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Irfan Ahmed Vassil Roussev William Johnson Saranyan Senthivel ...

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Irfan Ahmed Vassil Roussev William Johnson Saranyan Senthivel Sneha Sudhakaran Greater New Orleans Center for Information Assurance gnocia.cs.uno.edu 1
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Page 1: Irfan Ahmed Vassil Roussev William Johnson Saranyan Senthivel ...

Irfan AhmedVassil Roussev

William Johnson Saranyan SenthivelSneha Sudhakaran

Greater New Orleans Center for Information Assurancegnocia.cs.uno.edu

1

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A SCADA Testbed On-going Research Efforts Course on Industrial Control System (ICS)

Security

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Historian

Power

Distribution

EtherNet/IP

HMI

Modbus

Ethernet

Switch

Field Site 1

Control Center

Gas Pipeline

Field Site 2

Wastewater

Treatment

Field Site 3

PROFINET

PLCPLCPLC

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Cyber attacks and Vulnerabilities Cyber attacks on the testbed vs. similar SCADA

systems in industry Small scale physical model put limitations

does not offer a large set of parameters and variables from physical process

Limited data for network traffic analysis

Limited number of PLCs and ICS protocol support

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Research Prototype Evaluation Testing on testbed enforces the constraints of a

typical SCADA system 24/7 availability requirement of SCADA services

Resource-constrained embedded devices

Interaction of cyber and physical worlds

ICS communication protocols Difficult to add security functionalities in PLCs proprietary firmware/OS

Limited tools/techniques to access and modify firmware/OS code in PLC

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Useful for Digital Forensic research Tools and techniques to extract and analyze

digital artifacts from

HMI and other SCADA services

PLCs

ICS Network traffic

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Demonstration of physical processes Varied programming software support PLCs of three vendors, each using different

programming software

Schneider Electric - SoMachine Basic

Allen-Bradley - Studio 5000

Siemens - SIMATIC STEP 7 Varied SCADA protocol support EtherNet/IP

Modbus

PROFINET

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Topics Introduction to industrial control

systems (ICS)

PLC programming

ICS network protocols

ICS vulnerabilities and cyber attacks

ICS security solutions Hands-on PLC:Allen-Bradley’s Micrologix 1400 B

Program PLC to control Traffic Lights

Implement man-in the middle attack

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PLC Vendors

GE, Mitsubishi, Allen Bradley, Omron, WAGO, Siemens, Automation Direct, and Schneider

PLCs

Micro820, ControlLogix, 1214 TIA, CJ1M, and Fanuc 90/30

Protocols

CC Link, PROFINET, DNP3, Modbus, EtherNet/IP, PCCC, BAC, FL-Net, MC, FINS, and CJ2,

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No fieldbus I/O support No connectivity with the cloud No IoT appliances in the testbed

So called industrial internet of things

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Irfan [email protected] - 280 - 4409

Contact me


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