REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ~attoigattha1Jatt Quezon City SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CRIM. CASE NO. SB-16-CRM-0530 Plaintiff, FOR: Violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019, as amended - versus- Present: DE LA CRUZ, J., Chairperson LORENZO H. JAMORA, ET AL., MUSNGI, J. * Accused. CRUZ, J. ** Promulgated on: JJw •• w .J.I, ;I>/Pt X - - - - - - - - - - ,-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X RESOLUTION DE LA CRUZ, J. This resolves the following: 1. Accused Wilfredo M. Feleo's Omnibus Motion 1. To Dismiss the Case/Quash the Information; and 2. To Defer Arraignment, dated September 16, 2016; 2. Accused Renato P. Legaspi's Motion to Quash and Defer Arraignment, dated September 16, 2016; 3. Accused Lorenzo H. Jamora's Omnibus Motion to Quash and to Defer Arraignment, dated September 16, 2016; 4. The prosecution's Consolidated Comment/Opposition (To Accused Jamora's Omnibus Motion to Quash and to Defer Arraignment, Wilfredo M. Feleo's Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and Quash the Information, Renato P. Legaspi's Motion to Quash and Defer Arraignment), dated October 19, 2016; and 5. thereto. Accused Legaspi's Reply, dated October 25, 2016, Sitting as Special Member of the First Division as per Administrative Order No. 204-2016, dated June 29, 2016. "S/fflng as Speda' MemO" ofthe Fi"J Divisiot: as pet Mmini"",';", 0""" No. 327-2016, dated November 2~ 2y ~
Transcript
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
~attoigattha1JattQuezon City
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CRIM. CASE NO. SB-16-CRM-0530Plaintiff, FOR: Violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019, as amended
- versus- Present:
DE LA CRUZ, J., ChairpersonLORENZO H. JAMORA, ET AL., MUSNGI, J.*
1. Accused Wilfredo M. Feleo's Omnibus Motion 1. ToDismiss the Case/Quash the Information; and 2. To DeferArraignment, dated September 16, 2016;
2. Accused Renato P. Legaspi's Motion to Quash and DeferArraignment, dated September 16, 2016;
3. Accused Lorenzo H. Jamora's Omnibus Motion to Quashand to Defer Arraignment, dated September 16, 2016;
4. The prosecution's Consolidated Comment/Opposition(To Accused Jamora's Omnibus Motion to Quash and to DeferArraignment, Wilfredo M. Feleo's Omnibus Motion to Dismiss andQuash the Information, Renato P. Legaspi's Motion to Quash andDefer Arraignment), dated October 19, 2016; and
5.thereto.
Accused Legaspi's Reply, dated October 25, 2016,
·Sitting as Special Member of the First Division as per Administrative Order No. 204-2016, dated June 29, 2016."S/fflng as Speda' MemO" ofthe Fi"J Divisiot: as pet Mmini"",';", 0""" No. 327-2016,dated November 2~ 2y ~
RESOLUTIONpp vs. Lorenzo H. Jamora, et al.Crim. Case No. SB-16-CRM-0530
In his omnibus motion, accused Feleo contends that the casemust be dismissed for violating his constitutional right to a speedydisposition of the Complaint filed against him before the Office of theOmbudsman. He argues that the Office of the Ombudsman tookmore than three (3) years to finish the fact-finding investigation andresolve the preliminary investigation, reckoned from the filing of theComplaint on December 9, 2010 up to the time when theOmbudsman approved the Resolution finding probable cause, onSeptember 2014. He cites the case of Tatad v. Sandiganbayan/where the Supreme Court dismissed the case because of almostthree (3) years delay in conducting the preliminary investigation.Accused Feleo also refers to the case of People v. Sandiganbayan,2in which the long delay it took for the Office of the Ombudsman toinvestigate the complaint was found to be inordinate and oppressiveand thus warranted the dismissal of the case.
Accused Legaspi, in his motion, asserts that the case shouldbe dismissed as there was inordinate delay in resolving thepreliminary investigation thereby violating his right to due processand speedy disposition of the case. He invokes the Tatad andPeople v. Sandiganbayan cases cited by accused Legaspi, as wellas the ruling in Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan.3 He maintains thatthere is no plausible explanation for the inordinate delay of morethan three (3) years in resolving the preliminary investigation orascertaining probable cause, when the issues and facts of the caseare not complicated. Moreover, he claims that no adverse actwhatsoever can be attributed to him for such inordinate delay.
In his omnibus motion, accused Jamora moves that this Courtquash the information filed against him on the ground that there isinordinate delay in resolving the preliminary investigation whichviolated his right to due process and speedy disposition of the case.He echoes the allegation of his eo-accused that it took theOmbudsman more than three (3) years (3 years, 9 months, 17 daysto be exact) from the filing of the Complaint on December 9, 2010 upto the approval of the Resolution, dated May 19, 2014, by theOmbudsman on September 26, 2014, in resolving the preliminaryinvestigation. He contends that prior to the filing of the Complaint,the Field Investigation Officer already conducted fact-findinginvestigation to substantiate the charges. Considering that the factsand issues of the case are actually simple, it will not take more than
1 March 21,1988, 159 SeRA 702 December 11, 2013, 712 SeRA 3593 G.R. No. 191411, July 15, 2013
RESOLUTIONpp vs. Lorenzo H. Jamora, et al.Crim. Case No. SB·16·CRM·0530
three (3) years for the Ombudsman to figure out such. Moreover,following Coscollue/a, it is the mandate of the Ombudsman to actwith reasonable dispatch on the cases filed before it.
By way of comment/opposition, the prosecution counters thataccused's reliance on Tatad is misplaced considering that its factualmilieu is different from the present case. The prosecution argues thatthe Supreme Court, in ruling that there was inordinate delay inTatad, considered certain factors such as the political motivation inprosecuting the case and the act of the Tanodbayan in blatantlydeparting from established procedure prescribed by law.· As for theruling in Cosco.flue/a, the prosecution asserts that it was also heldtherein that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved isnot sufficient and the right to speedy disposition of cases is deemedviolated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious,capricious and oppressive delays.
In this case, the prosecution avers that the length of time ittook to complete the preliminary investigation is not inordinateconsidering the following factors:
1. The Order directing accused Jamora to submit hiscounter-affidavit took a while to serve as he was no longerconnected with the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) andhe could not be found at the residential address provided by LWUA.He was finally served with the Order only on October 17, 2012.
2. Accused Jamora filed six (6) motions for extension oftime to submit his counter-affidavit, with the last motion datedDecember 10, 2012 and received by the Office of the Ombudsmanon December 20, 2012, but he never submitted one.
3. Accused Legaspi and Feleo submitted their counter-affidavits on November 28, 2011 and December 1, 2011,respectively.
4. The Resolution finding probable cause was issued onMay 19, 2014 and it was approved by the Ombudsman onSeptember 26, 2014. Thereafter, the accused filed their separateMotions for Reconsideration on October 20, 2014, November 12,2014 and November 13, 2014, respectively, and their denial wasapproved by the Ombudsman on January 30, 2015.
RESOLUTIONpp vs. Lorenzo H. Jamora, et al.Crim. Case No. SB-16-CRM-0530
5. Accused Legaspi filed a second Motion forReconsideration with leave on March 12,2015, which was denied inan Order, dated April 7, 2015, and the order approved by theOmbudsman on May 4, 2015.
6. The proposed Information underwent a thorough reviewat the Office of the Special Prosecutor. On May 16, 2016, the OSPsubmitted a revised Information which was approved by theOmbudsman on July 24, 2016, and filed with this Court on August12, 2016.
7. None of the accused moved for the early resolution ofthe preliminary investigation or objected to the perceived delay in thetermination of the proceedings.
In his reply, accused Legaspi asserts that the change ofaddress of his eo-accused Jamora and his requests for extensionare not valid justification for the delay. According to him, theOmbudsman should not be controlled or dictated by the respondentsin the conduct of the preliminary investigation. He maintains that heis assailing the inordinate delay in concluding the preliminaryinvestigation and not in the filing of the Information. Moreover, hissecond motion for reconsideration is a non-issue and not a factor inthe conduct of the investigation and hence, did not contribute in thedelay. He also points out that in CoscollueJa, it was held thatconformity with office procedure and the need for a thorough reviewwere found as unacceptable reasons for the delay.
The motions are impressed with merit. The Office of theOmbudsman committed inordinate and unreasonable delay in theconduct of the preliminary investigation.
The records will bear out, and the parties do not dispute, thetimeline below.
1. Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer I LiwaywaySumagaysay-Rondina signed the Complaint on March 22, 2010,which was sworn before Acting Director Joselito P. Fangon on March25,2010.4
2. The said Complaint was filed before the Office of theOmbudsman on December 9,2010.5
• Records. Vol. I. pp. 54-755 Ibid .. p. 006
I
RESOLUTIONpp vs. Lorenzo H. Jamora, et al.Crim. Case No. SB-16-CRM-0530
3. Prior to the filing of the Complaint, the FIO alreadyconducted tact-tmdinq investigation to substantiate the charges.
4. On September 26, 2014, the Ombudsman approved theResolution, dated May 19, 2014, finding probable cause to chargeaccused Jamora, Feleo and Legaspi, but dismissing the complaintagainst Emmanuel B. Malicdem.
5. On August 12, 2016, the Information was filed against theaccused.
It took the Office of the Ombudsman six (6) years, four (4)months and twenty (20) days to conduct and complete thepreliminary investigation against the accused, that is, from the dateof the Complaint (March 22, 2010) up to the filing of the Informationin Court (August 12, 2016). The fact-finding investigation, whichshould have been included in the computation, is not evenconsidered.
The period of delay of more than six (6) years, to the mind ofthe Court, is inordinate and unreasonable especially considering thatthe issue involved in the case is not complicated, and no validexplanation was offered for such delay.
A person's right to the speedy disposition of his case isguaranteed by no less than Article III of the Constitution. Section 16thereof states:
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedydisposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, oradministrative bodies.
This constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is notlimited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to allparties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in allproceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearinqs."
In AI/ado v. Diokno,7 the Supreme Court held that "certainly inthe hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights takes precedence over theright of the State to prosecute, and when weighed against eachother, the scales of justice tilt towards the former."
6 Supra at note 27232 SeRA 192. 210
RESOLUTIONpp vs. Lorenzo H. Jamora, et al.Crim. Case No. SB-16-CRM-0530
In People v. Sandiganbayan,8 the Supreme Court held thatinordinate delay in resolving a criminal complaint, being violative ofthe constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and to thespeedy disposition of cases, warrants the dismissal of the criminalcase. It is thus incumbent for the State to prove that the delay wasreasonable, or that the delay was not attributable to it.
In the present case, it is not disputed that from the filing of theComplaint on December 9, 2010, accused Legaspi and Feleosubmitted their separate counter-affidavits on November 28, 2011and December 1, 2011, respectively. In view of the alleged difficultyto immediately locate the whereabouts of accused Jamora, theOffice of the Ombudsman was able to finally serve upon him theOrder directing him to file his counter-affidavit on October 17, 2012.Thereafter, it granted accused Jamora's six (6) motions for extensionof time to submit his counter-affidavit which the latter eventuallynever complied with.
Section 4, Rule II of Administrative Order (AO) No. 07 or theRules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman provides for theprocedure to be followed in the conduct of the preliminaryinvestigation. Thus:
Section 4. Procedure - The preliminary investigation ofcases falling under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan andRegional Trial Courts shall be conducted in the manner prescribedin Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, subject to the followingprovisions:
a) If the complaint is not under oath or is based only onofficial reports, the investigating officer shall require thecomplainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits tosubstantiate the complaints.
b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigatingofficer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of theaffidavits and other supporting documents, directing therespondents to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof,his counter-affidavits and controverting evidence with proof ofservice thereof on the complainant. The complainant may file replyaffidavits within ten (10) days after service of the counteraffidavits.
c) If the respondent does not file a counter-affidavit, theinvestigating officer may consider the comment filed by him, if any,as his answer to the complaint. In any event, the respondent shallhave access to the evidence on record.
8 December 11, 2013, 712 SeRA 359, citing Angchonco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, February 13, 1997. 268 SCRA 301
RESOLUTIONpp vs. Lorenzo H. Jamora, et al.Crim. Case No. SB-115-CRM-0530
d) No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack ofjurisdiction. Neither may a motion for a bill of particulars beentertained. If respondent desires any matter in the complainant'saffidavit to be clarified, the particularization thereof may be done atthe time of clarificatory questioning in the manner provided inparagraph (f) of this section.
e) If the respondents cannot be served with the ordermentioned in paragraph 6 hereof, or having been served, does notcomply therewith, the complaint shall be deemed submitted forresolution on the basis of the evidence on the record.
f) If, after the filing of the requisite affidavits and theirsupporting evidences, there are facts material to the case whichthe investiqatinq officer may need to be clarified on, he mayconduct a clarificatory hearing during which the parties shall beafforded the opportunity to be present but without the right toexamine or cross-examine the witness being questioned. Wherethe appearance of the parties or witnesses is impracticable, theclarificatory questioning may be conducted in writing, whereby thequestions desired to be asked by the investigating officer or a partyshall be reduced into writing and served on the witness concernedwho shall be required to answer the same in writing and underoath.
g) Upon the termination of the preliminary investigation, theinvestigating officer shall forward the records of the case togetherwith his resolution to the designated authorities for theirappropriate action thereon. No information may be filed and nocomplaint may be dismissed without the written authority orapproval of the Ombudsman in cases falling within the jurisdictionof the Sandiganbayan, or of the proper Deputy Ombudsman in allother cases.
It must be emphasized that Section 4(e), above, expresslyprovides that H[i]f the respondents cannot be served with the ordermentioned in paragraph 6 hereof, or having been served, does notcomply therewith, the complaint shall be deemed submitted forresolution on the basis of the evidence on the record." Thus, thejustification of the prosecution that the Office of the Ombudsman haddifficulty locating accused Jamora, and that the latter subsequentlyfiled several motions for extension, thereby admittedly prolonging thepreliminary investigation, is contrary to established rules.
As aptly explained by the Supreme Court in Coscolluela, theright to speedy disposition of cases is intended to serve the followingpurpose:
RESOLUTIONpp vs. Lorenzo H. Janwra, et al.Crim. Case No. SB-16·CRM-0530
"Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition ofcases is not merely hinged towards the objective of spurringdispatch in the administration of justice but also to prevent theoppression (If the citizen by holding a criminal prosecutionsuspended over him for an indefinite time. Akin to the right tospeedy trial, its "salutary objective" is to assure that an innocentperson may te free from the anxiety and expense of litigation or, ifotherwise, or having his guilt determined within the shortestpossible tim e compatible with the presentation and consideration ofwhatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. This loomingunrest as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by the passageof time shou d be weighed against the State and in favor of theindividual. In the context of the right to a speedy trial, the Court inCorpuz v. Saidiqanbayan (Corpuz) illumined:
A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rightsof the accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedytrial cases Oil an ad hoc basis.
x x x Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interestof the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect,namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimizeanxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit thepossibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the mostserious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequatelyto prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. Thereis also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recallaccurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is notimprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints onhis liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion andoften, hostility. His financial resources may be drained, hisassociation is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy."
The Office of the Ombudsman's failure to resolve the complaintwith such promptness and prudence as dictated by law andjurisprudence placed the accused in a tactical disadvantage andopened the possibility that their defense will be impaired. It is alsoprobable that aside from the anxiety and unrest that came with aprolonged investigation, the availability of witnesses anddocumentary ev idence to the accused was also affected consideringthat the subject transaction took place in 2004. The Court agreesthat the action or inaction of the respondents should not control theconduct of the preliminary investigation, to which the Office of theOmbudsman has clear and express mandate.
That the proposed Information underwent a thorough review atthe Office of the Special Prosecutor likewise cannot be offered as anexcuse for the delay, considering that, as previously stated, thequestion involved in this case is not complex and difficult.
RESOLUTIONpp vs. Lorenzo H. Jamora, et al.Crim. Case No. SB-1ti-CRM-0530
Thus, the Court is constrained to decree the dismissal of thepresent case for violation of the accused's constitutional right to aspeedy disposition of their cases.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, accused Feleo'sOmnibus Motion 1. To Dismiss the Case/Quash the Information; and 2. ToDefer Arraignmen( dated September 16, 2016, accused Legaspi's Motionto Quash and Defer Arraignment, dated September 16, 2016, andaccused Jamora's Omnibus Motion to Quash and to Defer Arraignment,dated September 16, 2016, are hereby GRANTED, and the Information inthis case is ordered QUASHED. Accordingly, this case is herebyDISMISSED, for violation of the constitutional right of the accused tospeedy disposition of their cases ..
The hold-departure orders issued by this Court against the saidaccused-movants are hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE, and the bondsthey posted for their provisional liberty are ordered RELEASED, subject tothe usual accounting and auditing procedures.
SO ORDERED.
EFREN ~ (;\E LA CRUZchairpers~:V Kssociate Justice
