Libya: Tribes, Militias, Interests and Intervention jamahiriyanewsagency.wordpress.com /2016/03/30/libya-tribes-militia-interests-and-intervention/

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Editorial Comment:

This article is an outsider’s view of the situation in Libya. He has made an effort to unravel the complex threads,but confuses revolutionaries with counter-revolutionaries, calls the NATO war an uprising and cannot understandmany details of inter-tribal politics, let alone how each tribe views the “4 governments”. Perhaps these errorsare due to his sources being mainstream media and pentagon reports.

The tribes, the Libyan people and the resistance are better, more reliable sources.

Although he misses this fact, there is no doubt that LIFG, al Qaeda, Da’esh, are different brand names for thesame Gladio terror network.

The most important lesson to learn from this article is that Libya’s situation is vastly complex, worthy of carefulscrutiny. And indeed, it is to our own peril if we neglect to learn these details and lessons. The war theater willonly expand and become ever more labyrinthine. Anything that is understood here will become generalizedknowledge that will serve us well, both in the present and the future.

Jamahiriya News Agency

It is something that had never happened in any country since the formation of the United Nations. The UN has,without an election, created unilaterally its own government for a country, and then immediately recognized it.The Government of National Accord, the GNA for Libya is a government based in exile and not elected butchosen by the “International Community”.

By Richard Galustian

A concerted effort over Easter for the GNA in exile in Tunis to ‘take power’ in Tripoli failed completely despite thespin and false optimism of the UN and the U.S. and UK in particular.

Let’s rewind a little.

The recent United Nations plan to bring peace to Libya and eliminate ISIS was/is a two stage process fraughtwith great risk, uncertainty and is poorly thought out.

First is to persuade Libya’s factions to unite under a Government, the GNA while it is in exile. Second, to provideweapons, training and air support for a newly united Libyan army to attack ISIS.

These are totally unrealistic expectations that will never happen.

The background needs to be understood. The critical fact being that Libya’s main factions are divided into twovery loose camps.

One camp supports the elected parliament, the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk. The other is made upof the previous parliament, the General National Congress (GNC) and supports ‘Libya Dawn’, an Islamist-ledcoalition of militias that include the extremist elements of the Muslim Brotherhood and former Libyan IslamicFighting Group (LIFG) counter-revolutionaries [JNA ed]. The LIFG is an al-Qaeda offshoot.

Civil war began in July 2014 when ‘Libya Dawn’ seized Tripoli by force after the elections saw sharp losses forthe Muslim Brotherhood and its Islamist allies including notably former leader of the LIFG, the infamous Abdel

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Hakim Belhadj, currently suing in the London Courts the then Foreign Minister and MI-6.

The HoR won international recognition straight after the UN announced its election was free and fair, but underintimidation (that’s when Islamists destroyed Tripoli International Airport etc) from militias, the HoR fled east toTobruk.

To further complicate the situation one must realize that within these two camps are a lattice work of rivalries andtribal divisions.

Libya has no ‘third force’ of police or army acceptable to all sides. The militias are the third force! Essentially theyrepresents ‘guns for hire’. The army and police are first and second.

The problem for the international community is while destroying ISIS is their stated priority, both Libya’s rivalcamps see each other as the greater threat. ISIS is a threat, but neither camp believes it is an existential threat,so the priority for both camps is fighting each other.

Map of Libya

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Oil and gas locations

1 ISIS in Libya

Bases: Derna, Sirte, Sabratha; Strength: 6,000 (Pentagon estimate)

1.1 In Derna

ISIS arrived in Libya in the summer of 2014 and established control of the eastern town of Derna, aided by aYemeni preacher and a group of 200-300 ISIS fighters, many of them Libyan, includes many of the Al BadrBrigade, which had fought in Syria and Ansar Al Sharia whom some credit for killing the US Ambassador andthree other Americans in Benghazi.

In June 2015 a mixed force of regular army and an Al Qaida affiliated militia, Omar Mukhtar Brigade, pushedISIS out of the town to its base in the forested green mountains to the south, the only high ground in the East.

Rumors that Qatari backed, Abdel Hakim Belhadj is linked to ISIS have never been proven. His LIFG was by theway designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S.

1.2 In Sirte

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The ISIS headquarter in Libya is in Sirte, Muammar Gaddafi’s birthplace and the site of his capture andexecution at the end of the 2011 war in October.

Since establishing itself there in 2014, ISIS has pushed outwards, and now holds 150 miles of the Mediterraneancoast either side of the town facing Europe. It has also pushed south, raiding production units in Sirte Basin,Libya’s largest collection of oil fields.

In December 2015 it attacked Libya’s principle oil ports, Es Sider and Ras Lanuf, east of Sirte, setting storagetanks ablaze. In March 2016 it attacked Sarir, the largest remaining oil field still in production, 200 miles southeast of Sirte.

The Pentagon estimates ISIS has 6,000 fighters and anecdotal reports suggest more are arriving hiding amongmigrant streams crossing Libya’s southern border. The majority of ISIS fighters in Libya are foreign, withcontingents from Tunisia, Chad, Yemen, Syria, Mali, Niger and most recently Senegal. Other estimates put ISISnumbers closer to 10,000 and in future that number will undoubtedly grow.

1.3 In Sabratha

The main ISIS base in western Libya was at Sabratha, 30 miles west of Tripoli. Remnants still remain there.

In February U.S. air strikes successfully struck an ISIS compound killing 41 fighters, the bulk of them, accordingto ID cards recovered, were from Tunisia. Subsequently ISIS units overran the town, beheading 12 policeofficers in the police headquarters.

In early March ISIS units briefly captured areas of the Tunisian border town of Ben Gardan, before succumbing togovernment troops in fighting that left 50 dead. The U.S. strikes and subsequent fighting exposed links betweenthe town’s Libya Dawn leadership and ISIS, who were able to use private houses leased by townspeople.

2 Tobruk (HoR) Government Forces

Regular army and militias from eastern Libya, militias south and west Libya. Strength estimates for full and parttime fighters: 15,000-30,000. Between 12 and 30 fighter bombers + helicopters.

2.1 Regular forces

Tobruk’s most powerful force is the regular army. It is based in eastern Libya and has recently captured the bulkof Benghazi from Islamist militias and ISIS. It is led by Tobruk commander-in-chief Khalifa Haftar, [CIA asset JNAed.] probably the most polarizing figure in Libya. He is more popular than Western media portrays. He hasvowed to destroy Islamist forces which he brands terrorists, and is supported and hated in equal measure.

The otherwise most popular soldier in the East is the enigmatic much respected Col. Wanis Bukhamada.

The army’s key units are the Saiqa and Zawiya-Martyrs’ brigades based in Benghazi and the 204 tank brigade.These units have some characteristics of militias, in that their personnel are not interchangeable andcommanders decide in advance if they will perform various actions. But they cooperate and have ability tocoordinate combined attacks with limited supporting artillery.

The air force is commanded by Haftar’s close aid Gen. Saqr al-Jerushi and has grown to more than 16 planesand helicopters. It has the capacity to launch accurate strikes on shipping attempting to bring weapons to Islamistunits in Benghazi. In early March it broadcast footage showing the aftermath of an air strike on three ships thathad been bringing weapons to Islamists in Benghazi from Misrata. Air force senior Officers say better training,pilots and planes, have given them the ability to spot and hit targets, even at night, at sea, and at least half adozen similar strikes have taken place since October.

2.2 Petroleum Facilities Guard

Officially a defense ministry formation, the PFG is a tribal militia led by a charismatic and unpredictable yetimportant warlord, Ibrahim Jidran and his brothers who control four principle eastern Libyan oil ports.

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When attacked by ‘Libya Dawn’ in 2014 and ISIS in 2015 it defended the ports and cooperated with Haftar inclearing Islamists from the nearby town of Ajbaiya. But Jidran remains emotionally unstable, and has in the pastsuggested switching support to ‘Libya Dawn’. He has signaled support for the GNA though that could change!This is a fairly typical trait, to switch allegiances regularly which makes analyzing the situation on the ground sodifficult.

2.3 Zintan + Warshefa militias

The most powerful pro-government [JNA ed – which government?] militia in western Libya is from Zintan, 90 kmsouth west of Tripoli. It formed in the 2011 uprising, and at that time united with the rebel militia of Misrata tocapture Tripoli. When Misrata joined Libya Dawn to capture the city in 2014, Zintan militia, who were until thenthe main pro government unit, quit the town and left the international airport after a six week battle. Theyreturned to their almost impregnable mountainous region.

Importantly Zintan holds Saif Gaddafi.

Since 2014 Zintan has allied with militias from the Warshefani tribal belt, a crescent south of the capital. Theyhave an integrated command center in Zintan with numbered brigades and their units cooperate well in offensiveoperations. Zintan’s best equipped unit is SAWAC, which deploys American uniforms and helmets and UAEmanufactured armored cars. Its component parts dissolved in the 2014 fighting and joined other Zintan brigadesbut have since reformed.

Zintan now cooperates with Haftar, but, typically for Libyans, from time to time declines to take orders from him.Its operations are usually coordinated with air force bombers commanded by General Saqr Jerushi operatingfrom the giant Wattiya desert air base north of Zintan. In December U.S. special forces were photographed at theairbase, reportedly engaged in reconnaissance of the Sabratha ISIS base 30 km north which American jetsstruck in February.

3 ‘Libya Dawn’

Militia led forces holding Tripoli, the western coastal belt and districts of eastern city of Benghazi. Strengthestimates full and part time fighters 15,000-40,000. 3-6 fighter bombers operating out of Misrata and fromTripoli’s Mitiga Air Base which doubles as a civilian airport following Tripoli International Airport’s destruction.

‘Libya Dawn’ militias are broadly speaking divided between Islamist and tribal. The strongest and most importanttribal militias are primarily from Misrata, as well as western coastal Libyan towns, reviving an ancient coastal-interior tribal fault line. The new UN-backed GNA has split Libya Dawn, probably permanently, with some militiasin favor, others not, and consequential clashes in Tripoli between the two.

‘Libya Dawn’ was formed in July 2014 after Islamist and Misrata allies suffered defeat at the ballot boxes, inelections for the House of Representatives parliament, which was to replace the former General NationalCongress (GNC) parliament in which Islamists had enjoyed a narrow majority. Libya Dawn militias capturedTripoli in six weeks fighting that saw most embassies leave for Tunis or Malta and, as stated earlier, theInternational airport (TIP) completely destroyed.

Dawn then proclaimed support for a rump of the former GNC, composed of approximately 30 Islamist andMisrata former MPs. The exact number is not verified because the rump GNC holds sessions in secret. Thisnewly constituted version of the GNC appointed a government led by a prime minister and cabinet called theNational Salvation Government (NSG).

After a disputed Supreme Court judgement in November the rump GNC insisted it was the “real” parliament. Theelected HoR now residing in Tobruk denounced the judgement, saying the Supreme Court judges wereintimidated, in fear of their lives when they were forced to make their deliberations and when they were physicallysurrounded by Dawn militias.

Also as stated earlier, the UN’s GNA plan has divided Libya Dawn militias, some in favor, some against althoughthe process is fluid and dynamic and ever changing.

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3.1 ‘Libya Dawn’ – Pro GNA militias

3.1.1 Rada, or Special Deterrence Force

Formerly Nawasi, a Salafist formation, led by Abdul Rauf Kara. It is the self appointed religious police in Tripoli,ensuring women’s dress codes and closing shops displaying female garments. It clashes regularly with drugsuppliers and usually summarily executes them on the spot.

It operates from Mitiga Airport, the city center Libya airport, formerly only an AF air base. Its units are wellequipped, with imported tan colored Toyotas with armor plating. To be fair Rada has brought a degree of securityand stability to central Tripoli. Rada is expected to become the key security force for the GNA if it ever entersTripoli. It has over 3,000 personnel.

3.1.2 Misrata: Halboos, Central Shield, Al Majoub, 166 Brigade

Halbous is an armored brigade, nicknamed the Black Brigade in the 2011 war because it painted its vehicles thiscolor to differentiate from tan-colored Gaddafi forces for NATO jets. Founded by two engineer brothers bothkilled in the counter-revolution, its units have held back from militia fighting and diplomats regard Halboos ashaving, as a result, good relations with both Tripoli and Zintan.

Halboos and Zintan negotiated a ceasefire in October 2015 which is holding. Optimistic plans call for Rada,Halboos and Zintan units to jointly patrol Tripoli to protect the GNA. This is an unlikely coalition. Some Zintan andMisrata commanders say they are reluctant, fearing increased firefights leading to mostly civilian casualties.

Privately, each expresses fears that less disciplined militias from their towns will take the opportunity to enterTripoli, with family/tribal connections obliging regular units to avoid confronting them. Misrata’s Al Majoub Brigadeand Central Shield militias, which have also refrained from gangsterism, also support GNA. Misrata’s 166brigade is the lead formation battling ISIS on the Sirte front. It supports the GNA and UK and French specialforces are reportedly advising it prior to an inevitable planned assault on Sirte.

3.2 ‘Libya Dawn’ – Anti-GNA militias

3.2.1 Libya Revolutionaries Operations Room (LROR)

The LROR is a Salafist brigade formed as the headquarters of ‘Libya Shield’, a Muslim Brotherhood ‘parallelarmy’ set up by the former General National Congress (GNC) in 2013 as counterweight to the regular army.

In reaction to the military uprising against Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt in the summer of2013, LROR and Shield units deployed around Tripoli and were paid, bribed, whatever you like to call it, 900million dinars on orders of GNC president Nuri Abu Sahmain.

In October that year LROR kidnapped then prime minister Ali Zeidan from a Tripoli hotel. Since then, LROR, likemost Tripoli militias, has seen membership rise and fall as fighters join and leave other units and return; andendless cycle of defections. Its leadership has declared it will fight any attempt by the GNA to control Tripoli.

3.2.2 Haitham Tajouri

A young maverick, not very smart even by the standards of Libyan militia leaders, he opposed LROR in 2013,claiming false credit for freeing Zeidan.

Since then his militia from Tajoura in south west Tripoli has fought alongside and against LROR in a continuallychanging alliances. Politically he has been outflanked by Rada which has UN approval, and is opposed to theGNA though he could change his mind in a heart beat. In March his units captured Gaddafi’s former Hall of thePeople to deny it to the GNA as a possible base. That said the two most favored locations in order of preferencefor the GNA would be the former UN base by the Med adjacent to the futuristic Palm City.

A most important figure who maintains a very low profile is Hisham Bishr; a man to watch in future; an intelligent6/15

thoughtful former librarian.

3.2.3 Al-Samoud Front

Al Samoud is an amalgamation of 12 militias led by Misrata Islamist politician Saleh Badi, who led the mostpowerful ‘Libya Dawn’ force in its 2014 capture of Tripoli, capturing and then burning Tripoli International Airport.Badi formed the front from the most politically reliable units from both Misrata, eastern Tripoli and the coastaltowns of Zawiya and Sabratha in reaction to gains made in 2015 fighting by Zintan. Badi is adamantly opposedto the GNA. To be frank, he is considered by many to be a thug, pure and simple.

3.2.4 Benghazi Shura Council

The complexity of Libya’s inter-twined tribal and Islamist conflict is highest in Benghazi.

After the 2011 uprising the Muslim Brotherhood GNC installed three Libya Shield brigades in the city: February17 Martyrs, Rafallah al Sahati (commanded my Muhammad al-Ghariani) and Libya Shield 1 (commanded byWissam bin Ahmaid) All three were MB in orientation, and advised by Ismail Salabi, brother of Libya’s keyMuslim Brotherhood preacher Ali Salabi, based now in Turkey, Erdogan being the world champion of ‘theBrothers’ as they are known.

Qatar’s wish that the three brigades should support Libya’s 2012 elections saw a breakaway group, Ansar alSharia, formed. Washington accuses Ansar of the attack on the US cluster of buildings, wrongly called aconsulate, which was protected by a small force from February 17, that killed in Benghazi ambassador ChrisStevens in September 2012.

However, there was overlap between the Brotherhood brigades, Ansar and other terror formations. After amassacre of 30 civilians in June 2013, Libya Shield 1’s headquarters was overrun. IEDs and a makeshift jailcreated in the former toilet block were discovered. Former Shield militiamen recalled that the bulk of Shield 1were local teenagers, paid to guard the compound. Within the compound was a forbidden area of several sandcolored buildings where foreign Arabs worked. Shield militiamen were forbidden to talk to them and surmisedthey were operating a terror campaign in Benghazi.

Through 2012 and 2013 Islamist units launched terror attacks, mostly assassinations, against military and policeofficers, judges and civil rights activists to intimidate and control the population. They culminated in the slaying oftwo young activists and the killing of one of Libya’s most prominent activist, Salwa Bughagis, who photographedthe militia unit that killed her.

In May 2014 Gen. Khalifa Haftar, then a retired general (who had lived the previous two decades in VirginiaUSA), launched Operation Dignity, with a mixed army and militia force attacking both Brotherhood and Ansarmilitias.

In February this year, according to Le Monde aided by French special forces, army units overran most Islamistpositions in the town. By then, Islamist units had morphed into two parallel structures.

Brotherhood militias, severely depleted, had merged with Ansar al Sharia to form the Benghazi Shura Council. Itwas supported politically and with deliveries of weapons and fighters from Misrata and Tripoli and financed bythe Central Bank of Libya.

Fighting both in competition and alongside were units of ISIS, which grew quickly among Shura areas, imposingharsh discipline. The Islamists were based in districts populated by people from western Libya suspicious of theeastern tribal majority.

4 Prospect of a Divided Country

Until 1934 Libya did not exist as a country, and was divided into three regions created by Ottoman rulers.Cyrenaica, in the east, Tripolitania in the west and Fezzan in the south. Italian colonizers displaced theOttomans after World War One, invented the name Libya and united the three provinces.

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Of the three provinces, the only homogeneous one is Cyrenaica (East Libya), where tribal leaders have wellestablished rules for mediating conflict. For instance, when the Ajdabiya units of the PFG refused to allow Haftarunits, from tribes further east, to enter the town to battle ISIS, Hafar demurred. Negotiations followed, thebalance tipped by the strength of the regular army, and after tribal leaders agreed, army units entered the town.

Tripolitania (West Libya) and Fezzan (South Libya) are split, with local squabbles taking precedence over rivalrywith other provinces.

Tripolitania is home to four million Libyans with a tribal divide separating the coast from the interior. Fezzan issplit between ethnic conflict between gangs from Arab, Tobu and Tuareg peoples, some aligning with Tobruk,others with Tripoli in ever-changing loyalties.

5 Deployment of International Military Forces

5.1 Aviation

5.1.1. U.S.

The U.S. has struck militant positions in Libya in June and November 2015 and in February this year. It usesbombers based in both the UK and Italy. U.S. Marines are based in Italy and Spain for use to extract downedpilots. U.S. drones operate over Libya from both Italy and Niger.

In addition, several aircraft, including a Dornier and Beechcraft, used by U.S. Special Operations Commandoperated most days of March off the Libyan coast, visible because they use flight transponders when ininternational airspace.

In December 2015 20 U.S. servicemen in civilian clothes were rather embarrassingly photographed among dunebuggies and a USSOC Dornier at Al Wattiya base near Zintan. The Pentagon says it has special forces in Libyaseeking alliances with militias to attack ISIS. Meanwhile Barack Obama has said the U.S. will continue to launchair strikes on militant “targets of opportunity” in Libya.

5.1.2 France

France has an aircraft carrier, Charles De Gaulle exercising with the Egyptian navy in the Mediterranean as ofMarch 18, after it returned from deployment in the Persian Gulf.

Additionally, France has a force of 3,000 deployed in Niger and other parts of the Magreb, Operation Barkhane,which intercepts suspected jihadist convoys entering and leaving Libya. Guided by U.S. drones, the interceptionshave seen several battles. However, the forces say they are unable to distinguish ISIS jihadist recruits movingacross the border unarmed, from the tens of thousands of migrants making the same journey. The migrants areactually a ‘Trojan horse’ for ISIS.

Le Monde reported French special forces and intelligence personnel have been operating from Benghazi’sBenina airport in support of Gen.Khalifa Haftar. Photographs of their alleged compound have been circulated onsocial media. Though this was denied by the much respected and popular other military officer, the head of SF inBenghazi, Col. Wanis Bukhamada.

5.1.3 UK

Britain has fighter bombers, unarmed drones and reconnaissance aircraft in Cyprus.

In February the UK announced a 20-strong unit was advising Tunisia on protection of its border against ISISincursions. Germany has also announced advisors deployed for the same purpose.

5.2 Troop deployments

5.2.1 Training

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Detailed plans have not been released for deployment. Italy has said 3,000 troops may be provided, the UK up to1,000. France, Germany and Spain may join. It is likely training would be concentrated in ‘Libya Dawn’ areas. InTripoli, training would take place in several disused army bases on the south-east of the city in Tajura district.Zliten police college to the east will probably not be used after it was devastated by an IS truck bomb. Otherdeployments run the risk of obstruction or violence. Southern cities are considered too unsafe by continuingfactional war. Benghazi would prove too controversial, but Tobruk would offer security. There is a thin line whendescribing ‘trainers’ and combat troops. The head of the British Parliament’s All Party Foreign Affairs Committee,Crispin Blunt MP, himself a former soldier, voiced the strongest opposition to the UK deploying any troopsdescribing his Committees actions actions against the British Governments plan as “I hope we put a bullet in thatplan.”

5.2.2 UN

The UN Security Council has heard a recommendation from experts that an armed UN security force ofthousands is necessary before the mission can return.

5.2.3 EU

A report leaked to Reuters written by the famously incompetent former communist, the EU foreign policy chiefFrederica Mogherini, recommends an armed security force to protect EU advisors. The EU wants to send inmore than 100 advisors from the European Border Assistance Mission, who evacuated the capital in the 2014fighting. A hundred can achieve nothing. They also want to hand over €100m to the GNA. That would come inuse to bribe militias, well initially anyway.

6 Divisions among Outside Powers

Libya is a strategic asset. It holds the largest oil reserves in Africa and has more than $100 billion in foreignassets and cash. The oil is light and sweet, placing it in the top four percent of world premium oil. It remains astrategic prize. Libya has also many other minerals that have yet to be exploited.

Libya Dawn’s Muslim Brotherhood component has seen it attract support and weapons from principally Turkeywhile Egypt and UAE do the same for the House of Representatives (HoR) and its rather maverick but popularcommander Gen. Khalifa Haftar. This popularity is understated by the mainstream western media.

The GNA plan is led less by the UN than by the U.S. State Department and the UK Foreign Office. Both believe itis strategically important to ensure the Brotherhood retains a position in North Africa, after it – Morsi and Co –was replaced by force in Egypt as well as losing elections in Tunisia. The American and the British, this authormaintains, are mistaken and that it is a gross error on both their parts.

Never forget that Turkey is the world’s only Muslim Brotherhood governed country.

The MB is unwilling to accept a place in parliament commensurate with its 14-17 percent electoral support,fearing, possibly correctly, that it will be persecuted. Instead, it is demanding a guaranteed chunk of power,policed by its own force, with control of at least part of Tripoli and at least part of the Central Bank of Libya (CBL).

An important fact that needs to be acknowledged is that pitted against MB influenced ‘Libya Dawn’ isnevertheless the legitimate parliament in Tobruk consisting of all the other parties and factions, forming anebulous chaotic whole without a recognizable ruling group and with opposing group factions within it.Parliament has never managed to hold a session with more than 140 of its 188 MPs present and recent sessionshave fallen below 100.

The position of foreign powers remains mixed.

France is more lukewarm in its support for the MB, but is united with Britain and the U.S. in wanting a rapid endto the civil war and the destruction of ISIS. Its special forces reportedly helped Haftar capture most of Benghazi.The fall of Benghazi, assuming it is completed, will represent the most strategic shift in the civil war since itbegan in July 2014, handing Tobruk the east, the bulk of the oil, and the upper hand. If truth be know, France

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would like the South of Libya (Fezzan) for a variety of obvious reasons associated with controlling Libya’ssouthern neighbors.

Italy has, to all intent and purposes, sided with ‘Libya Dawn’, in part because Dawn controls ENI assets and theimportant Melitah terminal of the Greenstream gas pipeline to Europe west of Tripoli. An Italian deployment toTripoli is seen by both camps as a decisive gesture in support of Libya Dawn.

Germany and other European states follow the lead of the most prominent three western powers on the UNSecurity Council.

Russia remains the enigma. It has joined with Egypt in proposing a UNSC resolution to lift the arms embargo forthe regular army which will benefit Haftar. There is speculation in Libya that as Britain and the US move closer tothe Muslim Brotherhood in Tripoli, Russia will increase her support for Tobruk.

On March 14 Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said any western military intervention in Libya must haveUN Security Council approval. Legally speaking the move is unnecessary as UNSC Resolution 1970 from 2011remains in force.

However, the statement is seen as a clear break with western powers. If intervention were to go ahead withoutRussian agreement, there is the possibility Russia, with Egypt’s help, will deploy in eastern Libya.

One other danger of the GNA is that its existence causes Libya to split because of the nature, the make up, of theso called government. While a majority of the 9-strong presidency council are non Islamist, they are obliged tomeet in Tripoli under control of the MB, the ‘Libya Dawn’ Islamist and Misratan units who control the city and itsinstitutions at present. They (the presidency council) have been threatened with arrest should they enter Tripoli.Without eastern or southern forces, it is likely eastern and possibly southern presidency members will eitherboycott the GNA or stay away for fear of immediate kidnap.

In this case, the GNA if it succeeds to get to Tripoli, will operate under the same intimidation, extended to theCentral Bank and other ministries, that the GNC now operates under, effectively the GNA will become a ‘LibyaDawn mark 2’.

In this, the UK and U.S. may feel they have met their apparent objective of securing the Muslim Brotherhood inLibya, because international recognition status will have switched from the Tobruk parliament to the GNA. A madidea by anybody’s measure.

In effect, under this scenario, the division of Libya remains the same, but recognition status switches from theeastern government to the GNA which as explained will fast become ‘Libya Dawn mark 2’. Such a scenariocarries with it the possibly of split recognition. Egypt, UAE and possibly Russia will likely not agree to switchrecognition to the GNA and maintain it’s ties to the HoR in the East.

7 Military Training

Italy has offered 3,000 soldiers and the UK has suggested up to 1,000, to train a GNA army. The UK asexplained earlier is highly unlikely to do this.

Most of these forces will be engaged in support and ‘force protection’. Diplomats say the deployment is also andprimarily aimed at providing foreign troops on the ground to strengthen the control of the GNA, while notacknowledging this publicly.

However, the deployment carries risks. A former training initiative, agreed at the 2013 G6 summit in Lock Earnesaw the UK, U.S., Italy, Turkey and Jordan agree to train Libyan forces, but outside Libya because of securityconcerns.

The U.S. training plan for 5,000 Libyans in Bulgaria was abandoned. Britain abandoned after some months thetraining of 300 recruits in Cambridgeshire after several were jailed for various offenses including male rape.Jordan curtailed its training after a group of recruits rioted in their dorms in Amman. Italy trained more than 200

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without incident. Turkey’s training was compromised by its support for ‘Libya Dawn’. Remember that Turkey isheaded by the world’s only Muslim Brotherhood government.

Libyan loyalties are to the tribe and family. “Tribes trump religion” is a popular saying by some. As in Lebanonand Iraq, units formed by recruits from different tribes and groups have low cohesion. Tribal and Islamist unitshave high cohesion, but are self-governing, refusing orders from higher commanders.

The risk for foreign ‘trainers’ is that they train militias backed by the GNA, creating a fresh fighting division inLibya. This is like putting wood on a fire.

A second risk is that a proportion of equipment delivered to these formations will be illicitly sold to other militiasand ISIS.

A third risk is force protection. As in Iraq, ISIS deploys trucks laden with explosive driven by suicide bombers.Such bombs are guaranteed to destroy the outer guard post of a base. Western troops will initially rely on Libyanmilitias to control outer security. But attacks by ISIS may see the militias reluctant to do so. Killing of foreigntroops will raise political problems in the West. Politicians will criticize not just the deployment, but also thelikelihood that if the deployment continues, there will be further casualties. The bottom line is; from where willthese forces be recruited, who will lead them, against whom and with what legal protections? Unless the stateenjoys a monopoly on force, few Libyans will likely join a foreign backed ‘army’ for a government in exile that hasno organic legitimacy, traction or policy for the State beyond combating ISIS.

However, Pentagon planners favor a more direct approach than their civilian counterparts. In January the U.S.Defense Department said its special forces are in Libya seeking to “partner” with local militias in the fight againstISIS.

Such partnerships would be short term and ad hoc. They would see special forces support ground attacks anddirect air strikes, in what would be a repeat of the NATO bombing of Gaddafi forces in 2011.

This strategy also carries risks. ISIS in Sirte are in a built up area, and western forces will not want to be blamedfor civilian casualties.

Also, the bombing of Sabratha exposed the ties some Libya Dawn factions, in this case the city leadership, havewith ISIS.

8 Other Factors

8.1 Sanctions – UN option to stop and search ships and planes

While Tobruk forces get weapons and ammunition, mostly Russian made, across Egypt’s border, ‘Libya Dawn’rely on ship and plane transport from Turkey, according to the UNSC Panel of Experts report of March 2015. Butmany ask how and why when Turkey is part of NATO? A seemingly unanswerable question, well one no one inthe West has the balls to ask.

A proportion of the ‘Libya Dawn’ supplies and fighters go to ISIS. Cutting sea and air routes would cut ISISsupplies but also those of Dawn. By contrast, the UN has no means of enforcing an arms embargo on theEgyptian border, without Cairo’s agreement. Thus, enforcing the embargo will see the Tobruk-Dawn military headto head change to the advantage of Tobruk.

8.2 Muslim Brotherhood

Britain’s and the U.S.’s security and intelligence communities are allegedly concerned about the overlapbetween the Muslim Brotherhood and ISIS. Part of the reason that British and American politicians have forsupporting the MB is the hope that they think it represents a non-violent outlet for jihadists who might over whilebe encouraged to join ‘more extreme’ terrorist organizations. These are echoes of the ridiculous debate aboutgood and bad terrorists in Syria.

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But the Brotherhood’s decision to rebel against the elected Tobruk parliament has cast doubt over thisassessment. Some ‘Dawn’ units are interchangeable with some ISIS units, although many are not. And many ofTripoli’s ostensibly Islamist units are closer in character to armed criminal gangs. The MB enjoys little support inwhat is a tribal society, winning between 13 and 17 percent in elections and the few authoritative opinion pollssince the revolution. Its success in winning the 2012 election was attributed by critics to it inserting MBcandidates posing as independents, notably religious figures. The MB has an extensive network in the U.S.whose leadership enjoys access directly to the White House.

8.3 Libyan Institutions

Libya’s overseas assets and oil income are controlled by the Central Bank, National Oil Corporation and LibyaInvestment Authority. The chairmen of all three were replaced by the HoR in late 2014, but refused to leave,staying in office in Tripoli. Officially they declare they are independent of both Dawn and the HoR, but the UNSCpanel of experts reports that intimidation and political links ensure all three work with Dawn.

The Libya political agreement (LPA) calls for the HoR chairs to be dismissed, leaving the Tripoli chairs in charge,and, for opponents, giving ‘Dawn’ access to Libya revenues.

Without resolution, this may see a break, as the east refuses to export oil from eastern ports if the incomereturns to a ‘Libya Dawn’ controlled Tripoli.

If Egypt, UAE and Russia continue to recognize Tobruk and the HoR which includes the Al Thinni government,then Libya will see the complicated reality of the east able to sell oil, and receive income, from those three stateswhile the GNA in Tripoli sells to certain favored western powers.

An added complication is allegations recently made publicly by both the UK ambassador Peter Millett and theUNSC panel of experts claiming the Tripoli central bank (CBL) is paying militias. The UNSC says it also hasevidence that the CBL is paying Ansar al Sharia directly, who are listed by the UN and the U.S. as a terroristorganization.

Central bank governor El Sedik al Kabir, now a resident of Malta, has denied the reports, but evidence that he ispaying armed groups, militias and possibly terrorists may see foreign oil buyers withhold payments, fearing inparticular prosecution by the United States.

8.4 Benghazi

The fate of Benghazi is the hinge on which the Libya civil war turns. If the army complete Benghazi’s capture,eastern Libya will be free of Islamist units and able to exploit oil fields holding two thirds of Libyan production.

It will be de facto independent of Tripoli and able to resist the GNA. The Muslim Brotherhood and some Islamistbrigades in Tripoli say they will support the GNA only if the UN can ensure a supply corridor to preserve theirgarrison in Benghazi.

UN envoy Martin Kobler has tried to facilitate this through, amongst other ways, a Qatar backed Swiss charity,pushing for it to be allowed access to Shura Council areas of Benghazi. Success will allow a regular supplypipeline and will cement the front lines, denying Haftar control of the city.

For this reason Tobruk forces are likely to resist the move. Kobler’s decision to back the charity has brought backechoes of the controversy of his predecessor’s Bernadino Leon departure to live and work for the UAEgovernment. In October last year Leon emails were revealed showing him accepting a job from the UAE andoffering them inside information on the peace process. At best described as a conflict of interest.

Paradoxically, a de facto division is already underway. Most Benghazi residents from western tribes have fled, ashave many non-Dawn citizens from Tripoli and its environs. The UN says half a million of Libya’s six millionpopulation are displaced by war. In Benghazi, eastern tribes say that if residents from western tribes are allowedback, Islamist militias will reform among them.

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Conclusion

The international community, if possible in an ideal world, including Russia, should forget Libya’s internal rivalriesfor now and, using overwhelming force focus only on ISIS, by air sea assets and boots on the ground, and onceand for all eradicate ISIS in Libya, which some Pentagon sources privately say is possible within as little as atwo week period.

If not this, then there are no easy policy options for Western forces in Libya.

Doing nothing means risking the civil war getting worse, Libya tipping into humanitarian crisis and ISISexpanding to dominate the country.

Options for striking ISIS fall into three choices.

1 – Do nothing.

This is likely to see ISIS grow as the civil war worsens. For the moment ISIS is not a mass movement amongLibyans. However, growing numbers of foreign fighters are joining its ranks particularly those fleeing Syria andIraq. They arrive in Libya courtesy of assistance by a NATO ally, Turkey. Go figure!

2- Air Strikes Lite.

Air strikes without government permission are technically legal, as they are covered by the UNSC Resolution1973 in 2011. However, they are politically difficult for western governments, notably Great Britain and France.

The Pentagon “war lite” plan for air strikes backed by ad hoc alliances with local militias may fail if they cannotachieve quick results.

3 – Unity government which then can be followed by Western air strikes.

Accept Western air strikes have already occurred without that need; witness the bombing of Sabratha by theAmericans.

The UN plan, engineered principally by the U.S. State Department and UK Foreign Office, relies for success onthe acceptance of a unity government, the UN picked GNA.

Talks on this broke down late last year, with the elected parliament, the HoR, was unwilling to give ‘Libya Dawn’more power than its voter share entitled it to. The HoR wants the ballot box votes to prevail over guns.

Instead, led by U.S. and UK diplomats, who provide the impetus and expertise for Kobler, the GNA has beenliterally forced through.

Its legitimacy is built on very shaky ground. The GNA was rejected by both the GNC in Tripoli and the HoR inTobruk, albeit with chaos in both so called parliaments and significant factions in both for and against it.

The GNA is built around the Libya political agreement. This calls for a prime minister, Fayez Seraj, a low profileTripoli politician and businessman to rule as part of a 9 strong presidential council. None chosen by Libyans butby the UN!

The HoR leadership disrupted attempts to have a vote, however a suspiciously looking dubious letter was signedby allegedly up to 100 MPs declaring they supported the GNA but some say they were prevented from voting.

How many MPs signed it is unclear with several complaining they were absent. The letter, if genuine, is notenough for the political agreement underpinning the GNA to come into effect. Crucially, this agreement calls forinternational recognition, and control of oil income, to pass to the GNA.

There is further controversy because the heads of all three key state institutions the Central Bank of Libya (CBL),National Oil Corporation (NOC) and Libya Investment Authority (LIA) were replaced by Tobruk in late 2014.

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The political agreement cancels those replacements, with power reverting back to the three pro-Dawn chairmenwho, despite being sacked, remained in control of the institutions in Tripoli. The UK, UN ‘Libya Dawn’ and theinstitutions themselves insist they are independent of both sides which is poppycock according my observations.In fact the UN Panel of Experts has actually reported that the Tripoli branches are controlled by ‘Libya Dawn’militias, often through violence and intimidation.

Plans call for ‘Libya Dawn’s’ Rada and assorted Misrata brigades to provide security, carrying the risk that theGNA will assume the position that the GNC now enjoy. The difference for practical purposes is that internationalrecognition of supporting powers will switch from Tobruk to Tripoli. However, Egypt, UAE and Russia maycontinue recognizing Tobruk, which will institutionalize, and quite possibly accelerate, the civil war.

Never forget, what comes with international recognition is the potential of unfrozen cash and assets representingtens of billions of dollars to the GNA who are currently just a government in exile.

To get a sense of proportion of anyone trying to govern Libya, to ‘pay off’ all the Militias and tribes as former PMAli Zeidan did, would cost around $30B a year alone! The annual budget average in last 5 years has beenaround $70B in total for 6 million people.

If the GNA can get to Tripoli to govern, this will leave western military forces, if deployed, likely to be embeddedamong ‘Libya Dawn’ units, and facing attack from ISIS but opposition from the regular army. An unenviablesituation to say the least.

An international meeting to discuss military training deployment and air strikes was held in Rome on March 18with up to 30 nations invited. However, problems with the GNA entering Tripoli, and fears it could trigger worsefighting in the capital, saw no decisions reached.

The UK also has a new obstacle. On March 16 the UK Foreign Affairs Select Committee, which is investigatingUK policy in Libya, and indeed PM David Cameron himself, demanded the government seek permission for anyLibya deployment from parliament. The UK, which had been expected to take a lead in air strikes, militarytraining, logistics and security in Tripoli has had to put its plans on ice. The British government then promptlyannounced it had no plans for deployments, and promised parliament to announce such plans if they developed.A volte face.

This has been a blow to its coalition allies but prime minister David Cameron is wary of having another Syria-style debate on military action against ISIS in Libya. U.S. policy on Libya is also uncertain, because theRepublicans, who may win the presidency in November, are hostile to the Muslim Brotherhood, whoseorganization in the States has regular access directly to President Obama.

At time of writing the GNA has committed itself to moving from Tunis to Tripoli “within days”. That was over twoweeks ago. They talk boldly of moving “within days” where wiser heads say it will take “weeks and months”.

Legally, because it is recognized by the U.S., UK and France, it can request foreign air strikes in Libya andcontrol overseas funds from Tunis. However, for presentational reasons, each foreign government wants amilitary assistance request to come only once it, the GNA, is installed in Tripoli not while it is in exile.

The GNA process is on a clock, because special forces and air assets were committed in December andJanuary. Western military planners say these forces cannot stay in theater or primed indefinitely. They musteither be used, or withdrawn and the operation cancelled for several months. With ISIS growing and the migrantseason beginning with the arrival of spring weather, Western diplomats fear political pressure if they contemplatean extended military delay.

This author emphatically believes the West, certainly Europe, has no more time if we are to stop ISISstrengthening it’s position in Libya which would represent a real and imminent threat to the very existence of theEU.

For the UN plan to work, the GNA must go to Tripoli, which itself is very doubtful since it cannot be secured thereeven if embedded in Palm City with the UN Headquarters next door, much like a more concentrated (but more

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isolated) Green Zone like that that originally existed in Baghdad in 2003.

But in so doing, it would certainly spark a more intense round of the civil war, leaving only ISIS as the winners ofthe spoils of such an internal conflict. One outcome if that happens is that certainly East Libya would declareunilaterally independence and become a new country, as happened to South Sudan. The second consequencemuch more dire and important than the split of Libya is that ISIS will eventually destroy Europe as we know it.

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