Until now, the military operations of the Nordic War have only been studied as a whole, but not in the various and numerous territories and states in which it was fought. Portrayals of the war as a whole only give them a fleeting sketch. To simply review the great battles, such as Narva (1700) and Poltava (1709) will provide the historiography of the period with many worthy monographs, however, the result is that many other battles or actions are given either insufficient attention, or none at all. It is into this latter category that the Battle of Kalisz falls; fought on Oct. 29, 1706 between a Russian, Polish and Saxon army on the one side, and Swedish Corps with the Polish auxiliaries made up of supporters of Stanislaus Leszczynski on the other. To produce anything like a complete description of this battle, one must consult both Russian and Soviet works, as well as German and Swedish histories. All limit themselves to brief comments; in Carlson alone will one find even a superficial, two-page long description of the action. At the same time, though, the battle was by no means an insignificant one. The number of troops involved was considerable, and the battle would come to take on still great significance later on, when as a result of the political events of the time, these troops were rendered unavailable. It is therefore of no great surprise that both the battle itself and the complicated political situation that lay behind it awakened the interest of the prominent Polish historian of the period, Kazimierz Jarochowski. This indefatigable explorer of Polish history under the Wettin Dynasty has within his incomplete History of the Reign of August II a whole series of historical sketches and studies. It is in one of these studies, entitled “In the Saxon Era: Problems of the Internal Situation, Politics and War,” that one can find the only comprehensive portrayal of the Battle of Kalisz. This work was published 75 years ago (translator’s note: 1886), and today we have a different interpretation of several of Jarochowski’s portrayals. Additionally, the work suffers from the author’s incomplete understanding of the art of war at the time of the Battle of Kalisz. Thus this particular sketch is anachronistic to us, in spite of all of Jarochowski’s scrupulousness. In part this is due to the narrow range of sources at his disposal. This works include biographies of Charles XII by Adlerfelt and Nordberg, as well as the work of lesser, contemporary memorialistes like Zawisza and Otwinowski. To supplement these, he utilized handwritten notes contained within the files of the Saxon State Archives in Dresden. Although Jarochowski combed the Dresden files of the
history of domestic and foreign policy for this era for a complete and undamaged description of the Battle of Kalisz, he only found one report of military operations contained in this disorderly wealth of information. Thus one must compare and utilize these different sources with the greatest of care. Jarochowski was, in this respect, less than critical, and it considerable lessens the value of his work. One grave fault of his efforts was the absence of Polish sources, a fault which he, in a sense, compounded. It thus fell to me to discover such writings as existed in the Czartoryski Bibliothek in Krakow, and the Ossolinski Bibliothek in Breslau. They gave a much better picture of the military operations from the Polish side, and when coupled with the Swedish sources, they created a portrayal which could be considered accurate. In terms of the Russian side, we have not had their point of view at our disposal until recently. There was some doubtful material available at the Soviet archives to be had; but there is also the “Writings and Notes of Peter the Great” in which one would expect to find the materials from 1706 forward contained in Vol. 4. On the other hand, the original material was not difficult attain. Finally, one can use the extensive writings of Adlerfelt and Nordberg in Swedish publications. There were, in particular, several important sources that Jarochowski did not use in forming his portrayal of the Battle of Kalisz. I know of four such sources that fully corroborate one another. They are sketch maps. Three have their title and a heading in German, the fourth is in French. They are as follows:
1). One, by Adlerfelt, is colored. It is in two pieces: the upper portion shows the position of the troops in the various phases of the battle, under the name of their respective commanders. This map is most valuable, as it contains as description of the course of the action as well. 2). the second map is to be found in the 1742 German language edition of Nordberg. It is missing from the 1748 French edition. This German version is likewise colored. However, in contrast to Adlerfelt’s, it shows on the position of the troop deployments prior to the battle. However, it corrects some of the names of the unit commanders from Adlerfelt’s edition. 3). Carlson’s works contain a fold-out map that follows the written descriptions of the War Archives in Stockholm. It is twice as large as Adlerfelt’s map, but lacks the written descriptions of the latter. The troops engaged are indicated in red for the Russians, Saxons, and their Polish allies, and in blue for the Swedes and their Polish associates. 4). the final map is hand-drawn, in black, red and blue. It lies in the Czartoryski Bibliothek in Krakow.
All four fully corroborate each other, although the French-language explanations on the fourth suffer from poor legibility. In all probability, the first three derive from a common source. The fourth, from the Czartoryski Bibliothek is not the original from which they are derived. In fact, it is a copy from an earlier map produced in French. All are of importance in reconstructing this battle. It is all the more strange that Jarochowski did not utilize at least that of Adlerfelt, which he presumably had at his disposal. This leaves only the background material leading to the battle itself to cover. The general circumstances under which this action came about are well known. Thus, I will keep my descriptions short.
At the beginning of 1706, the Congress of the Confederation of Grodno adjourned. It had convened the preceding November from among the enemies of Sweden to craft a new joint strategic plan. The result was a plan for a two-pronged attack on the position of the Swedish army west of the Vistula, before Charles XII could intervene. The attack from the east was by means of Russian, Polish and Saxon troops, from the west by means of the Saxon Corps of Schulenburg. In January 1706, the Swedes attacked the Russian Corps in the region of Grodno, driving a portion of it to the east and encircling the remainder in Grodno itself. August the Strong escaped in good time with his cavalry, during which the remaining Russian troops no doubt were left to defend their fortified camp. The King demanded that Count von der Schulenburg march with his troops to join him in Greater Poland, although the latter’s corps was not yet battle worthy. For him to even suggest such an undertaking after such a short preparation time shows his sense of urgency: Schulenburg’s army contained considerable numbers of French, Bavarian, and Swiss elements which, although they had fought in the showplaces of the War of the Spanish Succession, had yet to be integrated into the Saxon Army. However, on Feb. 13, 1706 this force was engaged by the Swedish Corps of General Rehnsköld and heavily defeated at the battle of Fraustadt (Wschowa). With that defeat, the plans of the Grodno assembly for a pincer movement against the Swedes collapsed. Field Marshal Ogilivy (the Russian field commander) had to fight his way out of the converging Swedes, and led his troops on a long march back to the Ukraine. For their part, the Swedish Army undertook a pursuit of the fleeing Russians, slogging their way through the swamplands of Vohlynia. At this point, the Swedish King compelled some of the remaining szlachta to crown Stanislaus Leszczynski king. However, the threatened reprisals of the Swedes clearly did not work as well as hoped: only a few magnates—the Jablonowskis and a few of the Lubomirskis—spoke out for Stanislaus, albeit with a sense of alarm. The great majority of the szlachta realized, however, that in spite of the threats of plunder and death, that the Swedish bayonets could not keep the crown for Stanislaus, and continued in their support for August. Meanwhile, August and his supporters retraced their steps back to Krakow, and cobbled a new Saxon-Polish force together. A dozen Saxon Horse and Dragoon regiments in good order lay at his disposal. Also, a Polish contingent, composed exclusively of cavalry, entered into the city. Their supreme commander, after the death of Hieronim Lubomirski was the newly-designated Crown Grand Hetman, Adam Mikolaj Sieniawski. The bulk of the infantry of the Polish Crown Army maintained itself as garrisons in the fortified places of the Ukraine, in order to prevent the outbreak of any new Cossack or peasant revolts. Additional forces, including a portion of the Lithuanian Grand Ducal Army and the whole of the Russian cavalry, were collected into a command under the Crown Treasurer Ludwik Pociej.
Between these forces, August II accumulated a strong force of more than 15,000 horse near Krakow by July 1706. For several months however, from April to June, this force undertook no great actions against the Swedes. In Krakow, the fortified lines were strengthened by means of a peasant levy. These farmers were thus converted into fortification workers. Sieniawski took the opportunity to re-equip several regiments with new weapons and supplies, and prepared them for the upcoming campaign.
It was the King’s intent to assail Rehnsköld’s Corps in Greater Poland, and to crush it, thus bringing Posen under his control. From there, further operations were to begin; to the east, activities were to be coordinated with the Russians now concentrated in the area of Kiev. In addition, there remained the Streifkorps (translator’s note: fast-moving, raiding forces) of Śmigielski, Świnarski, and Prażmowski. To support them, August sent a detachment of Saxon dragoons, to Adam Śmigielski, the Starost of Gniezno, and charged him with the task of keeping the Swedes under constant harassment.
At the beginning of July, Rehnsköld set his corps in motion with a march in the direction of Krakow. Although August actually had something like 15,000 men at his disposal, he was fearful of being caught in a pincer movement between the Swedish forces of Rehnsköld and those of Charles XII, currently in Vohlynia. Therefore, he left a small garrison in Krakow and marched north with his force to Radom, to cross the Vistula at Warsaw. This crossing was actually carried out on July 14th, in the area of the village of Swiezé, opposite Maciejowice, with the help of a pontoon bridge. Afterwards, August united his army with the 6,000 man Lithuanian cavalry force under Hetman Michal Wísniowiecki and but upon encountering the Swedish Corps of General Mayerfeld at the village Brześc on the Bug River, he marched them around and pushed on over the Tykocin toward Novogradek. This move was curious, as Mayerfeld’s 4,000-man Corps was substantially weaker than his own, and they could easily have been annihilated. In all probability, the Swedish Corps probably owed their good fortune to the fact that the King was trying to initiate a new round of negotiations with Charles XII, and he simply wished to avoid any unfortunate contact with Mayerfeld’s force that could scuttle this initiative.
Throughout this long period, Charles XII had been unable to bring his pursuit of August in Poland to a conclusion. Whenever the Polish king escaped, he would collect to himself new troops, and take a new position in which to resist further penetration into the lands occupied by his supporters. This prompted the Swedish king to directly attack August’s ancestral Saxon lands, in order to force him to vacate the Polish throne. Charles calculated that after forcing the abdication of August, all of the magnates and szlachta would be forced to acknowledge Stanislaus Leszczynski as king, and to give him the full control over the military forces of the Polish Republic. With control over these Polish forces, he could then turn them against Russia. Thus, on July 18th, the Swedish Army left Jaroslawice near Łuck and headed toward Horodlo, despoiling the countryside along the way, and then united with Mayerfeld’s Corps and the detachments of Józef Potocki and the Sapiehas, and the other Polish supporters of Leszczynski. Charles XII’s troops crossed the Bug into Puławy, then crossed the Vistula and marched through Radom, Nowa Miastro, Rawa, Brzeziny, and finally Stryków. Rehnsköld’s Corps joined them there.
In Poland, the Swedish king had left only a small corps of 6,000 men under the command of Mardefeld, as well as some detachments of his Polish cavalry. He was determined to invade Saxony with the remainder, with himself at its head. This plan met with resistance on the part of numerous Swedish generals, who pointed out the great risks involved in undertaking an operation of this kind. The troops of August and the Russians could easily destroy Mardefeld’s Corps during the Main Army’s push into the hereditary Saxon lands, as well as cut them off from their main operational base and their flow of
reinforcements. Despite these objections, Charles busied himself with preparations. His troops crossed the Silesian border on Aug. 28th, near Sulmierzyce and began a two week march across Silesia, ending on Saxon soil at Bischofswerder. Leszczynski marched with the Swedish Army as well, accompanied by numerous Polish troops.
The Imperial Ambassador Baron Zinzendorf protested against this deliberate infringement of Austrian territory, through which the Swedish king had brought his army and himself. The progress of a strong Swedish army through central Germany generated a great fear for the Austrians, engaged at that time as they were in a bitter struggle against France. The anti-French Coalition had no guarantee that Charles XII might not ally himself with France, and overthrow Austria. For the opponents of France, these developments were fraught with peril. Thus, the Protestant Zinzendorf and the Ambassadors of the Sea Powers, i.e., England and Holland, remained with the Swedish Army to watch events unfold.
The danger was quickly apparent to August. The longer he remained to protect his Polish crown from the uncertainties of his position, then the more likely he would present his Saxon homeland to the prospect of devastation. Since Saxony was defenseless against a Swedish invasion, he determined to undertake the preliminaries to peace negotiations, in order to prevent the entry of the Swedish Army. Thus, on August 16, the King empowered two Saxon diplomats of his court to conclude a peace. These two officials, Kämmerpräsident von Imhoff and Privy Councilor Pfingsten met on Sept. 10th in Saxony with representatives of Charles XII and Stanislaus Leszczynski and negotiated the terms of the Treaty of Altranstadt. These negotiations ended with their signatures.
The terms were thus: August abdicated his Polish crown to Leszczynski, and pledged to commit himself to a return to his Electoral domains. He retained only the personal title of King, but not the royal status of the ruler of Poland. He was compelled to release all of his Polish subjects from their oaths of loyalty to him; all decrees and declarations made during the Nordic War by the Senate, the Estates, and the Congress of the Confederation of Grodno were declared void. The punishment of traitors was cancelled, and the Archives and Royal Insignia were to be returned from Saxony to Poland. The most humiliating clause, however, compelled August to turn over all Swedish dissidents, including Patkul, as well as all Russian officers and troops, over to Sweden.
August II was quite aware of what effects an untimely publication of his negotiations could have. His political advisors called for immediate military operations against Mardefeld’s Corps and Leszczynski’s adherents, both of which would be easily defeated. For the negotiations to be carried out in true secrecy, he would have to conduct a campaign in Greater Poland to cloak them. Thus, in the month of August, he sent the Royal Master of the Hunt, Zygmunt Rybiński with a mixed Polish and Saxon force to Krakow. This force left a garrison in the city itself, and then marched to Zips. Rybiński’s march was intended to encounter Leszczynski’s supporter, the Zipser Starosten Teodor Lubomirski, who was at the head of a marauding band of more than 1000 men. Rybiński’s other goal was the devastation of Little Poland. His detachment thus sacked Lubowla, the seat of the Lubomirskis, and blew its castle sky-high, while he himself directed the proceedings from the village square.
Rybiński then led the main force of the Polish-Lithuanian-Saxon army to Novogradek in the middle of September. He took them first to the area of Dublin, and next to Dubno, in the province of Vohlynia, where he joined forces with Russian auxiliary force commanded by Alexander Menschikov (translator’s note: Prince Menschikov replaced Ogilvy in command of these Russian troops). Their strength is difficult to determine. Jarochowski broke camp on Sept. 30th, and headed towards the camp of Jakubwice (near Lublin), and sent a report to the Saxon Privy Council in Dresden indicating that his force contained 10,000 regular cavalry, 6,000 Kalmuck irregular cavalry, 4,000 Cossacks and some 62 battalions of infantry. Given that a Russian infantry battalion had at that time an established strength of roughly 600 soldiers, this 62 battalions would total some 37,200 men. However, this total seems high, as it gives uniform manpower strength to units that had suffered damage through battles and marches. In all probability, the Russian infantry may have tallied as few a 20,000 men, especially since the main Russian military efforts were then being directed towards Livonia.
On Oct. 1, these troops left the Lublin area and sought the Vistula, including the Russian infantry, whom the Polish and Russian commands deemed would be unable to recross the Vistula. The newly-combined army also unified its Cavalry and Dragoon commands, in which the latter were to take the roll of infantry on the battlefield. The Saxon troops intended to cross the Vistula near Kazimierz Dolny, the Russians above it, and the Poles below it. For their part, the Swedish troops under the command of Maj. Gen. Arvid Axel Mardefeld remained in Poland, numbering some 6,000 men. This force contained the following elements: The Norra Skånske Cavalry Regiment under Col. Gustav Horn; the 3 German Dragoon regiments of Maj. Gen. Ernst Detlef Krassau, Col. Marschalck and Col. Müller; a Västerbottens Infantry Regiment commanded by Lt. Col. Gideon Fock; a Pommerska Infantry Regiment under Col. Carl Horn; Bavarian infantry regiment under Col. Heinrich Wilhelm Görtz; and finally, a battalion of Swiss infantry and another of French grenadiers, recruited from among the prisoners taken at Fraustadt and incorporated into the Swedish Army. These latter two were originally led by Col. Joyuese, and after his death, by Col. Johan Funck. The Västerbottens Regiment was in garrison at Poznań; the remaining troops under the command of Mardefeld camped for some 4 weeks on the banks of the Warta, until on Sept. 16 when they marched to the village of Wieluń. As this catalogue of units illustrates, Mardefeld’s command was composed principally of foreign regiments. The six long years of war had already exhausted Sweden to the point that there were few native recruits to be found. Thus, new formations were principally formed from foreigners, and even the older formations were given foreign recruits as replacements for casualties. The exact strength of the Polish units in the Swedish army and those of Leszczynski’s adherents naturally cannot be calculated with the same precision as those in the Swedish army proper. In determining the size and nature of the various commands, one has to take into account not only those units whose commanders went over to Leszczynski, but also the newly raised Western-type Kürassier units (as opposed to the traditional Hussars), as well as Dragoon and Infantry regiments. These were organized into several divisions under the command of the Crown Chancellor Jerzy Dominik Lubomirski, and several others of lesser note. The supreme command of the pro-Swedish
Polish forces went to the Voivoda of Kiev, Józef Potocki, who had been named Hetman by Stanislaus Leszczynski. Outside of these forces, a portion of the Lithuanian detachment of the Sapieha originally sent to support Charles XII could also be found in Greater Poland. The Sapieha family had raised a whole series of contingents, predominantly cavalry, likewise organized along the lines of Western-style Kürassier regiments, as well as a good dozen troops of light cavalry recruited among the Tartars resident in the grand Duchy of Lithuania. The overall commander of this force was the Lithuanian Grand Hetman Jan Kazimierz Sapieha, who had been raised to this office during the Sejm of Lublin in 1703. His main strength was concentrated in Widawa, although some light cavalry undertook numerous raid such as those actions taken against some of August’s insurgents or movements against their supply lines. To give one example, in the early days of October, the camp above the Vistula was set upon by Seniawski’s troop, and they set the horses of the troops encamped there loose. When Potocki came into contact with Mardefeld, he detached a 200-man unit to operate under the command of Lt. Nils Gyllenstierna to Piotrów. An additional detachment of 160 horsemen under the command of Maj. Oppenbusch was sent to protect Częstochowa against the well-led depredations of the enemy operating out of Krakow. Finally, scouting detachments of the so-called Vallacker (Wallachians) were sent out; they were a Polish-style organization of light cavalry in the Swedish service (translator’s note: they were not unlike the aforementioned Streifkorps in August’s service). They operated against Rybiński in the Krakow area, and against Śmigielski in the interior of Greater Poland. After the united Russian-Saxon-Polish troops crossed the Vistula, they pushed westward along parallel march routes. On Oct. 15th, the Polish detachment of Opoczno was raised and the Russians and Saxons occupied Piotrków. It was here that August II first heard news of the Treaty of Altranstadt, with the arrival of Pfingsten. He feared that an armed clash with the Swedes would destroy the peace treaty, so he tried to stop or at least delay the march against Mardefeld’s corps. At the same time, he sent Pfingsten back to Saxony with a brief for the Swedish generals in his possession, to inform them of the conclusion of the peace treaty, and urge them to withdraw to Posen by means of leaving them a direct route of retreat. However, these efforts by August came to naught. For although Menschikov indeed lobbied for a longer rest at Piotrków with a view to resting the exhausted horses, he was opposed in the Council of War by the two Polish Hetmen, the Crown Grand Hetman Sieniawski, and the Field hetman Stanislaw Rzewuski, along with the support of the chief of the Saxon Corps, General Brandt. Together they extorted the consent for a further advance. Simultaneously, they recalled the scouting detachments and ordered them to retrace their steps back to the main force. The unit commander’s wish for a battle was such that August felt that he could not opposes their united view.
Thus, on Oct. 22, the main army of the Saxon-Russian-Polish allies began a continuation of their march. The train was left behind and a strong advance guard was sent out front. The Advance Guard was led by Treasurer Atanzy Miaczyński and it included some 30 troops of Polish cavalry, along with several Russian Dragoon regiments, Cossacks, and Kalmucks under the command of Generals Rönne and Bauer. They were given the task of finding the location of the enemy. The two parties were therefore pushed, against the will of August, into battle.
At the same time, August’s attempt to warn the Swedish general had fallen through. Mardefeld had received the letter sent by August via Pfingsten too late. Pfingsten had not delivered it personally, but had given it over to the Swedish Resident in Breslau. When Mardefeld was informed of the approach of his mixed force of adversaries by Potocki, he directed his force to decamp from Wieluń on Oct. 11th. His corps pulled themselves over the Brzeżnica and moved a mile away to village of Kalinowa on the Warta on Oct. 13th. On the following day, Rittmeister Bråckenhielm arrived with the news that Potocki had withdrew from a battle near Widawa. In point of fact, there was such an action near Bużenin on the Warta, from which Potocki had nimbly withdrawn to go to Widawa. However, Kalmucks and Cossacks of the Advance Guard had suddenly fallen upon Widawa, and so when Bråckenhielm had arrived there, he found only marauding camp followers that, with the Kalmucks in pursuit, were trying to flee in the direction of Bużenin. Potocki sent 8 companies of cavalry to the support of Bråckenhielm, although the Kalmucks led them into an ambush by the Cossacks in a nearby wood by means of a feigned flight. These companies were scattered, and lost more than 100 men as a result. For Potocki, who had almost no infantry at his disposal, this ambush served as a warning, and he determined to retire on to the Swedish Corps. After the news of this action reached Mardefeld, he called for a council of his principle commanders. The troops fleeing from Widawa did not travel too far, before they were able to group in good order to be able to return to the attack against their opponents. At the Council of War, both General Krassau and Col. Müller spoke on the matter, urging that Potocki come quickly to their aid. Other Swedish commanders, such as Col. Marschalk and the two Horns, argued that as they could not depend upon the Poles, they should therefore not risk a battle against such superior forces and should instead immediately withdraw. In the end, it was decided that the infantry, together with the heavy baggage, would be sent to Posen via Kalisz, but that the cavalry would be sent to the aid of Potocki. Correspondingly, the command was divided and the plan was put into effect. As Mardefeld’s Corps advanced to the village of Charłupia, they learned that Potocki’s troops were a half-mile ahead of them. After the two corps united, they returned to Błaszki and later to Opatówek. Here a new Council of War was called, to which Potocki’s commanders were invited. Leszczynski’s Polish supporters wished to precipitate a battle while their foes remained in camp. The Voivode of Troki himself, Jerzy Sapieha, and Jan Grudziński, the leader of the Greater Polish insurrection in particular supported the proposal. On the basis of information from their scouting detachments, they assumed that their foes were not especially strong, and possessed few infantry. In addition, they felt that their previous clash at Bużenin had generated false conclusions as to the battle-worthiness of their foes, and that with Swedish support they could emerge victorious. The other Polish commanders, however, showed little enthusiasm for the idea, as their wives and children were in camp, and they believed that they’d be needed to protect them. They did, however, profess the bravery of their troops and themselves, so that in the end Mardefeld gave in to their wishes and decided to halt the march at Opatówek. On October 21st, August’s Hofmarschal Pflugk sent a messenger under the cover of a flag of truce to Opatówek, with the pretext of freeing a number of Chancery officials
who had been apprehended. He met with Mardefeld face to face (translator’s note: the original uses the interesting idiomatic phrase “under four eyes”), and read a message from Pflugk, explaining the situation concerning the pending peace treaty and the summons to Mardefeld to return. For Mardefeld, this was the first, totally unexpected news of the Treaty of Altranstadt, and it is of no wonder that he mistrusted it and the instructions it contained, especially without any corroboration from his own monarch. Nevertheless, he came to the conclusion that he’d avoid going to Kalisz and at the same time, he would try to steer Potocki and his troops northward, in the direction of the Warta. In this manner he intended to prevent the Pole’s search for a battle. However, Leszczynski’s supporters were dead set against such maneuverings, and they pulled the whole army toward the Prosna, and crossed it near Kalisz on Oct. 23rd, and raised a camp there. On the following day, Mardefeld sent Charles XII a courier seeking confirmation of the news of the peace treaty. The Swedish king informed Mardefeld he would be told of the actual state of the negotiations only when he completed his withdrawal. Certainly, that would be too late, what with the main strike force of the Allies relatively close, and Śmigielski on his way toward Poznan with a dozen troops of Polish cavalry and 2 Saxon dragoon detachments to cut him off. The Swedish army could, with their infantry and their extensive supply train, only maintain a slow march rate, during which their opponents, composed as they were exclusively of cavalry, would be able to overtake them as they wished.
The main force of the Saxon-Russian-Polish allies was meanwhile in this manner able to push into the area of Sieradz. On Oct. 23rd, their scouting detachments informed them that their Swedish-Polish enemy had begun to move in the direction of Kalisz. August and Menschikov remained in Sieradz with the Saxon infantry and a portion of the Russian force. Meanwhile, a Polish contingent consisting of Rybinski’s division and a portion of the Russian Advance Guard under the overall command of the Hetman was on Oct. 26th some 20 miles from Krakow and was closing in on the small town of Staw. On the next day, the remainder of the army under August and Menschikov followed, and the overall movement toward the Prosna continued.
The news of their arrival in Staw caused Potocki to once again advocate an attack. These proposals were once again rejected by Mardefeld, who fully understood that the low strength of their troops did no permit this. Nevertheless, on Oct. 27th, Potocki undertook a reconnaissance toward Staw with a dozen troops of light cavalry, but quickly returned without action, apparently shocked by the size of the enemy’s force. From this point on, he and Mardefeld came into a new, stronger conflict. A new council of war was called with the advent of Pflugk’s letters. In them, Sweden once again called for a cessation of hostilities; for this purpose they were to be granted, in the name of August II, a space of 48 hours in which to withdraw. To Mardefeld’s understanding, as the withdrawal route went through Śmigielski, a battle was therefore unavoidable whether he stayed at Kalisz or not, or whether he accepted the advice of his foes or not.
On Oct. 28th, the entire force of the Allies arrived at Prosna, and after only one evening’s stay, they were athwart the river at Kalisz. The Saxon and Russian force sat at Piwonice (5 miles to the south of the city), the Poles one kilometer further south, over the river. The question of crossing the latter was quite difficult---it lay in marsh land---and the bridge was quickly rendered useless. This compelled a division of the Crown Army on the right bank for the evening, but the remainder of the army crossed in the morning.
The allied troops, which had crossed in their order of battle, were quickly put into proper formation in the immediate neighborhood of their enemies. A collision between these two parties was now certain.
Kalisz lay on the Prosna River, and was one of the oldest cities in Poland. It had fallen into some decay, and now counted only some 1500-2000 inhabitants. The original settlement lay on the right bank of the Prosna, but at a later time the suburb of Tyniec had grown. Because of the frequent heavy flooding, and arm of the river had created an island, which was somewhat higher and less swampy than the surrounding area. Thus stood Kalisz in this period; it was the capital of the Voivode, and it played a long-established role in the life of the Republic. Although in the time of Kazimierz the Great, in the 14th Century, the walls had been torn down, a good defense could be made in the town together with the camp.
Nevertheless, Mardefeld decided not to fortify the city but to face his foes in the open lands to the northwest of Kalisz. The Prosna flowed past Kalisz from the south along the eastern and then northern sides of the city. At the point where it turned to the west, it forked and formed the island noted previously. Although the waters of the Prosna were not deep at this point, the area around was marshy and difficult to traverse. On the eastern “fork” of the Prosna, two brooks emptied into the river. The more southerly had a reasonably deep bank; the other, being located some 4 kilometers to the north of the city was especially swampy. Beyond the delta of the latter lay the small village of Kościelna Wieś. This village extended into a wood, which in turn projected some 5-10 kilometers distant. Some five kilometers to the west of Kalisz (and south of Kościelna Wieś) lay the village of Dobrzec. The battle took place on the open fields between these two villages. The Prosna and her two tributaries formed an isolated area with three sides, with the western side being open.
The strength of the combatants is in some dispute. The Saxon and Polish sources state a somewhat high strength for the Swedish troops; relying on the help of Carlson, who researched the exact strengths, it can be determined that there were 4358 soldiers in the Swedish Army at Kalisz. One can easily ascertain their location on the battlefield maps: 6 infantry battalions and 26 companies of cavalry took part in the battle. In addition to the above-noted troops, the Västerbottens infantry battalion remained in Poznan. By the same token, they probably mustered at less than full strength (an infantry battalion had at full strength 500 men; a cavalry regiment had 1000 men). It is rather more difficult to determine the strengths of their Polish allies, the followers of Stanislaus Leszczynski. Sources give strengths ranging from 9,000 to 16,000 men. However, Leszczynski’s full standing war strength in Poland mustered on a total of some 16,000 men, so it appears that no more than between 9-10,000 men would have been engaged at Kalisz. Even so, a portion of these troops were not with the main force, and a portion of Potocki’s force had suffered losses at Bużenin. Finally, Mardefeld and Potocki had some 10 cannon at their disposal, most likely of 3- to 6-pounders in weight.
For the Allied army, we can easily list the names of the Saxon regiment present, the names of their commanders, and locate them on the battle field. They include 9 regiments of heavy cavalry: the Chevalier Garde, the Mounted Life Guard, Regiments Küprinz, Köningin, and Prinz Alexander, as well as those of Lt. Generals von Buest and Colonels von Eichstädt, Damnitz, and von Gersdorf. After these, in precedence, came 5 Dragoon regiments, namely those of the Leibregiment, Lt. General von Brause, Maj.
Generals von der Schulenburg, von der Goltz, and Milkau. These regiments had a strength of 8,400, or 600 per regiment. As elsewhere, they were probably weaker, as a they show a listed strength of 50 squadrons, yet only 42 are shown on the maps. From this we can conclude that the previously listed troops had lost a quarter of their strength through their various field actions and marches. Note should also be made of the two Saxon dragoon regiments detached to operate with Śmigielski. One can thus safely conclude that that the strength of the Saxon troops at Kalisz numbered no more than some 6,000 men. This is the total given in the various sources.
Naturally, the strength of the Polish and Russian troops is more difficult to ascertain. The Crown Army detailed in the state lists of 1706 consisted of some 15,000 Horse, plus 5,640 Dragoons. However, the factual muster strength did not always accord with the estimates (Some of the total revenue for the soldiers was given over for the support of the officers). In addition, several of Lubomirski’s units had gone over to the enemy, or were at other places. One can thus conclude from the sources that a rough total of 10,000 Polish troops were operating with the Russians and Saxon, but this includes the detachments of Śmigielski and Rybinski. However, on should note that the 12 troops of these Streifkorps cavalry under the former belonged to the national levy, and were not part of the Crown Army per se.
The Russian army, as has already been mentioned, had 10,000 regular Dragoons, 6,000 Kalmucks, and 4,000 Cossacks. These numbers are probably high as well, so we should give the Allied army a rough strength of 35,000 men, making it about 50% stronger than that of their Swedish-Polish foes. They also had some 17 cannon, likewise of the 3- and 6-pound variety. However, one should note that the Russian Dragoon regiments also possessed small mortars, which were transported on horseback in pack saddles. These mortars would play a notable role in the battle (translator’s note: Wimmer never specifies when this happened).
August and Menschikov, as well as Mardefeld, must have spent the night of Oct.28-29 putting their regiments into a state of battle readiness. In the early morning, the troops of the latter moved along the banks of the winding brook, to where the village of Biskupie Smolane stood. Their battle formation was center on the heights of the village of Dobrzec. Several kilometers away, the Saxon, Russian, and Polish troops of August and Menschikov began to close in, the remainder of their army having crossed over the river in the morning. The Cossaks, Kalmucks, and a Russian mounted regiment were posted on the right bank of the Prosna, in the area of the suburb of Tyniec. The antagonists were separated from one another by long ditches and the banks of the brooks. To engage the Swedes in this situation was impossible; the Allied leaders directed their whole army to shift to the left one kilometer, so as to be able to cross a more open land and engage them enemy. It took one hour to reach their new positions. Accordingly, the Polish-Saxon-Russian army sought to utilize the elevation of the open land ahead of them in an attempt to mask their movements from the enemy. As these obstacles were overcome, the troops of the Allies now stood opposite of their foes, (translator’s note: they had apparently detected the shift), and had wheeled their force to take a new positions, in a line between Kościelna Wieś and Dobrzec.
Mardefeld’s formation stretched for no more than 3 kilometers. Its right was anchored on the swamps, and it’s left on the banks of the stream. The Prosna lay to their rear, and Kalisz was to their left. In this manner, the flanks and rear of the Swedish-
Polish army were secured by these natural obstacles, although any counter-attack would require going up to the higher ground where the Allied army stood. Mardefeld had massed the following troops: in the center stood the Swedish detachment in two lines, alternating units of infantry and cavalry. In the first line, from right to left, were the following: 3 companies of Col. Marschalk’s Dragoons, Col. Funk’s Swiss Battalion, 3 companies of the Norra Skånske Cavalry Regiment (Col. Gustav Horn), Col. Carl Horn’s battalion of Pommerska infantry, 3 more companies of the Norra Skånske Cavalry Regiment, 1 battalion of French Grenadiers, and finally, 3 companies of the Dragoon regiment von Krassau. The second line consisted of the following, deployed from right to left: 2 more companies of Col. Marschalk’s Dragoons, the 1st battalion of Infantry regiment von Görtz, 2 companies of von Müller’s Dragoons, General Mardefeld himself (most likely with a squadron of dragoons acting as a body guard), 2 more companies of Müller’s Dragoons, the 2nd battalion of von Görtz, and one company each from Dragoon regiments von Müller and Krassau. Thus, in the first line stood 15 mounted companies and 4 battalions of infantry; in the second stood 9 companies of mounted troops and 2 battalions of infantry. Additionally, a small force of 2 companies of Krassau’s Dragoon regiment was left behind in Kalisz.
On Mardefeld’s right flank stood Potocki’s command, consisting of Polish troops. They were deployed into 3 lines, in which the units on the outside edge of the command were somewhat “staggered” behind Kościelna Wieś.. 4 Dragoon detachments stood in Kościelna Wieś itself. The maps show 54 troops of Hussars and Pancerny, as well as 26 units of dragoons and Kürassier, although it is unclear as to how the command was subdivided (translator’s note: this indicates a mixture of old and new troop types).
On the left flank adjacent to the banks of the stream, Mardefeld placed the command of Michał Potocki, consisting of Sapieha’s (Lithuanian) detachments. It likewise stood in three lines.
The Swedish baggage train remained in the city, whereas Potocki’s troops erected a fortified camp to the rear of the army, centered on the marshy area. It had a series of wagons chained together, and was most certainly surrounded by a ditch.
The overall commander of combined army was Lt. General Mardefeld, and old and experienced commander, already the veteran of a great many campaigns. The Polish commander was not at his level of distinction, but he was a good cavalry commander who had to this point not held an independent command in a large battle. It is therefore understandable that Mardefeld place him on the ground to his right.
In the Allied army, the center was held by the Saxons and Russians, and like the combined army of Mardefeld, the Polish troops held the wings. To the left of the Russians stood the Saxons, formed in two lines. In the first Saxon line, from left to right, were the following units: the Leibdragoon regiment, then the Kürassier regiments Köningin, Kürprinz, von Buest, and Prinz Alexander, as well as the Leibregiment and the Garde du Corps. In the second line stood the following units: the dragoon regiments of von der Schulenburg and von der Goltz; the Kürassier regiments of von Damnitz, von Gersdorff, and von Eichstädt, and finally the dragoon regiments of von Milkau and von Brause. The overall Saxon commander was Lt. General Michal Brandt, who came from Holstein and was an old, seasoned soldier who had served in the Polish army in Sobieski’s day. During the Northern War, August frequently gave him command over the Saxon troops. Other commanders of note included Generals St. Paul, Kospoth, von der
Schulenburg, Rohlandt, Milkau, Plötz and Brandstein. The King himself took no specific command during the battle, but as we shall see, took an active role in it.
On the right of the Saxons stood the Russians, who marched out in three lines. Their commanders were Prince Alexander Menschikov, and under his command were Generals Rönne, Bauer, Pflug and Henski. Behind the third line stood a reserve, strong in mounted regiments. The Polish detachments stood in two lines, on both flanks, but their front ranks were positioned somewhat further back than the rear lines of the Russians and Saxons. To the left, on the Saxon wing, was Crown Grand Hetman Adam Mikolaj Sieniawski. On the right, on the Russian side, was the command of the Crown Field Hetman Stanislaw Rzewuski. These two Hetmen, like their counterparts in Mardefeld’s army, had no great prominence as battle captains, although during the Turkish campaigns had displayed no great deficiencies, either. Aside from them, other Polish commanders included the Voivoda of Krakow, Janusz Wiśniowiecki, and the Hofschatzmeister (Chancellor) Atanazy Miączyński, the Lithuanian Master of the Hunt Stefan Potocki, the Crown Master of the Hunt Zygmunt Rybiński, Colonels Józef Kalinowski, Marcin Cieński, Józef Brzuchowski, Adam Olizar, Jan Zachorowski, Dąbrowski, Stanislaw Granowski, and various others.
On the other side of the marsh, in a wood behind the village of Kościelna Wieś, lay Adam Śmigielski at the head of 12 troops of Polish light horse and 2 squadrons of Saxon Dragoons. Behind the Prosna were posted the Cossacks and Kalmucks, as well as a regiment of Russian dragoons, to hinder any flight away from the river. What little artillery the Allies had can be found as follows: 4 cannon with the Saxons, and 13 with the Russians,
Contemporary accounts of the action have it that supreme command of the allied army was not invested on a single person, but was in fact divided among the various Generals and Hetman. This was often the case in that era. In any case, neither King August nor Prince Menschikov acted as an overall commander.
The battle began at 3:30 in the afternoon, in an ominous atmosphere, as the sun sets before 5:00 PM in the waning days of October. At 3:00, the cannon fire of the Swedish-Polish force was met with twice its weight on the part of their enemies. Nevertheless, the Swedish cavalry stormed forward to the attack with great élan. On the Swedish right, Col. Marschalk led the attack, but their energy was soon slackened by the uphill climb. Marschalk’s three companies hit the Saxon Garde du Corps and Leibregiment, under the command of Generals St. Paul and Kospoth, who withstood the shock of their opponent’s assault and then began to push them back. However, an infantry battalion came to the aid of the retreating Swedish cavalry directly, and simultaneously, Col. Gustav Horn arrived in haste at the head of his Norra Skånske Cavalry Regiment. He broke the resistance of the first Saxon line, and along with Krassau, came to grips with the Russians, likewise rolling up the first line and then attacking the second.
The Allied center was in a grave situation. August, fighting bravely with sword in hand, lost hope of victory in an instant, especially since he saw the Swedish second line had already advanced to the aid of their brothers-in-arms in the first. The situation was saved in this most dangerous moment by General Brandt, who hastily advanced the Saxon dragoons of the second line and put the Swedes under a strong musket- and
cannon-fire. The result was that the Swedish pressure lessened, and after they fell back somewhat, order was restored in the Allied line.
Meanwhile, Potocki’s detachment had advanced along with the Swedish right flank, and engaged the enemy. A Kürassier squadron of Leszczynski’s supporters fought the Saxon Garde, and the considerable strength of Potocki’s force now constituted a menace to the Saxon flank. The Saxons were in luck, though as, these troops encountered the rear-most posted troops of Sieniawski, who then opportunely engaged them. Seniawski’s attack threw back Potocki’s division, and at the same time, Śmigielski, at the head of his Polish light horse and Saxon Dragoon detachments, advanced out of the woods and over the marsh near Kościelna Wieś. The pressure from the front and flanks together broke the resistance of Potocki’s troops, and they fled straight for their fortified camp. Elements of both Seniawski’s and Śmigielski’s cavalry undertook a pursuit, while the remainder attacked the now unprotected Swedish right flank and rear.
On the Swedish left flank stood the troops of Sapieha, who supported Horn’s attack on the Russians and who had like Horn’s troops suffered considerable losses in the process. Quickly, Field Hetman Rzewuski and his Polish cavalry on the Russian right flank advanced and put them under heavy pressure. The resistance of Sapieha’s troops was on the verge of breaking when Potocki’s contingent routed; Sapieha’s men soon joined them in flight. There only remained the Swedish troops, who valiantly attacked the center of the Saxon-Russian army, cutting into it like a wedge, while their flanks were exposed and their rear menaced. Twilight was descending, but the Swedes fought on, engaged on all sides and despite the fact that their camp was now doubtless in enemy hands. However, their seemingly irresistible power collapsed all at once. The whole Swedish corps had gradually been blasted into a single group, while the original order of the Allies remained intact, enabling them to surround the Swedes. A heroic charge by a part of the cavalry under the command of Maj. General Krassau succeeded in breaking through the Allied troops. Krassau saw that it was not possible to give any aid to his comrades, and so he set out with some 500 horsemen in the direction of Poznan. The remainder of the cavalry as quickly was quickly wiped out.
The infantry resisted longer, as the enemy’s attack was easier for them to resist. However, once the Allies wheeled up their artillery and opened up a murderous fire on the encircled Swedes in the fading light. Seeing that his situation was hopeless, Mardefeld sought a capitulation. His sole condition was that his officers retain their horses and personal property. After a three-hour battle, the Swedes grounded arms.
Several hundred Swedes had managed to cut their way out of the field to Kalisz, and together with the remaining detachments there, formed together a body of some 600 men. The King and Menschikov chose to plunder the city and the fortified camp immediately, and to this end, they brought up their artillery and opened fire. The shot opened a breach in the läger, but in view of the darkness, a storm was not considered. This was postponed until the next day. 6 Russian and 4 Saxon regiments were detailed to watch the läger and camp.
In the läger, Potocki had altogether more than a dozen troops of cavalry. He also had under his command the remains of various other detachments, as well as the women and children of numerous commands. That night, Michał Potocki, Jerzy Domnik Lubomirski, the Crown Quartermaster, and the Sapieha came to the castle and decided to hazard an escape attempt by an immediate crossing of the Prosna. At the head of several
hundred men, they reached the crossing point, and although several men did fall into the Cossacks posted there, the remainder fled in the direction of Konin. On the next morning, Oct. 30th, the remainder of the army in the camp under Potocki capitulated; that evening, the Swedes in Kalisz did as well. The city had suffered under a heavy artillery bombardment, with numerous houses going up in flames.
The Allied triumph was complete. Into captivity went the commander in chief, Mardefeld, and four senior officers, namely the two Horns (Carl & Gustav), Marschalk, and Müller, as well as some 100 other officers and more than 2000 Swedish soldiers. Of the Polish troops of Stanislaus Leszczynski, the prisoners included their leader, Józef Potocki, the Crown “Küchenmeister” Aleksander Lubomirski, Col. Skórzewski, and various other officers as well as 1000 soldiers. 10 cannon and over 30 standards and something like 5000 wagons were also captured. August gave the army’s War Chest and a portion of the prisoners to the Russians. An exception to this general disposition was made for Mardefeld, obviously in consideration for the Treaty of Altranstadt. The Swedish commander was placed in the care of August’s physician and treated most graciously.
When reviewing the course of the battle, one cannot escape the impression that only Mardefeld had a concrete plan of action. He wanted to attack the Allied center with his Swedish Corps and tie up the flanks of the Allies with Potocki’s and Sapieha’s troops. When he reached them, the Russians and Saxons were fully broken through and demoralized, but the ill-success on the flanks meant this the near-victory in the center lost its meaning. And with this defeat, the string of victories that had accompanies Swedish arms came to an end. General Brandt’s actions at this critical juncture in the battle was, in this sense, the pivot point which switched the momentum away from the Swedes and over to her enemies. Thus one can say that the decision of the battle came in the center. However, the successful actions of the Seniawski’s and Rzewski’s detachments on the flanks likewise had great implications for the eventual encirclement of the Swedes. In the event of an enemy victory on the flanks, the Russians and Saxons would have been fated to fall back on their camp.
The battle was also notable for the failure of Leszczynski’s Polish commanders to live up to their proud boasts prior to the battle. On the contrary, of all the other troops on the field that day, only the Swedes and certain specific elements of the Allied army held together, fought well, and gave as good as they got. There were in fact some contemporary accounts that the Polish, Russian, and Saxon commands all pulled in their various detachments with an idea of suspending action in mid-battle and repatriating prisoners. This groundless rumor may have been due to the fact that several units exploded into rout when various detachments had been recalled immediately prior to contact with the enemy. In such an instance, a successful commander would take care that the flight of a single detachment did not cause the whole force to retire.
The victory of Kalisz caused great shock. After the destruction of their only significant field army in Poland, nothing further remained in the Republic aside from a garrison in Poznan, some of Leszczynski’s detachments, and a few raiding detachments. The news of the reverse caused the desertion of many of Leszczynski’s supporters. August allowed many of them to renew their loyalty oath. In fact, the fleeing Lubomirski declared his return to the Confederation of Sandomierz, at the head of 6000 men. A liberation of the entire Republic was now only a matter of time, as their was nothing
available to seriously hinder the return of the Russian infantry after their plunder of Poznan. There only remained the troops encamped with Charles XII in Saxony, now fully cut off. It was not a rosy picture.
August, however, would not renounce the Treaty of Altranstadt. The day after the battle, he fired a Te Deum in thanks to God for the victory. Immediately afterwards he broke camp at the head of his troops and marched to Warsaw via Poznan, each now freed through his victory at Kalisz. There, he set his Swedish prisoners and their commander free. A month later, he marched to Krakow and then on to Saxony. There he remained, the victor of this unwanted battle, refusing to utilize the results to re-conquer Poland.
Thus, in retrospect, the battle was more important than the numbers involved would indicate.
Orders of Battle
The Swedish, Saxon, and Polish/Lithuanian orders of battle are detailed in the text.
Russian Order of Battle at Kalisz From Menshikov’s Relation
(Kindly provided by Vladimir Velikanov) 1st Line - Viborni (selected) Squadron Menshikov - Dragoon Regiment K. Renne (532 together with Menshikov's Squadron) - Dragoon regiment G. Phflug (660) - Dragoon Regiment B. Gagarin (450) - Dragoon Regiment P. Mesherski (605) - Dragoon Regiment G. Volkonski (611) - Dragoon Regiment M. v. Shults (566) - Dragoon Regiment G. v. Rosen (598) - Dragoon Regiment R. Bauer (512) 2nd Line - Dragoon Regiment M. Netlegorst (456) - Dragoon Regiment count v. Shauenburg (520) - Dragoon Regiment G. Gein (580) - Dragoon Regiment Y. Genskin (614) - 2nd Ingermanland Dragoon Regiment under A. v. Shtoltz (474) - Dragoon Regiment I. v. Millen-Felsen (480) - Dragoon Regiment N. Inflant (537) Reserve - Dragoon Regiment A. Volkonski (561) Total: 8,756
