illustrate how deficiencies of a “strong”virtue ethics formulation can be overcome by amore balanced tripartite approach, this paperrefers to several normative leadership paradigms(each based on a combination of virtue, deon-tology, or consequentialist teleology ethics per-spectives) and the dangers inherent in each. Themost balanced and thus favored leadershipparadigm is servant leadership, grounded in atripartite ethic.
Just as it begins with a challenge to continuephilosophic debate of Louden’s appeal forabandoning mononomic conceptions of ethicstheory, this paper concludes with a challenge toempiricists to develop a more current descriptiveunderstanding of the moral language used incontemporary organizations. This, along with thecontinuing development of user-friendly decisionmodels combining act-oriented approaches withdeliberate attention to human virtues and vices,
can assist practicing managers lead moraldevelopment and moral reasoning efforts.
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