of 8
7/24/2019 Japan's Intelligence Reform Inches Forward _3!2!15 Stratfor
1/8
3/5/2015 Japan's Intelligence Reform Inches Forward | Stratfor
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/japans-intelligence-reform-inches-forward?mc_cid=97793ea9cb&mc_eid=b0dabc2161
Tweet 75 13
Japan's Intelligence Reform Inches ForwardAnalysis MARCH 2, 2015 | 10:08 GMT Print Text Size
Summary
When the Allies defeated Japan at the end of World War II, they dismantled the Japanese security apparatus
and deliberately left the country dependent on outside powers. This entailed not only taking apart the military
but also the extensive imperial intelligence apparatus that had facilitated Japanese expansion in Asia. As it
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (L) inspects troops at the Ground Self-Defense Force Asaka training ground
on Oct. 27, 2013. (TORU YAMANAKA/AFP/Getty Images)
http://-/?-http://void%280%29/https://www.stratfor.com/https://www.stratfor.com/analysishttps://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.stratfor.com%2Fanalysis%2Fjapans-intelligence-reform-inches-forward&title=Japan%27s%20Intelligence%20Reform%20Inches%20Forward&description=7/24/2019 Japan's Intelligence Reform Inches Forward _3!2!15 Stratfor
2/8
3/5/2015 Japan's Intelligence Reform Inches Forward | Stratfor
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/japans-intelligence-reform-inches-forward?mc_cid=97793ea9cb&mc_eid=b0dabc2161
reconstituted itself, postwar Japan opted for a decentralized intelligence system as an alternative to its prewa
model. The result was more a fragment of an intelligence apparatus than a full system, with Tokyo
outsourcing the missing components to its allies. This system worked through the Cold War, when Japan was
more essential to U.S. anti-Soviet strategy. Since then, however, Japan has found itself unable to count on its
allies to provide vital intelligence in a timely manner. The Islamic State hostage crisisin January, during whic
Japan depended on Jordanian and Turkish intelligence, reinforced this lesson.
In response to the recent incident, Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party has started drafting a proposal to
create a new agency specializing in foreign intelligence. To address Japanese dependence on outsiders, thenew system will shift away from a decentralized model with limited collection capacity to a centralized system
with in-house capabilities. The plan would support Japan's slow normalization of its overall military capabilitie
in order to face new threats.
Analysis
During the Cold War, Tokyo could depend on Washington to provide for Japan's external security, while
relying on its own economic muscle to gain access to resources. But Japan is no longer the vital Cold War
bulwark in the Pacific, giving the United States less incentive to cooperate. Meanwhile, both China and North
Korea have emerged as threats to Japanese security. Farther afield, Japanese nationals have become more
deeply involved in regions such as Africa and the Middle East. Today, Japan needs fast, accurate and reliab
intelligence. Nearly a quarter century since the end of the Cold War, however, Japan is still using a vintage
system maladapted to the changing world.
Japan's current intelligence apparatus is fragmented among five organizations. The Cabinet Information and
Research Office focuses on open-source and geospatial intelligence. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs
collects diplomatic intelligence. The Defense Intelligence Headquarters gathers signals intelligence, including
electronic and telecommunications systems. Under the Ministry of Justice, the Public Security Intelligence
Agency mainly conducts internal investigations and monitors subversive domestic groups. The most powerfu
of these is the National Police Agency, which is responsible for domestic law enforcement, counterterrorismand combating transnational crime. It also has personnel positioned in the four other institutions as high-leve
intelligence directors.
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/islamic-state-kidnapping-shows-japans-vulnerabilities-abroad7/24/2019 Japan's Intelligence Reform Inches Forward _3!2!15 Stratfor
3/8
3/5/2015 Japan's Intelligence Reform Inches Forward | Stratfor
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/japans-intelligence-reform-inches-forward?mc_cid=97793ea9cb&mc_eid=b0dabc2161
7/24/2019 Japan's Intelligence Reform Inches Forward _3!2!15 Stratfor
4/8
3/5/2015 Japan's Intelligence Reform Inches Forward | Stratfor
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/japans-intelligence-reform-inches-forward?mc_cid=97793ea9cb&mc_eid=b0dabc2161
This system lacks two key components: Its greatest weakness is the absence of a clandestine intelligence
arm, depriving Japan of reliable access to human intelligence. The country also does not have an institution
that pools the intelligence gathered by the different branches. Such an institution would provide
comprehensive analysis to top policymakers and ensure effective information-sharing among agencies.
Instead, Japan's intelligence agencies each report directly to the prime minister's office. The absence of thes
two key nodes has left Japanese policymakers with huge gaps in awareness, forcing them to react to crises
instead of pre-empting them. Time and again, this has led to tragic consequences for Japanese citizens.
Imperial and Cold War Roots
To understand the current limitations of the Japanese intelligence system, one must look at the country's
militarist past and its Cold War-era grand strategy. Before 1945, the Japanese military dominated the
government structure. The armed forces saw the conquest of Asiaas the island nation's best means of
securing access to the resources it needed. To destabilize its foes and prime Asia for conquest, the military
developed a strong foreign intelligence apparatus modeled along German lines: the army and navy ran their
own intelligence services, while the military police corps, or Kempeitai, conducted counterintelligence and
secret police functions.
The empire's intelligence system was highly effective. The military ran clandestine operations through spynetworks called Tokumu Kikan, or special services agencies. In addition to collecting intelligence, the Tokum
Kikan conducted a range of activities to keep Japan's adversaries off balance, carrying out assassinations an
false flag operations, as well as training fifth columns like Subhas Chandra Bose's Indian National Army.
Officially, military intelligence commanders reported to the intelligence branches of various regional armies
and navies but their connections in Tokyo gave them wide latitude. Like the rest of Imperial Japan's military,
the Tokumu Kikan had little oversight and subverted civilian authority with impunity, at times running politicall
motivated operations aimed at justifying military expansion. During the 1931 Mukden Incident, for example,
Japanese military intelligence agents acting on their own initiative bombed the South Manchuria Railroad and
blamed local Chinese forces. The operation provided the pretext for Japan to seize the resource-rich and
industrialized region of Manchuria in modern-day northeast China.
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/remembering-pearl-harbor-attack-cost-japan-its-empirehttps://www.stratfor.com/analysis/geopolitics-japan-island-power-adrift7/24/2019 Japan's Intelligence Reform Inches Forward _3!2!15 Stratfor
5/8
3/5/2015 Japan's Intelligence Reform Inches Forward | Stratfor
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/japans-intelligence-reform-inches-forward?mc_cid=97793ea9cb&mc_eid=b0dabc2161
Japanese experts inspect the scene of the alleged sabotage of the South Manchuria Railway on Sept. 18, 193
leading to the Mukden Incident and Japan's occupation of Manchuria. (Rekishi Syashi
After World War II, the victorious United States dismantled Imperial Japan's military, along with the military
intelligence apparatus. Disarmed and occupied by the United States, Japan was forced to fall back on its
economic strength to acquire resources. From this emerged the Yoshida Doctrine, named for then-Prime
Minister Shigeru Yoshida, in which Japan outsourced external security to the United States while
concentrating on economic reconstruction.
Fortunately for Japan, its location made it indispensable for U.S. containment of the Soviet Union. The United
States guaranteed Japan's external security in a 1952 mutual defense treaty. The intelligence system followe
this model. Japan came to depend on the CIA to collect intelligence and inform the Japanese government,
which retained reliable access to timely intelligence throughout the Cold War.
However, Japan continued to face domestic threats. These included Soviet support for the Japanese
Communist Party and terrorist groups such as the Japanese Red Army. Japan's police force moved to fill the
gap by collecting domestic intelligence. From this foundation, Japan developed a decentralized intelligence
network focused primarily on domestic threats. The National Police Agency dominated this intelligencestructure, a position it continues to hold today.
Although the Cold War-era intelligence system was limited and dependent on the United States, it met Japan
needs throughout this period. Attempts to strengthen the intelligence system ran into strong opposition from
both lawmakers and from the public, which remembered the excesses of the imperial-era military intelligence
services.
Post-Cold War Challenges
After the end of the Cold War, Japan found itself in a new context. Its economic involvement deepened in
7/24/2019 Japan's Intelligence Reform Inches Forward _3!2!15 Stratfor
6/8
3/5/2015 Japan's Intelligence Reform Inches Forward | Stratfor
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/japans-intelligence-reform-inches-forward?mc_cid=97793ea9cb&mc_eid=b0dabc2161
Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. Meanwhile, China's explosive growth since 1978 had transformed
from a weak economic backwater to an aggressive peer competitor in both security and economics, just as
Japan's own growth began to decline precipitously. The collapse of the Soviet Union jeopardized North
Korean security and led Pyongyang to redouble efforts to acquire and test nuclear and ballistic missile
capability. It also diminished U.S. interest in underwriting Japan's security, particularly once Washington
began channeling more of its resources and attention toward stabilizing the Middle East. As the interests of
the United States and Japan diverged, fewer and fewer intelligence resources were directed toward objective
that Japan found important.
Former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori (C) with special forces troops inside the Japanese ambassado
residence in Lima in April 1997 after releasing the 77 hostages captured by the Revolutionary Movement Tup
Amaru guerrilla group. (MARIE HIPPENMEYER/AFP/Getty Image
Declining U.S. support exposed the inherent weaknesses in Japan's underdeveloped intelligence system. In1996, for example, Peru's Tupac Amaru Marxist Revolutionary Movement occupied the Japanese
ambassador's official residence in Lima, taking 24 Japanese hostages, including the ambassador and severa
high-level officials. The Japanese foreign minister flew to Lima, where he needed to be briefed by the
Canadian ambassador and spend time collecting firsthand information. Japan was then caught off guard in
1998 by the launch of a North Korean Taepodong rocket and its inability to track the missile's flight. This
incident led Japan to invest in reconnaissance satellites and develop its own geospatial intelligence program
housed in the Cabinet Information and Research Office. This small step was insufficient, however, and Japan
found itself once again caught unawares by the recent Islamic State hostage situation spurring the ruling
party to propose more wholesale intelligence reform.
7/24/2019 Japan's Intelligence Reform Inches Forward _3!2!15 Stratfor
7/8
3/5/2015 Japan's Intelligence Reform Inches Forward | Stratfor
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/japans-intelligence-reform-inches-forward?mc_cid=97793ea9cb&mc_eid=b0dabc2161
Reform Attempts and Challenges
In the post-Cold War period, the Liberal Democratic Party has championed intelligence reform. In 2006, a
party parliamentary committee produced the Second Machimura Report, which proposed a new agency to
collect foreign intelligence operating out of Japan's embassies. The proposal also called for an agency to
perform centralized intelligence analysis in a manner akin to the U.S. Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
The Second Machimura Report did not change the Japanese intelligence system, but the latest LiberalDemocratic Party proposal nine years later addresses the same deep-rooted problems. However,
Japanese intelligence reform continues to face several challenges. The first are the persistent anti-militarist
sentiments of the Japanese public. The Japanese Constitution famously contains an article, Article 9, that
forbids the use of war to solve international conflicts. Though there is no intelligence equivalent to Article 9
forbidding a clandestine intelligence service, in the eye of the public, intelligence and militarism are deeply
intertwined. Memories of World War II still run deep.
Bureaucratic hurdles also stand in the way to reform. The Cabinet Information and Research Office's
geospatial wing established after the incident with North Korea in 1998 was intended to play a role fusing the
separate intelligence streams. However, the other intelligence agencies opted to bypass it entirely. Any newcentral analysis organization would face similar resistance, especially from the influential National Police
Agency, which has historically been reluctant to share information. The same holds for a new foreign
intelligence agency, which would most likely divert personnel and fiscal resources from existing agencies. Th
United States, too, dealt with the same issues in establishing its Office of the Director of National Intelligence
and Homeland Security's "fusion centers" in the wake of 9/11. The U.S. oversight agency has yet to succeed
fully in its objective of collating intelligence from the 16 other agencies of the U.S. intelligence community.
Japan, however, is moving slowly and inexorably toward intelligence reform, just as it is moving forward with
its military normalization. Since the end of the Cold War, the Japanese have added capabilities when
absolutely necessary. In the wake of the 1998 North Korean rocket launch, for example, Tokyo managed to f
critical gaps by investing in reconnaissance satellites and building up its geospatial intelligence capabilities.
Today, geospatial intelligence is a strength of the Japanese intelligence system. In 2013, the Liberal
Democratic Party pushed through the Special Secrecy Law, which established a unified classification system
among agencies and laid out clear consequences for leaking secrets. Previously, the different agencies
protected information in different ways, meaning that they could not trust one another to keep secrets safe.
The standardization of classification schemes encouraged collaboration. The law is highly unpopular with the
public, but it ended a long struggle to impose such a reform.
There is no guarantee that the Liberal Democratic Party's current proposal will lead to immediate or sweepin
changes. However, the demands for fast and accurate intelligence are rising, and Japan cannot depend on it
allies to meet its needs. The reform process will be slow, but Tokyo will eventually acquire and fully develop itown human intelligence and central analysis capabilities. The country will invest in its cyber intelligence
capabilities as well as it strives to develop an intelligence system to manage all aspects of intelligence
operations. The maturation of the technical aspects of this system will take time, but Japan's institutions have
historically proved capable of mastering new procedures within a relatively short timespan.
The United States is likely to encourage Japan throughout this process by sharing its own experiences and
expertise. This will ease Japan's growing pains as it builds its missing capabilities from scratch. For its part,
the United States wants to empower Japan to shoulder more alliance burdens. However, the long-term effec
will be to afford Japan the autonomy needed down the road to independently pursue and protect its own
https://www.stratfor.com/forecast/decade-forecast-2015-2025https://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/us-encourages-japan-enhance-its-security-rolehttps://www.stratfor.com/forecast/decade-forecast-2015-20257/24/2019 Japan's Intelligence Reform Inches Forward _3!2!15 Stratfor
8/8
3/5/2015 Japan's Intelligence Reform Inches Forward | Stratfor
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/japans-intelligence-reform-inches-forward?mc cid=97793ea9cb&mc eid=b0dabc2161
interests abroad.
Tweet 75 13
Reprinting or republication of this report on websites is authorized by prominently displaying the followingsentence, including the hyperlink to Stratfor, at the beginning or end of the report.
"Japan's Intelligence Reform Inches Forward is republished with permission of Stratfor."
Simply copy and paste this code:
"Japan's
Intelligence Reform Inches Forward is republished with permission of Stratfor."
Get our FREEweekly Intelligence Reports
Enter Your Email Address
GET REPORTS!
Join over 350,000 readers on our FREEintel reports list.
We will never sell or share your email address or information with anyone.
RELATED CONTENT
Send us your thoughts on this report.
EDITOR'S CHOICE
The Other Ukrainian Crisis
A Risky U.S. Proxy Battle Against Islamic State
Decade Forecast: 2015-2025
https://www.stratfor.com/forecast/decade-forecast-2015-2025https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/other-ukrainian-crisishttps://www.stratfor.com/forecast/decade-forecast-2015-2025https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/other-ukrainian-crisishttps://www.stratfor.com/analysis/risky-us-proxy-battle-against-islamic-statehttps://www.stratfor.com/analysis/risky-us-proxy-battle-against-islamic-statehttps://www.stratfor.com/analysis/japans-intelligence-reform-inches-forwardhttps://www.stratfor.com/forecast/decade-forecast-2015-2025https://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.stratfor.com%2Fanalysis%2Fjapans-intelligence-reform-inches-forward&title=Japan%27s%20Intelligence%20Reform%20Inches%20Forward&description=