Joll, C. M. (2010). Religion and Conflict in ST - Beyond Rounding Up the Usual Suspects. CSEAS...

7/28/2019 Joll, C. M. (2010). Religion and Conflict in ST - Beyond Rounding Up the Usual Suspects. CSEAS 32(2), 258-279

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Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 32, No. 2 (2010), pp. 25879 DOI: 10.1355/cs32-2f

2010 ISEAS ISSN 0129-797X print / ISSN 1793-284X electronic

Religion and Conflict inSouthern Thailand: BeyondRounding Up the UsualSuspects

CHRISTOPHER M. JOLL

This article takes clues from Mark Juergensmeyers comparative study

of religious violence and develops Imtiyaz Yusufs proposal that the

southern violence represents a conflict between the competing exclusive

ethno-religious worldviews of Thai satsanaa and Malay agama. It

moves beyond the routine rounding up and interrogation of the usual

suspects in two ways: first, by including a range of uncivil elements

of Thai Buddhism, and second, by examining often ill-conceived Thaiinterference in Islamic matters. The article also poses questions about

the usual suspects, beginning with a description of Islamic movements

which contribute to an increasingly divided Islamic community less

able to prevent and limit Islamic violence. The paper investigates the

Islamic credentials of the insurgency and distinguishes between the

presence of jihadi rhetoric with a developed jihadi rationale, a recent

development in southern Thailand. The article argues for the localization

of the global, a process which features local actors and agents that are

informed by parochial and highly ethnocized version of Islam that is

countering occasionally uncivil Buddhist opponents, as an approach

for studying violence in the Thai south.

Keywords: South Thailand, Southeast Asian Islam, ethno-religious conflicts,

Islamic activism, Jihad.

CHRISTOPHER M. JOLL is a Patani-based Visiting Research Fellow at theMuslim Studies Center, the Institute of Asian Studies, ChulalongkornUniversity, Bangkok.

06 Christopher.indd 258 7/30/10 2:08:11 PM


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Religion and Conflict in Southern Thailand 259

The present conflict in Thailands far south continues to attract

much attention from academics and analysts. While applaudingapproaches framing aspects of this conflict in the wider context ofThai society that is facing a range of crises, many remain concernedwith establishing local connections to globaljihadimovements.1 Suchan approach resembles the rounding up of the usual suspectsordered by inspector Louis Renault in the closing scene of the 1942classic movie Casablanca. Anthony Johns likens this to studies ofSoutheast Asian Islam where the interrogation of the usual suspectshas become a routine exercise. While there may be ways to makepeople talk, there are many more questions to ask and interrogatorsare capable of putting into suspects mouths what they want themto say. In short, there is the need to discover ways and means ofmoving beyond what has become habitual, of finding new questionsto ask and more suspects to round up.2

This article sets out to achieve a number of goals in the discussionon the role of religion in Thailands southern conflict since 2004.Before asking new questions of Thailands southern Malay Muslims,the paper begins by rounding up some unusual suspects, speci-fically, the uncivil elements of Thai Buddhism. This approachresembles that of Juergensmeyers study of religious violence whichexamines the logic of violence by Christians, Jews, Muslims, Sikhs

and Buddhists.3 The article also seeks to develop Imtiyaz Yusufspersuasive proposal that the southern violence represents a conflict

between the competing exclusive ethno-religious worldviews of Thaiand Malay religions.

Attempts at a clear and coherent discussion of religion insouthern Thailand are complicated by more than the inseparabilityof Islam and Malayness. Dynamics viewed as religious also relate tolocal history, politics, education and economics. For instance, chronicunemployment explains the ease with which young Malay men arerecruited by insurgents, for two reasons.4 First, the large number of

Malay Muslim migrant workers in Malaysia means that many parentsare unable to protect their children from being recruited by theinsurgents, and these recruits themselves would be less attracted tothe movement if they were engaged in gainful employment. Joiningsuch movements like a religious education and involvement indawah (Arabic for Islamic missionary movements) groups bolsterthe cultural capital of unemployed Malays. Second, the reductionof space shared by ethnic Thais and ethnic Malays in southernThailand has been perpetuated by the preference of Malay Muslimsfor private schools teaching Islam (PSTI) (rongrian soon satsana



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260 Christopher M. Joll

Islam), or reformedpondokover Thai state schools. Not only do PSTI

students have less contact with Thai Buddhists, but on graduationare also less equipped to find places in Thailands modern economy.5

This article begins by rounding up some new suspects in theethno-religious conflict, before beginning the important task of askingnew questions about the usual suspects.

Rounding Up New Suspects

Michael Jerrysons research on the role played by monks in southernThailand offers correctives to what he regards as the misconceptionthat Buddhism is a mystical and inherently peaceful religion. This,according to Jerryson, has led to a lack of attention to the roleof Buddhists in a number of conflicts.6 The context for Jerrysonsstudy is the attack in 2004 of nine Buddhist temples (Wat) inwhich four monks were killed, and two others injured. The mosthighly publicized of these was the murder of monks and novicesat Phromprasit temple in Panare in October 2005. Following thisincident, the Sangha committee of Patani published a twenty pointdeclaration which included calls for the abolition of the NationalReconciliation Commission (NRC) (of which more later). Despiteassertions by McCargo that this initiative was backed by elements of

the military, and the names of some monks were included withouttheir consent, the Patani Sangha claimed the NRC to have shownlittle interest in the plight of local Buddhists. Leading southernmonks gave interviews slamming the rhetoric of human rights andsuggesting this did not apply to the murdered monks. Moreover, asthey also pointed out, while all presidents of the Islamic councilsin the three southern provinces had been invited to join the NRC,southern monks had not.7 This would not be the only controversythe NRC would be involved in, as its conclusions were criticizedas amounting to an exoneration of Islam in the conflict.8

Between 2004 and 2007, sixteen watwere attacked, leaving fivemonks dead, and seventeen injured.9 In the most violent districts,these attacks reduced the number of monks making their earlymorning rounds for alms, with those continuing to do so receivingassistance from the government including military escorts and bullet-proof vests.10 Attacks on southern temples also resulted in theirmilitarization.11 While often opposed by the southern abbots, fortifiedtemples functioned as barracks and depots for military hardware. Theend result was that Malay Muslims identified temples with the Thaimilitary and places where fleeing Buddhists would seek refuge.12



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In addition to militarized temples, Jerryson documents a covert

initiative in which military monks have been assigned to guardsouthern Buddhist temples and fellow monks.13 While theordinationof active soldiers is prohibited, and the 1905 Thai Military ServiceAct made monks exempt from military service, the Thai Buddhisttradition of temporary ordination creates space for circumventing theguidelines for Buddhist soldiers. Soldiers are granted a four monthpaid leave for ordination; and seventy-five soldiers were ordained, forinstance, on Queen Sirikits birthday in 2005. Jerryson argues suchleniency to have been further extended by covert military monkswho are ordained but do not put down their weapons nor abandontheir military duties.14 Like much of the southern insurgency, militarymonks are shrouded in secrecy. Drawing comparisons with Sri Lankaand Cambodia, Jerryson views Thailands southern conflict as havingactivated the latent tendency for militant Buddhism.15

Dismissing suggestions by specialists in Thai Buddhism suchas Charles F. Keyes that Buddhism plays a positive civic role inThai democracy, McCargo cites Jerrysons findings to demonstrate theuncivil nature of Buddhism in Thailand. The anti-Islamic polemics bythe influential scholar-monk Prayudh Payutto are seen by McCargo asproviding robes of respectability for growing Buddhist intolerance.In addition to calling for the abolition of the NRC, southern abbots

also expressed sympathy for the heavy-handed tactics of the Thaimilitary.16 During the drafting of the 2007 Constitution, monks alsoadvocated that Buddhism be made the national religion.17

Members of the royal family have also become involved inreligious controversy. In addition to the security provided by thepolice, army, and village defence volunteer system (Chor Ror Bor),Buddhist villagers successfully petitioned Queen Sirikit for additionalsecurity during her stay in Thaksin Ratchanives Palace in Narathiwatin 2004. This led to an additional village defence volunteer system

being formed, referred to as Or Ror Bor. While originally envisaged

as a mixed force composed of both Buddhists and Muslims, theInternational Crisis Group (ICG) claims that they consist almostexclusively of the former. In addition, these groups are based intemple compounds, and are explicitly mandated to protect Buddhistminorities.18 Another incident involving the Queen took placefollowing the fatal shooting in Narathiwat of two palace officialson 16 November 2004. The Queen delivered an emotional speechto an audience of over a thousand people that was also broadcaston national television. In it, the Queen declared that Thais weredetermined to die for their compatriots, and urged Buddhists not to



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be intimidated, to remain in the region and to take shooting lessons

which she herself would also undertake to do. While noting thejudiciously worded speech which the King made to police and armyofficers the next day, McCargo comments that this was not the sortof royal intervention liberals had hoped for.19

Over and above the volunteer schemes charged with the defenceof Buddhist and Muslims communities, a number of paramilitaryorganizations are also present in southern Thailand.20 These includethe clandestine group, Ruam Thai (Thais United) that is led by PoliceColonel Phitak Iadkaew, and boasts 6,000 members. Recruits are trainedin a two-day course in private rented facilities. In addition to raisingawareness of security risks, and providing basic military training(with their own weapons) for self-defence, Non-Violence Internationalclaims commando training is also provided. Those who completethe training are also permitted to work alongside the police wearingpolice-like uniforms and to carry combat weapons. Accusations ofvigilante-style attacks against Muslims by Ruam Thai led to Phitakstransfer out of the area, though subsequently the decision was reversedfollowing protests from Buddhist residents in Yala.21

The existence of armed Buddhist and Muslim civilians has con-tributed to displays of sectarian violence. One of the most infamousexamples followed an incident on 14 March 2007 in which a

passenger van was ambushed in the Yaha district of Yala province.Nine Buddhist passengers were shot at point-blank range (only oneof whom survived), but the Muslim driver was spared. While notwithout precedent summary executions of Buddhist civiliansalso occurred in the late 1970s it is worthwhile to describe thereaction to this incident. On the evening after the ambush, twoattacks on Muslim civilians in Yaha took place. The first was agrenade attack on the Almubaroh mosque in the Patae sub-district.The second, which occurred an hour later, was an armed attackon a tea shop in Padaeru village (Katong sub-district) in which a

Muslim patron was killed. On the same night, unidentified gunmendrove around the predominantly Muslim village of Kuan Ran (BukitToreng), firing at random. On the night of 17 March a pondok inSabayois Pien sub-district was attacked: grenades were thrown,and huts were sprayed with bullets from shotguns and M16 assaultrifles, killing two and injuring eight. Muslim villagers picketed the

pondok, and accused Rangers of perpetrating the attack and kept uptheir protest for over a month. On 26 March local Buddhists stageda 2,000-strong counter-protest outside the town hall in Sabayoi,demanding that Rangers and Border Patrol Police remain in the



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village. On 27 May seven bombs exploded in Had Yai, killing one

and injuring twelve, followed the next day by a bomb explosion inthe Buddhist section of the market in Sabayoi town which killedfour, and injured twenty-six. On 31 May 2007, young men sittingopposite the Kolomudo mosque in Sabayois Chanae sub-districtwere fired upon by gunmen from two pickup trucks, leaving fivedead and two injured.22

Camroux and Pathan comment that calls from the Queen andsenior monks for the defence of Thai Buddhists not only increasedthe flow of weapons and number of self-defence organizations andparamilitary groups, but increased the the spectre or at least thelanguage of civil war.23 While these suspects will reappear in mytreatment of government involvement in Islamic affairs, let us nowconsider new questions that can be asked of the usual suspects.

New Approaches to the Usual Suspects

The need for a nuanced and sophisticated approach to the study ofIslamism in Southeast Asia is widely acknowledged. Over and abovedata obtained through interrogation (and occasionally torture) JohnSidel raises concerns over the filtering effects of both non-Muslimand Muslim police, military or intelligence personnel many of

whom have strongly anti-Islamist views on data collection.24Limited explanations are also proposed, such as Islamism activity inIndonesia being most commonly attributed to the militant organization

Jemaah Islamiyah. The ICG criticizes conceptions of Islamism thatlump together under one banner a range of activism. Not only doesthe ICG argue Islamic activism is superior to the nebulous termIslamism, but that Islamic activism takes the following three forms:political Islamism; missionary activism; and jihadi movements.25The nature of Islamic activism varies depending on assessments atthe time on the nature of the predicament being faced, the nature of

political activism, and the place (if any) of violence. All three formsexist in southern Thailand, including the jihadiwing of the Salafiyyamovement (al-Salafiyya al-jihadiyya). Because of its importance, thispaper moves on to describe the two forms of missionary activismthat presently exist in the far south.

The first, but least important, of these is the Tablighi Jamaat,a South Asian revivalist movement established in 1926, whicharrived in Thailand in the 1980s. The Tablighi Jamaat is primarilyconcerned with the revitalization of Islamic practice at the grassrootslevel among nominal Muslims living in Muslim-minority contexts.26



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The success of the Tablighi Jamaat in southern Thailand can be

attributed to the following: its emphasis on face-to-face oral contactwith Muslim communities through regular visits; avoidance ofreligious controversies; and access to large numbers of unemployedor under-employed Muslim young people.

The second is the Salafiyya (or Salafi) movement a namederived from Salaf al-Salih (venerable ancestors in Arabic) of seventh-century Arabia, which is locally referred to as either kaum mudo(in Malay) or kanat mai (in Thai).27 Its origins are in the modernistand reformist agendas of al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897), MohammedAbduh (d. 1905), and Rashid Rida (d. 1935), who were alarmed thatthe majority of the worlds Muslims were living under Europeancolonial rule. Salafism is a movement defined by a methodologythat emphasizes: (1) the authoritative example of the seventh-centuryal-Salaf al-Salih; (2) ijtihad (Arabic for independent interpretation)over taqlid(blind imitation); (3) the eradication ofbidah (illegitimatereligious innovation); and (4) mentoring (mulazamah in Arabic) fromSalafiyya mentors in the Middle East. In the 1920s under Ridasleadership, the Salaf movement joined the more austere Wahhabimovement. Subsequent to their acquisition of economic powerin the 1970s, the Saudi-based movement would eclipse the more

broadly based Salaf movement. The most important proponent of

Salafism in southern Thailand was Shaykh Muhamwhmad Sulongbin Abdul Kadir bin Muhammad al-Fatani (Haji Sulong) (18951945),who became influential in the politics of the region in the 1930safter his return to Patani.28 Salafism is most commonly foundin Muslim-majority contexts where they seek to eliminate localcustoms viewed as bidah, co-opt existing institutions and ulama,and establish and train new ones. An emblematic example of thelatter is the establishment of Yala Islamic University by its foundingRector, Saudi-educated Dr Ismail Lutfi Japakiya. Lutfi functions asthe unofficial head and principle articulator of Saudi-style Salafism

in the far south.As well as conflating these forms of missionary activism, rarely

do commentators of transnational movements in southern Thailandmention these as modern examples of local Islamic thought andpractice being impacted from the outside. While the Indian Oceantrade connected (not separated) Southeast Asia from the MiddleEast, Patanis connection was guaranteed by its natural harbour andproximity to trans-peninsula trading routes. This was the route thatin the fourteenth century brought Shaykh Said of Pasai, credited withpersuading the Raja of Patani to adopt Islam. This route was also



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used by luminaries such as Shaykh Daud bin Abdullah bin Idris

al-Fatani (Shaykh Daud al-Fatani) (17691847), Shaykh Zain al Abidin(Tuan Minal) (18201913), Shaykh Wan Ahmad bin MuhammadZain al-Fatani (Shaykh Ahmad al-Fatani) as they travelled to Mecca(via Aceh). As noted below, it was not outsiders, but Malays fromPatani such as Haji Sulong and Lutfi who introduced such Islamicmodernism and reformism.

Advances in transport and communication across the IndianOcean strengthened this existing connection at a time when theMuslim world was marked by change and occasional trauma. Forinstance, the Wahhabi occupation of Mecca and Medina in 1803and 1805 inspired the Padri rebellion in Minangkabau (180732),which derived its name from the Dutch who referred to returningpilgrims seeking to repeat the accomplishments of Wahhabis aspadres. By the 1890s, sailing vessels carrying cargo and independentpilgrims had disappeared from the Indian Ocean. These had begunto be replaced in the 1860s by steamers that travelled alongshipping lanes controlled by the British and Dutch colonial powers.29In 1884, the Ottomans established a Malay printing press in Meccathat was run by Shaykh Ahmad al-Fatani, the most famous ulamafrom Patani. Printing presses in the Middle East, and later Singapore,disseminated modernist and reformist developments in the Malay

world through journals such as al-Manar (The Lighthouse) and al-Imam (The Leader).30 The tumultuous events of the 1920s suchas the abolishment of the Ottoman caliphate and the definitiveWahhabi capture of the Haramayn in 1926 impacted MuslimSoutheast Asia. For example, the formation of the worlds largestMuslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), came out of the desirefor a Javanese protest delegation to be sent to Mecca.

As the impact of Salafism increased in southern Thailand, so didthe traditionalist backlash. Where successful, Salafism in southernThailand succeeded in substantially reforming Malay customary

Islam, Arabicizing the religious lexicon and introduced attire suchas the full-faced veil (niqab) for women. Even among communitiesthat rejected such reforms, aspects of traditional Islam were affected.This led to widespread confusion over Malay ethnic, cultural, andreligious identity and authority.31 While the decline in authority ofreligious leadership is not unique to either Islam or Thailand (asthe Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines and the Sangha inThailand demonstrate), what is unique in south Thailand is thetraditionalist elite being marginalized by both reformist elementsand the Thai state, as described below.32



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Revisiting Thai Interference

A point rarely raised in discussions of competing ethno-religiouselements in southern Thailand is that the entry of Islamic reformismnoted above roughly coincided with increased interference by Siameseand Thai governments. While this interference had commencedover a century earlier, the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 officially

brought the former Malay sultanate of Patani under Siamese control.During the reign of King Vajiravudh (r. 191025) who emphasizedallegiance to the Thai nation, monarchy, and Buddhism theCompulsory Primary Education Act of 1921 required all Malaychildren to attend Siamese primary school for at least four years.

In 1932, five years after Haji Sulongs return to Patani, the absolutemonarchy was replaced with a constitutional monarchy, and Patani

became one of Thailands three southern-most provinces.During the governments of General Phibulsongkhram (193844

and 194857), a range of ultra-nationalist polices were promulgatedwhose effects would last for decades. As well as enforcing the1921 Compulsory Primary Education Act, the Thai Custom Decree(Rathaniyom) became law in 1939. This forbad designations otherthan Thai and advocated a homogeneous society based on the Thaination, monarch and Buddhism. The Thai language was promoted

as well as a range of modern and Thai behaviours. Malays, forinstance, were forbidden from wearing traditional clothing.In 1945, the Patronage of Islam Act established the King of

Thailand as the patron of Islam in Thailand, and mandated thecreation of the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand (under theMinistry of Interior) which was headed by the Chularajamontri (orShaykh al-Islam) who would act as both the symbolic leader ofMuslims in Thailand and royal advisor on Islamic issues. On the

basis of the governments successful control of Buddhism throughthe Sangkharat, Surin Pitsuwan argues control rather than patronagewas its primary purpose.33 The lack of respect and interest in theChularajamontri in Patani, Yala, and Narathiwat is well known; asSurin explains, Malay Muslims preferred to follow their own ulamasuch as Haji Sulong who functioned as the de facto Shaykh al-lslam

before his death in mysterious circumstances.34

Legislation promulgated between 1960 and 1971 forced traditionalpondok schools to register as PSTI and required them to teach theThai national curriculum. The severity of the response to theseinitiatives is explained by the local importance ofpondok schoolswhich provide more than just a religious education. Through these



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schools, local Malay identity is constructed and maintained, and a

range of social and religious functions are performed. Thai governmenteducational initiatives led many Malay Muslims to pursue Islamiceducation in the Middle East and South Asia, which ultimately ledto the state having less control over Islamic matters.

With specific reference to Indonesia, Michael Laffan arguesreformism to have coexisted (rather than clashed) with sultans, andcolonial or postcolonial authorities until they attempted to intervenein defining or manipulating Islam. When this occurred, the seedsof violence on the disenchanted fringes of Islamic movements weresown.35 Thai interference, Salaf activism, and traditionalist resist-ance described above produced unprecedented change, diversityand division in southern Thailand, and provided the context inwhich violence could occur more easily. The persuasiveness of JohnSidels proposal that Islamic violence in Southeast Asia relates toits weakness rather than its strength is proven by its currency inrecent studies. McCargo emphatically denies suggestions of Islam insouthern Thailand as being resurgent, aggressive and wielding armswith a confident flourish. Rather, southern violence has emergedfrom the combined effects of fragmented, weak and insecure Islamicinstitutions, and a disappointed, dissenting, and divided Malay-Muslim community. Rather than religion, the conflict represents

a complex political problem centering on questions of legitimacy.Militant movements are one element of political dynamics broughtabout by the Thai states unsuccessful and corrosive attempts toco-opt Malay Muslim elites that resulted in their involvement inmanaging Muslim affairs being jeopardized.36

Reconsidering Islamic Credentials

Malay resistance has undergone a number of changes since thetime when movements such as GAMPAR (Gabungam Melayu Patani

Raya) and the Patani Peoples Movement (PPM) which employedorthodox guerrilla tactics, were led by the Malay elite, and weremotivated by Malay nationalism were active. Since 2004, militantshave employed a decentralized cell structure and attacks have been

better coordinated and increasingly sophisticated: Chaiwat Satha-Anand has described the militant movement as a network withouta core.37 Over and above militants being Muslims, what are theIslamic credentials of the insurgency? This author concurs withLiows assessment that assertions that Islam plays no role in southernviolence, or that it lies at the heart of it, are equally erroneous.



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Despite the dearth of information on its ideological drivers, Liow,

through interviews with past and present insurgents, and analysis ofthe contents of the limited booklets and pamphlets, finds a fairlycogent map of some ideological pillars.38 Many have proposedthat a radical Islamist ideology has been grafted onto nationalisticnarratives, which is corroborated by the presence of leaflets repletewithjihadirhetoric.39 Sungunnasil argues that as well as representingthe only authentic and detailed statement of radical Muslim militantviews in the deep South, Berjihad di Patani restates the strugglein explicitly religious terms (see below).40

The weakness of such claims are exposed by Chaiwat Satha-Anands study of violence in southern Thailand between 1976 and 1981that examined PULO leaflets found at the scene of insurgent attacks.Besides claiming responsibility, these leaflets offered justifications fortheir actions. These included emphasizing the distinctiveness andsuperiority of Islam, calls for unity among Muslims (to support theiraim of establishing an independent Islamic Patani state), claims thatfighting kafirs was a Muslim obligation, and that those who refusedto do so were hypocrites (munafik).41 Thus one can be legitimatelyskeptical of claims that jihadi rhetoric is either a post-11 September2001 or post-2004 development.

The most analysed tract in the post-2004 era is the Jawi booklet

entitled Berjihad di Patani, discovered on one of the victims ofthe April 2004 Krue Se mosque attacks.42 A number of rebuttalsof Berjihad di Patani have been written, including by Thai Islamicauthorities. The first and only one to have been written in Malaywas by Lutfi. In it, he addressed misperceptions about the role ofIslam in the conflict, and religious pluralism in Islam. He emphasizesthat only a recognized religious authority is permitted to declare

jihad, and that this was only possible after other avenues such asdawah had been pursued.43

There has been disagreement about the extent to which Berjihad

di Patani reveals traditionalist or Salaf positions on jihad. Theemployment of a range of invisibility and invulnerability medicine,and zikir (chanting of the names of Allah) in the April 2004 attacksis widely viewed as precluding the latter.44 Once again, there isnothing new in this. A number of studies have mentioned Sufitariqa (Sufi brotherhoods)being involved in past Malay separatistgroups.45 Despite advocating the Shafiite school of jurisprudenceand the restoration of the Patani sultanate (over a pan-Islamicstate), Abuza and Sungunnasil argue Berjihad di Patani to be asalafi-jihadi on the basis of its discourse on martyrdom (shaheed),



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and Muslim apostasy or hypocrisy (takfir).46 There are a range of

explanations for why most of the victims of the violence since 2004have been Muslims. While private vendettas, Buddhist militias, andthe involvement of rogue elements of the Thai security forces cannot

be ruled out, militants have also targeted Muslims declared to becollaborators or hypocrites. Abuza argues that militants insistencethat Islam is incapable of triumphing without having first beenpurged of corrupting impurities and incorrect interpretations leadsto the conclusion that a war is being waged against the Muslimcommunity. As such violence in southern Thailand is as much acultural war as a traditional insurgency.47

Does the presence ofjihadi rhetoric prove the existence ofa developed jihadi rationale? McCargo comes to a number ofnegative conclusions about Islam and jihad in south Thailand.Neither jihadi rhetoric, the role religious teachers and schools inrecruitment, swearing ceremonies, nor magic prove the conflict isprimarily a religious one: instead, it is regional. McCargo states,Islam has something to do with it, but it is not about Islam.Having dismissed Islamic goals or theology as motivations, McCargoproposes Islam to function as a rhetorical and legitimizing resourceand ideological framework that is selectively and pragmaticallyinvoked. By justifying jihad on the basis of injustice or aggression,

local jihadi ideology is viewed as simplistic, populist, lackinghistorical or theological foundations, and ultimately representingattempts to capitalize on popular global discourse about jihad.The abandonment of state programmes encouraging Islamic teachersto teach correct religious doctrines is cited as evidence of therelative unimportance ofjihadi rationale in the far south.48 This iscorroborated by Liows examination of unpublished Jawi works on

jihad which make no attempt to differentiate between general jihadand jihad qital (armed struggle); silence on jihad qital being fardkifaya (group responsibility performed by individuals) or fard ain

(individual responsibility); no mention of the imperative ofmujahidinrequiring parental permission; and silence on the details of religiousauthorities capable of mandating jihad qital.49

By contrast, Lutfis doctoral dissertation provides a thoroughconceptualization of Islamic and non-Islamic societies, and theeffects these have on the application of Islamic law in which Lutfiadvocates Muslim accommodation to different contexts.50 A numberof lands (dar) exist. The two most important are Dar Al-Islam(house of Islam) where a Muslim ruler is present and the sharia isupheld, and Dar Al-Harb (house of war). Others include: (1) Juristic



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Dar Al-Islam (distinct from the above by the presence of a Muslim

ruler who actively implements the sharia); (2) Nominal Dar Al-Islam(where non-Muslims allow Muslims to practise and implementaspects ofsharia, or Muslim rulers in Dar Al-Islam fail to implementsharia); and (3) Dar As-Sulh (Arabic for land of peace treaty whichis the transitory sub-category of Dar Al-Islam and Dar Al-Harb).

Lutfi affirms the defence of Dar Al-Islam as an individualobligation (fardhu ain), and that Dar Al-Islam is not converted intoDar Al-Harb by being ruled by non-Muslims. Rather, this requiresMuslims being unable to practise their major religious obligations.Whenever this happens, emigration (hijrah) is an obligation for allthose able to do so. This imperative of migration might explainShaykh Ahmad al-Fatani departure following Patanis defeat in1836.51 Aligning himself with classical scholarship, Lutfi foreclosesthe possibility of multiple Dar Al-Islams existing at the same time.Modern nation states are therefore considered excusable based on thejuristic concept of dhrurat (Arabic for emergency) that temporarilypermits the prohibited. Nevertheless, Muslims are required to useall possible means to rectify this situation. Liow acknowledgesthis amounting to support for a transnational caliphate of sorts,that runs contrary to conventional understanding of internationalrelations. This is, however a position that Lutfi does not explicitly

mention. Another issue addressed by Lutfi is Muslims living in DarAl-Harbbeing obliged to migrate to a Dar Al-Islam to avoid religiouspersecution and/or restrictions on religious freedom. However, it isnot obligatory for Muslims living in Dar Al-Harb whose religiousfreedom is guaranteed. Where an invasion or coup detatbrings aboutnominal Dar Al-Harb, Dar Al-Islam must be re-established through

jihad declared through a considered collective legal opinion basedon independent interpretation (ijtihad).Furthermore, if unsuccessful,neighbouring Muslims are obliged to offer assistance.

In addition to Lutfis insistence that Islam forbids the spilling

of Muslim blood, what is the relevance of his jurisprudentialclassification of lands and people to this discussion of the Islamiccredentials of the insurgence? First and foremost, Lutfis claimsthat the provinces of Patani, Yala, and Narathiwat are nominal DarAl-Islam differ from that of militants. Secondly, there is no strictdivision between Dar Al-Islam and Dar Al-Harb that is perpetuallyat war with each other. Nevertheless, Liow concedes ambiguity toexist on the obligation of Muslims in southern Thailand to reclaimformer Dar Al-Islam through jihad. Based on the classical scholars,which Lutfi aligns himself with, this is a possibility.52



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Local or Global Suspects

Many claims and counter-claims about the global jihad connectionin southern Thailand have been made. Commentators have notedthat the absence of suicide attacks and legal opinions (fatwa)suggests jihad does not exist. Rather than a pan-Islamic caliphate,the goal of the militants is the religious sacred community, ofan imagined Malay nation of Patani.53 Foreign operatives who havevisited southern Thailand have been treated with mistrust, and theiragenda to expand the conflict beyond the three southern provinceshas been rejected.54 Claims that decapitations have been inspired byinsurgents in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Middle East (who behead

their victims as a form of execution) are questionable as beheadingsin south Thailand are performed post-mortem. Rather than the localpresence of global jihadism, Camroux and Pathan argue for thelocalization of the global.55 These resemble proposals by Frenchsociologist Olivier Roy who argues Islamic neo-fundamentalismis both the product and agent of globalization. One of the effectsof globalization is the unprecedented numbers of Muslims livingoutside traditionally Muslim countries. One of the results of thisis neo-fundamentalists de-territorializing Islam by emphasizing thesupranational ummah over statist politics.56

I consider concern for, and questions about, foreign fighters beingpresent in the far south as misguided for at least three reasons.First and foremost, neither non-Malays nor Malays from elsewhereimported the jihadi fringe of the Salaf movement, al-Salafiyya al-

jihadiyya rather it was Patani Malay Muslim veterans of theAfghan Mujahidin who did so, such as those who founded GerakanMujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP). As is well known, success inAfghanistan against a superpower had an intoxicating, life-changingand radicalizing effect on these alumni, many of whom went on toform other networks.57

Second, religious developments in present-day southern Thailandhave historically featured mobile and multilingual Malays whoselect appropriate and mediate elements of Islam encounteredabroad. As many mobile polyglots were members of Southeast Asiashybrid communities, these have been referred to as Islams creoleambassadors.58 While most major streams of Islamic thought andpractice in the Middle East and South Asia are found in SoutheastAsia, the processes of selective appropriation, along with the presenceof pre-existing Islamic and non-Islamic features, resulted in localIslams resembling their Middle Eastern antecedents but withsome distinguishing features.59



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Third, increased disposable income, access to the Internet and

affordable air travel now perform the roles which steamers andprinting presses played a century earlier: Muslims in present-daysouthern Thailand are connected to the worldwide ummah withoutthe need to perform the hajorenrol in foreign madrasas or trainingcamps. John Bowen notes that treatments of transnational Islam areoften concerned with Muslim migration and transnational organiza-tions and neglect transnational Islamic space.60 Islams universalityis demonstrated in its ritual elements, institutional innovations,communication and history of movements. Arabic is not only thelanguage of the Koran, it is also the language in which mandatoryprayers (salat) are performed, and religious scholarship is written. Theimperative of seeking religious knowledge from the highest possibleauthority has contributed to the creation of networks of authority,learning and communication. While including recognized centres inthe Middle East, these also include a range of Internet sites, andcable television channels accessed by millions of Muslims, accessto which does not require Muslims to leave their locales.61

The importance of local mediators, long-standing connectednessand transnational Islamic space facilitated by the Internet allcontribute to local co-option of religious metaphors that legitimizeactions, increase appeal and further recruitment. What is surprising

is that the conflict has remained as insular as it has. This can beseen as confirming Yusufs thesis of Malays in the far south adheringto a highly ethnocized form of Islam.62

With regard to suggestions that analysts must decide betweeninternationalist jihadism and Malay ethno-nationalism as theinsurgencys ideological motivation, Sascha Helbardt claims theseelements are found together. For instance, jihad is mandated byPatanis invasion and occupation by the kafir Siamese. Liow addsthat despite appropriating a range of religious metaphors, and makingclaims of being involved in a religious conflict, insurgents in the

far south are motivated by local ideas and vehicles of transmission.Nevertheless, past grievances have been repackaged into a narrativethat provides further meaning and intelligibility for its consumers.While a range of extremist views have local currency, the conflictremains rooted in insecurity about cultural and ethnic identity,and historical grievances. While the importance ofpondok schoolsin recruitment and indoctrination is undeniable, this is not dueto the Islamic studies content of their curriculum. Rather, pondokfunction as conduits for disseminating local histories that emphasizenarratives of oppression and colonization. Liow therefore proposes



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religion to have animated the narrative of Malay ethno-nationalism,

injecting further meaning and intelligibility into the drive for self-determination. A point that has recently been emphasized by anumber of commentators is that the geographical footprint of thearmed insurgency has not changed for over one hundred years,remaining in the specific cultural, historical and political milieu ofthe Malay-dominated far south.63 The involvement of Muslims of bothSalaf and traditionalist orientation further confirm the absence oftheological coherence of this highly localized, diffuse and religiouslyeclectic insurgency.64

Conclusions

In discussing the role of religion in the southern insurgency there isa need to move beyond rounding up and the routine interrogation ofthe usual suspects. An example of this is the southern conflict beingincreasingly framed in the wider context of Thailands widespreadviolence and instability. This article has introduced new suspects inthe treatment of religious issues. Together with their involvement inIslamic affairs, which undermined local leadership and inadvertentlycontributed to creating a context more conducive to violence, thearticle has described the Thai militarys militarization of southern

Buddhist temples. A number of Buddhist militias also operate in thefar south, some of which have the Queen as their patron and theirpresence has contributed to violence occasionally demonstratingsectarian characteristics. Together with the controversial crushing ofthe Tamil Tigers by the Sri Lankan security forces in 2009, theseconfirm the presence of uncivil forces in Buddhist-majority countriesin Southeast Asia.65

In addition to including new subjects, the article moved beyonda routine interrogation of the usual suspects by drawing attentionto the impact of missionary activism in south Thailand, particularly

through the Salaf movement, which coincided with increasedinterference in Islamic matters by Bangkok. Together with a rangeof traditionalist reactions, these led to unprecedented divisionswhich created a context in which religious violence could moreeasily occur. I have not only raised questions about jihadi rhetorichaving been conflated with jihadi rationale, but that the latter isa recent development. I regard there being at least two reasons forquestions about foreign fighters being irrelevant. In addition to thepresence of transnational Islamic space, all Islamic movements arelocally mediated by mobile Malays, as demonstrated in the impact



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of Haji Sulong and Ishmael Lutfi. Avoiding the equally erroneous

assertions that Islam plays no role or that it lies at the heart of it,the religious ideology of Muslim insurgents resemble those elsewhere,but with a specific geographical footprint. This localized versionof the global is informed by an ethno-religious Malay Islam whichis competing with a Thai Buddhist state and security forces thatcontain uncivil elements.

NOTES

1 See Marc Askew, Conspiracy, Politics and a Disorderly Border: The Struggle

to Comprehend Insurgency in Thailands Deep South, Policy Studies 29(Washington, D.C. and Singapore: East-West Center Washington and Institute ofSoutheast Asian Studies, 2007); International Crisis Group, Southern Thailand:The Impact of the Coup, in Asia Report N129 15 March 2007 (Brussels:International Crisis Group, 2007); International Crisis Group, Thailand: PoliticalTurmoil and the Southern Insurgency, in Asia Report N80 28 August 2008(Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2008); Joseph Chinyong Liow, The Coupand the Southern Thailand Conflict, Crossroads 19, no. 1 (2008); DuncanJ. McCargo, Mapping National Anxieties: Thailands Southern Conflict, RUSI154, no. 3 (2009): 5461; Duncan J. McCargo, Thaksin and the Resurgence ofViolence in the Thai South: Network Monarchy Strikes Back?, Critical AsianStudies 38, no. 1 (2006): 3972; Chaiwat Satha-Anand, Untying the GordianKnot: The Difficulties in Solving Southern Violence, in Divided over Thaksin:

Thailands Coup and Problematic Transition, edited by John Funston (Singapore:Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008). For the global Jihad connection seeZachary Abuza, Conspiracy of Silence: The Insurgency in Southern Thailand andIts Implications for Southeast Asian Security (Washington, D.C.: United StatesInstitute of Peace Press, 2009); Peter Chalk, The Malay-Muslim Insurgencyin Southern Thailand: Understanding the Conflicts Evolving Dynamic, RandCounterinsurgency Study, Paper 5 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,2008); Peter Chalk et al., The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: ANet Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009); Aurel Croissant,Unrest in South Thailand: Contours, Causes, and Consequences since 2001,Strategic Insights 5, no. 2 (2005): 117; Rohan Gunaratna, Arabinda Acharya,and Sabrina Chua, Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand (Singapore:

Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2005).2 A.H. Johns, Perspectives of Islamic Spirituality in Southeast Asia: Reflections

and Encounters, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 12, no. 1 (January2001): 6.

3 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of ReligiousViolence, Comparative Studies in Religion and Society (Berkeley, CA: Universityof California Press, 2000).

4 On the issue of recruitment see International Crisis Group, Recruiting Militantsin Southern Thailand, Asia Report N170 22 June 2009 (Brussels: InternationalCrisis Group, 2008).



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5 David Camroux and Don Pathan, Borders of/on the Mind, Borders in Jungles:Islamic Insurgency and Ethno-Religious Irredentism in Southern Thailand, in

Promoting Conflict or Peace through Identity, edited by Nikki Slocum-Bradley(Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2008), p. 96.

6 See Michael K. Jerryson, Sacred Fury, Sacred Duty: Buddhist Monks in SouthernThailand(Santa Barbara, CA: University of California, 2008), p. 49. Also MichaelK. Jerryson and Mark Juergensmeyer, Buddhist Warfare (New York, NY: OxfordUniversity Press, 2009).

7 Duncan J. McCargo, Thailands National Reconciliation Commission: A FlawedResponse to the Southern Conflict, Global Change, Peace & Security 22, no. 1(January 2010): 8081.

8 For a discussion of the NRC, see ibid.

9 Jerryson, Sacred Fury, op. cit., p. 94.

10 Ibid., p. 151.

11 For more on militarized temples, see N.J. Melvin, Conflict in Southern Thailand:Islamism, Violence and the State in the Pattani Insurgency, SIPRI Policy Paper20 (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2007).

12 Michael K. Jerryson, Appropriating a Space for Violence: State Buddhism inSouthern Thailand, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 40, no. 1 (January2009): 9, 13.

13 Ibid., pp. 1333; Jerryson, Sacred Fury, op. cit., pp. 21029.

14 Duncan J. McCargo, Buddhist Democracy on Trial: Thailands Southern Conflict,in Religion and Democracy in Thailand, edited by Imtiyaz Yusuf and CananAtiligan (Bangkok: Konrad-Adenauner-Stiftung, 2008), p. 74.

15 Jerryson, Appropriating a Space for Violence, op. cit., p. 24.

16 McCargo, Buddhist Democracy on Trial, op. cit., pp. 63, 69, 71.

17 See Joseph Chinyong Liow, The Fluid Terrain of Islamism in Southeast Asia,NBR Analysis 19, no. 4 (October 2004).

18 International Crisis Group, South Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries,Asia Report N140 23 October 2007 (Brussels: International Crisis Group,2007), p. 19.

19 Duncan J. McCargo, Tearing Apart the Land: Islam and Legitimacy in SouthernThailand (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. 1920.

20 International Crisis Group, South Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries,

op. cit., esp. pp. 1421.21 Non-Violence International, Charged September/October, 2007 .

22 The above is based on the account in International Crisis Group, SouthThailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries, op. cit., pp. 2124.

23 Camroux and Pathan, Borders of /on the Mind, Borders in Jungles, op. cit.,p. 91.

24 John Thayer Sidel, The Islamist Threat in Southeast Asia: Much Ado AboutNothing?, Asian Affairs 39, no. 3 (2008): 34041. On the issue of torture, see



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Amnesty International, Thailand: Torture in Southern Counter-Insurgency(London: Amnesty International, 2009).

25 International Crisis Group, Understanding Islamism, Middle East/North AfricaReport N37 2 March 2005 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2005),pp. 1, 17.

26 For general treatments of the Tablighi Jamaatin South Thailand, see AlexanderHorstmann, The Inculturation of a Transnational Islamic Missionary Movement:Tablighi Jamaat Al-Dawa and Muslim Society in Southern Thailand, SOJOURN22, no. 1 (January 2007): 10730; Alexander Horstmann, The Tablighi Jamaat,Transnational Islam, and the Transformation of the Self between SouthernThailand and South Asia, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and theMiddle East 27, no. 1 (January 2007): 2640; Farish A. Noor, Pathans to theEast! The Development of the Tablighi Jumaat Movement in Northern Malaysia

and Southern Thailand, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and theMiddle East 27, no. 1 (January 2007): 725; Farish A. Noor, The TablighiJumaat Movement in the Southern Provinces of Thailand Today: Networks andModalities, Working Paper Series No. 174 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School ofInternational Studies, 2009).

27 For description of the kaum muda in Southeast Asia see William R. Roff,Kaum Muda-Kaum Tua: Innovation and Reaction Amongst Malays, 190041,in Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia, edited by Sharon Siddique AhmadIbrahim and Yasmin Hussain (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,1985), pp. 12332; William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism (KualaLumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1967), pp. 5690; William R. Roff, Patternsof Islamization in Malaysia, 1890s1990s: Exemplars, Institutions, and Vectors,

Journal of Islamic Studies 9, no. 2 (April 1998): 21028.28 The following provide summaries of Haji Sulong: Chalermkiat Khunthongpetch,

Haji Sulong Abdul Qadir: A Rebel or a Hero of the Four Southern Province(Bangkok: Matichon, 2004); Joseph Chinyong Liow, Religious Education andReformist Islam in Thailands Southern Border Provinces: The Roles of HajiSulong Abdul Kadir and Ismail Lutfi Japakiya, Journal of Islamic Studies 21,no. 1 (January 2010): 2958.

29 Michael F. Laffan, Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The UmmaBelow the Winds (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 36, 49.

30 For more on al-Imam and Al-Manar, see Abu Bakar Hamzah, Al-Iman: Its Rolein Malay Society 19061908 (Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1991); AzyumardiAzra, The Transmission of Al-Manars Reformism to the Malay-Indonesian

World: The Cases of Al-Imam and Al-Munir, Studia Islamika 6, no. 3 (October1999): 7597.

31 Yusuf, Faces of Islam in Southern Thailand, op. cit., pp. 9, 13.

32 Alexander Horstmann, Approaching Peace in Patani, Southern Thailand SomeAnthropological Considerations, Journal Asia Europe Journal6, no. 1 (January2008): 6263. Sidel, The Islamist Threat in Southeast Asia, op. cit., p. 349.

33 Surin Pitsuman, Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Study of the Malay-Muslims ofSouthern Thailand (Bangkok: Thai Khadi Research Institute, 1985), p. 103. Onrecent examples of Thai control and interference to influence the 2005 ProvincialIslam Committee elections see Duncan J. McCargo, Co-optation and Resistance



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in Thailands Muslim South: The Changing Role of Islamic Council Elections,Government and Opposition 45, no. 1 (January 2010): 99113; McCargo, Tearing

Apart the Land, op. cit., pp. 1920.34 Pitsuman, Islam and Malay Nationalism, op. cit., p. 147. For more on the

Chularajamontri, see Imtiyaz Yusuf, Islam and Democracy in Thailand: Reformingthe Office of the Chularajamontri/Shaikh Al-Islam, Journal of Islamic Studies9, no. 2 (April 1998): 27798; Imtiyaz Yusuf, The Role of the Chularajamontri(Shaykh Al-Islam) in Resolving Ethno-Religious Conflict in Southern Thailand,The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 27, no. 1 (January 2010):3153.

35 Michael F. Laffan, The Tangled Roots of Islamist Activism in Southeast Asia,Cambridge Review of International Affairs 16, no. 3 (August 2003): 39798.

36 McCargo, Tearing Apart the Land, op. cit., pp. 1920.

37 Cited in ibid., p. 181.38 Joseph Chinyong Liow, Ideology, Religion, and Mobilization in the Southern

Thai Conflict, in Radical Islamic Ideology in Southeast Asia, edited by ScottHelfstein (Westpoint, NY: The Combating Terrorism Center at Westpoint,2009), pp. 75, 79, 92, 94. For a portrayal of the various forms which religiousmotivation take, see Marc Askew, A Tale of Two Insurgents, Bangkok Post,19 July 2009.

39 Chalk, The Malay-Muslim Insurgency in Southern Thailand, op. cit., p. 12. Onmilitant leaflets, see Duncan J. McCargo, Patani Militant Leaflets and the Usesof History, paper presented at The Phantasm in Southern Thailand: HistoricalWritings on Patani and the Islamic World, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok,

1112 December 2009.40 Wattana Sungunnasil, Islam, Radicalism, and Violence in Southern Thailand:Berjihad Di Patani and the 28 April 2004 Attacks, Critical Asian Studies 38,no. 1 (January 2006): 128.

41 Sabrina Chua provides a summary of his main findings in Political Islam inSouthern Thailand: A Radicalisation?, paper presented at the InternationalSymposium on the Dynamics and Structures of Terrorist Threats in SoutheastAsia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 2005, pp. 6265.

42 Anonymous, Berjihad Di Patani[Waging Jihad in Patani]. Full English translationsof Berjihad di Patani are provided by Gunaratna, Acharya, and Chua, Conflictand Terrorism in Southern Thailand, op. cit., pp. 11845. For discussionsof its contents, see Joseph Chinyong Liow, International Jihad and Muslim

Radicalism in Thailand? Toward an Alternative Interpretation, Asia Policy 2(July 2006): 97103; Joseph Chinyong Liow, Muslim Resistance in SouthernThailand and Southern Philippines: Religion, Ideology and Politics, PolicyStudies 24 (Washington, D.C.: East-West Center Washington, 2006), pp. 3942;Sungunnasil, Islam, Radicalism, and Violence, op. cit., pp. 12430; Yusuf,Faces of Islam in Southern Thailand, op. cit., pp. 1415.

43 Ismail Lutfi Japakiya, Islam Agama Penjana Kedamaian Sejagat [Islam asthe Pathway to Harmony] (Alor Star: Pustaka Darussalam, 2005). See JosephChinyong Liow, Islam, Education and Reform in Southern Thailand: Traditionand Transformation (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009),pp. 12027; Joseph Chinyong Liow, Local Networks and Transnational Islam



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in Thailand (with emphasis on the Southernmost Provinces), in TransnationalIslam in South and Southeast Asia: Movements, Networks, and Conflict Dynamics,

edited by R.W. Hefner (Seattle, WA: The National Bureau of Asian Research,2009), p. 203.

44 For treatments of the attack on Krue Se, see McCargo, Tearing Apart the Land,op. cit., pp. 13839; Chaiwat Satha-Anand, The Silence of the Bullet Monument:Violence and Truth Management, Duson-Nyor 1948, and Kru-Ze 2004, CriticalAsian Studies 38, no. 1 (January 2006): 2930; Sungunnasil, Islam, Radicalism,and Violence in Southern Thailand, op. cit., pp. 12930.

45 Saroja Dorarirajoo, Violence in the South of Thailand, Inter-Asia Cultural Studies5, no. 3 (2004): 468. Referring to Pitsuman, Islam and Malay Nationalism: AStudy of the Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand, op. cit., pp. 25155. HughWilsons study of Tengku Mahmud Mahyiddeen mentions his reservations about

the spontaneous emergence of groups with magic-religious overtones associatedwith the invulnerability cults. See Hugh E. Wilson, Tengku Mahmud Mahyiddeenand the Dilemma of Partisan Duality, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 23,no. 1 (January 1992): 52.

46 See Imtiyaz Yusuf, The Ethno-Religious Dimension of the Conflict in SouthernThailand, in Understanding Conflict and Approaching Peace in SouthernThailand, edited by Imtiyaz Yusuf and Lars Peter Schmidt (Bangkok: Konrad-Adenauner-Stiftung, 2006), p. 181. On the increased acceptance of the nation-state, and the abandonment of the concept of the Islamic state within politicalIslamism see International Crisis Group, Understanding Islamism, op. cit., p. 6.

47 Zachary Abuza, The Islamist Insurgency in Thailand, Current Trends in IslamistIdeology 4, 2006 .48 McCargo, Tearing Apart the Land, op. cit., pp. 17677, 188.

49 Hassan Nikmatullah, Jihad Fi Sabillillah Pengertian Dan Bidang [TheUnderstanding and Call for Struggle in the Way of Allah], unpublishedmanuscript. For Liows treatment see Liow, Islam, Education and Reform inSouthern Thailand, op. cit., pp. 12729.

50 Liow, Islam, Education and Reform in Southern Thailand, op. cit., pp. 11320.Ismail Lutfi Japakiya, Ikhtilaf Al-Darayn Wa Atharu-Hu Fi Ahkam Al-MunakahatWa-L-Muamalat[The Effect of the Two Dars (Dar Al-Islam and Dar Al-Harb) onIslamic Personal and Transaction Laws], 2nd ed. (Cairo: Dar al-Salam, 1998).

51 Liow, Islam, Education and Reform in Southern Thailand, op. cit., p. 118. For

an excellent discussion of the important period between 1785 and 1838, seeFrancis R. Bradley, When Patani Became Pattani: The End of the MandalaState, 17851838, paper presented at The Phantasm in Southern Thailand:Historical Writings on Patani and the Islamic World, Chulalongkorn University,Bangkok, 1112 December 2009.

52 Liow, Islam, Education and Reform in Southern Thailand, op. cit., p. 119.

53 Sascha Helbardt, Autonomy of Southern Thailands Insurgency: Some PreliminaryInsights .

54 National Reconciliation Commission, Overcoming Violence with the Power ofReconciliation (Bangkok: National Reconciliation Commission, 2006), p. 37.



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55 Camroux and Pathan, Borders of/on the Mind, Borders in Jungles, op. cit.,p. 94.

56 Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (London: C. Hurst,2002). Neo-fundamentalism share: the conservatism and literalism of Islamism;salafisms concerned with the defence of a pristine Islam from external influences;and jihadist-salafism that emphasize physical external threats to Islam.

57 International Crisis Group, Understanding Islamism, op. cit., p. 16.

58 Christopher M. Joll, Islams Creole Ambassadors, paper presented at thePhantasm in Southern Thailand: Historical Writings on Patani and the IslamicWorld, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 1112 December 2009; Laffan,Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma Below the Winds,op. cit., p. 9; Laffan, The Tangled Roots of Islamist Activism in Southeast Asia,op. cit., p. 398.

59 Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, Between the Global and the Local: Islamism,the Middle East, and Indonesia, Analysis Paper9 (Washington, D.C.: The SabanCenter for Middle East Policy, the Brookings Institution, 2005), p. 16.

60 For an excellent treatment of transnational Islamic movements see, The NationalBureau of Asian Research, Transnational Islam in South and Southeast Asia:Movements, Networks and Conflict Dynamics (Seattle, WA: The National Bureauof Asian Research, 2008).

61 John R. Bowen, Beyond Migration Islam as a Transnational Public Space.

62 Liow, Ideology, Religion, and Mobilization in the Southern Thai Conflict,op. cit., p. 93.

63 Liow, Ideology, Religion, and Mobilization in the Southern Thai Conflict,op. cit., pp. 75, 79, 80, 92, 94. On the issue of geographical footprintsee Joseph Chinyong Liow and Don Pathan, Confronting Ghosts: ThailandsShapeless Southern Insurgency (Sydney, NSW: Lowy Institute for InternationalPolicy, 2010), pp. 23, 44.

64 Liow and Pathan, Confronting Ghosts, op. cit., p. 44.

65 International Crisis Group, War Crimes in Sri Lanka, Asia Report N191(Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2010).

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