REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

MARINE ACCIDENT AND INCIDENT

INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE

[Investigation Report No: /2016] Serious Marine Casualty M/V “SEVEN SEAS”, grounding, off Larnaca, Cyprus, 30th May, 2016

Foreword

The sole objective of the safety investigation under the Marine Accidents and Incidents Investigation Law N. 94 (I)/2012, in investigating an accident, is to determine its causes and circumstances, with the aim of improving the safety of life at sea and the avoidance of accidents in the future. It is not the purpose to apportion blame or liability. Under Section 17-(2) of the Law N. 94 (I)/2012 a person is required to provide witness to investigators truthfully. If the contents of this statement were subsequently submitted as evidence in court proceedings, then this would contradict the principle that a person cannot be required to give evidence against themselves. Therefore, the Marine Accidents and Incidents Investigation Committee, makes this report available to interested parties, on the strict understanding that, it will not be used in any court proceedings anywhere in the world. This investigation was not carried out as a joint investigation.

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Contents

FOREWORD ............................................................................................................................................ I

LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................................... II

LIST OF ANNEXES ................................................................................................................................... II

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................ III

1. SUMMARY OF THE MARINE CASUALTY ......................................................................................... 1

2. FACTUAL INFORMATION ............................................................................................................... 2

2.1. SEVEN SEAS ................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 2.1.1 Ship Particulars ................................................................................................................... 2 2.1.2 Voyage Particulars ............................................................................................................. 3 2.1.3 Marine Casualty or Incident Information............................................................................3

2.1.4 Shore Authority Involvement and Emergency responce........................................................3

3. NARRATIVE .................................................................................................................................... 4

3.1. Sequence of Events ..................................................................................................................... 4

4. ANALYSIS ....................................................................................................................................... 7

4.1. The Ship ....................................................................................................................................... 7 4.2 The Crew..................................................................................................................................

4.3 The Environment....................................................................................................................

4.4. Safety Management.................................................................................................................

5. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................. 12

6. RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................................................. 13

List of Annexes 1. Bridge Bell-Book 2. Bridge Log-Book (2 p.) 3. Voyage plan (2 p.) 4. Onboard Familiarization Check list (2.p) 5. Table of shipboard working arrangements 6. Hours of Work / Rest (3 p.) 7. Drug & Alcohol Policy 8. Emergency Check list No6 Stranding 9. Non-Conformity / Corrective action report 10. Class Society survey statement (3p.) 11. Minimum Safe Manning Document 12. IMO Crew List 13. Nautical chart extract

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AB Able Seaman

AIS Automatic Identification System

ARPA Automatic Radar Plotting Aid

C/O Chief Officer

COLREGS The Int/nal Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972, as amended

DBT Double Bottom Tank

DO Diesel Oil

DWT Deadweight Tonnage

DOT Diesel Oil Tank

ECDIS Electronic Chart Display and Information System

ETA Estimated Time of Arrival

ETD Estimated Time of Departure

FO Fuel Oil

FOT Fuel Oil Tank

FPT Fore Peak Tank

GPS Global Positioning System

HFO Heavy Fuel Oil

IMO International Maritime Organization

Lat. Latitude

Long. Longitude

LOT Lubricant Oil Tank

LT Local Time

MC Management Company

MP Cyprus Marine Police

m Meter

MT Metric Ton

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OOW Officer of the Watch

OS Ordinary Seaman

PSN Position

RPM Revolutions per Minute

SAR Search And Rescue

S.B.E. Stand By Engine

SOLAS Safety of Life At Sea Convention

STCW95 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers 1978, as amended

S-VDR Simplified Voyage Data Recorder

VDR Voyage Data Recorder

VHF Very High Frequency

VTS Vessel Traffic Services

UTC Universal Time Coordinated

ZT Zone Time

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1. Summary of the Marine Casualty A grounding was investigated in which a general cargo vessel ran aground off Larnaca roads, Cyprus. In conducting its investigation, the Marine Accident Investigation Committee (MAIC), visited the ship at Larnaca roads, where, interviewed the crew members involved in the accident, reviewed events surrounding the accident and documents provided by the ship’s management and performed analyses to determine the causal factors that contributed to the accident. Accident Description The M/V SEVEN SEAS is a General Cargo ship registered in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. She was built in 1994, deadweight 3,715 tonnes, gross tonnage 2,450. The vessel was on a short voyage from Haifa-Israel to Larnaca-Cyprus. She departed from Haifa in ballast condition at about 06:30 hours on 30 May 2016 (GMT+3) and was due to arrive at Larnaca roads at about 22:00-23:00 hours (GMT+2) the same day. The Master, at approximately 22:00-22:05 hours slept for about 5 minutes on arrival at Larnaca roads, therefore did not drop anchor, as it was planned and the vessel proceeded north of the anchorage, in 5 minutes covering distance of 1 nautical mile. At approximately 22:05 hours, the M/V SEVEN SEAS” ran aground 1 NM off Larnaca roads, about 200m from the nearby shore. The Master managed to refloat the vessel by own means, without external assistance. The vessel sustained no damages. There were no injuries, no pollution, and no damages to offshore installations. The Causes of the grounding Immediate cause The vessel grounded as a result of the Master falling asleep / a short "micro-sleep" during which the progress of the vessel was not being monitored therefore, not anchored in time. Root cause Inadequate Rest, the opportunity for rest was provided but the Master failed to take it. Contributing cause Fatigue is considered a factor to the accident. Safety Issues No ECDIS Specific training for the type of the vessel’s ECDIS System No familiarization for the vessel’s ECDIS System Recommendations Four (4) recommendations have been issued to the Management Company.

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2. Factual Information

2.1. SEVEN SEAS

Photo of the SEVEN SEAS (ex name GUIMARES)

2.1.1. Ship Particulars

Name of ship: SEVEN SEAS IMO number: 9006344 Call sign: J8B5110 MMSI number: 376783000 Flag State: St. Vincent & Grenadines (VC) Type of ship: General Cargo Gross tonnage: 2,450 Length overall: 87.86 m Breadth overall: 12.80 m Classification society: DNV-GL Registered shipowner: High Seas Group Ltd.

(IMO number: 5294357) Ship’s company: Haifa Marine Shipping Ltd

(IMO number: 5184957) (Haz-maut 102 St. Haifa Israel)

Year of build: 1994 Deadweight: 3,715 Hull material: Steel Hull construction: Single Hull Propulsion type: ICE - SBV 8 M 628 Type of bunkers: HFO & MDO

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Number of crew on ship’s certificate: 7

2.1.2 Voyage Particulars

Port of departure: Haifa-Israel Port of call: Larnaca-Cyprus Type of voyage: International Cargo information: Ballast Manning: 9 Number of passengers: None

2.1.3 Marine Casualty or Incident Information

Type of marine casualty/incident: Less Serious Marine Casualty- Grounding

Date/Time: 30 May 2016/22:05 LT Location: Off Larnaca roads Position (Latitude/Longitude): Lat. 34° 56.60'N / Long. 033° 38.90'Ε External and Internal Environment: Smooth Sea State, Light Breeze Wind,

Night, Visibility good Ship operation and Voyage segment: Normal service – In passage – Ballast

mode Human Factors: Yes/Fatique/Sleep deprivation Consequences: No damages-No pollution- No Injuries

2.1.4 Shore authority involvement and Emergency response Immediately after the vessel grounded, the Cyprus Marine Police (MP) called the Master on the VHF Channel 16, 14, 17. Master informed the MP that he is attempting to refloat the vessel and that if successful, will proceed to Larnaca roads and drop anchor. In the mean time, a MP boat arrived at the scene to check for damages and pollution. MP instructed the Master to stop the Main Engine (ME) and to not perform manoeuvres, because in the area there were oil submarine pipes. MP informed that the next day a Diver will check for damages and that a Tug-Boat and Pilot will be sent to refloat the vessel. The Master agreed with the MP, nevertheless he continued his attempts to refloat the vessel. The Master decided to refloat the vessel himself by own means, because the ship was in ballast condition and it was plausible. Sometimes the Master did not answer VHF calls from the MP, because he was at the Navigation Bridge’s wings, concerned with refloating manoeuvres.

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Finally on 31/05/2016, at about 01:00 hrs, the Master succeeded in refloating the vessel and proceeded to Larnaca roads about 1NM distance where dropped anchor at about 01:20 hours LT.

3. Narrative

3.1. Sequence of Events

1. The vessel loads on a permanent basis from Larnaca port, cargo of Gypsum and discharges it at Haifa port. The ship has only one hold and loads 3500-3600MT. The distance between Larnaca to Haifa is 150 nautical miles (NM), with speed of 9, 5-10 knots, the voyage’s duration is about 15-16 hours. (Haifa-Israel: GMT+3, Larnaca-Cyprus: GMT+2)

2. On the 28th and 29th of May, 2016 the vessel was in the port of Haifa. After

19:00hrs the Master continued to be concerned with the business of the ship, until midnight. (Master’s scheduled daily hours of work when the vessel is in port are (08-12) –(13-19))

3. On the 30th of May, 2016 the Master gone for sleep at 01:30hrs LT and woke

up at 4:00hrs LT. (He slept 2½ hours)

4. On 30/5/2016 at 6:10 hrs LT Pilot on Board. Unmooring operation. At 6:30 hrs LT Pilot left. Exit from Haifa port.

5. After sailing from Haifa, the Master was on watch on the Navigation Bridge

until 12:00hrs (Master’s watch at sea: (8-12)-(20-24).

6. After his watch, the Master had lunch at 12:00 hrs and slept for about 1½ hours.

7. Until his next watch at 20:00hrs, he was busy preparing documents and

supervising the Chief Officer (CO) and the Second Officer (2/O) who were only 10 days on board.

8. On 30/5/2016 at 20:00hrs, the Master took over watch from the C/O.

9. On 30/5/2016 at approximately 21:50 hrs, approaching Larnaca roads where

was planned to drop anchor. The Master ordered the Bosun who was on watch with him (20-24) to go down for coffee and then to go forward to drop the anchor. At the same time (21:50 hrs) gave telegraph order from Full

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Ahead to Half Ahead (reduced speed to proceed slowly to the anchoring position).

10. The Master while was alone on the Navigation Bridge, entering into the Larnaca anchorage, fell asleep for about 5 minutes, between 22:00-22:05hrs.

11. The ship proceeded north of the anchorage for about 5 minutes covering a distance of 1 NM and touched the sea bottom by bow at approximately 22:05 hrs, at position Lat.: 34:56:60N – Long. 033:38:90E.

12. When the vessel grounded, the Master felt the impact and woke up. He

stopped the Main Engine (ME) immediately and then made Half Astern & Full Astern.

13. The Bridge Navigation Watch Alarm System (BNWAS) did not give alarm. The BNWAS is always in operation when the ship is at sea. It gives alarm every 12 minutes. Due to the fact that the Master slept less than 12 minutes between 22:00-22:12, it did not give alarm while he was sleeping.

14. The Master stated that: “After the Bosun left I remember that I saw in the Larnaca anchorage the ship “SEVEN STAR”, “EXE OTTER” and another one. Also another one in the tanker anchorage”.

15. At the moment of the grounding the Bosun was forward. He felt the impact

although it wasn´t strong. The Master told him that he will not drop the anchor and to make depth soundings around the vessel.

16. The Master sounded the General Alarm and all crew mustered on the

Navigation Bridge.

17. The Master assigned duties to crew members. The C/O made soundings with the Bosun, the Second Officer (2/O) on the Navigation Bridge with the Master, the C/E in the Engine Room (E/R).

18. Started pumping out ballast water from the Fore Peak Tank (FPT) and No. 2 &

No3 Double Bottom Tanks (DBT) with two pumps. After de-ballasting and using the Main Engine, Rudder Port & Stbd and Bow Thruster Port &Stbd, the ship refloated at about 1:00hrs LT, of 31/5/2016.

19. The grounding located about 200m from shore. All navigational equipment

was in operation. The Gyro compass error was 0°. The echo sounder indication at the moment of the grounding was 0:00m. Draft: Fwd =2.00m -

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Aft=2.90m. The water depth was Fwd=1.80m – Aft =3.50m. The ship had no list. The ship´s speed before grounding was approximately 9 knots and course 335° true.

20. While the vessel was grounded, the MP called the Master on the VHF Channel 16, 14, 17. Sometimes he did not answering because he was at the Bridge-wings. He was told by the MP to stop the Engine and that the next day they will send a Tug-Boat and a Pilot but he decided to refloat the vessel himself, because the ship was in ballast condition and the grounding was on mud therefore he considered that it was plausible to refloat the vessel himself by own means (i.e., by using vessel’s engine and rudder).

21. On 31/05/2016, DNV-GL Surveyor inspected the vessel for damages.

Underwater hull has been surveyed by approved Diving Company under the supervision of the DNV-GL Surveyor. No damages were found on the vessel’s structure, propulsion system and machinery. The class status of the ship was confirmed.

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4. Analysis

(The purpose of the analysis is to determine the contributory causes and circumstances of the accident as a basis for making recommendations to prevent similar accidents occurring in the future). The following analysis draws mainly on the statements taken from the Master, the Bosun and the C/E of the M/V “SEVEN SEAS”, when the vessel was anchored at Larnaca roads, on documents provided on board by the Master and external sources.

4.1 The Ship

Class notation: 100 A5 E General cargo ship - Equipped for carriage of containers DBC DG Main Engine MCE AUT. No overdue conditions of class. Dimensions: Length Overall (LOA)=87.86m / Length Between Perpendiculars (LBP)=81.00m × Breadth (B)=12.80m × Depth (D): 7.10 m / m and Deadweight DWT=3,715 on 5.468m Draft. Hull yard/ Outfitting yard/ Contracted builder: Peene-Werft GmbH (Hull no: 409) Main Engine: DEUTZ MWM/SBV 8M 628/1500 KW (2045HP) 1 x 1500KW@900rpm (Periodically unattended machinery space) Navigational EquipmentAt the time of the grounding, all navigational equipment was in operation. No paper charts are in use for navigation. There is an Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS), with another one as back-up (as provided in the Record of Equipment for Cargo Ship safety-Form E, attached to Cargo Ship Safety Equipment Certificate, issued by DNV-GL). ECDIS System: Furuno PCU 3000 / Chart in use GB43324A Radar: 1)Consilium 9GHZ 2) Koden 9GHZ The Gyro compass error was 0°. Echo Sounder: Furuno FE-700 .Indication at the moment of the grounding was 0:00m. Draft Fwd =2.00m - Aft=2.90m. Water depth Fwd=1.80m – Aft =3.50m. Therefore it is concluded that the forward part of the vessel was submerged into the mud/sea bottom about 20cm.

:

Bridge Navigation Watch Alarm System (BNWAS) The Bridge Navigation Watch Alarm System (BNWAS) is always in operation when the ship is at sea. It gives alarm every 12 minutes. Hull survey after bottom touching The DNV-GL surveyor inspected the ship for damages on 31/05/2016. Underwater hull has been surveyed by approved Diving Company under the supervision of the DNV-GL Surveyor. No damages on the ship structure, propulsion system and machinery were found. The class status of the ship was confirmed. There was no evidence of any defect or malfunction of the ship that could have contributed to the accident.

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4.2 The Crew

Training and Certification M/V “SEVEN SEAS” was manned with crew licensed, qualified and medically fit in accordance with the requirements of the International Convention on Standards of Training Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) Convention as amended. The Master The Master, 43years old, held a Ukrainian Master’s Certificate of Competency, STCW’95 II/2. He had 27 years seagoing experience, 11 years with the company, the last 4 years in command. He signed-on 09/04/2016, i.e., 50 days before the accident.

He had undergone a 40-hour Generic training on “The Operational use of electronic chart display and information system (ECDIS)” based on IMO Model Course 1.27. He did not undergo Specific training on the ECDIS system FURUNO PCU 300 installed on the M/V “SEVEN SEAS” as required by STCW. He did not receive on board familiarization with the vessel’s ECDIS which is not included in the relevant checklist (Manual Code no. SMS 60: Onboard familiarization checklist- familiarization with Bridge Equipment). He stated that he has 5-year experience in the use of ECDIS systems. During the last 10 days, he provided training to the C/O and 2/O on the vessel’s ECDIS System. He stated that: “I do not consider that lack of Specific ECDIS training, affected the course of events, because I know how to operate it”. This statement shows “Can do behaviour”.

The Chief Engineer The Chief Engineer, 47years old, held a Ukranian Certificate of Competency, STCW’95 III/3 authorising him to serve in the capacity of the Chief Engineer on ships powered by main propulsion machinery of between 750 and 3000KW propulsion power. A lack of training and certification was not a contributory factor to the accident.

Organization on board

Shipboard Working Arrangements at Sea:

While at sea, three Deck Officers (Master, C/O and 2/O), maintain a watchkeeping routine of four hours on, eight hours off, i.e. three watch system. The Master (08-12)-(20-24)-the C/O (4-8)-(16-20) - the 2/O (00-04)-(12-16). Non-watchkeeping duties: the Master (12-14) the C/O (08-10) the 2/O (10-12)

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Two ABs (one of them acts as Bosun) perform watchkeeping duties. The AB (08-12)-(20-02) and the Bosun (02-08)-(16-20).

Shipboard Working Arrangements in port:

The Master (08-12)-(13-19), the C/O (6-12)-(18-24) and the 2/O (00-06)-(12-18). Fatigue Prior and on the day of the accident, the recorded hours of Work/Rest were in accordance with the MLC, 2006 and STCW 78 as amended. Nevertheless, the Master according to his statements continued work, beyond his scheduled working hours. He had accumulated a considerable sleep deficit in the course of the preceding few days. On the 28th and 29th of May, 2016, the vessel was in the port of Haifa. The Master’s duty when the vessel is in port, is officially 8:00-19:00. (According to his statement his scheduled work hours when the vessel is in port, is officially 8:00-17:00. Nevertheless, in the “Table of Shipboard Working Arrangements - Daily hours schedule”, is (08-12) and (13-19). After 19:00hrs he continued to be concerned with the business of the ship, until midnight. He also stated that due to the fact that the C/O and the 2/O were new on board, he was concerned all the time in supervising them. This statement shows obsessive behaviour who trusts only himself. This situation made him feel tired. On the 30th of May, 2016, the Master woke up at 4:00hrs LT. He had gone for sleep at 1:30hrs LT (30/05/2016). He did not go out the previous day. He stated that he considers that the Master must be on board at all times. This statement shows obsessive behaviour who never stops thinking about his job. On 30/5/2016 at 6:10 hrs LT Pilot on Board. Unmooring operation. At 6:30 hrs, the Pilot left. Exit from Haifa port. After sailing from Haifa, the Master was on watch on the Navigation Bridge until 12:00hrs (Master’s watch at sea: 8-12 & 20-24). After his watch, he had lunch and slept for about 1½ hours. Until his next watch at 20:00hrs, he was busy preparing documents and supervising the Chief Officer (CO) and the Second Officer (2/O) who were only 10 days on board. At 20:00hrs, the Master took over the watch from the C/O. At approximately 21:50 hrs, approaching Larnaca roads where was planned to drop anchor. The Master ordered the Bosun who was on watch with him (20-24) to go down for coffee and then to go forward to drop anchor. At the same time (21:50 hrs,) gave telegraph order to reduce speed from Full Ahead to Half Ahead. The Master while was alone on the Navigation Bridge, proceeding to the anchorage, slept for about 5 minutes, approximately between 22:00 and 22:05.

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Fatigue extends beyond normal tiredness. It is a factor causing diminished physical/mental capability resulting from periods of prolonged wakefulness, sleep deprivation, shift work, workload, stress and lifestyle. Fatigue is considered a factor to the accident. (Contributory factor) Manning level At the time of the incident, she was manned in excess of the vessel’s Minimum Safe Manning Document (MSMD). She had a crew of 9 although MSMD provides for 7. The crew consisted of 9 Ukranians: the Captain, the Chief Officer, the Second Officer, the Chief Engineer, the Second Engineer, the Electrician the Motorman, 2 ABs one of them acting as Bosun, and a Cook.

A lack of manpower was not a contributory factor to the accident. Alcohol Impairment

After the grounding no one (Authorities) performed alcohol test to the Master and crew. The alcohol and drugs policy of the company does not allow possession and use of them and there are no on board. There is an attachment to the “Crew Contract of Employment” which is signed by each employ, stating that the use, misuse, possession distribution, sale of illegal drugs is prohibited and that crewmembers are only allowed to receive non-alcoholic beverages. There was no evidence to suggest that alcohol or drugs were taken by any of the crew members involved in the accident. There was no evidence to suggest that alcohol impairment was a contributory factor to the accident.

Working and Living Conditions At the time of the incident, the ship had valid Maritime Labour Compliance Certificate (MLC) along with a Declaration of Maritime Labour Compliance (DMLC) issued by her flag state. There was no evidence to suggest, that, the working and living conditions was a contributory factor to the accident.

All crew members were holders of medical certificate for service at sea issued in compliance with the STCW Convention as amended. They were certificated as fit for sea duty without restrictions and not suffering from any medical condition likely to be aggravated by service at sea or to render the seafarer unfit for such service or to endanger the health of other persons on board.

Physiological, Psychological, Psychosocial Condition

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There was no evidence to suggest that the crew’s physical, physiological, psychological, or psychosocial condition was such that could have contributed to the accident. They were physically and mentally fit to perform their job.

4.3 The Environment The weather conditions at the time of the accident were good. Smooth Sea State, Light Breeze Wind, it was Night and the Visibility was good. The Master recalled that after the Bosun left from the Navigation Bridge, to go for coffee and then forward to drop the anchor, he saw in the Larnaca anchorage the ship “SEVEN STAR”, the “EXE OTTER” and another one. Also another one ship in the tanker anchorage. The anchorage was not crowded. The external environment was not a factor in the accident.

4.4 Safety Management A Voyage Plan as provided in the Safety management System (SMS) of “HAIFA MARINE SHIPPING LTD” – Shipboard Operations Manual-Manual Code no. SMS 70, was completed properly from berth to berth and was approved and signed by the Master.

No paper charts are in use for navigation. There is an ECDIS system, with another one as back-up (as provided in the Record of Equipment for Cargo Ship safety – Form E, attached to Cargo Ship Safety Equipment Certificate issued by DNV-GL).

In the Voyage Plan the publications to be used were: List of Lights Volume NP86 / Tide Tables Volume NP 208 / Radio Signals Volume ALRS 286(3) / Sailing Directions Volume ADS 49.

There was no evidence to suggest, that the navigational requirements of the safety management system were inadequate and/or not properly implemented.

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5. Conclusions At about 22:05 hrs LT, the M/V SEVEN SEAS” ran aground off Larnaca roads, 1 NM – 5 minutes from Larnaca roads, about 1 cable from the nearby shore, on a muddy bottom. There was a submarine oil pipe in a distance of about 100m from the grounding position. The ship´s speed before grounding was approximately 9 knots and course 335° true. The ship had no list. The water depth (acc. to ECDIS) was Fwd=1.80m – Aft =3.50m. The Echo Sounder indication at the moment of the grounding was 0:00m. The Draft Fwd =2.00m - Aft=2.90m. The Master, shortly after 22:00 hrs (22:00-22:05) slept for about 5 minutes on arrival at Larnaca roads, therefore he did not drop anchor, as it was planned and the vessel proceeded north of the anchorage for about 5 minutes covering distance of 1 NM. The Bridge Navigation Watch Alarm System (BNWAS) which is always in operation when the ship is at sea and gives alarm every 12 minutes, did not give alarm, due to the fact that the Master slept less than 12 minutes. The vessel grounded as a result of the Master falling asleep / a short "micro-sleep" during which the progress of the vessel was not being monitored, therefore not anchoring in time. (Immediate cause) There were 3 Deck Officers. The vessel is a simple Bulk Carrier. She has only one cargo hold and loads homogeneous cargo, always the same. Even if the C/O and the 2/O were new on board (only 10 days) the Master could delegate work to them and when in port after 19:00, he, (the Master) could have rested. Although the trip between Haifa-Larnaca is only 15 hours, he could take the opportunity for rest between (12-20), the C/O and the 2/O could call him if it was needed. Haven’t had a can-do attitude and being obsessive, would have delegated work, or informed the Management Company (MC) for a solution, i.e. an additional Deck Officer.

Inadequate Rest was a factor, because the opportunity for rest was provided but the Master failed to take it. (Root cause) The Master the C/O and the 2/O did not undergo Specific training on the ECDIS System FURUNO PCU 300 installed on the M/V “SEVEN SEAS” as required by STCW. (Safety Issue) The Master the C/O and the 2/O did not receive on board familiarization with the vessel’s ECDIS which is not included in the relevant checklist (Manual Code no. SMS 60: Onboard familiarization checklist- familiarization with Bridge Equipment). (Safety Issue)

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6. Recommendations

Management Company: 1. The Management Company by way of a circular or other means, to advice its crews, to adopt personal strategies which are likely to decrease the effects of fatigue such as the following:

Take the opportunity to have adequate sleep to prevent them becoming fatigued Making the most of permitted rest breaks, including naps Advising colleagues if one detects feeling drowsy Alerting colleagues if they appear to be becoming drowsy

2. The Management Company to consider the need for providing to its Masters and Officers, “Marine Resources Management” training, to promote awareness to fatigue and sleep issues.

3. The Management Company to ensure that Masters and Navigation Officers employed on ships carrying an ECDIS System have undergone Generic ECDIS training and to provide ECDIS Specific training for the type of the vessel’s ECDIS System.

4. The Management Company to insert in the relevant checklist (Manual Code no. SMS 60: Onboard familiarization checklist- familiarization with Bridge Equipment), on board familiarization with the vessel’s ECDIS.

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Sticky Note

At about 22:05 hrs LT, the M/V SEVEN SEAS” ran aground off Larnaca roads, 1 NM – 5 minutes from Larnaca roads, about 1 cable from the nearby shore, on a muddy bottom. There was a submarine oil pipe in a distance of about 100m from the grounding position. The ship´s speed before grounding was approximately 9 knots and course 335° true. The ship had no list. The water depth (acc. to ECDIS) was Fwd=1.80m – Aft =3.50m. The Echo Sounder indication at the moment of the grounding was 0:00m. The Draft Fwd =2.00m - Aft=2.90m.