Hrltaln's Secret WarThe Indonesian Confrontation 1962-66

THE CONFRONTATION IN THE AIR 18

TACTICS 19

MAINLAND RAIDS, 1964-65 15

3

6• The phases of 0pcr.ltions - the baulclicld - the troops• General Walker's operational principles• 'I leans and mil1d~' - 22 SAS -the Border ScOUlS

• Summary of Commonwealth forces

CONFRONTATION

CONTENTS

• The Brunei remit. December 1962

THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

• Longj<w..ai. Scplt"mber/OclObcr 1963 - Kalabakan,December 1963/Febmary 1964 - Long Miau and theR~ang river,Janlialy 1964 -lhe BanH"kok talks

• Track 6, "larch 19fi<!- British reinforccmcllts

• Indonesian seaborne and airborne landings in Malaya• Australian and New Zealand commiunent, 1965-66

INDONESIAN CROSS-BORDER ATTACKS,1963-64 11

WILL FOWLER hn wortledIn Jourmllllam and publishing.Ince H112, reportIng forEurope.n, American, Aalan'nd ArabIc magazlnea fromEurope, the USA, the MiddleE..t, Chi", .nd SE Alia.Amongst hIs more than 30publllhed books II the belt­MllIng MAA 133 Sattle for

the Fa/Illanth: Lsoo Force•.A TA Hldl., for 30 years, hewa. cornml..loned from theranks In 4th Bn Royal GreenJlCk.~, .nd volunteeredfor Operatiofl 'Granby' Inthe Qulf, 1HO-91. In 19931M ,nteh,latad from the FrenchAnny _ ,taff office,.

cou..... at the Ecole Milltalre,Parla. WIll .. married and liveaIn RomMy, Hampshlra.

KEVIN LYLES Is an experton the history of the Vietnamconnie!., 'nd , talentedlIlustnltor of 20th centurymilitary subjects. He ha,ll1~tratlldMveral book' forOIpray, and has elso writtentlu.s on the US Army InVietnam, a aubject In which1M h.s along-standingklte...t. Ka lives and wortlsIn Hertfordshlre, UK.

• Jllngle forts: I GJ at Stass,July 1964 - 2 Pam al Pia man Mapu.April 1965

• Patrolling• SAS tactics

'CLARET' OPERATIONS 24• Taking lhe war to the enemy - rilles of engagement• SAS Claret opera lions• Australian SAS• New Zealand SAS

THE LAST YEAR 38• Gunon~Tepoi: Rarnbahadllr Limbu, VC• Gelling OUl: the Indonesian COllp - peace agreemell1­

sllmm,lIy of casualties

THE PLATES 43

INDEX 48

Men-at-Arms· 431

Britain's Secret WarThe Indonesian Confrontation 1962-66

Will Fowler· Illustrated by Kevin LylesSe"es ed, tar Milrt,n W,ndrow

Fm published '" a-l ernUl '" 2006 by Osl:ny NlIlsIlIr>g.MkIIand House. West Wwy. Solley. O~!ord 0:<2 OPI-l. UK«3 p,n, Avenue S<lulh, New Vork. NY 10016, USA

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SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ulaxl<tnd, Gregory. '171' IlLgimnl/S lkpllrf, WilliamKimber (London, 1971)

Cross. LtCoI j.P., :A Faa lik'lI Chirllm Sfjacksjd,~

Greenhill Books (London. 1996)Cross, LtC.oIJ.P.,jllllgl.e mllfall', Arms & Armour Prcss

(London. 1989)Dt,nnis. Peter, &.Icfrcy Grcy, Emergrncy (/1111 umfirm/{/fioll:

A/ISlmllflll Mililflr)' Opcl"fllicms 1Il "'nlilJa mill IJoIllff)1950-66, Allen & Un\\i'l (NS\\'. Aunralia, 1996)

De\\~lr, Michael, llnul/ HI'(' 1I11/')", Robert 1·lalc (London.1984)

Dickens, Pelcr. &AS - TIu! jlll/gle Fron/itT:. Arms &Armour Press (Loudon. 1983)

Flimha11l, Victor, Air m"l1:S- and AirrmJl, Arms & ArmourPrcss (Londoll, 1989)

Artist's Note

Readers may care to note thai the original paintings from which !hicolour platllS in this book were prepared are available 'Of privatesale. All reproduction copyright WhalS08Yflt" is Illlwned by thePublishers. All enquiries shookl be addressed to:

KIIVIO Lyles. 10 COw Roast, Tring. He<1s HP23 5Rf. UK

The Publishers r&glllilhat they can ante< into no corrospondenc:eupon !1Iia manEll".

Honn:r. Da\id. SAS - PllOll/oms of lIlt jlll/gU>, GreenhillBooks (Londoll. 1991)

jackson, Cen Sir William, lI'ilhdrr/llJ(jIJrom Empire.B.T.B.1I5ford (London. 1986)

james, Harold, & Denis Shcil-Smith, Tile L'mledm1!d Hat.Leo Cooper (I..ondon, 1971)

L1dd, .James, SHS - Th, bll'isibll' RairlC:5, l\rlllS & ArmourPress (London, 1983)

J....;ldd.jalllcs, TM ROJal Man·Ill!S.jane's (I..ondon. 1980)McAlister. Cell R.W., Bllgl,& Kllllri, \'012 (Regimental

Trust. 10th l'l;ncess Marl's 0\\11 Gurkha Rifles(1984)

Nasution. Cen Abdul Ifaris. FlIIlI/mnmlaL~ofGlltrrilluI\tl'filll', Pall Malll'rcss (I.ondon, 1965)

BRITAIN'S SECRET WAR:THE INDONESIAN CONFRONTATION

1962-66

THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

OPPOSITE Two of the e••entlalfactol'll In the British victory

In the Confrontation: Gurkhahlfantry, and a Fl••t AIr ArmWessell helicopter, whichhal JUlt dropped them on thetleliplld built out,ide a hilltop

fort In Bomeo. The foreground

aoldle. carrie. an LMG fleld­modified with. forward plltolgnp. (Royal Navy}

THE WHOLE OF SmITH-EAsr ASIA saw dramalic changes between Ult'mid 1950$ and lhe early \9605. Se\'erdl fonner Dutch, French andBritish colonies in the region had become independent nations,

sOllie of them after bloody guerrilla campaigns, and were now assertingtheir newfound national idemil)'_ United Slates agencies had beeninvolved in South Vietnam - fonned)' part of French Indochina- since1954, and since 1961 US Army advisors had been assisting itsgovernmelll. By the end of 1964 there would be 23.000 US personnel inViemam, and the following March the first major ground units wouldarrive, beginning a commitment \\'hieh would last seven grim years.

The former Bdush colony of f\.'!alara had been granted independencewithin the Commonwealth in August 1957. after the suppression of anine-year communist guclTilla campaign (the ·E.mergency·) almostentirely limited to the large Chinese minority population. This hadinvolved some 100,000 British and Gurkha troops with Australian, NewZealand and Malay support; but the new government w:a.~ both stableand well inclined towards the West..'

Indonesia had achieved independence from the Netherlands inDecember 1949, but these hundreds of islands - stretching some 3.000miles from ,,'est LO east - were only partially controlled by the Djakartagovernment; their population of some 85 million, divided into 17 majorethnic b"'Oups. was riven by unrest. Ne\'ertheless, in 1962 the president.Achmad Sukarno, an aggressive nationalist with pretensions to widerleadership among the 'non-aligned' nations, had a grandiose dream offorging a new Pacific union called 'Maphilindo', to bring togt.'lherMalaYA, the Philippines and Indonesia as a regional power bloc. Thisdream had been born in r.'!arch 1945 when Snkamo bad been amember of a body set up by the Japanese mililall' adminiSffiltion of theoccupied Netherlands East Indies,

The greater, southern pan of the hllge jungle island of Borneo (tothe Indonesians, K..'1limanLan) lay within Indonesia: and iniliallvSukarno \\'ished to extend his control o\'er lhe neighbollring Britishcolonies and protectorates in nonh-western I~orneo - SarJ.\\'ilk, Sabahand the Sultanate of Brullei, knowll collecti\'ely as the North BorneoTerritories - which were also approaching negotiated independence.

In May 1961 the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman.proposed that r-,'Iala)'a. the island Slate of Singapore and the NorthBorneo Temtodes should fonn a fedemtion named Malaysia. Althoughat first sceptical, the British go\'ernmenl So.'1W the advantages that this planoffered, and the scheme would be acceptable to the United Nations. 11le1 See M«>-al·Arml132, ThaMaiayan~ 1948-60 3

SO TH-EAST ASIA

, : ~~-- ...-,I... _ , '· ,'", ,~~

: TIlAlL.AND ~'11>',

• I •, ?-- ... '\ : ':VIETN"MI .: S (I /I I h, .

• IA', ... China

LAY

J

DON E 5

~.~~""''';;;:;.~~.

~._----~-.,:,,_--_.'~--

A

Ewm1lNEA•

'AUT:,,,,,,,.••·••

•

TunJ...u was well qualified to lead t\.lala)'sia; an aristocratic Brilish­educated la\\'}'cr, he had established his crcdclllials both with ~lalayans

as an am.i-eolonialist. and \'o'il.h the British as a staunch allli-communisl.In Indonesia, SUKarno sal. lhis move as a rebuff to his plans forMaphilindo. A flambol"31l1 oralor and 'headline addict', he tanedincluding in his public rants a slogan that "ould become hicatchphrase: 'Cmyong MalaJ'sia' - 'Smash Mala\'sia',

AfLcr many di.scussions the Federation of ~Iala,:.ia was finallvproclaimed on 16 September 1963 (though without the Sultanate ofBnll1ci. ",!lich preferred sovereign independence), TIle IndonesianForeign Ministcr, Dr Subandrio, tJlen began making public referencesto a poliC) of Confl'omation or KOIifrrmtasl towards Malaysia, accusingthe ncv.' StalC of being 'accomplices of nco-colonialist and nco­imperialist forces pursuing a policy hostile towards Indonesia', In lhewords ofGen Sir William Jackson, 'He did nOl ~pell OUl \\hat was meantb~ -confronL.,tion~, but it was assumed to be a blending of political.economic and milira.n presstlresjust short of war:

The Brunei revolt, December 1982The first sholS of the ConfronL."ltion pre-dated the fonnation ofMalavsia, On 8 December 1962 a rebellion mmembers of the Kedayanuibe broke alii in tllC oil-rich Sulmnate of Brunei. The rebels adoptedthe title ~ortll Kalimantan National Ann\' (Tnltara Naswnm Kallman/anl}tara - TNKU): lhc\' were led by YaMin AfTendi. The TNKU hadalX>1ll 4,000 followers in Brunei and Sarawak, but onl)'some 150 ofLhcmwere well anncd and about 2,000 had shOlgum, The rebellion would besupprcssed quickly by men from four ballalion-sized British infantry

units: 1st llatmlion, 2nd Gurkha Rifles (I/2nd GR), 42 C.ommandoRoyal Marines (42 Cdo RM). 1st GrecnJackets (I GJ). and the Queen's~11 I lighlanders (QOI-I),

AI 8nlllci to""'n. and at Limbang across the border in Sarawak. theTN'KU had taken hosmges. and there were indications that these "-Quidbe execute<! on 12 December. In Singapore. 42 Cdo R.\l was wal11ed tobe read, to deplo) to Bnlllei, Aircraft carried Gurkhas to Bnll1ei townand L'lbuan island, "hieh \\ere quiekJr secured. On 10 December aBlackbunl Beverley piloted b)- f Lt Fenn earning 90 men of theQueen' OWII Highlanders landed <tIthe rebel-held airstrip ofAnduki ina lDUP d, ma", operation, The control to",cr and police Slation weresecured. two rebels killed and the captured. At Seria the QOII released46 hoslages. "'hile Hawker 1hillIer jets of 1\'0.20 Sqn RAF kept therebels' heads down with dummy strafing runs.

At Bakenu. over the border in Sar:.l\,·ak, I GJ suffered no casualties,killed five rebels and ,,'ounded six, and rounded up a further 328. fromwhom they recovered 327 sholguns, The)' were assisted by grOllps oflocal irregulars, subsequently led by ~lr Tom Han'isson; nmv the curlllm'of the Sarawak Museum, he had been parachuted into the Borneojungle during World War II to organize resistanceagaimt theJapancse, and he knew and was trustedb, the tribes.

Also on 10 December, L Co), 42 Cdo RMcommanded bv Capt Jerem)' Moore, ~IC, flew toBnlllei town and prepared to move up-rin~r 10

Umbang, Scant imelligence on the enem,'suggesled thal they ,,'ere about 150 suong, anned",ilh ~hOlguns, rifles and one Bren light machinegun, Against lhem Moore could commit two anda half lroops of Marines (about 75 men), theCompan) IIQ, and a section of .303in Vickersmachine guns. In Brunei to.....n the Marines foundt....·o old Z-Jigillers, ramp-Io.'uling harges that couldbe used as imprm;zed landing crafL Beforedawn on 12 December, firing lhe White Ensign;llld under Ror.ll Navy cre,,'S from lhe CO:lSlalminesweepers HMS Shawf(m and fiskerloll, thelighters set sail for Limbang carrying the Marines,Al thaI taWil, when about 300 )~\rd.~ from shore,they camc under fire, I"hich the Vickcl'S crcwsremrned, When the MGs on the second lighter\,'ere masked by the craft upstream, Q:\IS CrrilQuoins asked Lt Peter Dm"11 RN if he \\'ould pull0111 of line astern lO give him a dearer field offire.'Sergeant-major'. came lhe reply. 'Nelson ,,'ouldhave Im'e<! ,"ou!' - and the lighter moved into amore exposed position.

The first lighter beached 30 ' ...rds from thepolice station and the commandos stormedashore, 8\ chance the coxs....... in of lhe secondlighter had been ,,'ounded, and the craft driftedpasllhe landing point to beach 150 }'l.Irds further

Bakanu, s.r.w.. Noottl~

Territories., Oec:ember IH2:

Rifleman TetTY F~ of htGreen Jac.kttta wfth • UnionFl"1I aI'Ir8dHd by the THKU....o.t..... _ ... 1M OJ rtn.

iii""" beret .nd .1....... crow.-d,w....thed M.It... Crou b80ge,

OG .hlrt, OG lroYHn blouHdO'Ier Jungle boot., .nd th.l1ICentl~ I••ued 58 PIn webequIpment; hit 7.82mm l1A1SlR I••Iu", o....r hi' 'hould.r.{Importal War Mu'.umFESl821283/a"l

•

6

~ _rport. Dt>o::.....~ tM2:

men of "I Bn, 0.-.. OwnHighlanden unloading .t_from en RAf' Blackburn~C 1 tf8nS9Ort, During ttMoConfron18tlon No 34 Sqn _tel

~t. B....ef1eys from se"18rendu~n,

upstream ncar the hospital- ....hcre the hostages \\'crebeing held. For l.he loss offive killed and six \,'ounded(including a sailor) thehosmges \,'cre rescued andthe tow'n secured. Therebels lost 15 killed and50 capwrcd; the) hadnumbered 350, anned withautom.ltic weapons. riflesand shotguns.

TIle Bnmei re-.·oIL W'aS

efTecLi\'e1~ o\cr b\ 17December, but since it wassponsored b\ Indonesia iti no\\ regarded as markingthe beginning of the

Confronlalion. Lieutenant-Colonel HJ.S\\cenC\, Me, commanding ICJ, did not dismiss lhe TNKU rcbels as a force: '[Lhe)} \\ereexmlOrdinarih 1,'e11 organized so far as knOl~dng \\hal 10 do, which \ilaJinstallations lO seize and the I'l>e of organization required to caIT't alita coup d'lal. Ther were organi7ed in platoons, companies andb."l.u:aliolti, t.hi1 had a unifoml of sorts, and Iheir plans had been welllaid. TIle rebellion failed inil.iall) 10 achieve its objects lx"C3.use of lad.of",eapons, the inept manner in \\hich il ",as cxecUlcd in spile ofgoodplans, the unexpected resisL."l.nce of the police.. , and poor leadershipespecialh' on 11le higher levels, To all this was added another impon.antfactor: the authorities al the. last moment became suspicious and thepolice ,,'ere standing-Lo.'

At llle close of operations the L111il.'o of 3 Cdo Bde received a ... ignalfrom C"1.pt S.R.PI;ngle RM. the Assistanl Brigade Signals Officer, and LtEJOatley RJ.\1. 1llis announced the institution of a medal for thecampaign, and inauentive recipiems must have reached Para Threebefore their suspicions were fully aroused as to the signal's stams:"illEr;" TilE FAct:.SlDE OFTIIE BOR.'\'EO MEDAL Bb\KS A:o< t.NGRAVI:-.'GOFTIIE

I'KOFILE OFTIIE KING OF Ot:.NMARK. A:o<D TilE REVERSE SIDE, A.'.: ENGRAVED

MFSSt\GE FRO:.'>1 GRATE.FUL f'~OI'LE OF COI'E'.:HAGEN. D~;:-.'\IARKS CAI'ITAL

ell" A.\:D SITE OF TilE EXI'OKT BO'lTLlNG FACTOKY OF CARLSBERG LAGER.

Tf IE. RIBBON WILL BE BLOODSI lOT RED WITf I PINK ELE.l'f IANTS "'''D L1TILE

(,RH.-," RATS SKJU-ULl..YEI\GRA\,ED UPON [T, TIlt. ~I~DAJ.SWILL BE ISSUED BY

Kl-:'LLOGS LTD. WIIO W[LL ENCLOSE Tll~.M WITIl ,\ UALLOOi\ AND SIIERlFf'S

SlAR IN TlltJR eOR.\lFLAKJo: PACKETS.

CONFRONTATION

General Sir \\'illiamJackson described the three-and·a·half)'earconnictas a six-round COntest. of which the Tunku and his BriLish supporters\\'on the firsL fi\'e rounds conclushely on points, He identified RoundOne as Suk."lmo's aHempt to stop the creation of Mala) ia; Round Two\\'as the breaking of trade and diplomatic links, and the first cross-border

raids bv TNKU 'volunleers': Round Three brought Indoncsian polilicalpressure through the United Nations, a peace conferencc in S...ngkok inFebnmrv 196-1 during a short cease·fire, and the simultaneousdeplonuem of regular Indonesian forces: Round Four sa\\ operations1)\ Indonesian n·gulars in Borneo and on the Mala\<Ul mainland, Blitishcross-border raids in I'cspon.se, and peace talks in June 19&1 in Tokyo.During Round Fi\e in earlv 1965 ~lalarsia's position seemedIllornelllarily to be shaken when Singal}{)re withdre\\ from theFederrllion; bUI in Round Six, as Indonesia's economy spun out ofcomral in the second half of 1965, internal dissension ill Indonesiadestroyed Slikarno and halted the ConfrOtWllion,

The main area." of opera lions would be lhe gOO-milt' border betweenK.,linmntlin (Indonesian Borneo), Sarawak, Bnlllei and Sabah, Foroperntional control, Sarawak was divided b}' the British into five'dh'isions', from lhc Finn Dhision in the \\est based 011 lhe capital ofRuching, to the Firth Dhision on the S::lbah border (note that these\\ere simph' operational areas, nOI 'divisions' in Ihe sense of militaryformations). Sabah itself was dhided into West, Central and [as(Brigade areas.

The British soldiel'S \\ ho fought in ~lala\'Sia were of a nc.."" generation- the post8ational $enice all-mlunlecr career anny, Though the troops\\ere the children of the post--\\~dr 'Baby Boom', their commandingolncers had foughl through \\'orld \\'011' II and Korea, and lllany companycommanders and senior NCOs had g:'linedjungle experience during theMalayan Emergency of the 19505, When tllese ol1icers and men deployedto lhe Far Easl they came as formed batl<lliotls, regimenl~ or '\(juadrons(nol, like the US AnllV in Vietnam, a:. a uickle of conscripted indi\idualreinforcements - a s}"!ltem which pro\cd bad for morale and ullitcohesion). The married men were <lccomp<lnied by their f<lmiliesand <lccommodated in British-built marriedquarters, wilh Aml} schools for tJleirchildrcn. TIlebarmcls, airfiel(l~ <lnd harbours built bet\\cen the193<b <lnd 1950s were still a\'ailable in ~lala\<l,

Singapore and Iiong Kong as pan of8litain's 'Eastof Sue1' defence commiunents, IlowC\er, little ofthis infrastmctllre existed in S...bah and S.,rawak,where roads, airstrips <lnd accollllllodationwOllld have to be irnprO\il.ed, imprO\'cd or buillfrom scratch,

General Walker'. operationalprinciplesTIle British and later Federation and Common­\\callh forces who deplored to Bomeo from 1963were \\ell sen'ed b\ the Director of Operntions,MajCen Walter Walker, GOC 17th GurkhaDi\ision and a veLCran of the jungles of BUlllla andMalara, who arri\'ed in theatre in December 1962,

Walker's initial responsibility W,Li to quash lheBrunei rebellion: but hejudged lhal there was ag,'ealer threat from Indonesia. and requested thaIat the close of lhal opel'alion force levels in the

Serll, Brunel, 24 De<:embet"1Ge2: Mlialn Wllter Walk...,CSE, DSO (cent,..), aoc 17thGurkha Int Div and the newlyappointed OI~IOt" 01 Operalton.In the Borneo lorrllOf1n - 10

tIM IJOldlan pIItrolllnsl tIM bonIet'he _. 'Jungle .11m'. GenefatSIr W1l1lem JM;kaoft dHcrlbedWalkel' e. 'I .trong, rIItt-"_t_ personality, who

wovkl ontr~t the hWtHt

pnlt...oonet standenh; -.MIdid not autt... loon gIed~ Heheld cryatal cJnr Mws on the

polk... to bepY~ In North

Borneo, about which he lenno one In Iny doubt'. On the

right I. LtCo' W.O.McH.n:ty, MC,commllndlng ttt Q~n" OwnHlghllnders, II ...etelll" of NorthAfrica who h.ad lllJO been badlywounded In Nonnandy. At len I.Mll1l,O.Clmet'Of1. c:om.....ndlng ACompany. (IWM FES 112/2&4128)

7

NORTH BORNEO BORDER AREA1962-66

,-_..:"..._"'"....._"'."......:D_

1--- --I..........._~--

•'; 0

-- -

'; ,

·,.

8

TlIroughcKlt Borneo the Inlandle..,.l" w.. cn.rKteft~edby

Iteep ridges mlng to 8,000tt

mountain.; thick rIIln I_I,

_It Into ~'lNtu.1 gloom bV thetOOft high lungle canopy; f••I­flowing Itreaml, and C08ltalmangrove Iwamp•. Therll WI,.very few motor1lble road., end

the climate ranged 'rom ,tlninghumidity to chltl night, on whichtold I.... needed lleepll'lil bagl.Dally downpourII of IrQPlcll ,.Inadded to the mlnrl•• of troop.

In the field, and r••trlcted bothmovement on the ground ,ndnight. by h.llcopt.....

area should not be reduced. Walker's as.'iCSSlllent "''as correct. andoperations would soon have to be undertaken first 10 cOlltain CI'"OSS­

border raids b} IBTs - "ndoncsia-b..'lSCd Bordcr Terrorists' - and later [0

deslro) their ""ill to laullch them. In his first oper-Ilions directh'c Walkerlaid dO\m the six principles which would guide the proseclltion of thecampaign:(I) Joim operations between the police and the Ihree armed services(2) Time!) and accurate illlclligence informaLioll(3) Speed, mobilil) and nexibility(-I) Security of bases(5) Domination ofthejulIg'le(6) Winning and keeping the confidence of the indigenous people.

The Police Special Branch, working with the Ann)'. was able to supplyinronnalion aboutlocaltelTorisl leaders and their likely hiding places inSarawak and Sabah. Thanks tu Ihis intelligence, Yassin AfTendi, the laslof the surviving TNKU leaders, who had sel up a base in s"",unp5 on thebank of the Brunei river ncar Kampong Scrdang, wa,~ eliminated, Menof the 2/ith Gurkha Rines sl\'ept through his camp at dawn on 18 May1963, and Yassin AJTendi was fawlly wounded when his party rnn into acUl-oJT group positioned outside the camp.

'Hearts and minds' - 22 SASAmong the units under his command Cell Walker had A Sqn, 22ndSpecial Air Sen.ice Regiment. His original plan for their employment""'as as a mobile ·fire brigade· ""hich could parachule into Ihejungle torecapllIre an) border ,'mages seized by the Indonesians. Thecommanding oOicer of 22 5.\5. LICoI John Woodehousc. feil that this

\\'ould resull in hea\)' casualties and was a poor use of skilled men.Woodehouse had joined the British Anm as a prh.uc in 1941: he.\Iichael Cahert and Dare Newell were the lhret" men \\ho hadlransfonned the Malamn ScOULS into 22 SAS in lhe earh 1950s,Woodehouse. \,;th a fund of practical experience 10 dr.m upon.proposed lO Walker that the SAS should operate in small pmrols alongthe jungle border as 'eyes and cars'. while gailling the confidence of thelocal tribal groups - thus achieving both il.ellls (2) and (6) on Walker'slisl of plinciples,

l1u~ SAS patrols \,'ere deplo)'ed aboul e\'c'1 60 miles along theborder, and immcdiately beg'drl a 'hearts and minds' progr.unme amonglhe tribal \;lIages of the Dvaks, ~hlnlts. Kclabits and Punans, For theloe-.lI popliialion lhere \\ere real benefi ..... from the relationship. sincethe antibiotics c.l.rried b\ the SAS medics could sometimes cureO\emighl simple medical conditions from which lhe patients hadendured months of distress, Apart from rOlll.ine medical assistance, theresourceful SAS teams made themselves popular in many other wa)'s(one enterprising sergeanl named 'Crps)" Smith buill a miniaturehy'dro-cleClric plant in a Slream al Talibakus, Sabah, and pro\~ded lheonlv electric lighting for 370 miles). BerwcenJanuatv and April 1963. ASqn operated \\;th onh iO men in thealre. but bv breaking lheir fom­man patrols down to two or lhrt.--e men the\ were able to send out 21patrols. ThC) remained Ollt in the jungle for up ro six months, Ih;ng\o\ith 'Small tribal communities. By the lime the Indonesians began largeSC".tle incursions in April 1963 the trip\\ire .....IS in place and reponinge!lcmy movements.

Wilh his forces slretched to lhe limil, Gen Walker allthoriled thearming and lr:'lining of lribc'\tlIel1 from comtllunilies close to lheKalimantan border as a 'home guard' force called the Ilorder $cOUl\.Under lhe leaden;hip and guidance of mel1 of the SAS and GurkhaIndependent Pa ......dllll.e Compall\. the Scouts became 'one thousandpain; ofeves and can;' pro\iding useful intelligcnce, since thC\ ",ere ablero move Frech across the borders. One of lhe men selected 10 ad\;sc onfonnation of the Border ScOllts was Tom Ilarrisson, the World War II\ereran whose delailed local knowlcdge hadalread" pro\cd valuable in the Bnmei rc\oh,

'Ilearts and minds' operations were conductedby all frOllllinc units; recalling the disuibmion ofmedical aid 10 lhe Dyab; in 19B4, 2/Lt Itobenl)asle}'·Tyler of 3 CJ wrote: '11hink that it would befair to <oar lh;lI onlv aboUl '" 40 per cenl of thesick trealed \\cre genuine, The orher 60 per celll.juslliked our pills: LiemenalH N.E.Sha\\ of I CJ.\o\'riting in 1962 about conmcts \\;th the Kelabits,refleered an affecrion and respeer for them \\hich....'as widespread among the soldiers: 'What markslife in a Kelabitlonghousc is ilS freedom and lackof rules. The)' are an easy.living people: childrencan do an)'lhing they want 10, a girl can marl}'whom shc wants, E"en the dogs. within reason,ha\e the freedom of the longhouse.,. The e,IS,,­going friendship was extended to liS soldiers. We

'Heert, eltd mlltd" In • tnHIvillage, 11165: e m.dal Ol"derty

from the 0-..~Quant. c...... e _ .. cut

hand before d,...mg It. The

phr-... 'hNrU lind rnincb' "-dft...t be4n uNd by FM Sir Gerald

Temp'-r In h4e: e.m~lgn ..I~tCommunl,t T.non,t, fC"r.llnMaley•• 19S2-ae, when troop'under hll commend hed won theloyel , ..lltene. 01 Jungl. tnb.... Intelligene....thenlt"I .Itdguld.... The conc<t91 wouldpnrte ..,en maN .lfttetln In

Borneo. where It wn inIt:IBtBdby 22 SAS but pu.-.ued by ...

front·IIM untte. l'hB .aldieR'medicel It}Q could ......... huge

dllfentne. In ...,.,ot. v'llegetIwhich hed _r hIId Keen tomodem treatm.nt, but It we.eo popul., th.t e",ryone w.ntBdpiU. wheth.r th.y were lick

01" not, The Royel Ul,ter Rt","

dl_..-cl thet • smertloHchocobt. bNn I'Bf)ldIy cul'Bdmen)' e notlonel'" 'lIlc:k' childeltd Hnt them _.,~

(IWM FEW/S5I5Q/3)

•

.0

1984: ltColKe+Iw"Y,hmb<tt",

CO of 1" Afvylt • SuthotriandHig~In~ta 8ordef'Scout, ettKhed to hh A

Comp8n)!. TheM lbanl are tully

unIformed and equipped, andanned with SLAa; the _ at t.r

len hal • trlMl tllttoo _rttl"Ofrom lind..- h'- ,,-lrU,",,', andthe word 'I~' on hi, f_rm.The InltJ.1 BorOer ScCKlt

prognlmme w•• In.-trilledby polltlc..l and "oanetatdifficulti••, and the rM:rultm...t

01 the wrong men (by nome• .,. all tri~men _ ... bom

warriorsl; blJt they w.... ste.dilyImproVed by the energetic

commitment of Mel John Cro..,en ...perieneed 7th Ourkh..

offlc,r, Hand-picked by 0 ...

Walker, thl, veteran Jungle

"Idler produced Impr...lveresult. by ••rly H185.Other Scottllh units deploy.clduring the Confrontallon and

not already menllon.cl In the

body tut w.... 1,t GordonHlghlande,.. end 1.t King'.Own Scottl,h Borderen.(IWM FEB &4/421381

were nOl held in ;I\\'C beC;\U5e we wcre while andstmngc. We \,'cre men who could talk, becomefriends. Illke and givt~ presents. \Ie ""cre peoplewho could amuse them too.'

In Febmary 1965, I Sqn, Australian SAS Regt(SASR) deployed to Bnmei, and in March sentom the first operdtional patrols on Operation'Keen Edge' (see 'AuSlralian SAS'. below). Thisoperation combined jungle familiariL.1.tion ....ith aheans-and·minds programme; and a repon b\2/LI Treml' Roderick describes 1.... 0 of the BorderScoms. While Sgt John loon Ngerong .....as '\,enimelligelll. Slrong and health, " another Scout ....-asa 'Ian con man but quite a character. L'seful forsmall jobs and interpreter, speaks limited Englishand Mala,. Bachelor and lecherous bloke, liL.es hissex and grog and ....'orships Dollars. A s.....ift beL.

now and then might help him. I leep scaring Christ om of him, .... hen Itell him I am going to take him o\'er the border'. Like a good Australian.Roderick made a cricket bat and his patrol instmcted lhe \illagers in themdimenlS of the game. HowC\'er, the real assistance ....-as medical, and hispatrol medic Pte Bmce English treated ems and minor injuries, flu andchickenpox. and el·en assisted at a childbirth. Other medics found thatpenicillin worked \'en' efTecti\eh. \\hile WO Thompson reponed thal 'adistribution of vitamin pills. oilllmel1l and Elastoplasl goes mer .....ell ...They ha\'e supplied us with a couple of meals of cumed squirrel (\en­good), curried chicken and rice'.

Summary of Commonwealth force.In December 1962. Cen Walker had JUSt one brigade of three infantrybanal ions, and six TOIl Class coastal minesweepers. These little 36().tonw<lnhips - wil,h a crew of29, one 40nlln Bofors and t.....o 20mm Oerlikonguns - were invaluable for palrolling the 1,500 miles of Borneo'scoastline and estuaries. Walker also had 15 Fleet Air Ann (FAA) andRAF helicopters, which were to playa critical pan in the campaign. AfterMalaysian statehood in September 1963, Walker's forces wereaugmented by the 3rd & 5th I3ns. Royal .\'Ialay Regiment (R.\'lR). and theFederal Reconnaissance Regiment.

When Walker handed o\'er command in March 1065 to M~Gen

George Lea. his multi-national fQl'cc consisted of 17.000 men of whomo\'er hair were Brilb.h and the remainder Gurkha. Malay. Australian orNew Zealanders; and out on tbejul1gle borderlhere were ,mother 1,500tribal Border Scouts. At all)' one time I3ritish Far East Land Forces hadabout 18 baualions of British and Gurkha infanu), eilher underWalker's direct command or available lit need. He had twO regiments of5..1.ladin armoured cars armed with 76mm guns, engineers, and anillerywith 5.5in (140 mm) medium guns and 105mm pack howitzers. TheBlitish and Commonwealth air forces had ill anyone time about 80helicopters and 40 fixed wing aircraft. including Hawker Hunter andGlosterJa\'elin jet fighters. OIT05hore ....·ere a Roral Nan force of aircraftor helicopler carriers, destrolers, frigates, coasL."l.1 minesweepers. fastpatrol boalS- and at Tawau, Sabah. e\en Saunders Roe SR.~5 hO\ercrafL

The Malayan, North B_ andS.,-.wak Polica Field F_ andSpecial Bnlnch played a m.jOf'

per1 hl pthttring Intalilgence;

he.- en offic:et" hl*tl8<'ts a un1t

of ebout 20 Borde<' Scouts.1beMo men .,. armed with the

.3031n "na No.5 Mk 1 Dr'lunglecerblne', which waa laaued 10

1M Sc:0IIts In some numbe,..

Ttll' cut·down waapon wa'unpopular wIth BrltI'h troop,lor It, vlclou. kick, muzzla bla.t,and un,.nabla .Ighta. At I.r1.11, an NCO waa,. tha 'Bordar

SCout.' lnoulder tltla I'" PlaiaH2), .nd the homblll Ihouldarpetch devlMd by Mil] JotInCrosl. (AM Mu.....m)

J

II

Thll IBT being ascorted to tha

tannlnal bulldillil at SlbI.I aIrportIn Third Olvl.Jon ...ml to IUovamuilipia light wound•. Ttla

soldier gUllrding him II ea.rT)'lng

the prisoner's Sten SMQ and

web pouctHts. Generel Walkerhad INnets dropped _ lhe

border.,.a IItld~h

rout... ottaring ula conduct to

IndonNlans and Iocel guarriUa.

who cno.. to .urntnel.r 'befo...you .... killed by tha s.c:urlty

Fore.l, or be10... you dl. ofdl..... Or Itarvatlon In the

lungla'. (IWM HU 12175)

INDONESIAN CROSS-BORDERATTACKS, 1963-64

The first clash Cline on 12 April 1963, ....hen IBT~ attacked 1I policestillion at Tebedll in SOlllh-wCSI Sarawak: although the raidcl'S wererepulsed by Insp Cbimlxlll's mcn, the lnTs looted the local ba/.<lar.Elel'en days later 15 lOTs attacked a police post at CUlI1bang in Sar.l\\':.lk·sFirst Di\"i~iol1, held by a half·section from C Cov, 40 Cdo Roval ~larines.

The, I'Clllmed fire, killing IWO IBTs and wounding three; one ~Iarine

W"dS slighll\ wounded. Thcse small-scale raids.scl the shle for operation.swhich were illlended 10 illlimidale the police and destro\ meirinflucnce on the border,

TIle Special Branch discmered that a group called me ClandestineCommuniSt Organil.ation (CeO) \\'as established in w('Stem 5."lra\\<Lk.Captul'ed suspects lalked ofwt--apons training,.lS well as plans for altackson police slMions and ambtlShcs against the seClirih forces. The CCOwould provide the Indolle~ians ...·ith an indigenolls 'frolll' for Iheirraids; and Djakarta named thdr raiders the TNKU - North K"llilllam.,mNational Arm) - ostensibly the heirs of the original Brunei I'cbel5.Allhough the first raids did include CCO members. thcy \\'crc led byreb'l.llar Indonesian office" or NCOs from the i\laline commandos­Kmp5 Kommulo Operas; (KKO); the Arm" para-commandos - JYg!,nnlPara Kmnmlllulo linguloll Damt (RPKAD); and the Air Force paralroops­Pa.mklllj (""ak JJf'/XIt (PCT).

Long Jawal, September-October 1983On 28 September 196.~ about 150 !BTs crossed into the TIlird Di\isionand aU<lcked a smaJl OUtpOSt at LongJawai garrisoned b\ six soldiers from1/2nd GUI'kha Rines, three policemen and 21 Border ScOlllS_ Lnder firefTom automatic weapons and a GOmm mor(;lr the garri.'lOn sufferedc::lSuahies and were forced to withdraw; <;e\"elt Border Scouts ...·erecapILII'ed and later murdered. The Indonesians had scored a small"ictal)', bUI werc now 50 miles inside 5."lrawak. The CO of 1st/2nd CR. the 11

12

An leT (right) '- brought Into• ~Icopt.,. U, probIIbIy .t

"."IIP Out In S8,..w.k's ThirdDIviakIn, by th,.. .... fonnally

d...-.d 80fdM kovta, .rmed

wftfl IJing,-"~ 12 bon!....--.The Crn.-8onHIt' Scout...fOR. 01 ..0 apeclally H+ected

tb8n trilMsmen, 101.. raisedby the SAS In __ 1lil64.

They weN tt1Il.-t by Mllj JohnEctw• ..o. 01 A Sqn, who ted

them untlt the end of ~thlu...FnHn Augu.t 1lil64 they 101 ...

.ctlno in w..t.m S8raw ; .netIt _. their ...porU 01 numerou.t~.I.n MkII_ In vill-oH.reMlnd 8emb.n ecro.. the

bord.r In K.Umenlen th.tidentified the.. bmpong•••.,-,Ing poIhI lor cro..-border

rakl. Into Flrll DII,I.lon.

(RoV.1 N·1IY1

-.•

Imphal veteran LtCol Clements, ~lC, used FAA Wessex helicopters from845 Naval Air S<,uadron (NAS) 10 position ambushes on likely exir rollles.

On I OCLObcr the Gurkhas got their first pa\b..ck: an ambushcommanded by Lt Pasbahadur caught tWO Indonesian longboats andsank one, killing 26 IBTs: from the Olher the radio sets from LongJa",,-aiwere recovered, along with tht' 60mm monal·. Survivors from thelongboats were killed in an ambush on 10 October, and a staging campwas located two days later. Three Indonesians ""ere also killed as theo.auempted to shoot down a helicopter operating close to the border. TheGurkhas' tactics were to ~t the st\le for containment operations:ambushes were set to catch IBT!l either on their \\"'3\ in for an atL-.d., ifintelligence allowed this: or on their way alii as they ran for the border.,\ H'teran ofthcse operalions explainrd thai ",'itll a fC\\ exceptions thisinC\ilabh meant that IUT raids were of shon duration. and so did notpenetrate deep into Mala~ ian lemlOn.

Kalabakan, December 1963-J8nuary 1964'Ole Indonesians had concentrated their efforts on Sarawal, but in midDecember 1963 thc\ decided 10 launch a large scale attack againslTa\'"'3l1. the capitaJ ofSabah. and the 10Wl1 of Kalab.-.kan. General Walkerhad anticipated thai raids mighl be launched across the coastal borderof &tbah. and men of :-:05.2 & 6 Sections of the R,\t Special BoalSquadron (SBS) - working ",itll 40 Cdo R.\1 - patrolled the Semdongri\er and 5ebatik island on Ihe east coasL In 1963 theo. had set up theTa",-otu Assault Croup (TAG), a ri\-crine force based at the mouth of theSemdong and operating from chilian "lbin cmisers, dories and nativelongboats as well as sns Klepper canoc'S.

The Indonesian force assembled for the attack con~is[ed of 128 men,mosth mluntcers. wilh 35 Indonesian KKO marines and N'COs. Theywere divided into four detachments: ~ I - KKO Sgl Bennv, "ith eighlKKO and 28 guerrillas: N2 - Wa~'ang, with 15 KKOand 21 guerrillas; WI- Lasani. with 34 men; and W2. KKO Sgl BuronlO with 22 men. ThC\'crossed the border on 21 December. and a week lalcr were close to

K.-'llabakan. N I atL'lcked a 3rd RMR post, whosedefences had not been completed: the IUTs wereable 10 crawl within grenade range, killing eighlsoldiers including the company commander andwounding 19 lroOpS. Another attack on thepolice stadon callsed no casualties, hm N I andN2 lingered in the area - which \'"'3S to pro\'e afatal mislake.

Lieutenant-Colonel Bumclt brought in B & CCors of his 1/IOth Curkha Rifles. and whileKalabakan was dug and \\ircd for defence, 5mal1ercommunities \I'crc evacuated and commercialtranspol1 cenu'llil.ed. to den, 100d and mobilirv tothe IBTs. B) .5 Janu:l1) 1964 ambushes were inposition cmeting Ihe likeh \\ithdrawal routes;and between i :lnd Ii Januan the Gurkhaskilled 15 IBTs :lml caplured ~i.x from :\1 and :'\2.B\ Febman, four IBTs from WI were deadand tJle remaining 12 scattered in twO groups.

J

I

\\'2. auempting to l..'scapethrough the mangro\'eswamps, encoUlHered theTAG, which was supponed:11 night by RAF aircraft andR.~ ships dropping flaresand firing smrshell, B) theend of febnmry, 96 of the128 IBTs had been killed orcaptured: 20 had managed10 regain Indonesian ter­ritory, and the 12 still atlarge had little hope ofsUl"\ival. Significantly, atleast 21 of the 35 KKOmarines had been accoun­ted for, and the NCOsL.'lSani and Wa\-ang hadbeen killed, The Kalabakanaltack prompted the BritishgO\ ernment to make moretroops a\-ailable for operations,

Long Mlau and the Rajang river, January 1984Close l.O Sabah in the Sarawak Fifth Di\,i..ion, on 23Janl1ary 1964. a ten­man patrol of the 1st Ro)'al Leicesters under Lt Michael Peele attacked40 Indonesians <L'l the) lunched in a dearing north of Long ~Iiall. Thep.1trol had been directed into the area after Sgt Bob Creighton of 0 Sqn,22 SAS had picked up the lI-acks of military boots (D Sqn had relievedA Sqn in Mar 1963), Peele's attack killed five enem\ and forced the restto flee. abandoning half a ton of anns and ammunition, \\11en SgtCreighton searched the site he found t,,'o suni\urs, who confinned thatthe group had been illlending to cross illlo Bnlllei,

In a small scale but tough operation in carl)Januan men of the 17thGurkhas and the Special Branch co-opcrated in eliminating a group of23 IBTs commanded b) an Indonesian sergeant, \\ho had landed b\boat in the mangro\'e swamps of an estuary in eastern Sabah, Realizingthat tbeir landing had been compromi'led. they split up; one group ofseven was deslro)'ed by Gurkhas led by M.ti D,O'Leary, operating from arequisitioned launch with the apt namc Thl! Jolly /Jor!u'/or. For threeGurkhas woundcd, thc)' killed three rniders, wounded IWO and capturedone, with an L~IG, a Sten and two Annalitcs, The remainder of theIndonesian group were later captured hiding on a stolen fishing boat.

• • •Talks in Bangkok, TIlailand, between Malaniia and Indonesia underUnited 1':ations chairmanship produced a tnlce which lasted from 25Januap" to 6 March 1964, Foreign Minister Subandrio insisted that theCl'oss-border raids were the work of local volunteers, be~'ond the controlof Djakarta. Tun Ralak, representing ~Iala}"sia, insisted that allinfiltrators should be wilhdrnwn before subslallli\'c negotiations couldSWrt, The wlks dragged on, but by the first week of March three groupsof between 30 and 50 IBTs had crossed the borders: huo the Firsl

PoNd photo found Of! t~

body of an lBT. The centre man

seeme to be making e political

point; Iho.. on either elde elm

l .. Enfield "nee - an SMlE ende No.4, They aHm 10 wear e

motley~ 0' BrttIah or Dulctlend US unlfOlTll end ~I",.

The Clandntlne Communlat

Orpnlutlon and othet"

lndlvtduab who Met vofunteered,been pren-pnged Of! ttIebctrlHt". or _ ~ ""'"I~ jalta, -.. fonIted

Into unlb called Pramut..,but theM were otten III trained

and poorfy mot"'ated, TheIndonfllan. would eventuallyaecept thall.he Confrontetlon

could only be pura~

aNectlvely by their regular

troope, {RM Mu..uml

13

Division at Lunclu at theend of Januan. at B..'ll! on21 Febman' and :n Rassauon 6 March. On eachoccasion mM \\ere inter­cepted b,12 Cdo R.\1 orI 2nd GR. dnd surreredcasualties before the,\\'ilhdrc\·:.

+Track 6, March 1964With the breakdown ofthe Bangkok l<llks theIndonesians 311Cmpled topush back lhe recogniLedborder bv occup\ing andholding commanding hillfe;llures JUSt inside Sara\<o'al:...On 7 March it fierce actiontook place on Trad. 6 onthe edge of the Kling­Kang range in the SecondDivision; twO Gurkhas ofthe 2/IOth were J...illedas the)' approached an

Indonesian poslllon. The lnrlonesians \\,;,hdrcw, leaving one dead(though more were cenainh carried 011) and mLich boot\': documentsindicaled that Ihe camp had held 40 men frOIll the regular 328 I'ara­Raider Ixmalion, R.'ldio intercepts picJ...ed up 328 Bn reporu. that the-.had a 101 of dead and wounded and were in considcrdble difficulties.The reph from their headquaners \<0<15 brief and brutal: basiC'dlh, 'Geton \<o;th it -there are plelllv more where thel came from'.

Some dars laler the Indone.'iians relumed to the ridge some 16 milesto the eastward, 111is time ~Iaj ~Iarman, commanding A Co\, 2 10thGR, was supponed ~ twO Wessex helicopters firing French ",'ire-guidedNord SSII missiles, a troop of IOSmm pack ho\\;uers from 70 Bt\ RA,and the 76mm guns of two Saladin armOlll'cd cars from Queen's Ro\-alIrish Ilussars. E\'en so the Gurkhas had a hard fight to dislodge lheIndoncsians, who lcfttwo dcad when they withdrcw.

• • •There were no fewer lhan 3'1 similar auacks along the border duringsummer 19&1. In Operation 'Sabre Tooth' Lhe Gurkhas of 2 10thhunted down a platoon-strenRth Indonesian patrol of the so-<alledBlack Cobra BaLLalion, commanded m Maj Aud\ Pata\\-ari, \<ohich hadcro~sed the border at the cnd of ~tarch, 111e Cobras blundered illlo aGurkha ambush which resulted in the loss of their packs containingfood lind ammunition. B\ April. Gurkha patrols had accounted ror27 out of the 36 raidcN,2

On 20 ~Iay 1964, Presidelll Sukarno boasted that he would cnlshMalaysia 'by the time the sun rises on I JanualJ 1965'. Reports Glme

A Royal Marine patrol bolInlatwo requisitioned civilian cabin

ervlM" In 8ruoe' town. In I H3

tM Sp.eia' BoIot s.rvlee usede.uo::n c..-It _ aJong.~ alNllI

nat"" boats and their own~m.n lOeppet' __ - when

they ..t up the Tawau AaAuttGroup (TAGlet the movttl of thes.n.6ong riv... on the •••t COIISt

of S.~h.n". fur1~ ....,ne....

1ty1ne UNo Whit. Enalgn, h••

an LMO ..t up on 1M bowsurrounded by plied pac:ka.

Mo,. conventional Roy.1 Nil""wal1lhlpa deployed 'In Borneow.t....' lnc:ludecl at varlouadat•• 5 alrcran carriers, 2commando (helicopter) c.rrI....,

1 c:rvIser, 7 destroyer-, 15 hitPl*and Ia c:oltSliIl mines.eepers ­1 of ttM latterma~ by ANZN

c:rewa.(IWM FES 112/2f1t165)

142 For _ K_, t.- WO!'I!l_1I-. RovaI~ "'''"'''-''''' m ...... !JfM MId.~mIlllII~,~

rmm • c:.p; • wtvIe rim, ........t • ,.,.,.. IIeld~ a bIlIck cotlfa c:"'*! to Ilrike, /IboI.-. 'SARAWolJ('

=a••

J

I

,

A "'-dm .,mo~".ct cal' of 4th

Roy•• T.nk Aegt, WOfttIn9c~wtth an Auster AOP til of 1e

Flight, ......e. during d patrol'n II low-lying area of S lIk

In 1lM4. The SIIladJn M.rs In.divisional sign of 17th BrltlahDlv - II black cat on II yellowbackground.

The Royal AnnOuree! Corps were

nolad lor thai. ve....tlllty; apartfrom ~d patrols they worked

with tile Infantry and SU,

patrolled riven In ca-. and

e.m.d out 'tt-rU • mind"poog.-m_ In~ \/111'9"­

a..Jdet; 4 ATR, the Ufa Guard..

0..-.. Dneoon Guard.,

Queen" Royal Irish Hunan

and 5 RTR all senred In tM.tt.

.t ....rtou. dill•• durir>g tMcampaign. (IWM FES 54/331"1

in of a Sleady build·up ofIndonesian ~larine commandosand ofparaU'oopers in camps inKalimaman, on the SumaL.r.lcoaSt opposite !.he "laI3\"11mainland. and on the RiauIslands sOUlh of Singapore.Faced b} this thl'cat, CeoWalker n~cei\'ed 51 Bde of theSu,Hcgic Resen'e. with iLS I-IQand one Gurkha and twoBritish battalions. Walker wasno\\, able to rOtate and redeployb<lIIalions. and he cstablishedthree brigade sectors: 99 GurkhaBde (h<l\ ing relie"ed 3 CdoBde) became West Brigade.

\'I;th fi\e battalions holdjng Kuching and the three western di\;sions ofSara\'l<l.k; 51 Bde took o,er as Central Brigade, \'I;th twO battalionsholding the rest of $3ra\'l<l.k and Brunei; and 5 ~lala,'Sian Bdc. based atTawau, had three baualions holding Sabah as Eastern Brigade.

MAINLAND RAIDS, 1964-65

In .June 1964 a bomb placed bv an Indoncsian infihralOr damaged anAvro ShackletOn of 205 Sqn RAF at Changi. Singapore; this marked achange of tactics b) the Inclon(.osi,m5. On 17 August the first of a seriesof raids b\ sea and air was launched against tJle Mala)<l.n Pcninsula ­'West ~lala)'Sia·.

The first group consisted of 53 Air Force paratroops (PGT).21 marines (KKO). 32 ~fala'-sians (of \'Ihom 27 were ChinesecommunisLS) and twO Indonesian \uluntcers, The plan \'IdS to land45 men from the sea north of the Sanglang riH::r near Senut. 33 atPomian Kechi!. and 30 to the south at Kukup. Once they were ashorethe,. \\'ould establish a base at Gunong Pulai about 12 miles inland. 10conduct gucrrilla operations, and would hHcr link up with p.1.ldlroops",ho \\'ould be dropped 11~ar 1...'Ibis in norlhcrnJohore. TIle hopes for thisand subscquent Indonesian landings were predicaled on aClivc supportby the local population. Remarkably, the Indonesians had com;ncedthemsel\es tJl,H Mala\'sia ",as ripe for rC\'olution and would welcome tJlcmas "liber:.ltOrs'. There had in f<lct been sc\eml da\'s of inter-racial riotingin Sing-.lpore in lateJuh 1964, resulting in 22 deaths and mam injuries­blll tJlis \'IdS cmphaticaU, nOi a pro-Indonesian insurrection.

The Pontian Kechil group came under fire from a police post as M.IOnas lhe\ I;mdcd; the" scallcrt.-d, abandoning much of their cquipmenLThe west coast of Malaya \'I'em on to tJle alert. and in under a \'leekall but four of tJ1C group had been captured. The Semlt groupencountercd 1\lala)'Sian forces and suffered four casualties; tJle su .... i\onwent into hiding, bUl between 2 and 23 October the seCUril' forceskilled their Icader and tr'ackecl down all but a fc\'l', The Kukup group wasdiscovercd wilhin 48 hOllrs of landing. and eliminated apart from four ,.

,.

E.,.ry blnlnon ..,..,Ing In the

jungle hid tnllned patrol end

Irecker doga, which could detecl

1M preHncl 01 the enemy

lhoNd, or could follow up blood

II1Illa. lnfanlly palrol dogs and

lrac:ken weN wortted elther onI long "ad, or 100M; ....tletI IooHthey gene...11y roamed about30 ylrda Iheld, aeeklr>g Kenls.

Greal care had 10 De laken

thll Ine dog did nol become

elllutusted; Lebradonl provedtM besl trac:ken., eePiLb" ofworking by dey and nighl for

lbout two dlYS II I ti....., Ind

A1..tlana (Gennln She9herdal

were Ilao used la patrol dog••

When Ihey ameli or heard an

approaching or concealedenemy they would 'point'. This

dog .. "ading I patrol by 2nd

a- JIdr..... (IWM FEW

65/32/00)

marines, .....ho escaped bad. to Sumatra in mid September. There loilS

some 10\\ IC\'e1 sabotage in Mala\'a and Singapore.On lhe night of I /2 Seplember 1964 four CI30R HerCIIles tran~p011l>

each carrying 48 men tool... off on Operaliotl 'D!lJikm'(l: The forceconsisted of 151 PGT p'lI'lIroops and II Malaysian Chinese communisl.'i.Bad weather and engine trouble forced t\\o aircraft to Itll"ll bad.. Thefirst group landed at 01.45 on the ""'TOng drop I.one and .....ere unable (0

rccO\"Cr their weapons, rations and equipment containers......hich "'crt'found bl the police. The second group landed on the correct DZ inthick jungle. and roped dO\\'n from the tree canop\. bill could not findlheir containers. t\ statc of emcrgency was declared in Malaya on 2September. and air' defences including l~risl.Ol Bloodhound SA.\ls of No65 Sqn. RAF J.nclin and RAAf Sabre fighters were deplmed: the(k'SlTO\er 11\15 KnIt was stationed in the Straits of ~lalacG\ to cOler ther.tdar gap between Bukit Gombak and Buuerwonh through \\hich theIndonesian CI30s had been able to pcnetr.ue.

The 1/lOth Gllrl..has and 1st Bn RO)'a1 New Zealand Regt (I RNZR)were alerted to hUIll the paratroops. RAF Ilawker IlullIers flew 14sorties on the first day. rocketing suspeCt areas. For some orthe Gurlo.hasI"L'led at L.1.bis police station this \\'as f.uniliar tcrritorv; they had huntedCTs in thc area during the Emergen0. '\Iall\' old hands of the Batt...liionwere there. onl, a litLIe bit older. \\;t;Cr and more rotund. but LIleirkeenness still nOI blunted ... Like terriers on a rat hunt. the BatL."llioncom'erged on Labis and then scmLIecl off into thejungle on the scem'.

The Gurkhas and I RNZR patrolled for a month, and hetween 7 and9 September LIle Gurkhas killed five pamtroopcl"s and captured two. Onthe 13th LIley suffered their first casualty \\hen a lance-corpornl was killedin a firellght in \\hich four more Indonesians were l..iI1ed and SC"encaptured. At dawn on 23 September. ~Iaj R.lladdo.... \\'as killed in anencounter in which all LIlt" Indonesians \\ere killed. Intelligence from thecaptured p.amtroops g.n-c the hunters detailed information wilh \\hich towork. II ....'}l~ believcd LIlat;. dl<\I;Smalic Indonesian p..ratroopcr. Sgll\lajWogimen. was still allarge. B) October 1964, howe\er, when 1/IOth GRwere \\;thdrawn from LIle hunt after accounting for 51 of the raiders. LI1C\''were forced to the regretful conclusion that W~rjmen "''as still hangingfrom his parachllle in one of the trees some\\here in thejungle',

On 29 OCtober. 52 Indonesians landed at the mouth of the Kesangrivcr on the Johore-Malacca SIaIC boundary. bllt wcre "polled byfishermen. A tight cordon was quickly pIll in place by the police, 3l'd BnRO\Wdl Australian Regt (3 RAR) and I RNZR: within 30 hours 50 raideT5had surl·endered. and the last t\\o. exhausted and taT\;ng. \\erecaptured three \\'eeks later.

Two morc major landing allempts were made along the west coasL On23 December. 28 Indonesians landed SQlIlh-\\'est ofJohore: \\ithin a shantime the) \\'crc cornered in thick mangrove swamps, and Operation'Birdsong' \\'as launched. Sycamore helicopters of 103 Sqn RAf acted asforward air controllers for Iltll1ters and Canberras. "nlree infiltrators\\ere killed and the rest surrendered. On 24 December. 61 Indonesiansattcmpted a landing nonhwwest of Kuala Lumpur. An Indonesian armedCuStoms launch lifted them to an island in t.he ~lalacG\ Straits, and thenpirated ten Malavsi:1Il fishing boats from One Fathom BanI... to CdTl') theraiders on lite final Slage of their jOLlllley. The COIl\'O)" was intercepted b)

-------------------------

the frig-IIC t-1MS ;\Ja.\~ the fishing boaL~ werecaplllred. 1\1th large stocks of ammunition andexplosives, but the launch escaped.

The Indonesians also attempted Iandin&1'S 011

the coastJine south-cast of Jallore. Ben\'ccli 7~o\'embt:r 1964 and 25 March 1965 the\ made Ii\clandin~; the !i1'SltWO. in ~O\emberand December.\,'ere quickh mopped up. On l.he night of 25/26Febm;uT. 44 Indon~ian police and \'Olul1leerscame ashore and ambushed men of the SingaporeRegt, killing cighland wOllnding fi\c. ill the end ofMarch, hOWl....'eT. Ihe seetlnt) forces had accountedfor all 44 infilmuors. Two more iltlempted landingswere quickh foiled, as well as several minorinou"Sions. On 31 ~Iarch 1965 the taLiI! numberof auempu.~d landings stood at 4), \\ith 142Indonesians killed and 309 captured. On 30 ~la\. ina fmal gesture. 25 Indonesian regular soldierslandl-'tt at Tal~ong Pen·Celih in c-dStem Johore and occupied a positionbuill 1>\ theJapaneo;e in World War 11 ..\ d;n later the\ surrendered, afterstrikes 1>\ rockel-filing lll1nter5.

Australian and New Zealand commitment, 1965-66The landings on the ~Iala\ I'eninsula had ....ider repercussions thanSukarno had alllicipated. The Australian go\ernmelll had beenreluctalll 10 prmide milimr\ assi~lance, because it shared a long border....ith Indonesia on Ihe huge island of New Guinea; Ihe westel1l half ...."aS

Indonesian 'WCSI Irian', and the caslern half Austalian-protected Papua­New Guinea. 111e" had troop<; based in Malara as part of 28thCommonwcalth Inf Bdc oflhe Far East Strall~gic Resen'e; btll these wereilllended ollh 10 protCCt Malara againsl external attack.

During the cordon-and·se:lrch operalions following Indonesian r:.lidson tbe mainland men of3 RAR and I RNZR were employed, since thesewel"e cleOId\' external allacks. The AlIsll',llian and ~e ....' Zealandgo\'emmcnu, now agrcl'd that troops should be commiucd 10 Borneo,and in March 1965,3 RAR an'i\'cd in Sarawa\.::, where it served unlilthe end of .July. During this lime the Australians mounted exlcllsheopcratioll~ on both sides of Ihe border, and had fOLlI" major contactSwith the Indonesians. In Mayan ambw;h commanded b)' Lt Patric\.::Beale caughl foul' Indonesian boalS. Two wcre destroyed; the third wasvisible 10 only one soldier, PLC Jackson, hut he engaged il with his rifleand killed all fhe OCcllpant'\.Jack....an hurled grenades althe fourth bom,and to gel:t bener shot ill it he climbed a tree. When LI Beale orderedthe .....ithdn.lwal, thc plat.oon had killed at least 15 Indonesians.

On 12 Jul), 1965 an ambush commanded bv 2/Lt B\'crs caught25 IndOllcsiall'\ in the ~illillgground; when it was spnlng 17 enemy werekilled, but the mni\'ol" count.cl·-:.tttacked, and in the subsequcnt ten­minute firefiglll two AliSlralian.) \,ere wounded. Calling down ..rtillel"'fire. Byers was Ihen able to withdraw his phlloon.

In 1966, 3 RAR \\ere replaced b\ "I RAR, whose lour in Saraw,t\.::belween April and AugUSl W;L'o quieler. but who also operalcd on bothsides of the border.

l5ePtemb...- 1064: the "!don••na.ndlnes on the M• ...,...,

m.1.w.ncl led to • "'"'htllned.18t. of 8lert .. the_

thf'MtIIned to H(;,818t1o to 8ft

entirely _ ........ An R.u:

Whlrtwlnd MAR 10 circlesF_t IKout e...- of C Sq.n,

0_" Roy.t lristl H ....Th8 ..-glt'\8nt Mel th ubA:aquHron••Kh of th troops,..ch troop eq..n~with

two S8llOdln -wn... he8't)'

.rmCHlred .:. with 711mm gUn$

.nd 2.J: .3Oln MO., .nd two MG­

.nned F.,.,.t Mk II teOIlt c~

• "1)8..1. '....u" troop' rodeIn S8r.c.n .rmCHlred ~nel

c.rri.....Th. RAF Ol)8r.tlKl Whirlwind.

0' No' 103, 110.230 Sqn' Indet8chment, b.Nd .t '1.rlCHl'loe.tlon,. Other Common""••lthh.lIcopt.r ....t. w.... th. UH·

1B 'Hu.»," of No 15 Sqn RMF,.nd the AJou.tte Ill' of No 15 SqnRMAF, (IWM R 2(1872)

17

18

Men from 11t0thQ~ RIftes­

~te white rec:ognltlon Ugnon NO - bring in one of the1HI1ndone.lan paratroop.",dropped naar Labl., Malaya, onthe night 01 1I2nd 5eptembet'

1t&4. H.llJtI)e.... to wear plain01"'- drab; other~raWON

tM camouftage uniform MownIn Plate A2. Thl. Gur1tha

ba't.llon lI«ounl.cl for &t otthe ,..1<1.... (M'l H.E,Shleld.l

RAF ..COm~••1th

air fo.-e. comblot squadron.deployed at various date.during the Confrontatlon

RAF!'1M 20 & 28 (I-UlIet GA9)

fa 60 & 50' (JII""" F9)No 4S (Canbena 815)

No 81 (CanbelTl PR7)No 205 (Shackleton MR2)

FWFflQ 3 & 75 (F-86 Sabre)No 2 (Canbento B)

I~~No 14 (Canbeml Bj

In addition to 3 and 4 RA.R, and \W'O squadronsof the Australian SASR (see heIO\,). Australiadeplo\'cd se,-cral anillcn" baueries and troops ofRopl Austrl.llian Engineers. In all, 23 Atbtralianswere killed during the Confrontalion and eightwounded.

THE CONFRONTATIONIN THE AIR

The fil'St helicoplers 10 arrive in Bomc..'O wereBristol Bch-ederes of ~o.66 Sq RAF. as well as\'anaus detachments ofWestland Whirh..;nds. TheFAA contributed four squadrons £h'ing IheWestland Wessex and \\11irh..;nd. and the .\rm..Air Corps (MC) five Scout and five Sioux flight.-..Though highel' figures have been quoted, CenJackson states that there \\'ere never more Ihan70 helicopters available in theatre at am onetime. Shcil-5mall and James suggest that 'had six

helicopters been a\'3ilable per battalion, Confrontation might ,..-ell ha\efinished a "ear earlier'. The jungle "orkhorses were unquestionabhthe \\'es.<;ex and the Scout. The Wessex IlAS ~Ik I could earn up to16 troops, with a range of645 miles: the SculllAH Mk I could caIT)' fourtroops plus the pilot and co-pilor; it had a rJ,nge of312 miles.

Though all lhe RAF. AAC and FA.\ fixed- and rotan-\\;ng cre"~ werecritkal for the supph;ng orromard troops and inserting and extractingthem from ule jungle. the na\,,-I ainnen of 8·15 ~.\S made a panicularf"significant contribution. Bel\\cen December 1962, \,hen th~ fir.>1 \,entashore, and earl> 1965 ule squadron completed 10,000 hours' fh'ing,c<lrried o\er 50.000 p~l'iSengcrsand 6.000.00Olbs ofstorcs. and evacuated500 c..'lSuallies - 40 ofulem at night in u'opical rainslonns. L'nder LtCdrGJ.Sherm:m. half of this Wessex squadron \\'cnl ashore ~plil into threedetachments. The headquarters "-as ;11 Sibu (which like am R.~ shoreestablishment \\-as gi,en a ship's name - I--I.\IS HqrnblJ{), and the otherdetachments were posted to ~angg-d Gaat and Simanggang in theSecond and Third Di\;sion.'i. The other half of the squadron remainedaboard the commando carrier~ HMS Bulwark i1tld Hr-.IS Alhhm, wilh eachgroup roUlting e\cn lhrce months.

During opeTalions 845 N~\S losl fi\e aircTaft WiUl thrce piloLS, tWOaircrewmen and II soldiers in accidents in Fcbru,an, ~Iarch and April1965. B\ then the squadron had such a close relationship ,\;th the lbansof Nangga Gaat that U1e ,;llagers volllntaril} weill into mourning for amonth; dl.ll;ng this period no gOI1&J"S were beatcn and. though cheerfully~ociable, tlte Ibans held none of their usual panie.'i.

The famous London Et'f11illg Stalldmr! cartoonist JAK' \;siled 845:'\lAS among \'3rious British units in Borneo during the Confrontation.One cartoon sho\\'S himself as a pale. bespectacled figure in a longboatnewed ma tattooed lban, am\;ng at a landing stage on a jungle ri,erto be greeted by a bunch of bearded toughs dressed in nothing bUlsarongs, wilh beads around their necks, spears in lhcir hands and

An RAF Bristol~ He 1

of No.M Sqn Is IoHed with,t_ by men of 178 Bty RoyalArtillery .1 a forward ~ltIon Insarawak; In the foreground, a10lSmm pack howitzer Is re.dledfor IIftlng a. an underslung load,Given the need for tlulblilty .nd• peed of fe.pon.e, Gen Walkerdecentr.llzed hi. artlilery andair ....t.. Gun.....ere deplo~ed

In one••nd two. to the JUI"I(II.fort. In Bomeo, .nd one gunper be«...... ""'.. held In _,

rellcfy to be lifted forwardby helkoplef" at need. The

B~ofNoM_baMd

at Kuehl... (JWM FEW 85/24/12)

IN/mllg'S (native machctc'i) at their belts: oneof tht,S(:' desperadoes has 3 ..mall monk~

clinging to hi:. neck and a Rmal :\'an berct onhis head.

In September 1963. Indonesian Air Force(ALtRI) B-25s escorted 1>\ P-5h from Potiak inK..llimantan made ninc incursions o\crSar:.lI\'3.k. A \earlater 13.-25s and B-26s launchedhit-and-rull alttlcks against isolated klllnpollg".

AlrhOllgh the much faster ClostcrJa\'elinjcLS ofNos.flO & 64 S<II\~ :.IlIernpted interceptions,Ihey had only one success mer Borneo.confronting a C-130 which escaped o\er lheoorder. O...er Sing<tpore the Javelins inu."r­ceplett a Tu-16 and esconcrl it OUl.. of the Mea.

l1lt~ Indonesians had more success with anti­aircr.ut .utillen, I\hich thev established on the

border and on the Riau Islands just south of Singapore. The first Britishaircraft to be lost to Indonesian A>\A "'as an Auster AOP.9 on 28December 1963 at Lundu: the wounded Sgt Thaker.l\ managed to landon a helic0pler LZ. In 1965 the air tr.ilfic comrollers at Changi Airpon.Sing<tpore re-routed civilian and milit<u) aircmflto avoid lhe Riau 1~I,mds,

and none I\~l~ hit h\ AAA; however, on Ii November 1965 the Indonesiansshot down a Whirlwind of No.I03 Sqn ncar Stas~ in the Fin;t Di\ision.

TACTICS

JUNGLE FORTS

Soon after Ihe T:":KL' rAid agtlinst Tebedu in April 1963. BrigF.C.B.'lnon, commanding 3 C..do Bde Group. initiated a fon constnlctionprogramme along the border bct\\'ecn &ira"-aJ;. and ~imaman. tocm'er all the liJ;.eh 'gates' illlo and out of .\1.l1a\~ia. The programmE""'aSendOBCd and expandcrll}\ Cen Walker, \\ho emphasized that the fortswere not illlended to be pas.."iive defenshe positions. but rather po'ltrolbases from \\hich the g<trrison could dominate the area.

The forts \':Ilied in strength from platoon 10 cOlllpan} size, and werebuill 011 high ground. Some were accessible b) road, but olhers rclieclfor f'llions, <lmmunition and stores 011 helicopters, shon take­off/landing <lircrafl like the Twin Pioneer or parachute deli\-er\. Thepacking for parachule drops wa~ a highly developed skill \\'hich allo\\edfrAgile cargoes like fresh eggs (and e\en six bottles of champagne tocelebrAte an officer's binhda\) to be delivered sauel,. There is oneullsumt,lIuiated repon I1mt a cat W"aS air-dropped 10 a fOr\\<lrd positionto assisl in allli-rat operations. The drop zone W:LS normall~ JUSt oUl!>idelhe fon, so lhat the cargo could be reern'ered easih but posed no risk tothe g;uTison if there \\'as a po'\rachllte malfunction. The parnchutematerial "'as (hed black and used for lightweight 'ZOOt suits', whichcould be worn as an extm layer or for '1leeping. Coloured pamchutecanopies \\ere also atwched to trees as 'gun marl-en>' to gi\e anillel1 apoint of reference if fire support was needed (though these I\cr('vulncrable 10 pilfering, as the Ibans favoured them lor making clothes). 19

20

With Jungle fort. co....nng moreIh.fIn iOO mile. of bot'der Ind

with "'.,., flw road., .l!'-dropplng01 ,upplle. end Mlulpment WI'vttal. AGyt' Army Serrice COfPS

,I, d~tcheR1_ !"\ate 031 ­who would soon 1M~ toIn. Roy.1 Corps of T,..nsport_neltcled quick ...ctlont In theconfined spIel of cargo hold.

whoen the doo... were opened

end tteavy cYntChute to.d. w....being .....nhandl..:l out _.

_II Dz.. ....,. • crew .-dy

_p~," fOf"' parachute dellYe,.,II en RAF H.,lIng. transportrun. In tOWlrd•• forward

po.ltlon In Borneo.RAF '\led-wing tnln.portsq~ron. dei»Oyec! w .... No2.15 (wftn~ Argosy C t I. 20Sl(TwIn~ Cell. 5Ol1V.1ett.C t I & 48 IHe.tlng. C1I2h baNdat ChIng!, Butterworth end

hillir with de'Khment, toLIIbuln ,nd othe' airfield••

The AAAf" ,Iso contributed It.No:MI Sqn IC-130A Hen:ules);the RNZAF tt. No., Sqn (Bristol

110 Frelght.,.l; N>d tM RMAF

It. No 8 Sqn Ic.rlbou.J,. (1WMFEW 651&0/111

Li"e all field defences. lhe fons used alayered syslem of obstacles and illlerlod.i.ngfire from automatic weapons. On theperimeter mutually supporting hunl..ersmOLlllled weapons like the 7.62mm GPMG(General Ilurpose Machine Gun) or the.303in Vickers medium machine gun. Tunnelsor trenches connected the positions: forstock) Gurkhas the trenches were quiteshallow. \\ hich caused problems if the)'handed over to a regimelll like l,he SeOlS

Guards, which included many six-fOOlcrs.The fort would ha\e a watch to\\'er. andcommunications b\ telephone line, radio andsimple \"isual signals, Water tanks, latrinesand 1i\;nK accommodation would be dug inand sand-bagged,

Each fon had its own 8lmm or 3in morL'lrs and one or two I05mmhowiuer~. \\'hich could fire in SUppol1 of a neighbouring fort or, later. across-border patrol. Men of 50 Gurkha field Engineer Regt and theRO\'a1 Englnecr1l built helicopter landing pads as far fom'ard aspracticable, in order to reduce dead fh;ng time, Jk\'ond the fon \OodS abelt of mines, b<lrbed I\;re and pml)i stakes. \\;th uip flares .mdconunand-dclOnated charges such as Clarmore mines mixed in; at thefurthest limit of I'isibility was an apron of Dannen wire. Baualionsundenool.. thrc(·-to-fi\e mOlllh tours in Borneo. and the nonnal practicewas to send a platoon back from its fort to b.-malion f-1Q at least once ina tour, to allO\<o the men 'the IUXll'1 of sleeping on a bed. howevcr basic,and ha\inga dail" 5ho\\er, ho\\e\'er primiti\'e the plumbing'. The resel"\eplatoon at batt<llion HQ would be read\' to reinforce a fort or conduct afollOW-lip ope'dlion. landing or being roped from a helicopter.

1 OJ at Stas., July 1964In June 1964, patrol basc~ came under allack as the IndonesiansswilChed their tactics. On the nighl of 18 Juh' a position at BukilKnuckle held b\ 5 Ptn. 1st Bn Green Jacl..ets cOnlmanded m LtChristopher Miers was probed b) the enemy. The Rinemen returnedfire, and the following morning twO pools of blood and splintered boneindicated at leastlwo casualties,

On 31 July a base at Stass manncd by 7 Pm, I GJ commanded b>2 Lt Pcter Chamberlin came undcr a night attack_ Major .\tKof'.commanding B Coy. had anticipated this and had positioned II Pinunder 2 Ll Roberts aoolll 1.000 \'ards south of the b."lSt' as a cut-offambush. Roberts positioned rcmoteh-triggered nares, No.36 grenadeslinked with dClOnaling cord for simultanCOllS delOnation, and /fflllpS. Al02.30hrs. SL'lSS CalTH' under fire fr0111 LMCs and 50mm mortars from arange of abolllBO rards, Chamberlin's men retUrned fire \\'itll their 3inmonar and small anns, and 105mm defensive fire fell 150 \.uds fromthe p1<lIoon perimeter. At 03.00 the Indonesians 1\ithdrC\\ underharassing artille~r fire..\t 0·1.12, a group of men chaltering exciledhcmcred II Ilin's ambush area. Roberts estimated their strength asaround 3D, mOI'ing in single file; Lhey were led by a llIan wilh a IOrch.

and lhe soldie,"" at point were armed I\'ilh ~hotgllns, As lhc last of lheIndonesians entered the killing ground Roberts sel ofT lhe flares. Theambush hlSlcd 15 seconds: the following morning one bod)' was foundnear; Pln's D:.ISe and fOlll' more in lhe ambush area, togcther withblood on the ptmju, It was laler confirmed thal an Indonesian regularunit lost a lieutenant, a sergeant and four pri\'ates, with fi\c woundedand nine others missing.

2 Para at Pia man Mapu. April 1965The most ambitious attack on a comp..,nr base c..une near the end oftlleConfonlation, at Plaman ~lapu in lhe FiBt Dhision on 2; April 1965,The position \'t,ts held b) B Col I-IQ, 2nd Bn The Parachute Regiment,plus a weak pl:uoon of soldiers fresh from the depot: the bulk of thecom pan, '\~.lS out on pmrol. The p..,ratroop battalion had deplmed toBorneo onh' in MardI. In the position \\ere lhree officers includingCapt Webb, thc artillen forward obser"ation officer (FOO>; CompamSergeant Major Williams, and cools, mortar cre\\'S and radio operators- a to..,\ slrength of 34 men, At O·t-t5hrs, during the usual nighttimedownpour, the position came under mortar and rockel-launcher fire,The auackers \\'ere from a toughJa\'anese unil oflhe Indonesian regularam1\': lhe 3rd Bn, Para-Commando Regt (RPKAD), commanded b\LlCoI $.,ro Edllie \\ldabo\'to. The R])KAD had seen a good deal ofaction in lhe 1950s and earh 196Ih, including SC\'eral combaljumps:lhe' el~o,ed elite s..,tus as trusted Ktlarcls of tlle regime, and had goodequipmelll from" mixlllI'c of sources both Smiel and Westem.

The Pard-Commandos CUI the perimeter wire with Bang-dloretorpedoes, and launched tlln~e assaults. The first gained a lodgementin the position, capturing an 81mm monar pil. CS~1 \\llli"ms andCapl Thompson, Ihc :Icting platoon commander, rallied lhe Pams,but Thompson was wounded b) mortar fire, With tlle siLUationdelerior,ning, WillialllS recalled thinking, 'This is it - lhis is the end ofIhe stOl1' :1Il}'\I,ly, "0 ,'II gi\'c 'em a bit of rapid fire'. He discarded his rifleand gl,lbbed a CP~IG, dipped twO more bellS to that all'ead), in thc gUll,and slood firing from thc hip, as epl Baughan led a counter-auack,Se"eral of the Indonesians charged straight at Williams, lhe nearcstbeing killed ani)' IWO yards aII'll)' frOIll him,

When lhe second assault came in, with supporting fire and Bang-aloretOrpedoes, 10511l1ll howitzers were able to fire on the enemy axis ofau.ack, IllSide lite position, CSM Williams brought another GPr-,'IC up,and Sgt McDonald fired t,hc 81 mill monar \'enicalJ)', w>ing onl)' lheprimary charge, so that the bombs fell onlr 30 preis a\'t~dy. This broke upthe second aSS:llllt, The third attackjusl before dawn, ataoout 05.45, \'t<lSnot pressed home with great \'igour.

When CSr-.1 Williams look out a clearing patrol he found oneIndoncsian, ,\'I101ll he killed, There \\'as no other sign of the enemy, ani)a wide blood tmil !incred \'t'itll discarded equipment and dressing~,

leading IO\\'ards the border, B Companr had lost 1'1"0 men killed andse"en woundt..'tI. Enemr \,capons recm-ere<! included Armalite lifles,somc of them ~1203s incorporating the 40mm grenade launcher:Smiet AK-4; assault rifles and RPD light machine guns. Subsequentintelligence anal\'sis re,ealed that the Paras had been anacked b,twO companies supported b\ 18 Yugosla\'·made 4-hnm ~15; rockel 21

22

A typical bonier lort insar.w.... tt "- an obMrvatlon1_. 1MInk... made of

logs and sandbags linkedby communicatlon tnmc:h...and ••I.~ walkway up thehili - ....nll.1 In the muddy

conditione created by tropk:a',.Inlall - rna. of cannlulLr.ed.,.,munitlon box.... Nola the tallpoln auP9Of1lng ~lo ..nat.,and the vegelltlon dHNCl .w~10 pnI¥ide good fields 01 fire.IIWM FES &4/242141

launclH:rs (one of ....hichwas captured), eighlSOmmmortars ,md ten machine.l;"llllS. The Indonesianshad sLln~red about 30caslIallic:s. but there wereno bodies. Years later 2I~ara's former illlciligenceofficer in 1965 mel anIndonesian officer on acourse in Britain. Thelatter told him thai lheabsence of bodies atPlaman ~Iapll ",-as impl\explained: the cleOid andse\(~reh wounded alil..e hadbeen dumped into a rherclose to the Illdone~iall

border.At dawn lhe baualion

medical officer arriH'd atthe position and prornpthemcuatcd CS~I Williams:he had been hit b) frag­menu; in lhe side of hishead. he ""as de:lfened,

and he h<ld losl hi~ Icfl c)e. The CP~IC he had fired had been hitlhreelimes, as had the A41 radjo in his posilion. Willialm receh'ed theDistinguished Conduct Medal for his brave.... and Jt.o·adership thaI night- a decoration second onh 10 the Victoria Cross in the e)es of Ilrilishsoldiers. TIle aClion at PI:lIllall Mapu was later described b} Hoi LordCan'er as 'another dcf('nce of Rorke's Drift',

PATROLLINGFrom the forts, a compam would send out pmrob for ten to 15 da\'S ofJungle b.."1Shing', Ihe length dicGlled b\ the amounl of rations that couldbe atrried b" each man. Various palrol techniques were emplm-ed, \\;t1la pIa lOon aiming 10 con~r a I,OOD-metre nmp SCluan' in a dOl", Among thetoughesl tasks wcre ri\'cr-line patrols, which foHO\"ed meandering ri\'ersand creeks to locatc crossings or \',lIer points, The rivers mighl be fast­f1o'\ing between big mOSS-<:O\CR't! boulden., or slo...• and swamp,. Onpatrol men would live ofT cold ralions. Food for 24 hours for Gurl-haswould consiSI ofa breakfast of tea and ·Biscuits. Plain' (bener known as'dog bi~lIits'): lunch would be lea, a tin of sardines and dog bi'SCuits;.mel lhe e\'cning lIleal, eaten before last lighl, would be lea, rice anddried fish. i\lany of thc itelll~ in lhe rations were locall\' bought ratherIhan part of a British Ann) 24-hollr ralion pack, In a patrol reporl onOperntioll 'Red Riwr' b\ 2/2nd CR, the patrol commander said thatmen calT\ing "eapons. ammunition and 15 daH,' rations had lo:uis ofaboUI 701~. while those ...ith the CP~IC""ere C"drT}ing nearl} 80 poullds,

Tracks were a\oided since the\' might be ambushed or mined, andthis could mean hacking through seconda!")' jungle at a roue of ahom

200 lards an hour. At 17:00hrs, when it would begin to grow darl, it waslime to set up a palrol base with simple shelters made from ponchos andp<lmclllue cord. B} 18.00 th~ rain would start to fall, oftcn for six hoursnOll stop, while the men atlemptcd 10 sleep in their \\'ct, muddyuniforms. If the patrol found indications of the enemy, or werefollowing lip an cnemr attack, the companr might bring in a dog team.

SAS tactics - 'shoot and scoot'Though S,\S palrols would ambush the enem} both in ~lala\'sia andlater across the border, this was not their primal) fUllction, Colonel\\'oodehollse laid down that the stllndard operating procedure for acontact would be 'shoot and scoot' - open fire to deter a follow-up, bLllbreak orr the contact as quid.h as possible.

Relie\ing A Sqn. 22 SAS in Ma\ 1963, 0 Sqn emlxlrked on deepoperalions along the estuaries in Sarnwak's lo\\-I\'ing western frontierregion. Tracks o\'er the high ground opposite LongJa\\oai in lhe ll1irdDh·ision. the \~d.llc} south of I>ensiangan in soluhern Sabah, and thecoastal eSluaries or Sabah were also identified as likel}' infiltrationroutes. During their first month D Sqn penetr.lIed a pre\'iollsl}unexplored area on the 5.'lbah border knO\\11 as The Gap: this patrol,commanded b, G.1pt 'And\' Dennison, included the experiencedSgt Eddie 'Geordie' lillico, Lillico would later suni\e an ambush inFebrual) 1965 \\ilh se\'ere leg wounds, and would cI<I\\1 for two da\'S,a\'oiding Indonesian palrols umil he reached lhe helicopter rendelvOlls.

In thc same momh, 22 SAS suffered its most. seriow. losses of thecampaign \\'hen, on 4 MOl}', a Belvedere helicopter crashed on take-offatBa Kclalan while carl'}ing ~l<y Ronald Nonnan. second·in-command oflhe regimelll. Ihe operalions officer ~(aj 'lam Thompson, Cpl 'Spud'Murpl1\ and other passengers and cre\\.

In December 1963, D Sqn complcled its first tour and A Sqn returnedfor a second. Dul"ing wimer 196~" Indonesian incursions increased inSabah; the squadron mounler! se\'eral long range patrols illlaK,llimantall, but on I\' close enough to lhe border that their incursioncould be pUI do.....n to a 'map-reading enul", In ~larch 1964 a l>dtrolcommanded b) Sgt 'Smol~" Richardson were tasked \\ith coYCring theborder north from Ba Kelanan and meeting a second patrol in a featureknown as tbe Long Pa Sia Bulge. Richardson'spatrol confirmed that the Indonesians werecrossing Ihe bol'der in slrength: they located alarge camp. bUI on the e\cning of 14 ~Iarch ther'bumped' a paU'OI of o\er a dozen Indonesiansoldiers, In a shool-and-5Coot engagement theradio operator, Tpr James 'Paddy' Condon fromTipperal)', was wounded in lhe Ihigh and becamesepar;lted; captul'ed by t.he Indonesians, he wasshot after it brief il1lerrobJ7llion.

Of the British, Australian and New Zealand$AS paLrols, Cen Walker \\TOLe: 'I regard 70Lroopers of the 5.r\S as being as valuable to me as700 infantry in the role of ~heartS and minds-,border surveillance. earl} \varning, stay-behind.and eyes-and-ears with a sting'.

M-.a 01 u.. Moriar~ of

1It Bn Seot, O~rd, In E.,t~Brigade, Sab.h, 1De5, The81mm mort.,.. aN protected by

~ mao. from ..ndbaogs,n.ttenecl olldl'llms, eonvgahldplYanl.l:ed tron .,w:r 11ft ......lrorl pickets. Note u.. All t 5rtn.. tyfng on u.. parafNts.

The G~rd","en_.r bMk:

•• ptn btilt order wtth ammo

pouches .nd two waterbott'e.,Orte comjWlny of l,t lri.h auard,HnHKl undM command of t SQ,

8nd u.. a~rds tn~.p.ndent

Parachute Coy abo deptayed to8onMo.. 11 SQ N .10M Norrisl

23

2.

'CLARET' OPERATIONS

In 1964 Harold \\ilson won the General Election and Brirain had aLabour go\'cnuncnt. lll(~ $ecrcl....I)' of State for Defence was DennisIlealc), who in World War II had served in the Royal Engineers. risingto the r~lnk of m;\jor and seeing action in [laly. The goycmmcllt \liascommiucd to supporting the nc....' Commonwealth nauons; the threalfrom Indonesia \\";IS c\ident, and the go\'cmmem"dS prepared to lakelough dcci~ions. Ileak'y and Wilson pro\ed shrC\'l'd political alli~ forMala\ ia and for Cell Waller. \\110 was able lO comincc (hem of the needfor lOp secn~t crOSSoborder raids against Indonesian ~tagingC"dmps.

These oper.uiolls \\'cre codcnamed 'Claret', and were imcnded 'to

pn..--empl any likel) build-up 01' attack. LO harass b} ambush and palrolsthe IndorH.'sial1s, and 10 induce Ihem to mo\'e their camps ... away fromthe bonier'. Indon("~ia and the Fedemrion of Mal.l\'sia, lel alone lheL'niled Kingdom. wcre nOt officialh at W;lr, so it \\"as a risk\ politicalmO\"l~, One Brili..h officer ..er\'ing wilh ~1.t1aysi;m Rangers rec-Alled thegrim preamble to the orders group prior 10 a Claret operation: 'Thisopcr.uiol1 is deniable and will be denied'. Once lhe soldiers had crossedme ill-dcfincd jungle border into Indonesia lhe) were on lheir 0\\11.\\'hen il \I~IS nece~s:u) 10 repon the resull of a Clarel raid 10 lhe media,il 1...1S described as 'a ~Llcccssful action in the border area'.

Tht.' SAS had in faci been crossing the K.alirnantan border sinceDecember 1963; bUI now anacls would be undertaken al plaloon ore\en com pan} 'itrenglh m rCKular Brilish infantn b."lllitiions, workingon imelligcllce galhered m SAS patrols - \\110 also mOllilled small scaleambusht.~. A special \\-.1.1' room \\.LS SCI lip lO handle lhe clandestineOper-dtiOns, which wcre condliCled under SInn guidelines 1m0"11 as TIleGolden Rules:(I) All 1<lids had to be <Iuthor_d by lhe Director ufOperations.(2) Onl)' lried and lested troops ,,'cre lO Ix: llsed (no soldiers on theirfirst lOlli' of dllr-. in Borneo),(3) Ibids were lO be made \I'ilh the definite aim of delerring andtll\\-dning a~rression bl tll(~ Indonesians. No anacks "ere lO be mounledin rerribUliol1 or simph \\ilh lhe geller-dl aim of inflicting casualties.(-I) Close air suppon would nOi be given excepl in an exrreme emergellC\'.

It was cmphasized. \lTote Brig E.D.'Birdie' Smith of lhe Gurkhas, thal'minimum force \\~l.S 10 be the principle used, "I tiler than large ~cale

al.tack.~ which would h~we inciled retaliation and risked escalalion.wming lhe border \\':i\r into something quitc difTerelH. costly in li\es andfrnughl \\illl inlernalional problems'.

The first l.aJ"gel \\<LS tile Indonesian garrison al ~antakor SOlltll ofPensiangan. The ,iIIage was \lilhin lhe 3,OOOm from lhe border \\hich\\'as at thai dale Ihe limil allo\\'cd, and iLS defences had been studied rnlhe SAS and Border Scotll'i, \1 ho had localed the minefields and ere\\'­~cn'cd wcapons. The lroops for the la...k were A Coy, 1/2nd Gurkhascommanded by i\h\i Digby Willoughby. The assault weill as planned; theIndonesian commander and live or his men \Icre killed and lhe campdesu'med. :u a coSI of four Gurkhas wounded.

The Ro\<,1 .\Iannes of 40 Cdo and lhe SllS Ta\\":tu .-\ss."llih Group weregi\ell an IIIH1Slla) Cl:lrel mission on 8 December 19&1: lhe\ \\ere ta.<.ked

f«mlj"Wfi Otl /101:' JJi

1; TNKU offlclll", North Botneo, December 1962

2: Sgt, Indonesia" AF paratroop.. 1M43: NCO, IndoMlJl." Army 328 Pare-Raider B". Kliog-Kar1g Mis, March 1964

2

..

B

1: Prlvate, A Coy, lsi Sn 0tMfit.. Own Highlanders; Brunei, December 19622: Manne, 42 Cdo RM; Brunei, winter 1962/633: Rllleman, lit Bn Green JlK:kets; N.Bomeo, w1nt.... 1962163

1: NCO, 3nl Bn~ AustIaIM Regt;Sar8wak, J ...... 11165

2: GuMdsman, I.t Bn Scots au.ds;

boat p;1ItroI, $ab8ft, 19&1

3; Radio ~Ol', 1.1 Bn~ Ulst.RiflB; Sarawak, Jvty 111&1

c

1: Trooper, 0 Sqn, 2200 SAS Regt, , 9632: Dog hilndlM, 2nd Bn Green Jackel., 196153: Puoan trKker, 1963

2

D

1: lance-Nalk R1lmbahadur 11mbu (VCI, C Coy, 2nd en, 10th Gurltha Rilles;

Gunong Tepol, 21 No....mber li1652: RillemIln, lat an, 10th Gurkha Rilles; labia, 5ej)tember 1964

3: Lt, 2nd Bn, 1nd Gurkh. Rl''''; lumbls, June li165

,

E

•

·1

1: W02, Royal Army Pay eorp.2; 5er(Jeant, Royal Army Medical Corps

3: Vlca·Admlral, AN4: Captain, Queen.. Royal Irish HI,r$$3r$

3

1: Petty Officer, RN landing party, 11&4

2: Sgt hellcopt. pilot, 65e Sqn Me3: UCpl, lS AIr Despatch R-vt. RASe; Kuching, 11164

G

H

1: CSM, 8 Coy, 2nd 8n Tn. PlIrKtlula Regt;Plaman Mapu, 21 AprIllM15

2: lban Bordat' ScoYI, 2nd 6n 101t0 0urkh8 Rifles, 1965

wiLh neutralizing an Indonesian observation post on Sebatik Island on·S."1bah·s east coasl, which was dose 10 an Indonesian base on NanukanIsland. In an earlier century the Dutch and British colonial carto­graphers had dhided Sebmik. an island measuring about 25 by 12 milt.-s,almost exactly in half: the southel"ll portion "~dS now Indonesian all(ltllenonhern ','IS pari of S."1bah. The SBS had recollllOilred the or earlierin 1964: and on 8 December the mOtor cmiser Bch SaWYi!r carrieda group of Rm.1I Marines under command of an SBS officer,Lt RA.~I.Secger, 10 a poim ofT tile coast. Here the~ launched threeGemini inflatablcs: one carried a support pam "'ith a GPMG to aposition on the bonier, La deter any Indont.osian pUl"Suit after the atl.lck.The other two boats, with 15 men aboard, paddled the 6 miles to a smallbeach. Seeger had di,ided the 15 men into a Gr~IG crew under SgtCosdev. a close <Iuaner ass;:llIh group with Sterling S~IGs under CplTomlin. and two scouts \,ith Annalites fiued "ith electric tOrches.

As Ihe (wo inflatables reached tile shore the Indonesians openedinaccuJdte fire. The RO}<l1 ~Iarines pUI in a quick assault \,ith supportingfire from the GPMG on the beach. Ranges "ere so dose that "henSeeger shouted 'Grenade!' and threw IWO illlo the Obsel'\<l.DOn post, theGP~IG crew held the gun abo\-e their heads and ducl-ed under ,,-,lIer toan)id 111e blast. Seeger raked the building "il1\ fire, and in the lighl ofthe campfire the Marines spotted 111ree bodies; but. \,ith orders nOI tobe drawn into a sustained firefiglu, tllC, l1\cn \,ithdrew. Soon afterwardsthe Indoncsians oc-gan to mortar the area ofl1\e OP. but b, then the SBS\,ere OUI or danger.

This W'iS nOl the onh Claret operation led b) LI Seeger, ,,'ho hadah·eady undertaken IWO reconnaissance patrols in October 19&1. On12 September 1965, firingat ranges of about 40 prdsduring Operation 'Frecfall',D Coy of 40 Cdo cxpendedover 900 rounds of7.62mm. 200 rOllnd~ of9mm. 100 rounds of 5.56mand eight grenades; lheattack, initiated by Seegerwith his Arrnalilc, \V<l~

described crisply as ':I ~oocl

0pcl<ltion ..On 30 November 1065,

in Opcr.ltion 'Jamcs Bond',130 men of the 2/2ndGurkha Rifles fought offfour enemy allack.'l incompan} strength insideIndonesia. Contacts, likeJnOH in the jungle. \,·ereat five yards' lange, andmen could describe theiradversaries in considc",blederail. The enem}' ,,·ore'OG uniform~, with pale

Ii ~ttol from 2 GJ tnO'M outttlf'OUOh the outer wiN ~terof tIwlrforl In 1865; the

Rifleman In the foNQlOUnd t\as

• 3G-round LMG 1fta98Zl- onh.. SlR. TN Tlger ..... _

tied to the b8ttNd wi,.. cont8irl

pebb.... which mtled If 8"

Intruder tried to cut h.. w8YthtoUgh the def~ .t night.

(IWM FEW &5/32/42)

33

grcen flashes on the sleeves. The~ .... ore junglehats, some IUrned up on both sides and ont' had:t red flash on the left side. One man had a ....hiteChe\TOIl on lhe left sleC\~·. \\il.h this le\e1 ofobservation b\ his soldieTS. ('.apt Erskine-TuUochcould ha\'e confidence in his repon of 24confirmed enelll' dead and ten wounded.

Some Claret operations were all a large scale,stich as that in mid May 1966 when bmh L & MCop. of 42 Cdo RJ\l crossed the border south ofBiawak in Saraw;:,k's First Division. A t,vo-daymarch with an over-night harbour brought themclose 10 an Indonesian base. TI1cir final approach10 lhe target was al night - no eas, task in t.hejungle, ";'11 nearh 200 men. Once they \\ere inposition around the kampong Cla\'tnore minesan<tched to bamboo IXlles were positioned to firedownwards through the roofs of the hms. At da"l1the mines were detonated and the atl4l.d wasspnlllg \\;th GP~lGs and Amlalites. TIle onhRO\'a1 Marine casualt) was Capt Ian Clark. whodied of his wounds.

34

Riflemen of 2nd O....n Jacket.about to set out on II flye-day

patrol on the Jungle border

between Scorewak an.dKall....ntan. The patroleommandet- mak.. a ".t-mlnuteeheek of arm. and equipment;

one. out on P11lrol ttIM onlycontKt wi1h thot'r be.. will beby radio, and _ ......11 Item

01 equipmotnt .." behind could

mean that UNo mluJon will notbe accomplilltloed. They wear ......Pm equipment with poncho roll".trapped to In. luIy~k, and

the p.trol commander hat •

'GOlioek' machete a' hi. hlp.

Apart lrom 1 .. 2 OJ end 2 Para,EnllUah and Irlah line batU,lIon"Which deployed to the Far

ea.t 8' varlov. dates w .foll_ (1,t 8"a in each c ):Royal LeicHten, Royal UlsterRin.., Queen" Ow" 8una,Dum.m Ught lnt.nt,." Roya'Werwlckstlire Fufilwn., RoyalHam9Shi and King's Own

yortuhl Ught 1"'Mlt)!.(IWM FEW 65132/34)

SAS CLARET OPERATIONS[n the winter of 1964-65, A & B Sqns. 22 SAS conducted:1 number ofcross-border oper.tt.ions; palrols from B Sqn wen~ concentrated on thePlich range of hills in western Sarawak. il1lcrcepting agents :llI.emptingto cont.act CCO cells in Lundu. E.'1.rl) in 1965. D Sqn under ~I:y Roger\\'oodh,iss replaced A Sqn again, and the Claret operatiom continued.In Apdl a four-man patrolled b\ Capl Robin Lens ncar 8db..'1.ng Raba inKalimant.."1l1 monitored Indonesian traffic on the Sentimo rher. and onthe morning of the 28th the\ spnll1g an ambush against twO longboats.In four minutes, at ranges a~ close as 8ft, tJ1C' liUed five Indonesiansoldiers: one CSCdped.

In Ma\ 1965, ~taj Woodiwiss briefed Sgl Don 'Lofn" Large - fomlerlyof t.he CloLlcest.er!>hirl' Reg:t, and a leteran of lhe Korean War - 10 leada patrol across the border 10 lhe Koemb:' ,'i\'er near Poed. On 10 ~lay

they encollntered an Indonesian platOon, but carefully skirted theirpo~i,-ion. When they had localed a position for an OP on t.hc edge of an,bl>cr plantation they \\~Ilched the ril'er traffic. The following day a 45ftlUXllr} motor yacht appeared. 'At the stern "'as the red and "hit.e flag...onh those boats with soldiers on board had f10"'1 it. so far, Amidshipsa ... citnop' shaded its occup.3nts.so that Large could not. make them OUL

On a shon mast.,. flew another banner. this one ha\;ng a str.lI1ge de\;cethat slrongl, suggested 10 his practi.sed e,e the son which \e.... seniorofficers displa~ to boo<;ttheir<'gos and inspire awe. ~We'lI have this one~.

Large whispered.' It "<1.5 then thai he saw a )oung girl among thepa.'>SCngers. Wondering if this meam thai t.he boat. carried a ci,;lianofficial. the}' let il pass; and 12 vea!"i 1:II.er, Cen Moerdani of theIndonesian Parachlllc Regt had an opportunity t.o tJl:tnk two fonnermembers of the palrol for tJleir chi,,;:,lr}'. Llrge had been right: the flaghad been the guidon of the tJ1Cli Col Mocrdani.

(

It took another day before another target presented itself; then, indn\;ng rain, the patrol opened fire OIL 45 preis' range on a 40ft launch\\;th t"'o soldiers al the stem and a deck cargo under tarp,;HIlins, Hil b\more than 60 rounds, the boat tool.. on a list and slaned to burn, andIhe smell of burning fuel borne on the wind follo\\,('(1 Ihe po-llrol asthe)' withdrew,

In late May 1965, D Sqn was replaced b) A Sqn, commanded by ~Iaj

Peter de la Billiere. That August, working c1osel) \\;Ih the Gurkhas. thesquadron launched a .'tenes of cross-border raids, MallY \,'ere fruitless;during an opera lion in September, 12 four-man palrol.. conducted a\~dn three-week search for a reponed CCO camp on the headwaters ofIhe Sempa)'ang and Bcmban rivers on Sarawak's western bordcr,

III December 1965 the ne'" Director of Operations. :\l;~Gcn GeorgeLea, cleared 6, 7 & 8 Tps of B Sqn for an extenshe spread of ambusheson the Bemban-to-Sawah track, The Indonesians had beell alened hitwo locals, but when they attempted to roll up one ambush in a sen~ offire-and-manocll\Te moves. file "'ere caught in the blast of a OanJlore:'111e result was shocking ... hats, limbs, bodies ne'\ and then la\grotesquel)' still". TIle remaining two Clanllores pointing down thetrack "ere fired blind and produced screams and groans. e\;dentJ> froma fullO\\-llp force which must have been halted in its tracks, for it ne\-erappeared.' Among the ambushers on this occasion was TprJohn White,whose brother l.\ilI) had been killed in an ambush while ~r...illg with ASqn in Augusl 196·\. John While had been so impressed when healtended his brOlher's memorial service at Hereford lhal he had\'olllll1eered for lhe Regiment.

An interesting de\'e1opmenl from this period was the formation, atthe close of the campaign in 1966, of G (for Guards) Sqn, 22 SAS,The S<luadron was composed of men from the dislxmded GuardsIndependent Parachute Compan" which had undertakell patrollingand dose reconnaissance missions on the central Sar;:m<tk border.Commanded b\ M.y LG.S.Head. the com pam had come to Bomeo inJune 1964, and conducted its first Claret operations in September 1965,

Australian SASFrom February to Jul) 1965. I Sqn, Au... lralian Special Air SeniceRegimelll served in Brunei. and 2 Sqn from February to July 1966 inSarawak; Ihey sutTered three killed in action,

Urigadier I larry TlllO, commander' urthe Cenlral Ilngade where theyoperated, noted Ihat lhe Australians 'appeared to be eXlremeiv keenand tough and arc 10 operale on the same lines as the Ikiti!.h $AS'. No,lS<luadron's commander, ~I.y AlfGarland, flew in with an advanced partlon 16 FebruaIl' and was bl;efed about the 'Colden Rules', laid dO"'!l in1961 bUI eased a veal' laler, In ,~"-S Phmlto'M O!tn,.jUIIgt" Da\;d Homerspells OUI these rules in greater detail than the olher accounts. and thefinal paragraph... gi\C an indication of how sensiti\'e the...e operations"cre thought to be:'[\'el") operalion mUSl be planned with lhe aid of a s;md-tab1e andthoroughly reheal'Sed for al leasl IWO week$, Each opc....tion to beplanned and cxecUled with maximulll security. E\'ery man taking partmUSI be sworn 10 secrecy, full co\'el' plam must be made and lheoperations 10 be given code-names and ne\'er discussed in detail 011

A haurd of long IUl'IlIle patrola­Iha rubber aole 01 tha lungleboot haa parted from tha can",..upper, TheM light boots w.,..comfortable but not robust

enough lor '"" eondltlons, andnMfHd raptaclng fNq~(.Author's collection)

3'

3.

" Rowal Marin4l Metlon gr'OlJpeOar'OlJnd their Bedford 3 ton truck

artar relumlng from a 'C"ret'opemlon InakM It.llmlltltlln.TM "ret Ct.,..t oper1IUOn$

P4'n4lb1otlld only up to 3,DOOm13,270 ,.ards) Ins," IndoneNnl..-ritory; but In 1M4 M.jGen

Walker's units were~zed10 .ltt~ thl. to lO,OOOm(c.1 .,000 yard. - o"or e mlleel,and ,..Jd. w.,.. ."ontu.Uypu.hlng 20,OOOm (n.arly t t

mlluJ Into Indon••la. BW 1865Drltl.h domlnarn:. of thojunglomoant that almo.t all Inl.nlryoperation. w.,.. of lhl. type.(RMMu....m)

telephones or r.ldio. Idelllit' discs must be leftbehind before departure and no traces - such ascartridge cases, paper rnlion packs, etc - must belen in KalimanL."t.n. On no account must an,'soldier taking pan be captured b\ 111e enell\\' ­alive or dead.'

Although the squadron had adopted the sand­coloured berel of the Ilritish SAS these had not velI~en issued. and the men am\oo in Singaporewearing their red berets. A day laler, Radio Djakartaannounced 1!t;lt the Ilritish Parachute Regimenthad deployed to the theatre.

Four-man patrols normall} lasted about (woweeks. The) would be flown into the area by fixed,,;ng aircraft, lifted to the border b) helicopter,and then might rope dO\\11 into the jungle. Tht')'

carried Bergens \\'cighing nearl\ 90Ib - almostt",;ce the \\eighl recommended in SOPs. Somer.ujons would be cached to be reco\(~red on theretum leg of tile patrol. Each man had a colouredidentification band sewn 10 the inside of hisjungle hat: \\hen he was approaching friendlvforces the hat would be worn inside out, sho\\;ngthe colour. The belt order had ammunitionponches with 60 rounds of 7.62ml1l or 100 of5.56mm, and water boules. An emergency pack

held r.llions, tetracycline and s.,.,1t tableI.'.. and an air mar"er panel. Acompass \\'as auached to the neck b} a lanrard.

Within the patrol. commlUlicatiOlu "ere either b~ whispel"5 or handsignals. The radio operator sent a coded message eo.cn 24 hours at ascheduled time; if the radio malfunctioned or the schedules could nOtbe met the patrol would acth"te i,-" SARBE (search and rescue beacon)at 'iet limes. or ",'hen an aircraft was ill the \;cinir.. Each patrol had acode\\'ord \\'hich meallt '1 am being chased and am heading for theBorder (or Exfillration) RV'; if this signal was heard, a helicopter wouldhome in on the SA.RBE.

The second Clarcl operation on 2 l\Ia}' 1965 was commandcd byLl Torn Marshall, a fonner l<\nkf'r, who enforced weighl discipline on histhree men: each soldier carried ani}' 30lb of equipment, in one 44 Pmand three wicker basket packs. Ilreakfast and l,he middav snack wcreboth haifa bar of chocolatc or half a packet of raisins and a bre"" of tea;the main meal \\'as a tin of meat and \"egclablcs, and lea. The diet ,,-asimpro\"ed b\ wild fruil, and rhe men 100" \;tamin mblets. The patrolwas OUI for 12 da\"s: "'hen it relUmed each man had lost bel",een 61bsand 100bs - but thC'\ had set lip an OP oH~rloolJngLabang in Indonesia.and obsen'ed 15 enenn in IWO huts.

Reconnaissance patmls continued. and tJle fi~t ofTensi\e Claretoperation b) the Australian SAS, ag<Jinsl Lumbis, took place in June196.1). Corporal Robinson guided 11 Co}', 2/7th Gurkhas \\;th CPMGsand 81mm mortars into position on lhe wet night of 25 Junc. Theambush was spmng at 09.00 when the Indonesians began their morningmeal: 50 minutes Ialer t.he order 10 wit.hdmw ....~<tS given. and as the

Australian.'> and CllI'khas pulled back I05mm howitzers at Kabu shelledthe kllmjJollg. A week lawr a Border $cOllI visited the area and reponedth;llthc Indonesians \\ere '\cI) much afraid'.

One patrolled b) Sgljohn Pellit had hcen obsen'ing the Salirir rin":!'cast of Baluladan since 3Jul). ",hen al 17.00 on the 5th thc)' sa\\ a bo;ltwith ninc men. onl) one of \\hom was wearing an olin' drab shirl.trousers and cap: Ihe cargo included what appeared to be anammunition box. I)Cttit sprung the ambush when the bom \\'as 10 vards,1\\'aY: his patrol llred 81 round... of 7.62mm and 26 rounds of9mlli. andhe estimated that the\ had killed se\en and seriousl)' w'ouuded IWO.Subst.'quelll reports frOIll local ci\;lians \'ia the Bordcr ScOUIS staled thaI(n'e soldiers had been l..illcd including a sergeant-major. and IWO morehad died later from wounds.

On 21 Juh. a large fighting palrol led m 2 Lt Trc..·mr Roderid, waswatching ri\er tramC \\hen.justafler midd,\\', Ih~' saw a narrO\\oo.·u withan omboard mOlor and six men in \\hite T-shirts and blue shorts. TIlerewas no ob\;ollS indication that the, were soldiers. blll Ihe ~harp e~es ofIhe Brell gunner. LI Cpl Chris jennison. spolled kil bags. rifles andwcbbing <lIthe bottom of tile boal: he opened fire. with his ofTiceraningas No.2 on the gun. A lOla] of 60 rounds ....-ere fired b, two Brens and 52m Ihe eight SLRs; all six Indonesians "'ere killed.

During its deplonnem I $qn. SASR spent three momhs on Claretoperations, and killed Ii enenl\ for the loss of onc uooper - PaulDenneht.1'. \\'ho was lat.'lll) injured nOI Il\ Indonesian fire but bva rogueelephant. during an operation in ~Ia, 196.:;.

New Zealand SASIn Febmar} 1965.40 men of the Ne..... Zealand SAS comm;mdetl b\ MajWJD.Mcldnnll arrhed in Borneo to take over some of Ule work. 11leKiwis spelll a month tmining at Tlllong in Brunei; skills learned andimproved included 'hot COlllacl' drills il1\'ohi.ng fast, dose rangeshooting. as well as navig-dtion and suni\'al. TIley ulcn moved toKuching ill westcrn Sal'll .......lk. \\'here they were au.a.chcd to 22 SAS. InAU&'\Ist 1965,2 Detachment NZSAS, 'mder r-,'l.y R.S.Bciu;ng. arrived inSingapore and. after training at TUlong, moved to Kuching to replaceI Oct on 6 October.

[n the First and Second Division areas theNZSAS took their turn a' monilOring river lmllicinside Indonesia. W.D.Baker lOok pan in onepatrol which found a good observation andambush position. with a clear field of fire andgood routes in and out. The day passed quietly.until they saw a longboat \\i.tl1 outboard motorstntggling upstream hea\i.ly laden with stOres,and crewed by alen, armed Indonesian soldiers.It ....-as photographed b) the patrol commander,\\ ho debriefed his men aboul what had the}' seen;they had recogni1ed Armalites. and werecomi.nced that the boat \\...IS on a supply nm to anIndonesian camp upstream. They decided toambush it on its return. and aboLlllwo hour'S laterthe sound of an outoo..lrd malar alcrrcd Ulel1l.

Men of 1,t $(:ot, Q_rdI

in • Mk 4 oUuult Boat on •.,.t.rc:ou.... In S.tJ.h's EntB~; • lighf mKhlne gun Ismounted In the bow, The Jungleriv.n weN neee,..r1ty lIHd by

both ,id..., ~Jor tnnSfXl(t.rterlel, .net ~ny CI.nfoper.llon, InvolwKl obItmIiMJon

.net .mbuan.. 0' lnet_lanriver tnlffic. (1 sa via JoIvI NoniII

37

3.

Whell the boat entered the 'K point of the ambush -the point \..herethe coxsw'lin would be unable to turn it - the troopers opened fire,and Ihe ambU5h was o\er in seconds: four Indonesians were killed andIWO \\Ollllded.

In Juh 1966. 4 Det ;,\,ZSAS under Maj D.W.S.~lolonC\ arrinxl inIheatre. TIlcir tour included a conl3ct \\ith Indonesian troops as laIc as:, Augu.)l: the ~ZSAS pavol, led by the appo"iteh named Lt 'Alb\' N"'i,followed the Indonesians, \\'ho \\'cre north of the border. On 12 August,whilc the) were still in lhc jungle, the Federation of Malaysia andIndonesia signed a peace agreemcnt.

THE LAST YEAR

Duling 1965 there were confused politic'll signals from Dj:tl..::tna, and itwas thcrefore felt to be politically expediem 10 reduce the cross-borderpressure. The British soldiers nicknamed these periods 'Be kind toIndos', and in realil\ the~ allo",·ed the Indonesians 10 regroup for whatwould be thc final spasms of the campaign.

On the Mala\osian side of the border, following the action al the2 I)ara fon al Plaman Maptl in Apnl, the PardS had furllier COnL"lCl'o ",iththe Indonesians 011 Ij ~Ia) 1965 ncar the v'illage of ~Iongkus. ~len of10 Pill outflanked an ambush where about 100 Indonesians werecovering a lrdck junclion: for the loss of one man lhe Par-IS killed fiveand drovc ofT the enemy force. In a follOW-lip after dark an Iban trackerIitcrally used his hands to feel OUl the route, until by 02,00 they were soclose thai they could smcll the enem)'. but b\ dawn the Indollc..ians hadslipped aW"'"n': anillcl' (irc ......110 called down on their likely mUlCS.

On 22 Maya helicoptcr assault put seven platoons of 2 Para intoan area between Mongkus and Mujal 10 cmel" the likelv rollle of 50Indotl(-siilIlS. Before the Paras roped dOMl the area had been preparedb\ anillen fire and anned hdicopters. It fell 10 a section commander,Gpl Tindale of JO PUl, 10 make COnl3CL lie heard mm'ement, sel hissection up in a snap ambush, and ....·hen al>out 40 Indonesians brokecover on a lidge he waited until tht.1' were only 20ft awav before he gav'ethe order to fire, The 1\\'0 Bren guns and the section's SLRs killed14 encmy, and when lile Indonesians began 10 mortar 1l1e position androll 11 lip from the flank Tindalc withdrew his little forct: withoulsllfTcring any caSllalties,

Gunong Tepol: Rambahadur Llmbu, YCOn 21 November 1965, on the Indonesi;m side of the border west ofUauin 1l1C exu'cme west of Sarawak's First Divi... ion, L/~aik (l, Cpl)Ramb.lhadllr limbu of the 2 10th Gurkha Rines \\on the onl) "klonaeros... of Ihe campaign. The action ....<is one of t\\O Qarct operntions ~the 2 lOlli, while the 2 '2nd made four alL"lcks, and 8 Sqn, 22 S,.\Slaunched cross-border ,macks in near squadron strength, killing20 Indone...ians.

In Operation 'Time Keeper', C Cov, 2/ 10th GR commanded bv CaptMauusell, reinforced b) I-IQ Coy's Reece and AS&"llllt Pioneer plaloons,had approached lhe area of an Indonesian platoon posilion, and a clo$('reconnaissance b)' Lt l{ar~it Rai of i Ptn had located it. The entrcnched

camp was aboul 3 milesacross the border, al theapex of three knife-edgt.'<iridges fomling an isol'ltt.'<ihill, Gunong Tepoi: thetwO eastenl ridges werecO\'ered in thick seconclanjungle. as were the deepsurrounding \<ll1eys. Onthe morning of 20 Nov­cmber. Capt Maunsell amiLI Uhagat Bahadur Rili of8 Pm moved close 10 theobjecth'e and examined itin demil; the camp \\"as stillunder construction, withfaligue panics al '~·ork.

Aboul 500 }.mts beyond iton lower, cuhh<lted ground",-as a companv-strengthIndonesian posilion \~;th mortius, in the hamlet of BalxlIlg. Thesecondaryjungle \\"a1> a serious ban·ier. almost as efTecth'e as barbed wire.

On the morning of the 21st the company mOl'ed ofT, and 800 yardsfrom the target they paused and ate a silent meal of cold rations; lhen.Ical'ing the Assault Pioneer Pm securing Ihe patrol base, the companyadvanced west in the order 7, 8, Reece and 9 Pia lOons. Maunsell andthree Gurkhas cut a 400-}'ard tunnel through the secondaryjungle usingg'dl"deners' secatellrs for silence. B) 13.30 the\' were creeping nonh upIhe southern ridge and were onh 20 \'ards from the Indonesians; theHnal obstacles were IWO ro"'1i of felled u'ees which blocked the two-rard"'ide ridgelop. As thel crossed the second obsL"lcie an Indonesiansoldier appeared; he ullslung his rine. and was shoL Racing along theridge four abreast. the Gurkhas auad.cd immediatel). 7 Pill leading onthe left; LI R."lIUit grenaded a machine gun post which Imd dela}edthem. and 8 Pm swung to the right. bUI moments later he'l\) fire againstalled tbe attack. Captain ~'!aunsell crawled fOI"\'o'ard 1,0 recover awounded Gurkha and. firing from the hip, Lt Bhagat led another nlshby 8 Ptn which look them into lhe enemy lrenches.

On the lert nank, L/Cpl Rambahadur Lirnbll or7 Ptll led a Bren guncrc\\, 10 silence an enem}' machine b'lln. lie ~prillled under fire IhroughIhe open vegetation and neutraliJ.ed the position ,~;th grenadell. bUl hisIwo-man gun crew were wounded by ~Illa\l arms fire and. unable tomove, took cover near a prominelll Iree. Unable to report thisdc\elopmem to his platoon commander, Lt RaIUit. under hean fireRambahadu. decided 10 bring his friends illlo cover. (h·e. a period of20 minutes he dodged small anns fire 10 make two dashes 10 pic).. lip thetwO men. and carried them hac).. to s."lfet) onc by one - a distance ofabom 70 prcls, four timell in succession. $."ldl}'. when the) were undercover it \~-as discmcred that both of them \~'ert' dead.

Afler l'~;ce lisking his life for his comrades, the Gurkha corporal nowrealized lhat their LMG was lying abandoned in an Indoncsian trench.He again ran forward under fire; and when he had picked up the gun

Ne.r Barlo, Saraw.k, 23 May

1He: Qurtr.hn prepare to board• fAA W..... on • typleetly

cr.mped Jungl. LZ. ",. Jungl.off••ed law natural lendlfll;l

zon•• for tHlllcopt..... PI.trO""S

of logs .nd tamped ••rth w..-.constructed ne•• forwsrd

posltlona, on.., on em'" n­trom which the vegetation Melbeen c which allowed the

pilot .n un tricted approach.

On operaUons emaJI paIrcMa

would rope down fTom the

hoeIlcoptar into tiny P98 In the

canopy, but larvar forcas wouldbe Iancload In cLa.artnge or on theshingle bMlluI of rive.... The

W_ll could carry up to Ul.......N I AIr Squ.dron. d.ployed

to rlou. locatl(ms ••hore fnlm

th. commando c.ni.... HMSAlbion and BulwMft w.,.NH 845. 848. 841 a 848 NAS.IRoy.1 Navy)

3.

40

'. (j)

he launched an aliacL. on twO indonesian machine gun positions.Charging across the hilllop supported b... a section from i Pm. he putthe gUllS Ollt of action and personally killed at least four Indonesians.C..,ptain Maun.sell wrote of R."l.mbahadur. 'That he \\'as able to achie\'e"'hat he did \\;thollt being hit was mird.culollS. His olll\tanding personalbra\l:-n. selfless conduCl, compleu~ cOlllempt of lhe enenl' and hisdetermination to So."l\C the li\es of the men of his fire group sel anincomparnblc example and inspired all \\ho S<"l.\\' him',

It look a final right flanking assallh 10 .secure lhe position. and thenMaunscll awaited the e"pencd counler-atlack. There was initially somefiring ill the direction 0(9 Ptll, and though tbe enem) were unseen thesmoke !".-om their I.;capons prmided an adequate targel location: whenCpt Krishnilbalmdlll' Rai fired 150 rounds from his GPMG .Il lite area,lhe firing ceased. Lielltenam Bllll\\.msing Limhu spread his ReecePm along the approach ridge on the right of 9 Platoon. When twoIndonesian solcliel1i apPC;lrcd. followed h\ three more. thn- were hil b.,.a bro."ld~ide of fire from lhb fire suppon group. \\llen Indonesian Iighlmonan opened fire the Gurkhas replied ...ith their 2in lUbes. whichnHbl ha\{' been on target. because the llring ceased. A textbookcOlllllcr-anack b\ six Indonesians using fire ,md mO\'emelll \,-.u SLOpped\1 ht:'11 lhrec men rose to make a fon'~drd bound and were again mel b"a Slorm of fire from lhe Gurkhas.

Finall}'. lhe Indonesian compan}' position al Habang put in an ,mackwilh abollt 70 men, and Maullsell called for ten rollnds of aniller}' fire

____upbt'

.......... ,""'._PIn

from his FOO. The !irst !k1.lvo almost landed on the Gurkhas, with achunk of melal slicing into a tree only a few feet from Maunsell's head.The gunners correct.ed their fir·e. and t.he neXI salvo crashed intolhe "crub among the Indonesians. ~Iaunscll had ncutr.l.lized theposition. ,md his COlllIKtll) had killed al leasl 24 of the enemy. sohe now g.l\'e the order 10 withdraw to lheir rendeZ\·Olls. Once theGurkhas were clear - laking \\ith them their three dead. oneseriousl) and one lightl) wounded - Mallnscll called dO\\ll aban-age of 5.5in alld J05mm fire on the \'3cated posiLion, Theaction had lasted abolll 90 minutes.

Captain M:llIl1scll and Lt R.1.IUit Rai each received the MiliL'lnCross. and L/Cpl R..'lmbahadur Limbll was awarded the \'jctoliaCross, IIi.s citiltion SL1.tcd tlmt he had displaved 'heroism. sc1f­sacrifice and a de\'otion to dllt\ and to his men of the veIlhighest order. His actions 011 this da) reached a zenith ofdetermined. prcmedilated \'31011r \\hich mllSt count amongthe mOSt notilble on record', lronicall). because Claretoperntions \\'ere secret. the localion of the Gunong Tepoiaction had to be concealed; it was described as being in theBall district inside Sarw'\ilk. To the lIninfonned this made theIndonesians appear much more aggressh"e and effecli\ethan the\ reall\ were. apparent!, capable of penetratingacross the border in strength and building a compamposilion in dIe jungle; in rcalit), the) had been pushedonto the defensh'e In the CI<l.rf'1 operntions,

Getting outIII late 1965 it 1\'3S clear to the Indonesian armed forces that the)' \\'erelosing the Confrontation, and - like the Argentine defeal in theFalklands campaign in 1982 - this triggered dissension al home.President Suk:trno had nirted with the CCO, and the domesticIndonesian Communisl Pan) (PKI) also e1uo)'ed his patronage, \\hicharoused suspicion among Lile strongl)' anli-comlllllllist milital}. OnI Octo~r 1965 Llle PKI launched a coup, killing six gcnerals; amongt.hose who escaped werc Ccn $uhano, a future leader of Indonesia. andCen Nasulioll, all inlillCTllial fonner defence minister. The Ann)' thenled an anti-cortltl1unist purge 0\'1"1' sevcral mont.hs during which morcthan 250,000 PKI members were massacred. On 21 F'ebrual1' 1966,Sukamo allempted 10 reduce lhe aUlhorit)' of his generals, bIll onII March he \\~IS forccd 10 sign an order handing all executive powerto Cen Suharto. Thc Ann)' then moved swifu)' to bring an end toConfrontation, \\hich was reckoned 10 be consuming about 60 per centof all govenunent expenditure,

At the eml of 1965 the number of Ilritish u'oops in Borneo had beenreduced frOIll a campaign peak of 17,000 to 14,000. B) .\Iarch 1966 theConfrontalion had elTectively ended; a prmisional agreemelll signed inBangkok on I June \\'as ratilied in Djakarta on II Augusl 1966. 11l('Indonesians senl a miliL'U) mission to the Mala\'Sian capiml. KualaLumpur. headed b) Col Moerdani -the paratroop officen\ho had beensp.'lred b\ SAS Sgt 'Loft,' L'lrge during a Claret operation.

The Confrontat.ion had COSI the Commonwealth milita'l and ci\ilianscnices 150 dead. 234 1\"Ollnded and 'I captured; of this tOlal the British

Ibmbahoadur UmIK.t, VC, 2110th

Ou~ RIfII. (... PYII £1).,

photOO"'pMd ..,..- I' • H.vlkillr(-V-Inl). HI w..,1 on to No

eommlulonfil, .nd 10 serve (KIt

I long Ind dl.tlngu~1:11.....­I' I Ou,.h. ottlelr.AllhCKlgh • 1111')' flw po.thumou,

'Wlrd. WI" midi durinll "Ier20th eentul')' I:IImp.llln., LlmlK.twu thl only 8rill,h soldier

who .urvlll~ 10 be dtK:Gr.ted

with Ihl Vletorll Cro•• between

1985,.1Id the IW.rd to Pte

Johnson 8eh.rry 0' hi Bn

Prine... of W.le." Roy•• Regllor gelllniry In t...q In M.y Ind

Junl 2004, (Ourilh. WIlf...

TN.')

41

42

AI Gunong T.pollhe FOO, 1I FOil

RA, wa. abl. to can down

artill.ry "~ fl"Oll'l tJ.... 1n.1deS.n1w.k to CO\l., the wtthdnIW.1

of Capt M._II" G.......",.•.'"'-_~ two 105mm pack

howftll... at C Coy. main tJ...

c:IImp at $erikln,a~ a ·/fmll..to the _.t, and • single S.atn

IJIIn at Peli"", about twice a.

fa' ~h·_.t.This photo shoWs_ of the tullsn-dnlQned

010 M Mse t DSmm pack

howitz of F Tp, 178 Sty RA

.t , ...n prac:t~ In a f_aniposition In Sanwak dl.lrlng

1""; note the white sq-..oreeognitlon eigne on the front

and back 01 the crew" j ...ngleh.ta. Royal Artlllef'y e+ementa

deployed d...rtng tlte campaign_ all or MNne b.tterietl of

the follO¥ring ,..1_... 4, e,40 • 4S Light; 2llI • ,S

Commando L.l9h1; 12, 18 • 22Light AI, Defenc.; 20 Medl...m;1M L.oc:atlng; pi.... L.oc:allng Tp,

3 RHA, .nd Air OP Tp, 4' FieldRagim.nt. (IWM FES 84/243131

suffered 19 killed and 44 wounded, and the Gurkhas. wbo bad bornethe brunt of the Claret raids, '10 killed and 83 wounded. TheIndonesians suffered 590 dead, 222 wounded and 771 captured. TIleBritish Prime Minister Harold Wilson, Defence Minister Dennis I-lealeyand Cens Walter Walker and George Lea had ensured that thisundeclared war remained a 'low illlensit) opclOltion' -the Indonesianswere kept under pressure, but never publicly provoked or humiliated ina wa) that might ha\'e escalated or prolonged the war.

• • •In Vietnam the US forces were facing a far stronger and morecommitted enem) and. in their rear areas, highly organized guerrillas.On a heavily populated battlefield their massive firepower causedheav} ci\;lian casualties, ,,;th inC\;table consequences. The British andCommonwealth troops deplo'ed to ~lahw5iawen~ spared a comparableordeal. Infant!"} warfare deep in the Borneo jungle was terriblvpunishing: the death of close comrades is as shocking" painful forsoldiers whether the total casual tie amoullI to a few hundred or tensof thousands, and as dC\'aSt.."lting for their families al home.~ IlowC\"er,the Confrontation ""as veT) largel) a soldiers' war, and rel;ttionshipswith the local populations were usualh easy-going. For man} British,Australian and Ne\\ Zealand \eterans there were some happiermemories of the Confront.."ltion: the, recall the beer, the girls andthe songs.

The beer was Carlsberg from Denmark. locally produced Anchor.or Tiger - an excellent lager brewed in Singapore. TIle girls werepan of the exotic Oriental nightlife et'U0)cd by soldiers who had beenamassing pay while sel"\;ng on the border. For some young soldiers,however, encounters \\'ith the seductive channs of the hoilau of BugisStreet. Singapore, taughl them that \\hile extemal appearances couldbe delightful, closer acquaintance re\'ealed some startling surprises.

The songs were tile pophilS of the earl) I960s,among them a number bythe British group TheAnimals which \\'as sling bythe soldiers with ironicgusto: 'IWVf golfO gtl mil ofthis fllar/', if it'~ th,. I{I.~I thingWi' roer do... ' Within acouple of years. about1.000 miles to lhe northacross the Somh ChinaSea, US se....;cemen wouldbe singing the same chonlSwith similar enthusiasm asthe sign-off Ilumber toUSO shows in the junglesof Vietnam.

3~ ... -..c.-"'0I0I<qI 42 COo AM, 1<-.:1110" .. 1M c:orAct._.~frwldqlIM_q1__ ..IIft.~briOIqI~_• .,.... carrying 1M chilli ..__

THE PLATES

AddilJonai material by Nick van dar 8l~

A1: TNKU officer, North Borneo,December 1962The Tenun NasionaJ Kalimantan Utara produced a hon"le­made oolorm WIth rudimentary 1OSignla. ThIs figure is basedon a khaki stwt '" the RM Museum; a second IS green,beanog onty the chest patch, "TNKU' shoulder titles, andbroad dark green outer loops on the shoulder strapS. A blueexample captured by 1 GJ, said to be that of the 'BluePlatoon' based at Lawas in 5arawak. bears plam whiteshoulder strap loops but alr the other iOSlgnla ~Iustrated

here. including the right sleeve patch; this shows a yellowsun above three slars between the horns of a black buffalohead, on a white background. Despite the obvious effort toestablish the TNKU on 'regular' lines With ranks and insignia.some members wore civilian shorts Of' saroogs and '!lIp-flop'sandals, and there was no specific headdress. Many carriedthe 12·bore shotguns which were widely used for hunting.bul with single-slug cartridges for combat.A2: Sergeant, Indonesian Air Force paratroops(PGT), 1964Indooesls's original airbome unit - tracing thelr hneage to ahandful 01 anti·Dutch guerrillas who jumped inlo Kalimantanin October 1949 - the PBsukan Gerak TJfJPlJf or Fast MobileForce saw action in the 1950s-60s against antl-goverrrnentrebels, belore being commlUed to both airborne andseaborne insertions dUl10Q the Conlrontation I'l 1964. By thenext year the PGT had ltvee battalions, headquartered atBandung; the force was latef redesignated KOPASGAT, andfinafty PASHKAS - M Fon::e SpeaaJ Fon:es - I'l 1983. Photostaken dunng the 19605 show ItlIS on&-Pl8C8 camouflageoverall based on the US Ml942 jungle SUIt WIth 1000extemalpockets. The squashed-1ooIung field cap I'l drab hermgbonetwiI seems to have been convnon (the orange beret ofKOPASGAT was not yet used). The tnSIgnIa worn here onbarracks dress were not displayed In the field: the AK ForceSpecial Fon:es left shoulder patch (inset A'll, the PGT title inblack on yellow on the right breast, and yellow metal AirForce parachute wings on the lelt. Rank was Dutch style,worn on should6f' strap slides. In the field, webbingequipment was of US M1956 pattern. and the standardpersonal weapon was the 7.62mm NATO FN-FAl rille.A3: NCO, 328 Para-Raider Battalion, IndonesianArmy; Kllng-Kang Mountains, March 1984On 7 March 1964 a company of this unit was Intercepted by2110th GR on Track 6 in the Kllng-Kang range. and muchequIpment and intelligence material was captured. includingphotos upon whtch this figure is based. The fl8kl cap andUflIIOl'TT1 are in the same eamoulIage pattern as that worn byA2., but the SOlt is two-p.ece and lacks the large thighpockets. Webblng compnses a US M1956 pIStol belt andsuspenders, WIth double clip pouches for hts M1 carbneand holstered Colt M1911A1 -the lattef being the orty signof his NCO status. The US M3 'grease gun' SMG was alsoearned by this unit. There wen:'! sevn versions of the Ratderright sleeve patch: the example shown (inset A5t Is believedto be contemporary.These Amry awbome .nfantry urms should not be confusedWIth the Para-eommanoo Aegt (RPKAOI, which was also

SaladIn. of the Queen's Royallrtsh Hu...,.. pause while onpatrol durtng the Brunei revolt, December 11M2; the ome....at left _a,.. the regiment" green and gold 'tent hat'I... Plat' F41. The QRlH took ov... ln OCtober 11M2 ..the divisional rec:or>nal...~ regiment 01 17tt1 Our1l.ha InfDIv; In September the following rear they handecI_ to"th Ropt ,..,. R., whose higher fonnaUon _ then

OeaIgnated 17th Brtttsh 0iYlskHl. (1WM FESle2J2e2l72)

encountered (see under Plate H 1). In order to 'ncrease therenable qUlCk·reactJon elements available 10 the O)akartagoverrment. in 1961 lour pICked units from the Ihr8e infantryregments based in Java had been QlYerI airborne tTainIng.including 328 & 330 Para-Aalder 80s. fTOm the KoJang Aegtof the Sitiwongl 0MsI0n.

Bl: PrIvate, A Company, 1st Battalion Queen'sOwn Highlanders; Seria airfield, BruneI,December 1962Men of A Coy deplaned from two TWin Pioneer Blrcraft toseize sana airfield after Just one hour's traIning in rapiddisembarkation at Labuan. This private wears a Mk III helmetwith scrim camouflage; for jungle patrols the Jocks wouldwear jungle hats With a blue rectangular patch beanng thewhite St Andrew's cross at front and back. His 'olive green'(OG) shirt displays shoulder strap slides WIth embroideredblack titles '001 HIGHlANDERS', and on both sleeves theformabon sign of 99 Gurkha Inf Bde - white crossed kuknson a brown rectangle. Issue OG trousers, WIth • map pocketon !he outslde of the left thigh, are confined I'l btancoed 37Pattern anklets. O\Ief polished ammunItiOn boots. His newlyIf'ItlOduced 58 Pin CEFO (Combat Equipment FIQhtlng~comprises belt, yoke (suspenders), two 'Bfen' pouches anda water bottle camet; a Wortd War II YI'ltage 171'l CoIinsmachete in a IIghI brown leather scabbard IS sUlg behn:Itwa hlp. HIs weapon is the 7.62mm semt-automatIC l1AlSl.R (self loading nfle) which had just become standard I'l

the BntJsh Army: weighmg 9'hlb, It had a detachable 43

44

2Q-round magazine. British infantry rifle training reqUired(and stiM does) accurate shootIng at 300 yards. ('o\flth thanksto LtCol Charles McHardy fOf his assrstance.)B2: Marine, 42 Commando, Royal Marines;Brunei, winter 1962/63Nos.40 and 42 Commandos served throughout theConfrontabon. l Company, 42 Cdo RM recovered thehostageS at Umbang: the company was com-nanded bycapt John Jeremy Moate, who had already won his first MeII'l the Malayan Emergency, and who would become moreWIdely known Ifl 1982 as commander of Bnttsh land fon;esIfl the Falklands campargn.ThIs Manne on a local patrol has folded hiS greenCommando beret forward IIltO a cap shape to sI'veId hISeyes He wears the OG shIrt and 'trousers drill green' with apair of the newly issued catf-1engtt1 green canvas jungleboots, with charcoal-coloured rubber soles and rein­forcement. With light 58 PIn patrol order he wears an old 37PIn mapcase. the flap lifted to show the acetate wil'ldowcovenng the map folded to the area of an operation. The9mm L2A3 Sterling sub-machine gun was a practicalweapon for close range contacts in wooded terraIn,weighing under 61b empty and having a 550l'pm rate of fire.B3: Rifleman, 1st Battalion Green Jackets; Mirl,North Borneo, winter 1962/63ThIS was the correct designation at this date, when - since1958 - the fOl'Tll8l" Oxfordshire & Bucklnghamshinl UghlInfantry (43rd & 52nd) formed the senlOf battalion of theGreen Jackets Brigade, alongside lhe former King's RoyalRifle Corps (60th) and the Alfie Brigade (95th). On 1 January1966 these .....Its would be amalgamated 10 10flTI a 'largeregltl"l8l"lt' as lSI, 2nd & 3rd Bns The Royal Green Jackets. In1962/63 1st Bn was commanded by UCol 'Todd' Sweeney.who had led a platoon on D-Day when 0 Coy, 2nd Bn Ox &Bucks U seIZed the River Orne bndges on the left ftank ofthe Normandy beachhead.This nfleman, about 10 board a hellcopler fOf Btl operatJon,

wears standard OG shirt and IrOUSer'S WIth Jungle boots, andhis brigade's nfIe-green beret wrth SIlver badge. He has thefull rl8ld krt fOf an extended operation: 58 PIn webbing, witha gro!Msheet in a poncho roll and a skatn of heavy COfClattached benealh Ihe 'kydney pouches', a machete on hishlp, and over all a 44 PIn haversack with a 'pick, Jightweight'in the shov~ retaining straps. This pack was shorter andeasier to wear with the crowded 58 PIn rear belt order thanthe field pack of that set, which was almost Invariably left onunit transport or In barracks.

C1: NCO, 3rd Battalion Royal AustralianRegiment; Sarawak, June 1965The uniform of the Australian Infantryman was the 'junglegreens' Introduced for aU arms io 1958: the ju"9le hat was ofthe Bntlsh pattem. If lhey were ever dISplayed on lanyards.3 RAR's identifying coIoU" was rifle-green, and 4 RAR'sscar1et. CharactenstlC8lly Australian ilems are the high, two­buckle IeggU"IQS of blackened webbing: the 'boots AB' of'NorId WfM UVIntage, though now blackened: and the longnet veil of ovaJ-weave mesh. The webbing is basically Bntish37 Pm, modified fOf jungle use Iale 10 Wand War II, althoughsome 44 PIn Items were also made available. The 37 Pmshoulder bnIces were WIdened to spread wetght. The basicpouctIes are W'OlTl, WIth Bnttsh 44 Pm water bottles, popular

fOf the integral aluminium mug, whICh could be heated for aquick 'brew' rather lhan bothering with messtms. TheAustTalian machete, IOtnxtuced in 1944, resembled the UStype. The 'Iarge pack' is that used by lhe BntlSh Army Sll"lCe

1908. The 9mm Owen SMG, modified in the 19505 WIth Btl

added sbdll'lg plate over the rear of the teCeMll", was by nowmore often blackened !han camoufIage-painted: the boxmagazJ08 hekl 33 rounds. and rate of lira was a rnpd700rpm. He I5IakJog from Its M7 'bandoleer' a US Ml8A1Claymore command-detonated dir8ctlonaf BtlIi-PfWSOMeI

m.ne; this prqected 900 ball beanngs 0Vf!Jt an arc of 60'", W1ttl

lethal effect out to 250 yards.C2: Guardsman, 1st Battalion Scot I Guards;boat patrol, Sabah, 1964ThIs rlQURt is a composite of two membeB of suctl a patrol.He wears a bulky, awkwarn kapok life jacket, and 44 PIn bellorder, over hiS OG shirt and trousers. He has cut down thebrim of his Jungle hat: and, unusually, he wears 37 PInanklets over his jungle boots, presumably 10 preventundergrowth snagging the laces - lhey would not beeffective protection against leeches. His weapon Is the USM79 40mm grenade launcher, called the 'elephant gun' byBfltlsh troops. This fired HE. smoke and illumination rounds;against area targets HE was effective 10 350 yards and forpoint targets to 150 yards.C3: Radio operator, 1st Battalion Royal UlsterRifles; Sarawak, July 1964This radioman operatlOQ the standard A41 VHF platoon setmay be on hrs first JUIlOIe operaliOl'l; he has made themIStake of SlOpping off his stwt. The 'floppy' Jungle hat bearshis battalion's black band WIth a green shamrock Sl9" at thefront, suctl SlgllS - usually SImple bands Of shapes Ifl solidlight colours - were used by many unrts for instantrecognItlOfl during fleeting jungle contacts. HiS 1r'COSefS,

lungle boots and partial 44 PIn belt Older would beconventional, but as a radio operatOf he camel a SlerIingSMG Instead 01 a rifle. The A41 set, welghlng 48Ib WIth ItS

spare battery and full ancilaries, IS camecI on the multi­purpose alumInium tubular 'general service canier', ighterthan lhat designed specrl'1Cal1y fOf use With the A41 IIIEurope. He is USIng a plastic SJiOex SIgnal encryption walletWith a clear front. ThIs system used vanable grids of alpha­numeric codes, written in pencil on celluloid slops, toencrypt important messages such as map refereoces. omer3and Intelligence reports.

01: Trooper, 0 Squadron, 22nd Special AirService Regiment; Sarawak, 1963When the Brunei revolt broke out in December t 962 theMure role of the SAS was under debate - was il to bededicated to NATO in Europe, or 10 prepare fOf globalmiSSIOnS? The outbreak of the revolt saw 0 Sqn deployedrapidly, and during the Confrontation thefe was always atleast one BntlSh, Austraban Of New Zealand SAS squadronin Borneo. ThIS troopef is depIcled al a Ilm8 when they wtlAl

providing a 'tnpwwe' and ptJfSI.Jrig a 'hearts and minds'programme 10 the villages along the Indonesian bofder. Itwas to be another year before the SAS began to developthetr dress and equipment by ImprovisatJOO and8CqU1S1tlOl'l5, and apart from the eut-down )uOQIe hat thistrooper wears arnost entlreIy standard clottwng and webbingorder. One difference is the belt fashloned from an 81(

resupply stowage strap with a roller buckle: another is thebackpack habitually carried - the 1944 Bergen rucksack.The LMG is the 7.62mm L4A5, rebarrelled from the old.3031n 8fen, and stili known by that name to most soldiers.Its 500rpm rate of fire was unimpressive, but it was lighterand shorter than the GPMG, and its 3O-round magazineaVOIded the problem 01 linked ammunitIOn fouling in dIrt orvegetabon. We have chosen to show one modlfl8d With aforward pIStol gnp - apparently from an Owen gun - by a unitarmourer (although the source photo Il'l fact shows 1tltscanied by a Gur1<ha - see page 2).02: Oog handler, 2nd Battalion Green Jackets;Sarawak. 1965ThIs tegllTlenfs jungle hat recogMlOn sign, when used, wasa wtvte Maltese Cross shape: lhese twiSted lengths of whiteand green pa.-acord are smply a way 01 'personalizing' thehat (paracord was also used lor bootlaces). Three typeS ofdogs were used 10 Borneo: infantry patrol dogs (as here), toalert patrols 10 the presence of the enemy; traekMl; and wardogs, to protect IOStaBatlMS. The handler wears standardpatrol undorm and 9qUlPf'*ll; photos 01 2 GJ show entiresets of 44 Ptn webbing, with the 'goIIock'-shaped machete.Apart from his own lot the handler's haversack contaJnS twolib tIllS of food for the dog and a SImple vetennary kit. Theofficially recommended stowage for the haversack was aslobNs: (left outside pocket) face veil, IOS8Ct repellent, footpowder, matches, water sterilizing lot, nne c1eamng box.stnng or pa.-acord, and Paludnne anti-malanal tablets; (rightoutside pocket) small meuM heH, spoon or fork, hexaminecooker. snack - tea, sugar, milk; (main compartment) 48hot.rs' nee etc ratlOl'lS. spare soclts, large waterproof bag,and for sectIOn commanders a medICal pack: (attachedbelow) poncho, and for sectIOn commanders a 120ft Nne. Apatr of gym shoes was often attached outside the pack.03: Punan tracker; Sarawak border. 1963The trackers and scouts employed by the Bntlst! in Borneoand mainland Malaysia were of severnl distinct tribal groups,and varied widely In appearance. Some - like thiS warrior ofthe Punan tnbe, from the Fifth DIvision In eastern Sarawak ­wore mostly natIve clothing, often simply a loincloth. He hasbeen given a pair of khaki dnll shorts: a Single-barrel 12-boreRemington·action shotgun to replace his 8ft blowpipe(although with the laller he could probably hit a coin at 30feet): and an old rifle charger bandolier to carry its car1ridges.Unlike e.g. the Iban, sea Dyak and Kayan. the Punan do notseem to practice extensive tattooing, but do stretch tlleirearlobes, and wear multiple bangles on their arms and legs.The elaborately woven black and white fibre hat, trimmedwith hornbill leathers, Is typical of this tribe: they tradedecorated mats with other tribes for Items they cannotfashion themselves, such as this Sea Dyak mandauheadhunter's sword secured by a woven bell. During theConfrontatoo some local scouts are alleged to halle takenheads, as they had done during the Malayan Emergeocy,althoogh offIcially thIS practice had long ceased.

E1: Lance-Naik Rambahadur Limbu (VC), C Coy,2nd Battalion, 10th Gurkha Rifles; GunongTepoi, Kalimantan. 21 November 1965The lour two-battalion Gurtd\a regwnents - 2nd, 6th, 7th and10th GurXha Rifles - provided about halt of the inf8lltrythroughout the CoolrontatlOfl. The story of the Claret

Capt Robin Adlhud. Army Air~ wtttl ~.Itls SbP:AH 1 helk:opt.... of tIM Me pl.toon attKhed to 2nd Qur1lha

Riftes t_ Plat. Q2~ He WN" the offlcen embn>ldeNdbltdg<lon a tKack patch on the pale bl_ Me beret, • KDshirt wfttl ..nk .Ildfl: on the shouldet" at..~ OQ trou....and whit. kid ft)'tng glo¥ea, and cam-s a whltto Mk.3 flyingh.lmet wi1h • tKack labrlc cover _ the vtaor. In latltf

rea,.. Robin hlm..1f _Id bM:_ • leading mlll'-ry

photog..pher. (lWMj

operation dunng wtllch LJCpI Umbu earned has VlCloriaCross is told In detail on pages 38-4'. He wears standardissue jungle uniform, with his battaloo's 'Nhlte 'X' recogntbonsign on the front and back of hiS hal. (Other Gurkha Signsused apart from those on thiS plate Included a red square by2I2nd GR. and a yelloW 'doughnut' by one battalion of 6thGR.) He wears 44 PIn lighting order, and carries the LMGthat he picked up and used instead of his US AnnaJlte AR15aftercarrymg in the two mcnally wounded soldiers 01 hiS gunSection, Kharbakahadur Umbu and BiJuliparsad Rai.E2: Rifleman, 1st Battallon, 10th Gurkha Rlfles;Labls. Malaya, September 1964This Illustrates the 44 PIn lighting order Without thehaversack. This set, made 01 lighter Webbing than the 58Pin, had been specifically designed lor tropical warfare andwas still much in demand although offICially Withdrawn fromservICe. The white 'doughnut' front and rear was 1/1Oth GA'srecognition sign. The belt order includes two water bottles:and the 161n l<ukri knife from whICh the GurXha soldier wasinseparable, and 'Nhich was used both for cleanng brushand - when opportunity offered - in close quarter combat.Some photos show machetes also being eatried Thestandal'd weapon at thrs data was the SLA, but the 5.56rrmAR15 (type-clasSlfled by the US Army as the M16) wascomll'lQ into use and would soon be ganera!1SSOe.

E3: Lieutenant, 2nd Battalion, 7nd GurkhaRifles; Lumbis, Kalimantan, Juna 1965This subalttll'n Is reconstructed as he might have appearedduring the Claret operation in late June, which B Coy carriedout with Australians from 1 5qn, SASA. Clothing isconventional, and hIS hat bears the white rocognition bandof 2flth GA. On cross-bardtil' operatIOns Unit titles and rankbadges were not worn: at other tunes doubled shoulderstraps Went attached to the shirt bearing e.g. two rank ptpsand '7 G.R.' embmidefed in black. OffICers wore 44 Ptnwebbing like their men. and camed nfles - elther the SlR or,by 1965, the AR15: PIStols wete conSIdered useless, andSMGs somelllTl8S unreliable. Officially. a sub-tnt leader andhis second-in-command were supposed to carry bif'Ioculars,compass, maps and pmtlaCtors: in practice binoculars wereof limited value, easy to break or lose. and awkward to carry.Most BntISh officers of Gurt<ha lSIllS canied the kukri knife.Apart from ammunrtion and grenades the ammo pouchesalso accomodated a lew comfons such as chocolate bars(eamed away from the body, or they mehed); sometlmes apall' of secateurs were carried secured by a lanyard, 10 cutsiJently 1tlrnugh foliage dumg the approach to the target.The 44 Ptn haversack contained spare clothing. rations. at\ammoct< of parachute matena!. the hghtwetght Australiangroundsheet, and sometimes an Australian Inflatablemattress - this was not for comfort, but for use as a stretcherfor casualties. Items such as washing krt, mosQUIto repellent,notebooks and pens, etc, were carried in plastiC bags8g8InSt the damp. (With thanks for 3SSlStanee to Bng. formercapt. DaVId Morgan. 7th GA.)

F1: Warrant Officer 2nd Class, Royal ArmyPay CorpsThis plate illustrates eK8fTlPles of clean, badged OG clothingworn In rear areas and as barracks dress. With the midnight­blue general service beret beanng the 'Stabrlte' badge of theRAPC, this W02 wears laundered and starched OG shirt andshorts. Bright 'RAPe' tJtles are pinned to the shoulderstraps, and (althoUgh it Is hidden at thiS angle) he wears thecorps' twisted primrose-yellow and blue lanyard at the leftshoulder. On each upper sleeve he displays the formationsign of 17th Gur1<ha tnf OIV - white crossed kukris on daMo;green. (The signs of the constituent brigades were the sameapart from the backgrouoo colours - red, black aoo brownfor 48, 63 and 99 Bdes respectively.) His warrant badge isworn on a right wrist strap, A 44 PIn belt, long khaki socks800 polished black shoes complete the uniform.F2: Sergeant, Royal Army Medical CorpsThe tightly cut Other ranks' 1950 pattem four-pocket boshjacket In OG Aertex was smart enough for wear in rear areas,but was uncomfortable and unpopular as a field dress. Itsintegral cloth waISt belt was usually removed. This RAMCsergeant, contributing to the 'hearts and minds' programme,

Iban trlbe.men of the 'Ju"'lliewood Fl;hters', the BorderSeout unit formed on 1 August tM3 to proteet &45 HAS'shelicopter baI.. at Hanoga Gat. The, wear 00 ....Irts and.hort. with jungltl lulls, apart from the corponol at c...m.,who .... a mldnlght.blue ~t; the bright, pierced badge.ho_ two naUve weapon. cro.sed on a circular wreath,with a centrsl -.hield. He alao diQKap white t.pe rsnkblIdgH and the 8onIef" Scouts ahcwld... title 1_ Plate H21.

46 All th,.. carry t2·borto ahotgun.. (IWM HU 727741

displays the cap badge and cherTy-red right shoulder lanyardof his corps; bright 'RAMC' shouldef titles: and the sleevepatch of HQ Far East Land Forces above his plain white tapebadges of rank. Insignia were attached wnh press studs orhooks-&-eyes. as the clothing required frequent Iauodering.F3: Vice-Admiral Sir Peter Twiss, Royal NavyWhen on shore In operational 8f83S RN olflCefS wore Amty­issue tfOPlC8l dress. In ttus case the Commander Far EastFleet, photographed viSiting 845 NAS at Nangga Gast.wean; the officer's equivalent to the OR's bosh jacket. thefour·pocket 'JOCket, cellular', HIS fuI dress gold lace shoulderboards 01 rank have been looped to Its shouIdef straps, andhe wears a midrllght-blue beret With the RN officer'sembroidered bullion cap badge - though In a sIoYenIymanner-, by Atmy and AM standards.F4: Captain, Queen's Royal Irish HussarsThIs capl8ln weaB the OAIH officer's traclitlOO8l goId4acedgeen 'tent hat' Officers used ISSU8 cIottwlg III the field butlor barracks wear they normally had tnlorms privat~

tailored Small varuttJOnS were common, by regmentalcustom or pnvate whim: !has cavcWy offlcer's '}8Cket, ceIuIar'has shaped breast pocket ftaps and leather 'football'buttons. Bronze metal ranloog IS 'MJm on the shoulderstraps. but not regmentaI tItles; on both sleeves he displaysthe 17th Gtrtha tnf Orv patch. and on tQ t:weast the 8ntJshand UN medal ribbons for Korean War serw:e.

G1: Petty Officer, Royal Navy landing party,1964ThIs sailor was photographed leaving a wessex I'leIicopter onthe carner HMS \1cronous in January 1964 He we<lf5 thenaval gunnery hemet of Royal Armcll.wed Corps pattern.painted dar1< grey: the light blue stwt and da1t blue dentmtrousers of No.8 dress. and naval boots (Wlthout separatetoecaps or hobnailed soles). His sleeves bear dar1< bluebadges on white 'tombstone' patches; on his left, his PO rank- crowned crossed anchors: and on hIS nght, the crossedcannon, between two six-pomt stars, all above 'A', of anti­aircraft ratIng 1st class. His web equipment is the RN 1919Ptn. with added 'NorId War II-vintage pouches for the 50­round magazines of the 9mm Lanchester Mk I' SMG ­venerable but visually Impressive, and with 8 usefully robustbutt for close-quarter persuasion. This was used almostexclusively by the RN, being carried by POs while sailors used

.303ln nfles and olftcerS webley revolvers. Unseen hef"e, a 37Ptn 'small pack' behind hls shoulders completes the rig.ThIS dress and eqUipment is more complete than was usualror the numerous small parties deployed by coastalminehunters and nver cralt to search local boats. Coastalcrews tool< lull adVantage of their distance from senIOr

officers to indulge in freedom of dress; locally-madelightwetght shirts and shans in !he same colours as issueNo.as were common, With canvas-and-rubber gym shoes,and any headgear from wNte naval caps to cootie hats (HMSWilkleston ~ crew even tndulged a craze for cowboy hats.)Army OG jungle hats, ~Ifofms and boots weAt sometlmesacqulf8d. Boatding partIeS from coastal aatt might COI'\SIstof an officer (usually the first lieutenant), 8 PO (the coxswain)or leading seaman, a radio operator and three other rabngs;!hey nonnalty wore no headgear (ttloogh helmets whenboarding a Iatge vessell, shirt. shorts and gym shoes, wrthwebbing and sma! arms (and rt\Il"IeSweep8l" sailors wereinseparable from 8 ngglng knife and marlin spike in a leatherbelt holster). Cover ITlIght be offered by Bten guns mountedon the bndge. (Witht~ to DaVId Mofris and Peter Down.)G2: Sergeant helicopter pilot, 656 Sqn, ArmyAir CorpsThe Me !lew the Soout and Sioux for light ffiISSlOf1S such asairborne command posts, and casualty and pri5OnE!fevacuation. ThIS sergeant's rank and qualifICation areidenlrfied by ItY8e smaI wM.e tape chevmns on the upperright sleeve, and the Army pi6ot's WJngS on the left breast (anythe Army and Royal Mannes train NCOs as helicopter piots).His one-piece light drab Ugntw8lght F1ylOg Overalls havepaws of ztpped pockets on the chest, !highs and lower legs.from one of which protrUdes his folded Me tight blue beret.His outfit IS completed by a FlyIng Helmet Mk 3, while kidllyIng gloves, jungle boots, and a 44 PIn belt WIth a holstered9mm BrownIl"lQ pistol hooked to its 8ITVT\UflItion pouch.G3: Lance-Corporal, 15 Air Despatch Regiment,Royal Army Service Corps; Kuchlng, 1964This despatcher on !he aufl8ld wears the RASe badge on hismldnight-b1ue beret: a one-piece cotton del'llm overall in adrab olive shade, wrth pockets at left breast and thigh only;and a pair of the popular 'hockey boots'. Round hIS neck area parachuttrnylon searl, and a lanyard securing a 9mm pistolholstered on a 44 PIn belt (as on Plate G2)-this would usuallybe discarded when In flight, so as not to snag on pallet straps.The brassard on his left shoulder displays his AD qualificationwings, the patch of 15 AD Regt (a gold-yellow Dakota on royalblue), and his badge of rank. The regimental patch was alsoworn on the right shouJOer, or alternatiVely on the left breastonly. (With thanks to VIc Wright.)

H1: Company Sergeant Major, B Company, 2ndBn The Parachute Regiment; Plaman Mapu,27 April 1965The action for whICh CSM Williams was awarded the DCM isdescribed on pages 21-22 (this reconstruction does notpretend to be a portrait of hIS features); his wounds cost hlfTlhIS left eye and the heanng in h~ Ielt ear. Williams wasroused from sleep by the first anack, and ran out weanngonly OG trousers and hastily-grabbed jungle boots and 5&PIn webbing; Inrtially he used hIS SLR, but later fired aGPMG from the hlp, Wlth a long belt of 762mm link (the'Jlmpy' w&lghs 24lb and has an 800rpm rate of fwe.)

Royal M.rl_ commanck>l., tlAld tM,It satisfied .ftet" Ntuminttl"On'l • crou-bonMt" 'Clarel' O9"f"Iltlon_ TheIr light belt onIer

Is _tNcted fnHn cargo ,....1.t~ \IIriUI rvIt-Jlln qukk........ buck.... Two I\fte f_ veils as ,_I rags, and ...Ntal" tr.c.. <tl'~ c_. on patrol __t

unw.1hed and unahften. at_ In. _It of w..t_ aoap_ distinctive In tM jung" ...cI might give. pabvl -.y to

an a6ert enemy. TM 5.5emm AA15 rtfI. was ...,...Uy UHdI" tM J-g" by this elal.: Its allow and p1a,ue componentsmad. 11 30 pe,r cent Ilghlat' than tM SLR, and~ tiM

bull.1 wu .Imoal two-Ihlnts Ilghlat' It "-d .bout 100m1,greatat' muzzle HIoc:Ity. (AM MuMutnI

The attackers were two companIeS 01 the 3rd Bn of theIndoneslan Army's Regunen PanJ·Komando Angatan Datat(RPKAO) based in Solo, central Java. The RPKAO was anelite loo::e; II had seen aclJon, including several combatjumps, dunng an antl-govemment rising in SUmatra In 1958,and In Dutch-held west Irian Orian Jaya) In 1962. Ounng theConfrontation elements of its three battalions tnltned localdiSSIdents as well as mounting cross-border operatIOnS.Later prominent In the anti-eommunist civil war of 1965-67,the regiment was expanded and redestgnated, Inlbally asKOPASSANDHA (1971) and later as KOPASSUS (1985),H2: Iban Border Scout attached to 2ndBattalion, 10th Gurkha Rifles, 1965Scouts might go naked aparl from loincloths, or wear oddsand ends of European clothing; indistinguishable from thelocal villagers, they were a valuable source of intelligence onIndofl&Sian border movements. As time passed and theirstatus was formalized some were Issued uniforms, 44 PInwebbing and weapons. Note the shoulder title worn here,'BORDER SCOUTS' In yellow on a long green arc With adouble yellow edging; a shoulder patch featuring theIndigenous hornblll bird was sometimes worn in camp, aswere Bntlsh rank chevrons and a badged daMo: blue befeI.Note thiS lban's lavish tribal tattooing, typically 9lctending allover the torso and tJmbs. His weapon is the .300in No.5 nfle- the jungle carbine verston of the Lee enfield.The Indoneslans obtained their weapons and ordnance ­InCluding mines - from many SOOI'CeS. At the scout's feet,made safe and laid aside for disposal, IS a US M2A4'bounding' anti-personnel mIne. Lifted ITU06S W9I'8 athermarked WIth while tape, or covered With a spn.ng dothpyramid marker. 47

48

INDEX

~IIIUln '" bold .d~, ". ,ll.... .-~".~".

\tId.....!. e,,,, Ilol~n ~~

~<r«'f1)b;" 11'-1",19~,,<t.rupo. 19,~)

~nnoul.,.l <an 11, 17.43;>rulk 411.uotr.I1 Iu«n 17-1~

SAS 10a-.Opt,.,,,,,,. "...i

Il.nuo' IlntI; H l ~1kaIr. I.. Paltkk 11'

1Irannc. ''''I L" '7...... <>pn-...lt>III.to::l Lobn &u.•/x... 14!lonkr S<0UIIlI 9. 10. 10, 11.14,.f6

""""'" !. i. I7nottll I>ordon~ I

Bn..... '"",eo l.7. II)....... ~""",""'n ronn; (.."u... r"......_UM;u.....>«.......t.nol;ood 10l~ 9. tooprn_ pnnn""" 7Dort;,U 1'J-23

!Iru...... ~, "" 4.1. 10, I~ U........, 11962 .....

BukJI ...... u.. '- !O

"'...... Ll 17

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The unIforms, equipment, history and organization

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Britain's Secrel

The Indonesian

• 1 .... &

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OSPREYPUBLISHING

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Photographs

Confrontation 1962-66

The 'Confrontation' between

Malaysia and Indonesia in

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ISBN 1-84603-048-X

9Il~IIU~111