John Rawls - Justice as Fairness (Part 2)

8/9/2019 John Rawls - Justice as Fairness (Part 2)

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PART IIPrinciples of Justice

§12. Three Basic Points

12.1. In Part II we discuss the content of the two principles of justice that apply to the basic

structure, as well as various grounds in favor of them and replies to a number of objections. Amore formal and organized argument for these principles is presented in Part III, where wediscuss the reasoning that moves the parties in the original position. In that argument theoriginal position serves to eep trac of all our assumptions and to bring out their combinedforce by uniting them into one framewor so that we can more easily see their implications.

I begin with three basic points which review some matters discussed in Part I and introduceothers we are about to e!amine. "ecall first that justice as fairness is framed for a democraticsociety. Its principles are meant to answer the #uestion$ once we view a democratic societyas a fair system of social cooperation between citizens regarded as free and e#ual, whatprinciples are most appropriate to it% Alternatively$ which principles are most appropriate for ademocratic society that not only professes but wants to tae seriously the idea that citizensare free and e#ual, and tries to realize that idea in its main institutions% &he #uestion of whether a constitutional regime is to be preferred to majoritarian democracy, we postponeuntil later 'Part I(, )**+.

12.2. &he second point is that justice as fairness taes the primary subject of political justiceto be the basic structure of society, that is, its main political and social institutions and howthey fit together into one unified system of cooperation ')*+. e suppose that citizens areborn into society and will normally spend their whole lives within its basic institutions. &henature and role of the basic structure importantly influence social and economic ine#ualitiesand enter into determining the appropriate principles of justice.

In particular, let us suppose that the fundamental social and economic ine#ualities are thedifferences in citizens- lifeprospects 'their prospects over a complete life+ as these areaffected by such things as their social class of origin, their native endowments, their opportunities for education, and their good or ill fortune over the course of life ')1/+. e as$by what principles are differences of that ind 0differences in lifeprospects0 madelegitimate and consistent with the idea of free and e#ual citizenship in society seen as a fair system of cooperation%

12.. &he third point is that justice as fairness is a form of political liberalism$ it tries toarticulate a family of highly significant 'moral+ values that characteristically apply to thepolitical and social institutions of the basic structure. It gives an account of these values in thelight of certain special features of the political relationship as distinct from other relationships,associational, familial, and personal.

'a+ It is a relationship of persons within the basic structure of society, a structure we enter onlyby birth and e!it only by death 'or so we may assume for the moment+. Political society isclosed, as it were and we do not, and indeed cannot, enter or leave it voluntarily.

'b+ Political power is always coercive power applied by the state and its apparatus of enforcement but in a constitutional regime political power is at the same time the power of



free and e#ual citizens as a collective body. &hus political power is citizens- power, which theyimpose on themselves and one another as free and e#ual3.

&he idea of political liberalism arises as follows. e start from two facts$ first, from the fact of reasonable pluralism, the fact that a diversity of reasonable comprehensive doctrines is apermanent feature of a democratic society and second, from the fact that in a democratic

regime political power is regarded as the power of free and e#ual citizens as a collectivebody. &hese two points give rise to a problem of political legitimacy. 4or if the fact of reasonable pluralism always characterizes democratic societies and if political power isindeed the power of free and e#ual citizens, in the light of what reasons and values 0of whatind of a conception of justice0 can citizens legitimately e!ercise that coercive power over one another% Political liberalism answers that the conception of justice must be a politicalconception, as defined in )5.1. 6uch a conception when satisfied allows us to say$ politicalpower is legitimate only when it is e!ercised in accordance with a constitution 'written or unwritten+ the essentials of which all citizens, as reasonable and rational, can endorse in thelight of their common human reason. &his is the liberal principle of legitimacy. It is a further desideratum that all legislative #uestions that concern or border on these essentials, or arehighly divisive, should also be settled, so far as possible, by guidelines and values that can besimilarly endorsed.

In matters of constitutional essentials, as well as on #uestions of basic justice, we try toappeal only to principles and values each citizen can endorse. A political conception of justicehopes to formulate these values$ its shared principles and values mae reason public, whilefreedom of speech and thought in a constitutional regime mae it free. In providing a publicbasis of justification, a political conception of justice provides the framewor for the liberalidea of political legitimacy. As noted in )5.*, however, and discussed further in )2/, we do notsay that a political conception formulates political values that can settle all legislative#uestions. &his is neither possible nor desirable. &here are many #uestions legislatures mustconsider that can only be settled by voting that is properly influenced by nonpolitical values.7et at least on constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice we do try for an agreedbasis so long as there is at least rough agreement here, fair social cooperation amongcitizens can, we hope, be maintained.1, 3

12.*. 8iven these three points, our #uestion is$ viewing society as a fair system of cooperation between citizens regarded as free and e#ual, what principles of justice are mostappropriate to specify basic rights and liberties, and to regulate social and economicine#ualities in citizens- prospects over a complete life% &hese ine#ualities are our primaryconcern. &o find a principle to regulate these ine#ualities, we loo to our firmest consideredconvictions about e#ual basic rights and liberties, the fair value of the political liberties as wellas fair e#uality of opportunity. e loo outside the sphere of distributive justice more narrowlyconstrued to see whether an appropriate distributive principle is singled out by those firmestconvictions once their essential elements are represented in the original position as a deviceof representation ')/+. &his device is to assist us in woring out which principle, or principles,

C ¿Los únicos crímenes son los enmarcados por lo antidemocrático?

1 It is not always clear whether a question involves a constitutional essential, as will be mentioned in due course I! thereis doubt about this and the question is hi"hly divisive, then citi#ens have a duty o! civility to try to articulate their claims

on one another by re!erence to political values, i! that is possible

C ¿$u% abarca o diri"e la idea del bien, que varía en el pluralismo ra#onable? ¿&o es la i"ualdad y la libertad la verdadera

idea del bien aquí?



the representatives of free and e#ual citizens would select to regulate social and economicine#ualities in these prospects over a complete life when they assume that the e#ual basicliberties and fair opportunities are already secured.

&he idea here is to use our firmest considered convictions about the nature of a democraticsociety as a fair system of cooperation between free and e#ual citizens 0as modeled in the

original position0 to see whether the combined assertion of those convictions so e!pressedwill help us to identify an appropriate distributive principle for the basic structure with itseconomic and social ine#ualities in citizens- lifeprospects. 9ur convictions about principlesregulating those ine#ualities are much less firm and assured so we loo to our firmestconvictions for guidance where assurance is lacing and guidance is needed 'Theory , ))*,2:+.

§13. Two Principles of Justice

1.1. &o try to answer our #uestion, let us turn to a revised statement of the two principles of justice discussed in Theory , ))111*. &hey should now read2$

'a+ ;ach person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully ade#uate scheme of e#ual basicliberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all and

'b+ 6ocial and economic ine#ualities are to satisfy two conditions$ first, they are to be attachedto offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair e#uality of opportunity and second,they are to be to the greatest benefit of the leastadvantaged members of society 'thedifference principle+.

As I e!plain below, the first principle is prior to the second also, in the second principle fair e#uality of opportunity is prior to the difference principle. &his priority means that in applying aprinciple 'or checing it against test cases+ we assume that the prior principles are fullysatisfied. e see a principle of distribution 'in the narrower sense+ that holds within thesetting of bacground institutions that secure the basic e#ual liberties 'including the fair valueof the political liberties+* as well as fair e#uality of opportunity. <ow far that principle holdsoutside that setting is a separate #uestion we shall not consider =.

' (his section summari#es some points !rom )(he *asic Liberties and (heir +riority,) (anner Lectures on uman -alues,

vol ., ed /terlin" 0c0urrin /alt La2e City3 4niversity o! 4tah +ress, 156'7, 81, reprinted in +olitical Liberalism In

that essay I try to reply to what I believe are two o! the more serious ob9ections to my account o! liberty in Theory raised by L : art in his splendid critical review essay, );awls on Liberty and Its +riority) 4niversity o! Chica"o Law

;eview <= /prin" 15>.73 1@, reprinted in his Assays in Burisprudence and +hilosophy D!ord3 D!ord 4niversity

+ress, 156.7 &o chan"es made in 9ustice as !airness in this restatement are more si"ni!icant than those !orced by artEs

review 1 (wo +rinciples o! Bustice <.

. Instead o! )the di!!erence principle,) many writers pre!er the term )the maDimin principle,) or simply )maDimin 9ustice,)or some such locution /ee, !or eDample, Boshua CohenEs very !ull and accurate account o! the di!!erence principle in

)Femocratic Aquality,) Athics 55 Buly 156573 >'>@>1 *ut I still use the term )di!!erence principle) to emphasi#e !irst,that this principle and the maDimin rule !or decision under uncertainty 8'617 are two very distinct thin"sG and second,

that in ar"uin" !or the di!!erence principle over other distributive principles say a restricted principle o! avera"e7 utility,

which includes a social minimum7, there is no appeal at all to the maDimin rule !or decision under uncertainty (he

widespread idea that the ar"ument !or the di!!erence principle depends on eDtreme aversion to uncertainty is a mista2e,althou"h a mista2e unhappily encoura"ed by the !aults o! eDposition in Theory, !aults to be corrected in +art III o! this

restatement

< /ee Theory, 8.H3 15>@155

/ome have !ound this 2ind o! restriction ob9ectionableG they thin2 a political conception should be !ramed to cover all



1.2. &he revisions in the second principle are merely stylistic. >ut before noting the revisionsin the first principle, which are significant, we should attend to the meaning of fair e#uality of opportunity. &his is a difficult and not altogether clear idea its role is perhaps best gatheredfrom why it is introduced$ namely, to correct the defects of formal e#uality of opportunity 0careers open to talents0 in the system of natural liberty, so called ' Theory , )12$ /2ff. )1*+.

&o this end, fair e#uality of opportunity is said to re#uire not merely that public offices andsocial positions be open in the formal sense, but that all should have a fair chance to attainthem. &o specify the idea of a fair chance we say$ supposing that there is a distribution of native endowments, those who have the same level of talent and ability and the samewillingness to use these gifts should have the same prospects of success regardless of their social class of origin, the class into which they are born and develop until the age of reason.In all parts of society there are to be roughly the same prospects of culture and achievementfor those similarly motivated and endowed. 4air e#uality of opportunity here means liberale#uality. &o accomplish its aims, certain re#uirements must be imposed on the basic structurebeyond those of the system of natural liberty. A free maret system must be set within aframewor of political and legal institutions that adjust the long run trend of economic forcesso as to prevent e!cessive concentrations of property and wealth, especially those liely tolead to political domination. 6ociety must also establish, among other things, e#ualopportunities of education for all regardless of family income ')1=+/.

1.. 3onsider now the reasons for revising the first principle ?. 9ne is that the e#ual basicliberties in this principle are specified by a list as follows$ freedom of thought and liberty of conscience political liberties 'for e!ample, the right to vote and to participate in politics+ andfreedom of association, as well as the rights and liberties specified by the liberty and integrity'physical and psychological+ of the person and finally, the rights and liberties covered by therule of law. &hat the basic liberties are specified by a list is #uite clear from Theory , )11$ /1'1st ed.+ but the use of the singular term @basic liberty@ in the statement of the principle onTheory , )11$ /: '1st ed.+, obscures this important feature of these liberties.

&his revision brings out that no priority is assigned to liberty as such, as if the e!ercise of something called @liberty@ had a preeminent value and were the main, if not the sole, end of political and social justice. hile there is a general presumption against imposing legal andother restrictions on conduct without a sufficient reason, this presumption creates no specialpriority for any particular liberty. &hroughout the history of democratic thought the focus hasbeen on achieving certain specific rights and liberties as well as specific constitutionalguarantees, as found, for e!ample, in various bills of rights and declarations of the rights of man. ustice as fairness follows this traditional view.

1.*. A list of basic liberties can be drawn up in two ways. 9ne is historical$ we survey various

lo"ically possible cases, or all conceivable cases, and not restricted to cases that can arise only within a speci!ied

institutional conteDt /ee !or eDample *rian *arry, (he Liberal (heory o! Bustice D!ord3 D!ord 4niversity +ress,15>.7, p 11' In contrast, we see2 a principle to "overn social and economic inequalities in democratic re"imes as we

2now them, and so we are concerned with inequalities in citi#ensE li!e prospects that may actually arise, "iven our

understandin" o! how certain institutions wor2

H (hese remar2s are the merest s2etch o! a di!!icult idea e come bac2 to it !rom time to time> (his principle may be preceded by a leDically prior principle requirin" that basic needs be met, as least inso!ar as their

bein" met is a necessary condition !or citi#ens to understand and to be able !ruit!ully to eDercise the basic ri"hts and

liberties Jor a statement o! such a principle with !urther discussion, see ; K +e!!er, 0arDism, 0orality, and /ocial

Bustice +rinceton3 +rinceton 4niversity +ress, 155=7, p 1<



democratic regimes and assemble a list of rights and liberties that seem basic and aresecurely protected in what seem to be historically the more successful regimes. 9f course,the veil of ignorance means that this ind of particular information is not available to theparties in the original position3, but it is available to you and me in setting up justice asfairnessB. e are perfectly free to use it to specify the principles of justice we mae availableto the parties.

A second way of drawing up a list of basic rights and liberties is analytical$ we consider whatliberties provide the political and social conditions essential for the ade#uate developmentand full e!ercise of the two moral powers of free and e#ual persons ')?.1+. 4ollowing this wesay$ first, that the e#ual political liberties and freedom of thought enable citizens to developand to e!ercise these powers in judging the justice of the basic structure of society and itssocial policies and second, that liberty of conscience and freedom of association enablecitizens to develop and e!ercise their moral powers in forming and revising and in rationallypursuing 'individually or, more often, in association with others+ their conceptions of the good.&hose basic rights and liberties protect and secure the scope re#uired for the e!ercise of thetwo moral powers in the two fundamental cases just mentioned$ that is to say, the firstfundamental case is the e!ercise of those powers in judging the justice of basic institutionsand social policies while the second fundamental case is the e!ercise of those powers inpursuing our conception of the good. &o e!ercise our powers in these ways is essential to usas free and e#ual citizens.

1.=. 9bserve that the first principle of justice applies not only to the basic structure 'bothprinciples do this+ but more specifically to what we thin of as the constitution, whether writtenor unwritten. 9bserve also that some of these liberties, especially the e#ual political libertiesand freedom of thought and association, are to be guaranteed by a constitution 'Theory ,chap. I(+. hat we may call @constituent power,@ as opposed to @ordinary power@ 5, is to besuitably institutionalized in the form of a regime$ in the right to vote and to hold office, and insocalled bills of rights, as well as in the procedures for amending the constitution, for e!ample.

&hese matters belong to the socalled constitutional essentials, these essentials being thosecrucial matters about which, given the fact of pluralism, woring political agreement is mosturgent ')5.*+. In view of the fundamental nature of the basic rights and liberties, e!plained inpart by the fundamental interests they protect, and given that the power of the people toconstitute the form of government is a superior power 'distinct from the ordinary power e!ercised routinely by officers of a regime+, the first principle is assigned priority.

&his priority means 'as we have said+ that the second principle 'which includes the differenceprinciple as one part+ is always to be applied within a setting of bacground institutions thatsatisfy the re#uirements of the first principle 'including the re#uirement of securing the fair

C ¿ay al"ún modo práctico de darse del velo de la i"norancia, !uera de su uso como eDperimento mental?6 ere I should mention that there are three points o! view in 9ustice as !airness that it is essential to distin"uish3 the point

o! view o! the parties in the ori"inal position, the point o! view o! citi#ens in a well@ordered society, and the point o!

view o! you and me who are settin" up 9ustice as !airness as a political conception and tryin" to use it to or"ani#e into

one coherent view our considered 9ud"ments at all levels o! "enerality eep in mind that the parties are, as it were,arti!icial persons who are part o! a procedure o! construction that we !rame !or our philosophical purposes e may

2now many thin"s that we 2eep !rom them, !or these three points o! view, see +olitical Liberalism, p '6

5 (his distinction is derived !rom Loc2e, who spea2s o! the peopleEs power to constitute the le"islative as the !irst and

!undamental law o! all commonwealths Bohn Loc2e, /econd (reatise o! Kovernment, 881.<,1<1,1<5



value of the political liberties+, as by definition they will in a wellordered society 1:. &he fair value of the political liberties ensures that citizens similarly gifted and motivated have roughlyan e#ual chance of influencing the government-s policy and of attaining positions of authorityirrespective of their economic and social class11. &o e!plain the priority of the first principleover the second$ this priority rules out e!changes '@tradeoffs,@ as economists say+ betweenthe basic rights and liberties covered by the first principle and the social and economic

advantages regulated by the difference principle. 4or e!ample, the e#ual political libertiescannot be denied to certain groups on the grounds that their having these liberties mayenable them to bloc policies needed for economic growth and efficiency.

Cor can we justify a selective service act that grants educational deferments or e!emptions tosome on the grounds that doing this is a socially efficient way both to maintain the armedforces and to provide incentives to those otherwise subject to conscription to ac#uire valuablesills by continuing their education. 6ince conscription is a drastic interference with the basicliberties of e#ual citizenship, it cannot be justified by any needs less compelling than those of the defense of these e#ual liberties themselves 'Theory , )=B$ f.+.

A further point about priority$ in asserting the priority of the basic rights and liberties, wesuppose reasonably favorable conditions to obtain. &hat is, we suppose historical, economicand social conditions to be such that, provided the political will e!ists, effective politicalinstitutions can be established to give ade#uate scope for the e!ercise of those freedoms.&hese conditions mean that the barriers to constitutional government 'if such there are+ springlargely from the political culture and e!isting effective interests, and not from, for instance, alac of economic means, or education, or the many sills needed to run a democraticregime12.

1./. It is important to note a distinction between the first and second principles of justice. &hefirst principle, as e!plained by its interpretation, covers the constitutional essentials. &hesecond principle re#uires fair e#uality of opportunity and that social and economic ine#ualitiesbe governed by the difference principle, which we discuss in ))1?15. hile some principle of opportunity is a constitutional essential 0for e!ample, a principle re#uiring an open society,one with careers open to talents 'to use the eighteenthcentury phrase+0 fair e#uality of opportunity re#uires more than that, and is not counted a constitutional essential. 6imilarly,although a social minimum providing for the basic needs of all citizens is also a constitutionalessential ')B.* )*5.=+, the difference principle is more demanding and is not so regarded.

&he basis for the distinction between the two principles is not that the first e!presses politicalvalues while the second does not. >oth principles e!press political values. "ather, we see the

1= It is sometimes ob9ected to the di!!erence principle as a principle o! distributive 9ustice that it contains no restrictions on

the overall nature o! permissible distributions It is concerned, the ob9ection runs, solely with the least advanta"ed *utthis ob9ection is incorrect3 it overloo2s the !act that the parts o! the two principles o! 9ustice are desi"ned to wor2 in

tandem and apply as a unit (he requirements o! the prior principles have important distributive e!!ects Consider thee!!ects o! !air equality o! opportunity as applied to education, say, or the distributive e!!ects o! the !air value o! the

political liberties e cannot possibly ta2e the di!!erence principle seriously so lon" as we thin2 o! it by itsel!, apart !rom

its settin" within prior principles

11 M/ee +olitical Liberalism, p .6N1' (he priority or the primacy7 o! the basic equal liberties does not, contrary to much opinion, presuppose a hi"h level o!

wealth and income /ee :martya /en and Bean Fre#e, un"er and +ublic :ction D!ord3 D!ord 4niversity +ress,

15657, chap 1.G and +artha Fas"upta, :n Inquiry into ell@*ein" and Festitution D!ord3 D!ord 4niversity +ress,

155.7, chaps 1@', and passim



basic structure of society as having two coordinate roles, the first principle applying to one,the second principle to the other 'Theory , )11$ =+. In one role the basic structure specifiesand secures citizens- e#ual basic liberties 'including the fair value of the political liberties')*=++ and establishes a just constitutional regime. In the other role it provides thebacground institutions of social and economic justice in the form most appropriate to citizensseen as free and e#ual. &he #uestions involved in the first role concern the ac#uisition and

the e!ercise of political power. &o fulfill the liberal principle of legitimacy ')12.+, we hope tosettle at least these #uestions by appeal to the political values that constitute the basis of freepublic reason ')2/+.

&he principles of justice are adopted and applied in a fourstage se#uence 1. In the first stage,the parties adopt the principles of justice behind a veil of ignorance. Dimitations on nowledgeavailable to the parties are progressively rela!ed in the ne!t three stages$ the stage of theconstitutional convention, the legislative stage in which laws are enacted as the constitutionallows and as the principles of justice re#uire and permit, and the final stage in which therules are applied by administrators and followed by citizens generally and the constitution andlaws are interpreted by members of the judiciary. At this last stage, everyone has completeaccess to all the facts. &he first principle applies at the stage of the constitutional convention,and whether the constitutional essentials are assured is more or less visible on the face of theconstitution and in its political arrangements and the way these wor in practice. >y contrastthe second principle applies at the legislative stage and it bears on all inds of social andeconomic legislation, and on the many inds of issues arising at this point 'Theory , )1$1?21?/+. hether the aims of the second principle are realized is far more difficult to ascertain.&o some degree these matters are always open to reasonable differences of opinion theydepend on inference and judgment in assessing comple! social and economic information.

Also, we can e!pect more agreement on constitutional essentials than on issues of distributive justice in the narrower sense.

&hus the grounds for distinguishing the constitutional essentials covered by the first principleand the institutions of distributive justice covered by the second are not that the first principlee!presses political values and the second does not. "ather, the grounds of the distinction arefour$

'a+ &he two principles apply to different stages in the application of principles and identify twodistinct roles of the basic structure'b+ It is more urgent to settle the constitutional essentials'c+ It is far easier to tell whether those essentials are realized and'd+ It seems possible to gain agreement on what those essentials should be, not in everydetail, of course, but in the main outlines.

1.?. 9ne way to see the point of the idea of constitutional essentials is to connect it with theidea of loyal opposition3, itself an essential idea of a constitutional regime. &he governmentand its loyal opposition agree on these constitutional essentials. &heir so agreeing maes thegovernment legitimate in intention and the opposition loyal in its opposition. here the loyaltyof both is firm and their agreement mutually recognized, a constitutional regime is secure.Eifferences about the most appropriate principles of distributive justice in the narrower sense,

1. M/ee Theory, 8.131>'@1>H, and +olitical Liberalism, pp .5>@.56N

C ¿COmo se ase"urará que la oposiciOn no sea nunca sobre la interpretaciOn de, por e9emplo, qu% es i"ualdad y qu%

libertad, de manera que imprevistamente se convierta en una lucha potencialmente antidemocrática?



and the ideals that underlie them, can be adjudicated, though not always properly, within thee!isting political framewor.

hile the difference principle does not fall under the constitutional essentials, it isnevertheless important to try to identify the idea of e#uality most appropriate to citizensviewed as free and e#ual, and as normally and fully cooperating members of society over a

complete life. I believe this idea involves reciprocity

1*

at the deepest level and thus democratice#uality properly understood re#uires something lie the difference principle. 'I say@something lie,@ for there may be various nearby possibilities.+ &he remaining sections of thispart '))1*22+ try to clarify the content of this principle and to clear up a number of difficulties.

§14. The Problem of istributi!e Justice

1*.1. &he problem of distributive justice in justice as fairness is always this$ how are theinstitutions of the basic structure to be regulated as one unified scheme of institutions so thata fair, efficient, and productive system of social cooperation can be maintained over time,from one generation to the ne!t% 3ontrast this with the very different problem of how a givenbundle of commodities is to be distributed, or allocated, among various individuals whoseparticular needs, desires, and preferences are nown to us, and who have not cooperated inany way to produce those commodities. &his second problem is that of allocative justiceFTheory , )11$ =/ )1*$ ??+.

&o illustrate$ accepting the assumptions implied by interpersonal cardinal comparisons of wellbeing, we might, for e!ample, allocate the bundle of commodities so as to achieve thegreatest satisfaction summed over these individuals from the present into the future. As apolitical conception of justice, the classical principle of utility 'as found in >entham and6idgwic+ can be seen as adapting the idea of allocative justice so as to be a single principlefor the basic structure over time.

1*.2. e reject the idea of allocative justice as incompatible with the fundamental idea bywhich justice as fairness is organized$ the idea of society as a fair system of socialcooperation over time. 3itizens are seen as cooperating to produce the social resources onwhich their claims are made. In a wellordered society, in which both the e#ual basic liberties'with their fair value+ and fair e#uality of opportunity are secured, the distribution of incomeand wealth illustrates what we may call pure bacground procedural justice. &he basicstructure is arranged so that when everyone follows the publicly recognized rules of cooperation, and honors the claims the rules specify, the particular distributions of goods thatresult are acceptable as just 'or at least as not unjust+ whatever these distributions turn out tobe.

&o elaborate$ within the framewor of bacground justice set up by the basic structure,individuals and associations may do as they wish insofar as the rules of institutions permit.

1< M:s understood in 9ustice as !airness, reciprocity is a relation between citi#ens eDpressed by principles o! 9ustice that

re"ulate a social world in which all who are en"a"ed in cooperation and do their part as the rules and procedures require

are to bene!it in an appropriate way as assessed by a suitable benchmar2 o! comparison (he two principles o! 9ustice,

includin" the di!!erence principle with its implicit re!erence to equal division as a benchmar2, !ormulate an idea o!reciprocity between citi#ens Jor a !uller discussion o! the idea o! reciprocity, see +olitical Liberalism, pp 1H@1>, and the

introduction to the paperbac2 edition, pp Dliv, Dlvi, li (he idea o! reciprocity also plays an important part in )(he Idea

o! +ublic ;eason ;evisited,) 4niversity o! Chica"o Law ;eview, H< /ummer 155>73 >H@6=>, reprinted in (he Law o!

+eoples Cambrid"e, 0ass3 arvard 4niversity +ress, 15557 and Collected +apersN



9bserve that particular distributions cannot be judged at all apart from the claims'entitlements+ of individuals earned by their efforts within the fair system of cooperation fromwhich those distributions result. In contrast to utilitarianism, the concept of allocative justicehas no application. &here is no criterion for a just distribution apart from bacgroundinstitutions and the entitlements that arise from actually woring through the procedure1=. It isbacground institutions that provide the setting for fair cooperation within which entitlements

arise.

1*.. &hese points can be made clearer as follows. &he word @bacground@ in the phrase@bacground procedural justice@ above is intended to indicate that certain rules must beincluded in the basic structure as a system of social cooperation so that this system remainsfair over time, from one generation to the ne!t 1/. 3onsider an e!ample. &he draft rule in aprofessional sport such as basetball rans teams in the opposite order from their standing inthe league at the end of the season$ championship teams go last in the draft of new players.&his rule provides for regular and periodic changes in the roster of teams and is designed toensure that teams in the league are more or less evenly matched from year to year, so that inany given season each team can give any other a decent game. &hese changes of playersare necessary to achieve the aims and attractions of the sport and are not foreign to itspurpose.

&he re#uired bacground rules are specified by what is necessary to fulfill the two principlesof justice. Dater on we survey some of these as found in a propertyowning democracy 'PartI(+1?. 4or e!ample, bacground institutions must wor to eep property and wealth evenlyenough shared over time to preserve the fair value of the political liberties and fair e#uality of opportunity over generations. &hey do this by laws regulating be#uest and inheritance of property, and other devices such as ta!es, to prevent e!cessive concentrations of privatepower 'Theory , )*$ 2*=ff.+.

1*.*. 6ince the difference principle applies to institutions as public systems of rules, their re#uirements are foreseeable. &hey do not involve any more continuous or regular interference with individuals- plans and actions than do, say, familiar forms of ta!ation. 6incethe effects of those rules are foreseen, they are taen into account when citizens draw uptheir plans in the first place. 3itizens understand that when they tae part in socialcooperation, their property and wealth, and their share of what they help to produce, aresubject to the ta!es, say, which bacground institutions are nown to impose. Goreover, thedifference principle 'as well as the first principle and the first part of the second principle+respects legitimate e!pectations based on the publicly recognized rules and the entitlementsearned by individuals 'Theory , ))*?*B+1B.

&he rules of bacground institutions re#uired by the two principles of justice 'including thedifference principle+ are designed to achieve the aims and purposes of fair social cooperationover time. &hey are essential to preserve bacground justice, such as the fair value of the

1 /ee Theory, 81<3 ><@>>, and note the distinction made there between the three 2inds o! procedural 9ustice

1H (he term )bac2"round) is introduced here and is not used in Theory

1> +roperty@ownin" democracy is discussed in Theory, chap -, but un!ortunately the contrast between it and wel!are@statecapitalism is not made clear enou"h (his de!ect I aim to correct in +art I-

16 (he remar2s in this para"raph reply to the 2ind o! ob9ection &o#ic2 raises to the di!!erence principle in :narchy, /tate,

and 4topia is description o! the ilt Chamberlin eDample, chap >, pp 1H=@1H<, su""ests that to apply that principle

to "overnment must involve continual inter!erence with particular individual transactions



political liberties and fair e#uality of opportunity, as well as to mae it liely that economic andsocial ine#ualities contribute in an effective way to the general good or, more e!actly, to thebenefit of the leastadvantaged members of society. Die the draft rule in professional sports,the arrangements re#uired by the difference principle are part of, and not foreign to, theconception of fair social cooperation in justice as fairness. ;ven with these rules of bacground justice, distributive justice may still be understood as a case of pure procedural

justice.

§1". The Basic #tructure as #ub$ect% &irst 'in( of Reason

1=.1. A characteristic feature of justice as fairness as a political conception is that it taes thebasic structure as its primary subject. I note two broad inds of reasons for this$ the first noteshow social institutions wor and the nature of the principles re#uired to regulate them over time to maintain bacground justice.

3onsider an important criticism of Doce. 6uppose we begin, as it seems he does, with theattractive idea that persons- social circumstances and their relations with one another shoulddevelop over time in accordance with fair agreements fairly arrived at. Guch as with Doce-sconception of ideal history, we might use certain principles to specify various rights and dutiesof persons, as well as their rights to ac#uire and transfer property. Cow suppose we start witha just initial state in which everyone-s possessions are justly held. e then say that wheneveryone respects persons- rights and duties, as well as the principles for ac#uiring andtransferring property, the succeeding states are also just, no matter how distant in time. 3allthis an ideal historical process view15.

&o wor out this idea we need an account not only of the just initial state and of fair agreements, but also of just social conditions under which fair agreements are to be reached.;ven though the initial state may have been just, and subse#uent social conditions may alsohave been just for some time, the accumulated results of many separate and seemingly fair agreements entered into by individuals and associations are liely over an e!tended period toundermine the bacground conditions re#uired for free and fair agreements. (eryconsiderable wealth and property may accumulate in a few hands, and these concentrationsare liely to undermine fair e#uality of opportunity, the fair value of the political liberties, andso on. &he ind of limits and provisos that in Doce-s view apply directly to the separatetransactions of individuals and associations in the state of nature are not stringent enough toensure that fair bacground conditions are maintained2:.

1=.2. &o preserve these conditions is the tas of the rules of pure procedural bacground justice. Hnless the basic structure is regulated over time, earlier just distributions of assets of all inds do not ensure the justice of later distributions, however free and fair particular transactions between individuals and associations may loo when viewed locally and apartfrom bacground institutions. 4or the outcome of these transactions taen together is affectedby all inds of contingencies and unforeseeable conse#uences. It is necessary to regulate, bylaws governing inheritance and be#uest, how people ac#uire property so as to mae itsdistribution more e#ual, to provide fair e#uality of opportunity in education, and much else.

15 &o#ic2Es :narchy, /tate, and 4topia is an eDample o! this 2ind o! view

'= Jor eDample, in Loc2eEs case they !ail to "uarantee the equal political liberties, as we can tell !rom /econd (reatise,

816 /ee Boshua Cohen, )/tructure, Choice, and Le"itimacy3 Loc2eEs (heory o! the /tate,) +hilosophy and +ublic

:!!airs 1 Jall 156H73 .=1@.'<



&hat such rules of bacground justice are in force over time does not detract from but rather maes possible the important values e!pressed by free and fair agreements reached byindividuals and associations within the basic structure. &his is because principles applying tothese agreements directly 'for e!ample, the law of contract+ do not alone suffice to preservebacground justice.

hat is needed, then, is a division of labor between two inds of principles, each ind suitablyspecified$ first, those that regulate the basic structure over time and are designed to preservebacground justice from one generation to the ne!t and second, those that apply directly tothe separate and free transactions between individuals and associations. Eefects in either ind of principle can result in a serious failure of the conception of justice as a whole.

1=.. 9nce the many transactions and agreements of individuals and associations are framedwithin a just basic structure, we have an ideal social process view, of which justice as fairnessis an e!ample. &he contrast with Doce-s ideal historical process view is in part this$ whileboth views use the concept of pure procedural justice, they specify this concept in differentways. &he historical process view focuses on the transactions of individuals and associationsas these are constrained by the principles and provisos applying directly to the parties inparticular transactions.

>y contrast, as a social process view, justice as fairness focuses first on the basic structureand on the regulations re#uired to maintain bacground justice over time for all personse#ually, whatever their generation or social position. 6ince a public conception of justiceneeds clear, simple, and intelligible rules, we rely on an institutional division of labor betweenprinciples re#uired to preserve bacground justice and principles that apply directly toparticular transactions between individuals and associations. 9nce this division of labor is setup, individuals and associations are then left free to advance their 'permissible+ ends withinthe framewor of the basic structure, secure in the nowledge that elsewhere in the socialsystem the regulations necessary to preserve bacground justice are in force.

&aing the basic structure as the primary subject enables us to regard distributive justice as acase of pure bacground procedural justice$ when everyone follows the publicly recognizedrules of cooperation, the particular distribution that results is acceptable as just whatever thatdistribution turns out to be ')1*.2+. &his allows us to abstract from the enormous comple!itiesof the innumerable transactions of daily life and frees us from having to eep trac of thechanging relative positions of particular individuals 'Theory , )1*$ ?/f.+. 6ociety is an ongoingscheme of fair cooperation over time without any specified beginning or end relevant for political justice. &he principles of justice specify the form of bacground justice apart from allparticular historical conditions. hat counts is the worings of social institutions now, and abenchmar of the state of nature 0the level of wellbeing 'however specified+ of individuals inthat state0 plays no role. It is a historical surd, unnowable, but even if it could be nown, of no significance21.

§1). The Basic #tructure as #ub$ect% #econ( 'in( of Reason

1/.1. &he second ind of reason for taing the basic structure as the primary subject derivesfrom its profound and pervasive influence on the persons who live under its institutions. "ecall

'1 /ee Theory, 81'3 H5, thou"h the point is not stated su!!iciently sharply



that in e!plaining the emphasis put on the basic structure as subject, we said that we viewcitizens as born into society$ it is there that they will lead a complete life. &hey enter thatsocial world only by birth, leave it only by death. And since any modern society, even a wellordered one, must rely on some ine#ualities to be well designed and effectively organized 3,we as what inds of ine#ualities a well ordered society would allow or be particularlyconcerned to avoid.

ustice as fairness focuses on ine#ualities in citizens- lifeprospects 0their prospects over acomplete life 'as specified by an appropriate inde! of primary goods+0 as these prospectsare affected by three inds of contingencies$

'a+ their social class of origin$ the class into which they are born and develop before the ageof reason'b+ their native endowments 'as opposed to their realized endowments+ and their opportunities to develop these endowments as affected by their social class of origin'c+ their good or ill fortune, or good or bad luc, over the course of life 'how they are affectedby illness and accident and, say, by periods of involuntary unemployment and regionaleconomic decline+.

;ven in a wellordered society, then, our prospects over life are deeply affected by social,natural, and fortuitous contingencies, and by the way the basic structure, by setting upine#ualities, uses those contingencies to meet certain social purposes. Pointing out thesethree inds of contingencies is not enough, of course, to show conclusively that the basicstructure is the appropriate subject of political justice. Co such decisive arguments areavailable, as everything depends on how the conception of justice as fairness hangs together as a whole. 7et if we ignore the ine#ualities in people-s prospects in life arising from thesecontingencies and let those ine#ualities wor themselves out while failing to institute theregulations necessary to preserve bacground justice, we would not be taing seriously theidea of society as a fair system of cooperation between citizens as free and e#ual. &hisreminds us that what we are asing is precisely$ what principles of bacground justice arepresupposed in taing seriously that idea of society ')12.1+%

1/.2. If citizens of a wellordered society are to recognize one another as free and e#ual,basic institutions must educate them to this conception of themselves, as well as publiclye!hibit and encourage this ideal of political justice. &his tas of education belongs to what wemay call the wide role of a political conception22. In this role such a conception is part of thepublic political culture$ its first principles are embodied in the institutions of the basic structureand appealed to in their interpretation. Ac#uaintance with and participation in that publicculture is one way citizens learn to conceive of themselves as free and e#ual, a conceptionwhich, if left to their own reflections, they would most liely never form, much less accept anddesire to realize.

C ¿COmo es que nin"una de estas desi"ualdades es política? ¿COmo es que nin"una de las di!erencias en deseos humanos

termina en perspectivas de vida distintas que ocasionan, por !uer#a, una di!erencia plenamente política y, por lo tanto,

contraria al carácter de i"ualdad y libertad?'' *y contrast, the narrow role mi"ht be somethin" li2e that o! speci!yin" the basic principles and most essential rules that

must be !ollowed !or political society to be endurin" and stable L : artEs idea o! the minimum content o! natural

law, which draws on ume, is an eDample /ee (he Concept o! Law D!ord3 D!ord 4niversity +ress, 15H17, pp 165@

15



3onsider further how the three contingencies 'noted above+ affect the content of people-s finalends and purposes, as well as the vigor and confidence with which they pursue them. eassess our prospects in life according to our place in society and we form our ends andpurposes in the light of the means and opportunities we can realistically e!pect. 6o whether we are hopeful and optimistic about our future, or resigned and apathetic, depends both onthe ine#ualities associated with our social position and on the public principles of justice that

society not merely professes but more or less effectively uses to regulate the institutions of bacground justice. <ence the basic structure as a social and economic regime is not only anarrangement that satisfies given desires and aspirations but also an arrangement thatarouses further desires and aspirations in the future. &his it does by the e!pectations andambitions it encourages in the present, and indeed over a complete life.

Goreover, native endowments of various inds 'say, native intelligence and natural ability+ arenot fi!ed natural assets with a constant capacity. &hey are merely potential and cannot cometo fruition apart from social conditions and when realized they can tae but one or a few of many possible forms. ;ducated and trained abilities are always a selection, and a smallselection at that, from a wide range of possibilities that might have been fulfilled. Among whataffects their realization are social attitudes of encouragement and support, and institutionsconcerned with their early discipline and use. Cot only our conception of ourselves, and our aims and ambitions, but also our realized abilities and talents, reflect our personal history,opportunities and social position, and the influence of good and ill fortune.

1/.. &o sum up$ for the two inds of reasons noted in this and the preceding section, we taethe basic structure as the primary subject. &his structure comprises social institutions withinwhich human beings may develop their moral powers and become fully cooperating membersof a society of free and e#ual citizens. And as a framewor that preserves bacground justiceover time from one generation to the ne!t it realizes the idea 'central to justice as fairness+ of pure bacground procedural justice as an ideal social process 'as e!plained under the firstind of reason+. It also answers to the public role of educating citizens to a conception of themselves as free and e#ual and, when properly regulated, it encourages in them attitudesof optimism and confidence in their future, and a sense of being treated fairly in view of thepublic principles which are seen as effectively regulating economic and social ine#ualities 'ase!plained under the second ind of reason+.

6o far, then, starting with the basic structure seems to accord with the other ideas of justiceas fairness, something we could not have foreseen at the outset. A sharp definition of thatstructure might have gotten in the way of fitting it into these other ideas, just as a sharpdefinition of them would have gotten in the way of fitting them to it. '"ecall the remars in)*..+

§1*. +ho Are the ,east A(!anta-e(

1?.1. e have referred to the least advantaged, but who are they and how are they singledout% &o answer these #uestions we introduce the idea of primary goods. &hese are varioussocial conditions and allpurpose means that are generally necessary to enable citizensade#uately to develop and fully e!ercise their two moral powers, and to pursue their determinate conceptions of the good. <ere we loo to the social re#uirements and the normalcircumstances of human life in a democratic society. Primary goods are things needed andre#uired by persons seen in the light of the political conception of persons, as citizens who



are fully cooperating members of society, and not merely as human beings apart from anynormative conception. &hese goods are things citizens need as free and e#ual persons livinga complete life they are not things it is simply rational to want or desire, or to prefer or even tocrave. e use the political conception, and not a comprehensive moral doctrine, in specifyingthose needs and re#uirements. hat count as primary goods depends, of course, on variousgeneral facts about human needs and abilities, their normal phases and re#uirements of

nurture, relations of social interdependence, and much else. e need at least a rough idea of rational plans of life showing why these plans usually have a certain structure and depend oncertain primary goods for their formation, revision, and successful e!ecution2. >ut, asstressed above, the account of primary goods does not rest solely on psychological, social, or historical facts. hile the list of primary goods rests in part on the general facts andre#uirements of social life, it does so only together with a political conception of the person asfree and e#ual, endowed with the moral powers, and capable of being a fully cooperatingmember of society. &his normative conception is necessary to identify the appropriate list of primary goods2*.

1?.2. e distinguish five inds of such goods$

'i+ &he basic rights and liberties$ freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, and the rest')1+. &hese rights and liberties are essential institutional conditions re#uired for theade#uate development and full and informed e!ercise of the two moral powers 'in the twofundamental cases ')1*++.'ii+ 4reedom of movement and free choice of occupation against a bacground of diverseopportunities, which opportunities allow the pursuit of a variety of ends and give effect todecisions to revise and alter them.'iii+ Powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of authority and responsibility.'iv+ Income and wealth, understood as allpurpose means 'having an e!change value+ 2=

generally needed to achieve a wide range of ends whatever they may be.'v+ &he social bases of selfrespect, understood as those aspects of basic institutionsnormally essential if citizens are to have a lively sense of their worth as persons and to beable to advance their ends with selfconfidence.

1?.. &he two principles of justice assess the basic structure according to how it regulatescitizens- shares of primary goods, these shares being specified in terms of an appropriateinde!. Cote that primary goods are given by reference to objective features of citizens- socialcircumstances, features open to public view$ their secured institutional rights and liberties,their available fair opportunities, their 'reasonable+ e!pectations of income and wealth seenfrom their social position, and so on. As we have said, the ine#ualities to which the differenceprinciple applies are differences in citizens- 'reasonable+ e!pectations of primary goods over acomplete life. &hese e!pectations are their lifeprospects. In a wellordered society where allcitizens- e#ual basic rights and liberties and fair opportunities are secure, the leastadvantaged are those belonging to the income class with the lowest e!pectations 2/. &o say

'. : s2etch o! the !eatures o! rational plans is "iven in Theory, chap -II

'< 4nhappily Theory is at best ambi"uous on this matter I am indebted to a number o! people, especially to Boshua Cohen

and Boshua ;abinowit#G and to :llen *uchanan, ( 0 /canlon, and /amuel /chemer !or valuable discussionG and to

0ichael (eitelman, who !irst raised the di!!iculty' Jor this idea o! eDchan"e value, see ;awls, )Jairness to Koodness,) +hilosophical ;eview 6< ctober 15>73 8111

:lso in Collected Papers

'H &ote here that in the simplest !orm o! the di!!erence principle the individuals who belon" to the least advanta"ed "roup

are not identi!iable apart !rom, or independently o!, their income and wealth (he least advanta"ed are never identi!iable



that ine#ualities in income and wealth are to be arranged for the greatest benefit of the leastadvantaged simply means that we are to compare schemes of cooperation by seeing howwell off the least advantaged are under each scheme, and then to select the scheme under which the least advantaged are better off than they are under any other scheme.

&o highlight the objective character of primary goods, note that it is not selfrespect as an

attitude toward oneself but the social bases of selfrespect that count as a primary good

2?

.&hese social bases are things lie the institutional fact that citizens have e#ual basic rights,and the public recognition of that fact and that everyone endorses the difference principle,itself a form of reciprocity. &he objective character of primary goods also is shown in the factthat in applying the principles of justice we do not consider estimates of citizens- overallhappiness as given, say, by the fulfillment of their 'rational+ preferences, or their desires 'as ina utilitarian view+. Cor do we consider their good in the light of some moral or associational or personal ideal. e also do not need a measure of citizens- moral powers and other abilities,or of how far citizens have actually realized them, so long as their powers and abilities sufficefor them to be normal cooperating members of society2B.

3itizens- appropriate shares of primary goods are not regarded as appro!imating to their goodas specified by any particular comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine or even as specified by what several such doctrines may hold in common concerning our 'comprehensive+ good. &he account of primary goods belongs, then, wholly within justice asfairness as a political conception of justice. &he reason for remaining within the politicalconception is by now familiar$ it is in order to hold open the possibility of finding a public basisof justification supported by an overlapping consensus.

Primary goods, then, are what free and e#ual persons 'as specified by the politicalconception+ need as citizens. &hese goods belong to a partial conception of the good thatcitizens, who affirm a plurality of conflicting comprehensive doctrines, can agree upon for thepurpose of maing the interpersonal comparisons re#uired for worable political principles.hile pluralism means that there can be no agreement on a complete conception of the goodgrounded in a comprehensive doctrine, some conceptions of the good are indispensable for any account of justice, political or other and they can be freely used in justice as fairness solong as they fit within it as political conceptions ')*+. &he partial conception of the good setout by the account of primary goods is one of them.

1?.*. A final comment$ there are at least two ways to proceed in specifying a list of primary

as men or women, say, or as whites or blac2s, or Indians or *ritish (hey are not individuals identi!ied by natural or

other !eatures race, "ender, nationality, and the li2e7 that enable us to compare their situation under all the various

schemes o! social cooperation it is !easible to consider (a2in" these cooperative schemes as possible social worlds letEs

say7 over which the names o! individuals re!er to ri"idly desi"nate7 the same individuals in each possible social7 world,

the term )the least advanta"ed) is not a ri"id desi"nator to use /aul rip2eEs term, see &amin" and &ecessityCambrid"e, 0ass3 arvard 4niversity +ress, 15>'77 ;ather, the worst o!! under any scheme o! cooperation are simply

the individuals who are worst o!! under that particular scheme (hey may not be those worst o!! in another Avensupposin", !or eDample, that it turns out, as commonsense political sociolo"y mi"ht su""est, that the least advanced,

identi!ied by income and wealth, include many individuals born into the least@!avored social class o! ori"in, and many o!

the least naturally7 endowed and many who eDperience more bad luc2 and mis!ortune 81H7, nevertheless those

attributes do not de!ine the least advanta"ed ;ather, it happens that there may be a tendency !or such !eatures tocharacteri#e many who belon" to that "roup

'> Theory is ambi"uous on this point It !ails to distin"uish between sel!@respect as an attitude, the preservin" o! which is a

!undamental interest, and the social bases that help to support that attitude

'6 n this point, see the discussion o! the provision o! health care in +art I-, 81



goods. 9ne is to loo at the various comprehensive doctrines actually found in society andspecify an inde! of such goods as a ind of average of what those who affirm the opposingdoctrines would need by way of institutional protections and allpurpose means. Eoing thismight seem the best way to achieve an overlapping consensus.

>ut this is not how justice as fairness proceeds. Instead, it wors up a political conception

from the fundamental idea of society as a fair system of social cooperation. &he hope is thatthis conception with its account of primary goods can win the support of an overlappingconsensus. e leave aside the comprehensive doctrines that now e!ist, or have e!isted, or might e!ist. 9ur thought is not that primary goods are fair to conceptions of the goodassociated with comprehensive doctrines by striing a fair balance between them. "ather,primary goods are fair to free and e#ual citizens$ these goods enable them to advance their permissible conceptions of the good 'those the pursuit of which are compatible with justice+.

§1/. The ifference Principle% Its 0eanin-

1B.1. e now turn to the difference principle as a principle of distributive justice in the narrowsense. "ecall that it is subordinate to both the first principle of justice 'guaranteeing the e#ualbasic liberties+ and the principle of fair e#uality of opportunity ')1.1+. It wors in tandem withthese two prior principles and it is always to be applied within bacground institutions in whichthose principles are satisfied25.

6ocial cooperation, we assume, is always productive, and without cooperation there would benothing produced and so nothing to distribute. &his assumption is not emphasized sufficientlyin Theory , ))121. 4igure 1 implies that there is production$ GA8 and DA8 '!1 and !2 in thefigure in Theory + are now representative individuals of the more and the less advantagedgroups respectively, the two groups engaged in productive cooperation :. &he 9P curve 'P for production+ runs northeast from the origin until it bends downward to the southeast1.

'5 (he eDplanation o! the principle o! +areto7 e!!iciency !or institutions is !ound in Theory, 8 1' 3 6@H'.= (his !i"ure is similar to !i"ure H in Theory, 81.3 HH

.1 Jor eDample, the !i"ures in Theory, 81'3 5! assume that there is an already "iven bundle o! "oods to be shared between

the two persons D1 and D' (his is shown in the !act that the e!!iciency !rontier runs northwest and southeast :nd no

mention is made o! these persons as bein" en"a"ed in cooperation to produce those "oods



In this figure the distances along the two a!es are measured in terms of an inde! of primary goods,with the !a!is the more advantaged group 'GA8+, the ya!is the less advantaged 'DA8+. &he line parallel to the !a!is is the highest e#ualjustice line touched by the 9P curve at its ma!imum at E.Cote that E is the efficient point nearest to e#uality, represented by the *=degree line. C is the Cashpoint, where the product of utilities is ma!imized 'if we assume utilities to be linear in inde!es of primary goods+, and > is the >entham point, where the sum of individual utilities is ma!imized 'againwith the same assumption+. &he set of efficient points goes from E to the feudal point 4, at which the9P curve becomes vertical.

e imagine the whole space southeast of the *=degree line to be filled with parallel e#ualjusticelines. &hus from each point on the *=degree line running northeast from the origin, there is ane#ualjustice line. &he line is simply the highest such line that can be reached when we areconstrained to move along the 9P curve. 6ociety aims, other things e#ual, to reach the higheste#ualjustice line measured by the distance from 9 along the *=degree line. &o do this it moves asfar northeast as possible along the 9P curve and stops when this curve bends to the southeast.

9bserve that the parallel lines are e#ualjustice lines and not indifference lines of the familiar indthat represent evaluations of individual or social welfare. ;#ualjustice lines represent how claims togoods cooperatively produced are to be shared among those who produced them, and they reflectan idea of reciprocity. &hey are e#ualjustice lines in the sense that any point on a line is e#ually

acceptable provided it is reached by an 9P curve of a scheme of cooperation satisfying theprinciples of justice prior to the difference principle. &he fact that they are parallel means that agreater inde! of primary goods 'here understood as a person-s prospects of income and wealth over a complete life+ for one group 'the GA8+ is justified only insofar as it adds to the inde! of the other group 'the DA8+. hen this is no longer true, even though the inde! increases for the moreadvantaged group, as it does beyond E, then the reciprocity implicit in the difference principle nolonger obtains. &his is shown by the fact that C and > are on lower e#ualjustice lines than E. Autilitarian e#ualjustice line through > would be a smooth curve conve! to the origin running fromnorthwest to southeast, showing the GA8 may gain more even though the DA8 receive less.3ontrary to reciprocity, tradeoffs are permitted.

4inally, note that as indicated in )1?, the GA8 and the DA8 are specified by reference to their sharesin the output and not as particular individuals identifiable independently of the scheme of

cooperation. hen we represent the inde! of the GA8 on the !a!is, the 9P curve lies everywheresoutheast of the *=degree line.

1B.2. A scheme of cooperation is given in large part by how its public rules organizeproductive activity, specify the division of labor, assign various roles to those engaged in it,and so on. &hese schemes include schedules of wages and salaries to be paid out of output.>y varying wages and salaries, more may be produced. &his is because over time the greater returns to the more advantaged serve, among other things, to cover the costs of training andeducation, to mar positions of responsibility and encourage persons to fill them, and to act asincentives. A given 9P curve is paired with a particular scheme of cooperation$ it indicates thereturns to the two groups when only wages and salaries are changed. &he origin of the 9Pcurve represents the e#ual division point$ both groups receive the same remuneration.

&o e!plain$ tae any point on the 9P curve$ if the wages to the more advantaged is thecorresponding point on the !a!is, then the wages to the less advantaged is thecorresponding point on the ya!is. &hus there are, in general, different 9P curves for differentschemes of cooperation and some schemes are more effectively designed than others. 9nescheme is more effective than another if its 9P curve always gives a greater return to the less



advantaged for any given return to the more advantaged 2. 9ther things being e#ual, thedifference principle directs society to aim at the highest point on the 9P curve of the mosteffectively designed scheme of cooperation.

1B.. A further feature of the difference principle is that it does not re#uire continual economicgrowth over generations to ma!imize upward indefinitely the e!pectations of the least

advantaged 'assessed in terms of income and wealth+. &hat would not be a reasonableconception of justice. e should not rule out Gill-s idea of a society in a just stationary statewhere 'real+ capital accumulation may cease. A wellordered society is specified so as toallow for this possibility. hat the difference principle does re#uire is that during anappropriate interval of time the differences in income and wealth earned in producing thesocial product be such that if the legitimate e!pectations of the more advantaged were less,those of the less advantaged would also be less. 6ociety would always be on the upwardrising part or at the top of the 9P curve *. Permissible ine#ualities 'thus defined+ satisfy thatcondition and are compatible with a social product of a steadystate e#uilibrium in which a justbasic structure is supported and reproduced over time.

Another aspect of the same point is this$ the difference principle re#uires that however greatthe ine#ualities in wealth and income may be, and however willing people are to wor to earntheir greater shares of output, e!isting ine#ualities must contribute effectively to the benefit of the least advantaged. 9therwise the ine#ualities are not permissible. &he general level of wealth in society, including the wellbeing of the least advantaged, depends on people-sdecisions as to how to lead their lives. &he priority of liberty means that we cannot be forcedto engage in wor that is highly productive in terms of material goods. hat ind of worpeople do, and how hard they do it, is up to them to decide in light of the various incentivessociety offers3. hat the difference principle re#uires, then, is that however great the generallevel of wealth 0whether high or low0 the e!isting ine#ualities are to fulfill the condition of benefiting others as well as ourselves. &his condition brings out that even if it uses the idea of ma!imizing the e!pectations of the least advantaged, the difference principle is essentially aprinciple of reciprocity.

1B.*. e have seen that the two principles of justice apply to citizens as identified by their inde!es of primary goods. It is natural to as$ hy are distinctions of race and gender note!plicitly included among the three contingencies noted earlier ')1/+% <ow can one ignoresuch historical facts as slavery 'in the antebellum 6outh+ and the ine#ualities between menand women resulting from the absence of provisions to mae good women-s e!tra burden inthe bearing, raising, and educating children so as to secure their fair e#uality of opportunity%

&he answer is that we are mainly concerned with ideal theory$ the account of the wellorderedsociety of justice as fairness. ithin that account we need to distinguish two #uestions$ first,what contingencies tend to generate troubling ine#ualities even in a wellordered society andthus prompt us, along with other considerations, to tae the basic structure as the primary

.' hen these curves criss@cross, the one tan"ent to the hi"hest BB !ine is bestG i! they touch the same BB !ine, the one whose

tan"ent is to the le!t o! the other is best

.. /ee his +rinciples o! +olitical Aconomy, b2 I-, ch -I

.< /ee the distinction at Theory, 81.3 H6 between per!ectly 9ust schemes and those 9ust throu"hout

C ¿P habrá siempre quien quiera hacer lo más di!ícil y menos atractivo? P si se hace atractivo por el pa"o lo más di!ícil,

como el campo o la docencia, ¿habrá muchos que ha"an lo menos pa"ado pero más placentero, como ahora que no hay

quien ha"a bellas artes apoyado por el estado?



subject of justice and second, how within ideal theory should the least advantaged bespecified%

hile there is some tendency for individuals most adversely affected by the threecontingencies ')1/.1+ to be among the least advantaged, this group is defined not byreference to those contingencies but by an inde! of primary goods ')1?, n. 2/+. &aing the

simplest form of the difference principle, the least advantaged are those who share with other citizens the basic e#ual liberties and fair opportunities but have the least income and wealth.e use income and wealth to specify this group and the particular individuals who belong toit may change from one arrangement of the basic structure to another 3.

1B.=. In ideal theory, as stated in Theory , )1/, the two principles of justice are to be applied tothe basic structure by assessing it from certain standard points of view$ namely, those of therepresentative e#ual citizen 'whose basic e#ual liberties and fair opportunities are secure+and of the representatives of various levels of income and wealth. Cevertheless, sometimesother positions must be taen into account. 6uppose, for e!ample, that certain fi!ed naturalcharacteristics are used as grounds for assigning une#ual basic rights, or allowing somepersons only lesser opportunities then such ine#ualities will single out relevant positions.&hose characteristics cannot be changed, and so the positions they specify are points of viewfrom which the basic structure must be judged.

Eistinctions based on gender and race are of this ind. &hus if men, say, have greater basicrights or greater opportunities than women, these ine#ualities can be justified only if they areto the advantage of women and acceptable from their point of view3. 6imilarly for une#ualbasic rights and opportunities founded on race 'Theory , )1/$ B=+. It appears that historicallythese ine#ualities have arisen from ine#ualities in political power and control of economicresources. &hey are not now, and it would seem never have been, to the advantage of women or less favored races. &o be sure, so sweeping a historical judgment may occasionallybe uncertain. <owever, in a wellordered society in the present age no such uncertaintyobtains, so justice as fairness supposes that the standard relevant positions specified by theprimary goods should suffice.

1B./. &o conclude$ when used in a certain way, distinctions of gender and race give rise tofurther relevant positions to which a special form of the difference principle applies ' Theory ,)1/$ B=+. e hope that in a wellordered society under favorable conditions, with the e#ualbasic liberties and fair e#uality of opportunity secured, gender and race would not specifyrelevant points of view. Theory taes up only two #uestions of partial compliance 'or nonideal+theory, civil disobedience and conscientious refusal to serve in an unjust war. &he seriousproblems arising from e!isting discrimination and distinctions based on gender and race arenot on its agenda, which is to present certain principles of justice and then to chec themagainst only a few of the classical problems of political justice as these would be settled withinideal theory.

&his is indeed an omission in Theory but an omission is not as such a fault, either in thatwor-s agenda or in its conception of justice. hether fault there be depends on how well thatconception articulates the political values necessary to deal with these #uestions. ustice as

C ¿$u% pasa con quien no quiere producir absolutamente nada, como los !ilOso!os? ¿Con la persecuciOn de la vida del

iluminado o del mon9e?

C ¿$u% pasa si sOlo la mayoría las acepta? ¿Al "rupo menos !avorecido de entre ellas se atiene?



fairness, and other liberal conceptions lie it, would certainly be seriously defective shouldthey lac the resources to articulate the political values essential to justify the legal and socialinstitutions needed to secure the e#uality of women and minorities. In Part I(, )=:, there is abrief discussion of the nature of the family and the e#uality of women.

§1. b$ections !ia ountereamples

15.1. Part of the idea of reflective e#uilibrium is to test the soundness of first principles byseeing whether we can endorse on reflection the judgments to which they lead in casessometimes framed for this purpose$ countere!amples socalled. &o be a proper countere!ample a case must satisfy all the relevant assumptions made in applying or inarguing for the principles of justice otherwise it misses the mar. Det us loo at threeobjections via countere!amples to illustrate this.

3onsider first two related objections$ 'a+ suppose the most effective 9P curve rises veryslowly to its ma!imum then the share of the more advantaged is much greater than the shareto the less advantaged. 'In 4igure 1 ')1B.1+, imagine E moved far to the right along the line.+ &his may seem unjust to the less advantaged. 9n the other hand$ 'b+ suppose that themost effective 9P curve falls very slowly after its ma!imum then the more advantaged do notreceive a much greater share even though their receiving this share would only slightlyreduce the share of the less advantaged. 'In the figure, imagine the arc from E through C and> and beyond stretched far to the right+. &his may seem unjust to the more advantaged.

In both cases, the troubling feature is the rather flat slope of the 9P curve, in one case before,in the other after, the ma!imum. &his means that large potential gains 'or losses+ to one groupare paired with small potential losses 'or gains+ for the other group. In such cases we aretempted to thin some adjustments should be made to achieve a greater overall gain. &hereply is that, given the re#uired bacground institutions securing both the e#ual basic libertiesand fair e#uality of opportunity, and the many possibilities of social organization, the mosteffective 9P curve is very unliely to have the flat slopes described above. &hus$

'i+ In reply to 'a+$ if citizens have fair and e#ual opportunities to develop their nativeendowments and to ac#uire socially productive sills, and if the scheme of cooperation iseffectively designed, then the 9P curve should rise #uicly enough to its ma!imum so that theratio of shares in favor of the more advantaged is not liely to strie us as unjust. &he idea isthat given the e#ual basic liberties and fair e#uality of opportunity, the open competitionbetween the greater numbers of the welltrained and better educated reduces the ratio of shares until it lies within an acceptable range. Cotice here how, in meeting the objection, werely on the way the difference principle wors in tandem with the prior principles. ithbacground institutions of fair e#uality of opportunity and worable competition re#uired bythe prior principles of justice, the more advantaged cannot unite as a group and then e!ploittheir maret power to force increases in their income=. &his has been mentioned before here

. Jor eDample, bac2"round institutions prevent doctors !rom !ormin" an association to push up the cost o! medical care

and thus to raise the income o! doctors, say by restrictin" entry into the medical pro!ession, or by a"reein" to char"e

hi"her !ees i"h earnin"s, however, are not su!!icient proo! o! collusion (he income o! opera sin"ers seems lar"ely

determined by !ree demand and supplyG the demand is hi"h, the supply is low, and in the short run nearly !iDed, but not!orever !iDed as is the supply o! the paintin"s by old masters (he number o! opera sin"ers is small enou"h so that their

earnin"s are not a serious worry in any caseG besides they wor2 hard and spread 9oy hereas doctors are a lar"e "roup,

and should competitive bac2"round institutions with !air opportunity not wor2 properly in their case, or in similar cases,

we would have to eDamine the causes !or the !ailure o! competitive arran"ements and try to !iD them i! that can be done



we see it illustrated.

'ii+ In reply to 'b+$ given the same assumptions as in 'i+, there surely e!ists some institutionaldevice to transfer at least part of the large return of the more advantaged to the lessadvantaged, by ta!ation, say, to reduce their return beyond the ma!imum of the 9 P curve.

15.2. In each reply the idea is that the shapes of 9P curves assumed in objections 'a+ and 'b+do not in fact occur when the basic structure satisfies the prior principles. 9ur aim is achievedshould the difference principle yield satisfactory conclusions in social worlds that fulfill theprinciples prior to it. &he difference principle specifies no definite limits within which the ratioof the shares of the more and less advantaged is to fall. Indeed, we hope to avoid having tospecify such limits, since we want to leave this ratio to fall where it may, as the outcome of pure bacground procedural justice. &his is perfectly acceptable unless, on due reflection, theactual ratio stries us as unjust/.

&he ratio of shares is, of course, an observable feature of the distribution of goods, and onethat can be ascertained apart from the scheme of cooperation itself. e simply tabulate whogets what. Cow it seems impossible to specify plausible limits on this ratio that can gain wideassent. 9ne reason is that it is not observable shares alone, or their ratio, that count, butwhether those receiving these shares have made an appropriate contribution to the good of others by training and educating their native endowments and putting them to wor within afair system of social cooperation. e cannot tell simply by listing who gets what whether thedistribution arises from the most 'or an+ effectively designed system of cooperation satisfyingthe difference principle. It is best to leave the limits unspecified and try to ignore theobservable features of distributions, or their overall shape. In a society well ordered by thetwo principles of justice, we hope that the observable features of the distributions that resultfall in a range where they do not seem unjust.

&he simplest limit, or shape, to impose on distributions is strict e#uality in all social goods.Plainly the difference principle is not egalitarian in that sense, since it recognizes the need for ine#ualities in social and economic organization, of which their role as incentives is but one. Itis, however, egalitarian in a sense to be discussed later in Part III$ it selects the efficient pointon the 9P curve closest to e#uality 'this is obvious from 4igure 1, in which the *=degree linerepresents e#uality and the segment E to > and beyond is the set of efficient points+.

15.. 4inally, I consider a third countere!ample meant to show that the difference principleneeds revision. Eiscussing it in some detail will bring out several points to remember intesting that principle?.

Indians >ritish

consistent with the prior principles e mi"ht also have to reconsider the soundness o! the di!!erence principle

.H ! course, within 9ustice as !airness, we do not have any !urther criterion to 9ud"e whether the ratio is un9ust, !or allour principles are met It is simply that the actual ratio may disturb us and ma2e us wonder It is as i! a state o! re!lective

equilibrium is a bit upset e hope the disparities that do occur !all within a ran"e where we are not thus troubled I am

indebted to ;onald Fwor2in !or pointin" out the need to ma2e this point eDplicit

.> (his eDample is !rom Fere2 +ar!it, ;easons and +ersons D!ord3 D!ord 4niversity +ress, 156<7, pp <5=@<5. I am"rate!ul to *rian *arry !or sendin" me his comments on the eDample which he presented at the annual meetin" o! the

:merican +olitical /cience :ssociation in 1561 have drawn heavily on *arryEs comments and any merits o! my

remar2s are due to him I should add that the eDample is o! no importance in +ar!itEs boo2, occurrin" amon" several

appendiDes, this one written with Bohn *roome hat I say is not in any way a criticism o! that remar2able wor2



'1+ 1:: 1::'2+ 12: 11:'+ 11= 1*:

In this e!ample there are only three alternative constitutions for India in 1B::, with thedistributions of primary goods as shown. Dooing at the three alternatives, the difference

principle selects '+ because it is the scheme in which the leastadvantaged group 'notalways the Indians+ does best.

&he e!ample is meant to show that it is not correct, as Theory is alleged to say, that therepresentative >riton-s advantages under constitution '+ are gained in ways that promote therepresentative Indian-s prospects$ it is not correct because the particular individuals leastadvantaged under '+, the Indians, would have been even better off under '2+. 9nly one placeis cited 'Theory , )1?$ 1:,1st ed.+ as grounds for this interpretation$ @> 'the least favoredrepresentative man+ can accept A-s 'the more favored representative man+ being better off since A-s advantages have been gained in ways that improve >-s prospects.@

&he mistae in the alleged countere!ample is clear$ the cited passage occurs early in Theory ,)1?, right after )1/, in which, as we have seen, the relevant groups for applying the differenceprinciple are specified by their prospects in terms of primary goods or in the simplest form of the principle, by income and wealth. In ideal theory, rigid designators such as Indians and>ritish are e!cludedB. &he idea of a representative man '@individual@ would have been better+is a familiar and handy way of speaing about a group already specified in some way. &hepassage cited 'and others similar to it+ should be read as referring to groups specified byincome and wealth. hat the numerical e!ample does bring out is that the difference principlemust not say 'we already now it does not say ')1B++ that the particular individuals, who areworst off under the basic structure it selects, would not be better off under any other practicable structure.

15.*. e might be tempted simply to dismiss the e!ample as violating the restrictions onrelevant groups. &his would be too hasty, since the passage cited from Theory mentions 'andso do many other passages+ a ind of reciprocity between groups appropriately named. hatlies behind this way of taling% Ignoring the matter of names for the moment, consider whatcan be said to the Indians in favor of '+. Accepting the conditions of the e!ample, we cannotsay the Indians would do no better under any alternative arrangement. "ather, we say that, inthe neighborhood of '+, there is no alternative arrangement that by maing the >ritish worseoff could mae the Indians better off. &he ine#uality in '+ is justified because in thatneighborhood the advantages to the >ritish do contribute to the advantages of the Indians.&he condition of the Indians- being as well off as they are 'in that neighborhood+ is that the>ritish are better off.

&his reply depends, as does the difference principle itself, on there being a rough continuumof basic structures, each very close 'practically speaing+ to some others in the aspects alongwhich these structures are varied as available systems of social cooperation. '&hose close toone another are said to be in the same neighborhood.+ &he main #uestion is not '+ against'2+ but '+ against '1+. If the Indians as why there are ine#ualities at all, the reply focuses on'+ in relation to reasonably close and available alternatives in the neighborhood. It is in this

.6 /ee 81>, n 'H





)2:. Degitimate ;!pectations, ;ntitlement, and Eesert

2:.1. "ecall from )1* that in justice as fairness distribution taes place in accordance withlegitimate claims and earned entitlements. &hese e!pectations and entitlements are specifiedby the public rules of the scheme of social cooperation. 6uppose, for e!ample, that theserules include provisions for agreements about wages and salaries, or for worers-

compensation based on an inde! of the firm-s maret performance, as in a share economy

*:

.&hen those who mae and honor these agreements have, by definition, a legitimatee!pectation of receiving the agreed amounts at the agreed times. &hey are entitled to theseamounts. hat individuals do depends on what the rules and agreements say they would beentitled to what individuals are entitled to depends on what they do 'Theory , )1*$ ?*, ?/+.

9nce more I stress that there is no criterion of a legitimate e!pectation, or of an entitlement,apart from the public rules that specify the scheme of cooperation. Degitimate e!pectationsand entitlements are always 'in justice as fairness+ based on these rules. <ere we assume, of course, that these rules are compatible with the two principles of justice. 8iven that theseprinciples are satisfied by the basic structure, and given that all legitimate e!pectations andentitlements are honored, the resulting distribution is just, whatever it is. Apart from e!istinginstitutions, there is no prior and independent idea of what we may legitimately e!pect, or of what we are entitled to, that the basic structure is designed to fulfill. All these claims arisewithin the bacground system of fair social cooperation they are based on its public rules andon what individuals and associations do in the light of those rules.

2:.2. Cow this statement is easily misunderstood. ithin our comprehensive view we have aconcept of moral desert specified independently of the rules of e!isting institutions. &o say

justice as fairness rejects such a concept is incorrect. It recognizes at least three ideas that inordinary life are viewed as ideas of moral desert.

4irst, the idea of moral desert in the strict sense, that is, the moral worth of a person-scharacter as a whole 'and of a person-s several virtues+ as given by a comprehensive moraldoctrine as well as the moral worth of particular actions

6econd, the idea of legitimate e!pectations 'and its companion idea of entitlements+, which isthe other side of the principle of fairness 'Theory , )*B+ and

&hird, the idea of deservingness as specified by a scheme of public rules designed to achievecertain purposes. &he concept of moral desert is not #uestioned. "ather, the thought is that aconception of moral desert as moral worth of character and actions cannot be incorporatedinto a political conception of justice in view of the fact of reasonable pluralism. <avingconflicting conceptions of the good, citizens cannot agree on a comprehensive doctrine tospecify an idea of moral desert for political purposes. In any case, moral worth would beutterly impracticable as a criterion when applied to #uestions of distributive justice. e mightsay$ 9nly 8od could mae those judgments. In public life we need to avoid the idea of moraldesert and to find a replacement that belongs to a reasonable political conception.

2:.. &he idea of a legitimate e!pectation is suggested as precisely such a replacement$ itbelongs to a political conception of justice and is framed to apply to that domain. hile the

<= /ee 0artin eit#man, (he /hare Aconomy Cambrid"e, 0ass3 arvard 4niversity +ress, 156<7



political conception as a whole does apply to the family as an institution belonging to the basicstructure ')=:+, its several principles are not intended to apply directly to the relationsbetween members of the family, or to personal relationships between individuals, nor again torelations between members of small groups, or associations*1. 4or e!ample, the politicalconception of justice does not re#uire parents to treat their children according to thedifference principle, any more than friends are re#uired so to treat one another. ;ach of these

cases presumably re#uires its own distinctive criteria. <ow far the idea of legitimatee!pectations holds must be considered separately in each case.

4inally, the idea of deservingness as specified by a scheme of public rules is illustrated atTheory , )*B$ 2?/, by games, as when we say that the losing team deserved to win. <ere it isnot denied that to the winners go the victory and the honors what is meant is that the loserse!hibited to a higher degree the #ualities and sills the game is designed to encourage, thedisplay of which maes the game enjoyable both to play and to watch. 7et chance and luc,or other mishaps, denied the losers what they deserved. &his usage also fits the case where,after a particularly well played game, we say that both teams deserved to win and whilebetter a victory than a tie, it is too bad either had to lose.

2:.*. ustice as fairness uses only the second and third ideas of desert. &he second we havealready covered in discussing legitimate e!pectations and entitlements. &he third ismentioned only at Theory , )*B$ 2?/, but it is generally implied, as it holds for public ruleseffectively designed to achieve social purposes. 6chemes of cooperation satisfying thedifference principle are such rules they serve to encourage individuals to educate their endowments and to use them for the general good.

&hus when individuals, moved by the public rules of social arrangements, try conscientiouslyto act accordingly, they may become deserving. >ut, as in games, there are competitors, andeven when the competition is fair, one-s success is not assured. Although welldesignedarrangements may help to avoid large discrepancies between deservingness and success,this is not always possible. &he relevant point here is that there are many ways to specifydeservingness depending on the public rules in #uestion together with the ends and purposesthey are meant to serve. 7et none of those ways specifies an idea of moral desert, properlyunderstood.

§21. n 5iewin- 6ati!e 7n(owments as a ommon Asset

21.1. In Theory , )1?, it is said that we do not deserve 'in the sense of moral desert+ our placein the distribution of native endowments. &his statement is meant as a moral truism *2. howould deny it% Eo people really thin that they 'morally+ deserved to be born more gifted thanothers% Eo they thin that they 'morally+ deserved to be born a man rather than a woman, or vice versa% Eo they thin that they deserved to be born into a wealthier rather than into apoorer family% Co.

<1 (his is not to deny that in "eneral the principles o! 9ustice restrict the !orm these arran"ements can ta2e c! 8<' and

8=7

<' (his remar2 is not made !rom within 9ustice as !airness, since this conception contains no idea o! moral desert in thesense meant n the other hand, the remar2 is not made !rom within any particular comprehensive philosophical or

moral doctrine ;ather, I assume that all reasonable such doctrines would endorse this remar2 and hold that moral desert

always involves some conscientious e!!ort o! will, or somethin" intentionally or willin"ly done, none o! which can apply

to our place in the distribution o! native endowments, or to our social class o! ori"in



&he second and third ideas of desert do not depend on whether we morally deserve our placein the distribution of native endowments. A basic structure satisfying the difference principlerewards people, not for their place in that distribution, but for training and educating their endowments, and for putting them to wor so as to contribute to others- good as well as their own. hen people act in this way they are deserving, as the idea of legitimate e!pectations

re#uires. &he idea of entitlement presupposes, as do ideas of 'moral+ desert, a deliberateeffort of will, or acts intentionally done. As such they provide the basis of legitimatee!pectations.

21.2. In Theory it is said ')1?$ 1:1, 1st ed.+ that the difference principle represents anagreement to regard the distribution of native endowments as a common asset and to sharein the benefits of this distribution whatever it turns out to be. It is not said that this distributionis a common asset$ to say that would presuppose a 'normative+ principle of ownership that isnot available in the fundamental ideas from which we begin the e!position. 3ertainly thedifference principle is not to be derived from such a principle as an independent premise.

&he te!t of Theory mentioned above is commenting on what is involved in the parties-agreeing to the difference principle$ namely, by agreeing to that principle, it is as if they agreeto regard the distribution of endowments as a common asset. hat this regarding consists inis e!pressed by the difference principle itself. &he remar about the distribution of endowments as a common asset elucidates its meaning.

21.. Cote that what is regarded as a common asset is the distribution of native endowmentsand not our native endowments per se. It is not as if society owned individuals- endowmentstaen separately, looing at individuals one by one. &o the contrary, the #uestion of theownership of our endowments does not arise and should it arise, it is persons themselveswho own their endowments$ the psychological and physical integrity of persons is alreadyguaranteed by the basic rights and liberties that fall under the first principle of justice ')1.1+.

hat is to be regarded as a common asset, then, is the distribution of native endowments,that is, the differences among persons. &hese differences consist not only in the variation of talents of the same ind 'variation in strength and imagination, and so on+ but in the variety of talents of different inds. &his variety can be regarded as a common asset because it maespossible numerous complementarities between talents when organized in appropriate ways totae advantage of these differences. 3onsider how these talents are organized andcoordinated in games and in performances of musical compositions. 4or e!ample, consider agroup of musicians every one of whom could have trained himself to play e#ually well as theothers any instrument in the orchestra, but who each have by a ind of tacit agreement setout to perfect their sills on the one they have chosen so as to realize the powers of all in their

joint performances 'Theory , )?5$ *=5n*+. (ariations of talent of the same ind 'as in degreesof strength and endurance+ also allow for mutually beneficial complementarities, aseconomists have long nown and formulated in the principle of comparative advantage.

21.*. e use the phrase @common asset@ to e!press a certain attitude, or point of view,toward the natural fact of the distribution of endowments. 3onsider the #uestion$ Is it possiblefor persons as free and e#ual not to view it a misfortune 'though not an injustice+ that someare by nature better endowed than others% Is there any political principle mutually acceptableto citizens as free and e#ual to guide society in its use of the distribution of native



endowments% Is it possible for the more and the less advantaged to be reconciled to acommon principle% 6hould there be no such principle, the structure of social worlds and thegeneral facts of nature would be to this e!tent hostile to the very idea of democratic e#uality.

&o resolve the #uestion, we try to show in Part III that the original position is a point of viewfrom which the representatives of citizens as free and e#ual would agree to the difference

principle, and so to the use of the distribution of endowments as, so to spea, a commonasset. If we can show this, then that principle offers a way of seeing nature and the socialworld as no longer hostile to democratic e#uality and in formulating such a principle justice asfairness does the wor of political philosophy as reconciliation. <ere it is crucial that thedifference principle includes an idea of reciprocity$ the better endowed 'who have a morefortunate place in the distribution of native endowments they do not morally deserve+ areencouraged to ac#uire still further benefits 0they are already benefited by their fortunateplace in that distribution0 on condition that they train their native endowments and use themin ways that contribute to the good of the less endowed 'whose less fortunate place in thedistribution they also do not morally deserve+. "eciprocity is a moral idea situated betweenimpartiality, which is altruistic, on the one side and mutual advantage on the other *.

)22. 6ummary 3omments on Eistributive ustice and Eesert

22.1. Dooing bac on our discussion, I add a few summary comments. ustice as fairnessdoes not reject the concept of moral desert as given by a fully or partially comprehensivereligious, philosophical, or moral doctrine. "ather, in view of the fact of reasonable pluralism,it holds that no such doctrine can serve as a political conception of distributive justice.Goreover, it would not be worable, or practicable, for the purposes of political life.

&he problem, then, is to find a replacement 0a conception that does the ind of wor neededfor a political view that we might naturally, though incorrectly, suppose could only be done bya concept of moral desert belonging to a comprehensive view. &o this end justice as fairnessintroduces a conception of legitimate e!pectations and its companion conception of entitlements.

22.2. 4or this replacement to be satisfactory, it must not only be worable, and answer theneeds of a political conception of justice, but also$

'a+ It should authorize the social and economic ine#ualities necessary, or else highly effective,in running an industrial economy in a modern state. 6uch ine#ualities 'as already noted+cover the costs of training and education, act as incentives, and the lie.'b+ It should e!press a principle of reciprocity, since society is viewed as a fair system of cooperation from one generation to the ne!t between free and e#ual citizens, and since thepolitical conception is to apply to the basic structure which regulates bacground justice.'c+ It should appropriately handle the most serious ine#ualities from the point of view of political justice$ ine#ualities in citizens- prospects as given by their reasonable e!pectationsover a complete life. &hese ine#ualities are those liely to arise between different incomelevels in society as these are affected by the social position into which individuals are bornand spend the early years of life up to the age of reason, as well as by their place in thedistribution of native endowments. e are concerned with the longlasting effects of these

<. /ee +olitical Liberalism, pp 1H@1>



contingencies, together with the conse#uences of accident and luc throughout life.

In addition to these desiderata, there are two others that deserve notice$

'd+ Principles specifying fair distribution must, so far as possible, be stated in terms that allowus publicly to verify whether they are satisfied**.

'e+ e should loo for principles that are reasonably simple and whose basis can bee!plained in ways citizens may be assumed to understand in the light of ideas available in thepublic political culture.

22.. &he #uestion, then, is whether the difference principle 'woring in tandem with the prior principles of the basic liberties and fair opportunity, and understood in the light of the ideas of entitlement and legitimate e!pectation+ meets these desiderata as well as if not better thanother available political principles. ustice as fairness holds that it may do so, and that it isworth considering, once we recognize that the role of commonsense precepts of justice, andof ine#ualities in distributive shares in modern societies, is not to reward moral desert asdistinguished from deservingness. &heir role is rather to attract people to positions where theyare most needed from a social point of view, to cover the costs of ac#uiring sills andeducating abilities, to encourage them to accept the burdens of particular responsibilities, andto do all this in ways consistent with free choice of occupation and fair e#uality of opportunity'Theory , )*?+. 9f course, we are only beginning to e!plore this #uestion 'we will say morelater+ and can never provide a conclusive answer.

In considering the merits of the difference principle, eep in mind what we have already said$when justice as fairness says we do not morally deserve either our initial place in society or our place in the distribution of native endowments, it views this as a truism. It does not saythat we never deserve in an appropriate way the social position or the offices we may hold inlater life, or the realized sills and educated abilities we may have after we have reached theage of reason. In a wellordered society we usually do deserve these things, when desert isunderstood as entitlement earned under fair conditions. ustice as fairness holds that the ideaof desert as entitlement is fully ade#uate for a political conception of justice and this is amoral idea 'though not the idea of moral desert defined by a comprehensive doctrine+because the political conception to which it belongs is itself a moral conception.

&he substantive #uestion, then, is whether we need, or should want, more than this in apolitical conception. Eoesn-t it suffice to cooperate on fair terms that all of us as free ande#ual can publicly endorse before one another% ouldn-t this be reasonably close to thepracticable, political best% 3ertainly some will insist that they do morally deserve certainthings in ways a political conception does not account for. &his people may do from withintheir comprehensive doctrines, and indeed, if the doctrine is sound, they may be correct indoing so. ustice as fairness does not deny this. hy should it% It only says that since theseconflicting doctrines say that we morally deserve different things in different ways for differentreasons, they cannot all be correct and in any case, none of them is politically feasible. &ofind a public basis of justification, we must loo for a worable political conception of justice.

22.*. "ecall that we started in )12.1 by asing$ what are the principles most appropriate tospecify the fair terms of social cooperation between citizens regarded as free and e#ual% e

<< (his !eature has been emphasi#ed in connection with primary "oods in 81>



are concerned with principles that tae seriously the idea of citizens as free and e#ual, and sowith principles suited to shape political and social institutions so that they may effectivelyrealize this idea. >ut, of course, this raises the #uestion of whether there may not be anumber of principles that tae the idea seriously. hat could these alternatives be% <ow canwe select among them% &he answer that justice as fairness proposes is that the mostappropriate principles taing this idea seriously are those that would be selected by citizens

themselves when fairly represented as free and e#ual. &o carry out this suggestion leads tothe original position as a device of representation ')/+. &he argument from that position ispresented in Part III.

&he bacground worry present in asing these #uestions is that we may not now of anyprinciples that tae seriously the idea of citizens as free and e#ual or that if we do, we nowof several conflicting ones. &hey impose very different re#uirements and there is endlessdispute about them influenced by which favors us most. 9r it may be that we now of at leastone family of principles that taes the idea seriously but we are not willing to act from it, for whatever variety of reasons. 6hould any of these things be the case, the #uestion ariseswhether our speaing of citizens as free and e#ual is seriously meant. Is it simply tal% Eoesit serve other than an ideological purpose, understanding this term in Gar!-s sense% Plainlythe integrity of constitutional democratic thought depends on the answers to these #uestions.

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John Rawls - Justice as Fairness (Part 2)

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