Georgian Civil Aviation and Maritime Transport Accident
Incident Investigation Bureau
Investigation Report
On the serious incident on 01.02.2014
to the Boeing 737-82R
Registered TC-AAZ
Operated by “Pegasus Airlines”
Flight PGT-463 Tbilisi - Istanbul
Tbilisi 2014
2
Aircraft Type: Boeing 737-82R
Aircraft Serial No: 40875
National Registration No: TC-AAZ
Owner: Poseidon Leasing LLC
Operator: Pegasus Airlines
Date and time of the serious incident:
01.02.2014. 02.46 (UTC)
Place of Incident: Tbilisi International Airport
(runway 31L) 413929.54N - 0445753.59 E
The sole objective of the investigation of an accident or incident is the prevention of accidents and incidents. It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability. (Article 3.1 of the Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention 1944). The present document is the translation of the Georgian Investigation Report. Although efforts are made to translate it as accurate as possible, discrepancies may occur. In this case the Georgian version is authentic.
3
Table of contents:
Brief Information
1. Factual information
1.1. Pre-flight history
1.2. Injuries
1.3. Damage to aircraft
1.4. Other damage
1.5. Personnel Information (Flight crew)
1.6. Aircraft Information
1.7. Meteorological information
1.8. Aids to Navigation
1.9. Communications
1.10. Aerodrome information
1.11. Flight Recorders
1.12. Wreckage and Impact Information
1.13. Medical and pathological Information
1.14. Fire
1.15. Survival Aspects
1.16. Tests and Research
1.17. Organizational and management Information
1.18. Useful or effective investigation techniques
2. Analyses
3. Conclusions
4. Safety Recommendations
Appendices
4
Brief Information
On February 1, 2014 at 02:55 (UTC) Head of Civil Aviation and Maritime
Transport Accident Incident Investigation Bureau received the notification
about the aviation incident. Namely, on 01.02.2014 when performing the
flight No PGT 463 Tbilisi Istanbul the aircraft Boeing 737-82R registration
No TC-AAZ operated by Pegasus Airlines on the starting point of takeoff
run from the runway 31L, the aircraft suspended take off, during which
went out of the runway range to the right side.
As per the requirements of regulations of the air-code of Georgia, Ministry
of Economy and Sustainable Development of Georgia and Investigation
Bureau, the investigation of the aviation incident was carried out by Civil
Aviation and Maritime Transport Accident Incident Investigation Bureau.
The investigation started on 01.02.2014
The investigation was completed: 25.03.2014
5
1. Factual Information
1.1. Pre-flight history
on February 1 , 2014 the aircraft Boeing 737-82R, operated by Pegasus
Airlines, registration No TC-AAZ, was performing the regular flight PGT -
463 Tbilisi - Istanbul;
At 02.45 (UTC), the aircraft TC-AAZ taxied to the airport runway 31L for
takeoff, it started takeoff run, which was rejected by the crew in a few
seconds, at the starting stage of run due to non-symmetric acceleration of
the engines, namely the parameters of the right engines fell behind the left
one. During the rejected takeoff the aircraft at the distance of 135 meters
from the threshold of runway went to the right side and stopped. Aircraft
main gear was on the right edge paved surface of the runway and nose
gear stopped on the Unpaved runway at 3.5 meter from the runway edge.
1.2. Injuries
The flight crew, cabin crew and 124 passengers received no injuries.
Injuries Crew Members Passengers Others
Fatal 0 0 0
Serious 0 0 0
Slight/None 0 0 0
6
1.3. Aircraft Damage
During the rejected takeoff the aircraft received no damage, Only nose
gear wheel was soiled.
1.4. Other Damage
Rejected takeoff caused no damage to other objects.
1.5. Personnel Information
Captain
Age: 44 years
Aircraft type rating: B737-300/900
Transport pilot license : ATPL
License valid until: 31.12.2014
Medical certificate: Class I
Date for medical check, term: 08.06.2013-08.06.2014
Inspection on simulator: 01.12.2013
Flying hours on Boeing 737: 3729
First Officer
Age: 35 years
Aircraft type rating: B737-300/900
Transport pilot license : ATPL
License valid until: 03.03.2014
Medical certificate: Class I
7
Date for medical check, term: 13.09.2013-13.09.2014
Inspection on simulator: 02.08.2013
Flying hours on Boeing 737: 2564 hours
1.6. Aircraft Information
Aircraft Type: Boeing 737-82R
Serial No: 40875
Year of Manufacture: 2010
Airworthiness certificate issued 14.06.2013, valid until 14.06.2014
National Registration mark: TC-AAZ Registration Certificate: 2294
Flying hours: 13992 hours /9254 cycles Last check: 27.01.2014
Engines:
Left Engine:
Type: CFM56-7B26/3
Year of Manufacture: 2010
Serial No: 804257
Last check: 27.01.2014
Operation hours: 13992 hours/9254 cycles
8
Right engine
Type: CFM56-7B26/3
Year of Manufacture: 2010
Serial No: 805264
Last check: 27.01.2010
Operation hours: 13992 hours/9254 cycles
1.7. Meteorological Information
The weather conditions at Tbilisi International Airport:
METAR UGTB 01 02 00 Z 16002KT 8000 –SN BKN006 BKN008 OVC029
M06/M07 Q1040 R31L/49//42 NOSIG=
METAR UGTB 01 02 30 Z VRB02KT 6000 –SN FEW005 OVC007
M06/M07 Q1040 R31L/49//42 NOSIG=
METAR UGTB 01 03 00 Z VRB02KT 7000 –SN OVC006 M06/M07 Q1040
R31L/690042 NOSIG=
1.8. Aids to Navigation
Not applicable.
1. 9. Communications
Not applicable.
9
1.10. Aerodrome information
Physical Data
Designations RWY NR
True BRG Dimensions of RWY (M)
Strength (PCN) and surface of
RWY and SWY
THR coordinates RWY end
coordinates THR geoid undulation
THR elevation and highest
elevation of TDZ of precision APP
RWY
31L 316.560 3000 X 45 PCN 66/R/A/W/T
Concrete
413929.54 N
0445753.59 E
THR 1558.3 FT
TDZ 1573.2 FT
On 01.02.2014 the condition of Tbilisi International Airport taxiways and
runway 31L conformed to established norms and at 02.45 (UTC) the
braking coefficient was 0.42 (under classification 0.42 and over 0.42 is
considered as “good”).
1.11. Flight Recorders
The FDR and CVR on the aircraft TC-AAZ (CVR-P/N: 980-6022-001 S/N:
980-6022-001 S/N: CVR 120-13726, FDR P/N: 980-4700-042 S/N; 17933)
were removed and deciphered at the directorate of Civil Aviation of Turkey.
1.12. Wreckage and Impact Information
Not applicable.
1.13. Medical and pathological Information
Not applicable.
10
1.14 Fire
Not applicable.
1.15. Survival Factors
During aviation incident the flight crew, cabin crew and 124 passengers
received no injuries. The flight crew did not require rescue operation or
immediate evacuation of passengers. Prior to pushing back aircraft the
passengers were disembarked by boarding stairs.
1.16. Testing and Investigation
After the incident, the aircraft TC-AAZ was inspected according AMM
Boeing-737-82R by "Pegasus airlines" technical center's maintenance
specialists. The nose wheels were replaced, the engines were examined
and the computer testing of the aircraft systems was conducted. In the
result of the above malfunction of the right engine anti-icing system (TC-
AAZ “Flight and Maintenance Log” record No 0539120) was revealed. The
anti-icing system valve of the right engine was deactivated – sealed and
according to the aircraft Boeing 737-82R MEL was classified as category C
until 11.02.2014. (TC-AAZ “Hold Item List” 05420 record).
Only after the performance of technical works Civil Aviation Agency granted
the permission to conduct technical flight without passengers to Istanbul
Airport.
11
1.17. Organizational and management Information
The air company “Pegasus Airlines” (Aircraft operator’s certificate # TR-004
issued on 04.05.1990 by Civil Aviation General Directorate of Turkey) was
granted the right to perform commercial air shipments/aviation activity, as
it is established in the enclosed operation specifications with the
observation of those requirements established under Flight Performance
manual, effective Turkish legislation and ICAO standards.
The air-company “Pegasus Airlines” is represented in Georgia by the
company “GASA” Ltd, while the handling services is provided by “TAV
Urban Georgia” LLC in Tbilisi International Airport.
1.18. The useful and efficient methods used for investigation
For investigation of the given aviation incident no new methods were used.
2. Analyses
The analysis has been conducted based on the study of the following
primary documents:
- Explanatory letters of aircraft Captain and Co-pilot;
- The extract of factual weather conditions in Tbilisi International
airport on 01.02.2014.
- Extract of radio-communication between the flight crew of the
aircraft TC-AAZ and ATC “Tbilisi Tower”.
- Explanatory letter of an air traffic controller of the ATC “Tbilisi
Tower”.
12
- The extract of radio communication between an air-controller of ATC
“Tbilisi Tower” and the aerodrome service of “TAV Urban Georgia”
LLC.
- SNOWTAM and NOTAM’s drawn and issued by Tbilisi aerodrome
service and ‘Sakaeronavigatsia” Ltd.
- Explanatory letter of duty shift chief of aerodrome service;
- Extract from runway and aerodrome movement area condition
evaluation log-book;
- Extract from the computer of braking coefficient measure unit “STFT
SARSYS.
- Data received from deciphering the (FDR-CVR) removed from the
aircraft TC-AAZ
- The onboard-technical log-book: Flight - Maintenance Log-book and
Hold Item List Log -book
- Flight operational manual, part B has been received from air-
company “Pegasus Airlines”
- FCOM of flight operational manual of Boeing 737-800;
- Data of the aircraft TC-AAZ and flight crew that were involved in the
accident sent from Aviation Incident investigation bureau of the
Ministry of Transportation of Turkey;
- Also other relevant local and international normative documents;
The study of the data of the aircraft TC-AAZ and flight crew involved in
the accident shows that nothing was recorded about any malfunction in
the aircraft technical log-book during the flight.
As per the explanation of a captain and the co-pilot, as well as the
extract provided by Sakaeronavigatsia Ltd – the radio-communication
between flight crew and ATC controller it is clarified that on February 1,
2014, when performing a flight PGT-463 Tbilisi-Istanbul captain was
conducting pilot flying of the aircraft TC-AAZ, while co-pilot was
performing monitoring (pilot not flying)
13
At 02:38:07 the crew received the following information on the actual
meteorological condition the runway 31L from the ATC controller of
“Tbilisi Tower”:
“For information runway is cleared from centerline 7.5 meters, braking
coefficient 0.42, runway is covered with snow and slush 0.75mm from
left and right 7.5 meters and rest is 3sm snow.”
During the investigation SNOWTSM and NOTAMs drawn by “Tbilisi
Aerodrome service” and “Sakaeronavigatsia” Ltd, explanation letter of
“Tbilisi Aerodrome Service” duty chief and an extract from runway and
aerodrome movement area evaluation log-book, also an extract from
the computer of “STFT SARSYS” of braking coefficient measure device
were studied, which state that runway 31 L had been cleared from snow
during the whole night and the braking coefficient was measured at the
following time periods.
00:20-00:30 o’clock braking coefficient = 0.42/0.42/0.42
01:10-02:20 o’clock braking coefficient = 0.42/0.42/0.42
And after the incident at 03:04 o’clock the braking coefficient
=0.5/0.5/0.51, it is also to be noted that prior to this incident the flight
had been performed without any problems in the following time periods:
Air-company „Belavia“- 00:03
Air-company „Lufthansa“- 01:26
Air-company „Turkish Airlines“- 01:58
Air-company „Georgian Airways“- 02:41
14
Note: 1) the results of deciphering of the flight objective control CVR –
FDR removed from the aircraft shows that the receipt of the mentioned
meteorological-information coincides with the standard pre-flight briefing.
It is also noteworthy, that during the pre-flight briefing the crew did not
discuss the recommended instructions for Cold Weather Operations,
Slush/standing Water Takeoff and Slippery Runway Takeoff by performing
of which the risk would have been brought to minimum.
It is also to be taken into account that from the moment of aircraft’s
leaving apron to the occurrence of the incident the crew was busy talking
about various topics in the intervals between the performance of the
procedures; considering the human factor this always leads to distraction
and certain extent of relaxation, which is not recommended at takeoff.
At 02:41:05 the crew starts moving from the apron via the taxiway “E” to
the direction of the runway 31L.
At 02:45:17 the aircraft enters the runway 31L at magnetic course
(308.67), when the aircraft is still in the regime of turning, it starts
acceleration of engines. At this time the engine levers are at a similar
position (59.24) while the number of engine rotation both in N1 and N2
engines start to differ from each other and the automated regime had not
been still switched on.
secsecsecsec Gr.speed Gr.speed Gr.speed Gr.speed
knknknkn
FlapFlapFlapFlap WarningWarningWarningWarning HeadingHeadingHeadingHeading TO/GATO/GATO/GATO/GA
sw sw sw sw
pressedpressedpressedpressed
TO/GATO/GATO/GATO/GA N 1LN 1LN 1LN 1L
%%%%
RPMRPMRPMRPM
N1RN1RN1RN1R
%%%%
RPMRPMRPMRPM
Trot Trot Trot Trot
Angl Angl Angl Angl
LLLL
Trot Trot Trot Trot
Angl Angl Angl Angl
RRRR
N2LN2LN2LN2L
%%%%
RPMRPMRPMRPM
N2RN2RN2RN2R
%%%%
RPMRPMRPMRPM
02:45:17 3 10 No
warning
308.67 Not
Pressed
Not
Eng
23.1 22 59.24 59.24 63 61.88
Note: 2): 02:45:22, when the aircraft TC-AAZ was not yet fully
straightened on the runway 31L and the difference between the number of
engine rotation both N 1 and N 2 accordingly increases, the crew switches
on the automatic regime TO/GA
15
secsecsecsec Gr.speed Gr.speed Gr.speed Gr.speed
knknknkn
FlapFlapFlapFlap WarningWarningWarningWarning HeadingHeadingHeadingHeading TO/GATO/GATO/GATO/GA
sw sw sw sw
pressedpressedpressedpressed
TO/GATO/GATO/GATO/GA N 1LN 1LN 1LN 1L
%%%%
RPMRPMRPMRPM
N1RN1RN1RN1R
%%%%
RPMRPMRPMRPM
Trot Trot Trot Trot
Angl Angl Angl Angl
LLLL
Trot Trot Trot Trot
Angl Angl Angl Angl
RRRR
N2LN2LN2LN2L
%%%%
RPMRPMRPMRPM
N2RN2RN2RN2R
%%%%
RPMRPMRPMRPM
02:45:22 4 10 No
warning
309.38 Pressed Engage 37.3 28 59.41 59.24 78.13 70.5
Note 3): In accordance with the requirements of flight operation manuals,
after entering the runway to perform the take-off run the crew must check
main parameters of engine functioning, namely Operational manual of an
aircraft Boeing 737-800 of air-company “Pegasus Airlines”:The requirement
of Chapter 2 – Normal Procedures : article 2.4 “Before Takeoff Procedures”
is the following:
„ARM the autothrottle only when lined up on the centerline to avoid loss of
directional control due to inadvertent selection of TOGA or autothrottle
malfunction. Refrain from setting parking brake on the runway. When
Commander is PM and takeoff clearance has been received, the
Commander will arm the autothrottle when lined up on the centerline,
increase thrust to 40% N1, press TOGA once engines have stabilized and
call, “N1 TOGA YOU HAVE CONTROL”. The First Officer will state “I HAVE
CONTROL SET,___%N1” however the Commanders hands will rest on the
thrust levers until V1.“
Note 4): The requirement of Operational manual of an aircraft Boeing
737-800 – FCOM- “Takeoff Procedures” D6-27370-82R-PGS NP.21.47 Is:
-Before entering the departure runway, verify that the runway and
runway entry point are correct.
- Align the airplane with the runway.
- Verify that the airplane heading agrees with the assigned runway
heading.
16
-Advance the thrust levers to approximately 40% N1.
-Allow the engines stabilize.
- Push the TO/GA switch.
-Verify that the correct takeoff thrust is set.
Note 5): The requirement of Operational manual of an aircraft Boeing
737-800 – FCOM- “Takeoff Procedures” D6-27370-82R-PGS SP.16.9 Is:
“Do the normal Takeoff Procedure with the following modification:
When engine anti-ice is required and the OAT is 3°C or below, the takeoff
must be preceded by a static engine run up. Use the following procedures:
Run up to a minimum of 70% N1 and confirm stable engine operation
before the start of the takeoff roll. A 30 second run up is highly
recommended whenever possible.”
During the takeoff roll of the aircraft TC-AAZ the critical situation developed
as of 02:45:17, at this very time the aircraft is in the process of turning
and rolls on the runway with the course 308.67°, the engine levers are on
the similar position (59.24), the crew tries manual manipulation of the left
engine lever to a higher regime of operation with the view of bringing the
aircraft to the precise take off course 312°, accordingly the number of left
engine rotation increases, and the engine develops more driving force, the
aircraft starts to take up speed with the tendency of turning to the right
and continues taking precise takeoff course. Even though at 02:45:22 the
aircraft is still at the course 309.38°, it still did not reach the precise take
off course 312°, the number of rotations of left and right engines already
significantly differs (the left engine N 1 =37.3%), (the right engine N 1 =
28%) at that moment the engine levers are on the different position (left
engine lever is 59.41),(right engine lever is 59.24) the crew switches on
TO/GA switch, which automatically brings engine operation levers to the
regime of operation required for takeoff.
17
Note: 6) 02:45:26 FDR recorded the warning signal on malfunctioning of
engine operation levers “AT Warn”, Following of which the FDR device
recorded the switching off of “Auto throttle Disconnect Switches” by the
Captain.
At this very moment due to the imbalance between the engines (left
engine N 1=88.5%), (right engine N 1=53.0%), the aircraft acquired the
tendency of moving to the right, enhanced by the tendency of moving to
the right previously given by the crew for bringing the aircraft to the
precise magnetic course, which in the whole led to the change of the
aircraft direction. In the result of the latter the Captain made the decision
to reject the takeoff at 02:45:28, manually switched the engine operation
levers to the lowest regime (IDLE), while reduction of engine rotation
numbers also occurred asymmetrically and took about 10 second. During
this period the aircraft continues movement to the right under its own
inertia and the course corresponds to 325°. At the time of reject of takeoff
the Captain used brakes. The brakes also was used asymmetrically until
the aircraft stopped finally
Time Brake Left (PSI) Brake Right (PSI)
02:45:26 422.2 133.7
02:45:28 616.8 41.5
02:45:30 643.9 67.7
02:45:32 645.6 121.0
02:45:36 643.1 91.4
Which indicates that at this very critical moment the Captain did not
manage to maintain the right direction on the runway by turning the nose
gear to the left, when he was trying to neutralize the aircraft movement to
the right in this way(using brakes) and stopping the aircraft within the
runway range. However, it turned out to be impossible.
The aircraft went over the edge of the runway at the 135 meter distance
from the threshold of runway went to the right side and stopped. Aircraft
18
main gear was on the right edge paved surface of the runway and nose
gear stopped on the Unpaved runway at 3.5 meter from the runway edge
At 02:45:51 the aircraft TC-AAZ crew reported to the ATC controller of
“Tbilisi Tower” about the rejected takeoff. The flight crew did not require
rescue operation or immediate evacuation of passengers. Prior to pushing
back aircraft to the parking stand the passengers were disembarked by
boarding stairs.
3. Conclusion
1. Incident – with the aircraft Boeing 737-82R, registration No TC-AAZ,
operated by Pegasus Airlines, on the runway 31L is considered as an
incident involving a high risk and therefor is classified as a serious
incident.
2. The primary cause of the serious incident was malfunction of anti-
icing system of the right engine of the aircraft TC-AAZ, which led to
considerable retardation of the right engine parameters (RPM-
number of rotation N1 and N2) during acceleration.
3. The following factors have contributed to the serious incident:
- Human Factor, namely, incomplete performance by the flight crew of the
aircraft TC-AAZ of the following:
- air-company "Pegasus Airlines" Operational Manual of Boeing 737-800 –
Part - B - „CHAPTER 2 – NORMAL PROCEDURES „ article 2.4. „BEFORE
TAKEOFF PROCEDURES“ and “Appendix I.13.30 Bulletin-30, Crew Briefings
- Takeoff Briefings”,
- FCOM of the Boeing 737-800
(D6-27370-82R-PGS NO.21.47) “Takeoff Procedures”
(D6-27370-82R-PGS NO.16.9) “Takeoff Procedures”
19
4. Flight Safety Recommendations
1.The report of the present serious incident be published via the web-site
of the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development of Georgia:
http://www.economy.ge/ge/civil-aviation-and-maritime-transport-accident-incident-
investigation-bureau
2.The written report will be sent to:
a) LEPL Civil Aviation Agency
b) Air company “Pegasus Airlines”
c) LLC “TAV Urban Georgia”
d) LTD “Sakaeronavigatsia”
e) The representative of the air company “Pegasus Airlines” in
Georgia – LTD “GASA”;
3. With the view of improving flight safety and prevention of similar
incidents in future the administration of the air company “Pegasus Airlines”
is to ensure the following:
- Organize detailed review of the final report of the serious incident in the
airline and implement of relevant preventive actions with the view of
enhancing flight safety culture.
- Organize additional theoretical trainings for flight personnel on the topic:
- Crew Resource Management’s objective in flight safety;
- Human Factor, situation awareness, timely comprehension and decision
making as per the requirements of FCOM and SOP;
Putting emphasis on the following during Crew Briefings:
- Trust Setting Management;
- Cold Weather Operations;
- Slush/standing Water Takeoff’
- Slippery Runway Takeoff;
21
Appendix 1
The overall picture of the numbers of aircraft and engines parametersThe overall picture of the numbers of aircraft and engines parametersThe overall picture of the numbers of aircraft and engines parametersThe overall picture of the numbers of aircraft and engines parameters
secsecsecsec GrounGrounGrounGroun
dddd
speed speed speed speed
knknknkn
FlaFlaFlaFla
pppp
WarninWarninWarninWarnin
gggg
HeadinHeadinHeadinHeadin
gggg
TO/GTO/GTO/GTO/G
AAAA
swswswsw
pressepressepressepresse
dddd
TO/GTO/GTO/GTO/G
AAAA
N 1LN 1LN 1LN 1L
%%%%
RPRPRPRP
MMMM
N1RN1RN1RN1R
%%%%
RPRPRPRP
MMMM
Trot Trot Trot Trot
Angl Angl Angl Angl
LLLL
Trot Trot Trot Trot
Angl Angl Angl Angl
RRRR
N2LN2LN2LN2L
%%%%
RPRPRPRP
MMMM
N2RN2RN2RN2R
%%%%
RPMRPMRPMRPM
02:45:2
0
3.5 10 No
warning
309.02 Not
Presse
d
Not
Eng
28.928.928.928.9 24.624.624.624.6 59.4
1
59.2
4
70.6
3
66.1
3
02:45:2
1
3.5 10 No
warning
309.02 Not
Presse
d
Not
Eng
31.931.931.931.9 26.126.126.126.1 59.4
1
59.2
4
74.1
3
68.1
3
02:45:2
2
4 10 No
warning
309.38309.38309.38309.38 PressePressePressePresse
dddd
EngagEngagEngagEngag
eeee
37.337.337.337.3 28282828 59.459.459.459.4
1111
59.259.259.259.2
4444
78.1
3
70.5
02:45:2
3
5 10 No
warning
309.38 Not
Presse
d
Engag
e
49.449.449.449.4 30.130.130.130.1 64.3
4
67.8
5
82.1
3
73.1
3
02:45:2
4
6 10 No
warning
309.73 Not
Presse
d
Engag
e
64.464.464.464.4 33.333.333.333.3 68.7
3
68.7
3
86.2
5
76.2
5
02:45:2
5
8.5 10 No
warning
311.13 Not
Presse
d
Engag
e
80808080 40404040 68.7
3
77.1
7
91.2
5
80.1
3
02:45:2
6
11 10 AT AT AT AT
warn warn warn warn
CaptCaptCaptCapt
314.65 PressePressePressePresse
dddd
Engag
e
87.887.887.887.8 53.953.953.953.9 65.9
2
35.6
8
93.8
8
83.2
5
02:45:2
7
12.5 10 AT
warn
Capt
319.92 Not
Presse
d
Engag
e
88.588.588.588.5 53535353 35.835.835.835.8
6666
35.635.635.635.6
8888
93 79.3
8
02:45:2
8
14.5 10 AT
warn
Capt
325.9 Not
Presse
d
Engag
e
79.979.979.979.9 42.942.942.942.9 35.8
6
55.7
2
90 76.1
3
02:45:2
9
14.4 10 AT
warn
Capt
332.93 Not
Presse
d
Engag
e
69.169.169.169.1 37.937.937.937.9 36.0
4
35.6
8
86.8
8
76
02:45:3
0
13.5 10 AT
warn
Capt
339.61 Not
Presse
d
Engag
e
58.658.658.658.6 33.533.533.533.5 35.8
6
35.6
8
83.5 73
02:45:3
7
0 10 No
warning
342.07 Not
Pressed
Eng
age
23.823.823.823.8 19.819.819.819.8 36.0
4
35.6
8
64.5 58.3
8
22
23
24
