Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONA.C. No. 3283 July 13, 1995RODOLFO MILLARE,petitioner,vs.ATTY. EUSTAQUIO Z. MONTERO,respondent.QUIASON,J.:This is a complaint for disbarment. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court resolved to refer it to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.On April 15, 1994, the IBP Board of Governors rendered a decision, finding respondent guilty of malpractice and recommending that he be suspended from the practice of law.IPacifica Millare, the mother of the complainant, obtained a favorable judgment from the Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra (MTC) which ordered Elsa Dy Co to vacate the premises subject of the ejectment case (Civil Case No. 844). Co, through respondent as counsel, appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Bangued, Abra (RTC). She neither filed a supersedeas bond nor paid the rentals adjudged by the MTC. The RTC affirmedin totothe decision of the MTC.The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed Co's appeal from the decision of the RTC for failure to comply with Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129 and Section 22(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines (CA-G.R. CV No. 11404). According to the CA, Co should have filed a petition for review and not an ordinary appeal (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 22).The judgment of the MTC became final and executory on November 19, 1986.On January 2, 1987, a Manifestation and Motion was filed by respondent as counsel for Co in CA-G.R. CV No. 11404, arguing that the decisions of the MTC and the RTC were null and void for being contrary to law, justice and equity for allowing the lessor to increase by 300% the rentals for an old house. Respondent, admitting his mistake in filing an ordinary appeal instead of a petition for review, prayed that he be allowed to file an action for annulment.On February 23, 1987, the CA gave due course to respondent's Manifestation and Motion and let the records remain with it. However, on November 10, 1987, the said court ordered the records in CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 to be remanded to the courta quo.On March 9, 1987, respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Decisions and/or Reformation or Novation of Decisions of the MTC and the RTC (CA-G.R. SP No. 11690), insisting that the decisions were not in accordance with existing laws and policies. On December 17, 1987, the CA dismissed the petition for annulment or novation explaining that . . . , aside from the reliefs provided in these two sections (Secs. 1 & 2, Rule 38), there is no other means whereby the defeated party may procure final and executory judgment to be set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation, unless (a) the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law, or (b) it has been obtained by fraud, . . . .There is no allegation in the present complaint to the effect that the judgments in the former cases were secured through fraud(Rollo, Vol. I, p. 35; Emphasis supplied).On January 15, 1988, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Set Motion for Reconsideration for Oral Arguments of the CA decision. The CA denied the motion. Again, respondent requested the CA to set his Motion For Oral Arguments on April 14, 1988.In a resolution dated February 12, 1988, the CA denied the Motion for Oral Argument and in a resolution dated October 18, 1988, denied the motion for reconsideration of the February 12 Resolution.Respondent then filed a Petition for Review onCertiorariwith this Court (G.R. No. 86084) questioning the decisions of the MTC and the RTC in favor of petitioner's mother. In a Resolution dated January 4, 1989, we denied the petition for having been filed and paid late on December 12, 1988 and November 12, 1988, respectively. A motion for reconsideration from such resolution was likewise denied with finality.Respondent filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Prohibitory or Restraining Order (dated July 6, 1988) in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690.On April 12, 1988, the mother of complainant filed a Motion for Execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 844. Respondent filed an Opposition to the Motion for Execution on the ground that the case was still pending review by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 and therefore the motion for execution was premature. On August 23, 1988, the MTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The RTC affirmed the order for the issuance of the writ of execution. Thus, a writ of execution was issued on October 18, 1988.On October 26, 1988, respondent filed a special civil action (SP CV No. 624) with the RTC, Branch 1, Bangued, Abra forcertiorari, prohibition,mandamuswith preliminary injunction against the MTC, Provincial Sheriff and complainant's mother, seeking to annul the writ of execution issued in MTC Civil Case No. 844 and RTC Civil Case No. 344. Respondent alleged that the order granting the writ of execution was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction since a petition to annul the decisions (CA-G.R. SP No. 11690) was still pending with the CA.On October 28, 1988, the provincial sheriff, Romulo V. Paredes, deferred the implementation of the writ of execution until the petition filed in SP CV No. 624 forcertiorariwas resolved. The CA denied in SP CV No. 624 respondent's Urgent Motion to Set Aside and Declare Null and Void the Writ of Execution.From the decision of the RTC, Branch 1, Abra in SP CV No. 624 denying the Petition forCertiorari, Prohibition,Mandamuswith Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory Order, respondent again filed an Appeal and/or Review byCertiorari, Etc. with the CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 17040).IIWe have no reason to reverse the findings of the IBP Board of Governors.Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to represent his client "within the bounds of the law." The Code enjoins a lawyer to employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client (Rule 19.01) and warns him not to allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case (Rule 19.03). In short, a lawyer is not a gun for hire.Advocacy, within the bounds of the law, permits the attorney to use any arguable construction of the law or rules which is favorable to his client. But the lawyer is not allowed to knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law. He cannot prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly groundless actions (Annotated Code of Professional Responsibility 310 [1979]). Professional rules impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary restrictions and qualifications (Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 579-582 [1986]).Under Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Implementing said Canon are the following rules:Rule 12.02. A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.xxx xxx xxxRule 12.04. A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial process, like the filing of dilatory motions, repetitious litigation and frivolous appeals for the sole purpose of frustrating and delaying the execution of a judgment (Edelstein, The Ethics of Dilatory Motions Practice: Time for Change, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 1069 [1976]; Overmeyer v. Fidelista and Deposit Co., 554 F. 2d 539, 543 [2d Cir. 1971]).The rights of respondent's client in Civil Case No. 844 of the MTC were fully protected and her defenses were properly ventilated when he filed the appeal from the MTC to the RTC. But respondent thereafter resorted to devious and underhanded means to delay the execution of the judgment rendered by the MTC adverse to his client. The said decision became executory even pending its appeal with the RTC because of the failure of Co to file a supersedeas bond and to pay the monthly rentals as they fell due. Furthermore, his petition for annulment of the decisions of the MTC and RTC which he filed with the CA (CA-G.R. No. 11690) was defective and dilatory. According to the CA, there was no allegation therein that the courts had no jurisdiction, that his client was denied due process, or "that the judgments in the former cases were secured through fraud."As ruled inRegidor v.Court of Appeals,219 SCRA 530 (1993):A judgment can be annulled only on two grounds: (a) that the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law, or (b) that it has been obtained by fraud. . . . (at p. 534).Moreover, when the CA ordered that the records of the case be remanded, respondent knew very well that the decision of the MTC was already ripe for execution.This Court, inPeople of Paombong, Bulacan v.Court of Appeals,218 SCRA 423 (1993), ruled:. . . [w]hen the judgment of a superior court is remanded to the trial court for execution, the function of the trial court is ministerial only; the trial court is merely obliged with becoming modesty to enforce that judgment and has no jurisdiction either to modify in any way or to reverse the same. . . . (at p. 430).(See also Valenzona v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 306 [1993] and Garbo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 250 [1993]).Respondent filed a total of six appeals, complaints or petitions to frustrate the execution of the MTC judgment in Civil Case No. 844, to wit:(1) Civil Case No. 344 Appeal from the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 844 of the Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra, with the Regional Trial Court, Abra;(2) CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Abra;(3) CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 An Action For the Annulment of Decisions And/Or Reformation or Novation of Decisions filed with the Court of Appeals;(4) G.R. No. 86084 Petition For Review OnCertiorarifiled with the Supreme Court;(5) CA-G.R. SP No. 17040 Appeal And/Or Review ByCertiorari, Etc. filed also with the Court of Appeals; and,(6) SP Civil Action No. 624 Petition ForCertiorari, Prohibition,Mandamuswith Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory Order filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Bangued, Abra.Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to forestall the execution of the same judgment, respondent is also guilty of forum shopping.InVillanueva v.Adre172 SCRA 876 (1989), the Court explained that forum shopping exists when, by reason of an adverse decision in one forum, defendant ventures to another for a more favorable resolution of his case. In the case ofGabriel v.Court of Appeals,72 SCRA 272 (1976), this Court explained that:Such filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the Court's processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to add,the lawyer who filed such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorneyto act with all good fidelity to the courts and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor (at p. 275).By having wilfully and knowingly abused his rights of recourse in his efforts to get a favorable judgment, which efforts were all rebuffed, respondent violated the duty of a member of the Bar to institute actions only which are just and put up such defenses as he perceives to be truly contestable under the laws (Garcia v. Francisco, 220 SCRA 512 [1993]). As correctly noted by the Committee on Bar Discipline "in filing a number of pleadings, actions and petitioner, respondent 'has made a mockery of the judicial processes' and disregarded canons of professional ethics in intentionally frustrating the rights of a litigant in whose favor a judgment in the case was rendered, thus, 'abused procedural rules to defeat ends of substantial justice'" (Report and Recommendation, IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, p. 2).WHEREFORE, respondent is SUSPENDED for one year.SO ORDERED.Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Jonar Santiago vs. Atty. Edison V. Rafanan, A.C. No. 6252, October 5, 2004

Facts:

Atty. Edison V. Rafanan, was allegedly notarized several documents on different dates and failed to: a) make the proper notation regarding the Community Tax Certificate (CTC) of the complainant; b) enter the details of the notarized documents in the notarial register; and c) make and execute the certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized.

On the other hand, Atty. Rafanan admitted having administered the oath but believed that non-notation of the Resident Certificates as well as not entering the details of the notarized documents in the notarial register was allowed. Notation of Resident Certificates are applied only to documents acknowledged by a notary public and was not mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending before courts and other government offices. He further asserted that this was a popular practice among notaries public in Nueva Ecija, some of whom were older practitioners.

Issues:

What is the rule on registry of notarial documents?

Held:

The court ruled in the negative. The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before them has presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification. They are also required to maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by them; and to give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding to the one in [their] register [and to state therein] the page or pages of [their] register, on which the same is recorded. Failure to perform these duties would result in the revocation of their commission as notaries public.

These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the degree of importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries public entering into their commissions are presumed to be aware of these elementary requirements.

It is intolerable that he did away with the basics of notarial procedure allegedly because others were doing so. Being swayed by the bad example of others is not an acceptable justification for breaking the law.

Disbarment, however, cannot be granted considering the nature of the infraction and the absence of deceit on the part of Atty. Rafanan. A fine of P3, 000 is imposed with a warning that similar infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely.

[G.R. No. 120592.March 14, 1997]TRADERS ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-INDEPENDENT,petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and EMMANUEL NOEL A. CRUZ,respondents.D E C I S I O NREGALADO,J.:Petitioner Traders Royal Bank Employees Union and private respondent Atty. Emmanuel Noel A. Cruz, head of the E.N.A. Cruz and Associates law firm, entered into a retainer agreement on February 26, 1987 whereby the former obligated itself to pay the latter a monthly retainer fee ofP3,000.00 in consideration of the law firms undertaking to render the services enumerated in their contract.[1]Parenthetically, said retainer agreement was terminated by the union on April 4, 1990.[2]During the existence of that agreement, petitioner union referred to private respondent the claims of its members for holiday, mid-year and year-end bonuses against their employer, Traders Royal Bank (TRB).After the appropriate complaint was filed by private respondent, the case was certified by the Secretary of Labor to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on March 24, 1987 and docketed as NLRC-NCR Certified Case No. 0466.[3]On September 2, 1988, the NLRC rendered a decision in the foregoing case in favor of the employees, awarding them holiday pay differential, mid-year bonus differential, and year-end bonus differential.[4]The NLRC, acting on a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution filed by private respondent as counsel for petitioner union, raffled the case to Labor Arbiter Oswald Lorenzo.[5]However, pending the hearing of the application for the writ of execution, TRB challenged the decision of the NLRC before the Supreme Court.The Court, in its decision promulgated onAugust 30, 1990,[6]modified the decision of the NLRC by deleting the award of mid-year and year-end bonus differentials while affirming the award of holiday pay differential.[7]The bank voluntarily complied with such final judgment and determined the holiday pay differential to be in the amount ofP175,794.32.Petitioner never contested the amount thus found by TRB.[8]The latter duly paid its concerned employees their respective entitlement in said sum through their payroll.[9]After private respondent received the above decision of the Supreme Court on September 18, 1990,[10]he notified the petitioner union, the TRB management and the NLRC of his right to exercise and enforce his attorneys lien over the award of holiday pay differential through a letter dated October 8, 1990.[11]Thereafter, on July 2, 1991, private respondent filed a motion before Labor Arbiter Lorenzo for the determination of his attorneys fees, praying that ten percent (10%) of the total award for holiday pay differential computed by TRB atP175,794.32, or the amount ofP17,579.43, be declared as his attorneys fees, and that petitioner union be ordered to pay and remit said amount to him.[12]The TRB management manifested before the labor arbiter that they did not wish to oppose or comment on private respondents motion as the claim was directed against the union,[13]while petitioner union filed a comment and opposition to said motion on July 15, 1991.[14]After considering the position of the parties, the labor arbiter issued an order[15]on November 26, 1991 granting the motion of private respondent, as follows:WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby ordered that the TRADERS ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES UNION with offices at Kanlaon Towers, Roxas Boulevard is hereby ordered (sic) to pay without delay the attorneys fees due the movant law firm, E.N.A. CRUZ and ASSOCIATES the amount ofP17,574.43 or ten (10%) per cent of theP175,794.32 awarded by the Supreme Court to the members of the former.This constrained petitioner to file an appeal with the NLRC on December 27, 1991, seeking a reversal of that order.[16]On October 19, 1994, the First Division of the NLRC promulgated a resolution affirming the order of the labor arbiter.[17]The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied by the NLRC in a resolution dated May 23, 1995,[18]hence the petition at bar.Petitioner maintains that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in upholding the award of attorneys fees in the amount ofP17,574.43, or ten percent (10%) of theP175,794.32 granted as holiday pay differential to its members, in violation of the retainer agreement; and that the challenged resolution of the NLRC is null and void,[19]for the reasons hereunder stated.Although petitioner union concedes that the NLRC has jurisdiction to decide claims for attorneys fees, it contends that the award for attorneys fees should have been incorporated in the main case and not after the Supreme Court had already reviewed and passed upon the decision of the NLRC.Since the claim for attorneys fees by private respondent was neither taken up nor approved by the Supreme Court, no attorneys fees should have been allowed by the NLRC.Thus, petitioner posits that the NLRC acted without jurisdiction in making the award of attorneys fees, as said act constituted a modification of a final and executory judgment of the Supreme Court which did not award attorneys fees.It then cited decisions of the Court declaring that a decision which has become final and executory can no longer be altered or modified even by the court which rendered the same.On the other hand, private respondent maintains that his motion to determine attorneys fees was just an incident of the main case where petitioner was awarded its money claims.The grant of attorneys fees was the consequence of his exercise of his attorneys lien.Such lien resulted from and corresponds to the services he rendered in the action wherein the favorable judgment was obtained.To include the award of the attorneys fees in the main case presupposes that the fees will be paid by TRB to the adverse party.All that the non-inclusion of attorneys fees in the award means is that the Supreme Court did not order TRB to pay the opposing party attorneys fees in the concept of damages.He is not therefore precluded from filing his motion to have his own professional fees adjudicated.In view of the substance of the arguments submitted by petitioner and private respondent on this score, it appears necessary to explain and consequently clarify the nature of the attorneys fees subject of this petition, in order to dissipate the apparent confusion between and the conflicting views of the parties.There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorneys fees, the so-called ordinary and extraordinary.[20]In its ordinary concept, an attorneys fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter.The basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with the client.In its extraordinary concept, an attorneys fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation.The basis of this is any of the cases provided by law where such award can be made, such as those authorized inArticle 2208, Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof.It is the first type of attorneys fees which private respondent demanded before the labor arbiter. Also, the present controversy stems from petitioners apparent misperception that the NLRC has jurisdiction over claims for attorneys fees only before its judgment is reviewed and ruled upon by the Supreme Court, and that thereafter the former may no longer entertain claims for attorneys fees.It will be noted that no claim for attorneys fees was filed by private respondent before the NLRC when it acted on the money claims of petitioner, nor before the Supreme Court when it reviewed the decision of the NLRC.It was only after the High Tribunal modified the judgment of the NLRC awarding the differentials that private respondent filed his claim before the NLRC for a percentage thereof as attorneys fees.It would obviously have been impossible, if not improper, for the NLRC in the first instance and for the Supreme Court thereafter to make an award for attorneys fees when no claim therefor was pending before them.Courts generally rule only on issues and claims presented to them for adjudication.Accordingly, when the labor arbiter ordered the payment of attorneys fees, he did not in any way modify the judgment of the Supreme Court.As an adjunctive episode of the action for the recovery of bonus differentials in NLRC-NCR Certified Case No. 0466, private respondents present claim for attorneys fees may be filed before the NLRC even though or, better stated, especially after its earlier decision had been reviewed and partially affirmed.It is well settled that a claim for attorneys fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services of a lawyer had been rendered or in a separate action.[21]With respect to the first situation, the remedy for recovering attorneys fees as an incident of the main action may be availed of only when something is due to the client.[22]Attorneys fees cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of the recovery is at the disposition of the court.The issue over attorneys fees only arises when something has been recovered from which the fee is to be paid.[23]While a claim for attorneys fees may be filed before the judgment is rendered, the determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to be held in abeyance until the main case from which the lawyers claim for attorneys fees may arise has become final.Otherwise, the determination to be made by the courts will be premature.[24]Of course, a petition for attorneys fees may be filed before the judgment in favor of the client is satisfied or the proceeds thereof delivered to the client.[25]It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that a lawyer has two options as to when to file his claim for professional fees.Hence, private respondent was well within his rights when he made his claim and waited for the finality of the judgment for holiday pay differential, instead of filing it ahead of the awards complete resolution.To declare that a lawyer may file a claim for fees in the same action only before the judgment is reviewed by a higher tribunal would deprive him of his aforestated options and render ineffective the foregoing pronouncements of this Court.Assailing the rulings of the labor arbiter and the NLRC, petitioner union insists that it is not guilty of unjust enrichment because all attorneys fees due to private respondent were covered by the retainer fee ofP3,000.00 which it has been regularly paying to private respondent under their retainer agreement.To be entitled to the additional attorneys fees as provided in Part D (Special Billings) of the agreement, it avers that there must be a separate mutual agreement between the union and the law firm prior to the performance of the additional services by the latter.Since there was no agreement as to the payment of the additional attorneys fees, then it is considered waived.En contra, private respondent contends that a retainer fee is not the attorneys fees contemplated for and commensurate to the services he rendered to petitioner.He asserts that although there was no express agreement as to the amount of his fees for services rendered in the case for recovery of differential pay, Article 111 of the Labor Code supplants this omission by providing for an award of ten percent (10%) of a money judgment in a labor case as attorneys fees.It is elementary that an attorney is entitled to have and receive a just and reasonable compensation for services performed at the special instance and request of his client.As long as the lawyer was in good faith and honestly trying to represent and serve the interests of the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for such services.[26]It will thus be appropriate, at this juncture, to determine if private respondent is entitled to an additional remuneration under the retainer agreement[27]entered into by him and petitioner.The parties subscribed therein to the following stipulations:xxxThe Law Firm shall handle cases and extend legal services underthe parameters of the following terms and conditions:A.GENERAL SERVICES1.Assurance that an Associate of the Law Firm shall be designated and be available on a day-to-day basis depending on the Unions needs;2.Legal consultation, advice and render opinion on any actual and/or anticipatory situation confronting any matter within the clients normal course of business;3.Proper documentation and notarization of any or all transactions entered into by the Union in its day-to-day course of business;4.Review all contracts, deeds, agreements or any other legal document to which the union is a party signatory thereto but prepared or caused to be prepared by any other third party;5.Represent the Union in any case wherein the Union is a party litigant in any court of law or quasi-judicial body subject to certain fees as qualified hereinafter;6.Lia(i)se with and/or follow-up any pending application or any papers with any government agency and/or any private institution which is directly related to any legal matter referred to the Law Firm.B.SPECIAL LEGAL SERVICES1.Documentation of any contract and other legal instrument/documents arising and/or required by your Union which do not fall under the category of its ordinary course of business activity but requires a special, exhaustive or detailed study and preparation;2.Conduct or undertake researches and/or studies on special projects of the Union;3.Render active and actual participation or assistance in conference table negotiations with TRB management or any other third person(s), juridical or natural, wherein the presence of counsel is not for mere consultation except CBA negotiations which shall be subject to a specific agreement (pursuant to PD 1391 and in relation to BP 130 & 227);4.Preparation of Position Paper(s), Memoranda or any other pleading for and in behalf of the Union;5.Prosecution or defense of any case instituted by or against the Union; and,6.Represent any member of the Union in any proceeding provided that the particular member must give his/her assent and that prior consent be granted by the principal officers.Further, the member must conform to the rules and policies of the Law Firm.C.FEE STRUCTUREIn consideration of our commitment to render the services enumerated above when required or necessary, your Union shall pay a monthly retainer fee of THREE THOUSAND PESOS (PHP 3,000.00), payable in advance on or before the fifth day of every month.An Appearance Fee which shall be negotiable on a case-to-case basis.Any and all Attorneys Fees collected from the adverse party by virtue of a successful litigation shall belong exclusively to the Law Firm.It is further understood that the foregoing shall be without prejudice to our claim for reimbursement of all out-of-pocket expenses covering filing fees, transportation, publication costs, expenses covering reproduction or authentication of documents related to any matter referred to the Law Firm or that which redound to the benefit of the Union.D.SPECIAL BILLINGSIn the event that the Union avails of the services duly enumerated in Title B, the Union shall pay the Law Firm an amount mutually agreed upon PRIOR to the performance of such services.The sum agreed upon shall be based on actual time and effort spent by the counsel in relation to the importance and magnitude of the matter referred to by the Union.However, charges may beWAIVEDby the Law Firm if it finds that time and efforts expended on the particular services are inconsequential but such right of waiver is duly reserved for the Law Firm.xxxThe provisions of the above contract are clear and need no further interpretation; all that is required to be done in the instant controversy is its application.TheP3,000.00 which petitioner pays monthly to private respondent does not cover the services the latter actually rendered before the labor arbiter and the NLRC in behalf of the former.As stipulated in Part C of the agreement, the monthly fee is intended merely as a consideration for the law firms commitment to render the services enumerated in Part A (General Services) and Part B (Special Legal Services) of the retainer agreement.The difference between a compensation for a commitment to render legal services and a remuneration for legal services actually rendered can better be appreciated with a discussion of the two kinds of retainer fees a client may pay his lawyer.These are a general retainer, or a retaining fee, and a special retainer.[28]A general retainer, or retaining fee, is the fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future services as general counsel for any ordinary legal problem that may arise in the routinary business of the client and referred to him for legal action.The future services of the lawyer are secured and committed to the retaining client.For this, the client pays the lawyer a fixed retainer fee which could be monthly or otherwise, depending upon their arrangement.The fees are paid whether or not there are cases referred to the lawyer.The reason for the remuneration is that the lawyer is deprived of the opportunity of rendering services for a fee to the opposing party or other parties.In fine, it is a compensation for lost opportunities.A special retainer is a fee for a specific case handled or special service rendered by the lawyer for a client.A client may have several cases demanding special or individual attention.If for every case there is a separate and independent contract for attorneys fees, each fee is considered a special retainer.As to the first kind of fee, the Court has had the occasion to expound on its concept in Hiladovs. David[29]in this wise:There is in legal practice what is called a retaining fee, the purpose of which stems from the realization that the attorney is disabled from acting as counsel for the other side after he has given professional advice to the opposite party, even if he should decline to perform the contemplated services on behalf of the latter.It is to prevent undue hardship on the attorney resulting from the rigid observance of the rule that a separate and independent fee for consultation and advice was conceived and authorized.A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to insure and secure his future services, and induce him to act for the client.It is intended to remunerate counsel for being deprived, by being retained by one party, of the opportunity of rendering services to the other and of receiving pay from him, andthe payment of such fee, in the absence of an express understanding to the contrary, is neither made nor received in payment of the services contemplated; its payment has no relation to the obligation of the client to pay his attorney for the services for which he has retained him to perform.(Emphasis supplied).Evidently, theP3,000.00 monthly fee provided in the retainer agreement between the union and the law firm refers to a general retainer, or a retaining fee, as said monthly fee covers only the law firms pledge, or as expressly stated therein, its commitment to render the legal services enumerated.The fee is not payment for private respondents execution or performance of the services listed in the contract, subject to some particular qualifications or permutations stated there.Generally speaking, where the employment of an attorney is under an express valid contract fixing the compensation for the attorney, such contract is conclusive as to the amount of compensation.[30]We cannot, however, apply the foregoing rule in the instant petition and treat the fixed fee ofP3,000.00 as full and sufficient consideration for private respondents services, as petitioner would have it.We have already shown that theP3,000.00 is independent and different from the compensation which private respondent should receive in payment for his services.While petitioner and private respondent were able to fix a fee for the latters promise to extend services, they were not able to come into agreement as to the law firms actual performance of services in favor of the union.Hence, the retainer agreement cannot control the measure of remuneration for private respondents services.We, therefore, cannot favorably consider the suggestion of petitioner that private respondent had already waived his right to charge additional fees because of their failure to come to an agreement as to its payment.Firstly, there is no showing that private respondent unequivocally opted to waive the additional charges in consonance with Part D of the agreement.Secondly, the prompt actions taken by private respondent, i.e., serving notice of charging lien and filing of motion to determine attorneys fees, belie any intention on his part to renounce his right to compensation for prosecuting the labor case instituted by the union.And, lastly, to adopt such theory of petitioner may frustrate private respondents right to attorneys fees, as the former may simply and unreasonably refuse to enter into any special agreement with the latter and conveniently claim later that the law firm had relinquished its right because of the absence of the same.The fact that petitioner and private respondent failed to reach a meeting of the minds with regard to the payment of professional fees for special services will not absolve the former of civil liability for the corresponding remuneration therefor in favor of the latter.Obligations do not emanate only from contracts.[31]One of the sources of extra-contractual obligations found in our Civil Code is the quasi-contract premised on the Roman maxim thatnemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari protest.As embodied in our law,[32]certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another.A quasi-contract between the parties in the case at bar arose from private respondents lawful, voluntary and unilateral prosecution of petitioners cause without awaiting the latters consent and approval.Petitioner cannot deny that it did benefit from private respondents efforts as the law firm was able to obtain an award of holiday pay differential in favor of the union.It cannot even hide behind the cloak of the monthly retainer ofP3,000.00 paid to private respondent because, as demonstrated earlier, private respondents actual rendition of legal services is not compensable merely by said amount.Private respondent is entitled to an additional remuneration for pursuing legal action in the interest of petitioner before the labor arbiter and the NLRC, on top of theP3,000.00 retainer fee he received monthly from petitioner.The law firms services are decidedly worth more than such basic fee in the retainer agreement.Thus, in Part C thereof on Fee Structure, it is even provided that all attorneys fees collected from the adverse party by virtue of a successful litigation shall belong exclusively to private respondent, aside from petitioners liability for appearance fees and reimbursement of the items of costs and expenses enumerated therein.A quasi-contract is based on the presumed will or intent of the obligor dictated by equity and by the principles of absolute justice.Some of these principles are:(1) It is presumed that a person agrees to that which will benefit him; (2) Nobody wants to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another; and (3) We must do unto others what we want them to do unto us under the same circumstances.[33]As early as 1903, we allowed the payment of reasonable professional fees to an interpreter, notwithstanding the lack of understanding with his client as to his remuneration, on the basis of quasi-contract.[34]Hence, it is not necessary that the parties agree on a definite fee for the special services rendered by private respondent in order that petitioner may be obligated to pay compensation to the former.Equity and fair play dictate that petitioner should pay the same after it accepted, availed itself of, and benefited from private respondents services.We are not unaware of the old ruling that a person who had no knowledge of, nor consented to, or protested against the lawyers representation may not be held liable for attorneys fees even though he benefited from the lawyers services.[35]But this doctrine may not be applied in the present case as petitioner did not object to private respondents appearance before the NLRC in the case for differentials.Viewed from another aspect, since it is claimed that petitioner obtained respondents legal services and assistance regarding its claims against the bank, only they did not enter into a special contract regarding the compensation therefor, there is at least the innominate contract offacio ut des(I do that you may give).[36]This rule of law, likewise founded on the principle against unjust enrichment, would also warrant payment for the services of private respondent which proved beneficial to petitioners members.In any case, whether there is an agreement or not, the courts can fix a reasonable compensation which lawyers should receive for their professional services.[37]However, the value of private respondents legal services should not be established on the basis of Article 111 of the Labor Code alone.Said article provides:ART. 111.Attorneys fees. - (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages the culpable party may be assessed attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of the wages recovered.xxxThe implementing provision[38]of the foregoing article further states:Sec. 11.Attorneys fees. - Attorneys fees in any judicial or administrative proceedings for the recovery of wages shall not exceed 10% of the amount awarded.The fees may be deducted from the total amount due the winning party.In the first place, the fees mentioned here are the extraordinary attorneys fees recoverable as indemnity for damages sustained by and payable to the prevailing part.In the second place, the ten percent (10%) attorneys fees provided for inArticle 111 of the Labor Code and Section 11, Rule VIII, Book III of the Implementing Rules is the maximum of the award that may thus be granted.[39]Article 111 thus fixes only the limit on the amount of attorneys fees the victorious party may recover in any judicial or administrative proceedings and it does not even prevent the NLRC from fixing an amount lower than the ten percent (10%) ceiling prescribed by the article when circumstances warrant it.[40]The measure of compensation for private respondents services as against his client should properly be addressed by the rule ofquantum meruitlong adopted in this jurisdiction.Quantum meruit, meaning as much as he deserves, is used as the basis for determining the lawyers professional fees in the absence of a contract,[41]but recoverable by him from his client.Where a lawyer is employed without a price for his services being agreed upon, the courts shall fix the amount onquantum meruitbasis.In such a case, he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services.[42]It is essential for the proper operation of the principle that there is an acceptance of the benefits by one sought to be charged for the services rendered under circumstances as reasonably to notify him that the lawyer performing the task was expecting to be paid compensation therefor.The doctrine ofquantum meruitis a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for it.[43]Over the years and through numerous decisions, this Court has laid down guidelines in ascertaining the real worth of a lawyers services.These factors are now codified in Rule 20.01, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and should be considered in fixing a reasonable compensation for services rendered by a lawyer on the basis ofquantum meruit.These are:(a) the time spent and the extent of services rendered or required; (b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (c) the importance of the subject matter; (d) the skill demanded; (e) the probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case; (f) the customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which the lawyer belongs; (g) the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the services; (h) the contingency or certainty of compensation; (i) the character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and (j) the professional standing of the lawyer.Here, then, is the flaw we find in the award for attorneys fees in favor of private respondent.Instead of adopting the above guidelines, the labor arbiter forthwith but erroneously set the amount of attorneys fees on the basis of Article 111 of the Labor Code.He completely relied on the operation of Article 111 when he fixed the amount of attorneys fees atP17,574.43.[44]Observe the conclusion stated in his order.[45]xxxFIRST.Art. 111 of the Labor Code, as amended, clearly declares movants right to a ten (10%) per cent of the award due its client.In addition, this right to ten (10%) per cent attorneys fees is supplemented bySec. 111, Rule VIII, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended.xxxAs already stated, Article 111 of the Labor Code regulates the amount recoverable as attorneys fees in the nature ofdamages sustained by and awarded to the prevailing party.It may not be used therefore, as the lone standard in fixing the exact amount payable to the lawyer by his client for the legal services he rendered.Also, while it limits the maximum allowable amount of attorneys fees, it does not direct the instantaneous and automatic award of attorneys fees in such maximum limit.It, therefore, behooves the adjudicator in questions and circumstances similar to those in the case at bar, involving a conflict between lawyer and client, to observe the above guidelines in cases calling for the operation of the principles ofquasi-contractandquantum meruit, and to conduct a hearing for the proper determination of attorneys fees.The criteria found in the Code of Professional Responsibility are to be considered, and not disregarded, in assessing the proper amount.Here, the records do not reveal that the parties were duly heard by the labor arbiter on the matter and for the resolution of private respondents fees.It is axiomatic that the reasonableness of attorneys fees is a question of fact.[46]Ordinarily, therefore, we would have remanded this case for further reception of evidence as to the extent and value of the services rendered by private respondent to petitioner.However, so as not to needlessly prolong the resolution of a comparatively simple controversy, we deem it just and equitable to fix in the present recourse a reasonable amount of attorneys fees in favor of private respondent.For that purpose, we have duly taken into account the accepted guidelines therefor and so much of the pertinent data as are extant in the records of this case which are assistive in that regard.On such premises and in the exercise of our sound discretion, we hold that the amount ofP10,000.00 is a reasonable and fair compensation for the legal services rendered by private respondent to petitioner before the labor arbiter and the NLRC.WHEREFORE, the impugned resolution of respondent National Labor Relations Commission affirming the order of the labor arbiter is MODIFIED, and petitioner is hereby ORDERED to pay the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS(P10,000.00) as attorneys fees to private respondent for the latters legal services rendered to the former.SO ORDERED.Romero, Puno, Mendoza,andTorres, Jr.,JJ.,concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 118746 September 7, 1995ATTY. WILFREDO TAGANAS,petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MELCHOR ESCULTURA, ET AL.,respondents.R E S O L U T I O NFRANCISCO,J.:Petitioner Atty. Wilfredo E. Taganas represented herein private respondents in a labor suit for illegal dismissal, underpayment and non-payment of wages, thirteenth-month pay, attorney's fees and damages conditioned upon a contingent fee arrangement granting the equivalent of fifty percent of the judgment award plus three hundred pesos appearance fee per hearing.1The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of private respondents and ordered Ultra Clean Services (Ultra) and the Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc., (PTSI) respondents therein, jointly and severally to reinstate herein private respondents with full backwages, to pay wage differentials, emergency cost of living allowance, thirteenth-month pay and attorney's fee, but disallowed the claim for damages for lack of basis.2This decision was appealed by Ultra and PTSI to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and subsequently by PTSI to the Court but to no avail. During the execution stage of the decision, petitioner moved to enforce his attorney's charging lien.3Private respondents, aggrieved for receiving a reduced award due to the attorney's charging lien, contested the validity of the contingent fee arrangement they have with petitioner, albeit four of the fourteen private respondents have expressed their conformity thereto.4Finding the arrangement excessive, the Labor Arbiter ordered the reduction of petitioner's contingent fee from fifty percent of the judgment award to ten percent, except for the four private respondents who earlier expressed their conformity.5Petitioner appealed to NLRC which affirmed with modification the Labor Arbiter's order by ruling that the ten percent contingent fee should apply also to the four respondents even if they earlier agreed to pay a higher percentage.6Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition forcertiorari.The sole issue in this petition is whether or not the reduction of petitioner's contingent fee is warranted. Petitioner argues that respondent NLRC failed to apply the pertinent laws and jurisprudence on the factors to be considered in determining whether or not the stipulated amount of petitioner's contingent fee is fair and reasonable. Moreover, he contends that the invalidation of the contingent fee agreement between petitioner and his clients was without any legal justification especially with respect to the four clients who manifested their conformity thereto. We are not persuaded.A contingent fee arrangement is an agreement laid down in an express contract between a lawyer and a client in which the lawyer's professional fee, usually a fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the action is made to depend upon the success of the litigation.7This arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction.8It is, however, under the supervision and scrutiny of the court to protect clients from unjust charges.9Section 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics states that "[a] contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness". Likewise, Rule 138, Section 24 of the Rules of Court provides:Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys;agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject-matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid thereforunless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.When it comes, therefore, to the validity of contingent fees, in large measure it depends on the reasonableness of the stipulated fees under the circumstances of each case. The reduction of unreasonable attorney's fees is within the regulatory powers of the courts.10We agree with the NLRC's assessment that fifty percent of the judgment award as attorney's fees is excessive and unreasonable. The financial capacity and economic status of the client have to be taken into account in fixing the reasonableness of the fee.11Noting that petitioner's clients were lowly janitors who receive miniscule salaries and that they were precisely represented by petitioner in the labor dispute for reinstatement and claim for backwages, wage differentials, emergency cost of living allowance, thirteenth-month pay and attorney's fees to acquire what they have not been receiving under the law and to alleviate their living condition, the reduction of petitioner's contingent fee is proper. Labor cases, it should be stressed, call for compassionate justice.Furthermore, petitioner's contingent fee falls within the purview of Article 111 of the Labor Code. This article fixes the limit on the amount of attorney's fees which a lawyer, like petitioner, may recover in any judicial or administrative proceedings since the labor suit where he represented private respondents asked for the claim and recovery of wages. In fact, We are not even precluded from fixing a lower amount than the ten percent ceiling prescribed by the article when circumstances warrant it.12Nonetheless, considering the circumstances and the able handling of the case, petitioner's fee need not be further reduced.The manifestation of petitioner's four clients indicating their conformity with the contingent fee contract did not make the agreement valid. The contingent fee contract being unreasonable and unconscionable the same was correctly disallowed by public respondent NLRC even with respect to the four private respondents who agreed to pay higher percentage. Petitioner is reminded that as a lawyer he is primarily an officer of the court charged with the duty of assisting the court in administering impartial justice between the parties. When he takes his oath, he submits himself to the authority of the court and subjects his professional fees to judicial control.13WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion the assailed NLRC decision is hereby affirmedin toto.Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

NAKPIL v VALDESFacts: Jose Nakpil was interested in a piece of property situated inMoran, Baguio.He went into an agreement with Atty. Carlos Valdes for thelatter to buy the property in trustfor Nakpil. Valdes did buy the property by contracting 2loans.The landstitles were transferred to his name. When Jose Nakpil died, Imelda Nakpil (his wife) acquired theservices of Valdes and his accounting and law firms for the settlement ofthe estate of Jose Nakpil. What Valdes did was to exclude the property in Baguio from thelist of assets of Jose Nakpil (he actually transferred the property to hiscompany, the Caval Realty Corporation) while including the loans hecontracted.What Imelda did was to file a suit for reconveyance in the CFI.While the case was pending, Imelda also filed an administrative complaintfor disbarment against Valdes.The CFIdismissed theaction forreconveyance.The CAreversed the CFI.The complaint for reconveyance went up to the SC and wasdecided in favor of Nakpil.The SC held that Valdes only held thelots intrust for Nakpil.Issue: W/n Atty. Valdes should be administratively sanctioned for hisacts, namely:oExcludingthepropertyinBaguiofromtheestateofJoseNakpil;oIncludinghisloansasclaimsontheestate;andoApparently,representingconflictinginterestswhenhisaccountingfirm prepared the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORNagainst the estate of Jose Nakpil, which was represented by his law firm.Held:The SC found Valdes guilty of misconduct and suspends him for1 year.The Court held that the first two acts clearly show that Valdesbroke the trust reposed on him by Imelda Nakpil when the latter agreed touse his professional services as alawyer and an accountant.It was clearthat Jose Nakpil and Atty. Came to an agreement that the latter would bebuying the property in trust for Jose.By his act ofexcluding the propertyfrom the estate and including the loans he contracted (and used for his ownbenefit) as claims, Valdes took for granted the trust formed between Joseand him (they had a close relationship since the 50s), which was the basisfor Imeldas decision to use his services.As to the third charge, wehold respondent guilty of representingconflicting interests which is proscribed by Canon 15 Rule 15.03.In thecase at bar, there is no question that the interests of the estate and that ofits creditors are adverse to each other. Respondent's accounting firmprepared the list of assets andliabilities of the estate and, atthe same time,computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly aconflictbetween the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that ofthe two claimants who are creditors of the estate.

[A.C. No. 4539.May 14, 1997]ROMANA R. MALIGSA,complainant, vs.ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING,respondent.D E C I S I O NPERCURIAM:ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING is charged by Romana R. Maligsa in a verified affidavit-complaint for disbarment with conduct unbecoming a lawyer for certifying under oath a Deed of Quitclaim dated 5 May 1992[1]over a piece of property subject of a pending civil case before the Regional Trial Court Br. 45, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, docketed as Civil Case No. U-5434.[2]On 11 March 1996 we required respondent to comment on the complaint. He failed to comply despite service upon him of our Resolution together with copy of the complaint.On 22 October 1996 we considered the failure of respondent Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting to file his comment as waiver of his right to do so and directed the case submitted for decision.On the basis of the complaint and the supporting documents, this Court finds sufficient legal basis for disciplinary action against respondent for making it appear in theAcknowledgmentof the Deed of Quitclaim in question that the affiant therein signed the document and acknowledged the contents thereof before him as Notary Public on 5 May 1992 when in truth and in fact the affiant did not and could not have done so.The evidence clearly discloses that on 5 May 1992 a Deed of Quitclaim was purportedly executed by one Irene Maligsa in favor of Juanito V. Abaoag over a parcel of land located in Cablong, Pozorrubio, Pangasinan.[3]The subject document was notarized by respondent on the same date. The document was apparently used as evidence against complainant in a pending civil case for annulment of OCT No. P-31297, quieting of title with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order plus damages.The complainant alleges that the Deed of Quitclaim could not have been executed and notarized on 5 May 1992 because the affiant Irene Maligsa died on 21 April 1992 or sixteen (16) days earlier.[4]Moreover, Irene Maligsa could not have signed the document because she "never knew how to write as she uses the thumb mark in every transaction she entered."[5]Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103[6]provides (a)The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under the official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.Furthermore, theAcknowledgmentcontained in the questioned document specifically provides"BEFORE ME personally appeared IRENE MALIGSA x x x x"[7]Clearly, the party acknowledging must personally appear before the Notary Public or any other person authorized to take such acknowledgment of instruments or documents.In the case before us, it would have been physically and legally impossible for the affiant Irene Maligsa to have executed the alleged Deed of Quitclaim on 5 May 1992 and to have personally subscribed to its authenticity and validity before respondent notary public on the same date, affiant having died on 21 April 1992. Also, it behooves respondent as a notary public to require the personal appearance of the person executing a document to enable the former to verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant.Quite importantly, this is not the first time that respondent has been involved in an act of malpractice in violation of his oath as a lawyer and the Canons of Professional Ethics.In the consolidated administrative cases ofValencia v. Cabanting,[8]the Court suspended respondent Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting for six (6) months from the practice of law. In those cases respondent purchased his client's property which was still the subject of a pendingcertiorariproceeding contrary to the prohibition stated in Art. 1491 of the New Civil Code and Art. II of the Canons of Professional Ethics. Under the circumstances, a recollection of the basic principles of professional ethics in the practice of law isapropos.A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession.[9]Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and protection of the interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts and the administrative offices generally.[10]Notarization of a private document converts the document into a public one making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity.As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon respondent and failing therein, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. By his effrontery of notarizing a fictitious or spurious document, he has made a mockery of the legal solemnity of the oath in anAcknowledgment.A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.[11]Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of his prior misconduct hereinbefore mentioned for which he was penalized with a six (6) month suspension from the practice of law, with a warning that repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely, the contumacious behavior of respondent in the instant case which grossly degrades the legal profession indeed warrants the imposition of a much graver penalty.ACCORDINGLY,the Court finds respondent ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING guilty of grave misconduct rendering him unworthy of his continued membership in the legal profession; consequently, he is orderedDISBARREDfrom the practice of law and his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately.Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all the courts of the land as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and recorded in the personal files of respondent.SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCAdm. Case No. 1474 January 28, 2000CRISTINO G. CALUB,complainant,vs.ATTY. ABRAHAM A. SULLER,respondent.R E S O L U T I O NPER CURIAM:What is before the Court is a complaint for disbarment against respondent premised on grossly immoral conduct for having raped his neighbor's wife.In the morning of January 20, 1975, while complainant was away, respondent Atty. Abraham A. Suller went to the complainant's abode in Aringay, La Union ostensibly to borrow a blade.As the respondent was a friend of the family and a neighbor, the complainant's wife let him in. Thereafter, respondent began touching her in different parts of her body. When she protested, respondent threatened her and forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. At that moment, complainant returned home to get money to pay for real estate taxes. When he entered the house, he saw his wife and respondent having sexual intercourse on the bed.1She was kicking respondent with one foot while the latter pressed on her arms and other leg, preventing her from defending herself.On January 23, 1975, complainant filed with the Municipal Court, Aringay, La Union a criminal complaint2for rape against respondent. The case was later remanded to the Court of First Instance, Agoo, La Union.On June 3, 1975, Cristino G. Calub filed with the Supreme Court the instant complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Abraham A. Suller.3On June 16, 1975, the Court required respondent to file an answer within ten (10) days from notice.4On July 14, 1975, respondent filed his answer. He denied the accusation as a fabrication.5On July 21, 1975, the Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report, and recommendation.6From 1975 until 1978, the Office of the Solicitor General conducted hearings where both parties appeared with their respective counsel. In a petition filed on November 6, 1978, respondent prayed for the suspension of proceedings pending final termination of Criminal Case No. A-420 pending with the Court of First Instance, La Union, Branch 3, Agoo.7On December 11, 1978, the Court referred the petition to the Solicitor General, the case having been referred to him previously.8In 1991, the investigation of the case was transferred to the Committee on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines. On August 28, 1991 the latter sent notice of hearings to both parties.9On January 23, 1992, the Committee issued an order terminating the proceedings and considering the case submitted for resolution as notice to complainant remained unserved while respondent failed to appear despite due notice.10On March 3, 1993, the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a resolution recommending that the disciplinary penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year be meted on respondent.11The record discloses that the Court of First Instance acquitted respondent Suller for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Such acquittal, however, is not determinative of this administrative case.The testimonies of witnesses in the criminal complaint, particularly that of the complainant suffice to show that respondent acted in a grossly reprehensible manner in having carnal knowledge of his neighbor's wife without her consent in her very home.A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.12In this case, we find that suspension for one year recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is not sufficient punishment for the immoral act of respondent. The rape of his neighbor's wife constituted serious moral depravity even if his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt in the criminal prosecution for rape. He is not worthy to remain a member of the bar. The privilege to practice law is bestowed upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally.13"Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but it must also be possessed at all times in order to maintain one's good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity."14WHEREFORE, respondent Abraham A. Suller is DISBARRED from the practise of law. Let his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.SO ORDERED.1wphi1.ntDavide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,concur

Arrieta vs Llosa

FACTS:A disbarment case was filed against Atty. Llosa by Pike P. Arrieta for allegedly notarizing a Deed of Absolute sale, wherein, vendors noted were already dead prior to its execution. Inanswer, respondent admitted having notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale. But before affixing his notarial seal, he first ascertained theauthenticityof the signatures, verified the identities of the signatories, and determined the voluntariness of its execution.

However, in a later date, the respondent sought to dismiss the disbarment case admitting to the fact the instant case is only aproductof misunderstanding and misinterpretation of some facts and is now convinced that everything is in order. The designated Investigating Commissioner of the IBP recommended the dismissal of the instant case. The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the above recommendation and resolved to dismiss the instant case afterfindingno compelling reason to continue with the disbarment proceedings.ISSUE:Whether or not Atty. Joel A. Llosa be disbarred or suspended from practice of law.HELD:YES. Respondent ordered SUSPENDED for six months from practice of law with a warning that another infraction will be dealt with more severely. Citing Section 1 of PublicActNo. 2103 also known as the Notarial law,the SupremeCourt explained theimportance ofadherence to said law as part of the responsibility of a duly deputizedauthorityto conduct such notarial process. Due diligence is to be observed, this being part of a lawyers professional responsibility and procedural lapse is not an excuse to cater to the convenience of clients. Any violation is tantamount to misconduct. Such misconduct is a ground for disbarment as stated by the Section 27 of Rule 138 ofthe Rulesof Court. Furthermore,the SupremeCourt stressed the primary responsibility of lawyers as stated in Canon I of theCode of Professional Responsibility that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. A lawyer must also refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counsellor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 ofthe Rulesof Court, all of these being broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional orprivatecapacity may be disbarred or suspended.

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 3248. September 18, 1992.]

DOMINGO R. MARCELO,Petitioner, v. ATTY. ADRIANO S. JAVIER, SR.,Respondent.

Vicente Peala forPetitioner.

In a verified letter-complaint 1 dated May 19, 1988, complainant Domingo R. Marcelo charges respondent Atty. Adriano S. Javier, Sr. with conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in connection with a transaction over complainants residential lot as security for a loan. Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and the resolution of the Court en banc of April 12, 1988, the present administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline for investigation, report and recommendation.

The said letter-complaint, along with complainants affidavit 2 required in the order dated April 5, 1989 of the said IBP commission, set forth complainants material allegations on his plaint. It appears that on November 13, 1984 complainant mortgaged his unregistered land consisting of 1,045 square meters located at Cambaog, Bustos, Bulacan to mortgagee Sy Hun Tek as security for a loan in the alleged amount of P80,000.00 payable on November 15, 1985 with legal interest, with the deed of mortgage having been prepared and notarized by respondent as the family lawyer of the mortgagee.

Of the alleged amount of the loan, complainant only received P50,000.00 from which was deducted P2,500.00 as first installment or the loan for the month of December, 1984, and a further amount of P5,000.00 was taken by respondent for the titling of said property under Act. No. 496. In effect, complainant only received the actual amount of P42,500.00.

As of the filing of the instant administrative case, respondent had not yet caused the mortgaged property to be duly titled. Complainant was not given a copy of the mortgage deed, much less the chance to read the same, and he learned of the contents of said deed only when he secured a certified true xerox copy thereof from the Records Management and Archives Office in Manila.

Upon complainants default on two months installments on the loan, respondent went to the house of complainant at a time when the latter was sick and asked him to sign some papers which respondent told complainant were merely to confirm the latters obligation to Sy Hun Tek. Relying thereon and because of his confidence in respondent, complainant signed the papers without being given copies thereof.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

A few weeks thereafter, complainant learned that the mortgaged property had been foreclosed and sold to one Enrico Perez, a resident of the place where the land is situated. There was no public auction nor the posting of appropriate notices thereof as prescribed by law. Moreover, the sale of the mortgaged property by Sy Hun Tek to Perez was within the redemption period.

Complainant, with the assistance of his present counsel, wrote to Enrico Perez indicating his desire to redeem the property but the letter was never answered. He likewise approached respondent to solicit the latters help to redeem said property but respondent refused to extend any help and told complainant not to worry because his obligation to Sy Hun Tek had already been settled thereby.

The pertinent portions of the mortgage contract 3 adverted to above further provide as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . ., the MORTGAGOR hereby by these presents, cede(s), assign(s) and transfer(s) all his rights, interests, and participation, by way of FIRST MORTGAGE, unto herein MORTGAGEE, his heirs, assigns and successors-in-interests (sic), the above-described parcel of land subject to the following terms and conditions, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. That the MORTGAGOR shall pay in full the loan obligation on or before November 15, 1985, with the legal rate of interest;

2. That MORTGAGOR shall caused (sic) to be paid the loan of P80,000.00 by way of installments in accordance with the following schedule, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1st December 15, 1984 P 2,500.00

2nd January 15, 1985 2,500.00

3rd February 15, 1985 2,500.00

12,500.00

4th March 15, 1985 2,500.00

5th April 15, 1985 2,500.00

6th May 15, 1985 2,500.00

12,500.00

7th June 15, 1985 2,500.00

8th July 15, 1985 2,500.00

9th August 15, 1985 2,500.00

12,500.00

10th September 15, 1985 2,500.00

11th October 15, 1985 2,500.00

12th November 15, 1985 2,500.00

12,500.00

_________

P80,000.00.

Plus the expenses for the

issuance of title 5,000.00

___________

TOTAL P85,000.00

xxx

"3. That provided, however, that if I, DOMINGO R. MARCELO, MORTGAGOR, shall pay or cause to be paid to the said SY HUN TEK, MORTGAGEE, his heirs or assigns, the said sum of EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS (P80,000.00), within the period of ONE (1) year from and after the execution of this mortgage, together with the legal rate of interest, then this MORTGAGE shall be discharged and of no effect; otherwise, I hereby agree that the said MORTGAGEE, may enforce his rights herein without judicial proceedings by causing the above-described property to be sold at Provincial Capitol after giving notice of sale for 20 days posted in at least three public places of the Municipality of Bustos, Bulacan, said sale to take place on a business day between 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. at the municipal building at said municipality, under the direction of a notary public of said municipality, the justice or auxiliary justice of the peace of the municipality, or the provincial sheriff, in accordance with Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118;"

xxx

For his part and in compliance with the order dated August 15, 1988 4 of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, respondent filed his verified answer 5 specifically denying that he was the one who prepared the deed of real estate mortgage, contending that the same was merely acknowledged before him by the parties thereto. He alleged that under the mortgage deed. complainant was under obligation to pay P80,000.00 plus P5,000.00 for titling of the subject property upon maturity, but despite receipt of said amount in cash from the mortgagee through the latters brother, Sy Hun Kiong, as evidenced by cash vouchers dated November 12, 1984, 6 complainant did not pay the sum of P5,000.00 and the costs of documentation and notarization of the mortgage deed. Respondent took two (2) copies thereof, one for himself and another for the Clerk of Court, while the rest of the copies were given to complainant and Sy Hun Tek.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Complainant having thereafter defaulted in his installment payments. he approached Sy Hun Kiong, brother of the mortgagee, offering to sell his mortgaged property in payment of the loan obligation and, together, they sought respondents legal advice on the effects of a dation in payment. After a week, or on August 26, 1985, Sy Hun Kiong. Sy Hun Tek and complainant returned to respondents law office and requested respondent to prepare the dation in payment which, inter alia, provided as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . the VENDOR MORTGAGOR hereby by these presents, waives, cedes, and assigns, all his rights, interest and participation (i)n the above-described property by way of DACION EN PACO (DATION IN PAYMENT), unto herein VENDEE-MORTGAGEE, his heirs, assigns and successors-in-interests (sic) subject to the following terms and conditions to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. That upon the signing of this agreement the VENDOR-MORTGAGOR shall be free and release(d) of all his existing obligation to the VENDEE-MORTGAGEE in the amount of P80,000.00 including interest and other such charges;

2. That the VENDOR-MORTGAGOR shall pay and shoulder the corresponding documentation and notarization expenses;

3. That the VENDOR-MORTGAGOR likewise waive(s) and transfer(s) all his rights, interests and participations over the subject property to the VENDEE-MORTGAGEE, including the right to take physical possession of the same;chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

4. That the VENDOR-MORTGAGOR shall guarantee the peaceful possession and enjoyment of right of the VENDEE-MORTGAGEE from any cause of action adversely (a)ffecting the mortgage rights and interests of the VENDEE-MORTGAGEE and assume to pay all expenses that may be incurred in connection with the said documents;

5. That the VENDOR-MORTGAGOR shall upon the signing of the AGREEMENT pay all the necessary taxes and assessment covering said property;

6. The parties bound themselves that the deed of Real Estate Mortgage shall be considered without force and effect by virtue of this AGREEMENT;

7. It is understood that this AGREEMENT was executed for the purpose of liquidating the obligation of the VENDEE-MORTGAGOR (sic) TO THE VENDEE-MORTGAGEE in the amount of P80,000.00 by way of selling the property described above to the latter so as to relinquish or as (sic) extinguish said obligation of VENDOR-MORTGAGOR." 7

Respondent similarly took two (2) copies of said document and gave the rest of the copies to complainant and Sy Hun Tek.

Further, respondent avers that there were no foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged property, either judicially or extrajudicially, precisely because of the previous settlement of the account as a consequence of the dation in payment at the instance of complainant. Additionally, respondent argues that there is no occasion to speak of a redemption period as there was no foreclosure to begin with. The sale of the property to Enrico Perez was valid since Sy Hun Tek had become the owner thereof as a result of the dation in payment and Perez cannot be compelled to have the property redeemed by complainant because the former acquired it through a legitimate and voluntary transaction. Respondent denies that he was ever approached by complainant for the supposed redemption and contrarily charges complainant with false and fraudulent misrepresentations because, although he was fully aware of the acquisition of said property by Perez, complainant continued to receive rental payments thereon from one Johnny Loo.

In a subsequent affidavit, 8 respondent stressed his earlier averments and insisted that all of complainants allegations were "fabricated, well-orchestrated, bereft of legal and factual basis, biased and unreasonable." Moreover, according to him, it was the mortgagee who insisted on having the property titled to secure his mortgage lien thereover, at the expense of the mortgagor; that the present complaint was filed as a leverage against the dismissal of complainants petition for mandamus to compel redemption of the subject property; and that all of complainants allegations in his affidavit could only have been possible through the inducement of some other persons and were founded only upon hearsay evidence and self-serving statements.

Annexed to respondents answer was an affidavit executed by Sy Hun Kiong 9 substantially to the effect that he was personally approached by complainant to seek his assistance in obtaining a loan of P80,000.00 from Sy Hun Tek, offering as security therefor the aforestated unregistered parcel of land. On November 10, 1984, complainant and said affiant requested Atty. Javier to prepare the deed of real estate mortgage. Upon approval of the terms of the deed by Sy Hun Tek, Atty. Javier notarized the same on November 10, 1984, the original and two (2) copies thereof being retained by Sy Hun Tek with another copy given to complainant.

Said affiant further avers that it was complainant who offered the mortgaged property in settlement of his indebtedness, which the mortgagee accepted due to the formers insistence. Atty. Javier was requested to prepare the document embodying the dation in payment, but for which legal services complainant likewise failed to pay the stipulated amount of P5,000.00, as well as the costs of documentation and registration of the document, realty taxes and other assessments.chanrobles law library

Complainant, in his reply, 10 challenged the veracity of respondents statements in his answer and branded the letters allegation that he merely acknowledged the mortgage deed as a brazen lie. He reiterated his previous allegations in his complaint and assailed the authenticity of the cash vouchers presented in evidence as proof of his supposed receipt of the proceeds of the loan by disclaiming having signed the same. While admitting that he filed the earlier petition for mandamus in an attempt to effect redemption, he denied having proposed, much less insisted on, the dation in payment as a means to settle his indebtedness.

In addition to his testimony, complainant presented Arthur Liqueron, an employee of Security Bank and Trust Company, to testify on the withdrawal made by Sy Hur Kiong from his current account deposit with said bank relative to the loan agreement, and Sy Hun Kiong who testified on the incidents surrounding the loan and mortgage contracts.

Following the submission of the parties respective affidavits and memoranda and upon admission of all exhibits and testimonies of the witnesses, the case was submitted for resolution on the following issues: (1) whether the amount of the loan was P50,000.00 or P80,000.00, with complainant receiving either the net amount of P42,000.00 or P77,500.00: (2) whether or not complainant was informed of the contents of the mortgage contract and furnished a copy thereof; and (3) whether or not complainant was fully apprised that what respondent made him sign was a dacion en pago and given a copy thereof after its notarization byRespondent.

On the first issue, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found sufficient evidence to sustain complainants claim that with regard to the obtention of the loan and the preparation, execution and notarization of the deed of real estate mortgage, he only dealt with the mortgagees brother, Sy Hun Kiong, also known as Achiong, and that respondent, as family lawyer of the mortgagee, actually prepared and notarized the deeds of real estate mortgage and dacion en pago. Thereafter, Sy Hun Kiong accompanied complainant to the Security Bank and Trust Company where a withdrawal from the current account of New Manila Panasahan Marketing owned by Sy Hun Kiong was made by a check in the amount of P50,000.00 from which P2,500 plus P5,000.00 were deducted as advance payment of the first installment on the loan and expenses for the titling of the mortgaged property, respectively, leaving a net sum of P42,500.00 for complainant.

The IBP commission extensively and correctly observed that

"From the context and on the face of the deed of real estate mortgage, it can also be gleaned that the actual loan obtained by the complainant from Achiong or Sy Hun Kiong but placed in the mortgage in the name of the latters brother Sy Hun Tek, is only P50,000.00 and the sum of P30,000.00, which is the total amount of the consideration of the mortgage is obviously for interest for one year on the loan of P50,000.00. This is quite evident from the schedule and the amount of installment payable by the complainant as stipulated in the mortgage, which schedule of installments is already hereinabove reproduced on page 3 hereof. Why is the sum of P30,000.00 as stipulated in the mortgage made payable in 12 equal monthly installments at the rate of P2,500.00 beginning December 15, 1984 up to November 15, 1985? And why is the sum of P50,000.00 made payable in four quarterly equal installments at the rate of P12,500.00? It is therefore quite very obvious that what the complainant received from Achiong or Sy Hun Kiong is a net amount of P42,500.00, which is the balance of the P50,000.00 after deducting the first installment of P2,500.00 and another sum of P5,000.00 either for the respondent or for expenses for the titling of the mortgaged property. And still on top of the one year interest of P30,000.00, the complainant, as stipulated in the mortgage, still had to pay interest at the legal rate on the total sum of P80,000.00.

"The conclusion therefore is that, indeed, the complainant actually received as loan under the deed of real estate mortgage only the sum of P50,000.00." 11

We also find merit in its following findings on the second and third issues, and we accordingly approve and adopt the same:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

"As to the second and third issues, there are tell-tale indications in the record that the complainant, was not apprised in full by the respondent of the total amount stated in the deed of real estate mortgage as his obligation thereunder, as well as of the terms and conditions stipulated therein. What respondent merely told him was that he had to pay P2,500.00 per month under the mortgage (TSN, Testimony of complainant, Hearing on April 12, 1989, pp. 42-43). And neither was the complainant given by the respondent a copy of the deed of real estate mortgage as well as a copy of the dacion en pago contrary to the claim of both respondent and Achiong (par. 8-Affidavit of Complainant, Exhibits D, D-1 to D-4; TSN, testimony of complainant, Hearing of April 12, 1989, p. 18). This finding is strongly corroborated by the fact that sometime before he filed his petition (captioned For Mandamus already quoted above) with the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan, the complainant had to secure a copy of the mortgage from the Bureau of Records Management. This certified copy of the mortgage was allegedly attached to the letter-complaint as Annex A thereof but it is nowhere to be found in the record. A copy of the certified copy of the mortgage was produced by the complainants counsel during the hearing before Commissioner Pineda, but the same was not submitted nor attached to the record, obviously because a xerox copy the said mortgage was already marked and offered as evidence as Exhs. 4, 4-A, 4-D ofRespondent. Had the complainant been given a copy of the deed of real estate mortgage as claimed by the respondent and by Achiong, he would not have taken the trouble of securing a certified copy thereof from the Bureau of Records Management.

"It is also quite relevant to note that said petition For Mandamus was filed with the Regional Trial Court on September 26, 1986, which is less than one year from November 15, 1985, after which later date the mortgage as stipulated therein, could be extra-judicially foreclosed. So that complainants petition to compel redemption of the mortgaged property was timely instituted because the mortgage could be foreclosed only after November 15, 1985. However, because of the failure of the complainant and his counsel to amend the petition as ordered by the RTC, the petition was dismissed by the Court (Annex 2 of respondents Answer, p. 26, Record).

"The complainant was not also informed by the respondent that what he was made by the respondent to sign when