Introducere in relatii internationale-Level of Analysis Isak

7/28/2019 Introducere in relatii internationale-Level of Analysis Isak

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Northeastern Political Science Association

The Individual in International Politics: Solving the Level-of-Analysis ProblemAuthor(s): Robert A. IsaakReviewed work(s):Source: Polity, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Winter, 1974), pp. 264-276Published by: Palgrave Macmillan JournalsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3234376 .

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The Individual in International Politics: Solving the Level-of-AnalysisProblem

Robert A. Isaak, Fordham UniversityThe field of international politics is dominated by two dehumanizing as-sumptions. Most scholars begin by assuming either that the internationalsystem must be their firstpremise, or that the nation-state is the best pointof departure. Whether used separately or combined, these two "levels ofanalysis"repress a third alternative-the assumptionthat the study of in-ternational politics is meaningless unless one begins by analyzing individ-uals in interaction with other individuals. The thesis of this essay is that ahumanistic science of internationalpolitics is only possible by beginningwith individual humanbeings. Furthermore, he phenomenological methodcan be used to solve the level-of-analysis problem without sacrificingem-piricalrigoror neglecting"outside deterministicforces" which characterizethe reified notions of "nation-state"and "internationalsystem."The solution to the level-of-analysis problem is largely a question oflanguage and definition. But definitions are never arbitrary.They grow outof conscious experience and are rooted in theory and method. The theoryand method behind the definitionof politics used here have been explicatedin Politics for Human Beings.' This theory defines politics as a social actthat attempts to solve the tension between human needs and social facts.Needs are basic prerequisitesfor healthy human existence, such as physio-logical, security, love, self-esteem, and self-actualization needs.2 Humanbeings of all cultures are motivated to satisfy such needs by using or over-coming existing social facts they find in their way. Social facts of everydaylife include existing values, personalities, social and political institutions,and rules of the game.3If, for a moment, this working definition of politics is accepted, oneconsequence is that individual human needs become the startingpoint ofall politics-domestic or international.The distinction between social and

1. Robert A. Isaak and Ralph P. Hummel, Politics for Human Beings (NorthScituate,Massachusetts:Wadsworth-Duxbury ress, 1974).2. This is the need-hierarchyof psychologist Abraham Maslow listed in orderof priority.See Maslow'sMotivationand Personality(New York: Harperand Row,1954).3. Space limits here preclude an explanationof these five types of social facts orof exactly how Maslow's need scale can be used for political analysis.For details seePolitics for Human Beings. For empiricalevidence of the universalityof Maslow'sneed hierarchysee JeanneN. Knutson, The Human Basis of the Polity (Chicago:Aldine-Atherton, 1972).


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political reality becomes merely one of awareness or political conscious-ness. That is, the social realities or facts of my everyday life become politi-cized for me only to the extent that I become conscious of tension betweenthese facts and the needs of myself or of others. Thus, so-called "objective"levels of analysisdissolve into subjective levels of consciousness. I can viewthe social acts of people in New York City from a domestic, national orinternationalviewpoint-depending upon how I perceive their effects uponhuman needs. It all depends on how nationalizedor internationalizedI amat that moment. Social facts derive their meaning from the people whomake them up.

This view of social reality is phenomenological. For (roughly speaking)phenomenology is the science of getting beneath the appearancesof every-day life. Phenomenologists see the facticity of social life as a never-endingprocess of human reconstruction in contrast to objectifying scientists whotreat socially constructed reality as a "finished"thing to be uncovered anddescribed.4 The attempt to define people as things-to "thingify" socialreality-is the fallacy of reification.To thingify groups of people into "ob-jective" nation-states or a single international system is to commit thefallacy of reification with an imperialistic consciousness-at least theo-retically speaking.Reification is the attempt to make something real or concrete that isnot. A common example is the tendency to anthropomorphize nation-states. For instance, sloppy scholars and space-conscious journalistsoftenwrite statements such as "England decided to join the Common Market"rather than "Members of Parliament decided .. ." Ronald Laing, the hu-manistic psychiatrist, called this fallacy "natural scientism: the error ofturning persons into things or things into persons, a process of reificationthat is not itself part of true natural scientific method." Laing continues:"Results derived in this way have to be dequantified and dereified beforethey can be reassimilated into the realm of human discourse. Fundamen-tally, the erroris the failure to realize that there is an ontological discontin-uity between human beings and it-beings." 5 Alfred North Whitehead

4. Like other thoughts in this essay this one is derived from hundredsof conver-sations about everydaylife with Ralph P. Hummel, who is presentlyreconstructingsocial realityat Jersey City StateCollege. As Ralphhas noted, criticswho cite EmileDurkheim's injunction "Treat social facts as things" misuse Durkheim who wasaware of how dependent social reality is on the minds of its members and theirconstant reassertionof its meaning. See Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman, TheSocial Constructionof Reality (GardenCity, New York: Doubleday-Anchor,1967),pp. 185-189.5. Ronald D. Laing, The Politics of Experience (N.Y.: Ballantine Books, 1967),p. 62.


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claimed that this error derives from "the fallacy of misplaced concrete-ness." Whitehead wrote: "This fallacy consists in neglecting the degree ofabstractioninvolved when an actual entity is considered merely so far as itexemplifies certain categories of thought. There are aspects of actualitieswhich are simply ignored so long as we restrict thought to these cate-gories." 6 "The international system" and "the nation-state-as-actor"levels of analysisare restrictivecategories in Whitehead'ssense. The aspectof reality which these reified categories neglect or ignore is the individualor humanisticaspect.I. System and Nation-State ReificationsOver ten years ago, J. David Singer published an article in WorldPoliticscalled "The Level-of-Analysis Problem" which dismissed phenomenologi-cal approaches to international politics on dubious groups. Since then,Singer's two favorite levels of analysis-the "systemic" and the "nation-state-as-actor"-have normally been taken for grantedas the major cate-gories of international political analysis in textbooks in the field. Evenwhen authorsinclude a section on decision-makingor personalityvariablesthe decision-maker is normally viewed from the systemic or nation-statelevel of analysis.7

Singer's influential article is an excellent example of the reification socommonplace in the theoreticalliterature of internationalpolitics.8Though

6. Alfred North Whitehead,Processand Reality (N.Y.: MacMillan, 1929), p. 11.Political scientists can learn from philosophersand phenomenologistsnot to takeeither the worldor theirfirstassumptions or granted.AlbertCamus (an existentialistand as such an intellectualoffspringof Edmund Husserl'sphenomenologicalmove-ment) wrote in The Myth of Sisyphus: "Beginningto think is beginning to beundermined.Society has but little connection with such beginnings."Likewise tocreate a humanisticscienceof politics,political scientistsmustbeginby underminingthemselves and their field as it exists today. Establishedelites, organizations,andtheories of political sciencehave little to do with such creativebeginnings.Humanis-tic politics begins by rethinkingand reconstructingexisting social facts in terms ofhumanneeds.7. Examples include K. J. Holsti, InternationalPolitics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall, 1967); John Spanier, Games Nations Play (N.Y.: Praeger, 1972);and Hans Morgenthau,Politics Among Nations (N.Y.: Alfred Knopf, 1972). Notethat Spanier's and Morgenthau's texts even reify nations in their titles! DavidEdwards'sCreatingA New World Politics (N.Y.: David McKay, 1973) is a note-worthyexceptionbut is more an essay than a comprehensive heoretically-groundedtext.8. J. D. Singer,"TheLevel-of-AnalysisProblem",WorldPolitics (October, 1961);and K. Knorr and S. Verba, The InternationalSystem (Princeton, N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1961).


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his argumentis difficult to summarize because of its complexity, the effortmust be made due to the significanceof the "level-of-analysis"term whichhe helped to popularize. This term presupposes some sort of "system" inlayers-perhaps viewed as a conceptual cone split up horizontally intofloors, beginningwith a large "macro"top and narrowinginto the smallest"micro" bottom. One can imagine the researcher as a pin-ball, sometimesbouncing back and forth between levels, but more likely getting stuck onone dimension for too long a time. Moreover, using the rhetoricof "levels"within "systems" deemphasizes the human origins of this perspective tothe point of excluding them, giving the levels and system an illusion ofobjective reality which they do not actually have in themselves. As Theo-dore Roszak has noted, "Objectiveconsciousness begins by dividing real-ity into two spheres, which would seem best described as In-Here andOut-There. By In-Here is meant that place within the person to whichconsciousness withdraws when one wants to know without becoming in-volved in or committed to that which is being known." 9Reifying the Out-There of nations and the internationalsystem necessarilymeans repressingthe In-Here of humanoriginsand needs.

Singer's argument begins by assuming the baggage of systems theory:"The observor may choose to focus upon the parts or upon the whole,upon the components or upon the system." 10In this framework individu-als can only be studied as components of a system. Singer laments thetendency of texts to roam up and down the ladder of complexity verticallyfrom the total system to coalitions to elites and so forth. He writes "thoughmost of us have tended to settle upon the nation as our most comfortableresting place, we have retained our propensity for vertical drift, failing toappreciate the value of a stable point of focus." The problem, of course,could just be the opposite for systemstheorists who follow Singer'sadvice:their points of focus are often too stable, to the extent of reifying a one di-mensional viewpoint.

Singer then proceeds to examine the implications of "two of the morewidely employed levels of analysis: the international system and the na-tional sub-systems."The systemic level of analysis is most comprehensive,but loses the necessary "dearth of detail." He does point out that the sys-tem-orientedmodel "tends to lead the observer into a position which exag-gerates the impact of the system upon the national actors and conversely,discounts the impact of the actors on the system."But such a crucial obser-

9. Theodore Roszak, The Making of a Counter Culture (N.Y.: Doubleday-Anchor, 1969), p. 218.10.This and all furtherquotationsfrom Singer are from his article, "The Level-of-Analysis-Problem," ited above.


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vationdoes not deterSinger romusing hesystemicperspective.He con-tinues,"this,of course, s by no means nevitable; ne couldconceivablylook uponthe systemas a ratherpassiveenvironmentn whichdynamicstatesact out theirrelationshipsather han asa socio-political ntitywitha dynamicof its own."Note herehow in shifting romthe "systemic"o"thenation-state-as-actor"evelof analysis,Singermerelyskipsfromonelevel of reification( hatis, the system"witha dynamicof its own") toanother(that is, anthropomorphizedtates that "act out theirrelation-ships"). Both levels of reification end to squeezeout individuals, ub-sumingthem under arger,deterministic onstructs. ndeed,in the onlyplace Singerreallyrefersto individuals,he compares hemanalogouslyto anthropomorphizedation-states: Justas individualsdifferwidelyinwhatthey deemto be pleasureandpain,or gain andloss, nationsmaydifferwidely n whattheyconsider o be the national nterest,and we endup havingto break down and refinethe larger category."Now oddlyenough, his"breaking own"of theconceptof nation-state oes not in-clude ndividual erceptions ecauseof thepitfallsSinger eesin "thephe-nomenologicalssue."II. TheAttackonthePhenomenological erspectiveSingerdescribes"thephenomenologicalssue"as a rigideither-or hoice:"do we examine our actor'sbehavior n termsof the objectivefactorswhichallegedly nfluence hatbehavior,or do we do so in terms of theactor'sperception of these 'objective factors'?"Singerrejectsthe latter op-tior-analysis in termsof perceptions f "objectiveactors"-upon sev-eralgrounds: 1) if one embraces phenomenologicaliew of causation,he will tend to use a phenomenologicalmodelfor explanatory urposesregardless f "outside"deterministicactorswhichmay"objectively"n-fluencethe situation hat he maynot perceive;(2) althoughperceptuallinkagesmaybenecessaryo establish ausal(asopposed o correlational)relationships etween orcesin the internationalystemandthe behaviorof nations,one is "byno meansrequiredo traceeveryperception,rans-mission,andreceiptbetween timulus ndresponseorinputandoutput norder oexplain hebehavior f the nationoranyotherhumangroup";3)empiricalobservations subject o a host of errors;nformeddeduction,inferenceor analogybasedon a coherent heoreticalmodel (that is, "theinternationalystem")can provideexplanations ustas reliableas those"basedupon a misleadingand illusivebody of data, most of which issusceptibleo analysisonlybytechniques ndconcepts oreign o politicalscienceandhistory;" 4) dimensionsand characteristicsf the policy-


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maker'sphenomenalieldmaynot be empirically iscernible at leastnotin anaccurate, ystematicashion);and f so, thegathering f such data sinefficient runeconomical ndone will tend to shyclearof it; and(5) ifthe nation-state s visualizedas a distinctentityapart rom its individualmembers,hephenomenologicalpproachwill tendto be rejected;or,"ifour actorcannoteven havea phenomenalield,there s littlepointin em-ployinga phenomenologicalpproach." ingerdoes pointout thatdisa-greementwithanyof assumptions , 2, 4, and5 abovewouldbe sufficientgroundsoradoptinghephenomenologicalpproach.Theassumptions bovearefarfrombeingself-evidentruths.To refutethemexhaustivelywouldtake severalvolumes.Butto pokea few holesinthem akes essspace.Consideringhe firstassumption,whichstates hataphenomenologicalmodelof causation ends to leadto phenomenologicalexplanations egardless f "outside"acts, it can be argued hat a socialscientist anincludeperceptualinks n a causalchainwithoutbecoming ointoxicatedwiththelinkthat he fails to include herest of thechain n hisexplanation.Takethenotorious xamplewhichSinger ites:anindividualwillfall to thegroundwhensteppingout of a tenth-storywindowregard-lessofhisperception f gravitationalorces,yetsuchperceptions a majorfactor n whetheror not he stepsout of the window n the firstplace.Toexplain hissocialeventadequately, oth the "objective"actsof gravita-tionandwindow-heightndthe perceptions f the walkermust be takenintoaccount.To adopt hephenomenologicalpproach oes notmean hatonetendsto ignorephysicalor sociologicalaspectsof concrete ituations.Rather,phenomenologymakes clear that everyobserveror participantselectscertainaspectsout of factsinexperiencehat are relevant o himatthattime.Factsarenotpureandsimple n socialor internationalituations.They arecomplexandpreinterpretedy those who would recordthem.Many prominent hinkersshare this notion of "fact" ncludingWilliamJames,JohnDewey,HenriBergson,andAlfredSchutz.Thelatephenome-nologistAlfredSchutz xpressedhisviewpoint ucidly:

All our knowledgeof the world,in common-senseas well as inscientificthinking, nvolvesconstructs, .e., a set of abstractions,generalizations,ormalizations,dealizationspecific o therespectivelevel of thoughtorganization.Strictlyspeaking, here are no suchthingsas facts,pureandsimple.All facts are from the outset factsselected roma universal ontextby the activitiesof our mind.Theyare,therefore,always nterpretedacts,eitherfacts lookedat as de-tached from their contextby an artificialabstraction r facts con-sidered n theirparticularetting. n eithercase,theycarryalong heir


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interpretational nner and outer horizon. This does not mean that, indaily life or in science, we are unable to graspthe reality of the world.It just means that we grasp certain aspects of it, namely those whichare relevant to us either for carryingon our business of living or fromthe point of view of a body of accepted rules of proceduresof thinkingcalled the method of science.11Of course, whether we are phenomenologists or systems theorists willmake a great deal of difference as to which aspects of facts we emphasize.And I believe that Singer'smain purpose was to make thisimportantpoint.

But he did not carrythis idea far enough to clarify the ethical and politicalvalue assumptions involved. Phenomenologists fall into the school of"methodological individualism"which maintains that any statement con-cerning a collectivity must in principle be reducible to a set of statementsabout the individuals of whom the collectivity is composed. Systemstheorists,on the otherhand, belong to the "holist school" which arguesthatin order to speak about a collectivity or system we need to introduce con-cepts which depend for their meaning upon the fact that they can neverbe reduced to a list of assertions about individuals. Charles Hampden-Turnerhas pointed out that such "variousphilosophies and methodologiesof social science are in fact disguised value judgments".12That is, systemstheorists,with their concern for stability and equilibriumin the status quo,tend to be ideological conservatives, who look for man's meaning in termsof knowable products-scientific or moral forces which exist prior to andindependently of man. Phenomenologists, on the other hand, tend to beideological liberals, who locate man's meaning in himself-in his values,

11. Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers:I. The Problem of Social Reality, edited byMaurice Natanson (The Hague: MartinusNijhoff, 1962), 5. For a recentinterpreta-tion of social realityfrom a similar kind of perspective,see PeterBergerandThomasLuckmann,The Social Constructionof Reality (Garden City: Doubleday-Anchor,1967). See WilliamJames,Principlesof Psychology,Vol. I, chapter x, "TheStreamof Thought,"224f, 289f; John Dewey, Logic, The Theoryof Inquiry (N.Y.: 1938),chapters ii, iv, vii, viii, xII; and the essay "The Objectivism-Subjectivism of ModernPhilosophy"(1941) in the collection Problems of Men (N.Y.: 1946), 316f; HenriBergson, Matiere et memoire, chapter I, "La Selection des Images par la Repre-sentation"; Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, II Bd., II, "Die idealeEinheit der Species und die neuen AbstraktionsTheorien", translatedby MarvinFarber,TheFoundationof Phenomenology (Cambridge,1943), chapterIX,251f.12. Charles Hampden-Turner,"On the Future of American Political ScienceEducation: Progress in Political Thought as Periodically Subversive."A paperpresentedat The American Political Science Convention in Chicago in September,1971 (Ann Arbor,Michigan: UniversityMicrofilms),p. 5.


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perceptionsand individualuniqueness.13n this light, going back toSinger's riginalassumption, ne mustsupposedlybe eitheranextremelyconservative ystemstheorist(evaluatingconsistently romthat "outer"level) oranextremelyiberalphenomenologistjudging nlyfrom"inner"values andperceptions).To combinebothperspectivesto be a "moder-ate")appearso belogically xcludednhis view.Yetsuchasynthesismaybe exactlywhatis requiredo build a humanistic cienceof internationalpolitics.Thatis, humanscholarshaveno choicebut to beginwitha per-sonal,subjectivevalue-stanceor take-offpoint (such as a human-needsorientation).But oncethisviewpointhasbeenmadeexplicit,there s nonecessaryreason theoretically o exclude all data derivedfrom otherapproaches rdisciplines.nfact,only by absorbinghefindings ndtoolsresulting rom the behavioralrevolution n social science can a post-behavioralhumanistic cience of international oliticscome into being.Oneof themostincisiveaspectsof a phenomenological pproachs itsstress upon the intentions of the researcher and the people involved inpoliticalactivity.Behavioralistsf AmericanbackgroundsuchasSinger)intendprimarilyo make nternationalolitics nto a science.Thepragma-tismandscientismof Americanacademicdeologyhavepredisposeduchscholarsto seek concretenessand quantification s ends in themselves.Humanistic ost-behavioralists,n theotherhand,haveadifferent rimaryintention.Basicallythey seek to make studiesin internationalpoliticsrelevant ohumanneedsandproblems f socialjustice.14 y attemptingouncoveran objectivescience of international olitics"OutThere,"manybehavioralistslip easilyinto the fallacyof reification-much as naturallawtheoristsdid sometimeago.Theprimary alue of suchtheoristsoftenendsup beingthe discoveryof laws andstability actors n internationalpoliticsratherthanthe impactof immediate nternational olitics uponhumanneeds.III. DereifyingSystems,Balance-of-Power,ndSimulationModelsSystems heory,balance-of-poweronstructs, ndsimulationmodelshold

13. For a detailed explanation of this conception of the liberal-conservativedimensionsee SilvanTomkins,"LeftandRight: A Basic Dimension of Ideology andPersonality," The Study of Lives, edited by Robert W. White (N.Y.: Atherton,1963), pp. 391-2.14.The distinctionbetweenbehavioralismand post-behavioralisms dealt with indetail in Politics for Human Beings, chapter 9; as well as in The Post-behavioral Era,editedby GeorgeJ. Grahamand GeorgeW. Carey (N.Y.: David McKay, 1972).


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at least one assumption in common: that there is a "system" or set ofinterrelatedelements "Out There" which can be discovered and manipu-lated towards equilibriumor stability.15In some respects, this is merely anew version of classic natural law assumptions, cast into terms of "scienti-fic" respectability, but still subject to the criticisms raised by Hume longago: any deductive proof of a matter of fact is impossible. In short, deduc-tive theorists who begin with an assumed conceptual system tend to con-fuse relationshipsbetween ideas with relationshipsbetween facts. And sucha methodology can never be used to demonstrate the existence of "mattersof fact," much less any "necessary"causal relationships between facts.16The mental process of moving from deductive abstractions to claims ofconcreteness andcausality is, of course, reification.Such reification s easily illustrated.For example, one influentialsystemstheorist in internationalpolitics, Morton Kaplan, wrote the following in hisSystem and Process in International Politics: "A social system is motivatedas trulyas an individualhumanbeing. .... If a political systemhas delusionsof omnipotence, this is likely ... ," etc.17Although Harold and MargaretSprout (among others) pointed out the fallacies of such reificationin sys-tems theory some time ago, many theorists in international politics haveyet to take these criticisms to heart.18For instance, consider the claims ofthe classic balance-of-power theorist,Hans Morgenthau,in a recenteditionof Politics Among Nations:

It will be shown in the following pages that the internationalbalance of power is only a particularmanifestation of a general socialprinciple to which all societies composed of a numberof autonomousunits owe the autonomy of their component parts; that the balance ofpower and policies aiming at its preservation are not only inevitablebut are an essential stabilizing factor in a society of nations; and that15. For various approachesto systemstheory which all embracethis assumptionsee: Society for the Advancement of General Systems Theory, General Systems(Ann Arbor: Michigan, 1956), I, Part i; Talcott Parsonsand EdwardShils, Towarda GeneralTheoryof Action (N.Y.: Harperand Row, 1962); and, David Easton,ASystems Analysis of PoliticalLife (N.Y.: JohnWiley, 1965).16. See David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40); and D.G.C.Macnabb,David Hume: His Theory of Knowledge and Morality (London: 1951).17. MortonA. Kaplan,System and Process in InternationalPolitics (N.Y.: JohnWiley, 1957), 253ff.18. See Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Ecological Perspective on HumanAffairs-with SpecialReferenceto InternationalPolitics (Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1965), 34-41, 210. And also see Marion Levy's brilliant"Does ItMatterIf He's Naked Bawled the Child?" n Klaus Knorrand JamesRosenau,eds.,ContendingApproachesto InternationalPolitics (Princeton,N.J.: Princeton, 1969).


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the instability f theinternationalalanceof power s due not to thefaultiness f theprinciple ut to theparticularonditions nderwhichtheprinciplemustoperatenasocietyof sovereign ations.19Morgenthaussumesherenotonlythata systemof necessary elation-shipsexists "OutThere,"butthatthissystem s baseduponaninevitableprincipleof a tendency owards tabilization.Morgenthau's principle"sunfalsifiable. hat s, MorgenthauismallsintothesamecategorynwhichW.G. Runcimanplaceddoctrinaire ersionsof Marxism,Freudianism,andCatholicism:"Itis whatis sometimesdescribedas the 'closed'char-

acter of all threesystemswhichrenders hemimmune o evidence n theway thata theory n the natural ciencesnevercan be. It is not thattheholderof sucha beliefmayneverchangehismind,but thatif he does theprocessis betterdescribedas 'conversion' hanby eitherthe ice-creammodel('hedecidedhe didn't ike it afterall') orthenatural ciencemodel('his evidence failed to confirm his hypothesis')." 20Most simulationmodels, particularlyhe popularINS ("InternationSimulation")and TEMPER ("Technological,Economic, Military,andPoliticalEvaluation utine")models,are alsosubject o theself-fulfillingreification hatRunciman efersto as the "closed" haracter f suchsys-tems.21 imulation heorists endto reifyconcreteeconomicandmilitaryindicatorshatcanbeeasilyquantified ndoperationalized,herebyunder-ratingnonmaterialndpsychosocialactors.In addition, imulationmod-els normallyassume(1) rationality n the partof decision-makers,nd(2) thatdecision-makers ill act to stabilizeboth theirownpositionsandthe political"systems"n whichthey operate.To criticize heseassump-tions in depthis a severalvolumeundertaking. or the purposesof thisessay,suffice t to saythat( 1) anemphasisuponconcreteeconomic,andmilitaryactorsusuallymeansa deemphasisto thepointof omission)ofindividualistic,umanistic, ndcultural actors; 2) assuminghat stabil-ization of the status quo is the first priority means that social changes,

19. Hans Morgenthau,Politics Among Nations, Fourth Edition (N.Y.: AlfredKnopf, 1967), 161. The italics are mine.20. W. G. Runciman,Social Science andPolitical Theory (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1965), 162.21. Summariesof the complex INS and TEMPERmodels can be found in WilliamD. Coplin, Simulationin the Study of Politics (Chicago: MarkhamPublishingCo.,1968), 7-111. Also see Harold Guetzkow et al., Simulation in International Rela-tions: Developmentsfor Research and Teaching (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963); and Clark C. Abt and Morton Gorden, "Reporton Project TEMPER"(prepared for the Institute on Computers and the Policy Making Community,Universityof California,LawrenceRadiationLaboratory,April 1966).


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evolutionary rrevolutionary, illtend to be seen as "dysfunctional"ndthereforewill not be evaluatedn termsof theirimportantnuances;(3)notonlyis "rationality"dubiousassumptionn the real worldof politicaldecision-making,ut,asNaziconcentrationampsdemonstrated,ationalefficiencycan be inhumaneand undesirable. f the aim of simulationmodels n internationalolitics s not to replicate he realworld,theyareusefulonly as heuristic ictions-like Plato'sRepublic.If, on the otherhand,they do claimto replicate he most dominantaspectsof the realworld,they are anti-individualisticeifications hat tend to promote heeconomic,military ndpolitical tatusquo.IV. TowardsA PhenomenologyfInternational oliticsPhenomenologyan be usedto solvethelevel-of-analysis roblemandtodereifypopularabstractions uch as "thenation-state s actor"and"theinternationalystem."Moreover, n the process, phenomenologyorcespoliticalthinkers o maketheirprimaryntentionsor value assumptionsexplicitand to maintaina rigorous mpirical onsistencyn theirmethodof analysis.

The phenomenologicalmethod-first developedby EdmundHusserl-involves threebasic steps:22(1) Consciously attend to phenomena as they appear in experi-ence.Thisdata-first pproachmakesrigorously ppliedphenomenol-ogyone of themostempiricalof methods.Forinitially he observermustsuspendoldvaluejudgments nd ookfreshlyatphenomena sif for thefirst ime-as theyactuallyappear o himin hisexperience.(2) Reduce the phenomena to the aspects essential in theirpartic-

ular presentation to you by bracketing out the unnecessary. Afterlookingat anobjector actionfreshly,question ts taken-for-grantedaspects o cut down tsmeaningoitsessentialaspects.(3) Examine the essences you perceive to uncover the workingsof consciousness that make them possible. Or ask: without whichassumptionswouldthispoliticalphenomenonr experiencenevery-day ife not havebeenpossible?This methodcanbe easilyusedto "solve" helevel-of-analysisroblemthatplagues he literature f internationalolitics.Roughly peaking,his

22. Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) fatheredphenomenologicalphilosophy in hisIdeas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, Boyce translation (New York:1931). For an expandedeverydayexplanationof phenomenology and applicationsof the method to internationalpolitics and to the other subfieldsof political sciencesee Politics for Human Beings.


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Research Notes &Provocations 275

problem involves the assumption that separable perspectives or levels ofanalysis exist that tend to be mutually exclusive. That is, I may investigatethe phenomena of international politics from the level of individual de-cision-making or the nation-state level or the level of the internationalsystem. To mix these perspectives is claimed to be confusing or theoreti-cally disastrous (according to theorists as J. David Singer). But thephenomenologist comes to a differentconclusion.Notice how the three steps of the phenomenological method (referringto the numbering above) can dissolve the level-of-analysis problem into adefinition of personal intention, background and consciousness.

(1 ) If the point of departurefor the observer is the lived world of "Hereand Now," his immediate perception of international phenomena is not"Out-There," abstracted from his own subjective world. For example, Ifirstconsciously experienced internationalpolitics in traveling to Switzer-land at 16. The international relations I experienced were made up ofmutualintersubjectiveexperiences:my culturalupbringingandperceptionsconflicted with and adjusted to those of particularSwiss people. Though Ihad previously experienced Swiss watches and films about Swiss mountainclimbing, these were not international politics for me. Even newspaperaccounts of international conflicts involving lands like Switzerland werenot meaningful politics in terms of my experience, but were just contem-porary history. In the firstinstance, internationalpolitics for me meant mypersonal interactions with Swiss people-with people associated withanother culture, another life-style, anotherplace, anotherupbringing.(2) In reducing my firstexperience of internationalpolitics to its essenceI find (a) a personal intersubjective experience between two or morepeople with different cultural backgrounds, (b) a foreign life-style andlanguage, (c) vague memories of things I was taught and told about "theSwiss" and "Switzerland"-images of specific nationalities and nation-states, and (d) the meaning of specific social interactions-"the socialreality"-was the result of the intentional construction of relationships ofthe people involved. Internationalpolitics becomes meaningful throughthesubjective interactions of foreign people, foreign languages, and culturalsymbols. The notions of "nation-state"or "the internationalsystem" onlybecome meaningful to me by reference to their particular concrete ex-pressions in my own personal experience. Likewise, others arrive atgeneralized notions about international politics through their particularexperience and background. The subjective meanings of all people inspecific places and times taken together is the intersubjective essence ofinternationalpolitics.(3) In trying to analyze the workings of consciousness that makepossible the essences of international politics that I derived above, I dis-


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276 ResearchNotes&Provocations

covered a complexof subjectiveattitudesrangingbetweenextremesofsimilarityanddifference, ooperationandconflict,baseduponpersonalexperiences andculturalupbringings.International consciousness involvesthe willingness of two or more people from different cultures to be em-pathetic enough to communicate their intentions by momentarilysteppinginto the shoes of each other in order to construct a particularsocial realitymutually defined in terms of similarities and diferences. Whether suchinteractioneadsto conflictorcooperation ependsuponthepsychologicalandideological igidityof thepeopleinvolved-a resultof theirpersonalneeds,upbringing, ndnationalizationn theirnationalcommunities.V. ConclusionThisessayrepresentsmerelyapreface oaphenomenologyf internationalpoliticsbased on a dereification f the level-of-analysisproblem.23tsfocus has been upon the intention,basic assumptions,and languageofscholars n internationalolitics.I haveargued hata humanistic cienceof international olitics must begin by analyzing he tensionsbetweenspecifichumanneeds andperceptions ndexistingsocial factsthateitherfrustrate rhelpto satisfy uchneeds.Awareness f thistensionconstitutespoliticalconsciousnessorthe humanbeing n question.Awareness f thepoliticalconsciousnesses f differentpeople fromvariousculturescon-stitutes he beginningof a humanistic cienceof international oliticsonthe partof politicalscientists."Science or its own sake"becomesbitterreificationf it failsto startwithandaim towardshumanneeds n a worldso dehumanizingorso manypeopleas ours is. A socialscienceof inter-nationalpoliticsshouldopenlyadmitthatit beginswiththe veryhumanperceptions f scholars, oloredbyparticularulturalupbringings. ndtobe humane,such a social science should intendto be relevantto theresolutionof politicalproblems hat threaten he survivaland healthofhumanbeingswhereverheirbasicneeds ailto be satisfied.

23. This essay representspart of an on-going researchproject that will result inIndividualsand WorldPolitics (North Scituate,Mass.: Wadsworth-DuxburyPress,1975). Otherwork relevant to this perspectiveincludes: Kyung-WonKim, Revolu-tion and InternationalSystem (N.Y.: New York University Press, 1970); ThomasFranck and Edward Weisband, World Politics (N.Y.: Oxford University Press,1972); Hwa Yol Jung, editor, Existential Phenomenology and Political Theory(Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1972); William Eckhardt,"Social Psychology andthe Effectivenessof HumanSystems" n Abraxas,i, 2 (Winter, 1971), 135-145; andPolitics for Human Beings.

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