The Sons of Iraq:Opportunity or Opposition

Edward J. McDonnell III, CFASaturday, April 25, 2009

“Those willing to stand and fight ought to be allowed to read and

write.”--BRIG. Bryan Watters, 2005.

CG’s SUMMARYThe Sons of Iraq (SoIs) were funded for two years by the Coalition Forces (CF), primarily the United States Government (USG). In October 2008, the Government of Iraq (GoI) committed to integrating the 100,000 or more SoIs into the Ministry of Interior (MoI) or other national agencies. Thus far, progress toward that end remains slow. The slipping away of these local guardians portends the type of violence witnessed during the past two days.

With a carefully executed strategic communications policy and seed money equal to roughly half a day’s cost of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the CF can compel the MoI to integrate these SoIs as active duty community police officers and support personnel.

The resources available to the GoI easily permit this program. The social costs imposed by a likely return to short-term secular conflict and the costs imposed by a renewed insurgency – one similar to that which followed the liquidation of the IraqiArmy. These costs, conservatively estimated would run at least 15-17x the cost of integrating the SoIs.

This presentation lays out a strategy, its implementation and its economic justification to catalyze the one critical element missing here: the will of the GoI to protect all of its citizens.

Summary of U.S. Policy toward Iraq

From the Department of State web-site:

“The focus of United States policy in Iraq remains on helping the Iraqi people build a constitutional, representative government that respects the rights of all Iraqis and has security forces capable of maintaining order and preventing the country from becoming a safe haven for terrorists and foreign fighters. The ultimate goal is an Iraq that is peaceful, united, stable, democratic, and secure, with institutions capable of providing just governance and security for all Iraqis and is an ally in the war against terrorism….”

The Fragile State of 2009This briefing proposes one scenario aimed at harnessing the Sons of Iraq to progress toward the security that U.S. policy toward Iraq identifies as critical to that country’s full maturation into democracy. By 2011, Coalition Forces (CF) will have substantially drawn down their presence. Hurdles confront the CF as we conclude Operation Iraqi Freedom:

•sectarian tensions between violent Sunnis and Shi’ites;

•escalating ethnic tensions between Kurds and Arabs;

•a recent up-tick in violence with 150+ religious innocents murdered in two suicide-bombings over the last two days; and,

•Increasing trend of oppression rising against women.

Value-Based Proposition:The Sons of Iraq (SoIs) can be recruited either as Agents of Progress or Disenfranchised Extremists, depending upon

decisions taken by the Ministry of Interior (MoI).RATIONALE1. The SoIs are armed and battle-ready.2. The SoIs, like members of the Republican guard once

dissolved, will be alienated from an already fragile democracy.3. The SoIs, if absorbed and paid properly, are drawn from their

communities to provide effective neighbourhood policing.4. The ability of Sunnis to defend themselves, through the SoIs,

strengthens moderates on both sides of the sectarian divide in their desire to avoid mutually assured depredations.

5. The SoIs have succeeded in eradicating much of the cross-border infiltration of non-state terrorists (e.g., Al Qa’eda).

Opportunity Costs of Not Harnessing the SoIsWhat IF…a minority of or no SoIs are integrated into

the MoI?The GoI saves $300-500 million annually. The burdens of the following social costs – in terms of dinars and quality of life – will be have to be tallied by the GoI and endured by Iraqis.1.possible rate of 15,000 to 30,000 sectarian murders per year and 100,000+ injuries;2.little likelihood of SoIs integrated into MoI arresting neighbours and tribal members not integrated into the MoI and re-joining local AIF;3.costs of 25% or more of GDP associated with ISF combatting and prosecuting such crimes as well as medical costs for the injured;4.lost commerce and tourism of up to $5 billion per annum;5.forgone foreign direct investment of up to $20 billion (2008 vs 2007); and,6.Annual costs of sustaining an enlarged police force of $3-4 billion.

Should the program be initiated but abandoned at a later date, the above itemised costs will be lower but still outweigh savings by at least 5x to 10x.

Strategy & Implementation Overview of Value-Based Proposition

(per frame-work proposed to MG Walid)

GOAL = End State of three safeties: safe neighbourhoods; safe community policing; and, safe markets.

OBJECTIVE = Milestones: education & literacy; employment of all Sons of Iraq (SoIs); and, sustained provisioning of police.

TASKS = Roles assigned within community to grow toward end-state of security through trained and equipped force levels.

ACTIVITIES = specific actions assigned to specific roles / tasks to accomplish the milestones required for civil end-state

ASSUMPTIONS:1. 125,000 SoIs enrolled under U.S.-sponsored program to be absorbed by the

Ministry of Interior (MoI);2. 25,000 SoIs currently placed but not on payroll of MoI;3. MoI commitment to take in 25,000 additional SoIs;4. current salaries paid to the 50,000 SoIs to be absorbed = NIL;5. estimated 1st-year payroll of $375 million for all SoIs (i.e., $250 per month);6. many SoIs recruited from anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF) with recidivism likely;7. SoIs recruited from local populations and known to residents;8. half of SoIs of questionable literacy and, therefore, unqualified for MoI;9. SoIs untrained in specialised labour (e.g., auto mechanics or construction); 10. cost-per-SoI of literacy education = $325; 11. cost-per-SoI of training for plant-&-equipment maintenance = $1,000; and,12. former J-TERP training program permanently cancelled by the Government of

Iraq (GoI) over reservations of the U.S. government (USG).

From SoI to Community Police125,000

Sons of IraqMinistry of Interior hiring & 16 weeks

of training

50,000 local police / first responders

MoI Human Resources and local

nominating committees

Court of Cassation ORIraqi Criminal

Justice System

Return to Communities, trained

for operations & maintenance

CRISIS SITUATION

FIRST Responders, with Emergency Response Unit (ERU)

and / or National Police (NP)

Contractors to MoI; back-up responders until ERU / NP arrives

Top 40% hired by MoI

felony convictions; no amnesty from GoI

Others train for O&M contract work with MoI;

four weeks of contingency response training

Strategy Analysis: GOALThe GOAL remains an IRAQ secure for all citizens, Sunni or Shi’ite and Arab or Kurd. This GOAL entails an end-state of:1.democratic policing under which each citizen can reasonably trust the police in the area to be mindful of his or her rights;2.community policing under which the citizens and the local “neighbourhood cops” work together to re-establish order;3.accountable policing answerable to the citizenry and to the MoI;4.visible policing to assure safety of access to markets by suppliers and consumers; and,5.publicly engaged policing to empower citizens to restore and to take pride in their neighbourhoods.

Strategy Analysis: OBJECTIVESTo sustain security, certain OBJECTIVES, defined by clearly identified milestones, must be achieved:

1.immediate short-term training for the 50,000 SoIs identified by the MoI for integration;

2.clarification of training and educational needs of the SoIs not scheduled for immediate integration;

3.funding authority sought and obtained by MoI to hire outside contractors for augmentation of logistics;

4.needs assessment completed for training resources required for transition of SoIs into the police force or as contractors; and,

5.quality control by local citizenry of community policing implementation and sustainment.

Strategy Analysis: TASKSThe following TASKS specify key means to attain the intermediate ends (i.e., objectives) required for an Iraq unthreatened by AIF:1.16-week police training for 50,000 SoIs to remain near their family centres-of-gravity;2.training in specialty maintenance and construction skills focussed on the needs of the home territory of the 75,000 SoIs not transitioning immediately to the MoI;3.use of these trained mechanics, electricians and construction specialists as contractors to the MoI;4.provision of equipment for contractors provided through MoI;5.training to guarantee minimum level of literacy for SoIs not immediately transitioning to the MoI; and,6.swearing in by Minister of 75,000 SoIs not transitioning as civilian reserve police in their communities.

Strategy Analysis: ACTIVITIESAside from class-room training, other activities ought to occur to usher in the community police-&-support programme:1.village and neighbourhood citizen committees to assess and nominate the allocated number of police officers from area SoIs;2.MoI human resources to amass bio-metric / biographic data on all SoIs joining the GoI at Ministry of Defence Centres;3.SoIs identified as violent criminals referred to justice system;4.SoIs tested as illiterate slotted into separate education programme;5.facilitation of immediate transition of 50,000 SoIs into MoI per October 2008 commitment;6.identify teachers, trainers and resources for specific sustainment contracts for the MoI and literacy;7.begin contractors’ relationship with MoI with full pay for three days’work each week; and,8.balance of work-week in continuing education in democratic policing or in literacy training to qualify all SoIs for MoI

Strategy Analysis: RESOURCESProposed requirements include, but are not limited to:1.$375 million for the 1st year salaries (maximum);2.$285 million for 1st year salaries more likely;3.$75 million for technical training;4.$30 million for literacy and police training; and, therefore,5.total first year costs of $390-480 million.

High requirements in a year during which budget reduced by 25% and GDP likely to contract materially. Resources available include:•$32 billion of net liquid reserves from recent budget surpluses in bank deposits or USG-issued T-bills;•$5 billion of Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) deposits in Federal Reserve Bank of New York;•$3.6 billion of unobligated funds for ISFF;•up to $1 billion of Economic Support Fund (ESF) unspent; and,•up to $200 million of State Department funding.

Strategy Analysis: CONSTRAINTS

Beyond the fiscal strain imposed by resource requirements upon a commodity-dependent economy suffering from material pricing contraction, institutional constraints confront the proposed programme:

1.sectarian tensions with a Shia-dominated government and predominantly Sunni-affiliated SoIs;

2.partisan control of MoI human and material resources restricting intended flow of resources;

3.failure of the former jobs-training program intended primarily for SoIs due to transfer of irrelevant skills; and,

4.too few SoIs to be integrated for adequate policing.

Overview of FundingPayment of

Instructors for O&M, Literacy and Civil

Defence

$1MM CSP grant

SoI Transition Assistance:

Pilot Programme

SoI Transition Assistance:

Full Implementation

Renovation of Education Facility

Technical O&M Training for 75,000

non-MoI

Lessons learned

$25,000 QRF grant

Training of 50,000 MoI employees

Lower of 20% or

$100MM seed funds from ESF and ISFF

Up to $100MM

Up to $50MM

1st year compen-sation for police &

contractorsUp to

$400MM

Outline for Immediate Tasks:1. re-establish credibility of jobs-training with focus on skills

immediately usable by SoIs as contractors to MoI;2. creation of Literacy-First program to make all non-criminal SoI s

eligible for eventual integration; and,3. secure allegiance of all SoIs to rule-of-law in Iraq and deputise

contractors as reserve corps to join other local police as firstresponders in times of emergency or disorder.

Activities for Immediate Tasks:• $25,000 State Department Quick Response Funds funding to

renovate local education centres;• up to $1 million of USAID / Community Stabilization Program (CSP)

and ESF funding to train or educate SoIs in Al Ala’am (Salah ad Din);

• upon success of pilot programme, roll-out of national programme with first 10-25% from ISFF and ESF funding and the balance from the Development Fund for Iraq, if permissible.

Next-Step Funding Strategy—Supporting BRIG. Marriner

PRTTeam LeadDoIA /

MoI-TTMoI-TT

DEPT of State:QRF Program

Provincial Recon-struction Team

USAID: Community Stabilization

Program

USAID Mission; U.S. EmbassyDiFD Mission;U.K. Embassy

U.K. Embassy

DoIA / MoI-TT MoI-TT

DiFD USAID Province

Rep.

$25,000

$1 million

intervention, if necessary

MNSTC-I

intervention, if necessary

First Year Funding Strategy:Supporting BRIG. Marriner

Bureau of International

Narcotic & Legal Enforcement

DoIA / MoI-TT

DoIA / MoI-TT

MNSTC-I

U.S. EmbassyMNF-I

Lesser of $100 million or 20%

DoIA & SR Civilians

Global Strategic

Communi-cations

Campaign to exert

pressure on MoI

intervention, if necessary

DoIA and MNSTC-I Officers / SR Civilians

intervention, if necessary

Iraqi Security Forces Fund

Comparative Contribution Analysis

(assumes $500 million of first year costs to cover overages)

1. $25,000 QRF micro-grant equal to 2% of unobligated PRT funds

2. $1 million USAID / CSP grant equal to 1% of unexpended amounts

3. $100 million seed invt in first year compensation equal to3% of unobligated ISFF funds

4. $100 million seed invt equal to 30% of unobligated ESF funds or 7% of unspent funds

20% contribution

1. $400 million GoI investment toward the inte-gration of SoIs equal to 1% of DFI reserves

2. $400 million GoI invt equal to 1% of GDP3. $400 million invt equal to 8% of CBI deposits4. $400 million invt equal to 3 days of oil production5. $400 million equal to 7% of 2008 MoI budget

80% contribution

References• http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6804.htm• http://74.125.77.132/search?q=cache:nneOwDLzX4gJ:www.afcee.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-070724-

036.pdf+Iraq+construction+OR+electrician+OR+mechanic+%22training+cost%22&cd=7&hl=en&ct=clnk SEE PAGE 19.

• http://74.125.77.132/search?q=cache:joJ-LOYMg8J:unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001586/ 158646e.pdf+Iraq+2008+construction+OR+electrician+OR+mechanic+%22cost+per+trainee%22&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk SEE PAGE 5.

• http://www.fdi.net/bmi/bmidisplay.cfm?filename=MMEG_20081106_216192_xml.html• http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/strat/download/etp43.pdf SEE PAGE 32• Letter from Edward J. McDonnell III, CFA to President George W. Bush dated June 2006.• http://www.ajc.com/business/content/printedition/2009/03/21/iraq0321.html?cxntlid=inform_sr• http://www.sigir.mil/reports/QuarterlyReports/Oct08/pdf/Report_-_October_2008.pdf SEE PAGEs 5 / 7 / 23• http://www.sigir.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/Jan09/pdf/Report_-_January_2009_LoRes.pdf SEE PAGEs 28 / 35 /

79 / 92• https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html SEE PAGE on Iraq• http://74.125.77.132/search?q=cache:eQgAfiAkD7IJ:www.imf.org/External/NP/LOI/2008/irq/112908.pdf+2009+CBI

+cash+OR+bills+OR+reserves+%22Government+of+Iraq%22&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk SEE PAGE 5• http://www.iamb.info/auditrep/r041309a.pdf SEE SLIDE 18• http://www.cfr.org/publication/16908/stabilizing_and_rebuilding_iraq.html• http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090423/ap_on_re_mi_ea/ml_iraq_death_toll• http://74.125.77.132/search?q=cache:Pi2XeBMYF9EJ:www.prio.no/projects/a25cost/COST0308_Brussels/Hall_E

CONOMIC%2520IMPACTS%2520OF%2520ARMED%2520VIOLENCE.ppt+gdp+2008+iraq+OR+iraqi+%22disposable+income%22+-US+-US&cd=10&hl=en&ct=clnk

• http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/international_statistics.html EEE TABLEs 1314 and 1356• http://www.fdimagazine.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/2716/Investment_soars_in_Iraq.html• Edward J. McDonnell III, CFA; baseline police manning study 2005.