Date post: | 08-Jun-2015 |
Category: |
News & Politics |
Upload: | anita-breuer |
View: | 142 times |
Download: | 3 times |
IslamicIslamicIslamicIslamic Political Communication OnlinePolitical Communication OnlinePolitical Communication OnlinePolitical Communication Online
An Analysis of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s official English websitesAn Analysis of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s official English websites
Name: Anita Breuer, [email protected] & Karim Al-Khasaba, [email protected]
Prepared for: IPSA-RC22 “Political Communication in Times of Crisis”, Granada 12 – 13 September 2013
Why study the online communication of Islamic
parties and SMOs?
� Religious actors played a supporting role in more than 50% of cases of
democratization between 1972 and 2009 (Philpott, Samuel Shah, and
Duffy Toft 2011).
� BUT: Muslim countries are democratic underachievers (Fish 2002)
� Mainstream academic research has long focused Internet’s role in
© 2013 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 2
� Mainstream academic research has long focused Internet’s role in
improving the organizational capacity of Islamist terrorist groups
� Post-Arab-Spring research in political communication has focused on
Internet use of liberal secular actors
� Little research on interrelation between ICT & civil, political Islam
Online communication of political parties and SMOs
� The Internet has supplemented parties‘ traditional
communication channels
� Most parties fail to realize the Internet's interactive potential.
Party websites are mainly used for unilateral top-down
communication (Gibson and Ward 2000; Welp and Marzuca
2014)
© 2013 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
2014)
� But the Internet has increased amount of information on minor,
fringe, and extremist parties (Norris 2003, 2005)
� SMOs are more likely to benefit from the Internet. Digital
networks facilitate decentralized forms of campaigning typical of
unconventional politics (Rohlinger, Bunnage, and Klein 2012;
Laer and van Aelst 2009)
3
Traditional communication strategies of the
Muslim Brotherhood (1928 – mid 2000s)
� Various degrees of state repression under Nasser, and Sadat, and
Mubarak.
� repression temporarily eased under Sadat (1976 – 1981) and
Mubarak (1981 – early 90s) → publication of magazines (al-Da’wa ,al-Mukhtar, al- I‘tisam, &Liwa’al-islam)
Three central pillars of communication during phases of repression:
© 2013 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
Three central pillars of communication during phases of repression:
(1) Federated structure of organization
(2) Vertical word-of-mouth communication
(3) Proselytizing in mosques
4
The Muslim Brotherhood in the digital era
� Renewed state repression under Mubarak starting from the early
1990s partially coincides with the „dawn of MB‘s digital era“
© 2013 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 5
MB‘s digital communication strategy:
Achievements and problems� Challenge the liberal secular domination of Egypt‘s online political
sphere (e.g. Kefaya, Youth Movement April 6)
� Criticism of Independent Young MB bloggers threatens cohesion of
public image
© 2013 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
� Before the Revolution Egyptian digital sphere was centred around
Western news and social media (Facebook,CNN, BBC)
� After the Revolution Egyptian digital sphere has re-arranged
around the periphery of MB websites. Content produced by the MB
has become dominant on Facebook (Howard et. al. 2011)
6
Empirical Analysis of the MB‘s official English
Websites� Period of observation: 8 to 13 December 2012 = run up to the
referendum vote on new Constitution
� Sites analyzed:
− Ikhwanweb.com official English website of the
Muslim Brotherhood
© 2013 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
Muslim Brotherhood
− Fjponline.com official English website of the
Freedom and Justice Party
� Methodology
− Quantitative: Feature Analysis
− Qualitative: Frame Analysis
7
Feature Analysis: Political Communication Functions
© 2013 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 8
Frame Analysis: Cognitive Frameworks for the
Interpretation of Reality
� Identity frames: Definition of a collective „we“ in
opposition to „others“ / In-group solidarity
� Injustice frames: Motivating collective action by
triggering moral indignation / victimization
© 2013 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
� Agency frames: Motivation to alter the status quo
through collective action / Empowerment of the
individual
9
Identity frames on Ikhwanweb and FJPonline
� Who are „we“?
� A modern pious organization
� Adherent to moral principals and religious laws of
Islam
� Supporting pluralist values of democracy
� Respecting the rights of women and minorities
© 2013 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
� Who / what are we not?
10
� Fundamentalist
� violent / terrorist / Jihadist
� Corrupted by the negative influence of secularization and Westernization
Injustice frames on Ikhwanweb and FJPonline
� What is being done to „us“?
� “violence and arson against us”
� “systematic campaign of slander and subversion”
� „heinous treachery“
� “vicious plot to overthrow the legitimate President elected by popular will”
© 2013 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
� ….and who‘s doing it?
11
� „opposition thugs“
� „paid criminals and mercenaries“
� „the media“
� „corrupt regime hangovers“
� „political forces opposed to the country's stability”
Agency frames on Ikhwanweb and FJPonline
� What can we do?
� Agency frames largely absent over period of observation except
�“Participate Positively in the Constitutional Poll”
© 2013 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
� Agency frames largely absent over period of observation except
call for conventional collective political action (YES vote in the
referendum)
� Limitations of this study: Focus on English language websites
that cater to Western audiences and diaspora communities:
“Ikhwanweb’s basic mission is to bridge the knowledge gap between the MB
and Western intellectuals“
12
2 MB Internet platforms = 2 communication strategies
© 2013 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
„Egyptians revolt for
the Prophet’s victory in
front of U.S. embassy“
Thank you for your attention!
German Development Institute /
Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
© 2013 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 14
Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
Tulpenfeld 6
D-53113 Bonn
Telephone: +49 (0)228-949 27-0
E-Mail: [email protected]
www.die-gdi.de
www.facebook.com/DIE.Bonn