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If you arenot paying for it, you arethe product How muchdo ...Ad-exchange MoPub, OpenX, Rubicon,...

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If you are not paying for it, you are the product * : How much do advertisers pay to reach you? Panagiotis Papadopoulos FORTH-ICS, Greece & University of Crete, Greece [email protected] Nicolas Kourtellis Telefonica Research, Spain Pablo Rodriguez Rodriguez Telefonica Alpha, Spain Nikos Laoutaris Data Transparency Lab, Spain *phrase originator: Andrew Lewis, a.k.a. blue_beetle
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  • If you are not paying forit,you are theproduct*:How much do advertisers pay toreachyou?

    PanagiotisPapadopoulos

    FORTH-ICS,Greece&UniversityofCrete,Greece

    [email protected]

    NicolasKourtellis TelefonicaResearch,SpainPabloRodriguezRodriguez TelefonicaAlpha,SpainNikosLaoutaris DataTransparencyLab,Spain

    *phraseoriginator:AndrewLew

    is,a.k.a.blue_beetle

  • Data-driveneconomy

    • TheuserdataofanITcompany→contributetoitsoverallmarketvaluation

    • Companiespursuemoreandmoreuserspersonaldata• Bypurchasingthem• Byprovidingfreeservices(Googlesearch,Facebooketc.)

    InternetMeasurementsConference[IMC'17]- P.Papadopoulos 3

  • Howisallthisdataconvertedtomoney???

    ecosystemof digitaladvertising($194.6billionin2016)

    InternetMeasurementsConference[IMC'17]- P.Papadopoulos 4

  • Digitaladvertising

    progressivelymovingtowardsaprogrammaticmodel

    adsarematchedtointerestsofindividuals

    elaboratedusertracking

    privacyimplications

    InternetMeasurementsConference[IMC'17]- P.Papadopoulos 5

  • Howmuchdoadvertisersactuallypaytoreachyou?

    InternetMeasurementsConference[IMC'17]- P.Papadopoulos 6

  • TheMotivation…

    InternetMeasurementsConference[IMC'17]- P.Papadopoulos 7

  • TheBackground…

    InternetMeasurementsConference[IMC'17]- P.Papadopoulos 8

  • ProgrammaticauctionsofRTB

    InternetMeasurementsConference[IMC'17]- P.Papadopoulos 9

    AdExchange(ADX)

    Real-timeAuction

    Websiteontheuser’sbrowser

    DemandSidePlatforms(DSPs)

    BidRequest(+userinfo)

    0.95CPM(+impression)Availablead-slot

  • 0.95CPM(+impression)

    RTBpricenotificationchannel

    InternetMeasurementsConference[IMC'17]- P.Papadopoulos 10

    Availablead-slot

    AdExchange(ADX)

    Real-timeAuction

    Websiteontheuser’sbrowser

    DemandSidePlatforms(DSPs)nURL example:

    cpp.imp.mpx.mopub.com/imp?ad_domain=amazon.es&ads_creative_id=ID&bidder_id=ID&..&bidder_name=..&charge_price=0.95&country=ESP&currency=EUR&latency=0.116&mopub_id=ID&pub name=..

    AD

    Impressiondelivery(i)youwon,(ii)here’sthechargeprice,(iii)theimpressionisrenderedsuccessfully

    Winningnotification

  • TheChallenge…

    InternetMeasurementsConference[IMC'17]- P.Papadopoulos 11

  • Encryptedpricesontherise

    InternetMeasurementsConference[IMC'17]- P.Papadopoulos

    • ChargepricesinnURLs tendtobeencryptedØEncryptionisaregularpracticeindesktopRTBauctions(~68%)ØLowerbutrapidlyincreasinginmobileRTBauctions(~30%)

    Previouswork[Olejnik,2013]assumesencryptedpricesfollowthesamedistributionascleartext.Butisthatso?

    Encrypted

    12

  • Ourapproach

    1. LeverageReal-TimeBidding(RTB)protocol:1. 74%ofprogrammaticallypurchasedadvertising2. $8.7billionin2016onlyinUS

    2. Methodologytocalculateatrealtimetheoverallvalueadvertiserspayperindividual userbasedonherleakedinformation.

    3. Year-longdataset(2015)of1600realusers+2realprobingadcampaigns

    InternetMeasurementsConference[IMC'17]- P.Papadopoulos 13

  • Methodology

    InternetMeasurementsConference[IMC'17]- P.Papadopoulos 14

  • YourAdValue browserextension

    InternetMeasurementsConference[IMC'17]- P.Papadopoulos 15

    MonitorsRTBnURLs &collectsfeatures:(i)auction-specificmetadataand(ii)personaldatatheuserleakswhilebrowsingtheweb

  • PriceModelingEngine(PME)

    InternetMeasurementsConference[IMC'17]- P.Papadopoulos 16

  • RequiredinputforthePME

    InternetMeasurementsConference[IMC'17]- P.Papadopoulos 17

  • TheEvaluation…

    InternetMeasurementsConference[IMC'17]- P.Papadopoulos 18

  • Evaluatingourapproach

    • Offlineyear-long(2015) datasetD withmobiletrafficfrom1600realusers

    • WeblogAdsAnalyzer:ØfilterRTBtrafficandØextractfeatures(auction’smetadataanduserdata)fromnURLs

    InternetMeasurementsConference[IMC'17]- P.Papadopoulos 19

    Metric D

    Timeperiod 12months

    Impressions 78,560

    IABcategoryofpublishers

    18

    RTBpublishers ∼5.6k/month

  • Featureextraction

    InternetMeasurementsConference[IMC'17]- P.Papadopoulos 20

  • Featuresthataffectprices(1/3)

    InternetMeasurementsConference[IMC'17]- P.Papadopoulos

    Distributionofchargepricesforthe2mostpopularmobileOSes.

    Whiskers:5th,10th,50th,90th,95th percentiles

    MoreAndroiddevices,butiOS-baseddevicesdrawhigherprices

    PercentageofRTBtrafficfortopmobileOSes.

    0%20%40%60%80%

    100%

    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

    RTB

    sha

    re

    Month of the year

    AndroidiOS

    Windows MobOther

    0.01

    0.1

    1

    10

    100

    Android iOS

    Cha

    rge

    pric

    e (C

    PM)

    Mobile Device OS

    21

  • Featuresthataffectprices(2/3)

    InternetMeasurementsConference[IMC'17]- P.Papadopoulos

    Distributionofthechargedpricesperad-slotsize(sortedbyareasize).

    Whiskers:5th,10th,50th,90th,95th percentiles

    Largerad-slotsizesdonotnecessarilygetchargedmore

    0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8

    1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8

    2

    320x50468x60

    728x90120x600

    300x250160x600

    300x600

    Cha

    rge

    pric

    e (C

    PM)

    Ad-slot sizes

    22

  • Featuresthataffectprices(3/3)

    • userlocationaffectsthemedianchargeprices

    • duringthedaymedianchargepricesareofsimilarrange->earlymorninghours- noon:morechargepriceswithincreasedvalues

    • someIABsaremorecostlythanothers->(“Business&Marketing”moreexpensivethan“Science”)

    InternetMeasurementsConference[IMC'17]- P.Papadopoulos 23

    Seemoreaboutfeaturesinthepaper…

  • PriceModelingEngine:adcampaigns

    InternetMeasurementsConference[IMC'17]- P.Papadopoulos 24

  • Realprobingad-campaigns

    • 2realprobingad-campaignsin2016(A1,A2):variousexperimentalsetups

    InternetMeasurementsConference[IMC'17]- P.Papadopoulos 25

    Metric D A1(enc) A2(clr)

    Timeperiod 12months 13days 8days

    Impressions 78,560 632,667 318,964

    IABcategoryofpublishers

    18 16 7

    RTBpublishers ∼5.6k/month ∼0.2k ∼0.3k

    Filtername Rangeofvalues(type)

    Cities Madrid,Barcelona,Valencia,Seville

    Timeofday 12am-9am,9am-6pm,6pm-12am

    Dayofweek Weekday,Weekend

    Typeofdevice Smartphone,Tablet

    TypeofOS iOS,Android

    Ad-format(smartphone) 320x50,300x250,320x480or480x320

    Ad-format(tablet) 728x90,300x250,768x1024or1024x768

    Ad-exchange MoPub,OpenX,Rubicon,DoubleClick,PulsePoint

    Contentcategoryofpublisher allIABspossible

  • ComparisonofCPMcostsforthedifferentIABcategoriesinourdatasetandthe2probingadcampaigns.

    CostperIABincleartext andencryptedprices

    InternetMeasurementsConference[IMC'17]- P.Papadopoulos

    Medianencryptedpricesalwayshigherthancleartext

    Timeshift:Morerecentcleartext pricesarehigherthantheoneslastyear

  • Howmuchdoadvertiserspaytoreachyou?

    InternetMeasurementsConference[IMC'17]- P.Papadopoulos 27

  • EncryptedVs.Cleartext prices

    “It’ssafetoassumethatencryptedpricesfollowthesamedistributionwithcleartext prices.”

    pricedistributionofencryptedprices(A1):→distinctlydifferent→about1.7xhighermedianvaluethancleartext prices(A2)

    InternetMeasurementsConference[IMC'17]- P.Papadopoulos

    Comparisonofpricedistributionsbetweencleartext andencrypted,fordifferenttimeperiodsanddatasets(Dvs.A1andA2).

    28

  • Howmuchdoadvertiserspaytoreachyou?

    • Cumulativecostfromencryptedprices:cannotsurpasscleartext (stilldominant).

    • someusersmorecostlythanothers

    • medianusercosts25CPM(73%oftheuserscost<100CPM)

    • 2%ofuserscost10-100× moretothead-ecosystemthantheaverageuser!

    InternetMeasurementsConference[IMC'17]- P.Papadopoulos

    CumulativeCPMpaidperuserinouryear-longdataset(2015)

    0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%

    100%

    10-2 10-1 100 101 102 103 104

    CD

    F

    Cumulative user cost (CPM)

    cleartextcleartext (time corr.)

    est. encryptedtotal

    29

  • Insummary…

    • Methodologytomeasurecostofadvertisersperindividual user:• Atrealtimeandonuser’ssidebasedontheuser’sprofile

    • Leveragead-auctionsandRTB’spricenotificationchannel

    • Constructamodeltoestimateencryptedpricesusingasfeaturesauction’smetadataanduser’sleakedinfo.(>82%accuracy)

    • Ourmethodologyistestedusingayear-longdatasetof1600realmobileusers

    InternetMeasurementsConference[IMC'17]- P.Papadopoulos 30

  • Takeaways

    üEncryptedpricesare1.7xhigherthancleartext

    üMedianusercosts25CPMperyear

    üTakingintoaccountseveraldifferentfactors:(HTTP+HTTPS,managementandintermediariescosts,mobile+desktop traffic)

    →overalluserad-costintherangeof0.54-6.85€peryear→ cheaper than most users think (10sof euros*)

    *Your browsingbehavior forabigmac:Economics of personal information online.WWW’13

    InternetMeasurementsConference[IMC'17]- P.Papadopoulos 31


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