Islam and Political Community

Islam and Political Community in the Arab WorldAuthor(s): Terrance G. CarrollSource: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2 (May, 1986), pp. 185-204Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/163261Accessed: 16/11/2008 11:43

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unlessyou have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and youmay use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with thescholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform thatpromotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toInternational Journal of Middle East Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

Int. J. Middle East Stud. 18 (1986), 185-204 Printed in the United States of America

Terrance G. Carroll

ISLAM AND POLITICAL COMMUNITY IN THE ARAB WORLD

This article attempts to delineate the set of circumstances under which religion acts as a significant conducive factor in the development of Arab political communities, and those circumstances under which religion presents an important obstacle to the emergence of a political community. The focus is restricted to the Arab world so as to permit a more precise analysis than would be possible were one to attempt to generalize across more diverse cultures, but some of its main threads may apply equally well to other peoples and other religions. For the reasons discussed below, religion seems to be a particularly powerful source of individual political identities, and of feelings of membership in political communities.

In the course of the last decade we have witnessed a welcome revival of scholarly interest in the political role of religion. As a part of this renewed concern a number of scholars have challenged the perspective which dominated Western political science for much of the postwar period-a perspective which saw religion as an anachronistic element in political life. This body of literature tended to portray religion as relevant to politics primarily because of its tem- porary and declining capacity to stand as an obstacle to modernization and political development.l

I have argued elsewhere that none of the main religions of the Third World seem to have any strong effect on the development of the processes, structures, and capabilities typical of a modern state.2 Indeed, that analysis suggested that on the whole Islam has a mild but positive effect on the development of central features of the modern state. It does present an obstacle to some ideologically based conceptions of political modernity, particularly to the liberal and Marxist models, but it complements other versions of the modern state. Aspects of Islamic culture and theology can serve to reinforce central normative assumptions of both conservatism and social democracy, for example, while also contributing to the capabilites associated with a modern state in the areas of communications, coercion, and legitimation.3

Arab politics specialists have been at the forefront of the emerging movement to assess more carefully the political role of religion. Several recent studies have addressed the effects of Islam on political development, and have arrived at conclusions similar to my own.4 Other scholars have emphasized the legitimizing potential of Islam, and have analyzed its availability to and use by both regime

? 1986 Cambridge University Press 0020-7438/86/020185-20 $2.50

186 Terrance G. Carroll

and insurgent elites.5 This legitimation function seems to me to be perhaps the single most important effect of Islam on short-term changes in the political situations of Arab countries. This is so because Islam can have a strong effect on the legitimacy of regimes, rulers, groups, and policies, and also because its effects on these aspects of political life vary so greatly across time and place.

As welcome as these studies are, however, they have not thus far given much attention to a second, perhaps equally important relationship between religion and Arab politics: the effects of religion on perceptions of and identification with political communities. In the short term this relationship serves more or less as a constant within any one Arab polity and it may be for this reason that it has received only limited scholarly attention. From a comparative perspective, however, the effects of Islam on political community may be an essential factor in accounting for patterns of similarity and difference among the Arab states.

Feelings of membership in a political community are conceived here to be special types of political identity. The next two sections of this article explore the role of religion in general, and Islam in particular, in the formation of political identities. This is followed by an analysis of the effects of religion on the development of political communities, and an examination of the influence of geopolitical conditions on this relationship. The final, substantive section examines the ways in which Islam and other religions help and hinder the formation of political communities which correspond to the boundaries of Arab states. Three propositions form the heart of the analysis and argument that follow:

1. religion is an especially powerful basis for the formation of political identities and, in particular, Islam is one of the most powerful sources of Arab political identities.

2. religiously based political identities are more likely than others to be transformed into political communities.

3. Islam is an important factor in the formation of Arab political communities, but the nature of its effect on community formation, and its consequences, depend upon three geopolitical conditions that will be specified.

RELIGION AND POLITICAL IDENTITY

"Political identity" is used here to imply a consciousness of belonging to a politically relevant group. To ask what my political identity is, MacKenzie has explained, is to ask in what political context "do 'I' properly use the word 'we'?"6 Social identities may derive from any number of sources and any individual will have a plurality of social identities. The relative importance of these identities will typically reflect the social importance of the roles which they represent. Identities are politicized when those who hold them become aware that, as a result of their common identity, they also share important goals which may be attained by political means.

While an almost infinite variety of circumstances can lead to the politicization of a social identity on instrumental grounds, there are a few specific types of situations that have an unusually high potential for politicization, and that tend to produce political identities which are especially strong and lasting. One such

Islam and Political Community 187

situation is that of any group defined by a social identity that incorporates powerful mythical and symbolic elements.7 Myths-by which I mean any widely shared interpretations of the supposed history and traditions of the group- fulfill a function akin to that of ideology. They provide a rationale and justifica- tion for the existence and well-being of the group. It is not just desirable that those sharing the identity should collectively benefit from the political process; it is also proper or natural. Symbols and rituals, as well as myths, help to reinforce the shared identity, and to increase the probability that members of the group will perceive their own welfare in terms of the success of the particular collectivity.

A second broad category of social identities which have a similarly high potential for politicization are those revolving around what MacKenzie calls "tribal stigmata."8 A stigma is the identifying characteristic of any social identity that is generally considered to be discreditable. Those that are ascriptive, and that characterize large groups of people-such as race, language, or religion- are "tribal stigmata." Any stigma serves to demark two social identities, those who share it and those who have the good fortune not to be so stigmatized.

Both of the identities derived from any important tribal stigma are likely to be particularly strong. For those who bear the stigma, the social identity so defined often will be the overriding feature of their lives. The more important, discreditable, and widespread a particular stigma, the more likely it becomes that the lack of this stigma will also be reinforced by a perception of other, valued characteristics that are thought to be shared by members of the nonstigmatized group. The negative identity based on the absence of stigma is transformed into a positive identity based on real or imagined commonalities. Identities that are based on the presence or absence of tribal stigmata have a high potential for politicization because, by definition, they denote a relationship of supposed superiority/inferiority. Any effort to alter or maintain this relationship is likely at some point to take a political form. These identities also tend to be particularly lasting because they are thought to be more or less ascriptive and unchangeable.

Identities based on both myths and stigmatization may be derived from a variety of social characteristics, of which religion is but one. Nevertheless, there are features shared by most religions which make them particularly likely to produce identities of both types, and to produce identities that are especially strong. In the case of myth-based identities, religions are almost unique in the importance that they place on the codification, perpetuation, and indoctrination of their central beliefs. In most cases there is an entrenched institutional structure devoted to this very task. If we compare this with another myth-based group, such as one defined by ethnicity or kinship, we find few of the advantages with which religions are so richly endowed. In the absence of a coterminous state structure, neither ethnic organizations nor the oral historians of a kinship group are very effective guardians of the mythologies of their groups in comparison with the ulama of Islam, the monks of Buddhism, or the priesthood of Catholicism. It is not surprising, then, that a review of the development of political identities in Europe led Rokkan and Urwin to conclude that "the most significant myth historically has been religion."9


With regard to identities based on stigmata, however, Rokkan and Urwin argue that language, and not religion, "is the most pervasive and obvious stigma of distinctiveness."'0 While this may be true in a European context, it seems clear that from a broader perspective visible racial features are the most obvious and inescapable type of tribal stigmata. Despite a few contrary examples such as Switzerland, however, a common language does seem to come close to constituting a necessary condition for the development of a political identity, and linguistic divisions approximate a sufficient condition for the development of distinct identities. There is no one best way of assessing the relative importance of differing sources of political identity: for example, is the pervasiveness of the stigma more or less important than its strength? Nor is there any obvious need to do so. Race may be the most powerful stigma of the modern age; language may be the most pervasive source of identities in contemporary Europe; and religion may be both strong and pervasive in other parts of the world, as well as having been the primary source of persisting identities that developed in an earlier age.1

Without denying the importance of race and language, then, we can also note the unique and powerful aspect of a religiously based identity: it is endowed with a conviction of moral righteousness. This increases the likelihood that other groups will be thought to be not just different, but also inferior, and thus increases the probability that the identity will become politicized as a result of intergroup conflict. The righteousness of a religiously based identity also makes it less likely that group members will be willing to see divisions depoliticized through a blurring of distinctions between groups in a manner similar to the effects of interracial marriage or bilingualism on identities based on racial or linguistic stigmata, respectively.12 There may be fewer external obstacles to religious conversion than there are to linguistic change, and "passing" may be easier for those who bear a religious stigma than it is for members of racial groups, but for those who share an identity based on religion, conversion and passing both require a symbolic rejection of divine wisdom and authority. Mar- tyrdom is but an extreme example of a more general point: membership in even a subordinate and oppressed identity group may be precious if one is certain that it is accompanied by a greater moral virtue. And it is not only those sharing the identity who are likely to foster its distinctiveness, but also outsiders. Perceiv- ing members of the religiously based identity group as stigmatized and not merely as different, they will also tend to place special stress on boundary maintenance.

Most frequently, of course, a religiously based identity group will have an internal solidarity that is derived both from its own corpus of myth and from social stigma. Members of any such group are likely to believe that this identity is a source of virtue. As a consequence such groups are unusually prone to see issues not just in instrumental terms, but also in terms of fundamental moral principles. This tendency reduces the potential for conflict resolution through processes of bargaining and compromise, transforming what might otherwise be "more or less" questions into zero-sum conflicts.13 A heightened potential for politicization is again the result.

To summarize, then, identities that have a mythological foundation, or that are derived from stigmata, tend to be unusually powerful and lasting, and to be


particularly amenable to politicization. Because it will place the highest importance on its corpus of myth, because it can provide significant institutional support to an indentity group, and because it can endow membership with moral virtue, religion serves as an especially powerful definitional criterion for identities of these types.

ISLAM AND POLITICAL IDENTITY IN THE ARAB WORLD

If religion in general is a particularly potent source of social and political identities, Islam stands out in comparison with the other world religions. As Crawford Young put it, "Islam is a political religion par excellence...."4 In part this is because of the scope of Islamic teaching, which recognizes no division between spiritual and worldly aspects of life. The devout Muslim accepts that Islamic principles should govern economic and political life, as well as social relations. In a sense, then, an Islamic religious identity is automatically also a political identity-and it is a political identity that is relevant to a great range of political issues. It is true that Islam, like all theologically rich religions, is open to a great diversity of interpretation. It seldom produces one clear, theologically indisputable response to a political issue. Nevertheless, it is available to those involved in almost any political dispute. They may turn to Islam for guidance when developing a position on an issue, or they may use religious principles to legitimate policy positions that reflect other types of values.

A second characteristic that also contributes to the special power of Islam as a basis for political and social identities is the frequency with which followers are called upon to display their commitment publicly. The cry of the muezzins calling the faithful to prayer five times each day; the ritual of prayer throughout the city or village; the gathering at the mosque on Fridays; the observance of Islamic obligations such as the fast of Ramadan; all of these serve to reinforce the religious foundation of identities for the Muslim.15 These public manifesta- tions of Islamic faith serve as powerful symbols of the strength, vitality, and immediacy of the political identity that so frequently results. The contrast with religions like Hinduism, with its irregular and largely private forms of worship, is sharp. Even the followers of such a ritualistically and symbolically rich faith as Catholicism are called upon much less frequently to reaffirm their shared identity publicly and collectively.

The available empirical evidence is scattered and scant. Nevertheless, it does all point to a single conclusion: Islam is one of the more powerful sources of social and political identities for Arabs. While this finding will seem almost a commonplace to students of Arab politics, it may be useful to review the evidence that has accumulated over the past three decades. A study conducted by Melikian and Diab at the American University of Lebanon in 1957/58 is among the earliest attempts to produce evidence about Arab political identities. Over two hundred psychology undergraduates were asked to make forced choices among five types of identity groups: the family, religion, nation (ethnic origin), citizenship, and political party. Muslim students ranked loyalty to family first, loyalty to their religion second, ethnicity third, political party fourth, and


citizenship last.l6 A replication by the same scholars was conducted in 1971, with similar results.'7

El Fathaly and his colleagues have reported on a 1973 survey of close to 600 adult males in seven Libyan villages. When asked to provide a self-assessment of their religiosity, more than half of their respondents replied that they were "extremely" or "very" religious. Almost half of the sample reported that they prayed in a mosque more than once a week, and nine of ten said that they did so at least weekly."8 Their respondents were also asked to name the people who could best lead their own villages, and to give reasons for their choice. Religious piety was cited by 75 percent of the sample, and that was almost double the proportion mentioning family and tribal ties, the second most common answer.'9

In 1976/77 Farah and Al-Salem carried out a series of studies in Kuwait and the Gulf states. Farah replicated Melikian and Diab's earlier forced-choice studies using a sample of 420 Arab students at Kuwait University. This sample included subsamples of thirty respondents from each of thirteen Arab states, plus Palestine. Religion was clearly the most important identity, with family in second place, reversing the order found in the Lebanese studies. Similarly, state citizenship displaced ethnicity (Arabism) as the third most powerful loyalty.20 The same questions were also put to a representative sample of Kuwaiti junior high school students, and they too gave priority to their religious identity. Among these younger respondents, however, state citizenship replaced kinship as the second most powerful identity.2' In Al-Salem's study of almost 1400 teen- agers from a number of Gulf states, 47 percent of the respondents indicated that their primary identity was one based on religion, while only 20 percent mentioned

22 state citizenship, the second most common response.2

Turning to more recent studies, between 1979 and 1981 Reiser conducted a survey of Arab students attending college in Boston. His sample included a large proportion of Lebanese Christians, and on some questions separate results are not reported for Muslims. By extrapolation, however, it appears that about 95 percent of the Islamic respondents claimed to be committed to their religion. Arab nationalism was a more important loyalty, as 50 percent of Muslims students identified most strongly with the Arab nation compared with 27 percent whose primary identification was religious. Only 16 percent of the Muslims in his sample gave state nationalism as their primary political identity, and under 5 percent chose ethnic, clan, or family ties. This varied considerably with the students' country of origin, however. Among Egyptian students, for example, 39 percent identified most strongly with Egypt, 33 percent with their religion, and only 28 percent with Arab nationalism.23

It is clear that we should not place much reliance on any one rank ordering of these various types of political identities. Apart from problems with the repre- sentativeness of some of these samples, it seems that the precise pattern of replies varies considerably as a consequence of the immediate political context. Ibrahim conducted a postal survey of large and representative samples of Arab university students in the United States in 1966, and again in 1968. In the earlier survey 55 percent of respondents scored high on an Arab nationalism scale, while in the latter survey-which followed the 1967 war-this proportion had increased to 61 percent.24 Al-Mashat surveyed 131 senior-year Egyptian political science majors


in 1980, and found that 79 percent identified with the Arab nation, and 63 percent believed that Arab unity was "possible." When he put the same questions to a sample of 186 Egyptian university seniors two years later, the comparable percentages were 44 percent and 57 percent.25 (It is worth noting that 72 percent of his respondents in the latter survey desired an Islamic society for Egypt, in preference to a socialist, liberal, or capitalist society.)

Nevertheless, we can conclude with some confidence that an Islamic political identity is one of the more important of the various political identities that exist in the Arab world. Nor are there grounds for thinking that this is a passing anachronism, destined to disappear as Arab societies modernize. Two Jordanian studies are instructive. In the first, carried out in 1966 by Sutcliffe, a survey of Muslim peasants in the Jordan valley produced no statistically significant relationships between religious commitment and any of three modern values.26 At about the same time Cunningham surveyed a large sample of high school seniors and post-secondary students in Amman, and a comparable group of first-year university students in Canada. He found the anticipated difference between the two groups with regard to social values about family obligations- the Jordanians were much more traditional and conservative. With regard to job-related values, on the other hand, the two groups were much more alike.27

Together these studies suggest that Islamic Arabs experience little tension in following traditional values in some spheres of life, and modern values in others, and that the development of some types of modern values has no necessary implications for the continued importance of religion. El Fathaly, in the Libyan study discussed previously, discovered similarly that modern respondents-high school graduates living in urban areas who watched television regularly-were not significantly less religious than those living a traditional life.28 In Syria, where social class might be expected to correspond fairly closely to a modern/ traditional continuum, Hinnebusch found no relationship between class and religiosity in a sample of members of the Ba'thist Revolutionary Youth Federa- tion.29 Because Ba'thism is a secular ideology one might expect religiosity to be quite weak in this sample, but two out of three of Hinnebusch's respondents claimed to be practicing followers of some religion. By contrast, Ibrahim studied a group whose members have an extremely strong religious commitment- imprisoned leaders of Islamic fundamentalist groups in Egypt. His interviews, carried out in the late 1970s, indicated that such people had surprisingly "modern" backgrounds. The typical member came from a middle-class family and had some post-secondary education, frequently in the natural sciences.30

El Menoufi's research on rural Egyptians demonstrates one of the reasons for the lack of any general relationship between modernity and secularization. His 1978/79 survey showed that exposure to mass media can as easily reinforce as undermine traditional religious values. The peasants in his sample who listened to radio or watched television regularly, did so very selectively. They listened faithfully to readings from the Qur'an, but tended not to listen to types of programs that might be expected to inculcate other attitudes and values.31

The available empirical research indicates clearly, then, that Islam is one of the most important sources of political indentities among Arabs, and that this is likely to continue to be the case despite modernization or change in other


spheres of life. But a religious identity is not a political community. Many people identify with a politically relevant group without having any inclination to transform the group into a distinct political community. Lawyers, political scientists, feminists, conservatives, and freemasons are but a few examples of political identity groups whose members have no broader collective political aspiration. Under what circumstances, then, is a religiously based political identity likely to be transformed into a sense of political community, and under what circumstances does the existence of such identities hinder the development of a political community?

RELIGION AND POLITICAL COMMUNITY

Three decades ago George Hillery collected ninety-four definitions of "community," and concluded that the only feature shared by all of these conceptions was that they dealt with human beings.32 Nevertheless, most understandings of the term do emphasize a sense of solidarity or "we-feeling," and a sense of significance or "role-feeling," among the members of a group that is larger than the nuclear family.33 To these I would add a breadth or scope criterion: a community is distinguished from other more restricted identity groups by the fact that the sense of solidarity and significance that derives from membership is important in a wide range of circumstances. Given the fundamental importance of authoritative decision-making to political life, then, we can take a political community to be a human group united by a common political identity sufficiently strong and sufficiently general to lead its members to perceive themselves as constituting a bounded collectivity that should properly have its own authoritative government.

It is not at all uncommon for people to identify with more than one such community, and multiple community identities need not be competitive or mutually debilitating. Citizens seem to find fewer problems than political scientists in accepting the idea of identifying with one political community for some purposes and in some circumstances, while simultaneously identifying with a different political community for other purposes or under different circumstances.34 A sovereign state may incorporate all or some portion of one political community; it may incorporate all or portions of two or more political communities; or, rarely, its citizens may have little sense of membership in any political community. The state will be strengthened if most of its citizens belong to a single political community (quite possibly in addition to their memberships in other, less encompassing communities), and if most of the members of that political community live within the state; that is to say, if the coincidence of state and political community approximates the nation-state model. States which lack a roughly coterminous political community will be weakened in a number of ways as a consequence.

Crawford Young has pointed out that the nation-state has become an im- mensely powerful normative concept. Most of the people of the world now believe that the state is, or should be, "an embodiment of the collective will of the populace and not an emanation of the ruler."35 Given this expectation, the legitimacy of any state depends fundamentally on the existence of a collective


will-a political community-among its population. Legitimacy is lessened if significant numbers of citizens find that their membership in a subnational political community conflicts with their feelings of solidarity with the larger community. It is weakened still more if there is no overarching political community whose boundaries approximate those of the state. The consequences of a legitimacy crisis are too extensive to permit a full discussion here, but we can note in passing that when legitimacy is lacking, voluntary compliance with state policies declines, the use of coercion by both the state and its opponents is likely to increase, and the employment of public institutions and capabilities for private ends becomes more common.

Having briefly outlined the nature of political community and its importance in relation to the state, we can now consider the role of religion. The definitional criterion for membership in a political community may be any number of things other than religion. Language, race, and ethnicity are among the more frequently occurring alternatives. Nevertheless, we have already seen that religion is a particularly powerful source of political identity, and there are good reasons for believing that a religiously based political identity is unusually conducive to the emergence of a political community. There seem to be at least six factors that help to account for this relationship between religion and the sense of membership in a political community.

1. The Comprehensiveness of Religion While there is considerable variation in the scope of affairs about which the

various world religions prescribe righteous conduct, they all encompass an extensive range of human activity. It is true that some believers see their religious beliefs as having direct relevance to only a narrow range of human concerns, viewing much of life as essentially secular in character. Nevertheless, each of the great religions is at least open to an interpretation that is sufficiently broad to serve as the foundation for a multipurpose political community.

2. The Ideological Character of Religion The literature, theology, and myths of the world religions set out collective

goals, prescribe means of pursuing those goals, and provide spiritual sanction for collective action. Equally, certain categories of action are proscribed by religious doctrine. In providing an integrated analysis of worthwhile ends and appropriate means, religion is akin to a political ideology. Like an ideology, religion can provide coherence and a sense of purpose to the political life of a society. It has the capacity to serve as the principal source of legitimacy for policies, actors, and institutions.

3. The Historical Linkages between Religion and Politics

Governance by religious authorities is a part of the heritage of most of the peoples of the world, and state boundaries are frequently based on preexisting religious divisions. The idea that a political community should be based on a


religious identity, and that the community should be governed in accordance with shared religious values, often receives an acceptance founded in tradition.

4. The Conflict Potential of Religion External threats are frequently an important factor in transforming a political

identity into a feeling of membership in a political community because the latter has a greater defensive capability than do normal identity groups. The broad scope of religiously based political identities, and the righteousness associated with their political positions, create an unusually strong potential for intergroup conflict. As a consequence, political identity groups with a religious basis are more prone than others to experience (or themselves to generate) external threats. The appearance of such a threat heightens the importance of the religiously based identity in comparison to citizens' other political identities; it leads those sharing the identity to value the solidarity of a political community more highly; and it fosters perceptions of a need for a communal capacity to make authoritative decisions. In all of these ways, then, the conflictual character of religiously based political identity groups contributes to the potential for their transformation into political communities.

5. The Institutional Resources of Religion We have already noted the importance of religious institutions as guardians of

the corpus of myth that integrates many identity groups, and the comparative weakness in this respect of such alternatives as ethnicity and kinship. The institutional framework that all of the great religions provide (albeit to varying degrees) is of even more consequence in the transformation of an identity group into a political community.

A political identity group may exist with only the most limited internal communications capability, but a political community requires a fairly sophis- ticated communications network. Religious institutions and personnel, in con- junction with religious services for the public, provide what is often an extremely efficient means for community leaders to speak to members, for members to provide input and feedback, and for the transmission of substantive and symbolic messages from one sector of the community to others.36 The existence of this institutionalized communications network also tends to encourage the development of an even more extensive informal pattern of internal communications. By encouraging such phenomena as residential segregation, exclusive social events, and concentration in particular occupations, a more-or-less closed communications community can be created. As Lenski noted of religious communities in the United States, this pattern of informal within-group communication often contributes to the development of shared beliefs, attitudes, and values on subjects that have no explicit religious content.3

Furthermore, through its institutional framework a religion is frequently able to produce leaders and spokesmen for the political community. It can ensure that these leaders are well socialized by the mythology and ideology of the


group. It can enable such leaders to speak to and for the community, and it can provide an authoritative stamp of legitimacy to the positions that they take.

6. The Cross-generational Character of a Religious Identity Group Political identities may be perceived by the people who hold them as essentially

ascriptive characteristics that are likely to persist for generations to come, or as more transient loyalties that may last only for the holder's lifespan, or a portion thereof. A political community, on the other hand, is almost invariably expected to be a social structure that will persist indefinitely. Because most members anticipate passing their religious identity on to all of their descendants, this type of political identity can readily serve as the basis for persisting, cross-generational political communities.

GEOPOLITICAL CONDITIONS FOR POLITICAL COMMUNITY

Despite these attributes, religion does not automatically give rise to a political identity, and a religiously based political identity does not necessarily produce a sense of membership in a political community. In order to understand the interaction of religion and community sentiments, one must also consider three types of conditions that are important to the formation of political communities, whether based on religion or some other identifying feature.

The first of these is the presence of a catalyst that can lead a large number of people to more or less simultaneously come to think that, of their various political identities, there is one that they share and that is of overriding importance. In ideal circumstances a sense of membership in a political community may simply evolve gradually over the course of centuries. No catalyst is required. More commonly, however, some factor such as an especially strong and immediate shared political goal, does seem to be required if a political identity group is to be transformed into a political community. The single most powerful catalyst is the perception of a serious threat to the physical security of those who bear the definitional characteristic of the group.38 When the threat is sufficiently strong and sufficiently persistent, it can contribute to the creation of a political community even in the absence of any immediate prospect for territorial control. The emergence of a Zionist political community scattered throughout Europe well before the establishment of the Israeli state is an example of the effectiveness of such a threat, as is the shifting patchwork of political communities in contemporary Lebanon.

Despite such exceptions, however, occupation of a definable territory, within which the group has at least a potential for political dominance, comes close to being an essential condition for the transformation of any political identity group into a political community. We have noted that a desire for a partly or fully autonomous within-group government is one of the most important factors distinguishing a sense of membership in a political community from other political identities. That implies that the community, acting through its government, should be capable of making authoritative decisions for all of the


inhabitants of a specific territory. If such an aspiration seems entirely unrealistic because of the power of an external government or governments, or because of the ability of nonmembers who occupy the same territory to resist the group's hegemony, few people will conceive of their identity group as a political community. It is true that history is replete with examples of groups who dreamed of the attainment of self-government, and whose dreams proved to be unrealizable. There does, nevertheless, seem to be a "reality factor" in even something that is so fundamentally emotional as the sense of belonging to a political community. One must be able to conceive of at least some distant possibility of its realization, or the affective tie is stillborn.

In addition to a catalyst and a territory, a third important condition is the congruence between the boundaries of the identity group and the frontiers of a sovereign state. The consequences of an incongruence for the legitimacy of the state have already been noted, but the effects are bidirectional. In the modern world the state has such extraordinary resources, and is so powerful a norm, that an embryonic political community that does not approximate the population of any state must surmount large obstacles if it is to evoke a self-conscious sense of membership from a significant proportion of its potential adherents.39 The record of contemporary secessionist and irredentist movements-even those whose followers occupy distinct and sizable territories-gives little ground for optimism about the prospects for redrawing state boundaries to accommodate emerging political communities. The prospects are somewhat brighter for political communities when their members aspire only to a limited measure of political autonomy, but even such relatively modest claims are often resisted fiercely by existing states. While a state faces equally grave problems in attempting to create a political community in the absence of a strong social foundation, it should be noted that a state can do a great deal to foster the development of a political community if social and political structures roughly coincide. A sense of political community can develop without the presence of a corresponding state, then, but with considerably more difficulty than when state and potential political community coincide.

In considering the effects of religion on the political communities of the Arab world, we must examine both the characteristics of Islam (and other religions), and the presence or absence of these three conditions: a catalyst, a distinct territory, and a congruent state.

ISLAM AND ARAB POLITICAL COMMUNITIES

All of the factors that make Islam an even more powerful source of political identities than most religions are also relevant to its role as an integrating tie for political communities. Historical geopolitcal patterns frequently limit the capacity of Islam to serve as a basis for the development of political communities in the Arab world, however, producing a situation that is particularly complex and particularly interesting. A sense of membership in any political community requires two things. Members must perceive a fundamental similarity that unites them, and an important contrast with outsiders. The pattern of state-building in


the Arab Middle East is such that Islam often is able to fill one or the other of these needs, but less frequently can it provide both internal integration and external distinctiveness.

The nineteen Arab states can be classified in three main groups on the basis of the effect of religion on political community formation.40 In about one-third of the Arab states the main effect of religion is to foster conflicting internal political communities. The cleavage between Shi'i and Sunni Muslims is important in Bahrain, Iraq, and the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen). In the Sudan we find a split between the Muslim north and the animist south; a cleavage that is reinforced by its coincidence with the Arab/non-Arab division. And Syria and Lebanon are segmented into a multiplicity of competing political communities as a result of Muslim/Christian divisions, cleavages within each of these great religions, and the presence of such sects as the Druzes. Only in Oman do we find a religious cleavage that does not seem to have contributed significantly to political divisions. Political conflict in Oman has tended to take place within the dominant Ibadi community, rather than between Ibadis and others.

A second category includes those Arab states in which Islam helps to unify the population without distinguishing it from neighboring peoples. Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Mauritania, and Tunisia are in this group. In each case, at least ninety percent of the population are mainstream Sunni Muslims. To this group we might add Qatar, where the popular devotion to Wahhabism distinguishes the population from much of the Islamic world, but not from Saudi Arabia, the only contiguous state.41

Finally, in the remaining six Arab states Islam does contribute to the development of a sense of membership in a political community that roughly cor- responds with the population of the state. This is probably clearest in the cases of Saudi Arabia and Libya where entrenched local variations in the Islamic tradition (Wahhabiyya and Sanusiyya, respectively) are embraced by most citizens. The combination of the 'Alawi dynasty and the maraboutic tradition plays a similar role in Morocco.

Kuwait, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), and the United Arab Emirates all share in the mainstream Sunni tradition. They achieve a measure of distinctiveness as a result of the external politico-religious geog- raphy. Kuwaitis cannot identify with either the strict Wahhabi doctrine of their Saudi neighbors or with the Shi'ism common in adjacent regions of Iraq. The Sunni tribes of South Yemen have a long history of resisting the hegemony of the Zaidis of north Yemen, and their religious identity also distinguishes them from their other neighbors, the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia and the Ibadis of Oman. Saudi Arabia is the only significant neighboring state for the UAE, and the Wahhabi movement in that country contributes to a sense of religious distinctiveness among residents of the Emirates. The populations of the UAE have relatively little else in common, and it is certainly too early to suggest that any strong sense of political community is emerging. Nevertheless, religion undoubtedly is important as a source of personal and political identities in the UAE; the religiously based identity is shared by most citizens, and there is an awareness of a contrast with Saudis.


The relevance of Islam and other religions as a basis for political community can be seen within each of the three categories. Of the countries in the third group, all but the UAE have produced political communities that are considerably stronger than the norm in the Arab world. In each case the existence of an inclusive and distinctive religious tradition was an important factor in the development of an awareness of shared membership in a political community, and the emergence of the community was assisted by group dominance in a given territory and, more recently, by the existence of a state with frontiers that coincided reasonably well with the boundaries of the group. In the case of South Yemen, a history of resistance to the Zaidi threat can be added to the formula, while for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia there is also an external threat of some importance. As oil-rich states, they would have much to lose were they to be incorporated into any larger political unit.

With the exception of the Emirates, the ruling group in any one of the countries in this category faces a somewhat easier task than the regimes of many Arab states because it functions within the context of an assumption that some regime and some government ought to exist within the social unit demarcated by the state boundaries. It is not at all clear that this assumption is generally made by residents of the UAE, but the alternative seems to be fragmentation rather than voluntary absorption in a larger unit. If a political community does emerge in that state, it may be in large part a result of the integrative and distinctive role of religion.

Turning to the second group of countries-those in which Islam helps to integrate the population while contributing little to distinguish it from neighboring groups-one might expect the appeal of pan-Islamic and pan-Arab movements to be of central concern. The distinction between these forces is no longer of much general relevance.42 While some political leaders may choose to emphasize Islam and others Arabism, and the popular reaction to these appeals may vary over time, for most Arabs they are virtually synonymous. To be an Arab is to be a Muslim or, at least, to accept that the Islamic tradition is central for all Arabs. Much of the literature on Arab politics deals with the challenge created for Arab states by these suprastate-level loyalites, and it is undoubtedly true that where no correspondence is perceived between the boundaries of citizenship and those of political community, this does tend to reduce the legitimacy of the state.43 This factor helps to account for the proclivity of some Arab leaders to urge the union of several states, and even on occasion to take practical steps toward that goal. More importantly, by weakening loyalties to the state, it probably also makes it easier for participants in day-to-day politics-which, after all, are largely internal state politics-to pursue the interests of subnational groups based on kinship or village at the expense of any conception of a national (state) interest.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that it is not in the states that most clearly belong to the mainstream of the Islamic Arab tradition that pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism have received the greatest emphasis. Rather, three factors other than the lack of a distinctive religious character seem to account for variations in the strength of suprastate loyalties. One is the place of a country in the history


of the Islamic Arab empires. In countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Egypt, where there is a collective memory of a glorious past as the center of a great empire, we find a contemporary urge to re-create that glory. Second, elites in almost all of the religiously segmented states have placed considerable emphasis on pan- Arabism as a means of decreasing the salience of internal divisions. And finally, to an important extent the emphasis on suprastate loyalties reflects the personal or collective values and strategies of leaders. Leading proponents of pan- Arabism, such as Nasser and Qadhdhafi, did not simpy react to some underlying popular enthusiasm for the pan-Arab cause. The potential support for pan- Arabism existed in Egypt and Libya, as it does in most Arab societies, but these leaders chose to emphasize suprastate loyalites rather than other equally available currents (including, in these particular cases, Egyptian and Libyan state nationalism).

We should not overestimate the negative effects of a lack of religious distinctiveness for the political community of a state. In some cases alternative sources of contrast with outsiders exist. For many Egyptians, pre-Islamic traditions and the contemporary importance of their country serve this purpose. For many Algerians the experiences of the war of independence are a source of a sense of distinctiveness. Moreover, there is a very powerful positive effect of a shared (but not distinctive) religiously based political identity. It does serve to integrate the population of the state. It contributes to a common pattern of behavior, a common set of fundamental values, and a shared world view. The importance of this aspect of the role of Islam becomes obvious if we consider the problems that are common in those states in which religion does not play this integrative role. The difficulties that result from the existence of suprastate loyalties are small in comparison with those that result from internal segmentation.

Lebanon and Syria are the clearest examples of countries currently struggling with the problem of religiously segmented political communities. In both cases it is important to note that religion per se has relatively little to do with the conflicts of recent years. Ideological differences, economic deprivation, regionalism, tribalism, and competitive kinship networks have all been identified as underlying factors. If the conflicts in both countries are widely perceived as conflicts between religious groups, this is simply because religion is the most powerful source of collective identities. The various political communities- Sunni and Shi'i Muslims, Druze, Maronite and Orthodox Christians in Lebanon; Sunnis, cAlawis, Druzes, and Christians in Syria-are sufficiently salient that their members see many political issues through the interpretative gauze of a religiously based political identity. Each such community can quite realistically point to serious threats to the well-being (or survival) of its members, and each has at least a limited territory within which it is an actually or potentially dominating force. As things now stand, however, no one such political community has an unchallenged and secure capacity to control the state as a whole.

The Yemen Arab Republic and the Sudan experienced prolonged civil wars between political communities defined in part by religion. The cleavage between Zaidi Shi'is and Sunnis was the main dividing line between the warring political communities of North Yemen, while the Islamic/animist division reinforced


cleavages of race and language in the Sudan. Armed conflict has given way to a tenuous peace in both countries.

Matters have not developed to the point of open civil war in Bahrain or Iraq, but the longstanding tension between Shi'i and Sunni communities persists in both countries. Despite the barriers of ethnicity and language that separate these Arabic Shi'i groups from Iranian Shi'ism, the success of the Iranian revolution has increased the stress experienced in Bahrain and Iraq. Westerners must avoid seeing the schism in Islam as a direct parallel to the Catholic/Protestant division within Christianity. Doctrinal differences between Sunnis and Shi'is are relatively minor, and followers of these two branches of Islam are generally very similar in their values and lifestyles. As is so often the case, however, the cleavages between Sunni and Shi'i communities in Bahrain and Iraq are reinforced by inequalities in the distribution of power and wealth. Violent conflict between these communities is by no means inevitable, then, but segmentation into political communities derived from religious identities presents a severe challenge to the Iraqi and Bahraini regimes.

As we have seen, Islam is a powerful element in the formation of Arab political communities. In countries that are both homogeneous and distinctive in religious character, the local variant of Islam contributes to the development of a nation state. Even when religion fails to distinguish members of a political community from outsiders, it often plays an important integrative role. For approximately a third of the Arab countries, however, there is a major incongruence between religiously based political communites and state boundaries. In these segmented societies religion still has a strong influence on the formation of political communities, but its effect is to foster internal conflict. The geopolitical conditions that help to account for these variations in the relationship between Islam and the development of political communities include the potential for territorial dominance, congruence with the boundaries of a state, and the presence of a significant threat to the security of members of the community.

CONCLUSION

Religion is an especially powerful definitional criterion for political identity groups. It is uniquely capable of providing a mythological foundation for an identity group; religiously based identities are particularly likely to take the form of stigmata; a religious foundation endows an identity with moral virtue; and most religions can offer significant institutional support to an identity group. In the case of Islam, to these strengths must be added the all-encompassing scope of Islamic teaching, and the unusually powerful symbolic and ritualistic characteristics of Muslim religious practice. The available empirical evidence demonstrates that Islam is one of the most important sources of social and political identities in the Arab world.

A religiously based political identity is also particularly likely to be transformed into a sense of membership in a political community. Among the characteristics of religion that make it conducive to community formation are


the comprehensiveness of religious doctrine; its ideological character; the historical linkages between religion and politics; the conflict potential of religion; the institutional resources that are usually available; and its cross-generational dimension. In the Arab world geopolitical conditions produce three types of relationships between Islam and the formation of political communities. In about a third of the Arab states Islam serves both to integrate the population and to distinguish it from neighboring peoples. In these cases, then, religion is a central factor in the development of national political communities. For a second group of Arab states, Islam contributes to political integration without distinguishing the political community of the state from those in adjacent countries. While the existence of suprastate-level loyalties does diminish ties to state communities, and thus exacerbates particularistic impulses, the integrative effect of Islam is still an important conducive factor in the formation of political communities that correspond to state populations. In the remaining third of Arab states, Islam also contributes to the formation of political communities but primarily at the subnational level. These segmented societies have experienced severe strains, reach- ing the point of open civil war in three of the six cases.

It is not possible within the confines of this article to go on to trace the consequences of this threefold classification of Arab states. We can note in passing that there are intriguing and sometimes impressively strong relationships between the religious character of the populations of these states and other vital aspects of political life. For example, the threefold classification of religious character can statistically account for almost half of the variation (eta2 = 0.49) in the number of successful and unsuccessful irregular transfers of executive powers that occurred in the fifteen largest Arab states between 1968 and 1977.44 These differences in the religious basis for political community formation can also statistically explain 16 percent of the variation in the number of protest demonstrations and 17 percent of the variation in the number of deaths resulting from political violence over that ten-year period.45 The discussion in this article suggests some of the reasons for these relationships, but a fuller analysis is clearly required.

Islam is a major factor in the formation of Arab political communities, then, and variations in the effects of religion on the development of political communities are strongly related to central aspects of the political life of the Arab states. The threefold classification of Arab states on the basis of the role of religion in the formation of their political communities is obviously very crude: It glosses over the important distinction between inter-Islamic cleavages and divisions between Muslims and non-Muslims; it fails to capture the significant variations that exist in the intensity of popular religious commitment; and it does not integrate into the account other, nonreligious sources of the feeling of membership in political communities. Refinement and further development of the conceptual schema are required in these and other respects. But the analysis and evidence presented here do seem to demonstrate that the effort required in order to achieve these improvements is likely to be worthwhile, and that even in its current rudimentary form, the classification of Arab polities on the basis of


the religious foundation for their political communities can make a useful contribution to our understanding of Arab politics.

NOTES

'See, for example, Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); and Donald Eugene Smith, Religion and Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970). For a survey of the variety of meanings that have been assigned the terms "modernization" and "political development," see Samuel P. Huntington and Jorge I. Dominguez, "Political Development," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, vol. 3 (Reading, Mass.: Addision Wesley, 1975), pp. 98-114.

2Terrance G. Carroll, "Secularization and States of Modernity," World Politics 36, 3 (April 1984), 362-82.

3Ibid., pp. 372-81. 4Among these are several of the contributions in John L. Esposito, ed., Islam and Development:

Religion and Sociopolitical Change (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1980); Ronald R. Maclntyre, "Saudi Arabia," in Mohammad Ayoob, ed., The Politics of Islamic Reassertion (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 9-29; and William Ochsenwald, "Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Revival," International Journal of the Middle East Studies 13, 3 (August 1981), 271-86.

5Mohammed Ayoob, "Conclusion: The Discernible Patterns," in Ayoob, ed., The Politics of Islamic Reassertion, pp. 271-72; Nasih N. M. Ayubi, "The Political Revival of Islam: The Case of Egypt," International Journal of Middle East Studies 12, 4 (December 1980), 483-84; and Michael C. Hudson, "Islam and Political Development," in Esposito, ed., Islam and Development, pp. 16-18.

6W. J. M. MacKenzie, Political Identity (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1978), p. 12. 7Ibid., pp. 157-65. 8Ibid., pp. 88-98. 9Stein Rokkan and Derek W. Urwin, Economy, Territory, Identity: Politics of West European

Peripheries (London: Sage, 1983), p. 67. 'Ibid., p. 68. "1John A. Armstrong, Nations Before Nationalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina

Press, 1982), pp. 238-40. 12Crawford Young, The Politics of Cultural Pluralism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,

1976), pp. 43-47. '3The question of control over the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 is an example. In addition

to aspirations for territory and security, for religious fundamentalists on both sides there is also an overriding moral or religious issue at stake. Any compromise is seen as religiously repugnant.

'4Young, Politics of Cultural Pluralism, p. 54. 5Ibid., pp. 32-33.

16 Levon H. Melikian and Lutfy N. Diab, "Group Affiliations of University Students in the Arab Middle East," The Journal of Social Psychology 49 (1959), 149-59.

"7Levon H. Melikian and Lutfy N. Diab, "Stability and Change in Group Affiliations of University Students in the Arab Middle East," The Journal of Social Psychology 93 (1974), 13-21.

'8Omar I. El Fathaly and Monte Palmer, Political Development and Social Change in Libya (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1980), pp. 29-30.

'9Omar I. El Fathaly and Monte Palmer, "Opposition to Change in Rural Libya," International Journal of Middle East Studies 11, 2 (April 1980), 252-53.

20Tawfic E. Farah, "Group Affiliations of University Students in the Arab Middle East (Kuwait)," The Journal of Social Psychology 106 (1978), 163-64.

21Tawfic E. Farah and Faisal Al-Salem, "Group Affiliations of Children in the Arab Middle East (Kuwait)," The Journal of Social Psychology 111 (1980), 141-42.

22Faisal Al-Salem, "The Issue of Identity in Selected Arab Gulf States," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 4, 4 (Summer 1981), 3-20.


23Stewart Reiser, "Pan-Arabism Revisited," The Middle East Journal 37, 2 (Spring 1983), 225-30. 24 Saad E. M. Ibrahim, "Arab Images of the United States and the Soviet Union before and after

the June War of 1967," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 16, 2 (June 1972), 237. 25Abdul-Monem Al-Mashat, "Egyptian Attitudes Toward the Peace Process: Views of an 'Alert

Elite'," The Middle East Journal 37, 3 (Summer 1983), 402-03 and 409. 26Claud R. Sutcliffe, "Is Islam an Obstacle to Development? Ideal Patterns of Behavior," The

Journal of Developing Areas 10, 1 (October 1975), 78-80. 27Robert B. Cunningham, "Dimensions of Family Loyalty in the Arab Middle East: The Case of

Jordan," The Journal of Developing Areas 8, 1 (October 1973), 58-60. 28Omar I. El Fathaly, Monte Palmer and Richard Chackerian, Political Development and

Bureaucracy in Libya (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1977), 70. 29Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "Political Recruitment and Socialization in Syria: The Case of the

Revolutionary Youth Federation," International Journal of Middle East Studies 11, 2 (April 1980), 152-53. Lest it be thought that the measure of social class simply failed to discriminate well, it should be noted that it was a strong predictor of intensity of Ba'thism, of nationalism, and of socialism.

30Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary Findings," International Journal of Middle East Studies 12, 4 (December 1980), 437-40.

31Kamal El Menoufi, "Occupational Status and Mass Media in Rural Egypt," International Journal of Middle East Studies 13, 3 (August 1981), 262-63.

32George A. Hillery, Jr., "Definitions of Community: Areas of Agreement," Rural Sociology 20, 2 (June 1955), 117.

33See David B. Clark, "The Concept of Community: A Re-examination," The Sociological Review 21, 3 (August 1973), 404-09; R. M. Maclver and C. H. Page, Society (London: Macmillan, 1961), pp. 291-93; and Raymond Plant, "Community: Concept, Conception, and Ideology," Politics and Society 8, 1 (1978), 86-87.

34David J. Elkins and Richard Simeon, Small Worlds: Provinces and Parties in Canadian Political Life (Toronto: Methuen, 1980), pp. 9-26; the editors' "Introduction" to David R. Smock and Kwamena Bentsi-Enchill, eds., The Search for National Integration in Africa (New York: The Free Press, 1976), p. 5; and Rokkan and Urwin, Economy, Territory, Identity, p. 114.

35Young, Politics of Cultural Pluralism, p. 15. 36Carroll, "Secularization and States of Modernity," 372-73. 37Gerhard Lenski, The Religious Factor: A Sociological Study of Religion's Impact on Politics,

Economics, and Family Life, rev. ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1963), pp. 319-36. 38For an analysis of the effects of threat on community formation in Ireland, see Rosemary Harris,

"Community Relationships in Northern and Southern Ireland: A Comparison and a Paradox," The Sociological Review 27, 1 (February 1979), 41-52; and Terrance G. Carroll, "Northern Ireland," in Astri Suhrke and Lela Garner Noble, eds., Ethnic Conflict in International Relations (New York: Praeger, 1977), 27-29.

39Young, Politics of Cultural Pluralism, pp. 67-73, and 97. 40The sources consulted on all nineteen countries are too numerous to cite here. For an excellent

review of politics in each of these countries excepting Mauritania, see Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

4'The differing classification of Qatar and Saudi Arabia is based primarily on their distinctiveness from contiguous states, but relative size is relevant too. Similarities with the Saudis may weaken the sense of distinctiveness for the people of Qatar, but the reverse is not true.

42See the editor's "Preface to the Paperback Edition," in Sylvia G. Haim, ed., Arab Nationalism: An Anthology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. ix.

43For example, see Elbaki Hermassi, "Politics and Culture in the Middle East," Social Compass 25, 3-4 (1978), 445-64; Michael H. Van Dusen, "Political Integration and Regionalism in Syria," The Middle East Journal 26, 2 (Spring 1972), 123-36; and Abdelkader Zghal, "Nation-Building in the Maghreb," in S. N. Eisenstadt and Stein Rokkan, eds., Building States and Nations, vol. 2 (Beverley Hills: Sage, 1973), 322-40.

44Data on successful and unsuccessful irregular transfers of executive powers, on numbers of protest demonstrations, and on numbers of deaths resulting from political violence, are all derived


from Charles Lewis Taylor and David A. Jodice, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 3rd ed., vol. 2 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983). Data are not available for Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. The statistical procedure employed is one-way analysis of variance.

45Segmented societies had the highest frequency of attempted irregular transfers of executive powers, of protest demonstrations, and of deaths resulting from political violence. Countries that are homogeneous but not distinctive in religion ranked second in average number of demonstrations and deaths, and third in average number of attempted irregular transfers. Homogeneous and distinctive societies ranked second on attempted irregular transfers, and lowest on the other two measures.

Article Contentsp.[185]p.186p.187p.188p.189p.190p.191p.192p.193p.194p.195p.196p.197p.198p.199p.200p.201p.202p.203p.204

Issue Table of ContentsInternational Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2 (May, 1986), pp. 119-258Front MatterDependent Development and U.S. Economic Aid to Egypt [pp.119-134]The Economic System in Contemporary Islamic Thought: Interpretation and Assessment [pp.135-164]Privacy in Eighteenth-Century Aleppo: The Limits of Cultural Ideals [pp.165-183]Islam and Political Community in the Arab World [pp.185-204]The Origins of the Mihrab Mujawwaf: A Reinterpretation [pp.205-223]Book Reviewsuntitled [pp.225-226]untitled [pp.226-227]untitled [pp.227-229]untitled [pp.229-230]untitled [pp.230-232]untitled [pp.232-234]untitled [pp.234-235]untitled [pp.235-236]untitled [pp.236-240]untitled [pp.240-242]untitled [pp.243-246]untitled [pp.246-247]untitled [pp.247-248]untitled [pp.248-249]untitled [pp.249-251]untitled [pp.251-252]untitled [pp.252-253]untitled [pp.254-258]

Back Matter

Date post:	20-Oct-2015
Category:	Documents
Upload:	mahinmi
View:	12 times
Download:	3 times

Islam and Political Community

Documents