International Relations and Pesc

8/13/2019 International Relations and Pesc

1/35

Review Article

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

THEORY AND THE RISE OFEUROPEAN FOREIGN AND

SECURITY POLICYBy ULRICH KROTZ and RICHARD MAHER*

Jeffrey T. Checkel, ed. 2007.International Institutions and Socialization in Europe.New York: Cambridge University Press, 292 pp.

Marise Cremona, ed. 2008. Developments in EU External Relations Law. Oxford:Oxford University Press, 336 pp.

Marise Cremona and Bruno de Witte, eds. 2008.EU Foreign Relations Law: Con-stitutional Fundamentals. Portland, Ore.: Hart Publishing, 324 pp.

Seth G. Jones. 2007. The Rise of European Security Cooperation. New York: Cam-bridge University Press, 310 pp.

Christoph O. Meyer. 2007. The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing

Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union. Basingstoke: PalgraveMacmillan, 232 pp.Michael E. Smith. 2004.Europes Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionaliza-

tion of Cooperation. New York: Cambridge University Press, 308 pp.

AT least since the mid-1960s, conventional wisdom held that Eu-ropean integration in foreign policy, security, and defense was un-likely to amount to much very quickly or smoothly, irrespective of the

often impressive achievements in other policy areas.1

However, begin-ning in the mid-1990s, under the auspices of a common foreign and se-curity policy (CFSP) and a European security and defense policy (ESDP),European integration in these domains of traditional high politics hasevolved and consolidated bit by bit. The old conventional wisdom, thatis, no longer seems to accurately reflect political reality.

* We are grateful to the editors of World Politicsand to the anonymous reviewers for helpful com-ments and suggestions.

1Gordon 199798; Haas 1975; Hoffmann 1966; Hoffmann 1982; Hoffmann 2000; Zielonka

1998. An interesting early exception is Galtung 1973.World Politics63, no. 3 (July 2011), 54879


2/35

IRTHEORY&EUROPEANFOREIGN POLICY 549

Accordingly, a group of scholars of very diverse theoretical, intellec-tual, and disciplinary backgrounds has argued that European integra-tion in these policy areas has gained considerable substance. Among

other developments, these scholars have identified numerous signs ofthe changing climate:

a growing desire in Europe for an increased ability to act autono-mously in security and defense matters and to raise Europes profile in

world politics;the institutionalization of patterns and habits of cooperation, con-

sensus building, and consultation in foreign and security policy;the creation of European military forces and security institutions;and the emergence of norms and other intersubjective understand-

ings, including the convergence of national strategic cultures around acommon European strategic culture.

Indeed, a growing number of scholars claim that European foreign andsecurity policy, like Europes power and influence more broadly, is onthe rise, and they are documenting their claims with mounting empiri-cal evidence. One longtime observer of European politics holds thatEurope today is a superpower and that world politics is once againbipolar, with the United States and the EU as the poles.2

Generally, national governments remain in firm control of the cre-ation and implementation of foreign, security, and defense policy, suchthat divergence and disagreement between governments will at timesbe inevitable. This raises an interesting and important theoretical ques-tion: why is it that European cooperation in foreign, security, and de-fense policy, which has significantly expanded and consolidated overthe course of the past fifteen years, seems to work and hold together insome specific instances yet not in others? As even the most casual ob-server of European politics knows, cooperation is uneven across both

countries and individual policy issues. Some European countries, suchas France, tend to strongly support Europe becoming a more cohesiveand powerful actor, whereas others, such as Britain, tend to be moreambivalent. In some instances, such as peacekeeping, Europe acts as

virtually a single political actor, whereas in others, such as the use ofmilitary force, the fissures and disagreements between governments of-ten surface quickly and remain pronounced. A cluster of recent books and journal articles sheds theoretical andempirical light on half of this question, namely, why intra-Europeanforeign and security policy cooperation has become more successful in


3/35

550 WORLDPOLITICS

recent years compared to what it was in the past. These publicationsplace different emphases on what has changed and hold sharply differ-ing views on what has caused the changes. There is divergence over just

what constitutes cooperation, how to measure it, and how to explain itsvariation across time. While each author seeks to develop theoreticallyand conceptually well grounded explanations for the increase in thescope and intensity of cooperation, eachdoes so from positions thatspan nearly the entire range of the major approaches to internationalrelations theory and of scholarship on world politics more broadly: re-alism, various types of institutionalism and legal institutionalization,and social constructivism. These recent writings bring together in sig-nificant and illuminating new ways the main strands of IRand social

science theory with the history and politics of European integration.Moreover, this takes place in the policy areas in which European in-tegration had traditionally been the weakest and least developed and,correspondingly, which had received the least theoretical attention. Taking these books and articles together, one can identify three broadissues that serve to frame this emerging field of study. Considered to-gether, these works illuminate the range of causal forces that may leadto increased cooperation and that shape its unique characteristics, the

political motivations behind cooperation, and the prospects for con-tinued or even greater cooperation in the future. First, how can we useIR theory to explain increased cooperation in European foreign andsecurity policy? In what ways can realist variables such as internationalor regional distributions of power account for greater cooperation? Oris cooperation a function of decades of institutionalizing certain normsand patterns of behavior or of the increasing legalization of Europeanforeign and security policy? Or does it derive from the gradual conver-gence of national strategic cultures around a distinct European strate-

gic culture? Second, with what purpose do European states adopt common posi-tions in foreign and security policy? Through a careful review of thiscollection of scholarly works, one sees how the various authors define,though sometimes only implicitly, the many different social and politi-cal purposes behind the greater European cooperation in foreign, secu-rity, and defense policy. Realists of different stripes point to the desireof many Europeans to act autonomously from the United States; to

avoid a potential security dilemma in postcold war Europe by bindingGermany into European political and security institutions; or to bal-ance against the United States in some form Historical instit tional


4/35


tionalization cite a desire to make foreign and security policy more rulegoverned or note the effects of path dependence for locking in certainnorms and practices over a span of several decades. Constructivists and

sociological institutionalists point to the process of moving beyond thenation-state as the main source or provider of security and to the deci-sive importance of norms, ideas, socialization, and discourse for actorsstrategies, policies, and concrete interests.3 The third issue concerns, in the vernacular of European integration,the EUs finality. Where is European integration in foreign policy,security, and defense ultimately headed? Toward a fully integrated sys-tem in which foreign and security policy is defined and implementedin Brussels? Toward a system in which the national governments retain

their own prerogatives over foreign and security policy but increasinglyconverge around common positions, from conflict prevention and crisismanagement in the Balkans to the promotion of good governance andhuman rights in places as disparate as the Caucasus, the Balkans, andsub-Saharan Africa? Or to a decentralized system in which power andauthority flow upward to supranational bodies and sideways to privateactors? Absent any consensus on the finality issue among scholars or pol-icymakers, the scope and intensity of cooperation may of necessity reach

its functional and political limits, at least in the foreseeable future.Nonetheless, together and individually the books and articles un-der consideration here prompt a rethinking of a long-held assump-tion about European foreign and security policy: that impediments tocooperation are insurmountable and that cooperation in foreign andsecurity policy will thus be shallow and ad hoc. These works agree thatEuropean foreign policy and security cooperation have reached a scopeand intensity unprecedented in the history of European integration. Ata minimum, the starting point in the future will not be debates over the

existence or nonexistence of substantive levels of cooperation but ratherwill be debates over (1) when, under what conditions, and to what ex-tent European states cooperate with each other in foreign policy andsecurity matters; (2) the relative importance of different causal factors,including the structures of the international or regional systems, in-stitutions, and norms, culture, and other ideational variables; and (3)the consequences for European politics, European states, and worldpolitics more broadly.

3In addition, policymakers cite the need to reduce the dominance of the United States or functional


5/35

552 WORLDPOLITICS

At the same time, one realizes that, as Europe attempts to find itsplace in the world, constraints and impediments to greater coopera-tionand thus perhaps to a greater role in world politicshave hardly

vanished. When it comes to core security interests, European govern-ments continue to pursue predominantly nationally defined interestsand policies. The heated debates preceding the Anglo-American inva-sion of Iraq in March 2003 or EU member states relations with Rus-sia, particularly over energy security, illustrate the resilience of state-centered interests, power, and prerogatives.4 It is questions of vitalnational interests and issues regarding the purpose of (pan-)Europesincreasingly outward orientation in foreign and security policy and thedirection in which Europe is heading that will continue to account for

the uneven patterns of cooperation and impose limits on the scope andintensity of cooperation in the future. In no other area is the likelihoodof incompatibility of basic interests and values higher than in foreignpolicy, security, and defense because those are the issues that strike atthe very core of state sovereignty and state identity. This article is organized as follows. The first section examines somedefinitional issues and sketches how, over the past decade, a new fieldhas emerged that merges the study of European foreign, security, and

defense policy with general theorizing in international relations. Thenext three sections consider European cooperation in foreign and se-curity policy as seen through the lenses of some of the main theoreticaland conceptual approaches to IR theory today: realism, various typesof institutionalism, and social constructivism. The fifth section drawsa number of lessons and insights from reading these various books andarticles together. In light of this articles findings and arguments, theconcluding section reviews the subject matters theoretical promise, as

well as its political importance.

THEEMERGENCEOFANEWFIELDOFSTUDY

Despite the advent of European foreign, security, and defense affairsas a distinct area of study, no standard definition of foreign, security, ordefense policy cooperation has emerged among the growing numberof scholars who study it. There is, in other words, no consensus onthe exact explanandum or appropriate dependent variable. This is so

4On Iraq, see Gordon and Shapiro 2004, 12836; on energy policy, see Abdelal 2010; Buchan2009, esp. chap. 9; Maher 2011, chap. 6. Additionally, on responding to genocide, note Smith 2010.


6/35


in part because the various scholars working in the field operate fromvery different theoretical orientations and are interested in explainingdifferent aspects of cooperation. While this may provide for a fruitful

diversity of theoretical and empirical studies that focus on differentfeatures of European foreign and security policy, it also tends to hinderthe accumulation of knowledge on the subject matter. Among the books under review, for example, Jones breaks downhis dependent variablesecurity cooperationinto four categories:security institutions, economic sanctions, arms production, and mili-tary forces. Smith parses his dependent variableforeign and securitypolicy cooperationinto two different categories: quantitative indica-tors of cooperation and qualitative ones. The quantitative indicators

include the expansion of European Political Cooperation (EPC) actionsand CFSPcommon positions and joint actions from 1970 to 1995, thenumber of functional issues with which EU foreign policy has dealt,and the expansion of the EU repertoire of foreign policy tools and in-struments. The qualitative indicators include the rationale for the ex-pansion of EU foreign policy cooperation and the collective responsesof EU member states. Meyers explanandum is the degree of norma-tive convergence around a distinct and coherent European strategic

culture. The Cremona and Cremona and de Witte volumes docu-ment the increasing legalization of EU foreign policy, in particular, thegrowth and complexity of EU external relations law and the extent to

which governments are accountable to judicial oversight of their for-eign policy actions.

The extent of this diversity is not surprising. Foreign policy, security,and defense are expansive concepts that span multiple sets of actionsand practices. They can include foreign aid and humanitarian concerns,areas in which both the European Commission and the individual na-

tional governments have long been active. The EU has conducted anumber of peacekeeping missions, both within and outside of Europe.Foreign and security policy also includes the creation and implemen-tation of measures of coercion, intimidation, and deterrencewhat

Thomas Schelling called the diplomacy of violence.5This includesthe imposition of sanctions and embargoes, an area in which Europeancountries are increasingly working through the EU.6For example, theEU (as well as individual governments) has imposed sanctions on Iran

for its failure to abide by successive Security Council resolutions to


7/35

554 WORLDPOLITICS

halt its uranium enrichment program. Defense policy, traditionally anexclusively national concern and historically the least integrated pol-icy area, is generally understood to encompass decisions regarding the

threat or use of force as well as arms development and production.7

De-fense cooperation could include humanitarian interventions, for whichMeyer claims there is increasing support across Europe, although thissupport is uneven across countries (pp. 13943). The very expansive-ness of these concepts underscores the multiplicity and magnitude ofthe European developments at the same time as it tends to obscure

what precisely is meant by cooperation or integration in foreign policy,security, and defense, how to measure it, and how to evaluate its changeover time.

Rather than being dichotomousabsent or presentEuropean co-operation in foreign and security policy has always existed along a con-tinuum, both before and after World War II. The nineteenth-centuryConcert of Europe is one type of regional security cooperation, as wasEPCof the 1970s and 1980s.8More prosaically, Europes very politicaland institutional development since the end of World War II is a formof intense foreign policy cooperation. Thus viewed, cooperation amongEuropean states in foreign policy, security, and defense is not a new

phenomenon. What is new, however, is that for the first time Europeappears to be an increasingly cohesive political unit that is looking out-ward, beyond Europe. And the scope and intensity of cooperation isqualitatively different today as compared with what it was even in the

very recent past. Furthermore, European security today embodies greater complexitythan it did in the past. Not only is there greater cooperation amongnational governments but there are also a multitude of different ac-tors that must be taken into account. The use of European foreign

and security policy can thus be ambiguous, referring either to suprana-tional or to intergovernmental processes. The European Commissiondispenses humanitarian aid and negotiates trade agreements on behalfof all member states.9Intergovernmental cooperation may encompassall EU member states or a subset of EU member states acting apartfrom the rest. Or individual European governments may act unilater-ally. At times a common position among the twenty-seven member

7On interstate cooperation and its impediments in security and defense, as well as neglected as-

pects of regional integration in Europe in these areas from the 1970s through the first decade of thetwenty-first century, see Krotz 2011.8On the Congress of Vienna and Concert of Europe, see Schroeder 1994, chaps. 12, 13; on EPC,


8/35


states emerges on specific issues. At other times different groups ofstates take the lead, for example, the British-French-German troikain negotiations with Iran. Individual states continue to pursue spe-

cial relationships with countries within or outside of Europe, such asFrance-Germany or Britain with the United States. In practice, Euro-pean governments oscillate between different degrees of unilateralism,bilateralism, and multilateralism in pursuit of national or European

values and interests.The formation of West European security arrangements after World

War II was deeply intertwined with the beginning of the cold war,U.S. involvement in continental reconstruction, and early steps towardEuropean integration.10The European Defense Community (EDC) was

to parallel the 1951 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) inbinding European governments and societies more closely together.

The EDCwould have established a Europe of the original sixWestGermany, France, Italy, and the Benelux countrieseffectively inte-grated in security and defense, and it would have created a Europeanmilitary. The EDCs conclusive failure in 1954 brought about two lon-ger-term consequences: NATO and the trans-Atlantic frame decisivelytook over in the areas of security and defense, and ultimate authority

in the domains of traditional high politics remained at the level of thenation-state. Thus, for many decades, political realities provided littlereason for scholars to spend much time thinking about European inte-gration and its causal forces in these policy domains. From the initialpostwar development of European integration in the 1950s, foreignand security policy received little empirical and even less theoreticalattention.

Starting in the 1990s, however, following Europes failure to stemthe violence in the Balkans, the EU has become more serious about

matching its significant commercial and economic prowess with dip-lomatic and political influence. In December 2003 the EU released its

very first paper outlining a unique security strategy, A Secure Europein a Better World, and it has articulated a number of areas in whichit seeks to act as a single, unified actor.11The time when foreign anddefense policy is dictated from Brussels for all member states is still faroffif not completely unrealistic. However, even if states continue to

10Hill and Smith 2000; Katzenstein 2005; Lundestad 1998; Lundestad 2003; Trachtenberg 1999.11European Commission 2003. Subsequently, a reflection groups May 2010 report analyzed some


9/35

556 WORLDPOLITICS

define the basic parameters, foreign and defense policy in Europe is nolonger exclusively a matter of atomized nation-states.12

Even Britain, long ambivalent over the creation of a European se-

curity and defense posture, reversed course in December 1998 at St.Malo, when Prime Minister Tony Blair pledged, along with PresidentJacques Chirac of France, Britains readiness to see the EU become apolitical actor backed by military capability.13Less than five years later,in March 2003, EU troops took over for NATOin Bosnia and Macedo-nia, marking the EUs first military mission. In June of that same yearEuropean troops embarked on a mission to eastern Congo, the EUsfirst military mission outside of Europe.

The classic theoretical positions on European integrationneo-

functionalism, as articulated by Ernst Haas, and intergovernmental-ism, as initially formulated by Stanley Hoffmannagreed that theintegrative pressures that characterized other policy domains wouldbe extremely difficult if not impossible to replicate in the security anddefense realms.14The other main theoretical or analytical frameworksused to study European integration and European politicstransac-tionism, federalism, and multilevel governancenever produced majortheoretical statements on EU foreign and security affairs.15Until al-

most the end of the twentieth century, theorizing on European inte-gration remained fairly aloof from the main developments in generalIRtheory.

Over the course of the 1990s, Andrew Moravcsik was among thefirst and most important scholars to seek direct connections betweenthe study of European integration and general IRtheory, formulatinga liberal intergovernmentalist approach that combined Hoffmannsoriginal statism with a liberal outlook that rooted national interests(or state preferences) in domestic and transnational societies.16 In-

stitutionalist, social constructivist, and structural realist explanationsof European integration followed.17The books and articles considered

12For overviews of the development and expansion of European foreign and security policy fromvarious angles, see Wallace 2005; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008; Smith 2008; Bindi 2010; Chiv-vis 2010; Mrand, Foucault, and Irondelle 2011.

13Howorth 2000.14Haas 1958; Haas 1975; Hoffmann 1966; Hoffmann 1982.15 On Karl Deutschs pioneering work on transactionism and cybernetics, see Deutsch 1954;

Deutsch et al. 1957; Deutsch 1963; in Deutschs spirit, note Puchala 1970; Katzenstein 1976; Sand-holtz and Stone Sweet 1998. On federalist approaches, see Etzioni 1965; Spinelli 1972; Etzioni 2001.

On multilevel governance, see Hooghe and Marks 2001; Jachtenfuchs 2001; Larat and Kohler-Koch2009.16Moravcsik 1991; Moravcsik 1993; Moravcsik 1997; Moravcsik 1998.


10/35


here continue and expand this trend in applying general IRand socialscience theory to European politicsthis time to foreign, security, anddefense policy.

What has emerged is an increasingly distinct field of study with itsown research questions, conceptual issues, and search for causal expla-nations. IR theory is now fully engaging with European integrationstudies and vice versaand, paradoxically, in precisely those policy ar-eas in which European integration traditionally had been the weakestand least developed.

REALISM: BINDINGGERMANY, AUTONOMYFROMTHE

UNITED

STATES

, BALANCING

The increase in European security cooperation in the postcold war era,as well as European integration in general, posed a puzzle for structuralrealist theory.18With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the WarsawPact, European states no longer faced a threat to their political andterritorial integrity. Accordingly, many realists expected European in-tegration, along with NATO, to weaken or recede; some even anticipatedpower competition to return to the European continent.19However,

rather than reverting to a balance of power system reminiscent of thenineteenth century, European security has become more deeply institu-tionalized. Instead of viewing each other as potential competitors andsources of threat, European states have increased the scope and inten-sity of their cooperation. In response to these developments, realismlargely absent from the field since Hoffmanns classic 1966 article onthe durability of the nation-state in Europe20has once again enteredthe theoretical debate on European integration.

In The Rise of European Security Cooperation, Jones asks why, after so

many failed attempts in the past, European states have been both moreopen to cooperation and more successful in establishing it in areas suchas the creation of a European security institution (CFSP); the impositionof economic sanctions on a European rather than a national or transat-lantic basis; collaboration on arms production; and the creation of Eu-ropean military forces. Jones attributes the increase in intra-Europeansecurity cooperation to changes in the structure of both the interna-tional system and the regional system in Europe following the end of

the cold war. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the international18Collard-Wexler 2006.


11/35

558 WORLDPOLITICS

system shifted from bipolarity to unipolarity. Two subsequent devel-opments changed the security environment in Europe and potentiallythreatened its stability. First, a unified Germany emerged as a potential

regional hegemon. Then, in the early 1990s, the United States beganto rapidly reduce its troop presence on the Continent, raising concernsabout its long-term commitment to European security. Both changes

were potentially highly destabilizing to the strategic equilibrium inEurope. In particular, some feared that the inevitable withdrawal of theUnited States from the Continent would create a power vacuum in theheart of Europe.

These simultaneous changes to the international and regional dis-tributions of power, according to Jones, motivated European states

to cooperate on security issues for two main reasons. First, Europeangovernments, including Germanys, were anxious to maintain peaceand stability in Europe. With Germanys rise in relative power andthe United States eventual retreat from Europe, a potential securitydilemma loomed.21European governments sought to bind Germanyinto a European security institution to prevent it from fomenting in-stability. This was successful because Germany today is a status quorather than a revisionist power and because German political leaders

also recognized and wanted to avoid a security dilemma.The second reason was to increase Europes ability to project powerabroad and to decrease its reliance on the United States. Following thecold war, it was inevitable that Europe and the United States wouldno longer define their interests with the same degree of compatibilityas they had during the preceding decades. The wars in the former Yu-goslavia in the 1990s characterized this new reality most profoundly.Europe, paralyzed by division and incoherence, catastrophically failedto stop the bloodshed in the Balkans. The United States, having no

immediate security interests in the region, encouraged the Europeansto do the job themselves. Only after it had become clear that it wouldtake American military action to stop the killing and that the very cred-ibility of NATOwas at stake did the United States intervene. The warsin Bosnia and Kosovo also demonstrated the vast disparity in militarycapabilities between the United States and Europe. Following these

wars, Europeans realized they had to develop an autonomous militarycapability to use when and where the United States chose not to act.

American unipolarity, according to Jones (pp. 2124 et passim), wasa necessary condition for enhanced European security cooperation.


12/35


While insisting that the United States does not pose any kind of threatto Europe, Jones holds that intra-European security cooperation wouldnot have proceeded as quickly in the absence of American unipolarity.

American preponderance produced a dependence on American mili-tary and political power for European countries. It followed from thissituation that a primary motivation behind recent European securitycooperation was to reduce Europes reliance on the United States andto increase its autonomy in world politics.

Jones provides an array of evidence demonstrating that significantincreases in intra-European security cooperation have in fact material-ized in certain policy areas since the cold war period. After three failedattempts in the past, the EU has been successful in creating a Euro-

pean security institution (CFSP). Whereas between 1950 and 1990 Eu-ropean governments that imposed economic sanctions on another statedid so through the EC in only two out of seventeen cases (12 percent),since 1991 EU member states have imposed economic sanctions ontarget states through the EU in twenty-one out of twenty-seven cases(78 percent) (p. 97). European arms producers are more likely to enterpartnerships with one another, rather than with American firms. Andthe EU now has its own military force that it can deploy to areas of

instability.The book, however, will not satisfy all skeptics, especially thosewho believe that Europes impressive capabilitieseconomic, politi-cal, military, and cultural or soft power appealhave not yet trans-lated into real influence and fall far short of Europes at times grandambitions.22For example, Jones does not examine whether Europeansecurity cooperation leads to effectiveoutcomes. Europe may have itsown security institutions, and European states may be imposing sanc-tions through the EU much more than they did during the cold war,

but do such sanctions bring results? Are they, for example, successful inchanging the behavior of the target state? And can Europe succeed inbundling its capabilities and act coherently when it really matters? Onarguably the most consequential security decision since the end of thecold warwhich position to take regarding the United States invasionof Iraqthe Europeans were hopelessly divided. Javier Solana, at thetime the high representative for CFSP, was completely marginalized inthe lead-up to the invasion. What does this say about the effectiveness

of this institution and about Europes real impact?Approaching the subject matter through structural realist precepts,J hi lf t th f ili h th t h l t th


13/35

560 WORLDPOLITICS

he includes. For example, there is no discussion of domestic politics,the weight of Europes history on elite and public attitudes to securitypolicy, or the recognition of the importance of political leadership, with

a corresponding complete lack of agency for European policymakers.This is somewhat curious because, as structural realists concede, theinternational system simply shapes the security environment in whichstates operate; structure alone does not determine outcomes.23In reallife, however, we know that political leaders, their motivations, andtheir choices matter greatly, for both the form and the content of co-operation. Jones neglects many other trends in European politics. Forexample, his account cannot explain why there has been greater sup-port among French and German policymakers for intra-European se-

curity cooperation, whereas other European states such as Britain, theNetherlands, Poland, and several in Central and Eastern Europe havesought instead to maintain the primacy of NATO.

A number of other realists have set their sights on European securitycooperation in recent years.24 While certain similarities aboundallplace causal primacy on the structure of the international systemthere are interesting differences as well, both about the causes of greatercooperation and about the motivations behind it. Barry Posen, for ex-

ample, attributes increased intra-European security cooperation to tra-ditional balance of power (as opposed to balance of threat) dynamics.25European security cooperation, in Posens account, is not motivated byfear of an imminent threat from the United States. Instead, Europeangovernments are concerned about maintaining their autonomy and in-dependent capabilities. While the United States and Europe continue toshare many values and common interests, they do not necessarily havethe same strategic objectives. By taking advantage of economies of scale,Europe ensures that it will be able to act independently of the United

States in areas such as crisis management and conflict prevention.Realists also hold different views on whether Europe is balancing

against the United States and, if so, whether this balancing is of thehard or soft type. Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth see noevidence of such balancing. They argue that regional security con-cerns, rather than balancing ambitions, motivate the increase in intra-European security and defense cooperation.26Keir Lieber and Gerard

23

Waltz 1986, 34344; Posen 2006, 160.24Art 2004; Hyde-Price 2006; Kupchan 2002; Kupchan 2003; Posen 2006.25For a contrary view, see Howorth and Menon 2009. The seminal work on balance of threat


14/35


Alexander do not view European security and defense cooperation asamounting to very muchcertainly not enough to balance U.S. pre-ponderance.27 Robert Art takes issue with both of these views. He

argues that the motive behind the EUs effort to increase its securityand defense capabilities is clearly a case of balancing the United States.28Specifically, Britain and France launched ESDPto enhance their politicalinfluence within the transatlantic alliance through soft balancing, but notto challenge Americas military hegemony with hard balancing.29

One thing on which realists do seem to agree is that Europes in-creased security and defense cooperation will serve to complicate rela-tions between the United States and Europe and lead to more frequenttransatlantic disagreements.30 As Europe charts a more independent

course in world politics and relies less on the United States for its ba-sic security needs, the United States and Europe will no longer definetheir interests with the same degree of commonality as they did duringthe cold war and in its immediate aftermath.

INSTITUTIONALISM: PATHDEPENDENCEANDLEGALIZATION

With a book and a number of articles over the past decade, Michael

Smith has emerged as the most visible expositor of a largely histori-cal institutionalist approach to explaining the appearance and consoli-dation of European foreign and security policy cooperation.31In Eu-ropes Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation,Smith asks how EC/EU member states have been able to intensifytheir cooperation in foreign and security policy since 1970 while simul-taneously respecting the sovereignty of the individual member statesand avoiding the transfer of control over foreign and security policy toBrussels. Smiths explanation, however, actually draws on various in-

stitutionalist approaches and combines elements of historical, socio-logical, and rationalist theorizing.32As he says: EU foreign policy ma-tured from a weak intergovernmental forum inspired by instrumental

27Lieber and Alexander 2005.28Art 2004; Art 20056.29Art 2004, 199.30Hyde-Price 2006, 23132; Jones 2007, 23843; Kissinger 2001, chap. 2; Posen 2006, 185.31In addition to the book, see Smith 2000; Smith 2001; Smith 2004a; Smith 2004b. For a forerun-

ner of this approach, see Ginsberg 2001.32Hall and Taylor 1996; Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallander 1999; Pierson 2004; Katznelsonand Weingast 2005; Krotz 2010. On combining rationalist and constructivist approaches, see Fearon


15/35

562 WORLDPOLITICS

rationality into a more institutionalized policy-making system gov-erned by social rationality.33

According to Smith, European foreign policy cooperation is not

directed by supranational institutions; does not involve bargainingbetween the member states over, for example, side payments or issuelinkages (issue-specific lobbying is virtually nonexistent, especiallycompared with other policy areas); is not dominated by the largeststates (the rotating six-month presidency gives small states importantagenda-setting and leadership opportunities); and does not reflect thelowest common denominator (as Smith points out, preference outli-ers often adapt their positions to be more in line with the communityposition). External influences, notably American power or American

policy choices, also cannot explain cooperation. Nor can functional orpolitical spillover (pp. 2532).34

Instead, European foreign policy and security cooperation emergedthrough the institutionalization of habits and patterns of cooperation,consultation, and consensus building, and much of the book is devotedto examining this historical process. Progress was gradual and incre-mental, marked by both intended and unintended consequences, andhas exceeded anything planned in the first meeting of EPC in 1970.

As Smith finds, although EU foreign policy was established alongstrict intergovernmental lines on the basis of a grand bargain, it hasbecome far more institutionalized than its architects had intended oreven expected.35This institutionalization has affected not only actorsinterests but their identities as well, especially those who work in thepermanent bureaucracy in Brussels.

Institutions lead to greater cooperation in foreign and security pol-icy by two mechanisms. The first, and more important, is preemption.By this Smith means that institutionalization keeps European gov-

ernments from unilaterally adopting fixed positions on consequentialforeign and security policy issues without consulting other Europeangovernments.36 The second is elite socialization. This has fostered atransition from actors pursuing their own instrumental rationalitybased on predetermined national positions to a socially constructedrationality based on collective positions.37

Historically, institutionalization, according to Smith, developed inthree stages (pp. 4049). The first stage began with the creation of EPC

33Smith 2004a, 103.34See also Smith 2004a, 9698.35 S ith 2004 99


16/35


in 1970. This was a strictly intergovernmental forum, both informaland inexpensive (in political and other costs), that sought to createconsensus among the foreign ministers of the different EC member

states. Governments at first were highly reluctant to cede any controlor authority in foreign and security policy to supranational institutions.As a result, there was little expectation that the initial meetings be-tween foreign ministers would result in any substantive developments.

The second stage featured the development of a transgovernmen-tal EPC network. The network included policy experts, bureaucrats,and members of the foreign policy establishments of the EC memberstates. The meetings became more frequent, information sharing wasenhanced, working groups were created, and the telex system of com-

munication was developed. As Smith points out, during this phase aunique culture of cooperation emerged among the foreign ministriesthat included shared standards of behavior, shared understandings, anda common (political) language. The foreign policy elites in differentgovernments got to know one another and became comfortable work-ing with each other. Trust developed, and consultation became secondnature (what has been called a coordination reflex).

The third stage involved deepening the institutionalization process,

which included the emergence of rules and norms, including the expec-tation that EU governments would consult each other before taking aposition on an important issue, and the development of the acquis poli-tique. With the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, CFSPbecame one of the EUsthree pillars, together with monetary union and Justice and HomeAffairs. Without the twenty years of EPC, Smith maintains, CFSPwouldhave been difficult if not impossible to achieve. EU foreign policy has also become an increasingly legalized domain.Legalization is a particular and distinctive form of institutionaliza-

tion. It involves decisions to impose legal constraints on governmentsin particular issue and policy areas.38Legalization creates obligationson governments and subjects behavior to outside scrutiny through thedelegation of monitoring and related tasks to third parties.

In EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentalsand De-velopments in EU External Relations Law, legal scholars Cremona andde Witte document the expanding legal institutionalization of Euro-pean foreign and security affairs and thereby complement and flesh out

other institutional work on the subject. The deepening of legal normsand principles in the EUs external relations has taken place via two


17/35

564 WORLDPOLITICS

pathwaysthrough the expansion of the EUs role in external rela-tions in the Single European Act (SEA) and the Maastricht Treaty; andthrough a process of judicial review: we have seen a rapid thickening

of judge-made constitutional law relating to the respective roles of theCommission, the Council, and the Parliament, to the intricate divisionof competences between the EU and Member States (Cremona andde Witte 2008, xii).

As a result of these two developments, the EUs foreign relationshave grown massively in volume and complexity (Cremona and de

Witte 2008, xiii). There is an increasingly large volume of both treatylaw and case law on issues ranging from trade and development policy,the EUs role in neighborhood conflicts (particularly covering conflict

prevention), and the EUs neighborhood policy, that is, the political,institutional, and constitutional changes states must make to be con-sidered for EU membership. At the same time, even as foreign and security policy has becomemore legalized, member states have resisted full legalization in thesedomains, particularly in areas of vital national interests.39This seems tobe true for institutionalization in general. Frequently, one has the sensethat institutionalization can explain cooperation only in cases in which

vital interests are not at stake. Decades of institutionalization did notprevent the fiascoes surrounding Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq, or the self-help policies in relations with Russia. This, many might say, may besobering news for institutional theorizing more generally, as the EU,composed of advanced Western democracies with a long history of co-operation, should be a favorable domain for effective institutionalizedsecurity cooperation. While the literature on institutionalization and legalization illu-minates important developments in EU foreign and security policy,

questions persist over their true causal role. In many instances, institu-tionalization is to a certain extent endogenous to other factorssuchas economic integration, shifts in domestic preferences, the expansionand consolidation of democratic institutions, integration in other policyand issue areas, and normative evolution, at both the societal and theelite levels. Evaluating the real impact of institutions independentlyfrom these other factors therefore remains a daunting yet critical task. Finally, institutionalism can be vague on the internal dynamics lead-

ing to institutional change and evolution, especially on the magnitudeand speed of institutionalization. Smith cites three such logics: a func-


18/35


tional logic, normative appropriateness, and a sociocultural (or social-ization) logic (p. 33). As a historical institutionalist, he holds that insti-tutions evolve incrementally and gradually over time. In many instances,

however, institutional development does not proceed in a constant andgradual manner. In such cases, the idea of punctuated equilibriummight be a better analogy to explain the institutionalization of Euro-pean foreign and security policy.40Punctuated equilibrium posits longperiods of stasis interrupted by relatively brief periods of major change.CFSPwas dormant until France and Germany made a deal at Maas-tricht on political and economic union. Similarly, defense cooperationremained modest until the 1998 Franco-British agreement in St. Malo.

SOCIALCONSTRUCTIVISM: STRATEGICCULTURE, NORMATIVECONVERGENCE, SOCIALIZATION

Scholars have adopted constructivist perspectives to explain variousfeatures of European politics, including aspects of regional integrationand eastern enlargement; Europes regional polity within the Ameri-can imperium; socialization of different sorts; and various aspects ofEuropean identity.41But only recently have scholars used constructiv-

ism to explain European security cooperation. So far this new focus hasmostly evolved around asking whether a common European strategicculture is emerging or whether in fact it already exists in some formand what if any effect this has on state behavior. Research on the emergence and possible robustness of a Europeanstrategic culture is politically important. A number of scholars (andnot only those studying strategic culture) and policy practitioners haveclaimed that European foreign policy, security, and defense, if they areto grow beyond current roles and capabilities, will require a foundation

of shared interests, values, priorities, perceptions of threat, and legiti-mate means and ends for the use of military force, as well as agreementon Europes proper role in the world. If disagreement or divergence onthese issues persists, many academics and policymakers believe, thencooperation in these policy areas is unlikely to develop and consolidate. In The Quest for a European Strategic Culture, Meyer analyzes theextent to which national strategic cultures in Europe have convergedsince the end of the cold war. Strategic cultures comprise deep-seated

norms, beliefs, and ideas about a states role in the world, its perception40Krasner 1984; Krasner 1988; Eldredge and Gould 1972.


19/35

566 WORLDPOLITICS

of security threats, and the legitimate means and ends for the use offorce (p. 2). Though these cultures remain distinct, Meyer finds thatthere is increasing convergence among European states regarding the

deprioritization of territorial defense since the end of the cold war; theneed and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping; astrong role for the UN, including authorizing the use of military force;and a general preference for civilian rather than military policy instru-ments (p. 185). While Meyer claims there has been broad normativeconvergence among Britain, France, Germany, and Poland (the fourcountries under consideration in his book), he cautions that nationaldifferences still exist: [N]ormative convergence in these areas does notmean that national beliefs have become fully compatible, but only that

differences have narrowed (p. 11). In explaining the process of normative convergence, Meyer specifiesthree causal mechanisms: changing threat perceptions due to changesin the external security environment; institutional socialization andthe role of epistemic communities as the drivers of cognitive change;and mediatized crisis learning, by which he means normative shifts

within media discourse that in turn challenge existing social norms andinduce learning (p. 6). To assess the degree of normative convergence

and thus the extent to which a distinctly European strategic culture isemergingMeyer uses data from public opinion polls, a content anal-ysis of newspapers, and responses to a questionnaire by think tank ex-perts and by national parliamentarians sitting on defense committees.

Where is Europe heading, and what is the purpose of foreign policyand security cooperation? Meyer sees the emergence of what he callsHumanitarian Power Europe, where there is convergence on lowto medium level of risk tolerance regarding the proportionate use offorce, moderate to high authorization requirements [for the use of

military force], a growing attachment to the EU as an actor with ageneral preference for using soft power, and support for goals regard-ing the use of force, which do not substantially transcend beyond thepurposes of humanitarianism (p. 30). This is contrasted to two otherideal types: Helvetian Europe, where Europe would limit its globalcommitments and profile, leave military alliances such as NATO, andprivilege nonalignment and neutrality; and Global Power Europe, in

which Europe would use its aggregated power to adopt a more activist

outward orientation, including the pursuit of realpolitik, a higher toler-ance for risk, and lower thresholds for the authorization of force.Alth h M k i t t ti d d th th t


20/35


culture is emerging and what effect this might have on state behaviorultimately remain inconclusive. Even Meyer confesses that only a nar-row and thin strategic culture has emerged (p. 42). Moreover, mea-

suring the existence and the causal effect of strategic culture (or nor-mative convergence)across four countries reflecting cultural changeswithin an entire regionis a conceptually and methodologically chal-lenging task. Strategic culture or related types of domestic constructionhave commonly been used to explain or compare the conduct of singlecountries.42Conceptual and methodological difficulties arise when ap-plying the concept to multiple countries. The difficulty is not unique toMeyer. Another attempt at evaluating the strength of a European stra-tegic culture suffers from conceptual and methodological challenges

similar to those that characterize Meyers study.43 Despite staking a claim within the modernist constructivist camp(p. 5) la Schimmelfennig, Katzenstein, Finnemore, and Checkel,among others, and self-consciously adopting a broadly positivist epis-temology, the book is surprisingly atheoretical. Even when Meyer ar-ticulates testable hypotheses, there is little attempt at explaining howall the variables and propositions hang together. Moreover, the hypoth-eses or testable propositions that are advanced are often in no way

unique to constructivist theorizing or clearly distinguished or distin-guishable from the expectations of other theoretical perspectives in IR.For example, Meyer states that Britain, France, Germany, and Polandhave a fading attachment to territorial defense today as compared

with their orientations during the cold war period and that a new nor-mative consensus has emerged regarding perceptions of external se-curity threats. However, this can be equally and perhaps more easilyexplained by rationalist and materialist approaches. Indeed, it would beastonishing (or proof of serious paranoia and poor political leadership)

if these countries felt the same or an increased perception of threat totheir territorial security now that the cold war is over and the SovietUnion and the Warsaw Pact are gone.

A second, related problem is the absence of any consideration or ex-plicit testing of alternative explanations. One gets the sense that thereis a general dissatisfaction with political realism, particularly structuralrealism, but there is hardly any discussion of specifically why realism isunsatisfactory and why the use of strategic culture will help us arrive at

more complete, accurate, and rigorous explanations of these important


21/35

568 WORLDPOLITICS

developments. The result is an apparent unwillingness either to subjectclaims to empirical disconfirmation or to demonstrate why this frame-

work offers a better explanation compared with the alternatives.

Third, there is also an issue of tautology or circularity in the bookthat applies the concept of strategic culture to European foreign andsecurity policy.44For example, normative convergence leads to chang-ing threat perceptions or changing attitudes about the legitimate use ofmilitary force. Meyer uses these in turn as evidence for evolving nor-mative convergence. Strategic culture can be used as either an indepen-dent or a dependent variable, depending on ones research objective.

The relationship between the two is not always clear in the work con-sidered here. It is true that the two could be co-constituted, but one

would then have to show specific feedback mechanisms linking strate-gic culture as an independent and an outcome variable, respectively.

In addition, it remains unclear where strategic culture is located andhow its impact should be measured or empirically documented. Thismight be because what represents strategic culture is not consistentthroughout Meyers book. In fact, to assess the strength of normativechange, Meyer uses different proxies for each of his three empiricalchapters. To assess changing threat perceptions in response to both the

end of the cold war and the rise of Islamist terrorism, Meyer focuseson existing public opinion surveys. One thus infers that public opinionrepresents or reflects strategic culture. To assess changing norms onthe use of force (particularly in response to cases of ethnic conflict andhuman rights abuses) and multilateralism, Meyer conducts a contentanalysis of national newspapers, offering anecdotal evidence that a nor-mative shift emerged following the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. Onethus infers that newspaper editorials reflect strategic culture. To evalu-ate whether the rise of new security institutions acts to socialize agents

operating within them, Meyer uses responses to questionnaires. Onethus infers that the degree to which institutional socialization occursreflects the strength of strategic culture.

However, as International Institutions and Socialization in Europedemonstrates, none of these criticisms or shortcomings is inherent toconstructivism as such or to applications of constructivist thought. Ex-ploring how institutions in Europe socialize states and state agents,

Jeffrey Checkel and contributors provide conceptually and method-

ologically rigorous constructivist research. The volumes basic proposi-tion is that international institutions are social environments and that


22/35


participation in them may socialize both individual policymakers andstates; institutions can have constitutive as well as constraining effects(p. 19).

Checkel defines socialization as a process of inducting actors intothe norms and rules of a given community (p. 5). He distinguishes be-tween two types of socialization. Type I socialization is the movementfrom instrumental rationality to the conscious adoption of new roles.

Type II socialization signifies changes in values and interests or whenagents accept community or organizational norms as the right thingto do (p. 6). By adopting the rules of the broader community, the ac-tor or agent moves from a logic of consequences to a logic of appropri-ateness.45Checkel further identifies three separate causal mechanisms

that induce change: strategic calculation, role playing, and normativesuasion (pp. 916, 24351).

The individual chapters apply this framework to the socializing ef-fects of several institutions in Europe, including NATO, the Council ofEurope, and the OSCE. Interestingly, the results of institutionalizationare largely consistent with Meyers findings. The empirical studiesdemonstrate that the socializing effects of European institutions areuneven and often surprisingly weak, and in no way can be construed as

shaping a new, post-national identity (p. 16). Unfortunately, no chap-ter looked specifically at CFSPor ESDP. It would have been instructive tocompare the findings with those of Meyer and Smith.46

WHERETHEFIELDSTANDS

These books and articles represent a decisive development in the lit-erature on European foreign and security policy. Examined together,they provide a number of lessons and insights. First, across theoretical

perspectives, a consensus has emerged that European states have suc-ceeded in establishing a degree of cooperation in foreign policy, secu-rity, and defense that is historically unprecedented.

Second, there is basic disagreement regarding which factors aredriving and thus are most important for explaining the apparent con-solidation of policy-making at the European level. That we find suchdisagreement across works rooted in different theoretical or intellectual

45March and Olsen 2006.46

In addition to the constructivist approaches outlined in this section, political sociology has en-tered the field as well. Situated in a broader argument about state transformation, ESDP, because it cutsto the heart of state sovereignty, redefines the way in which Europeans think about the state in the


23/35

570 WORLDPOLITICS

traditions should not be surprising. What is remarkable, however, arethe striking differences within the same macroperspective, realism inparticular.

Some realists attribute the rise in European security cooperation toa desire for enhanced autonomy from the United States and a greaterprofile in world politics. Others point to traditional balance of powerdynamics (a response to American unipolarity). Some, such as Jones,leave out balancing dynamics altogether. Yet another reason realistscite is a desire to avoid a potential regional security dilemma and tobind Germany into European institutions. Institutionalists place dif-fering emphases on the relative importance of logics of consequences

versus logics of appropriateness driving cooperation, as well as the role

of path-dependent versus sociological processes for institutional evolu-tion and adaptation. Constructivists diverge on how deeply institutionssocialize actors and over what matters most in reshaping the regionspolitical character: socialization through international institutions ornormative convergence otherwise driven. Third, while the works discussed here demonstrate that Europeanforeign, security, and defense policy has significantly expanded andconsolidated over the past fifteen years, marshaling a broad range of

causal factors and explanations for why this has happened, none of theauthors addresses the question of why cooperation works at some timeson some issues but not on others. For example, while the EU was ableto adopt a common position in response to the six-day war betweenRussia and Georgia in August 2008, including sending an EU mis-sion to Georgia to monitor Russias promise of troop withdrawal fromGeorgia proper, EU states are still divided on recognizing Kosovos in-dependence.

It is not clear how the authors would explain such variation: the

starts and stops of integration or why cooperation on foreign and secu-rity policy seems to ebb and flow. Rather than moving in a linear fash-ion, progress toward consolidating a more cohesive European foreignand security policy has been uneven and has moved in a number ofsuccessive phases, marked by incremental successes building on ma-

jor failures.47This returns us to the question raised earlier: why doesEuropean cooperation in foreign policy, security, and defense seem to

work and hold together in some political instances but not in others?

The extant research in this new field has not yet seriously considered oreven acknowledged this question. Theorizing on these starts and stopsill f th t th th b i fi ld i th f t


24/35


Fourth, it is also worth noting what is currently missing in this lit-erature. To date, there is no major theoretical work applying liberal IRtheory to increased European foreign and security policy cooperation.

A liberalIR

theory might stress how domestic and transnational so-cietal coalitions, interdependence, domestic institutions, and perhapsvalues shape state preferences and make cooperation more likely.

Such a liberal approach would also likely see the purpose of Eu-ropean cooperation in much different terms than that of a realist ap-proach, for example. It would place less emphasis on Europes militarycapabilities and advantages and instead highlight Europes soft powerappeal and its ability to attract others, particularly those states on Eu-ropes periphery that one day hope for EU membership. As Moravcsik

says, Despite its substantial military assets, Europes true geopoliticalcomparative advantage lies in projecting civilian influence: economicinfluence, international law, smart and soft power.48

Finally, another notable feature of this literature concerns the natureof causal explanation. Most arguments in this new field tend to adopta zero-sum form in which cooperation derives from international orregional pressures, orinstitutionalization, orculture and identity. In realpolitical life, any sensible observer would likely agree that the increase

in the scope and intensity of cooperation is probably shaped by morethan one of these factors, perhaps by all of them. There might even bean element of overdetermination.

The more interesting question is how these various factors interactwith each other, how and possibly in what order they combine to es-tablish causal effect, and how much each factor or variable explains in-dividually. The degree to which moving beyond monocausal argumentsor explanations more or less cleanly rooted in one macroperspective orparadigm and the degree to which analytic eclecticism might help to

arrive at historically and politically more exhaustive explanations offeran interesting theoretical puzzle that arises from these works. These arequestions that future scholarship in the area will likely consider.49

CONCLUSION: THEORETICALPROMISEANDPOLITICALIMPORTANCE

The past decade has witnessed the advent of a new area of research thathas merged the study of European integration in the areas of tradi-

tional high politics with international relations theory. Scholars have48 M ik 2009 409 10 F b i li f h lib l h f E f i


25/35

572 WORLDPOLITICS

identified a wide range of factors to explain the rise of European for-eign policy, security, and defense cooperation. This may reflect the mul-tiplicity of forces at work and the many dimensions that these changes

in European affairs imply, as well as the diversity of international rela-tions theory and the fields infancy. The new field offers a number ofpromising theoretical openings in areas of great political importance.

Bringing general IR theory to the study of European foreign andsecurity policy holds clear benefits for isolating key factors that canpotentially lead to greater cooperation or integration in these domains.But what about the reverse? What might the study of European inte-gration in security and defense offer to IR and social science theory?

Will there be new, meaningful contributions or reappraisals of some of

the central features, concepts, and conventional wisdoms of major theo-ries or theoretical paradigms? Since the seventeenth century Europeanpolitics has provided IRwith some of its core concepts and theories:the modern territorial state, the balance of power, deterrence, alliancepolitics, major aspects of power transition theory, the security dilemma,basic approaches to regional integration, offense-defense theory, andnationalism and ideology. Will similar theoretical or analytical break-throughs occur by studying European foreign and security policy of the

early twenty-first century?European foreign and security policy cooperation seems to be aqualitatively new form of resilient and evolving cooperation betweenstates in these areas. It is not simply a framework of collective security,nor a conventional military alliance, nor just a new type of twenty-first century European concert. Will this system in security and de-fense further consolidate into a distinct regional polity and machineryof policy-makingand thus offer new ways of theorizing internationalaffairs? Or will it, little by little, turn into a cohesive pan-European ac-

tor in high politics that resembles classic nation-states yet on a largerscaleand thus offer new terrain for theorizing full-scale regional in-tegration in foreign policy, security, and defense? What is highly likelyis that Europes role in world politics will largely be defined by Europesmost powerful states in pursuit of their own interests, perhaps along

with the increasing involvement of various European-level institutionsand offices, both intergovernmental and supranational. Taking domestic politics more systematically into accountwhether

viewed through historical institutionalist, constructivist, or rationalistlensescould be one of the more significant contributions of this newfield to the st d of international relations E ropean states are democ


26/35


safe, secure, and prosperous EU, foreign, security, and defense policyis in important ways a function of domestic politics. While the Talley-rands, Metternichs, Castlereaghs, and Bismarcks of European history

(and the many minor figures alongside) may not have had to botherwith trifles such as domestic pressures, democratic constitutional ar-rangements, or public opinion, this clearly is not the case for todayspolitical leaders. Systematic testing of the role of domestic politics,presumably in association with regional and systemwide factors andforces, promises to help the field to arrive at more comprehensive androbust theoretical knowledge. Beyond the theoretical promise of the subject matter, there is its ba-sic political importance. The fate of European cooperation in the for-

eign policy, security, and defense domains will be crucial if Europe is tofind its place and, one way or another, define its role in the world. Inone sense perhaps, European governments today face a decision similarto the one the United States faced in the 1940s: to boost their strategicmeans to match their expanding collective foreign policy goals or toscale down their ambitions to match their limited capabilities. Europeis unlikely to be able to afford to avoid this issue indefinitely and willeventually have to confront it. Europe will also have to accept that an

increased role worldwide potentially involves painful costs and risks,and it will have to determine which might be tolerable and which un-acceptable. One of the most noteworthy developments in Europeanforeign and security affairs is that longtime observers of European pol-itics have begun to reflect on what a European grand strategy shouldbeand could be.50 Arguments over the purpose and ends of European foreign policyand security cooperation will continue, not only among scholars oper-ating from similar or different theoretical orientations but also among

practitioners and policymakers across the political spectrum, and at thenational and supranational levels, promoting their preferred vision ofEurope as a political project. Similarly, the finality issuewhere Euro-pean foreign policy, security, and defense cooperation, as well as Euro-pean integration at large, are ultimately headedwill involve politicaldecisions. In any case, a Europe more or less cohesive in foreign policy, security,and defense would mark a dramatic shift from what Europe has expe-

rienced over the past two centurieswhether nineteenth-century-stylebalancing, great power concert, warring against each other, or loosely


27/35

574 WORLDPOLITICS

coordinating in matters of foreign and security policy. Such a Europewould also mark a significant feature of the basic character of worldpolitics in the decades and century ahead.

REFERENCES

Abdelal, Rawi. 2010. The Profits of Power: Commercial Realpolitik in Europeand Eurasia. Harvard Business School Working Paper, no. 11-028. Cam-bridge: Harvard Business School.

Art, Robert J. 2004. Europe Hedges Its Security Bets. In T. V. Paul, James J.Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, eds., Balance of Power Revisited: Theory andPractice in the 21st Century. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

. 20056. Correspondence: Striking the Balance. International Security

30, no. 3 (Winter): 17796.Bindi, Federiga, ed. 2010. The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Eu-ropes Role in the World. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Brooks, Stephen G., and William C. Wohlforth. 2005. Hard Times for SoftBalancing.International Security30, no. 1 (Summer): 72108.

. 2008. World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge ofAmerican Primacy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Buchan, David. 2009. Energy and Climate Change: Europe at the Crossroads. Ox-ford: Oxford University Press.

Butterfield, Herbert. 1951. History and Human Relations. London: Collins.

Checkel, Jeffrey T., and Peter J. Katzenstein, eds. 2009.European Identity. Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press.Chivvis, Christopher S. 2010.EU Civilian Crisis Management: The Record So Far.

Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND.Christiansen, Thomas, Knud Erik Jrgensen, and Antje Wiener, eds. 2001. The

Social Construction of Europe. London: Sage.Collard-Wexler, Simon. 2006. Integration under Anarchy: Neorealism and the

European Union. European Journal of International Relations12, no. 3 (Sep-tember): 397432.

Cooper, Robert. 2004. The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first

Century. New York: Grove.Cowles, Maria Green, James Caporaso, and Thomas Risse, eds. 2001. Transform-ing Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Uni-versity Press.

Deutsch, Karl W. 1954. Political Community at the International Level: Problems ofDefinition and Measurement. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.

. 1963. The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication andControl. London: Collier-Macmillan.

Deutsch, Karl W., Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Jr., Maurice Lee, MartinLichterman, Raymond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Loewenheim, and Richard W.

Van Wagenen. 1957. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: Interna-tional Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press


28/35


Eldredge, Niles, and Stephen J. Gould. 1972. Punctuated Equilibria: An Alter-native to Phyletic Gradualism. In Thomas J. M. Schopf, ed., Models in Paleo-biology. San Francisco: Freeman.

Etzioni, Amitai. 1965. Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and

Forces. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.. 2001. Political Unification Revisited: On Building Supranational Commu-nities. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books.

European Commission. 2003. A Secure Europe in a Better World. Manuscript,Brussels.

European Council. 2010. Project Europe 2030: Challenges and Opportunities.Manuscript, Brussels.

Fearon, James, and Alexander Wendt. 2002. Rationalism v. Constructivism: ASkeptical View. In Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons,eds., Handbook of International Relations. London: Sage.

Fligstein, Neil, Wayne Sandholtz, and Alec Stone Sweet, eds. 2001. The Institu-tionalization of Europe. New York: Oxford University Press.Foucault, Martial, Frdric Mrand, and Bastien Irondelle. 2010. Public Support

for European Defense: Does Strategic Culture Matter? Paper presented atthe conference of the Council for European Studies, Montral, Canada, April1517.

Galtung, Johann. 1973. The European Community: A Superpower in the Making.London: Allen and Unwin.

Giegerich, Bastian. 2006. European Security and Strategic Culture: National Re-sponses to the EUs Security and Defence Policy. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Ginsberg, Roy. 2001. The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire.Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield.Glaser, Charles L. 1997. The Security Dilemma Revisited. World Politics 50,

no. 1 (October): 171201.Goldstein, Judith L., Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaugh-

ter, eds. 2001. Legalization and World Politics.Cambridge: MITPress.Gordon, Philip H. 199798. Europes Uncommon Foreign Policy.International

Security22, no. 3 (Winter): 74100.Gordon, Philip H., and Jeremy Shapiro. 2004.Allies at War: America, Europe, and

the Crisis over Iraq. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Grieco, Joseph. 1995. The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union,and the Neorealist Research Programme. Review of International Studies21,vol. 1 ( January): 2140.

. 1996. State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A NeorealistInterpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Mon-etary Union. Security Studies5, no. 3 (Spring): 176222.

Haas, Ernst B. 1958. The Uniting of Europe: Political, Economic, and Social Forces,19501957. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

. 1975. The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory. Berkeley, Calif.: In-stitute of International Studies.

Haftendorn, Helga, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander, eds. 1999.Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space. New York: OxfordUniversity Press


29/35

576 WORLDPOLITICS

Hall, Peter A., and Rosemary C. R. Taylor. 1996. Political Science and the ThreeNew Institutionalisms. Political Studies44, no. 5: 93657.

Henke, Marina E. 2010. A Liberal-Intergovernmental Theory of European Se-curity Cooperation. Manuscript, Princeton University.

Herz, John H. 1950. Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma. WorldPolitics2, no. 2 (January): 15780.Hill, Christopher. 1993. The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing

Europes International Role.Journal of Common Market Studies31, no. 3 (Sep-tember): 30528.

Hill, Christopher, and Karen E. Smith, eds. 2000. European Foreign Policy: KeyDocuments. London: Routledge.

Hoffmann, Stanley. 1966. Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation Stateand the Case of Western Europe. Daedalus95, no. 3: 862915.

. 1982. Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe Today.Jour-

nal of Common Market Studies21, no. 1 (September): 2138.. 2000. Towards a Common European Foreign and Security Policy?Journal of Common Market Studies38, no. 2 (June): 18998.

Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. 2001. Multi-Level Governance and EuropeanIntegration. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield.

Howorth, Jolyon. 2000. Britain, France, and the European Defence Initiative.Survival42, no. 2 (January): 3355.

. 2009. Implementing a Grand Strategy. In lvaro de Vasconcelos, ed.,What Ambitions for European Defence in 2020?Paris: European Union Institutefor Security Studies.

. 2010. The EU as a Global Actor: Grand Strategy for a Global GrandBargain.Journal of Common Market Studies48, no. 3 (June): 45574.Howorth, Jolyon, and Anand Menon. 2009. Still Not Pushing Back: Why the

European Union Is Not Balancing the United States.Journal of Conflict Reso-lution53, no. 5 (October): 72744.

Hyde-Price, Adrian. 2006. Normative Power Europe: A Realist Critique.Jour-nal of European Public Policy13, no. 2 (March): 21734.

Jachtenfuchs, Markus. 2001. The Governance Approach to European Integra-tion.Journal of Common Market Studies39, no. 2 (June): 24564.

Jervis, Robert. 1978. Cooperation under the Security Dilemma. World Politics

30, no. 2 (January): 167214.Johnston, Alastair Iain. 1998. Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strat-egy in Chinese History. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Katzenstein, Peter J. 1976. Disjoined Partners: Austria and Germany since 1815.Berkeley: University of California Press.

. 1996. Cultural Norms and National Security. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Uni-versity Press.

. 2005. A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium.Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Katznelson, Ira, and Barry R. Weingast, eds. 2005. Preferences and Situations:

Points of Intersection between Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalism.New York: Russell Sage.Keukeleire Stephan and Jennifer MacNaughtan 2008 The Foreign Policy of the


30/35


Kier, Elizabeth. 1997.Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine betweenthe Wars. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kissinger, Henry. 2001. Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacyfor the 21st Century. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Krasner, Stephen D. 1984. Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions andHistorical Dynamics. Comparative Politics16, no. 2 (January): 22346.. 1988. Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective. Comparative Political

Studies21, no. 1 (April): 6694.Krotz, Ulrich. 2007. Parapublic Underpinnings of International Relations: The

Franco-German Construction of Europeanization of a Particular Kind.Euro-pean Journal of International Relations13, no. 3 (September): 385417.

. 2009. Momentum and Impediments: Why Europe Wont Emerge asa Full Political Actor on the World Stage Soon. Journal of Common MarketStudies47, no. 3 (June): 55578.

. 2010. Regularized Intergovernmentalism: France-Germany and Beyond(19632009). Foreign Policy Analysis6, no. 2 (June): 14785.. 2011. Flying Tiger: International Relations Theory and the Politics of Ad-

vanced Weapons. New York: Oxford University Press.. Forthcoming. History and Foreign Policy in France and Germany. Basing-

stoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.Kupchan, Charles A. 2002. The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and

the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century. New York: Knopf.. 2003. The Rise of Europe, Americas Changing Internationalism, and

the End of U.S. Primacy. Political Science Quarterly 118, no. 2 (Summer):

20531.Larat, Fabrice, and Beate Kohler-Koch, eds. 2009. European Multilevel Gover-nance: Contrasting Images in National Research. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Leiber, Keir A., and Gerald Alexander. 2005. Waiting for Balancing: Why the WorldIs Not Pushing Back.International Security30, no. 1 (Summer): 10939.

Lundestad, Geir. 1998. Empire by Integration: The United States and EuropeanIntegration, 19451997. New York: Oxford University Press.

. 2003. The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From Empire byInvitation to Transatlantic Drift. New York: Oxford University Press.

Maher, Richard. 2011. Friends and Rivals: Why Allies Disagree on Major Secu-

rity Issues. Ph.D. diss., Brown University.March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 2006. The Logic of Appropriateness. InRobert Goodin, Michael Moran, and Martin Rein, eds., Handbook of PublicPolicy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McNamara, Kathleen. 1999. The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the Euro-pean Union. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Mearsheimer, John. 1990. Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after theCold War.International Security15, no. 1 (Summer): 556.

Mrand, Frdric. 2008. European Defence Policy: Beyond the Nation State. NewYork: Oxford University Press.

Mrand, Frdric, Martial Foucault, and Bastien Irondelle, eds. 2011. EuropeanSecurity since the Fall of the Berlin Wall. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.Meunier Sophie 2007 Trading Voices: The European Union in International Com


31/35

578 WORLDPOLITICS

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1991. Negotiating the Single European Act: National Inter-ests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community.InternationalOrganization45, no. 1 (Winter): 1956.

. 1993. Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal

Intergovernmentalist Approach.Journal of Common Market Studies31, no. 4(December): 473524.. 1997. Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International

Politics.International Organization51, no. 4 (Autumn): 51353.. 1998. The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina

to Maastricht. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.. 2009. Europe: The Quiet Superpower. French Politics7, no. 34: 40322.. 2010a. Europe, the Second Superpower. Current History(March): 9198.. 2010b. Europe: Rising Superpower in a Bipolar World. In Alan Alex-

androff and Andrew Cooper, eds., Rising States, Rising Institutions. Washing-

ton, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.Nuttall, Simon. 1992.European Political Co-operation. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.

Parsons, Craig. 2003. A Certain Idea of Europe. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress.

Pierson, Paul. 1996. The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institution-alist Analysis. Comparative Political Studies29, no. 2: 12363.

. 2004. Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. Princeton:Princeton University Press.

Posen, Barry R. 2006. European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response

to Unipolarity? Security Studies15, no. 2 (July): 14986.Puchala, Donald J. 1970. Integration and Disintegration in Franco-German Re-lations, 19541965.International Organization24, no. 2 (Spring): 183208.

Risse, Thomas. 2010. A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities andPublic Spheres. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Rosato, Sebastian. 2010.Europe United: Power Politics and the Making of the Euro-pean Community. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Sandholtz, Wayne, and Alec Stone Sweet, eds. 1998. European Integration andSupranational Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University

Press.Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2003. The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe: Rulesand Rhetoric. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Schroeder, Paul W. 1994. The Transformation of European Politics, 17631848.Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sil, Rudra, and Peter J. Katzenstein. 2010. Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticismin the Study of World Politics. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Smith, Karen E. 2008.European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, 2nd ed.Cambridge: Polity Press.

. 2010. Genocide and the Europeans. New York: Cambridge University

Press.Smith, Michael E. 2000. Conforming to Europe: The Domestic Impact of Eu-ropean Foreign Policy Cooperation Journal of European Public Policy 7 no 4


32/35


. 2001. Diplomacy by Decree: The Legalization of EU Foreign Policy.Journal of Common Market Studies39, no. 1 (March): 79104.

. 2004a. Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation, and European ForeignPolicy Cooperation. European Journal of International Relations 10, no. 1

(March): 95136.. 2004b. Toward a Theory of European Foreign Policy-Making: Multi-Level Governance, Domestic Politics, and National Adaptation to EuropesCommon Foreign and Security Policy.Journal of European Public Policy11, no.4 (August): 74058.

Spinelli, Altiero. 1972. The Growth of the European Movement since the Sec-ond World War. In Michael Hodges, ed., European Integration. Harmond-worth: Penguin.

Trachtenberg, Marc. 1999.A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settle-ment, 19451963. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Vdrine, Hubert. 2001. France in an Age of Globalization. With Dominique Mosi.Trans. Philip H. Gordon. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.Vennesson, Pascal. 2010. Competing Visions for the European Union Grand

Strategy.European Foreign Affairs Review15, no. 1: 5775.Wallace, William. 2005. Foreign and Security Policy: The Painful Path from

Shadow to Substance. In Helen Wallace, William Wallace, and Mark A. Pol-lack, eds., Policy-Making in the European Union, 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford Uni-versity Press.

Walt, Stephen M. 1987. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1986. Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Re-sponse to My Critics. In Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics.New York: Columbia University Press.

. 1993. The Emerging Structure of International Politics. InternationalSecurity18, no. 2 (Autumn): 4479.

Zielonka, Jan. 1998. Explaining Euro-Paralysis: Why Europe Is Unable to Act inInternational Politics. New York: St. Martins Press.


33/35

T H E C O N T R I B U T O R S

JOHNGERRINGis a professor of political science at Boston University. He is the author of PartyIdeologies in America, 18281996 (1998), Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework

(2001), Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (2007), A Centripetal Theory of DemocraticGovernance (2008), Concepts and Method: Giovanni Sartori and His Legacy (2009), Social Sci-ence Methodology: A Unified Framework(2012), Global Justice: A Prioritarian Manifesto(inprocess), and Democracy and Development: A Historical Perspective (in process), along withnumerous articles. He can be reached at [email protected].

DANIELZIBLATTis a professor of government at Harvard University. He is the author of Struc-turing the State: The Formation of Italy and Germany and the Puzzle of Federalism (2006) andcoeditor of The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies (2010). He is currently completing abook entitled, Conservative Political Parties and the Birth of Modern Democracy in Europe.He can be reached at [email protected].

JOHANVANGORPis a fifth-year doctoral candidate in the Political Science Department at Bos-ton University. He is currently working on his dissertation, Discursive Institutionalism andPolitical Change in the Netherlands. He can be reached at [email protected].

JULINARVALOreceived his Ph.D. in political science from Boston University in May 2011.His work focuses on Latin American political economy and studies the interplay betweenideas and the formation of political values and attitudes. He can be reached at [email protected].

TARIQTHACHILis an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Yale Univer-sity. His research interests include examining the linkages between political parties and ordinaryvoters, ethnic and religious politics, and patterns of public spending in poor democracies. Heis currently completing a book manuscript based on his doctoral dissertation, examining howreligious nationalists can win over poor communities using social services. He

Date post:	04-Jun-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	ancys
View:	223 times
Download:	0 times