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7/25/2019 In Defence of Thrasymachus
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North merican Philosophical Publications
In Defense of ThrasymachusAuthor(s): T. Y. HendersonSource: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Jul., 1970), pp. 218-228
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American Philosophical
Quarterly
Volume
7,
Number
3,
July
1970
IV.
IN
DEFENSE OF
THRASYMACHUS
T.
Y.
HENDERSON
CRITICS
and
commentators
on
the
dispute
between Socrates
and
Thrasymachus
which
occurs
in
Book
I
of
the
Republic
come
closest
to
unanimity
on
two
points
:
that
Thrasymachus'
view
is
not
consistent
throughout
the
dispute
and
that
Socrates'
arguments
are
fatal
to
Thrasymachus'
position.
Not
all
commentators
by
any
means,
however,
are
in
agreement
as
to
just
what
position
Thrasymachus
is
defending,
or
on
what
points,
precisely,
he
is inconsistent. Nor
is
there
general
agreement
as
to
how
Socrates'
arguments
refute his
position.
The
dispute
between
Socrates
and
Thrasymachus
centers around
two
major points
of
disagreement
:
(
i
)
what
the
nature
or
essential
quality
of
justice
is,
and
(2)
whether
the
just
or
the
unjust
life
is the
best
(in
the
sense
of
most
profitable)
life
for
men
to
live.
It is
not
clear
that
every
commentator
agrees
that
Plato
was
even
aware
of the different
nature
of
these
two
questions,
but
in
the
text
he has Socrates
postpone
attention
to
(2)
until
he has
silenced
Thrasymachus
on
question
(1).
An
examination
of
the
arguments
involved
in
both
of
these
questions
would
render
this
discussion
much
too
lengthy,
so
I
shall
concentrate
my
attention almost
entirely
upon
question
(
1
).
I
propose
to
offer
an
interpretation
of
Thrasymachus'
view
of
the
nature
of
justice
and
the
just
life
which,
in
its essential
points,
is
consistent
throughout
Book
I.
It
is
true
that
Socrates
forces
him
to
reformulate
his
position
in
a
couple
of
instances,
but
in
so
doing,
I
shall
argue,
Thrasyma?
chus
does
not
change
his
basic,
or
original,
position.
Not
only
do
I
believe
that
Thrasymachus
is
consistent
in
essentials
throughout
the
dispute
with
Socrates
over
the
nature
of
justice,
I
shall
also
argue
that
Socrates'
most
vigorous
attacks
fail
completely
to refute, or even seriously to damage, Thrasyma?
chus'
position.
Yet
I
want
to
be
very
clear
that
my
interpretation
of
Thrasymachus
is
not
meant
to
be
a
"contemporary
reformulation,"
in the
sense
of
claiming
that this
is
the
way
Thrasymachus
should
have
argued;
nor
am
I
claiming
either
that Plato
deliberately
had Socrates
misunderstand
Thrasy?
machus'
position,
or
that
Plato
himself
really
didn't
understand
what
Thrasymachus
was
saying.
My
claim is
stronger:
I
believe that the
interpretation
I
shall
give
is
the
position Thrasymachus
held,
that
Plato
understood
it
in this
way,
and
that
in
the
dialogue
Socrates addresses
himself
to
it
directly.
If his
arguments
fail to
refute
Thrasymachus,
as
I
think
they
do,
it
is
not
because
the
disputants
are
arguing
at
cross-purposes,
but rather
because
Socrates'
arguments
are
defective.
In
regard
to
the
question
of the essential
nature
of
justice,
Thrasymachus
is
most
often accused
of
inconsistency
on
the
following points
:
(
i
)
He
offers
two
formulations
of
his
definition
of
justice,
which
I
shall
refer
to
hereafter
as
Ja
and
Jb
:
Ja:
"I
declare
that
justice
is
nothing
else
than
that
which
is
advantageous
to the
stronger."1
Jb:
".
.
.justice
and the
just
is
really
the
good
of
another,
the
advantage
of
the
stronger
who
rules,
but
the
self-inflicted
injury
of
the
subject
who
obeys;
that
injustice
is the
opposite,
and
rules
those
very
simple
just
souls; that the
governed
serve the advantage of the
stronger
man,
and
by
their
obedience
contribute
to
his
happiness,
but
in
no
way
to
their
own
(343C2-7)."
The
alleged
inconsistency
here
is that Ja
can
be
interpreted
as
implying
that
whenever
a
strong
man
acts
justly
this will
result
in
benefit
or
profit
to
himself;
whereas
Jb
can
be viewed
as
implying
that
whoever
acts
justly,
the
strong
or
the
weak,
such
action
never
results
in
profit
to
the
agent,
but
rather
to
someone
else.
(2)
Thrasymachus
maintains
that
it is
most
often
the
case
that
the
strongest
man
in
the
state
is the
ruler, and that the rulers in every type
of
state
make
laws
which
are to
their
own
advantage
(338
e
1-5).
Thus
according
to
Ja,
if
the
subjects
obey
the law
they
should
be
acting justly.
But
Socrates
points
out
that
rulers
are
capable
of
making
mistakes
in
their
legislation
and
thus
might
mistakenly
enact
a
law
which
was
not
to
their
own
advantage
(339
c
1-38).
In
such
case
the
subjects
would
be
acting justly
if
2l8
1
Republic,
338CI-2,
tr.
A.
D.
Lindsay
(London,
1935).
All
quotations
herein
are
taken
from
this translation.
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IN
DEFENSE OF THRASYMACHUS
219
they
obeyed
the
law,
but their
actions would
not
result
in
benefit
to
the
stronger,
thus
contradicting
Ja.
(3)
Following
Socrates'
appeal
to
the
analogy
of
other
arts
to
the
"art of
ruling," Thrasymachus
refuses to draw the conclusion which Socrates
believes the
argument
entails,
but instead
appeals
to
another kind
of
"art,"
that of
shepherding.
Socrates himself
then
accuses
Thrasymachus
of
inconsistency,
in
that in
speaking
as
he
does
of
shepherds,
he
fails
to
follow
his
own
recommenda?
tion
to
discuss
only
the
practitioner,
qua
practi?
tioner,
of
an
art
exclusively.
Socrates
claims
that
instead of
discussing
the
shepherd
"in
the strict
sense,"
Thrasymachus
is
speaking
of the
shepherd
as
an
earner
of
wages
or
fees
(345b5~346d7).
Other
alleged
inconsistencies
have
to
do with
the
second
major
point
of
disagreement
between
Socrates and
Thrasymachus
(whether
the
just
or
the
unjust
life is
more
profitable)
and
will,
there?
fore,
not
be
discussed
in detail.
* *
*
In
defending Thrasymachus
against
the
above
charges
I
require
a
bit of
stage-setting:
(1)
I
shall
assume
that
Thrasymachus
and
Socrates
are
in
implicit
agreement
that
just
action
requires
for
its
occurrence
some
form of human
society. Justice
is
treated
throughout
the
dispute
as
a
social
phenomenon,
demanding
for
its
instantia?
tion
a
context
in
which
people
act
upon,
interact
with,
and in
various
ways
deal
mutually
with each
other,
and the
same
goes
for
injustice,
of
course.
The
examples
of
just
actions
appealed
to
in
the
text are
all
such
as
to
involve
normally
some
form
of
reciprocal
action
by
those
toward whom
just
action is
directed
:
the
mutual
keeping
of
contracts
and
bargains,
business
deals,
etc.
(e.g., 343d
i-e5).
(2)
It is
a
truism
to
observe
that
genuine
dis?
agreements
can occur
only
within
a
context
of
shared
views. It
is
conceivable
that
Socrates
and
Thrasymachus
share
so
few
points
of
agreement
that
their whole
dispute
is
a
series of
arguments
at
cross-purposes.
Some
commentators
implicitly
or
explicitly
presume
that this
is
just
what
happens.
I
submit that
there
is
no
direct
textual evidence
for
this
conclusion.
If it
were
true,
it
would
constitute
a
serious
indictment
of
Plato,
since
he
nowhere has
Socrates
or
any
other character
point
this
out.
What
I
propose
to
do
is
to
assume
the widest
possible
range
of shared views between
the
two
antagonists
which
is consonant
with
the
text;
that
is,
on
each
point
relevant
to
the
argument,
if
there
is
not
some
textual
reference
precluding
it,
I
shall
assume
that
Socrates
and
Thrasymachus
are
in
general
agreement.
For
example,
since
it
is
nowhere denied, I shall assume that on the whole
they
agree
as
to
the
general
types
of
actions
normally
designated
"just"
and
"unjust." Honoring
contracts,
paying
debts,
paying
taxes,
keeping
bargains
and
so
on
would
be
some
examples
of
actions
which
they
could,
and
apparently
do,
agree
are
just
actions
and
their
opposites
unjust.
Their
disagreement
is
not,
or
need
not
be,
as
to
which
types
of
acts
are
just,
but rather
as
to
the
essential
property
which
all
just
acts
share.
(3)
I shall
also
assume
that Socrates
and
Thrasymachus
both
understand
what is
meant
by
an
essential
property,
and that
they
are
not
arguing
at
cross-purposes
in
their
attempt
to
arrive
at
the
essential
property
shared
by
all
just
action,
and
only
by
just
actions,
which
is
designated
by
the
universal
term
"justice."
It
might
be
objected
that
Thrasymachus
is
not
seeking
a
definition of
justice,
but rather
presents
his conclusion
baldly
at
the
beginning.
Nevertheless,
he is
willing
to
argue
for
the
truth of
his
contention and
to
abide
by
the
outcome
of
the
argument.
It is
no
logical
error
to
state
one's conclusion first and
then
present
one's
arguments.
* * *
Does
Thrasymachus'
formulation of his
definition
of
justice
in Jb
contradict
Ja?
Perhaps,
but
not
necessarily,
and
it
is
surely
not
poor
scholarship
to
give
Thrasymachus
the
benefit of
the
doubt.
Cross
and
Woozley
interpret
Ja
to
mean
that
every
time
anyone
acts
justly
the
consequences
of such
acts
will
be
in
the
form of
some
benefit
or
profit
to
the
strong
man.2 But
in
Ja
Thrasymachus
does
not
refer
to
the
consequences
of
just
actions;
he
says
that
justice
is
nothing
else
than
.
.
.
etc.
Why
not
take him
at
his
word and
assume
that he
is
desig?
nating
what
he
believes
to
be
the essential feature
of
just
action
itself,
rather
than
the
consequences
which
accrue
from
performance
of
just
action?
If
Cross and
Woozley's
interpretation
is
accepted,
then
Thrasymachus'
account
of
justice
can
be
a
definition
only
if
one
interprets
him
as a
subjectivist
who is
claiming
that
any
action
which results in
benefit
or
profit
to
the
stronger
is,
for
that
reason,
just.
The
only
reasonable
alternative
would
be
that
2
R.
C. Cross
and A.
D.
Woozley,
Plato's
Republic:
A
Philosophical
Commentary (London,
1964),
cf.
pp.
27,
37,
38
ff.
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IN
DEFENSE
OF
THRASYMACHUS
221
grand
scale
and
get
away
with
it.
Finally,
one
needs
the
courage
to
engage
in
and
pursue
such
a
program.
Thrasymachus points
to
examples
of
unjust
men
who
lack
either
the
wit
or
the
courage
or
both
to
practice
injustice
on a
grand
scale
(pickpockets,
cutpurses,
temple-breakers, etc.),
and
although
he thinks of these
as
stronger
than
their
counterparts
of
similar
station
among
just
men,
they
fall
short
of
the
ideal
strong
man
(348d5~9).
The
just
man,
on
the other
hand,
could
never
be
a
strong
man,
for he
lacks
at
least
one
necessary
quality
:
the
understanding
that
justice
is
advanta?
geous
to
the
stronger.
The
ruler
"in the strict
sense" is
defined
by
Thrasymachus
as one
who
always
makes laws
which
are
to
the ruler's
advantage
(34069-34
ia2).
He is
defined,
be
it
noted,
neither
as
an
unjust,
nor
as
a
strong
man.
Finally,
the
unjust
man,
on
Thrasymachus'
view,
is
simply
a man
who
performs
unjust
actions,
and
as
I
pointed
out
above,
since there
seems
to
be
no
textual
considerations
precluding
it,
I
am
assuming
that
Thrasymachus
and
Socrates
are
in
general
agreement
as to
which
actions
unjust
actions would
be.
It
is
true
that
Thrasymachus
argues
that rulers
of
countries,
whatever the
form of
government
might
be,
are
the real
strong
men.
Yet,
there
is
no
textual
reason
to
believe
that for
Thrasymachus
the
ruler
is
the
strongest
man
because
he
is
the ruler
of a state. Rather, the strongest man in the state is
most
likely
to
be,
or
to
become
the
ruler.
He
rises
to
the
top
naturally
because
he
takes
advantage
of
every
opportunity
to
make
an
unjust profit
and
to
further his
own
cause
at
the
expense
of
others.
Everyone
and
every group
who
deal
with
him
justly
are
exploited
by
him for his
own
profit.
It
could
hardly
be
the
case,
as
some
commentators
have
suggested,
that
the
ruler
is
by
definition
the
stronger,
because
Thrasymachus
admits
the
possibility
of
there
being
a
just
ruler
(343a).
A
just
ruler
would
not
be
the
strongest
man
in
the
state
in
Thrasy?
machus'
sense
of
"strong":
indeed
he
would
not,
in this sense, be
strong
at all. For
Thrasymachus
says
that the
just
ruler loses
on
all
counts:
his
business suffers
through
neglect,
and
he loses the
respect
of his
friends
and
relatives
because he will
not
grant
them
special privileges
during
his
tenure
of office.
It
should be
obvious
by
this
time
that
if
the above
interpretation
of
Thrasymachus'
position
is
ac?
cepted,
there is
no
inconsistency
between
Ja
and
Jb.
Just
action,
by
its
very
nature,
is
advantageous
to
the
stronger,
for
the
stronger
by
definition
is
one
who takes
advantage
of
all
opportunities
to
benefit
himself.
Justice
is
the
good
of
another,
in
that
acts
of
justice
afford
others the
opportunity
to
cheat
and
defraud
the
just
agent.
Injustice
is
advantageous
to
oneself, in that acts of injustice are those in which
one
takes unfair
advantage
of
others. Ja
does
not
imply,
on
my
interpretation,
that if
the
strong
man
acts
justly
it
is
to
his
own
advantage.
Rather,
Ja
entails that
just
action
always
creates
opportunities
for the
unjust
exploitation
of
just
agents,
which
is
repeated
in
slightly
different
words in
Jb.
Let
us
consider
in
more
detail what
the life
and
character of the
completely
unjust
ruler
might
be
like,
given
Thrasymachus'
view
of
the
nature
of
justice
and
injustice.
Some
commentators
seem
to
think
that the
only
sort
of
man
who
could fulfill
Thrasymachus' conception
of
such
a
ruler
would be
an
absolute dictator
who rules his
country
with
an
iron
fist,
stealing,
killing,
and
imprisoning
whenever
his
slightest
whim is
opposed.
It is
possible
that
Thrasymachus
would
agree
that
such
a
ruler
would,
or
could,
be
a
strong
man
in
his
sense
of
the
term.
But it
should
not
be
forgotten
that
he
claims
that
the
rulers
in
every
state,
no
matter
what
the form
of
government,
usually
fit his
conception
of
the
strong
man :
Well, every
government
lays
down
laws for
its
own
advantage?a
democracy
democratic,
a
tyranny
tyrannical
laws,
and
so
on.
In
laying
down these
laws
they
have made it
plain
that what is to their
advantage
is
just.
They
punish
him who
departs
from
this
as
a
law-breaker and
an
unjust
man.
And
this,
my
good
sir,
is
what
I
mean.
In
every
city
justice
is
the
same.
It is
what
is
advantageous
to
the
established
govern?
ment.
But the
established
government
is master
and
so
sound
reasoning
gives
the
conclusion
that the
same
thing
is
always
just?namely,
what
is
advantageous
to
the
stronger
(338e).
It
follows
that
even
in
a
country
where
the
ruler
is
elected
by
majority
vote,
and
where
to
retain
his
position
as
ruler,
he
must
retain
the
esteem
of
the
electorate,
the
ruler
may
still
be,
and
usually
is,
the strongest man in the state. This means that such
a
ruler
could
be
a
complete
villain,
a
man
who
believes
that
the
unjust
life is
the best
life for
man,
and that
justice
is
advantageous
to
the
stronger.
Bearing
this in
mind,
let
us
consider
a
possible
alternative
to
the
view that
Thrasymachus'
ruler
type
would
have
to
be
an
iron-fisted
dictator.
Imagine
the
following
rather
extended
hypothetical
case:
Early
in
life
a
politically
ambitious
man
named
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222
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL
QUARTERLY
Setarcos
comes
to
believe
that
Thrasymachus'
position
is
entirely
correct.
Suppose
that
Setarcos is
both
intelligent
and
courageous.
While
taking
advantage
of
every
opportunity
to
profit
unfairly
and
to
advance
his
own
fortunes
at
the
expense
of
others, Setarcos is clever enough to maintain a
public
facade
of
honesty
and
integrity.
He
publicly
proclaims
his absolute
faith in
the view
that
the
just
life
is
the
best and
most
profitable
life
for
man.
"Mutual
trust
is the
cornerstone
of
society,"
he
tells
everyone,
"and mutual
trust
is
possible only
when
the citizens
of
a
state
deal
justly
with
one
another."
His
voice is
loudest
in
condemnation
of
every
unjust
and
dishonest
act
by
an
official
in
power.
He ferrets
out
or,
if
need
be,
manufactures
evidence
of
im?
morality
and
corruption against
all
those who
oppose
him
or
stand
in
the
way
of his
rise
to
power.
Eventually
he
campaigns
for
the
highest
office
in
the
land
on
a
reform
ticket,
pleading
for
a
return
to
honesty,
justice,
and
fair
dealing
in
government.
He
pledges
himself
to
the elimination
of
graft
and
corruption
in
high places.
When he achieves
power,
he
is
too
clever
to
perform
an
about-face
and
become
a
tyrant,
perpetuating
his
rule
by
force.
Rather,
he decries
the
fraud,
waste,
ineptitude,
and
corruption
which he
claims
is his
legacy
from
the
previous
administration,
and reiterates
his
belief
that
justice
is the
best
policy.
After
all,
he
is
a
just
man,
and hasn't
he
become
ruler of the land?
Once
he
becomes
the
ruler,
Setarcos
may
be
able,
if he is clever enough and bold enough, tomaintain
his
public
facade
of
justice
and
honesty
for
a
long
time
or
even
indefinitely,
while
remaining
a
thoroughly
unjust
man.
But is
this
at
all
a
plausible
account
?
If
Thrasy?
machus
is
correct,
such
a
ruler,
to
the best of his
ability,
would
always
enact
only
those laws which
are
advantageous
to
himself.
Do
we
have
to
imagine
an
entire
citizenry
so
incredibly
naive and
innocent
as
to
overlook
this fact
indefinitely
?
For
if
people
were
to
notice
that
the laws of
the land
are
of
this
nature,
would
this
not
immediately
reveal Setarcos
as
a
completely
unjust
man
?
The answer to both
questions
is :Not at all. One
of
the
strongest
reasons
for
acceptance
of
my
interpretation
of
Thrasymachus'
view
is
that
it
would
entail the
possibility
that
a
completely just
and
a
completely
unjust
ruler
might
enact
exactly
similar
sets
of laws
Thrasymachus
says
that
justice,
not
injustice,
is
advantageous
to
the
stronger,
so
that
an
unjust
ruler would be foolish
to
enact,
e.g.,
repressive
or
discriminatory
laws.
He
would
want
the
citizens
to
act
toward each
other and toward
him
as
a
ruler
in
ways
which both
Thrasymachus
and
Socrates would
agree
are
just.
For
Setarcos
holds,
with
Thrasymachus,
that if the
subjects
believe that the
just
life is the
most
profitable,
and
thus
are
just
and
law-abiding
in
their
dealings
with
one another and with their government, they will
be
most
vulnerable
to
exploitation
by
the ruler.
All
states must
collect
taxes to
finance
legitimate
governmental
functions,
for
example.
If the
citizens
realize this fact
and
willingly obey
the
tax
laws
of
the
state,
they
place
themselves
in
a
perfect position
to
be
unjustly
exploited by
the ruler. It
is
often
very
hard for the
subjects
in
a
country
to
determine
whether
all
of their
tax
money
is
being
spent
wisely
and
justly
for the
purposes
for
which
it
is
collected.
Furthermore,
by
convincing
the
people
that
they
are
serving
their
own
interests
by
living
completely
just
lives,
Setarcos eliminates
a
major
source
of
expense
and
anxiety
which often
plagues
tyrants:
he does
not
have
to
employ nearly
as
large
an
internal
security
force
to
preserve
order,
enforce his
laws,
and
suppress
possible
rebellions.
It is
interesting
to
note
in
passing
that
Thrasy?
machus
might
well have
argued
that
Socrates,
who
is known for his
attempts
to
defend
the
just
life
as
the
best
and
most
profitable
life
for
man,
is
actually
playing
into
the hands
of the
unjust
ruler. Setarcos
would
want
everyone
in
the
state
(except
himself
who
knows
better)
to act
justly,
to
live
just
lives,
and
to
believe
sincerely
that in
so
doing
they
were
serving their own best interests.
It is
not
merely
because
one
sees
clearly
that
acting justly
renders
the
just
agent
vulnerable
to
exploitation
that
one
can
become
a
strong
ruler
of
a
state.
He
might
lack
the
intelligence
to
effect
a
master
plan
of
injustice
and
power-seeking,
or
else
he
might
lack the
courage
for
such
a
large-scale
operation.
In the
context
of
the
present
hypothetical
case,
our
unjust
ruler, Setarcos,
might
be ranked
as
to
his
degree
of
"strength,"
in
Thrasymachus'
sense,
on
the basis of
how well
he
was
able
to
convince
the
populace
of the
folly
of
living
un?
justly,
especially
in
their
dealings
with the
govern?
ment of their state. If Setarcos were able to
convince
everyone
in
the
state
that
he
is
a com?
pletely
just
man,
that because
he is
just
he is
happy,
that
justice
in
general
is
most
profitable
to
man
as
a
way
of
life,
while
at
the
same
time
being
able,
covertly,
to
cheat
and steal
from
the
people
systematically,
then
he would
conform
perfectly
to
Thrasymachus'
conception
of
the
strong
man.
If
Thrasymachus
were
to
prove
his
case
that the
unjust
life
is the
good
life for
man,
would
this entail
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IN
DEFENSE OF
THRASYMACHUS
223
that
Socrates,
or
you,
or
I,
or
anyone
who under?
stands what he is
talking
about
ought
to
begin
living
the
unjust
life ? This
conclusion would
at
least
not
follow from
such
a
proof.
I
find
no
textual evidence
that
Thrasymachus
was
advocating
universal
injustice
as a
way
of life
for
everyone.
In
fact,
the
greater
the ratio of
just
to
unjust people
in
a
state,
the
better life
can
be for
the
unjust
few.
Even
if
everyone
were
to
begin
to
live
completely
unjust
lives,
however,
this
would
not
negate
Thrasy?
machus'
claim
that
justice
is
the
advantage
of the
stronger,
only
no one
would
then be
acting
justly.
At
any
rate,
to
describe
a
certain
way
of life
as
the
best life
for
man
is
not
equivalent
to,
nor
does
it
entail that
everyone
should,
or even
can,
live
such
a
life.
Thrasymachus
could
be
implying
no
more
than
that
Socrates and the
others
ought
to
wake
up
and
realize
that
they
are
like
sheep
being
kept
for
the
profit of the unjust man, and that sheep-like, they
assume
naively
that
to
be
fleeced
and
slaughtered
for
mutton
is
better than
wearing
warm
clothes
and
being
well-fed.
It
is
important
to
understand
that
Thrasymachus
does
not
argue
that
the
ruler of
a
country ought
to
live
an
unjust
life for
the
following
reason:
when
Thrasymachus
defines the
"ruler
in the
strict
sense"
as
the
one
who
infallibly
enacts
laws which
are
advantageous
to
the
ruler,
he
might
be
interpreted
as
meaning
that it
is
logically
impossible
for
a
just
man
to
be
a
ruler in
the
strict
sense.
If
so,
then
of
course
he
would be
inconsistent,
for
he
has
ad?
mitted
that
a
just
man
could
be
a
ruler.
But
it
would
be
a
mistake
to
interpret Thrasymachus
as
claiming
that
when
a
ruler
makes laws which
give
him
the
opportunity
to
exploit
the
people
for
his
own
profit,
that
he
ought
to
exploit
them,
and
that
if
he
does
not,
he is not
a
ruler
in
the strict
sense
at
all.
On
the
contrary,
the
just
man
certainly
could
be
a
ruler
in
the
strict
sense,
if
we
do
not
read into
Thrasymachus'
definition
something
which isn't
there
in the
text.
The
laws
which
the
just
ruler
makes,
as
pointed
out
above,
might
be
exactly
similar
to
the
set
of
laws
which
an
unjust
ruler
would
make
(even
if
neither
made
any legislative
mistakes).
Thus the
just
ruler's
laws,
like those of
the
unjust
ruler,
would
afford
him the
opportunity
of
taking
unfair
advantage
of the citizens
when
they
act
justly. Being
just,
however,
he
would
not
do
so.
But
in
failing
to
cheat
the
populace
he is
not
failing
to
do
something
which
he
ought
to
do,
if
he
is
to
be
a
ruler
in
the
strict
sense.
On
Thrasy?
machus'
view,
he
is
merely
being
stupid.
To
sum
up
briefly,
I
interpret
the
dispute
between
Socrates
and
Thrasymachus
as
a
genuine
disagree?
ment
on
issues
which
are
quite
important,
his?
torically,
for moral
philosophy.
It is
a
genuine
disagreement,
in
the
sense
that it
arises within
a
context
of
shared
opinion,
and
on
no
major point
are
they arguing
at
cross-purposes.
I
view
Socrates
and
Thrasymachus
as
being
in
broadly
general
agreement
as to
the
practical
content
of the
just
and the
unjust
lives?that
is,
as
to
the
types
or
kinds
of
actions
which
are
correctly
called
"just"
and
"unjust."
The
dispute
between them is
not
a
simple
semantic
one
regarding
the
correct
moral
designa?
tion of
various
types
of actions. There
is
nothing
in
the
text
to
suggest
that
they
would
not
both
con?
sider
just
such
actions
as
honoring
contracts,
paying
taxes,
obeying
the
law,
giving
honest
measure,
and
so
on.
I
interpret
Thrasymachus
as
claiming
that
just
action is intrinsically disadvantageous to the
performer
because
by
its
very
nature
it
places
the
just
agent
in
a
vulnerable
position
with
respect
to
those
with
whom he deals
in
practical
life.
By
acting
justly
toward
one's fellow
man,
ipso
acto,
one
places
oneself in
a
position
to
be
unjustly
taken
advantage
of.
When
Thrasymachus
says
that
"justice
is
nothing
else
than
that
which is
advanta?
geous
to
the
stronger"
he is
referring
to
this
characteristic
of
justice,
which
he
believes
to
be its
essential
property.
By
the
"stronger,"
he
means
the
person
who
sees
justice
and
the
just
life for what
he,
Thrasymachus,
believes
it
to
be,
and who
has
the
intelligence
and
the
courage
to
practice injustice
on
a
grand
scale. One who
is
truly
a
strong
man
in
his
sense
would
thus
never
voluntarily
live
a
just
life.
* * *
Let
us
now
consider the
major
criticisms
which
Socrates
offers
to
Thrasymachus'
view:
If
an
unjust
ruler
makes
a
law which
he mis?
takenly
believes
to
be
advantageous
to
himself,
aren't
the
subjects
acting justly
when
they
obey
this
law ?
If
so,
then
justice,
in
this
case,
would
not
be
advantageous
to
the
stronger. Cleitophon
and
Polemarchus
immediately
conclude
that this
criticism is
devastating
to
Thrasymachus'
stated
position
(339e9~340C4).
If the
essential
quality
of
justice
is
that it
is
always
advantageous
to
the
stronger,
then
there
could
not
be
a case
of
justice
which
was
not
advantageous
to
the
stronger.
Socrates'
criticism
seems
to
them
to
offer
a
perfect
counter-example
to
Thrasymachus'
account of
the
nature
of
justice.
?
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224
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL
QUARTERLY
Gleitophon,
however,
believes
that
Thrasy?
machus
has
merely
misstated
his
view,
and
suggests
that
"...
by
what
is
advantageous
to
the
stronger
he
meant
fiwhat
the
stronger
thinks
is
to
his
advantage.'
This
is what
the weaker
must
do,
and
this is his definition of justice (34ob5~7)."
Cross
and
Woozley
argue
that
Thrasymachus
would
have done well
to
accept
Cleitophon's
reformulation
in
order
to
escape
inconsistency,
"for
while
a
ruler
may
make
a
mistake
as
to
what
actually
is
his
interest he
will
hardly
make
a
mistake
as
to
what he
believes
to
be
his
interest;
and if
it
is
right
for
subjects
to
do what
the ruler
believes
to
be
in
his
interest,
it
will
not matter
that
the ruler is
mistaken in
believing
so."4
Sparshott5 disagrees
with
this
suggestion,
and
I
believe
rightly
so.
If
Thrasymachus
had
agreed
with
Cleitophon
he
would
have been inconsistent. For
he has claimed that
justice
is
advantageous
to the
stronger,
and
Cleitophon's suggestion
entails
that
justice
is
obedience
to
the law. If
justice
is
nothing
more
nor
less than
obedience
to
the
law, however,
then
the
grounds
or
reasons
for
enacting
the
laws
(the
advantage
of
the
stronger)
drop
out as
irrelevant.
Thrasymachus,
however,
emphatically rejects
Cleitophon's
suggestion
on
the
grounds
that
in
the
strict
sense
of
ruler,
a
ruler
never
makes mistakes
(34odi~34ia2). Thrasymachus,
of
course,
is
not
here
claiming
either
that
some
rulers
are,
have
been,
or
might
be
infallible,
or
that
any
ruler
who
is
unjust
will
be infallible.
His
case
does
not
depend
upon
the
actual
existence
of
an
infallible ruler.
He
never
says, e.g.,
that
a
doctor
who
prescribes
the
wrong
medicine
on a
particular
occasion is
not
really
a
doctor,
nor
that
an
accountant
is
not
really
an
accountant
if he
sometimes
makes
mistakes
in
calculation.
He
simply
says,
in
effect,
that
our
grounds
for
calling
a man a
doctor
or
an
accountant
are
not
that
he
makes,
or
is
capable
of
making,
mistakes
in the
practice
of
his
profession,
and
the
same
holds
true
for rulers.
Thrasymachus
is,
I
suggest, doing
something
here
which is quite common in contemporary moral
philosophy:
he
is
distinguishing
a
role
or
office
from
the
man
who holds
the office
or
plays
the role. If
someone
were
to
ask
what
a
doctor
is,
and
if
we
know
of
a
particular
doctor
who has
made
a
mistake
in
the
diagnosis
of
a
certain
patient's
illness,
we
would
be
responding
in
a
misleading
and
inappropriate
way
if
we were
to answer
by
saying
that
a
doctor
is
one
whose
job
it
is
to
make
mistaken
diagnoses
of
people's
illnesses.
There
is
still
an
important
question
at
stake
here,
however
:
If
a
doctor
prescribed
a
certain medicine
on the basis of a mistaken diagnosis of a patient's
illness,
would
the
patient
be
acting
as
a
patient
should
if
he
obeyed
his
doctor?
By
analogy,
we
might
ask
Thrasymachus:
If the
unjust
ruler
makes
a
law which
he
mistakenly
believes
to
be advanta?
geous
to
himself,
would the
subjects
be
acting
justly
if
they obeyed
this law
?
We
know,
of
course,
that
normally
what
the
doctor
prescribes
is
what
a
patient
ought
to
do
to
treat
his
particular
illness
or
affliction.
It is
the
proper
job
of the doctor
to
prescribe
the
types
of
treatment
which
are
appropriate
to
the
particular
ills
and afflictions of
his
patients.
Thus
"doing
what
the doctor orders" is
commonly
accepted
as
roughly
synonymous
with
"applying
the
appropriate
treat?
ment to
the
proper
illness
or
affliction." But
this
does
not
mean
that
appropriate
treatment
for
any
given
disease
or
affliction
is
correctly
defined
as
"whatever the
doctor
prescribes."
If
I
smashed
my
toe
with
a
hammer
and
immediately
consulted
a
doctor,
his
advice
to
have
my
leg
cut
off
at
the
hip
would
not
be
acceptable
(at
least not
if
the smashed
toe
were
all
that
was
wrong
with
me).
Hence,
in the
case
of
Thrasymachus,
we
could
say
that in
one
sense,
a
vulgar
or
loose
sense,
a
man
would be
acting justly
if
he
obeys
a
law
which
a
ruler
mistakenly
thinks
to
be
to
his
own
advantage,
but
in
another
more
strict
or
absolute
sense,
he
would
not.
One
might today
want
to
contest
the
legitimacy
of such
a
distinction,
but
obviously
Plato
would
not,
since this is
a
characteristically
Platonic
way
of
arguing.
At
any
rate,
Socrates
accepts
Thrasymachus'
answer
as
satisfactory.
Subsequently,
he
speaks
only
of
the
ruler
in
the
strict
sense,
and
indeed,
as
Nettleship6 points
out,
he
thereafter identifies
the
practitioner,
qua
practitioner,
of
an
art
or
profession
with
the
art
or
profession.
Socrates next asks Thrasymachus whether the
physician,
qua
physician,
is
a
"money
maker,
an
earner
of
fees,
or
a
healer
of
the
sick,"
and
Thrasy?
machus,
of
course,
says
the
last
(341C2 ff.).
And if
a
man
is
sick,
it
is
obviously
to
his
benefit
to
have
the
services of
a
healer
available.
Socrates then
refers
to
other
examples,
each
of
which
is
designed
4
Gross
and
Woozley, op.
cit., p.
46.
5
F.
E.
Sparshott,
"Socrates
and
Thrasymachus,"
The
Monist,
Vol.
50
(1966),
pp.
424
ff.
6
Richard L.
Nettleship,
Lectures
on
the
Republic of
Plato,
2nd
ed.
(London, 1964),
p.
30.
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IN DEFENSE OF THRASYMACHUS
225
to
show
that it is
the
subject
matter
of
an
art,
which
is benefited
by
the
perfect practicing
of the
art.
Thrasymachus
grudgingly
agrees
in
each
case.
Thus in
regard
to
the
ruling
of
a
state,
which
Thrasymachus
has
agreed
is
an
art,
it
would
seem
by analogy that it is the subjects as "subject matter"
of
the
art
of
ruling,
who benefit
from the
perfect
practice
of
this
art,
rather than
the ruler
who
practices
it.
It
seems
obvious
in the
text
that Socrates believes
that his
argument
from
analogy
of the other
arts
to
the
art
of
ruling
has
dealt
Thrasymachus'
account
a
death
blow.
It
is
at
first difficult
to
see
why
he
should
think
so.
The
principle
question
at
issue has
to
do with
the
nature
of
justice.
Even
if it is
true
that
the
perfect practice
of the
art
of
ruling
is
beneficial7
to
the
subjects, why
should
this
force
Thrasymachus
to
give
up
his
claim
that
justice
is
advantageous
to
the
stronger?
After
all,
he has
not
claimed
that
the ruler
is
a
strong
man,
by
definition,
nor
has
he
argued
that in
order
to
be
a
ruler, qua
ruler,
one
must
be
unjust.
Admittedly
he would
have
to
give
ground
on
some
points,
but
even
so,
why
could
he
not
rebut
Socrates'
argument
success?
fully
by saying,
"All
right,
if
a
strong
man
becomes
ruler,
he
won't
act
as
a
ruler
should,
strictly
speaking,
but he could
still be
a
great
strategist
and
an
unparalleled grafter"?
I
believe
that
the
reason
why Thrasymachus
does
not
take this line
is
that
Socrates
(or
perhaps
Plato)
has accepted a suppressed premiss which Thrasy?
machus fails
to
question
:
it
is
that
the
only
reason
why
a
practitioner
of
an
art
would
fail
to
manifest
perfectly
the definition of that
art
in
his
practice
is
that he is
ignorant.
Either he
does
not
know
the
definition,
or
else he doesn't
know
in
every
case
which action instantiates the
definition
(although
in
the
actual
dispute,
the latter
kind of
ignorance
is
seldom touched
upon).
When
Thrasymachus
first
makes
the
vulgar-sense
vs.
strict-sense
distinction,
the
examples
he
uses are
those
of
a
doctor who mis
diagnoses
a
patient's
illness and
an
accountant
who
makes
a
mistake in calculation.
It is
implicitly
assumed that the
examples
referred to are
examples
of
unintentional
errors,
and
this kind of
example
is
extended
across
the
board
to
all
the
arts,
including
the
art
of
ruling.
Thus
in
the
analogy
of the
arts,
Socrates
assumes
without
argument
that the
only
deviations
from
perfection
in
ruling
must
be
in
the
form of unintentional
errors,
due
to
ignorance
of
the
true nature
of
ruling.
Because
Thrasymachus
accepts
this
suppressed
premiss,
he
believes
himself
to
be
in
the
following
dilemma
:
Insofar
as
a
man
is
unjust,
he
is
concerned
only
with
self-aggrandizement;
anyone
who
prac?
tices
an
art
less than
perfectly
does
so
out
of
ignorance of the nature of perfect practice of that
art;
the
perfect
practice
of
the
art
of
ruling
is
advantageous
to
the
subjects,
and
not
to
the ruler.
Therefore,
an
unjust
ruler,
to
the
extent
that he is
unjust,
and
in
virtue of
the
fact that he is
unjust,
is
ignorant
of the
nature
of
ruling.
Hence
a
com?
pletely unjust
ruler would
be
completely
ignorant
of
the
art
of
ruling.
He would
be
directly analogous
to
the
man
who
knows
absolutely nothing
about
music
or
musical
instruments,
yet
who
attempts
to
attune
a
stringed
instrument
properly
(cf.
349e).
Although
Thrasymachus
can
see
no
way
out
of
this
dilemma,
Socrates'
conclusion
seems
to
fly
in
the face of obvious facts.
Thrasymachus
believes
that the
vast
majority
of
actual
rulers
are
grossly
unjust
men,
and,
far
from
being ignorant
of
the
nature
of
ruling, they
seem
to
him
much
more
knowledgeable
than
the ruler
who
has
the
oppor?
tunity
to
defraud
his
subjects
on
a
grand
scale,
but
deliberately
refrains from
doing
so.
Socrates' view
seems
to
him
incredibly
naive. An
analogy
Thrasymachus
might
have used would be that of
a
gambling
game
between
an
honest
man
and
a
cheat,
in
which
the
cheat wins
(by cheating)
the
money, lands,
possessions,
servants,
slaves,
titles,
even the clothes on the back of the honest man. By
analogy,
Socrates'
position
would
seem
to
imply
that
the
honest
man
actually
comes
out
ahead,
because
he
plays
the
game
as
it
should
be
played,
and
that
every
time
the
cheater
cheats,
he
thereby
merely
reveals his
ignorance
of the
game.
Surely
Thrasymachus
should
have
rejected
Socrates'
suppressed premiss. Nothing
in
Thrasy?
machus'
account
requires
it.
To
accept
this
premiss
would be
to
place
in the
same
category
of
ignorance
a
young,
inexperienced
physician
who mis
diagnoses
an
illness,
and/or
mis-prescribes
treat?
ment,
on
one
hand,
and
an
experienced physician
who prescribes removal of organs and tissue which
he knows
to
be
healthy
(tonsils, appendices,
etc.),
to
gain
an
undeserved
fee,
on
the
other hand.
Nevertheless,
in
the
text
Thrasymachus
does
not
reject
Socrates'
suppressed premiss,
but
rather,
in
frustration,
turns
the
full
force
of his
scorn
and
derision
upon
him
(343a ,
ff.)
:
Socrates
needs
a
nurse
to
wipe
his
nose.
He
is
such
a
child
in
7
The
term
translated
"advantageous"
in
Ja
is
the
same
as
that
translated
"beneficial"
in
Socrates'
analogy
of the
arts
(To
Xump?ron).
Thus
his
claim could
have
been
worded,
"the
perfect
practice
of
an
art
is
advantageous
to
its
subject
matter."
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226
AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHICAL
QUARTERLY
practical
matters
that he
cannot
see
that
shepherds
and
cattle
herdsmen tend
sheep
and
cattle for their
own or
their masters'
profit,
rather than for the
benefit of
the
sheep
and
cattle,
and that the
rulers
of
states
treat
their
subjects
like
sheep, caring
for
them only to gain greater profit from them.
Socrates'
answer
to
this
attack
(345b4, ff.)
is
to
chide
Thrasymachus
for
failing
to
draw the
conclusion which follows from the
former
argument
(i.e.,
that
the
art
of
ruling
is
advantageous
to
the
subjects
and
not
to
the
ruler),
and
to
maintain
that
the
same
kind of
argument
applies
to
the
"art"
of
shepherding
:a
shepherd
is
correctly
defined,
not
as
an
earner
of
wages
or
fees,
but
as one
who
cares
for
sheep.
Thus
again
it
is the
subject
matter
of this
art
(the sheep)
which
benefits from excellent
practice,
rather
than
the
practitioner.
It is
interesting
to note
that
Thrasymachus
never
actually
admits
that
Socrates
has
refuted
his claim
that
justice
is
advantageous
to
the
stronger.
Thus
we
are
left
to
decide for ourselves
whether
he
really
believed his view
to
be
defeated,
or,
alternatively,
whether
he still
believed
his
original position
to
be
perfectly
correct,
even
though
he
was
unable
at
the
time
to
see
a
mistake in
Socrates'
reasoning.
Does
Socrates
make
such
a
mistake? Even
if,
purely
for the sake of
argument,
we
were
to
grant
him
his
suppressed
premiss
(i.e.,
that
any
deviation
from
perfection
in
the
practice
of
an
art
is
uninten?
tional and due
entirely
to
ignorance
of the
true
nature of the art), has he indeed shown that, in the
appropriate
sense,
the
art
of
ruling, strictly
speaking,
is
beneficial
(advantageous)
to
the
subjects
?
It
is
not
unimportant
that,
in
the
dispute
with
Thrasymachus,
Socrates
does
not
spell
out
the
ways
in
which
the
perfect practice
of the
art
of
ruling
would be
advantageous
to
the
subjects:
he
merely
concludes
that
it
must
be
so,
because
in the
case
of
the other
arts
examined,
the
subject
matter
of
the
arts,
rather
than the
artists,
were
the beneficiaries
of
excellent
practice.
Note
also
that
it
is
absolutely
vital
to
Socrates'
case
that
the
benefits derivable
from the perfect practice of an art be seen as such
by
the
subject
matter,
in
the
sense
that the
practice
of
the
art must
provide
something
needful,
worth?
while,
or
desirable
from
the
viewpoint
of
the
subject
matter.
Granted
this
presents
a
real
difficulty
in
those
cases
in
which the
subject
matter
is
inanimate,
as
for
example,
in
the manufacture
of musical
instruments,
even
here,
by
extension,
one
might
think of the
objective
worth
of, e.g.,
a
violin
being
enhanced
by
the
skill of
a
master
craftsman,
whereas
a
hack
might
have
used the
same
materials
and
made
an
inferior
instrument.
In
fact,
Socrates does
not
focus
attention
on
those
arts
whose
subject
matter
is inanimate when
he is trying to prove his point about the art of
ruling.
His
primary example
is that
of the
physician.
A
physician
is
defined
as
a
healer
of
the sick.
Healing
the sick
is
an
activity
which
is
beneficial
to
the
patients,
in
the
sense
of
providing
a
service
which
is
needful
and desirable
from the
patients'
point
of
view.
It
is
this feature which
Socrates
believes
has
its
analogue
in
all
the
other
arts,
including
the
art
of
ruling.
But
even
though
this
may
be
true
of
medicine,
it
is
a
mistake
to
conclude
that
all
arts,
if
practiced
excellently,
are
desirable
or
needful
from
the
point
of
view
of the
subject
matter.
This
can
easily
be shown
by
appeal
to
other sorts of
practices
which would
surely
fit into
Socrates'
broadly
general
concept
of
an
art.
The
art
of
torture,8
for
example,
would
surely
fit
Socrates'
model. As
an
art,
it
can
be
practiced
well
or
badly.
The
proficient
torturer
is
the
one
who
can
keep
his victims
alive
and in
constantly increasing
agony
for
the
longest
period
of
time.
He is
the
one
who
never
fails
to extract
the
confession,
or
the
recantation,
or
the oath
of
allegiance,
or
the
suppressed
information
from
unwilling
victims.
It
follows
that,
just
as
in
the
case
of
the
physician,
one
cannot
correctly
define
a
torturer,
qua
torturer,
as
an
earner
of
wages
or
fees.
Thrasymachus
himself
provides
another
example
which,
with
a
few
hypothetical amplifications,
could
also
serve
to
illustrate
Socrates'
mistake:
Suppose
it
were
the
case
that
extremely
fat
sheep
bring
the
best
price
on
the
market.
Suppose,
however,
that
very
fat
sheep
suffer from shortness
of
breath,
constant
pain
in the
lungs,
aching
ankles,
and
continual
nausea.
As
Socrates
says,
the
shepherd,
qua
shepherd,
is
defined
as
one
who
cares
for
sheep,
not
as an earner
of
wages
or
fees.
Yet in
this
case,
no
one
could
deny
that the best
shepherd
would
be the
one
who
was
able
to
bring
the
fattest
sheep to market (i.e., this is what "caring for the
sheep"
would
consist
of,
at
least
in
part).
The
above
are
only
two
of
many
possible
examples
which
could
be
given
to
illustrate
the
point
that the
perfect
practicing
of
an
art
may
not
be such
as
to
fulfill
the
needs
of,
improve,
or
in
other
ways
be desirable
from
the
point
of
view
of
the
subject
matter.
Socrates
speaks
of
the
function
of
an
art
as,
in
8
This
example
was
first
suggested
to
me
by
T. G.
Smith.
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IN
DEFENSE
OF THRASYMACHUS
227
one
way
or
another,
alleviating
the
"defects"
of
its
subject
matter
(342a2,
ff.).
The
art
of
medicine has
come
into
being
because
the
human
body
is
defective. But
this
sort
of
language
unjustifiably
prejudices
the
case.
In what
sense
is
the
subject
matter of the art of torture "defective" ?Only in
the
sense
that
various
forms of
external stimuli
are
capable
of
causing
people pain.
The
art
of
torture,
then,
would
never
have
come
into
being
if
people
were
unable
to
feel
pain
and
anguish.
If
Socrates'
discussion
of
the function
and
origins
of
the
various
arts
are
purged
of such
question
begging
language,
what remains
?What
conclusion
can one
draw
from his
analogy
of the arts?
I
suggest,
merely
the value-neutral
point
that
for
any
art
or
artist
to
exist,
there
must
be
an
appropriate
subject
matter
on
which the
art
can
be
practiced.
For
there
to
be
physicians
and
an
art
of
medicine,
there
must
exist
patients
on
whom
it can
be
practiced;
i.e.,
people
with bodies
that
are
not
invulnerable
to
disease, accident,
or
infirmity.
For
the
art
of
shepherding
to
exist,
there
must
be
sheep
to
care
for. And
for there
to
be
rulers,
there
must
be
subjects
to
rule. Whether the
subject
matter
"benefits"
from
the
proficient
practicing
of
an
art,
in the
sense
of
having
something
needful
or
desir?
able
provided
for
it
or
done
to it
(from
the stand?
point
of
the
subject
matter
itself,
that
is),
is
contingent
upon
the
type
of
art
involved.
It
is
certainly
not true
of all
the
arts.
Socrates' argument that the perfect practice of
the
art
of
ruling
is
necessarily advantageous
to
the
subjects
thus fails
completely
to
refute
Thrasyma?
chus.
All that
one
is
justified
in
concluding
from
his
argument
is
that there
must
be
subjects
on
which
to
practice
this
art,
or
else
neither
art
nor
artist could
exist.
One
can now
also
draw
the conclusion
that
even
if
Socrates
is
granted
his
highly questionable
premiss
that
failure
to
conform
perfectly
to
the
definition
of
an
art
entails
ignorance
on
the
part
of
the
artist,
it
remains
possible
that
a
ruler
might
be
unjust
and
still be
a
ruler
in
the strict
sense.
If the textual Thrasymachus had seen the error
in
Socrates'
analogy
of the
arts,
he
could
have
turned
the tables
on
him
by
pointing
out
that
Socrates
is not
dealing
with
the
ruler,
qua ruler,
but
rather
with
the
ruler,
qua
just
man,
which,
of
course,
is
precisely
what Socrates
is
doing.
On
Thrasymachus'
view,
one
is
a
ruler
in
the
strict
sense
of this
term
if
he
always
makes
laws
which
are
advantageous
to
himself. As
we
have
seen,
it
would be
a
mark of
ineptitude
on
the
part
of
the
ruler if these laws
were
other than what
both
Socrates and
Thrasymachus
would
agree
were
just
laws. If
a
ruler
were
in this
sense
infallible,
he
would
be
a
just
ruler in the
strict
sense
of ruler
if
he
did
not
take unfair
advantage
of
the
opportunities
for
exploitation which are afforded him by the law
abiding
acts
of
his
subjects;
he
would be
an
unjust
ruler
in
the strict
sense
of ruler if
he did cheat and
defraud
his
subjects
in
their
just
dealings
with
him.
*
*
*
A transition
in
Socrates'
line of
argument
be?
comes
evident
at
this
point.
Socrates
obviously
believes
that the
appeal
to
the
analogy
of
the
arts
has refuted
Thrasymachus'
claim that
justice
is
the
advantage
of the
stronger,
and he
then
turns
to
the
question
whether the
just
life
or
the
unjust
life is
more
profitable,
a
very
complex
problem,
but
separate
and distinct from
the
question
of the
essential
nature
of
justice,
and thus
beyond
the
scope
of the
present
inquiry.
I believe that Plato views
Thrasymachus'
account
of the
nature
of
justice
as
plausible
and
persuasive,
and
as
one
which,
as
far
as
it
goes,
is
accurate.
Justice
as
a
way
of
life is
a
social
pheno?
menon,
as
Socrates and
Thrasymachus
implicitly
agree.
It
requires
the mutual
interaction
of
the
members
of
a
society
or a
social
group
for its
occurrence.
And
it
is
surely
true
that
just
action,
in the absence of any legal guarantees or collateral
held,
does
place
the
just
agent
in
a
position
to
be
unfairly
exploited.
And
it
further
strengthens
Thrasymachus'
case
to
point
out
that in
most
organized
societies there
are
such
guarantees.
For
this
is
an
admission
that
the
vulnerability
involved
in
acting justly
has
to
be
compensated
for
by
the
imposition
on
society
of
a
system
of
laws,
police,
courts,
and
prisons
to
protect
the
just
from the
unjust.
To
counter
Thrasymachus'
insight,
Socrates
could
have
attempted
to
show
that
a
just
man
need
not
be
so
naive
as
to
believe
that
all
the
people
with whom he deals will be just. He could have
examined the
many
ways,
both
legal
and
social,
by
which
in