Khatami Faith Reason

IN THE NAME OF GOD

Alhikmah

A Critical, Intellectual Journal

Winter 2008

"Alhikmah" is devoted to providing a platform for discussions in

philosophical, cultural and critical issues. It is published twice yearly in

Europe, Northern Africa, North America and Asia.

Alhikmah provides a form for scholars, academics, postgraduates students,

and researchers across key areas of philosophy and religious studies,

particularly religion, philosophy, theology, mysticism, and ethics. Alhikmah

offers an international advisory board, reflecting Alhikmah's specialist

contributions and appeal.

The readers and contributors are requested to send their articles and

suggestions to the following address:

Mail Address: Islamic Research Institute for Culture and Thought, No.2,

second St. Ahmad Qasir Ave.Tehran, Iran. Postal Code:1514615911

Fax: 0098-21-88764792.

E-mail: [email protected] URL: www.Alhikmah.org

* Alhikmah does not necessarily subscribe to the viewpoints it publishes.

* All rights reserved for Alhikmah.

Editorial Board

Abaszadeh Mahdi (M.A.)

Kazemzadeh Parvin (M.A.)

Nozohoor Yousef (Ph.D)

Moradkhani Ali (Ph.D)

Shojaie Seyed Ali (M.A.)

Vakili Hadi (Ph.D)

International Editorial Advisory Board

Prof. Gholamreza A'vani (Iranian Institute of Philosophy)

Prof. Hiedar Baqhir (Para Madina University , Indonesia)

Prof. Reza Davari (Tehran University, Iran)

Dr. Mohammad Ilkhani (Shahid Beheshti University, Iran)

Prof. Ibrahim Kalin (George Town University, USA)

2 / Alhikmah/ Winter 2008

Prof. James Morris (Exeter University, UK)

Prof. Abdullah Nasri (Allameh Tabatabie University, Iran)

Prof. Peiravani (Texas University, USA)

Editorial Executive

Managing Editor: Ali Akbar Rashad

Editor-in-Chief: Hossein Kalbasi

Editor: Sadrodin Moosavi Jashni

Managing Secretary: Parvin Kazemzadeh

Technical Manager: Seyed Ali Shojaie

Design: Bijan Sayfouri

Production: Seyed Gholam Reza Hoseini

Typesetter: Leila Pakzadian

Alhikmah /winter 2008 / 3

Table of Contents

4. Editor,s Note Articles 7.Relation between Reason and Faith(By M.MohammadRezaei) 26.Scope of Function and Application of Reason in Understanding and Realization of Religion(By A.Rashad) 51.Theism, Atheism, and Rationality(By A.Plantinga) 62.On the Faith-Reason Controversy(BY M.Khatami) 78. Science and Reason, Reason and Faith(BY A.I.Tauber) 113.The Relationship between Religion and Philosophy In the history of Islamic thought(By R.Akbarian) Book Reviews 146.Review of the Leiden Encyclopedia of the Quran(By M.Rezaei Esfahani) 160.God and Man in the Quran(By I.Al΄akub) 161.On Wisdom and Knowledge 165.Rationality and Religion


Editor’s Note

Language, art, religion and culture are the true and original manifestations of

man’s life, playing a crucial role in the life of individual and society similar to

the vital role soul plays in the body. If historians and archeologists focus on

some manifestations of religion, art and knowledge for a better

understanding of the past civilizations, today too the same factors must be

considered the true representatives of societies and nations. Indeed the

regulation of social relations and creation of a balance between individual and

collective powers and institutions depend on the capacity and capability of

culture in offering suitable, effective patterns and models. However, culture is

not a single-dimensional, static phenomenon nor is it indifferent towards the

impacts of its surrounding environment. If yesteryears one would speak of

closed or “island” societies or cultures, today more than ever cultural

interactions and exchanges are on the anvil. However appropriate language

and literature are the unavoidable prerequisites to any cultural exchange and

interaction among societies. Today the philosophical – or more precisely

theosophical – language has demonstrated its capacity and capability for

forging mutual understanding among traditions and cultures. It should be

borne in mind that the utilization of this language and materialization of is

capacities require a new approach to this concept and rereading of its true

content.

Evidently, “theosophy” is not merely a set of obscure, intricate and

inaccessible lingual concepts or terms rather theosophy means a well-

founded knowledge of the truth that reflects a direct relationship with the

essence and secret of the universe. Since the universe and man are

enchanted with this ultimate goal, the language of this kind of knowledge too

is not unfamiliar for different reasons and natures. It has been this very

Alhikmah /winter 2008 / 5

knowledge and its concomitant language that on the one hand have related

Confucius, Buddha, Hermes, Zoroaster and Tao to each other and on the

other have created a link in the chain of the divine prophets from Adam to

Noah, Abraham, Jesus Christ, Moses and Muhammad. Hence the mystics,

philosophers, poets and artists are all questing for this knowledge and

language.

The Al-Hikmah offers a platform for dialogue among the philosophers, artists,

theologians and theoreticians as well as the advocates of cultural theoretical

issues. Naturally, the language, ambiance and milieu of the journal are closer

to the language of philosophy and theoretical issues.

Attempts will be made in Al-Hikmah to concentrate on a specific topic in each

edition to provide an opportunity for its scrutiny from different angles. Hence

all interested thinkers, scholars, researchers and students are encouraged to

transform this journal into a dynamic platform for fruitful dialogue and

exchange of ideas.

Editor-in-Chief

Articles Relation between Reason and Faith (or Philosophy and Religion) Mohammad MohammadRezaei *

Abstract

The issue of relation between reason and religion, or in other words

philosophy and religion, or relation between religious belief, rationality, and

faith is one of the most important issues in the field of study of religion and

philosophy of religion.

In this field, there is an essential question: Is religious belief rational or

irrational and even an anti-rational, which should be believed in?

To answer this question, there are two distinct viewpoint in the Western

world:

Religious beliefs are consistent with reason; this viewpoint is called

rationalism;

Religious beliefs are inconsistent with reason or even they are anti-rational;

this viewpoint is called fideism. Among rationalists, the viewpoint of Thomas

Aquinas and Immanuel Kant, and from among fideists, the viewpoint of

Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, Norman Malcolm, and Plantinga have been

mentioned and discussed.

Three arguments offered by Kierkegaard for fideism, i.e. approximation

argument, postponement argument and passion argument have been

discussed in more details.

* Associated Professor, Member of the Department of Philosophy, Tehran University, Tehran, Iran. E-Mail: MohamadRezaie391 @yahoo.com


In the conclusion, the viewpoint of Islam concerning the relation between

reason and religion has been introduced and it is emphasized that in Islam,

there are, in general, a harmony between reason and religion; while fideism

as it is introduced in the West, is not introduced in Islam; and the reason

behind this is mysteriousness of the main principles of Christianity and

rationality of the main principles of Islam.

Keywords: reason, religion, philosophy, faith, rationality, religious belief,

Islam, Christianity, Trinity, philosophy of religion.

Introduction

One of the most important issues in the philosophy of religion is the relation

between faith and reason. On this issue, there are important questions:

Is religious belief rational, or is faith essentially an anti-rational or at least

irrational activity? If, according to assumption, we are not able to prove

religious beliefs rationally, is their acceptance rational as well? For example,

if we cannot offer a rational argument for existence of God, is belief in

existence of God rational?

In the Christian world, there are two opposite viewpoint concerning the

relation between faith and reason:

The first viewpoint is that faith or in other words faith beliefs are consistent

with reason; for example faith in God is in harmony with reason. This

viewpoint is called rationalism.

The second viewpoint maintains that faith or in other words faith beliefs are

inconsistent with reason. This viewpoint is called fideism.

Each of these two viewpoints will be discussed in brief. Each of these

viewpoints is divided, according to consistencies and inconsistencies, to

various subdivisions, some of which will be discussed shortly. In the

conclusion, Islam’s viewpoint in this regard is discussed.

Rationalism

In the Western world, many thinkers, theologians, and philosophers,

including Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274), Cartesian philosophers, John Locke

(1632-1704), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Clifford (1845-1879), and

Richard Swinberne (1934- ) think that faith and reason are consistent; they

are, of course, of different opinions about this consistency. Some of them

maintain that one has to believe in the main principles of Christianity; the

Alhikmah / Winter 2008/ 9

other religious teachings, however, are in harmony with reason. Some others

think that all religious teachings are in harmony with reason, some of which

will be mentioned in this article. Also, here by reason we mean rationality, or

argument or rational explication; and by faith, we mean acceptance, and

submission to something with confidence.

1- Thomas Aquinas’ Viewpoint: Thomas Aquinas, who is one the greatest

Christian theologians and philosophers, believes that: reason is in almost

perfect harmony with religion and faith. For a man of 13th Century in the

Western

Europe, one of the meanings of the term “philosopher” was

impious. He could not think of a man who was at the same time a

philosopher and a saint (Gilson,1375, p. 24, Persian Translation). Aquinas,

however, considered Aristotle’s philosophical ideas and thoughts to be in

harmony with Christianity; in other words, he baptized Aristotle (Ibid, p.27).

He never thought that an inconsistency might be found between goals of

philosophical enquiry and goals of theological enquiry. In his viewpoint, their

final goals were the same. If knowledge of God is the highest summit where

human enquiry may attain, there is essential agreement between teachings

of the teacher of Christianity’s truth and philosopher’s teachings. At the level

of natural knowledge, philosopher is a theologian as well (Ibid, p. 35).

Now, was it necessary that God communicate a set of teachings to human

beings through revelation? Thomas believes that for man’s salvation, in

addition to philosophical knowledge, which is product of human reason,

another category of knowledge which is inspired by God is necessary. That

was why God, by His Will, wanted to make man happy. This is his very

understanding of this saying that the final goal of man is happy countenance,

i.e. eternal life with God (Ibid, p. 41). Thomas states, “Thus, if the only way

open to the knowledge of God were the way of reason, the human race would

dwell long in thick darkness of ignorance: as the knowledge of God, the best

instrument for making men perfect and good, would accrue only to a few,

and to those few after a considerable lapse of time”, and with numerous

mistakes. That is why Thomas states: for man’s more appropriate and certain

salvation, it was necessary that man learnt Divine truths through Divine

revelations (Ibid, p. 44).


Also, Thomas believes that the same issue may be studied from various

angles. Philosophers go to study the issue of God through reason, and

theologian understands the same in the light of Divine revelation. In the

same way that astronomer and physicist study the same issue, for example

eclipse; physicist through direct observation and astronomer through

mathematical reasoning (Ibid, p. 46).

Concerning priority of philosophy or holy teachings, Thomas maintains that

holy teaching employs other sciences as its own maidens; and more

explicitly, other sciences are at the service of this science. “She (wisdom (or,

reason)) hath sent forth her maidens: she crieth upon the highest places of

the city” (The Bible, King James, Book 20: Proverbs, 9:3). Thus, holy

teaching is not based on philosophical sciences, in other words it has not

adopted its own principles from such sciences. In what it knows or what it

teaches, holy knowledge is not indebted to philosophical sciences (Ibid, p.

66).

Critique

Thomas is one of the greatest rationalist Christian theologians and

philosophers who has played an important role in rational explication of

Christian teachings; nevertheless, some mistakes seem to be admitted in his

viewpoint. Concerning priority (or posterity) of the holy teaching to

philosophical sciences, he is of the opinion that holy teaching is based on no

philosophical principle. This is another version of fideism, that is, we have to

first believe in the teachings of the Bible, and then we may understand them.

That Thomas says holy teaching is necessary for man’s happiness is a

rational statement. And that we should follow God’s teachings, for God is the

Absolute Perfect and the Creator of man, and to follow the Absolute Perfect is

preferred, is a rational statement; thus Thomas’ idea that holy teaching or

articles of faith are not based on a philosophical or rational principle cannot

be defended. Also, Thomas’ remark that if God abandoned human beings by

themselves, only a few of them might attain the complete happiness seems

to be doubtful. If some articles of faith of holy teaching are beyond the scope

of reason, this means that they cannot be grasped by reason easily in the

same way that Thomas himself believes that Trinity, which is a Christian


article of faith, will never be grasped by reason; thus, his statement is not

correct. Not all articles of faith, therefore, can be understood through reason.

Immanuel Kant

Kant is one of the great philosophers of the Western world who is considered

by some thinkers to be among those who believe in complete harmony

between reason and religion. It is pertinent here to briefly explain some of

his ideas concerning the relation between reason and religion.

Having divided reason into theoretical and practical, Kant is of the view that

theoretical reason fails to prove or negate metaphysical things, since it has

categories and concepts which are of use only in the field of experience.

Thus, concerning theoretical reason, Kant is agnostic. But in the field of

practical reason, he maintains that it is able to prove the existence of God,

soul and its eternity. In the field of religion, he has authored a book called

Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. In this book, he asserts that there

is perfect harmony between practical reason and religion.

Since Kant rejects any theoretical knowledge concerning God, he cannot

accept a rational theology, but a theology which is based on morality (Kant,

1952, p. 191). Also, he is of the opinion that man cannot have a commitment

to God (Sullivan, 1989, p. 262).

Kant considers morality to be essentially independent and maintains that only

through morality and practical reason we may understand God; even, before

admitting the Bible’s God we should compare Him with our ideal of moral

perfection or moral principles (Kant, 1960, p. 95). Thus, we do not need to

refer to religion in order to know moral law or to follow the law. Man’s

autonomy cannot be based on a thing other than reason. If we consider

morality as loyalty to, and acceptance of, God’s will, we have been exposed

to another approach to will; in other words, if we consider God as rewarding

and punishing one behind moral law, we have followed the rule of caution,

and our motivation to obey moral law is fear of punishment or hope for

reward, and this will devalue our morality (Sullivan, 1989; p. 263); for,

according to Kant, a law is of moral value when it has been enacted by us.

Historical religions claim that the Scriptures are ultimate sources of religious

truth, and man has to be humble before them. Kant says:


“For the final purpose even of reading these holy scriptures, … is to make

men better; the holy scriptures should be interpreted according to moral law

and not vice versa” (Kant, 1960; p. 81).

We consider contents of the Scripture as authentic revelation only when their

moral teachings are in accord to the rules which we have previously known

congruence with their truth based on completely rational arguments. This

means that we have to interpret the Scripture symbolically, and not verbally

(Ibid, p. 95). Thus, our own practical reason is valid only based on religious

belief and practice. Thus, religion’s claims should be limited to those ones,

which are in congruence with our moral argument within the limits of pure

reason (Ibid, p. 90). I, even, have to know what is my duty, before I can

accept it as a Divine command. “Hence for its own sake morality does not

need religion at all … by virtue of pure practical reason it is self-sufficient”.

(Ibid, p. 3). But, since without the idea of God and His will, it is difficult to

make claims of moral requirements sensible, according to reason we can only

believe that we have a moral commitment to become religious; in other

words, we can consider all our duties as if they are commands of God, and

we do so to give spirit and strength to our own moral intention (Ibid, p. 142,

quoted conceptually). The main traits of moral religion, therefore, are not

dogmatic ideas and religious practices, but they are heartfelt wishes to do all

human duties as if they are Divine commandments (MohammadRezaei,

1379; p. 268).

Critique

Kant has come to such results on the basis of principles of his own

philosophical system. Naturally, any critique and objection to his principles

will cause problems for his philosophical system. One of the principles of his

moral system is that following God’s commands is inconsistent with man’s

autonomy. This is not true. If, as Kant believes, God is an Infinite Wise

Being, then if man’s reason, voluntarily, comes to the result that it is

preferred for man to follow Divine commands, such following is consistent

with man’s autonomy. Thus, to follow God’s commandments is completely

consistent with man’s autonomy.

Kant maintains that the essence of religion is morality; but such an idea does

not require us to negate worships and religious practices; for not only these


are not obstacles to attain moral goals, but are also ways to realize moral

goals as much as possible.

If according to Kant, it was necessary to attain moral perfection or

sacredness, but desires are obstacles to attain sacredness, he would have to

propose a way to overcome them. That Kant has not proposed such a way is

a shortcoming in his moral system; religion, however, proposes ways in the

form of practices to realize moral goals and overcome material desires or

modify them; and through following these ways, yearning to overcome these

desires will be awakened in us.

Religion is of various dimensions and aspects: one of these dimensions is

moral one. The other is epistemic in nature. We should not deprive ourselves

of epistemic and other dimensions. If God Who is both infinite Reason and

good-wanting, sends commands in the form of religion through revelation to

guide man and for attaining the highest good or absolute perfection, then,

man has to try to learn the language of this religion in order to understand

religion’s commandments and act accordingly so that he may acquire the

highest good as much as possible. For no one of these commandments has

been issued in vain. Thus, we are not allowed to take one of the religion’s

dimensions as an axis and undertake interpretation in accordance to it in a

symbolical manner. Consequently, it is not right to interpret the religion

symbolically according to morality or ignore some duties.

Fideism

Fideism may be called the position that holds that objective reason is simply

inappropriate for religious belief. Faith does not need reason for its

justification, and the attempt to apply rational categories to religion is

completely out of place. Faith creates its own justification and its own criteria

of internal assessment. There are two versions of fideism.

Religion is bound to appear absurd when judged by the standards of

theoretical reason.

Religion is an activity wherein reason is properly inoperative. It is not so

much against reason as above reason.

The theologian of the 3rd Century, Tertullian, says: “What has Athens to do

with Jerusalem? (By Athens, he means Greek philosophy, and by Jerusalem

he means Christian Church). The possible answer is "nothing"; faith and


reason have nothing to do with each other; the two are completely opposite

to each other (Pojman 1987, p. 397; Peterson 1991, p. 33). Tertullian

seemed to hold that religious faith is both against and beyond human reason

(and perhaps St. Paul holds the same); but many fideists, such as Calvin,

would subscribe to the latter position. Blaise Pascal may be thought among

defenders of the second version of fideism; for he says: the heart has its own

reasons which are not known by the reason; and some people may abandon

the reasoning powers so that they may believe (Peterson, 1991, p. 33).

Because of the importance of Kierkegaard in the field of fideism, his

viewpoints in this regard are introduced briefly below.

Kierkegaard

The Danish philosopher, Soren Kierkegaard, father of existentialism, seems

to hold to both versions of fideism. For him, faith, not reason, is the greatest

virtue a human being can reach. Faith is necessary for the deepest human

fulfillment. If Kant, the rationalist, adhered to a "religion within the limits of

reason alone", Kierkegaard adhered to "reason within the limits of religion

alone". He unashamedly proclaimed faith to be higher than reason in the

development of essential humanness, that alone which promised eternal

happiness. Kierkegaard thought that we all live by simple faith in plans,

purposes, and people. It is rarely the case in ordinary life that reason is our

basic guide. Paraphrasing Hume, he might have said “that reason is and

ought to be a slave to faith”, for, we all have an essential faith in something,

reason comes in largely as an afterthought in order to rationalize our

intuitions and commitments. (Pojman, 397)

For Kierkegaard, “knowledge of metaphysical issues is not really desirable;

because it prevents the kind of human striving that is essential for our fullest

development. For him, faith is the highest virtue precisely because it is

objectively uncertain; for personal growth into selfhood depends on

uncertainty, risk, venturing forth over seventy thousand fathoms of ocean

water.

Faith is the lover's loyalty to the beloved when all the evidence is against her.

Even if we had direct proof for theism or Christianity, we would not want it,

for such objective certainty would take the venture out of the religious

pilgrimage, reducing it to a set of dull mathematical certainties.


According to Kierkegaard, genuine theistic faith appears when reason reaches

the end of tether, when the individual sees that without God there is no

purpose to life.

"In this manner God becomes a postulate, but not in the otiose manner in

which this word is commonly understood. It becomes clear rather that the

only way in which an existing individual comes into relation with God, is when

the dialectical contradiction brings his passion to the point of despair, and

helps him to embrace God with the "category of despair" (faith). Then the

postulate is so far from being arbitrary that it is precisely a life-necessity."

(Pojman, 1987, 397).

Robert Adams mentions Kierkegaard's arguments as follows:

The approximation argument:

All historical enquiry gives, at best, only approximate results.

Approximate results are inadequate for religious faith (which demands

certainty); therefore, all historical enquiry is inadequate for religious faith.

The postponement argument:

One cannot have an authentic religious faith without being totally committed

to the belief in question.

One cannot be totally committed to any belief based on an enquiry in which

one recognizes the possibility of a future need to revise the results.

Therefore, authentic religious faith cannot be based on an enquiry in which

one recognizes the possibility of a future need to revise the results. Since all

rational enquiry recognizes the contingency of future revision, no authentic

religious can be based on it.

The passion argument:

The most essential and valuable trait of religious faith is passion, a passion of

the greatest intensity.

An infinite passion requires objective improbability. Therefore, that which is

most essential and valuable in religious faith requires objective improbability

(Ibid, p. 398; Adams, 1987, p. 408)

Critique

From Kierkegaard's arguments for fideism one would find that he employs

rational arguments to prove fideism; and he considers three essential points:


Religion's teachings cannot be taken from the Bible; for the Bible is a

historical text and enquiry; and all historical enquiries give [at best]

approximate results; thus, the Bible is not supported by certain.

One of the problems, which arose from historical enquiry, was doubts in the

Bible. Critics of the Bible made clear that the first five books of the Bible have

not been written by Moses (a); but rather they have been written at least by

four different persons; or they doubted in John's Gospel which is the most

desired one for Christians. Even they said that the historical and real Jesus

was other than the Jesus appeared in Gospel. In brief, critical study of the

Sacred literature puts some of the esteemed beliefs under doubt; doubted in

truth of some events recorded in the Scriptures, and showed the miraculous

aspect of the history of the Bible to be trivial. (Smart, 1383, p. 255; Persian

trans.)

One of Kierkegaard's motivations to introduce this argument may be distrust

in the Bible. But from this, it does not result that no historical evidence and

enquiry may lead to certainty. At least the historical statement that

"Kierkegaard lived in the 19th Century and advocated fideism" results in

certainty. Historical traditions and reports are of some kinds. Some of them

result in certainty, and some do not. Muslim jurists maintained that

“tradition” which is a historical report is of two kinds: unanimous tradition

and isolated tradition. Unanimous tradition is a sense and repeated narration,

which leads to certainty. Sense tradition is the one that narrator himself has

heard its contents or eye-witnessed it. And repeated tradition is the one,

which has been narrated through various ways, and it is so repeated that no

possibility of error is admitted in it; thus, some traditions are of the kind

about which there is no possibility of error (Sadr, 1378/1999, p. 342)

2- Rational argument is not able to explain essential principles of Christianity

such as Trinity, the Eucharist, and the like. Christian thinkers think that

essential principles of Christianity are mysterious; for the same reason they

cannot be expressed within the frame of rational arguments. In

postponement argument, Kierkegaard says that the results of rational

arguments are always subject to revision; thus, authentic religious faith

cannot be based on such uncertain results. Postponement argument is valid

for historical enquiry as well. Since historical enquiry will never come to an


end, and in the process of historical enquiry there appears always new

problems, as one attempts to solve these problems, again newer problems

will appears; and this will continue forever. Consequently, as a result of this

process, religious commitment and faith based on historical enquiry will be

always postponed. Now, if religious faith is based on historical enquiry or

rational argument, since these are always subject to revision and will never

attain certainty, since religious faith is based on the former ones, it too will

find an unstable state; thus, authentic commitment and faith will be

necessarily postponed.

To criticize the postponement argument one may state: 1- complete negation

of rational argument is against evidence. Sciences such as mathematics are

among certain sciences and enjoy perfect certainty, and no doubt is admitted

in them. As regards to historical enquiry, as said previously, many historical

enquiries, which are based on unanimous traditions, are of perfect certainty;

for example, we found that Kierkegaard lived in the 19th Century. As a result,

faith and commitment based on such traditions are certain.

2- The other objection is that the postponement argument itself is a rational

argument. Kierkegaard stands against rational argument with the help of

rational argument (this is similar to liar paradox in which one says that all my

sayings are lies). Then, this one is a lie as well. He cannot say that this one is

not so; for this statement as well is a narration; thus, selection among

rationalism and fideism needs rational argument; accordingly, in the selection

of fideism as the best approach to religion and God, there is some kind of

rational argument.

3- The third objection is that, if faith is some sort of leap and one wants to

select from among the existing religions, what criterion is there for his

selection? In which religion can he believe? Is he obliged to believe in his

ancestors' religion, or ought he to select based on some criterion and then

believe? If he proceeds to select without a criterion, then this is

"preponderance without there being a preponderant", which is impossible. If

he selects according to some criterion, some states are possible: A- if his

criterion is his ancestor[s' religion], this does not seem to be a correct

criterion. His ancestors' religion may be combined with superstitions. In this

case, his belief is only a blind imitation. B- if one's criterion to select a


religion is consistency, non-contradiction, and religious beliefs being realistic,

reason has to employ such criteria concerning various belief systems; and

then proceeds to compare them with each other, and select the best. This is

not other than opposition to fideism; in other words, before believing or

leaping in a particular religion, that religion should be assessed rationally.

And if reason accepts that religion, he may believe in it; and this is the same

as rationalist viewpoint to religion. If he believes in some religion without

assessment or criterion, this is "preponderance without there being a

preponderant", and if he believes according to some criterion, that criterion is

not other than rational assessment.

3- Religious passion is the most valuable and essential trait of religious faith;

an infinite passion requires objective improbability.

Kierkegaard maintains that the more there is uncertainty or in other words

the more there is risk, the more religious faith appears. And, on the contrary,

wherever certainty governs, there is no room for risk and venturing to

appear; and whenever risk reduces, passion will be lesser and, as a result,

religion will lose its valuable and essential trait. In other words, if there is no

risk, there will be no faith.

In a passage, Kierkegaard states:

"Without risk there is no faith. Faith is precisely the contradiction between

the infinite passion of the individual's inwardness and the objective

uncertainty. If I am capable of grasping God's objectivity, I do not believe. If

I wish to preserve myself in faith I must constantly be intent upon holding

fast the objective uncertainty, so as to remain out upon the deep, over

seventy fathoms of water, still preserving my faith." (Kierkegaard, 1941, p.

182, Peterson, 1991, p. 38)

From the abovementioned Kierkegaard's statement it be concluded that faith

is inconsistent with certainty and reason. To illustrate that how uncertainty is

a good position for infinite passion, the two following examples may be

examined:

“1- You plunge into a raging torrent to rescue from drowning someone you

love, who is crying for help.

2- You plunge into a raging torrent in desperate attempt to rescue someone

you love, who appears to be unconscious and may already have drowned. In


both cases, you manifest a passionate interest in saving the person, risking

your own life in order to do so. But, I think Kierkegaard would say there is

more passion in the second case than in the first. For in the second case you

risk your life in what is, objectively considered, a smaller chance that you will

be able to save your loved one. A greater passion is required for a more

desperate attempt” (Adams, 1987, p. 414).

Critique

1- Although Kierkegaard tries to show that faith and rationality are

inconsistent; if one scrutinizes it will become clear that this very passion

argument as well is based on rational argument; i.e., he proves with the help

of rational argument that where there is no certainty, there will be more

passion. Also, if we pay more attention to examples, passion is objectively

based on many certainties:

A- One has to be certain that torrent is torrent (and not, for example,

mountain); B- He should be certain that it is his own loved one (and not that

of other person) who is drowning; C- he should be certain that, plunging into

the torrent, he is able to rescue her; D- plunging into the torrent is a sign of

loving the loved one and passion for her. Also, in the example of one who

risks his all things, he has some certainties as presuppositions for this: 1-

Christianity has particular principles and foundations which distinguish it from

other religions. The Christian one has to be objectively certain that he

sacrifices himself for Christianity and not for worthless things; 2- He has to

be certain that to risk the life is a sign of passion, and not complacency.

Thus, the Kierkegaard's saying that passion is not consistent with certainty is

not true.

2- The second objection is that, contrary to Kierkegaard's opinion, rationality

of religious belief does not reduce passion. Absolute trust of rational believers

in God, for which they have authentic rational arguments, is not lesser than

that of the believers who do not have such arguments. From among the

ancients as well as

the contemporary ones , manyexamples may be found that, in

addition to having rational arguments for their beliefs, have unfathomable

passion for their beliefs as well. For example, one may mention the Holy

Prophet of Islam (PBUH), and the Commander


of Faithful, Ali (A) as well as the infallible Imams and lovers of the traditions

of these great men who though speak of rational argument and rationality of

their own religious belief, show unfathomable sion for their religious belief as

well.

3- Kierkegaard states that rational arguments for existence of God do not

lead to certainty. Against this opinion, one may say that rational arguments

for existence of God lead to certainty, at least for some people, and they are

able to come to certainty in this way. Thus, it can be said that certainty is in

agreement with faith; and rational argument does not reduce one's passion;

and also for some people rational argument for existence of God leads to

certainty.

Ludwig Wittgenstein's Fideism

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) is one of the great philosophers of the

Western world in the 20th Century. In his Lectures on Religious Belief he

argues that there is something sui genesis or special about the very linguistic

framework of believers, so that the concepts they use cannot be adequately

grasped by outsiders. One has to share in a form of life in order to

understand the way the various concepts function in that language game.

Wittgenstein ridicules Father O'Hara for giving the impression that there is a

nonperspectival, impartial way of assessing the truth value of religious

assertions. Such a viewpoint, Wittgenstein believes, is absurd. (Wittgenstein,

1987, p. 418)

In brief, Wittgenstein is of the opinion that to grasp religious concepts we

have to enter the religious language game; in other words, we have to

participate in practices of that religion, and such a language game is not

based on argument; i.e. we accept it and live with it; and in this sense, there

is no argument for religion. Thus, to accept the essence of religious

framework or to enter that language game lacks rational justification.

Critique

What is wrong in such fideist viewpoints is that various religions have

different and sometimes contradictory claims; and each of them has a

language game other than the other ones’. If we are to enter such language

games, we have to select. Now, a question arises: on what basis is this

selection made? It seems that before entering the language games, the best


one from among them should be selected, and then we may enter it; for the

period of life will not allow us to enter all of them.

Alvin Plantinga's Fideism

Alvin Platinga (1932- ) is one of the contemporary thinkers of the Western

world. He is one of the founders of a special kind of reformed

epistemology.The philosophers believing in reformed epistemology, seek to

show that religious experiences provide a firm basis for religious beliefs, and

make them rational and justified. They think that even if we have no

evidence for religious beliefs, these beliefs are

rational and justified; for example he [Platinga] believes that existence of

God is one of the basic beliefs, and for basic beliefs such as existence of God,

no argument is needed to be provided To the question that "followers of

various religions maintain that their beliefs concerning God are among basic

ones, while they are in conflict with each other. How can this be justified?,”

he answers that for him various basic beliefs may be rational, but not all of

them are true; of course there are traits such as creatorness and being

absolute good for God which are common among religions such as Islam,

Christianity, and Judaism; but differences involve other beliefs which are

obtained differently.

We obtain other beliefs through revelation and intuition; for example, if

Christians believe in Trinity, it is because of the fact that God has introduced

Him in the Bible as such, and Muslims and Jews have their own beliefs; thus,

for him, there are two sources for beliefs of Christianity: first, intrinsic

attitude to belief in God and some of His traits, and secondly, revelation.

Differences between monotheistic religions are traced back to the sources of

revelation (Plantinga, 1381; p. 135).

Critique

1- Plantinga's viewpoint concerning God seems to be very similar to

“argument of human nature” to prove existence of God in Islamic field; but

he faces an essential problem: if one's basic belief is in conflict with a belief

he got through revelation, what has he to do? Should he abandon his basic

belief or his revelatory learning? He believes that Christian beliefs including

Trinity are true; and, on the other hand, he has a basic belief and says that

basic belief concerning God states that He is a person who is the absolute


knower, powerful, and good. Now, if one’s basic belief concerning God says

that He is a person, how may this belief turn into three persons? Such

conflict between beliefs taken from two sources cannot be removed, unless

we abandon one kind of our beliefs, and this is not what Alvin Plantinga

wants.

2- Adherents of various religions maintain that their basic belief is the same

as their own belief concerning God; but, these basic beliefs are in conflict

with each other. In such cases, what criteria may be employed to distinguish

true basic belief from untrue one? If one thinks mistakenly that his own basic

belief has particular traits, and the other claims otherwise and admits

explicitly that his basic belief is not sheltered against doubt and it may be

false, then what can be done? Alvin Plantinga does not seem to provide such

criteria, and this is the essential defect of his thesis. Thus, as long as we

have no criterion for truth of basic beliefs, illusive and real basic beliefs are

similarly true; and when we provide some speculative criterion, that criterion

will be the basis, and this is against our assumption.

Viewpoints of the Holy Quran and Traditions Concerning Relation

between Reason and Faith

At the end of our discussion concerning relation between reason and religion

in the Western world, it is necessary to briefly introduce Islam's viewpoint in

this regard. Concerning relation between reason and religion, Islam maintains

that reason and religion are two Divine Graces God has granted to human

beings. With the help of reason and religion, man can attain eternal

happiness. Reason confirms religion, and religion confirms reason. For

example, we mention

some verses and traditions concerning reason:The Holy Quran mentions

revelation of the Holy Quran to reason: "LO!

We have revealed it, a Lecture in Arabic, that ye may reason" (12: 2)

In other verses, the Holy Quran says: "Lo! the worst of beasts in Allah’s sight

are the deaf, the dumb, who have no reason." (8: 22).

Imam Sadiq (a) says: “Reason is believer's guide” (Kulayni, 1363/1984,

p.25).

Also, in other hadith he says: "He who is rational, has religion, and he who

has religion will go to the Paradise" (Ibid, p. 11).


From these verses and traditions, it is well understood that Islam has put

great importance on rationality. To select a religion and to follow that as well

are done by reason. It is through reason and with the help of rational

argument that man thinks that following religion will lead to happiness. No

Islamic school seems to deny importance of rationality completely. Difference

is only a matter of the scope of reason. Thus, religious ones, from whatever

school they may be, employ reason at various levels, some at higher levels

and some other at lower levels.

Also, reason is Divine evidence in man's nature, and Divine commands have

been handed down to man in two ways: first, through revelation and

Scriptures, and the other through reason. Thus the same as explicit

commands of the Scriptures, which are authentic and authority, evident

commands of reason (whether theoretical or practical) are authentic. That is

why reason has been regarded as one of the sources of religion. In Islam,

therefore, there is no conflict between reason and religion; if some conflict is

observed, it is between rational statements and narrated ones which may be

solved by particular methods. In other words, in the same way that we

reconcile two contradictory reports based on the preponderances concerning

conflicts, we may remove conflict between rational statement and narrated

one. It leads to the conclusion that in the field of Islam, reason is of

paramount importance both to refer to religion and to find religious

statements. And Islamic principles of religion may be demonstrated by

rational argument. Minor commands as well are either in harmony with

reason or based on reason. In other words, since authority of the sayings of

Infallible figure has been proved through rational argument, if the Infallible

figure has said something which is not understandable for direct reason,

since it is based on the above-mentioned rational statement (authority of the

sayings of Infallible), it is acceptable.

In the Christian world, since the essential principles of Christianity are

mysterious and irrational, and they cannot be rationally proved, many

thinkers have found no option other than to say: “Believe to understand”;

and not to seek to understand and then to believe. The main reason behind

fideism in Christianity seems to be this very mysteriousness and irrationality

of the Christian principles; and even Christian rationalists have failed to


rationally understand the essential principles of Christianity such as Trinity

and the like, and in such cases they have found no way out other than

fideism. Thus in Islam, there is no fideism, as in Christianity; and this is

because of the importance attached by Islam to rationality.

References

The Holy Quran

Nahj al-balaghah

1. Adams, Robert, (1987), Kierkegaard’s Argument against Objective Reasoning

in Religion, in Philosophy of Religion, ed., Louis Pojman, America, Waedsworth

Publishing Company,

2. Bible

3. Gilson, Etien, (1375 AH/ 1996 AD), Foundations of Christian Philosophy, trans.

by Muhammad MuhammadRezaei and Seyyed Mahmoud Musawi, Qom, Bustan-e

Ketab,

4. Kant, Immanuel, The Critique of Practical Reason, tr. Abbott, T.K., pp. 289-361,

in Great Books of the Western World, Eds., Hutchins, R.M. Chicago…, Encyclopedia

Britannica INC, Vol. 42, 1952.

5. Kant, Immanuel, (1960), Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, tr., with

an Introduction and notes by Greene, TM, Hudsin, H.H. Neww York, Harper

Torchbooks, the Cloister Library.

6. Kierkegaard Sören, (1941), Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David F.

Swenson and Walter Lowrie, Princeton University Press.

7. Kulayni, (1363 AH/1984 AD), Kafi, Tehran, Dar al-Kutub al-Islamiyah, vol. 1

8. Majlisi, Muhammad Baqir, 1403 AH (Lunar) Bihar al-anwar, Beirut, Moasseseh al-Wafa,

9. MuhammadRezaei, Muhammad, (1379 AH/ 2000 AD) Tabyin wa naqd-i falsafah-

ye akhlaq-i kant, Qom, Bustan-e Ketab.

10. Mutahhari, Morteza, 1379 AH/ 2000 AD, Ashenayi ba ‘ulum-i Islami, Qom,

Sadra Publications,

11. Peterson Michae,l1376 AH/1997 AD,… Reason and Religious Belief, Tehran,

Tarhe Now.

12. Peterson Michael, (1991), …Reason and Religious Belief, New York, Oxford,

Oxford University Press.


13. Pojman, Louis, (1987), Philosophy of Religion, America, Waedsworth Publishing

Company.

14. Sadr, Muhammad Baqir,(1378 AH/1999 AD) Qawa‘id-i kulli-yi istenbat,

translated and commented by Reza Islami, Qom, Bustan-e Ketab.

15. Smart, Ninian, (1382 AH/2003 AD), Human Religious Experience, trans. by

Muhammad Muhammad Rezaei and Abolfazl Mahmoudi, Tehran, SAMT Publications,

16. Sobhani Ja‘far, 1417 AH (Lunar), Buhuth fi’l milal wa’l nihal, Qom. Moasseseh

al-Nashr al-Islami.

17. Sullivan, R.J., (1989) Immanuel Kant’s Moral Theory, New York, Cambridge

University Press.

Scope of Function and Application of Reason in Understanding and Realization of Religion Ali Akbar Rashad *

Abstract

Reason has many functions and achievements in research “within religion”

and “concerning religion” as well as in religiosity and realization of religion.

From among eight classifications of functions, the most important one is

dividing it to general and particular functions, which is discussed in brief.

While confessing that such a subject may not be discussed sufficiently in an

article , the author has proposed a plan titled “ Detailed Structure of Function

and Application of Reason in Study of Religion” which may be employed as an

introduction to an inclusive and perfect research.

Keywords:

Reason, sources of religion, study of religion, Methodology for discovery of

religion, religion’s functions

Introduction

By functions of reason concerning religion, we mean kinds of contributions

reason has in the field of study of religion and religiosity. Reason has many

functions and achievements in research “within religion” and “concerning

religion” as well as in religiosity and realization of religion. Function and

application of reason in study of religion is one of the essential issues of the

* . Associated professor, Member of the Department of Philosophy and President of

Institute of Islamic Culture and Thought (IICT), Tehran , Iran. E-Mail: Rashad @iict.ir


logic of discovering religious propositions and teachings. Collection of

functions of reason, among other things, may be classified as follows:

Functions and applications of reason concerning religion may be

classified in various ways, for example:

First) Division of functions of reason in terms of the role the application of

reason plays in discovering propositions of the four fields of religion

(Theology, Morality, Religious Judgments and Knowledge)

1-1- As the whole argument (and as sufficient cause to understand and

prove a proposition)

1-2- As a part of argument (and associate cause to understand and prove)

Second) Division of the functions of reason in terms of its various

applications:

1-1- Concerning religion

1-2- Within religion.

Third) Following the division of reason into theoretical and practical, functions

of reason in two scientific and practical fields of religion may be divided into

two groups.

Fourth) In terms of various applications reason has in the fields of each of

other references (Book, Verbal traditions, Practical traditions, nature

(fitrah)), functions of reason may be divided into four kinds.

Fifth) Classification of functions of reason in terms of four fields of religious

independent judgment or inference (ijtihad) (i.e. fields of understanding,

concept-generating, explanation and realization of religion). Sixth) Function

of reason in terms of inclusion of all fields

of religion or a particular field of it in what follows, kinds of

(his classification will be described in details).Seventh) Division of functions

to: 1-Generation of knowledge, 2- Making sense; 3- Assessing (because of

the importance of this classification, its kinds are described here).

Reason’s generating knowledge in understanding religion - which is its first

and most important function - means that some religious sciences are

generated and handed down to us by reason. For example, “God exists” is an

epistemic proposition implicating a factual reality. This proposition tells us

that out of human’s mind, there is a reality called God. In spite of the fact


that “God exists” is a basic religious proposition, it is not taken from

traditions or Scriptures.

Before proving the origin of religion, general prophethood, and special

prophethood, and before accepting authority of the revealed book and

sayings and conducts of the Infallible, appeal to tradition leads to vicious

circle. First of all, existence of a God who has sent a prophet, who has

brought His book, should be proved; then narration (Scripture) may be

appealed to explain and prove religious propositions. As seen, the proposition

“God exists” is the basis of principles of religion and all imperative

propositions of religion are based on it, and if there is no origin beyond,

commands (Holy ought tos and ought not tos) and morality (deontological

might and might not) will be meaningless, and imperative and behavioral

teachings are all in its debt for their meanings and values; and this

proposition is understood and proved with the help of reason.

That in Islam number of principles of religion is considered to be three or five

and sometimes even more is only a mathematical division; but the

fundamental principle of religion is only one and that is the proposition “God

exists”. But we say that since God is Wise, Just, and Merciful, He guides His

creatures to the path of perfection; in this way, prophethood and revelation

are proved; and also, since He rewards good-doers and punishes evil-doers,

resurrection is required.

Divine prophets (a) as well refer understanding of the principle of principles

of religion to human reason or nature; they speak to deniers of God’s

existence saying that “Can there be doubt concerning Allah, the Creator of

the heavens and the earth?” (14: 10). In other words, [they say] "refer to

your reason and nature and see whether it is possible that there be no God".

Thus, according to this verse as well, reason as well as nature play their role

in generating knowledge, and therefore produce some parts of religious

knowledge.

Some verses such as “Thus Allah bringeth the dead to life and showeth you

His portents so that ye may understand” (2: 73), “Now We have revealed

unto you a Scripture wherein is your Reminder. Have ye then no sense?” (21:

10) as well as verses 164, 170, and 171 of the Chapter 2 as well as the verse

22 of the Chapter 8 emphasize reason’s role in generating knowledge; in the


same way that some verses introduce knowledge as the source of proofs to

recognize truth and find knowledge as the essence of the revealed book; for

example “Bring me a scripture before this (Scripture), or some vestige of

knowledge (in support of what ye say)” (46: 4). Some other verses regard

tradition and reason to be comparable with each other and discuss with

deniers in this way; for example: “And they say: Had we been wont to listen

or have sense, we had not been among the dwellers in the flames.” (67: 10)i.

The second role played by reason in the field of study of religion is to make

sense of other proofs; without application of reason, it is impossible to

understand narration. If the addressee of religion lacked reason, nor would

he be an addressee of religion; the explanation of the fact that man is at the

position of addressee of religion is his very reason; also applying of the same

grace, human is able to understand holy uttering.

Some verses mention the role reason plays in making sense, for example: “…

listen to the word of Allah, then used to change it, after they had understood

it, knowingly ?” (2: 75). In this verse, listening to the word of Allah has been

introduced as an introduction to understanding it. And the verses such as

“Lo! We have revealed it, a Lecture in Arabic, that ye may understand.” (12:

2) introduces the mystery of the eloquence of the language of Holy Quran in

that it makes possible to understand it and think about it.

The third function of reason is that it assesses truthfulness and meaning; in

other words, when a particular knowledge and meaning is acquired through

other proofs and arguments, that meaning is assessed by reason to make a

distinction between true and false; and if from appearance of the verse or

statement of the Infallible a teaching or proposition inconsistent with rational

criteria is resulted, reason forces us to review it to find the exact and correct

sense of the verse or narration; and if it is impossible to acquire the

reasonable and rational sense, while admitting our inability, we will stop at

the same point.

There is no doubt in the correctness of ascribing verses to the revelatory

origin of the Holy Quran; but if the appearance of tradition induces an

irrational claim; there may some doubts in correctness of ascribing it to the

Infallible.


Knowledge-generating, sense-making, and sense-assessing roles of reason in

the field of religion appear both in discovering religion and in application of

other arguments and proofs - for example, in helping to make use of the Holy

Quran, and verbal and practical tradition to find Divine wills and in realization

and application of religion.

Thus, among the widest classifications are, firstly, three functions of

knowledge-generating, sense-making, and sense-appreciating, and the other

is division to two kinds of 1- general functions and 2- particular functions. In

this article and mentioning about 35 functions in brief chapters, for example

scope and kinds of functions of reason are simultaneously explained based on

these two divisions.

Chapter One - General Function of Reason in Discovering and

Applying Religion

The term “general function” of religion is applied to that kind of functions

which are not specific to a particular field of religion; we consider function of

religion in a particular field (such as theology, religious ethics, religious

judgments, and religious knowledge) as special function.

There are many general functions for reason, and among them are functions

described in what follows briefly:

Understanding the Presumptions for Necessity of Religion

Before accepting a religion, origins of religion should be explained with the

help of non-narrative epistemic arguments and sources. Relying on the

accumulated experiences, reason says: human being is a social being in

nature, and access to all truths of the world and all interests of human being

is not possible [only] with the help of reason and other epistemic sources

which are accessible to man; and man is not able to enact all laws which

provide his interests as it should. Thus, origin of law should be one who

knows man and his interests as it should. And he is not other than the

Creator of human beings. It is in this way that foundations of necessity of

religion and philosophy of religion are proved with the help of reason.

Consequently, necessity of acceptance of religion by human being as well as

necessity of religiosity is proved. According to reason, it does not suffice to

only believe in religion; but rather it is necessary to make oneself committed

to it and realize religion in the scene of human individual and social life;


otherwise, it will lead to vanity. Thus, in addition to proving the origin of

religion and explaining its foundations, reason is responsible to prove the

necessity of religion, belief in religion, and religiosity.

1-2-Making grounds for understanding epistemic systems of religion

In addition to proving presumptions of acceptance of religion and belief in it,

reason specifies foundations to understand each of the five religious

epistemic systems (i.e. insight, action, value, education, and knowledge)

based on various principles, for example through establishing “starting points

to discover-understand religion".

For example, reason proves that God is Wise and Just. Consequently, it is

proved that His sayings and acts should be wise and just; as a result,

imperative and value judgments as well are wise and just; and in this way,

reason prepares the grounds for belief in Divine wisdom and justice to

understand identity of epistemic systems of religion; and provides

understanding one with such grounds. Thus, the interpreter organizes

positive laws according to requirements of such traits; and if from among

deduced judgments, he finds a teaching which is inconsistent with wisdom or

unjust, he will regard it to be illusory or incoherent for it is inconsistent with

traits of justice and wisdom, or he admits his failure to understand it. This

admission of failure in understanding, of course, is itself a sort of

understanding the point.

1-3- Proving the Possibility to Understand Religion

The importance of the question “is it possible to attain correct and precise

understanding?”will become clearer when one

pays attention to the present debates concerning possibility orimpossibility of

understanding the essence of religion and true religion. Some people think

that since religious text readable, it lacks sense individuation and has no

objective and definitive interpretation! They maintain that religion is so

readable that a text accepts even contradictory readings. They think that all

the Scriptures are subject to this general judgment.

Relying on clear proof, reason disproves readability of revelatory text, and

proves understandability of religion. That some texts (verses and narrations)

are sometimes understood differently by different persons, cannot be denied.

But this does not mean that all religious texts are understood differently by


each and every one; or these different understandings are all contradictory

and different. This claim may be accepted as a particular affirmative

proposition, and not as a universal one. For that religion’s incomprehensibility

is inconsistent with the traits of wisdom, justice of the Origin and the Author

of the Scripture as well as the Truth’s being guide, and religious text’s being

wise and consequently guide.

Many questions concerning possibility of, and methodology for,

understanding religion may be answered only through employing reason.

1-4- Contribution to Recognition of Identity of Epistemic Fields of

Religion

Reason helps us to recognize characteristics and qualities of each of the

epistemic fields of religion. To recognize qualities of topics and issues

discussed in theoretical and practical philosophies as well as characteristics of

the fields such as religious knowledge, theology, morality, and judgments, it

plays a critical role in the process of discovering religion, designing and

establishing rules and laws governing discovering religious propositions and

teachings in each of the epistemic fields.

1-5- Contribution to Arranging Logic of Discovering-Understanding of

Religion

Another general function of reason in the field of religion is to help to

organize collection of rational laws and rules for discovering-understanding of

religion, and organizing rules which are deduced through sources and

documents, including the Holy Quran and tradition. If there were not

assistance of reason, such organization would not become possible. In the

absence of reason, even if human beings were able to establish rules for

discovering and they were able to apply the term “rules” on them, they would

never be able to organize them so systematically that they might be

employed in discovering religion and its propositions. Thus, to systemize all

what we call logic of discovering-understanding of religion is performed with

the help of reason.

To Establish Regulations and to Make Rules for Discovering-

Understanding of Religion

Some rules and regulations for discovering-understanding of religion are

provided by reason. Some of these rules may be employed universally and in


some fields. Some of them, however, are of limited uses, and they are

helpful in understanding [only] a particular field and even in a particular part

of that field.

From amongst general rules which are of use in all fields is the rule of mercy

which is of striking use both in theology or apologetics (Kalam) and in

jurisprudence (fiqh). In the field of theology, we say: God, because of His

mercy, is expected to send prophets to guide human beings; and in this way

general prophethood is proved. To prove the necessity of authority of

Infallible Imam and appointing him as well, the rule of mercy is appealed to;

in the same way to prove necessity of legislation of imperative and

governmental teachings the same rule is appealed to. It is said that God,

because of His mercy, should provide man with efficient governmental rules

and political teachings so that, based on them, he may be able to attain

guidance and salvation.

In addition to the fields of theology and judgments, the rule of mercy is

useful in the field of proofs for judgments. For example, this rule has been

applied to prove authority of consensus. Those who appeal to this rule

concerning consensus believe that if all jurists and scholars of an age are in

agreement concerning a judgment, and all of them make the same, but false,

legal decision, since for their false decision the entire ummah will go wrong, it

is the Infallible and Authority who has to prevent all the jurists from

committing mistake; and even, he has to, in some way, induce the correct

decision to one of the jurists, or he himself as a jurist has to provide the

correct one, so that agreement on the false decision may be removed and

not all believers may go wrong.

Application and efficiency of a proof or a method or a rule depend upon

realization of some conditions and observance of some conditions. By

regulations of discovery, we mean conditions for efficiency and application of

proof and argument as well as methodology and rule for discovering religious

propositions and teachings. Reason is able to recognize and determine many

of these conditions.

Discovering and Proving Authority of Religious Proofs and References

Discovering religious arguments and proving authority of references and

proofs are mainly performed with the help of reason. Investigation of this


function of reason comprises the main part of science of legal theory. A great

volume of the issues in the field of legal theory, even in the topic of words, is

rational.

Establishing Rules and Regulations to Validate Religious Proofs

In addition to proving authority of valid proofs and references (religious

sources), to recognize them as well is one of the functions of reason which is

of paramount importance. Through providing rules, regulations, and

methods, reason helps the interpreter and understanding one to validate

proof of authority, and for example, to make distinction between tradition

and other than tradition. Without the help of reason, we are neither able to

prove authority nor to validate arguments and proofs to discover religion.

Determination of Relation between Valid References and Proofs

Determination of universal relation between each proof and reference with

others is among very important and critical topics in the logic of discovering

religion. That from among reason, nature, Book, verbal tradition and practical

tradition, which one is the original one and which ones have to follow it,

which is prior and which is posterior; and when compared, which one is

preponderant and which is preponderated, is among critical points in

understanding of religion, and reason plays a very striking role in this regard.

This is other than the issue of disagreement between arguments; in

disagreement of arguments, the way to remove disagreement between two

arguments which are individuals of the same kind of proofs and references

may be discussed.

Interpretation and Representation of Proofs

another function of reason is to interpret verses and narrations as well as to

make them speak. Interpretation (understanding and interpretation) of the

Book, verbal and practical traditions, is mainly performed with the help of

reason. This contribution of reason is one of its most significant functions.

1-11- Comparison and Recognition of True and False in Religious

Knowledge

In addition to playing a role in discovering arguments, proving authority, as

well as specifying proofs and references and their senses, reason helps us to

distinguish genuine knowledge from authentic one. Enacting regulations and


rules, and designing suitable methodologies, reason provides the interpreter

with such possibility.

Mending and Compensation of Errors in Religious Knowledge

In addition to all functions mentioned for reason, another function of reason

in the field of study of religion is to compensate errors committed in man’s

knowledge of religion. When we acquired knowledge in some way - whether

through reason or other proofs - and then found that we had committed an

error in acquisition of that knowledge, it is again reason which teaches us the

way to remove or correct that error. It should be explained that, in addition

to pathology of religious knowledge (as mentioned above), reason removes

pathogens from religious knowledge - and this ability is regarded as an

independent function - and one can (and in fact should) deem the two

functions as two separate ones. Hence, under logic of discovering-

understanding of religion, it is necessary to introduce a topic titled “ways to

cure and remove pathogens from understanding of religion and application of

proofs of discovering"; these ways are, mainly, rational.

1-13, 1-14, 1-15- Ways to Solve Kinds of Disagreements

In the field of logic of discovering and religious knowledge, three

disagreements may occur:

1- Disagreement between two judgments, which occurs when two judgments

disagree with each other so that the two cannot be executed simultaneously.

For example, necessity of simultaneous rescuing of two drowning ones may

be mentioned.

2- Disagreement between two arguments; under the title "Equivalences and

Preponderances" in the legal theory this point is discussed.

3- Disagreement in referents of the subjects of two judgments (when

referents of the subjects of two judgments are the same) which may be

called correspondence of two subjects. Here, there is no disagreement

between judgments or arguments; but rather the referent we face is both a

referent of command and a referent of prohibition; as if the same act is at

the same time a referent of "commanded act" and a referent of "prohibited

act". In terminology of the legal theory, it is called "gathering of command

and prohibition in the same subject".


Well-known example for this point which is generally mentioned in the

literature of legal theory is: when someone is in an usurped place and [at the

same time] he has to pray. On the one hand, according to the command "go

to pray", praying is necessary for him, and on the other according to the

command "do not usurp", he has to avoid from going to the usurped place.

Action of such a person, for example when he bows, is in a way an act of

praying and it is necessary; and the same act is a referent of manipulating in

other's property and it is an act of usurpation and consequently prohibited.

Here, no disagreement between judgments (or commands) has occurred- but

rather prayer is in its own right necessary, and usurpation is in its own right

prohibited- and two arguments do not disagree with each other; for, one

argument signifies necessity of prayer, and the other prohibits one from

usurpation, and implicates prohibition of it; only subjects of the two

judgments are, in terms of referents, the same.

The point is not, of course, so simple. On this point, one can find a host of

various opinions. For example, great figures such as Akhund Khorasani

(Khorasani, undated, pp. 89-160), Mirza Na'ini (reh), d. 1355 AD (lunar)

(Kazemeyni, 1404 AD (lunar), pp. 394-453), who are among great legalist

and jurists and contemporary to each other, are completely in disagreement

with each other on this point. The debate has been in process before these

two great figures, and still goes on.

Finding solutions for each of the three above-mentioned disagreements

(disagreement between two judgments and correspondence of the two

subjects) may be regarded as one of the important functions of reason- in

particular in the field of deduction of judgments. Some of these

disagreements, of course, may occur in the field of deduction of ideological

propositions of religion, which should be solved by reason. In this way we

mentioned the 13th, 14th, and 15th functions of reason, altogether.

1-16-Judgment about Necessity of Commitment to the Contents of

Religious Propositions

In the same way that reason forces human being to be committed (by his

limbs and probably by his heart) to juridical and functional teachings in the

field of judgments, it invites man to follow moral and behavioral teachings in

the field of morality. This function, in the field of theology, appears as


justification of the necessity of belief (in other words, only through heart

commitment). Reason dictates that if a Divine proposition has been proved

by valid arguments, it should be believed in and committed to; though when

a proposition is proved by rational arguments, it satisfies reason

automatically, and consequently, it leads to belief. Here, proving a

proposition is the same as establishing it in man's heart. Consequently, when

for example man, through his own reason, understands God's existence, at

the same time he believes in God as well; and there is no gap between

"knowledge" and "belief", between understanding and faith.

In enlisting and describing general functions of reason, what has been said

suffices us; though there are more functions for reason. In what follows,

some particular functions of reason are explained.

Chapter Two: Particular Functions of Reason in Investigating and

Realization of Each Religious Field

As said previously, from amongst the eight categories of functions, the most

important one is dividing it into general and particular functions. Thus far, we

have briefly studied the general functions of reason. It is pertinent to

describe particular functions of reason in two categories of investigation and

realization, each of epistemic-practical systems and fields of religion. If we

apply the term "general function" to those which are in use in most of five (or

at least two) fields of religion, the term "particular function" should be

applied to those which are in use only in one field.

From amongst the particular functions, the most important function is in the

field of theology and religious knowledge (2-1); while fields of judgments (2-

2), morality (2-3), and education (2-4) are placed in the following stages.

2-1- Particular Functions of Reason in the Field of Theology (Beliefs -

Divine Propositions)

2-1-1- Independent Understanding of Principles of Theology

One of the particular functions of reason in the field of theology is

independent understanding of the important divine propositions. Reason

understands the main and basic beliefs such as the necessity of the

Necessary Being, tawhid (monotheism or unity of being), resurrection,

necessity of religion and universal prophethood.


Independent understanding is the one in which all premises (or at least the

major term of an argument generating knowledge) are (is) rational. An

understanding whose major term is narrative, however, does not lead to

independent rational understanding.

2-1-2- Understanding and Proving Minor Divine Propositions of

Religion

Reason is able to understand and prove some minor Divine propositions as

well. For example, in addition to proving the "necessity of prophethood",

some consequences of this principle such as infallibility of the prophet are

also understood with the help of reason. Reason states: "If the prophet is not

infallible, understanding, interpretation, promotion, or execution of shari'a

(religious laws) will be subject to error; also in his commitment to shari'a, the

prophet is likely to commit mistakes. And all these will lead to contradiction

and even bewilderment of believers. If the prophet is not infallible, he will not

receive the revelation correctly, or he will regard other than revelation as

revelation, or he will not be able to interpret revelatory findings correctly,

and in transferring or promoting it, he will commit errors; and all these will

violate the objective of prophethood.

"Prophet should be infallible" or "messenger is infallible" are minor divine

propositions but they are understood and proved by reason. The list of minor

divine propositions, which are understood by reason, is a very long one.

In Islamic philosophy, metaphysical theology (al-ilahiyat bi'l ma'na al-akhas)

attempts to find and prove religious ideas even in the language of philosophy

(pure demonstrative reason). When metaphysical theology is discussed in

philosophy, naturally we deal with a collection of rational propositions which

are understood and proved through rational premises. It applies to the

discipline of kalam (apologetic or theology) – though it is a multi-ware and

multi-method discipline, it is regarded to be among rational sciences; for

reason is the main reference, and rational method is the most important one

for finding or defending ideological propositions. Hence, majority of topics

and concepts discussed in kalam are rational.


2-2-Particular Functions of Reason in the Field of Judgments (Ought

to’s)

Reason is widely used in the field of judgments. Here some characteristic

instances and cases are mentioned.

2-2-1- Understanding some Important Propositions and Major

Judgments

A striking part of the principles and important Divine commandments is

rational. Even without being revealed by the Legislator, such judgments were

understandable; and this has led reason to be regarded as one of the sources

of jurisprudence. This function of reason will be clearly confirmed through

referring to the juridical rules which are general juridical commandments.

2-2-2- Independent Understanding of Some Arguments and

Philosophies of Religious Judgments

In the field of judgments, we deal with “ought to’s” (command and

prohibition: Ask to do some act and ask to leave some other act). Hence, we

should regard “judgments” as “ought to’s”. In morality, however, we deal

with “may’s” and may not’s”; for, there, it is good and evil, may and may

not, which matter.

In religious thinking, “may’s” and “ought to’s” have been distinguished from

each other by Muslims; and this is a very accurate and correct one, thanks to

comprehensiveness and richness of Islam. In other religions such as existing

Christianity or in quasi-religions such as Buddhism, such a distinction is not

possible. That is why in such religions no epistemic field called “judgments”

exists; but, their teachings is divided into theology and morality. Even if

there are some “ought to’s” in these schools, they are classified under

morality. Since judgments play an important role in Islam, the Muslims, have

separated them from morality. Alas, in generating sciences as compared to

the part of judgments, a remarkable indolence may be observed.

In the field of judgments, the first source is the Holy Quran. The second,

third, fourth, and fifth sources are, respectively, verbal tradition, reason,

practical tradition (mode of conduct), and probably nature. Consensus is also

regarded to be among sources of jurisprudence.

The main part of principles and rules employed in deduction of judgments are

rational ones; even if while discussing, we regard them to be legislative, and


try to base their authority on legislation (which is the popular approach in

today jurisprudence). Juridical rules are mainly rational; for such rules are

divided into two categories:

1- They are resulted from rational approach, but because of non-opposition

of the Legislator, they have been deemed as authentic ones. If we study

rules of this category thoroughly, we will find that a rational argument

underlies each of them; and the sagacious people have acted according to

them because of their [rational] foundation.

2- They are based on rational argument(s), and regarded as completely

rational rules.

Hence, important juridical propositions are understood and proved with the

help of reason. Presence of reason and its impact on devotional laws is, of

course, a weak one.

2-2-3- Contribution in Recognition of Minor Terms and Referents of

General Legal Judgments (Study of Judgments)

Recognition of minor terms and referents of general legal judgments is

among the main functions of reason. To base positive laws on legal theory

without employing reason is not possible. For example, it is reason which is

able to distinguish harm from other than harm, and make possible to apply

the rule of no harm in certain cases and for certain referents.

2-2-4- Recognition of Subjects of Judgments (Study of Subjects)

Subjects of judgments are of three kinds: legal, conventional, and scientific:

1- Legal subjects: subjects which are invented by the Legislator, and have

been enacted by the Legislator, such as prayers and fasting.

2- Conventional subjects: subjects which are followed from convention, and

the Legislator has taken them from convention. When people call some

financial interaction or barter “exchange” and the Legislator accepts it, the

judgments issued will be applied to the same subject as interpreted

conventionally.

3 - Scientific subjects: sometimes, the subject is neither of the kind enacted

by the Legislator nor of the kind which may be understood by convention and

majority of people; but its recognition requires some expertise, and it should

be recognized within the framework of a particular science and through a

particular science. We call the latter group, “scientific subjects”.


The above threefold division is the one proposed by the author of this article;

for, the term “conventional subjects” should be applied to a group of subjects

which is known for public and convention. Those subjects, which are complex

and whose recognition needs accurate, scientific, and professional

investigation should be classified under an independent group which is called

“scientific subjects”. To recognize this group needs, sometime, to serious

personal attempt which is the jurisprudent’s duty, and sometimes other it

should be done by experts of other sciences such as natural sciences,

sociology, anthropology, and the like… Sometimes it is said that jurisprudent

has nothing to do with the subjects of judgments. It is not absolutely correct;

for invented legal subjects could be deduced only by the jurisprudent; and

that they regard the conventional subjects, since they are non-legal ones,

absolutely out of the scope of the jurisprudential study is not correct; for, to

recognize some subjects, though they are not legal ones, expertise and

knowledge is necessary; and such recognition is, sometimes, possible only

with the help of juridical expertise.

Reason is involved in recognition of scientific subjects; for science, even

empirical science, is a gift of reason. In fact sense is particularist and does

not proceed to judge; and it is not able to understand universal things or

issue universal judgments. To deduce invented legal subjects, like other

ijtihadi issues, is not possible without involvement of reason.

2-2-5- Understanding the Philosophy of Judgment

Judgments are based on advantages and disadvantages; and reason is able

to recognize many advantages and disadvantages. Reason is responsible to

explain the philosophy of jurisprudence in the sense of philosophy of

judgments (and not philosophy of the discipline of jurisprudence which is a

part of philosophy of religious knowledge), including goals of legal rules and

reasons behind legal rules, and is regarded as a part of philosophy of religion.

“Philosophies of” are, essentially, of the kind of philosophy and among

rational sciences.

2-2-6-Understanding the Effects Resulting from Execution of

Judgments

In addition to understanding advantages and disadvantages in theoretical

and real worlds, recognition of the advantages and disadvantages in


execution is possible by reason. It is reason which recognizes results of

judgment, whether good or evil, when performed. This function has a critical

impact on the judgment about subject. According to some traditions

(hadiths), sometime because of certain causes and in some situations,

execution of some judgments should be stopped (Hurr ‘Amili, 1403 AH

(Lunar), p. 318). What is faculty, other than reason, able to recognize this?

Recognition of the disadvantages resulted from judgments when performed,

of course, may be regarded as a function of reason in removing disagreement

between judgments.

2-2-7- Judgment concerning Permission, or Relief, and even Right of

Legislation in the Cases Left Unsaid

In some cases (which are called “what for it there is not text” by Mirza Na’ini,

“Left Zone” by Shahid Sadr, and we call them “zone of delegated legislation”)

reason suggests permission, relief or even right of legislation for human

beings; this has been explicitly mentioned in some hadiths. For example, the

King of Wisdom and Eloquence (s) has said: “Allah -the Exalted- has kept

silence on some issues, but His silence does not stem from forgetfulness

(Suduq, 1404 AH (Lunar), 15:53, Hurr ‘Amili, Ibid, 61: 129). Inspired this

noble saying, one may call those cases “cases left unsaid”; the same silence,

of course, may be regarded as delegation of judgment, and delegation is

regarded as a judgment about such cases.

Here, some people think that reason commands to permission; in other

words, since prohibition has been mentioned in no text, thus judgment

suggests permission. Some other people say: “The Legislator had to

communicate His judgment in whatever way possible. Since He has not

communicated His command, if a committed figure commits an error in this

regard, he could not be punished, for God is Wise, and punishment without

warning is wrong, and the Wise never commits wrongdoing; thus, here the

committed one is exempted".

“Permitted [subject]” has three senses or functions: 1- [Subjects] without

judgments, 2- [subjects] permitted (judged to be permitted); permitted in

the most particular sense, 3- Opposite to prohibited, which includes

necessary, recommended, permitted, and disliked; in other words what is not

prohibited; permitted in the most general sense of the term. Of course, it is


necessary to discuss what is meant by the lack of text or silence of the

Legislator. But due to shortage of space it cannot be discussed here.

2-2-8- Specifying a Mechanism for Realization of Social Judgments of

Religion (Program, Organization, Methodology)2 iiOne of the fields of Divine legislative providence is the state of execution of

legal rules which requires programs, organization, and selecting methods

(classification, regimentation, and division). The goal of these three elements

is to prepare the grounds to actualize religion or to make shari‘a operational

according to temporal and regional, national and climatic conditions.

A part of these three elements is essential for the religious government and

society, and they cannot be replaced, and should be deduced and adopted

from religious proofs. Part of them is accidental. Essentially, judgments we

deal with in governmental aspects are of three kinds: 1- stipulated

judgments, 2- deduced judgments, and 3- delegated judgments. Essential

elements of the religious government are of the first and second kinds, and

non-essential ones are of the third kind. For the first and second kinds, the

role of reason is to make sense of, and to evaluate, them; and for the third

kind, it has some contribution, i.e., it is in the place of the source of

knowledge-generating and it is a reference of legislation.

The Legislator has stated that when the Infallible is present, governmental

affairs should be organized through his command, and when he is absent, a

fully qualified jurisprudent should proceed to execute the commands. This is

one of the essentials of religion. But is separation of powers necessary? Is

the jurisprudent able to play the role of the head of legislative body, while

the heads of judicial and administrative branches (observing separation of

powers) are supervised by him? Or, maybe the legislative branch is managed

separately, while judicial and administrative branches are merged into one

body (in other words, judgment and administration are assumed by the same

branch, and the other branch proceeds to legislate; while the whole system is

guided by the jurisprudent)?

Also, it may be said that the branches of the government should increase

from three to four, or even five bodies. For example, armed forces should be

organized independent from other three branches, so that the administrative

branch (or other branch) may not impose its own will, relying on armed


forces, to other parts of the system. Also, in addition to the four branches,

another independent branch called cultural branch should be devised in the

system. In fact if the formation of ideas and mentalities is exclusively in the

hands of one of the branches, that branch will be able to make votes as well.

For example, in the existing pattern of the Islamic Republic of Iran armed

forces and cultural branch are not controlled by one of the three branches of

the government, but by the Leader, and this is a completely wise and realistic

decision. Thus, independence of the cultural branch and armed powers may

be defended according to the same principles of the theory of separation of

powers. Consequently,

organization of government may be flexible, follow different variable

conditions, and can be formulated in a scientific way. Since it is a discretional

job to determine essentials of the religious government, in this part, reason

plays the role of interpretation and evaluation.

This function of reason may be regarded as a referent of the previous

function, and

mentioning it independently, at

least, may be deemed as mentioning the particular case after universal one,

and to emphasize the particular one.

2-3- Functions of Reason in the Field of Morality

(Values and Behavioral System of Religion)

Functions of reason in the field of morality are, more or less, similar to its

functions in the field of judgments and religion’s functional system. The

reason behind this similarity is that the two fields of judgments and morality

are defined under practical philosophy of religion. Hence, one of the divisions

of functions of reason is division according

to general realms: 1- Speculative philosophy (religious ideas and knowledge),

and 2- practical philosophy (religious judgments, morality, and education).

Human’s characters appear in his conducts. Though, according to other

terminology, “practical philosophy” is applied only to morality.

Here, we mention some functions of reason in the field of morality.


2-3-1- Grounds for Understanding of Morality and Arguments and

Philosophies of Moral Propositions

Understanding of beauty and ugliness is one of the functions of reason in the

field of an epistemic system, which aims to morality.

Khwajah Nasir Tusi (597-672 AH (Lunar)) has specified judgments of acts in

terms of beauty and ugliness rationally. Then, to prove rationality of

beauty and ugliness of acts, he has appealed to the following arguments:

We find, through our conscience, that some acts are ugly and some others

are beautiful; and even if the Legislator did not present injustice as ugly and

justice as beautiful, we would find beauty of justice and ugliness of injustice

through our conscience.

If we know beauty and ugliness of acts which are essentially beautiful or ugly

dependent upon the Legislator’s judgment (like Ash‘aris), we would have

denied religious beauty and ugliness as well.

If we believe that we are not able to understand ugly and beautiful actions

rationally, then it will be permitted that the Legislator, in the same way that

He performs beautiful acts, commits (God forbid) ugly acts like lying; and if it

is rationally permitted that the Legislator may lie, we cannot believe in truth

of His communications, for He is always possible to say (in lie): “this is good

and that is evil”! That is why if we deny beauty and ugliness rationally, we

deny them religiously as well.

If beauty and ugliness cannot be rationally understood, the two should be

able to replace each other; in other words, what is ugly may replace

beautiful, and what is beautiful may substitute ugly! But, it is well known that

falsehood is impossible to replace truth and [it is impossible] to say that false

is good; or truth is impossible to replace falsehood, and it is impossible to say

that truth is evil. Thus, it becomes clear that beauty and ugliness are

rationally understood.

Since, reason is other than nature and it is not a level of the soul; and soul is

blended with Divine nature, the first point from among the three above-

mentioned points may be regarded as a natural (fitri) argument.

With these explanations, it becames clear that one of the most important

functions of reason is to understand and prove beauty and ugliness of acts;

such an understanding is both a basis for morality and a foundation for many


juridical and educational topics. For, the same religion is not able to issue two

equivalent, but inconsistent, judgments in its two functional and characterical

systems. For example what is unacceptable in morality but acceptable in

jurisprudence, and vice versa. At least in strong cases of beauty and

ugliness, wherein moral judgment turns into obligation, inconsistency

between judgments of the two systems and epistemic fields of religion cannot

be defended.

2-3-2- Independent Understanding of Important Moral Propositions

In addition to understanding the whyness of moral judgment, reason

understands being and whatness of the main and important moral

judgments. When we study minds, lives, and conducts of various nations,

whether religious or othrewise, we find that there are many values and

characterical things common between various individuals and human

societies.

We may mention propositions such as “lying is ugly”, "righteousness is

beautiful”, “trustfulness is beautiful”, “breach of trust is ugly”, which are

agreed upon by all human societies; and even if they have not been

communicated by religion, we would have been able to prove and understand

them with the help of reason.

2-3-3- Recognition of Minor Terms and Referents of Moral

Propositions

In addition to recognition of foundations, principles, universals, and major

terms, reason recognizes actions which are referents and minor terms of

moral universals and major terms; for example not only it states “lying is

evil” but also recognizes an act which is a referent of lying.

2-3-4- Recognition of Disadvantages and Advantages Resulting from

Execution of Moral Judgments and Understanding of priorities, and

Removal of Disagreement between Moral Judgments with each other

and between Moral Judgments and Juridical Judgments

If God’s prophet is prosecuted by some criminals, should I show his safe

place to those who want to murder him and ask me to betray him? Here,

reason finds that if I observe the moral command, a prior and more

important command will be violated, and a murder, murder of the prophet,

will occur. Thus, it prefers to leave the important command to observe the


more important one; for, here, righteousness is actually a contribution to the

murder of the prophet, which is the ugliest act. Reason recognizes

disadvantages and advantages resulting from performance of moral

judgments, and on this basis, it determines priorities; hence, commanded by

reason, we will be able to prefer prior to other than prior and more important

to important.

2-3-5- Permission or Enactment of Moral Judgment Where There Is

no Judgment

Where no moral judgment has been issued by the Legislator, reason judges

by its own discretion. In the field of morality, reason plays a more serious

role than in the field of commandments. For, in the field of commandment of

worship, reason has a limited scope; and in the field of social relationships

too there are many stipulations. For example judgments about bounds,

blood-money, retaliation, and the like. That is why agreement upon the field

of morality between human beings is stronger than upon the fields of

judgments and laws, for all of them adopt moral judgment from common

sources of reason and human nature. But concerning judgments, since

religious ones enjoy the source of shari‘a as well and atheists are heedless to

this source, there is a striking disagreement between religious and non-

religious societies.

2-3-6- Encouragement of Good and Acquiring of Virtues as well as

Persuading to Give Up Vice

Encouragement of the people to acquire virtues and do good as well as to

leave vice and evil is another function of reason in the field of morality.

2-3-7- Specification of a Mechanism to Realize Religious Morality

Specifying the main mechanism (program, organization, and methodology)

for the realization of morality is another function of reason.

N.B.: If we apply the term “general functions” to the interdisciplinary fields-

even if between two fields- majority of functions of reason in the field of

practical philosophy will be among general functions.

2-4- Special Functions of Reason in the Field of Religious Education

and Religious Knowledge

Like its functions in the field of theology, judgments, and morality, functions

of reason in the field of educational knowledge of religion may also be


discussed here. Like for those three fields, for this one as well one may

present certain subdivisions in the same way that reason has many functions

in the field of religious knowledge. To be brief, we ignore introduction and

study of these two fields.

What has been so far said has been an overview of our conception of the

scope and kinds of functions and applications of reason to find and apply

religious propositions and teachings. To do justice to the point, a detailed

research and study is needed. We think that the following points should be

discussed in details. Details of these topics have been discussed in the book

“Neo-Sadrean Philosophy”.

Third Chapter: Detailed Structure of “Function and Application of Reason in

Explaining Religion and Realizing It”

Preface: Introduction of the Point

First Part: Generalities

In this part, meanings and levels of reason as well as methodology to find it

should be explained.

Second Part: Foundations and Arguments for Authority of Reason in Religion

Third Part: Scope and Kinds of Functions and Applications of Reason in Religion

Fourth Part: Methodology for Application of Reason in Study of Religion

Notes

1. I have discussed briefly, though in full details, the status of the grace of reason as

viewed by the Holy Quran in a chapter of "Nahadhaye Rahnamaye Fahme Din" in

Falsafayi din (Philosophy of Religion), in which relationship between reason and

revelation as viewed by the Holy Quran is seen clearly. (Rashad, 1383, pp. 101-120)

2. This function of reason, I have described in Sacred Democracy (Democracy – yequdsi)

(See, Rashad, 1382)

References

1. Hurr 'Amili, Muhammad ibn Hasan, Wasai'l al-Shi'a, edited by Abdolrahim Rabbani,

Dar Ihya al-Thurat al-Arabi, Beirut, 1403 AH (Lunar), vol. 18


2. Kazemeyni, Muhammad 'Ali, 1404 AH (Lunar), Fawaid al-usul, Institute of Islamic

Publications, 2nd edition, Qum, vols. 1-2

3. Khurasani, Muhammad Kazim, Kafayat al-usul, Entesharat 'Ilmiyah Islamiyah,

undated, Tehran, vol. 1

4. Rasahd, Ali Akbar, 1382/2003 (Summer),"Nahadhaye Rahnamaye Fahme Din"

(Institutions to Understand Religion), Qabasat Journal, vol. 9, issue 32.

5. Rasahd, Ali Akbar, (1382/2003) Sacred Democracy (Democracy-ye qudsi),

Institute of Islamic Culture and Thought, 2nd edition, Tehran,

6. Suduq, Muhammad ibn 'Ali ibn al-Husayn, 1404 AH (Lunar), Man layahdar al-

faqih, Institute of Islamic Publications, , 2nd edition, Qum, vol. 4

7. Tusi, Khwajah Nasir, 1407 AH (Lunar), Tajrid al-i'tiqad, annotated by Mohammad

Javad Hosseini Jalali, Maktab al-A'lam al-Islami.

Theism, Atheism, and Rationality Alvin Plantinga *

Abstract

Atheological objections to the belief that there is such a person as God come

in many varieties. Here we have, as a centerpiece, the evidentialist objection

to theistic belif, according to which a theist who has no evidence has violated

an intellectual or cognitive duty of some sort. There is an obligation of

something like an obligation to proportion one’s beliefs to the strength of the

evidence. The theist without evidence, we might say, is an intellectual gimp,

whose cognitive faculties do not work properly.

The theist, however , doesn’t see himself as on the other foot; he may be

inclined to thind of the atheist as the person who is suffering, in this way,

from some illusion, from some noetic defect, from an unhappy, unfortunate,

and unnatural condition with deplorable noetic consequences

Isn’t there something deeply problematic about the idea of proper

functioning? What is it for my cognitive faculties to be working properly?

What is cognitive dysfunction? What is it to function naturally? My cognitive

faculties are functioning naturally, when they are functioning in the way God

designed them to function, the theist may say.

The theist, unlike the atheist, has an easy time explaining the notion of our

cognitive equipment’s functioning properly: our cognitive equipment

functions properly when it functions in the way God designed it to function. Keywords: Atheological objection, evidentialist objection, theist, atheist, proper functioning, cognitive dysfunction Atheological objections to the belief that there is such a person as God come

in many varieties. There are, for example, the familiar objections that theism

* . Professor, University of Notre Dame , USA. E-Mail: [email protected]

52/ Alhikmah/ Winter 2008

is somehow incoherent, that it is inconsistent with the existence of evil, that

it is a hypothesis ill-confirmed or maybe even disconfirmed by the evidence,

that modern science has somehow cast doubt upon it, and the like. Another

sort of objector claims, not that theism is incoherent or false or probably

false (after all, there is precious little by way of cogent argument for that

conclusion) but that it is in some way unreasonable or irrational to believe in

God, even if that belief should happen to be true. Here we have, as a

centerpiece, the evidentialist objection to theistic belief. The claim is that

none of the theistic arguments-deductive, inductive, or abductive-is

successful; hence there is at best insufficient evidence for the existence of

God. But then the belief that there is such a person as God is in some way

intellectually improper-somehow foolish or irrational. A person who believed

without evidence that there are an even number of ducks would be believing

foolishly or irrationally; the same goes for the person who believes in God

without evidence. On this viewpoint, one who accepts belief in God but has

no evidence for that belief is not, intellectually speaking, up to snuff. Among

those who have offered this objection are Antony Flew, Brand Blanshard, and

Michael Scriven. Perhaps more important is the enormous oral tradition: one

finds this objection to theism bruited about on nearly any major university

campus in the land. The objection in question has also been endorsed by

Bertrand Russell, who was once asked what he would say if, after dying, he

were brought into the presence of God and asked whyhe had not been a

believer. Russell's reply: "I'd say, 'Not enough evidence, God! Not enough

evidence!'" I'm not sure just how that reply would be received; but my point

is only that Russell, like many others, has endorsed this evidentialist

objection to theistic belief.

Now what, precisely, is the objector's claim here? He holds that the theist

without evidence is irrational or unreasonable; what is the property with

which he is crediting such a theist when he thus describes him? What,

exactly, or even approximately, does he mean when he says that the theist

without evidence is irrational? Just what, as he sees it, is the problem with

such a theist? The objection can be seen as taking at least two forms; and

there are at least two corresponding senses or conceptions of rationality

lurking in the nearby bushes. According to the first, a theist who has no

Alhikmah / Winter 2008 /53

evidence has violated an intellectual or cognitive duty of some sort. He has

gone contrary to an obligation laid upon him-perhaps by society, or perhaps

by his own nature as a creature capable of grasping propositions and holding

beliefs. There is an obligation or something like an obligation to proportion

one's beliefs to the strength of the evidence. Thus according to John Locke, a

mark of a rational person is "the not entertaining any proposition with greater

assurance than the proof it is built upon will warrant," and according to David

Hume, "A wise man proportions his belief to the evidence."

In the nineteenth century we have W.K. Clifford, that "delicious enfant

terrible" as William James called him, insisting that it is monstrous, immoral,

and perhaps even impolite to accept a belief for which you have insufficient

evidence:

Whoso would deserve well of his fellow in this matter will guard the purity of

his belief with a very fanaticism of jealous care, lest at any time it should rest

on an unworthy object, and catch a stain which can never be wiped away1

He adds that if a

belief has been accepted on insufficient evidence, the pleasure is a stolen

one. Not only does it deceive ourselves by giving us a sense of power which

we do not really possess, but it is sinful, stolen in defiance of our duty to

mankind. That duty is to guard ourselves from such beliefs as from a

pestilence, which may shortly master our body and spread to the rest of the

town. 2

And finally:

To sum up: it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe

anything upon insufficient evidence.3

(It is not hard to detect, in these quotations, the "tone of robustious pathos"

with which James credits Clifford.) On this viewpoint theists without

evidence-my sainted grandmother, for example-are flouting their epistemic

duties and deserve our disapprobation and disapproval. Mother Teresa, for

example, if she has not arguments for her belief in God, then stands revealed

as a sort of intellectual libertine-someone who has gone contrary to her

intellectual obligations and is deserving of reproof and perhaps even

disciplinary action.


Now the idea that there are intellectual duties or obligations is difficult but

not implausible, and I do not mean to question it here. It is less plausible,

however, to suggest that I would or could be going contrary to my

intellectual duties in believing, without evidence, that there is such a person

as God. For first, my beliefs are not, for the most part, within my control. If,

for example, you offer me $1,000,000 to cease believing that Mars is smaller

than Venus, there is no way I can collect. But the same holds for my belief in

God: even if I wanted to, I couldn't-short of heroic measures like coma

inducing drugs-just divest myself of it. (At any rate there is nothing I can do

directly; perhaps there is a sort of regimen that if followed religiously would

issue, in the long run, in my no longer accepting belief in God.) But secondly,

there seems no reason to think that I have such an obligation. Clearly I am

not under an obligation to have evidence for everything I believe; that would

not be possible. But why, then, suppose that I have an obligation to accept

belief in God only if I accept other propositions which serve as evidence for

it? This is by no means self-evident or just obvious, and it is extremely hard

to see how to find a cogent argument for it.

In any event, I think the evidentialist objector can take a more promising

line. He can hold, not that the theist without evidence has violated some

epistemic duty-after all, perhaps he can't help himself- but that he is

somehow intellectually flawed or disfigured. Consider someone who believes

that Venus is smaller than Mercury-not because he has evidence, but

because he read it in a comic book and always believes whatever he reads in

comic books-or consider someone who holds that belief on the basis of an

outrageously bad argument. Perhaps there is no obligation he has failed to

meet; nevertheless his intellectual condition is defective in some way. He

displays a sort of deficiency, a flaw, an intellectual dysfunction of some sort.

Perhaps he is like someone who has an astigmatism, or is unduly clumsy, or

suffers from arthritis. And perhaps the evidentialist objection is to be

construed, not as the claim that the theist without evidence has violated

some intellectual obligations, but that he suffers from a certain sort of

intellectual deficiency. The theist without evidence, we might say, is an

intellectual gimp.


Alternatively but similarly, the idea might be that the theist without evidence

is under a sort of illusion, a kind of pervasive illusion afflicting the great bulk

of mankind over the great bulk of the time thus far allotted to it. Thus Freud

saw religious belief as "illusions, fulfillments of the oldest, strongest, and

most insistent wishes of mankind."4 He sees theistic belief as a matter of

wish-fulfillment. Men are paralyzed by and appalled at the spectacle of the

overwhelming, impersonal forces that control our destiny, but mindlessly

take no notice, no account of us and our needs and desires; they therefore

invent a heavenly father of cosmic proportions, who exceeds our earthly

fathers in goodness and love as much as in power. Religion, says Freud, is

the "universal obsessional neurosis of humanity", and it is destined to

disappear when human beings learn to face reality as it is, resisting the

tendency to edit it to suit our fancies.

A similar sentiment is offered by Karl Marx:

Religion . . . is the self-consciousness and the self-feeling of the man who has

either not yet found himself, or else (having found himself) has lost himself

once more. But man is not an abstract being . . . Man is the world of men,

the State, society. This State, this society, produce religion, produce a

perverted world consciousness, because they are a perverted world . . .

Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the feelings of a heartless

world, just as it is the spirit of unspiritual conditions. It is the opium of the

people.

The people cannot be really happy until it has been deprived of illusory

happiness by the abolition of religion. The demand that the people should

shake itself free of illusion as to its own condition is the demand that it

should abandon a condition which needs illusion.5

Note that Marx speaks here of a perverted world consciousness produced by

a perverted world. This is a perversion from a correct, or right, or natural

condition, brought about somehow by an unhealthy and perverted social

order. From the Marx-Freud point of viewpoint, the theist is subject to a sort

of cognitive dysfunction, a certain lack of cognitive and emotional health. We

could put this as follows: the theist believes as he does only because of the

power of this illusion, this perverted neurotic condition. He is insane, in the

etymological sense of that term; he is unhealthy. His cognitive equipment,


we might say, isn't working properly; it isn't functioning as it ought to. If his

cognitive equipment were working properly, working the way it ought to

work, he wouldn't be under the spell of this illusion. He would instead face

the world and our place in it with the clear-eyed apprehension that we are

alone in it, and that any comfort and help we get will have to be our own

devising. There is no Father in heaven to turn to, and no prospect of

anything, after death, but dissolution. ("When we die, we rot," says Michael

Scriven, in one of his more memorable lines.)

Now of course the theist is likely to display less than overwhelming

enthusiasm about the idea that he is suffering from a cognitive deficiency, is

under a sort of widespread illusion endemic to the human condition. It is at

most a liberal theologian or two, intent on novelty and eager to concede as

much as possible to contemporary secularity, who would embrace such an

idea. The theist doesn't see himself as suffering from cognitive deficiency. As

a matter of fact, he may be inclined to see the shoe as on the other foot; he

may be inclined to think of the atheist as the person who is suffering, in this

way, from some illusion, from some noetic defect, from an unhappy,

unfortunate, and unnatural condition with deplorable noetic consequences.

He will see the atheist as somehow the victim of sin in the world- his own sin

or the sin of others. According to the book of Romans, unbelief is a result of

sin; it originates in an effort to "suppress the truth in unrighteousness."

According to John Calvin, God has created us with a nisus or tendency to see

His hand in the world around us; a "sense of deity," he says, "is inscribed in

the hearts of all." He goes on:

Indeed, the perversity of the impious, who though they struggle furiously are

unable to extricate themselves from the fear of God, is abundant testimony

that his conviction, namely, that there is some God, is naturally inborn in all,

and is fixed deep within, as it were in the very marrow. . . . From this we

conclude that it is not a doctrine that must first be learned in school, but one

of which each of us is master from his mother's womb and which nature itself

permits no man to forget.6

Were it not for the existence of sin in the world, says Calvin, human beings

would believe in God to the same degree and with the same natural

spontaneity displayed in our belief in the existence of other persons, or an


external world, or the past. This is the natural human condition; it is because

of our presently unnatural sinful condition that many of us find belief in God

difficult or absurd. The fact is, Calvin thinks, one who does not believe in God

is in an epistemically defective position-rather like someone who does not

believe that his wife exists, or thinks that she is a cleverly constructed robot

that has no thoughts, feelings, or consciousness. Thus the believer reverses

Freud and Marx, claiming that what they see as sickness is really health and

what they see as health is really sickness.

Obviously enough, the dispute here is ultimately ontological, or theological,

or metaphysical; here we see the ontological and ultimately religious roots of

epistemological discussions of rationality. What you take to be rational, at

least in the sense in question, depends upon your metaphysical and religious

stance. It depends upon your philosophical anthropology. Your viewpoint as

to what sort of creature a human being is will determine, in whole or in part,

your viewpoints as to what is rational or irrational for human beings to

believe; this viewpoint will determine what you take to be natural, or normal,

or healthy, with respect to belief. So the dispute as to who is rational and

who is irrational here can't be settled just by attending to epistemological

considerations; it is fundamentally not an epistemological dispute, but an

ontological or theological dispute. How can we tell what it is healthy for

human beings to believe unless we know or have some idea about what sort

of creature a human being is? If you think he is created by God in the image

of God, and created with a natural tendency to see God's hand in the world

about us, a natural tendency to recognize that he has been created and is

beholden to his creator, owing his worship and allegiance, then of course you

will not think of belief in God as a manifestation of wishful thinking or as any

kind of defect at all. It is then much more like sense perception or memory,

though in some ways much more important. On the other hand, if you think

of a human being as the product of blind evolutionary forces, if you think

there is no God and that human beings are part of a godless universe, then

you will be inclined to accept a viewpoint according to which belief in God is a

sort of disease or dysfunction, due perhaps, to a sort of softening of the

brain.


So the dispute as to who is healthy and who diseased has ontological or

theological roots, and is finally to be settled, if at all at that level. And here I

would like to present a consideration that, I think tells in favor of the theistic

way of looking at the matter. As I have been representing that matter, theist

and atheist alike speak of a sort of dysfunction, of cognitive faculties or

cognitive equipment not working properly, of their not working as they ought

to. But how are we to understand that? What is it for something to work

properly? Isn't there something deeply problematic about the idea of proper

functioning? What is it for my cognitive faculties to be working properly?

What is it for a natural organism-a tree, for example-to be in good working

order, to be functioning properly? Isn't working properly relative to our aims

and interests? A cow is functioning properly when she gives milk; a garden

patch is as it ought to be when it displays a luxuriant preponderance of the

sorts of vegetation we propose to promote. But then it seems patent that

what constitutes proper functioning depends upon our aims and interests. So

far as nature herself goes, isn't a fish decomposing in a hill of corn

functioning just as properly, just as excellently, as one happily swimming

about chasing minnows? But then what could be meant by speaking of

"proper functioning" with respect to our cognitive faculties? A chunk of

reality-an organism, a part of an organism, an ecosystem, a garden patch-

"functions properly" only with respect to a sort of grid we impose on nature-a

grid that incorporates our aims and desires.

But from a theistic point of viewpoint, the idea of proper functioning, as

applied to us and our cognitive equipment, is not more problematic than,

say, that of a Boeing 747's working properly. Something we have

constructed-a heating system, a rope, a linear accelerator-is functioning

properly when it is functioning in the way it was designed to function. My car

works properly if it works the way it was designed to work. My refrigerator is

working properly if it refrigerates, if it does what a refrigerator is designed to

do. This, I think, is the root idea of working properly. But according to

theism, human beings, like ropes and linear accelerators, have been

designed; they have been created and designed by God. Thus, he has an

easy answer to the relevant set of questions: What is proper functioning?

What is it for my cognitive faculties to be working properly? What is cognitive


dysfunction? What is it to function naturally? My cognitive faculties are

functioning naturally, when they are functioning in the way God designed

them to function.

On the other hand, if the atheological evidentialist objector claims that the

theist without evidence is irrational, and if he goes on to construe irrationality

in terms of defect or dysfunction, then he owes us an account of this notion.

Why does he take it that the theist is somehow dysfunctional, at least in this

area of his life? More importantly, how does he conceive dysfunction? How

does he see dysfunction and its opposite? How does he explain the idea of an

organism's working properly, or of some organic system or part of an

organism's thus working? What account does he give of it? Presumably he

can't see the proper functioning of my noetic equipment as its functioning in

the way it was designed to function; so how can he put it?

Two possibilities leap to mind. First, he may be thinking of proper functioning

as functioning in a way that helps us attain our ends. In this way, he may

say, we think of our bodies as functioning properly, as being healthy, when

they function in the way we want them to, when they function in such a way

as to enable us to do the sorts of things we want to do. But of course this will

not be a promising line to take in the present context; for while perhaps the

atheological objector would prefer to see our cognitive faculties function in

such a way as not to produce belief in God in us, the same cannot be said,

naturally enough, for the theist. Taken this way the atheological

evidentialist's objection comes to little more than the suggestion that the

atheologician would prefer it if people did not believe in God without

evidence. That would be an autobiographical remark on his part, having the

interest such remarks usually have in philosophical contexts.

A second possibility: proper functioning and allied notions are to be explained

in terms of aptness for promoting survival, either at an individual or species

level. There isn't time to say much about this here; but it is at least and

immediately evident that the atheological objector would then owe us an

argument for the conclusion that belief in God is indeed less likely to

contribute to our individual survival, or the survival of our species than is

atheism or agnosticism. But how could such an argument go? Surely the

prospects for a non-question begging argument of this sort are bleak indeed.


For if theism-Christian theism, for example-is true, then it seems wholly

implausible to think that widespread atheism, for example, would be more

likely to contribute to the survival of our race than widespread theism.

By way of conclusion: a natural way to understand such notions as rationality

and irrationality is in terms of the proper functioning of the relevant cognitive

equipment. Seen from this perspective, the question whether it is rational to

believe in God without the evidential support of other propositions is really a

metaphysical or theological dispute. The theist has an easy time explaining

the notion of our cognitive equipment's functioning properly: our cognitive

equipment functions properly when it functions in the way God designed it to

function. The atheist evidential objector, however, owes us an account of this

notion. What does he mean when he complains that the theist without

evidence displays a cognitive defect of some sort? How does he understand

the notion of cognitive malfunction?

NOTES

1. W.K. Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief," in Lectures and Essays (London: Macmillan,

1879), p. 183.

2. Ibid, p. 184.

3. Ibid, p. 186.

4. Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion (New York: Norton, 1961), p. 30.

5. K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3: Introduction to a Critique of the

Hegelian Philosophy of Right, by Karl Marx (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975).

6. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Ford Lewis Battles

(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), 1.3 (p. 43- 44).

References

1. Calvin, John, (1960),Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Ford Lewis

Battles (Philadelphia: Westminster Press,).

2. Clifford, W.K. (1879),"The Ethics of Belief" , in Lectures and Essays (London:

Macmillan,)


3. Marx , K. and F. Engels, (1975) ,Collected Works, vol. 3: Introduction to a Critique

of the Hegelian Philosophy of Right, by Karl Marx (London: Lawrence & Wishart,).

4. Sigmund, Freud, (1961) ,The Future of an Illusion (New York: Norton,).

On the Faith-Reason Controversy Mahmoud Khatami∗

Abstract

The relation of reason to faith has always been crucial for some of the issues

and questions that, especially in present time, deal with human beings as

members of a worldwide community that meets the full train of both reason

and faith. The following discussion is not aspiring to generate a new idea

about their relation or to discuss the controversy so as to conclude any

discussion. The overall aim of this paper is rather to review some aspects of

the problem that seem to be often missed in modern controversy on the

subject.

Key words: Faith, Reason, Divine Message, Divine Guidance, Quran,

Fideism, Rationalism

He who takes away reason to make way for faith puts out the light of both.1

I. Introduction

There is a diversity of promising theories one may take concerning the

relation between faith and reason.2 However, modern debate commonly has

occurred among three principal theories.

I. The first theory claims that the truth of Divine message is the truth of

reason revealed to us before we have been able to discover it. However,

ultimately reason and faith will agree because the truths known by faith will

be authenticated by reason in an agreement of truth with itself. Rationalists

take this position, giving the priority to reason but recognizing human,

temporal restrictions. No more explanation needed here indeed, since reason

begins from rules that are evidently known to be true and proceeds logically

∗ . Professor, University of Tehran, Iran. E-Mail: [email protected].


from them to achieve certainty. However, it is argued that such a reason

implies either of two possible upshots to the rationalist assumption, (i)

skepticism or (ii) absolutism.

(i) suppose one rejects the proof for God's existence, as one certainly can

when he confines his thinking to what can be demonstrated by reason

unaided, then (a) he is reduced to the tautologies of pure logic, and (b)

reporting of the facts of immediately present experience. Even reminiscence

of very recent events cannot be trusted.

(ii) Suppose one finds a rational manner to admit that reason is sufficient to

the world. In this case one may make a list of the true propositions that give

a comprehensive explanation of the world, and connect those propositions to

one another logically. This will lead to absolutism. Although there are some

true evidence to the rationality of faith, this position overlooks emotive and

performative aspects of faith.

II. The second theory assumes the incommensuratablity of reason and faith;

then they are mutually exclusive. It generally views that religious beliefs are

not subject to rational evaluation, but are instead a matter of irrational faith.

It is more suspicious of the use of good reasons in general, and espouses a

more general anti-intellectualism, or opposition to reliance on good reasons.

According to this view, there are two ways of knowing, independent of one

another--reason is the method for knowing in one realm and faith is the way

of knowing in the other realm. It sees the problem of the realm of reason,

and supplements reason with the realm of faith. But having created two

realms, not only are humans caught in the clutches of reason, they are also

hopelessly schizophrenic. In addition, it moves religious beliefes that cannot

be understood by reason to the realm of faith.

III. A Third theory also developed through modern thinkers seems to be

accepted widely in the West. This theory is regularly understood to mean that

religious knowledge is obtained by faith and understood by reason.

Meanwhile, religious knowledge itself is founded on faith; reason is

instrument for understanding of what is given by Divine message.

Kierkegaard understood quite well that one cannot step outside reason to talk

about it. For him, the paradox of Abraham is not that faith must contradict

reason, but that Abraham cannot be understood by rationalist philosophers in


thinking that they have gone beyond religious doubt to rational certainty.

Abraham cannot speak, and yet he does speak. What Abraham says however

is absurd: it cannot be apparently logical, but it is not to say that it has no

meaning. Abraham's silence is a silence for logical reason. What Abraham

says is logically absurd, but not in itself. The absurdity here has the type of

an impossible proposition provided that meaning should only be logical;

otherwise it seems to be paradoxical. However, one may argue against this

“provided that,” since he may claim that this "otherwise" is not unreasonable

or contrary to reason, except from the point of view of a logical reason that

has been defined as a reason that has no origin except itself.

It is not contrary to reason because it is, in fact, the foundation of reason. As

foundation, it cannot appear as what it is within the realm of reason, but that

logical impossibility does not mean that nothing can be said, known, or

understood about the foundation. Within the realm of reason, the foundation

can be said. But it can only be said "ironically," for it always slips away when

one assume to grab it.

Nevertheless, that the foundation cannot be said clearly and distinctly does

not mean that it has no meaning or that it cannot be grasped without

difficulty. The depth of the foundation of reason is not necessarily the depth

of unnecessary complexity and rationalizing obscurity.3

II. Reason Wedded to Faith: Mutual inclusion

However, these positions are not the only ones available to the believers. In

later Persian philosophical period, Mulla Sadra argued for a mutually inclusive

relation between faith and reason, claiming that “both of them command the

same true."4 I am not exposing his philosophical approach and arguments

here; instead I will briefly depict his idea in the light of the Quran.

Reason and faith have the same hierarchic structure in that every level of

faith corresponds a similar degree and level of reason.5 Now, as people are,

generally speaking, bestowed degrees of reason in common, at the same

time they enjoy the corresponding degrees of true faith they have, and can

be justified in their faith rationally. But this requires a very important

condition: Reason must be considered here in itself, and not be affected by

passion. This requires considering the role of passion in regard to reason.


This will make clear that, when reason seems to conflict Divine Message, it is

affected by passion in its variety.

a) The Role of Passion

Faith seems to be a type of passion. The inconsistency between reason and

passion runs through human history. Both are necessary for a full, rich and

balanced life, but to reconcile them is an extremely difficult problem. Reason

counsels prudence and caution while passion exhorts man to dare and take

risks. In the modern history of western thought, authority of reason has been

succeeded by an episode of revolution against reason. Over-confidence in the

power of reason has been followed by disappointment with reason. The

eighteenth century was the age of reason par excellence. We are witnessing

the violent reaction against reason today. After a long period of unquestioned

supremacy, its authority was challenged from various lodgings. The poets of

the Romantic revival insisted on the natural worth of emotion and gloried in

uninhibited expression of all emotions. The mystics were enthusiastic in

claiming that emotion was a better and more reliable direct for man than

reason. The philosophers did not dawdle in this protest against the

domination of reason. The psychologists queried the view that man is a

rational being and arranges his life in the light of reason. In the Freudian

theory the irrational unconscious acts deeply, while reason here is a servant.

The reason is required to formulate specious explanations to rationalize the

irrational acts of unconscious desires. Human beings were disappointed with

reason and looked for guidance to irrational elements in human nature.

In defending of reason, we would remember that it is no longer possible to

restore to it that situation of unqualified incomparability which was accorded

to it by the rationalists. There is a great agreement of truth in the criticism to

which it was subjected. Reason tends to be exhibited as an instrument of

desire. Its job is to safe the ends which we unconsciously set ourselves, by

inventing excuses for what we instinctively want to do, and arguments which

we instinctively want to believe. Reason is the power of deceiving ourselves

into believing that what we want to think that true is in fact true.

The Quran points to how one deceives himself when he is under the control

of a base passion:


Hast thou seen him who chooseth for his god his own baser passion. Wouldst

thou then be guardian over him. Or deemest thou that most of them hear or

understand? (25 : 43-44).

These are people who have allowed their reason to be distorted by base

passions:

Hast thou seen him who maketh his baser desire his god. The result is that

Allah's Law of Retribution sends him astray, notwithstanding his knowledge,

and seals up his hearing and his heart and puts on his sight a covering (45 : 23).

It is obvious that reason may often be enrolled in the service of selfish

desires and base passions. In such a case, reason, instead of guiding man to

the right way, leads him more astray. The Quran says:

(Their fate) is manifest unto you from their (ruined and deserted) dwellings .

as they followed their base passions, although they were keen-sighted (29: 38).

It is evident that reason, when it is misted up by passion, is not an aid, but

an obstacle to the search of worthy ends. It can guide accurately only when it

is performing correctly. However, it is not the mistake of reason that it

sometimes leads us astray. The mistake is ours, in letting reason to be

conquered by our passions. In a well-adjusted mind, reason performs

appropriately and gives right guidance. In this case, all passions and desires

join into a harmonious entire and are organized into a rational system by

reason. In such a mind, reason performs a controlling but not a repressing

role. Animal passions and sensual desires are not concealed but only put in

their appropriate position. On the other hand, a feeble personality is not

continued by reason and, therefore, reason plays in it the minor role of a

submissive to passion. Moreover, if reason has to have full performance, it

must be qualified and developed like other faculties of the mind. Reason

functions according to the role one gives it. The question is only of giving it

the appropriate function. Otherwise, nothing wrong will be with reason as

such. There might be a disagreement between reason and passion. However,

to remedy is not to suppress one or the other, but to strike equilibrium

between the two. Reason and passion are important essentials. The abolition

or deteriorating of either will hurt human personality. We have to discern a

manner of introducing agreement between the two and employing them for

best interests. This discovery however is reational. Passion is blind and can


not control itself. Reason can examine itself and can discern its own

restrictions. Passion, left to itself, will tend to restrain reason, but reason

recognizes passion’s correct position in life. The Quran speaks of the slaves of

passion in no uncertain terms:

And if they answer thee not, then know that what they follow is their passion.

And who goeth farther astray than he who follows his passion without

guidance from Allah (28 : 50).

b) The Role of Science

The reason purified from passion has no disagreement with Divine Message,

His guidance and His command. But what about modern science which claims

true facts are accessible through scientific reason with objectivity? Being a

very strong challenger for religion, modern science, as a rational and

objective vehicle, may be against faith; so how one may allege mutual

inclusion between faith and reason? Scientists claim that whatever knowledge

we have achieved about this mysterious universe is in debt to reason. This

knowledge may be insufficient; nonetheless it is valuable and obligatory.

Scientific research reveals reason as its best. Gradually science is increasing

our knowledge. However, we may be allowed to question whether there is

any other way to knowledge, at least to knowledge that matters more-

knowledge of our aim in life and how it may be achieved. The instruction of

reason is based on the knowledge at its disposal. If the knowledge is

insufficient, the instruction is necessarily uncertain. Reason rightly decides

only when all the related facts are located before it. It is helpless when these

facts cannot all be achieved. Science may claim that it has discovered

knowledge and much more about human body. But man have a real self also

and our knowledge of it is miserably insufficient. The real self is not subject

to quantitative treatment of the scientist. One may talk about it only in the

light of eternal verities which transcend science. Common sense cannot catch

Ultimate Reality and the real self of man can grasp itself only by the direction

of the Ultimate Reality or God. Therefore, the necessity of divine direction

without which he will remain earth-bound. In the physical world, we should

always act on the instruction of scientific reason. But when we wish to

accomplish our fate, we would go beyond this rational restriction. We should

search for rational faith which is the vehicle of Divine guidance. Such a


reason acts in the light of His guidance, and will guide us to the true way.

Hence, faith supplements reason. In this way we will be completely ready to

undertake the problems of life and we would be responsible before the

powers we have

c) The Role of Value

Value is the most living issue in a religious life, and we may see how reason

helps us to take value. First of all, reason tells us which one of the things we

desire is good and valuable and which one is bad and hurmful. Reason

evaluates things by the criterion of self-interest. Things which contribute to

self-protection and improvement of life are qualified as good, whereas things

which are injurious to life and weaken man's ability for development are

undesirable, or not-good. But reason does not merely assert its judgement

on things. It judges on things to be good, and encourages man to choose

them, though his preference and desire favors the hurtful things. When the

choice is between valuable and invaluable things, scientific reason may fails

to make the right choice. Science has placed the requisite knowledge of the

properties of material things and of their effects on man's body. Through this

knowledge, reason finds it easy to answer questions about which things are

desirable and which are undesirable. But man has a real self too, and our

knowledge of this self is imperfect. We cannot grasp the real self by science.

The essence of the real self is unknown to science, and our reason should

have either way to access it. All we can say is that we can achieve the goal

provided we live in harmony with the eternal verities. These verities are

hidden from our view and transcend science.

The case will be more crucial if we are to choose between two good things

(not between a good and a bad), to sacrifice one good for the sake of

another. Suppose we face a situation in which we can save either our life or

our wealth. Reason tells us to choose life and be resigned to the loss of our

wealth. Again a situation may arise in which we can save our honor only at

the cost of life. Reason tells us, though perhaps not as promptly as in the

earlier case, to save our honor rather than life. Reason clearly refers to an

accepted criterion of values. The criterion of values helps us to decide which

of the two good things is privileged. Reason then commands to choose it. It

is worthy to note that the more privileged the values may be the more


purified should be reason from material interests. Knowledge of these

presupposes knowledge of the heights to which the human self can rise

through its constant growth. Here faith accords reason over the stile. The

highest value can be determined only according to the fate of the self. The

criterion of values constructed by reason is useful, and faith confirms it as

reason confirms faith. It cannot be refuted that knowledge of ultimate values

is crucial for the right ways of life and the unrestricted growth of the self.

However reason, which is the main tool of knowledge we have, judges on

relative values. It cannot even give an ultimate answer to the question as to

whether there are ultimate values and, if so, how they should be known. It

inclines to give a subjective definition, only in relation to the singular

experiencing person. It leads to an implicit refutation of an objective scheme

of values that is valid for human beings at all times. Religion, nevertheless,

involves belief in objective and ultimate values and in an objective and

ultimate moral norm. Reason, if being in worldly experimental attitude, is

continually revising and reconstructing its criterion of values and its moral

norms in the light of fresh knowledge. Considering men have, therefore, felt

the need of some reliable foundation of values other than reason. The

ultimate values cannot, of course, be meant to have only subjective validity

for the person concerned. Ultimate validity can only relate to universal values

and norms, the existence of which the person concerned recognizes and

acknowledges. That there is one absolute standard of values, which is the

same for all rational beings, is just what morality means. Therefore, what is

notorious is not the existence of an objectively valid Moral Law but only the

way of its being. Therefore, while the authority of reason cannot be

questioned in the world of fact, the realm of ends is definitely outside its

jurisdiction. Faith is the only source of our knowledge of the highest values.

Prepared with adequate knowledge of values, we can, if we want, live and act

in full agreement with the undeniable moral order of the universe. The

knowledge does not consist in merely the recognition of a value as a value

but involves a just approximation of the degree of worth possessed by it, so

that it can be compared with other values. Confronted with condition where

we are called upon to choose between two values, we can then rapidly

choose the higher and sacrifice the lower value for the sake of the higher.


Character is fortified by our intentional sacrifice of a lower value to save a

higher one. When a man has to choose between life and money, he does not

delay to throw away money and save his life. Here instinct backs his choice;

but the same man may be forced to choose between life and honor. It is a

spiteful choice and the man might not reconcile himself to the loss of either

of the two very valuable things. Reason will recommend him to save honor at

the cost of life, but he may not be entirely convinced by rational arguments.

He may even make the right choice but for wrong reasons. He may choose

honor, not because he values it more than life, but because he is frightened

of gaining social condemnation.

He has chosen rightly, yet has overlooked the feeling of performance which

should come with the right choice. To choose the higher value is an act of

faith; a conviction in God and in the Hereafter which is confirmed by pure

reason. On the basis of scientific knowledge and experience, we may not be

able to come to a decision which of the two values is the higher. Reason can

recommend delay of conclusion. We can delay conclusion but we cannot

delay action and when we have acted, we have already made the choice.

When the light of pure reason flashes, we should let ourselves be guided by

the light of Divine message. It directs us towards the ends of the human life,

which, by looking for them, qualifies itself to maintain its existence on a

higher level in this world and Hereafter. In this way, one may tell that the

rational knowledge regarding ultimate values can be accomplished and

confirmed by Divine message. This shows the necessary relationship between

reason and faith.

III. Conclusion

The above discussion shows that the rational sciences furnish useful

knowledge regarding the means by which we may attain our ends. However,

it is silent on the vital question of what ends we ought to set for ourselves.

The ends we ought to pursue are those which can fully satisfy our needs. The

needs of the physical self are clearly perceived and easily satisfied. Food and

water appease hunger and thirst. Reason can help us to secure food and

water. The needs of the real self may be as insistent but are only dimly

perceived. In the fitful light of reason, it is not easy to see the way in which

they can be gratified. Here too reason is forced to lean on faith. The


distinction between physical self and real self which runs through the above

discussion, needs to be clarified further in the light of the Quran. The

distinction between body and soul, matter and spirit, is basic to the teaching

of most religions, The, Quran does not support this dichotomy. In the Quranic

view, man is not compounded of two distinct entities-soul and body. He is a

single indivisible being. If we apply to him the categories of science, he

appears to be a physical organism, but he reveals himself as a free being

when "value" categories are applied.

Religion (also moral life) is possible only for a being who possesses a

permanent self. Value is relative to the person who experiences, and a

system of absolute values has meaning only in relation to a real self. To deny

the existence of a permanent self is to deny absolute values and the denial of

absolute values entails the denial of moral standard too. An ethical policy is

based on a system of values. By achieving insight into absolute values

become capable of leading a moral life. Regarding the absolute values, the

only dependable source of knowledge is Divine message. Through intense

reflection on His message, we can hope to understand the meaning and

purpose of creation, the worth of the human self and its possibilities and

destiny. We would do well to lay the following soul-stirring verse to heart:

In the creation of the heavens and the earth, and in the alternation of night

and day, are surely signs to men of understanding. Such as keep before their

mind the Laws of Allah, standing and sitting and reclining, and reflect on the

creation of the heaven and the earth, saying: Our Rabb ! Thou hast not

created this in vain (3 : 189).

His message shed lights our path in the realm of values. However, we cannot

understand His message only by faith, nor through reason alone. What is

needed for this purpose is a happy blend of the two. Reason wedded to faith

leads us to the inner spirit of the Faith. The Quran speaks of men who have

grasped the meaning of His message, as "men of real understanding" (5:

100). They are the true believers because irrational belief has no value (65:

10). So far as the Quran is concerned, there can be no real conflict between

faith and reason. It speaks of those who believe as "having both knowledge

and faith"(30 : 56). They are the twin stars that enlighten the path of man.

In the West, however, conflict between faith and reason is a strand that runs


through history. The warfare between science and religion ran its sanguinary

course through several centuries. Only recently the truth has dawned on the

Western people that reason and faith, far from being antithetical, need, as

well as sustain, each other.

This is the Quranic outlook asserted in many verses and reinforced by the

clear statements of the Prophet. It should be clear by now that it is not the

purpose of God to strangle reason and encourage blind faith to supplant it.

The Quran nowhere glorifies blind faith. Far from decrying reason,

knowledge, and experience, the Quran insists on our making full use of our

intellectual faculties to understand and appreciate the ultimate truth

conveyed through Divine message (wahy). His message helps reason to

reach maturity. The human mind, having reached this stage, not only knows

but sees. Seeing, here refers to the clarity of mental vision:

Those who have due, regard for God's Laws, when an encompassing

temptation from Satan comes to them, they remember the Divine guidance,

and Lo! they see (the truth) (7 : 201).

Many may know the truth through reason but they "see" it in the right

perspective when the image in the eye of faith is superimposed on the image

in reason's eye. This clear perception of truth helps to lead man to peace and

eternal happiness. It helps man to maintain a happy balance between the

demands of his body and the demands of his real self. The Islamic way of life

has for its goal the development of the human personality in all its aspects.

The believer, once realizes this, puts himself in the hands of God and in

return asks for the fulfillment of his personality. The Quran referring to this

bargain says:

Allah hath bought from the believers their lives and their wealth

(9 : 111). For those who do good in this world there is a good reward (here)

and the Hereafter will be still better (16:30).

In the mentality of man, the Quran seeks to implant faith in the heart of

reason—faith in God who sustains the universe, which reveals a few of the

infinity of His aspects; Faith in the reality of the human self and in its

unlimited capacity for development; Faith in the absolute values which set

the goal to both human attempt and cosmic process; and finally faith in a

purposive life.


Notes

1. Locke J, Essays Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A. C. Fraser (New York:

Dover, 1995),, Book, IV (XIX, 4)

2. For historical trends and major approaches see these two classic books for the

Medieval debate on this subject: GILSON, E. Reason and Revelation in the Middle

Ages,( New York: Charles Scribner's sons, 1938.); and A.J. Arberry, Reason and

Revelation in Islam ( London, 1957).

3. Heidegger writes of what he calls "the otherwise tonality" of the principle of

sufficient reason, a tonality that does not deny that everything has an explanation, but

that alerts us to the fact of the ground of what can always be heard "before" reason as

well as always ignored (Martin Heidegger, The Principle of Reason, translated by

Reginald Lilly (Bloomington:. Indiana University Press, 1991), 39-40). Kierkegaard

helps us see the necessity of such a ground by showing the impossibility of giving an

explanation of Abraham; gust as the principle of contradiction is necessary to all

reasoning, but its necessity comes not from itself, but from the demand that I give an

acceptable explanation to another. The principles of reason have their origin in the

apologetic character of reason, which is the very basis for my existence as a unique

individual. (Emmanuel Levinas. Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority,

Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969 252-253)

4. This is traditionally known as the implying rule (qaedatol molazama) indicating that

Kollama Hakama beheshshar’, hakama behel ‘aql. Sadra speaks of this rule widely in

his works. For example see Mafatih al-qayb, Tehran 1364 H.S. his approach to the

subject is commonly accepted by Persian philosophers and jurisprudents after him.

5. This theory also shows that taking side for or against reason with regard to faith is

plausible; when the correspondence of reason and faith in the same level and degree

will not be respected. Then it is plausible when Bergson discusses the question whether

it is possible for human intellect to reach reality and gives a negative answer : "Not

through intelligence, or at least through intelligence alone, can (man) do so:

intelligence would be more likely to proceed in the opposite direction; it was provided

for a definite object and when it attempts speculation on a higher plane it enables us at

the most to conceive possibilities; it does not attain any reality". (The Two Sources of

Religion and Morality. Trans. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton. Garden City,


NJ: Doubleday Anchor Books, p. 201), or when Einstein, the most eminent physicist of

his time, frankly admitted that science can never give us "spiritual." guidance. He

argued that only men to whom Faith has been vouchsafed, could give us guidance in

the "spiritual" sphere: "On the other hand, representatives of science have often made

an attempt to arrive at fundamental judgements with respect to values and ends on

the basis of scientific method and in this way have set themselves in opposition to

religion. These conflicts have all sprung from fatal errors . . . . Science cannot create

ends and, even less, install them in human beings ; science can, at the most, supply

the means by which to attain certain ends. But the ends themselves are conceived by

personalities with lofty ethical ideals". (Einstein, A. Out of My Later Years, ed.

Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1970, pp. 25 ; 124) Such expressions are due to

neglection of the degrees of reason, and not being affected by passion and utilitarian

ends.

References

1. Arberry A.J., (1957), Reason and Revelation in Islam ( London).

2.Gilson, E. , (1938), Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages,( New York:

Charles Scribner's sons.)

3. Heidegger M., (1991),The Principle of Reason, translated by Reginald Lilly

,Bloomington:. Indiana University Press.

4. Levinas E., (1969),Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, Translated by

Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.

5. Locke J, (1995), Essays Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A. C. Fraser

(New York: Dover,) 6. Mulla Sadra, Mafatih al-qayb, Tehran: Eslamiyyeh 1364 H.S

Science and Reason, Reason and Faith Alfred I. Tauber *

Abstract

In this article, the author will firstly mention the history of debates between

science and religion from "monkey trial" up to multiverse hypothesis, as well

as theories posed to show that there are no design and intelligence in

universe.

Then he goes to introduce a Kantian perspective in this regard and speaks of

the unity of reason (theoretical and practical).

He concludes his article as follows:

The challenge of how reason might be regarded as unified, the “unity of

reason” problem, does not first appear with Kant’s schema, but grows from

modernity’s conundrum of determining how humans can be both part of the

natural world of cause and effect, and at the same time exercise free will and

thus assume moral responsibility. How Kant regarded reason as unified has

been deliberated in three basic formulations: 1. They are compatible with each other, that is, insofar as the principles of

one do not conflict with those of the other; 2. Both can be derived as components of a unitary and complete system of

philosophy, which has as its starting point a single first principle; 3. They possess an identical underlying “structure,” or constitute what is in

essence a single activity of the subject. (Neuhouser 1990, p. 12)

* Professor, Member of the Department of philosophy, Baylor university. E-Mail: [email protected]


In this article, the author shows that the autonomy of both theoretical and

practical reason serves as the bedrock of Kant’s entire philosophy, a system

that provides for freedom in both the apprehension of the natural world and

the discernment of moral action in the social world. This fundamental

characteristic seems best to address the unity of reason question. But,

neither this interpretation, nor the argument for others has resolved the

issue. Suffice it to note that while Kant regarded reason as fundamentally

unified, others did not, and at the very least, how theoretical and practical

reason functioned in different domains remained a beguiling question. Keywords: science, faith, Kant, reason, practical, theoretical, cognitive

functions

During the week before the Christmas of 2005, Judge John E. Jones, III,

sitting in the Federal Middle District of Pennsylvania, ruled against teaching a

new form of creationism in the public high school. The case arose from a suit

brought by parents against the Dover school board, which, in 2004 had

instructed teachers to read a short statement about the inconclusive status of

neo-Darwinian evolution theory and suggest that Intelligent Design might be

entertained as an alternative explanation. After a long trial that delved into

the nature of scientific theory and the questions of what constituted scientific

knowledge, the judge ruled Intelligent Design was a ploy to bring religion into

the classroom and accused certain board members of duplicity. Judge Jones

only confirmed what the voters had already accomplished by throwing the

errant board members back to church.

The country was riveted on the courtroom drama, some comparing it to

Scopes circus of 1925, when Clarence Darrow confronted William Jennings

Bryan in the famous Tennessee “monkey trial.” The 1960 movie “Inherit the

Wind,” so well enacted by Spencer Tracey and Fredric March, captured my

own imagination as a youngster, and then, as now, I was fascinated with the

arguments about God’s presence or absence in nature. I can well understand

how religionists regard nature with awe, and to find coherence, and perhaps

more importantly, meaning, in the cosmos, they cannot abide placing their

God outside His handiwork. If He is present in their daily lives, why should He

be omitted from designing the greatest of creations, human intelligence?

After all, the Bible describes how Adam was made in the image of God.


Accordingly, His intelligence, like our own, must have some engineering

capability dwarfing even our wildest conceptions. True believers maintain that

orthodox scientists are blind to a deeper Reason, because they have yet to

see His fingers at work. So what looked to Darwin and his followers as only a

contingent, blind evolutionary process, is, in fact, only understandable as an

act of deliberate design.

The Dover case took on a special luster during the summer of 2005, when in

the New York Times, Cardinal Schönborn wrote a controversial op-ed piece.

He claimed that he was protecting “rationality” against an ideological science:

The Catholic Church, while leaving to science many details about the history

of life on earth, proclaims that by the light of reason the human intellect can

readily and clearly discern purpose and design in the natural world, including

the world of living things.

Evolution in the sense of common ancestry might be true, but evolution in

neo-Darwinian sense — an unguided, unplanned process of random variation

and natural selection — is not. Any system of thought that denies or seeks to

explain away the overwhelming evidence for design in biology is ideology, not

science…

Now at the beginning of the 21st century, faced with scientific claims like

neo-Darwinism and the multiverse hypothesis in cosmology invented to avoid

the overwhelming evidence for purpose and design found in modern science,

the Catholic Church will again defend human reason by proclaiming that the

imminent design evident in nature is real. Scientific theories that try to

explain away the appearance of design as the result of “chance and

necessity” are not scientific at all, but as John Paul put it, an abdication of

human intelligence.

The slippage is evident: Schönborn propels his metaphysical reason, that

which supports God’s cosmological purpose, into the epistemological domain,

where the preponderant scientific interpretation sees no design (and,

incidentally, makes no comment about God’s presence or absence). In other

words, theological reason is conflated with scientific reason, and the

boundaries are trespassed as if there were no difference. The Kantian lesson

(discussed in detail below and elaborated in the Appendix) — how reason

must make way for faith — is simply ignored. Rather than provide divine


presence and teleology with its own reason, the Cardinal insists on projecting

his faith into the natural world. In short, because his reasoned theology (as

in the Church’s persecution of Galileo) apparently could not accommodate

neo-Darwinian blind evolution, Schönborn must dispute dominant scientific

opinion. Given his first allegiance to his own religious tenets he had no other

option.

What I am calling “slippage” is a result of these competing metaphysics, and

here we come face to face with the challenge in its starkest terms:

Schönborn’s metaphysics demands divine intervention; science embraces a

naturalism whose metaphysics are defined independently of teleology.

Reason is simply the tool used by each to support its respective agenda.

Unfortunately, “reason” is used by like-minded theologians as some kind of

universal solvent for dissolving problems without acknowledging that it is not

reason that is in dispute, but rather the metaphysics in which reason

functions. The question of whether Intelligent Design might take its place in

the scientific menu does not strike me as particularly interesting at this

point.1 We have witnessed endless and convincing rebuttal, but what

intrigues me, and the question upon which I will focus, concerns the

character of reason. Both sides claim a rational discourse, and, indeed,

intelligent people espouse Intelligent Design, but given the pre-suppositions

of each system, the conclusions of the respective positions are irreconcilable.

Argument is stultified, because pre-suppositions are, as R.G. Collingwood

described them, the suppositions that are closed to further analysis or

revision (Collingwood 1940). They are the bedrock of the conceptual

apparatus they support. Start with different presuppositions and logical

progression will bring the disputants to very different ends. More to the point,

scientific method, specifically its notions of objectivity coupled to empiricism,

has asserted its own program at the expense of other modes of knowing.

Indeed, scientific facts are not at issue, but rather their interpretation, so

that we should recognize the instrumentality of reason: Science may be used

by anyone; its technology applied for diverse social pursuits; its knowledge

perhaps designed for one purpose, applied to another; its findings interpreted

to support one metaphysics, or another.2

And now we come to the heart of the matter.


The Intelligent Design case exemplifies not only how science is in tension

with different worldviews, but more deeply how the metaphysics in which

science functions as an instrument of inquiry is in conflict with others. The

drama is not about science per se, but about the metaphysics in which

science functions. The classic examples are the religious disputes arising from

Galileo’s astronomical findings and Darwin’s theory of common descent. In

each instance, a religious orthodoxy disputed the science. Galileo’s case has

been settled, but Darwin’s still lingers, not in the particulars of evolutionary

findings, but as in the case of the Cardinal, the meaning of those findings.3

When the fossil record is placed within a fundamentalist reading of the Bible,

a “meta-theory” has supplanted the scientific one. And the irony of our age is

not that science cannot trump fundamentalist arguments, but rather that the

wondrous picture science presents may be translated into religious terms and

effectively employed against those who supported and developed the system

for very different ends.4 We will not settle the matter by argument, rational

or otherwise. The best we can do is support the liberalism, which allows

communities with different belief systems to thrive next to each other. To

that end, I will direct my comments.

Since science’s understanding of the universe and our place in it, may or may

not include a divine presence, God is besides the matter. If one wishes to

impose a secondary layer of divine interpretation upon those findings, fine,

but do not conflate two ways of knowing. Each has its place, and therein, its

authority. This is my theme.

The Problem

Neo-Darwinism’s non-teleological, materialistic view may be interpreted as

denying major assertions of Christian theology, and much else. Indeed, each

form of materialistic theory — from evolution to the origin of the universe,

from the heart’s beating to the brain’s functions — rests on a denial of

design, and consequently, a displacement of a master divinity. More than just

rejecting religious doctrine, neo-Darwinism asserts its own metaphysical

picture in contrast to it: a stark, materialistic universe with no telos. Such a

view leaves humans the chore of defining significance and meaning within a

human construct. I believe that challenge lies at the base of the conflict

between secularism and religious ideology. In a sense, Nietzsche’s challenge


(“God is dead!”) remains an abiding unresolved question: Can, or even

should, Man define his cosmos? Beyond naturalistic explanation, can the

values which govern society be truly based upon, or even derived from,

human deliberation? Can we successfully assert our own significance? Can we

meaningfully exist without divine revelation and live in a world navigated and

created by human intentions and will?

These questions have rested at the heart of the secular enterprise throughout

modernity. Indeed, they largely define the humanistic project, and when

liberal society is confronted by such expressions of discontent as the Dover

case, we are reminded that for a vast proportion of Americans, the world

science presents cannot provide meaning that satisfies their existential

needs. Indeed, they are correct. I readily admit that science requires some

“framing” — aesthetic, spiritual, moral — to integrate its worldview with

human experience. The fundamentalists aspire to integrate a scientific picture

— evolution — with deeply held religious commitments. I also seek seamless

connections between a materialistic universe governed by laws that have no

personal enchantment and the various dimensions of my subjectivity. So I

share with the fundamentalists a humane aspiration to understand my own

identity — psychologically, sociologically, spiritually, and so on — as my

identity is refracted from different perspectives. In short, all of us seek some

kind of “placement.” The difference between fundamentalists and me is that

they have a scheme, revealed and doctrinaire, and I do not, at least not as a

dogma. Instead, I firmly reside within a humanist tradition that attempts to

provide responses to these existential questions within the framework of

“Man as the final measure.”

On this view, science not only provides the basis for technological advances,

but answers to its deepest commitments of exploring nature as a response to

our metaphysical wonder. In this, science and religion are closely aligned, but

quickly separate, not so much because of reason, but rather as a result of

differing metaphysical presuppositions (e.g., Marcum 2003; 2005). In

contrast to a cosmos revealed by revelation, science was born as natural

philosophy, and thus committed to a vast program of empirical discovery.

Indeed, science as a branch of philosophy still adheres to the humanist

tradition, and despite deep tensions, their broader agenda of promoting


liberal inquiry must bring them again into close proximity. From this vantage,

the science-humanist alliance, melded in philosophy, must be seen again as a

key bulwark of modernity and its liberal program.

The tack taken here is guided by a sighting of reason; the winds are coming

from starboard; we require a steady compass to hold our course. I suggest

we find our bearings by looking back to the port from which we embarked.

That safe harbor is the Enlightenment. From there, we must chart our

present predicament. So let us begin with a review of some history.

The Call of the Enlightenment

What is Enlightenment? Kant’s famous answer, “Enlightenment is mankind’s

exit from its self-incurred immaturity” or as he further extolled, “Have the

courage to use your own understanding…” (1784, 1996). The essay goes on

to celebrate the virtues of an independent mind, guided by rationality, moral

forthrightness, and above all, a vision of personal freedom, which captures

these moral and epistemological virtues of the philosophes. This is only a

partial answer and we will have occasion to visit this conceptual question

again, but for now, let me ask a simpler historical question: What is the

Enlightenment? That, also, turns out not to be a trivial question, as I learned

about 15 years ago, long before I attained my present level of alarm. I was

presenting a report to a group of physicians, and dropped the phrase, “the

Enlightenment,” probably as a dangling participle to no good effect. In any

case, the chief medical officer, a man in his mid-40s at the time (that is, a

man about my own age), South African (and thus possessing an accent that

smacked of erudition), and a rather general haughty air about him (no doubt

from the authority of his position), stopped me by asking, “What is the

Enlightenment?” I paused, not sure of his intention, but soon discerned that

he was genuinely perplexed from a state of utter ignorance. At that moment,

there in the boardroom of the big city hospital, I realized that we were in

trouble, deep trouble. Shortly thereafter I initiated my career shift into

philosophy, where despite encountering a universe of different kinds of

problems, at least my colleagues knew such turn of phrases as “the

Enlightenment” and could respond with a kindly nod or a disapproving frown.

They knew how we are the products of that cultural moment, and how those


values developed and continue to guide liberalism and the specific endeavor

we call education.

I have often contemplated how I might have answered my physician

inquisitor. Instead of sputtering some incoherent mumblings, I wish I could

have quickly listed the key components of the Enlightenment: celebration of

an unfettered reason; the relentless questioning of authority and doctrine;

the promotion of individuality and free-choice; the centrality of selfhood and

moral agency; the confidence in progress; the sanctity of secularism. In

short, these precepts, refracted into the worlds of politics, law, social mores,

and perhaps most evidently in theology, marked modernity’s coming of age.

Science played a singular role in promoting this enterprise and, in turn, was

indebted to it. I would have explained that the clinical science that he

practices is a product of a new way of thinking, born during the “Century of

Genius” (Whitehead 1925) as an expression of a form of rationality that had

become a tool for open-ended inquiry. Indeed, I would have emphasized the

open-ended character of truth-seeking; the agnosticism about the divinity;

and, not least, the fallibility of knowledge.

Modern science in many ways exemplifies the Age of Reason; specifically I

am referring to its program of truth-seeking. Somewhat chastened by the

postmodern critique of any final Truth, I still believe we make an important

distinction between an understanding of reason that serves a predetermined

goal (for instance one defined by religious faith that is constrained a priori by

presuppositions deemed immune in advance to questioning), as opposed to

the use of enlightened reason that is open-ended. Inquiry in this latter

formulation has no telos other than the inquiry itself. In this sense, scientific

knowledge is neutral; the process of study is putatively immune to bias and

prejudice (at least in its theoretical prime state); fallibilism is assumed;

objectivity is sought. I will be making the case that this view of epistemic

accomplishment is fundamental to liberal thought and that this characteristic

binds science firmly to the humanities. Each share the same critical values,

and, in many respects, the same methods of analysis and tireless questioning

of the fruits of their respective studies. That alliance may be directed towards

secular ends, but not necessarily so.


Returning to my doctor colleague, I would have explained that his ignorance

was symptomatic (a word he would undoubtedly have understood and would

hopefully peak his interest) of the troubled status of this humanist-science

alliance. Let us briefly review that recent history.

Science and Reason’s Division

Almost half a century ago, the growing separation between science and the

humanities prompted C. P. Snow to describe academic culture as comprised

of “Two Cultures” (Snow 1959, 1964). He described mutual illiteracy, which

prevented scientists and humanists to engage each other across the

boundaries separating their respective disciplines. Because of its success and

its independence of the larger philosophical context from which it emerged,

science was regarded as an unruly adolescent: full of itself; brimming with

confidence and even arrogance; overflowing with its power and promise. As

Winfred Sellers noted (writing as a philosopher):

The scientific picture of the world replaces the common-sense picture….the

scientific account of “what there is” supersedes the descriptive ontology of

everyday life….[I]n the dimension of describing and explaining the world,

science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not

that it is not. (Sellers 1956, 1997, pp. 82-3)

Here, “common-sense” or “common-place” is a placeholder for all those

modes of knowing eclipsed by the triumph of science’s worldview.

Humanists feared an imbalance in two domains. The first was intellectual:

Scientism was viewed as imperialistic, assuming to apply its methods and

logic in arenas where, despite its authority, caution is required. Humanists

were suspicious of claims that are by their very nature fallible and which

history has repeatedly demonstrated are infected by pernicious cultural

determinants. A particularly invasive scientific philosophy, positivism,

asserted a rigid factuality to what constituted knowledge, and that standard

as applied to the human sciences (Comte 1825, 1974), would devalue other

hermeneutical forms of inquiry. Thus, as a purely intellectual conflict, most

scientists and humanists found themselves on different sides of the

demarcation lines outlined by the positivist program.

The second domain of controversy arose from the political and social

consequences of the first. Despite the achievements of science, humanists


rightly feared the imbalanced influence of the science “lobby,” whose

authority rested on the economic bounty indebted to scientific advances. The

Two Culture divide was consequently also an expression of how science,

largely as a result of its material success, increasingly dominated public

policy decisions and education resources. The social apparatus that supported

the scientific enterprise ranged from the educational reform stimulated by the

Sputnik challenge to scientific industries promoting their vested interests.

Beyond the technology sold to the domestic West, these were prominently

energized by, what Eisenhower menacingly described, a “military-industrial

complex,” which prominently displayed its products in Vietnam and later in

Iraq. Many were troubled by the danger of misplaced applications (like

nuclear power) and, even more, a kind of political arrogance, which seemed

to accompany the power of unbridled technology. These matters, while

germane, are not our subject. Here, suffice it to note that by the end of the

1950s, science education dominated other forms of knowing, so that a gentle

species of scientism seeped into the schools educating new generations of

citizens.

Ironically, coincident with Snow’s critique, the original cultural divide began

to mend in an unexpected way, only to be broken again along different fault

lines. Bridged by inter-disciplinary studies of science, where philosophers,

historians, and sociologists pursued an ambitious program to characterize the

laboratory as an intellectual and cultural activity, science no longer was

allowed to perform insulated from outside scrutiny. Indeed, science was

wrenched back from its isolated status, and the Two Cultures were melded

back to one, with a vengeance. The sacrosanct status of scientific rationality

and claims to orderly progress was challenged by Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of

Scientific Revolutions (1962), which closely followed Michael Polanyi’s

exploration of a more comprehensive appreciation of scientific thinking than

that offered by positivist philosophies of science. Indeed, Polanyi’s Personal

Knowledge (1958, 1962) marks the beginning of a new movement to study

sciencein a broadened humanistic context, which employed analytic tools

quite alien to the then current “internal” approaches espoused by Rudolf

Carnap and other logical positivists.


To place these developments in their historical context, I present a review of

the original alliance of humanists and scientists, how they separated, and

why a renewed effort to hold their common ground is incumbent on both. We

begin with Kant, who responded to the 18th century challenge of

understanding the legitimate claims of science, moral discourse, and religion

in the face of rapidly changing notions of the divine and its place in a secular,

liberal society. Revelation had been displaced by a critical stance oriented by

new standards of what is factual and what is not; what is knowledge and

what is opinion; what is objective and what is subjective. He specifically

sought to define reason in its various guises so that the pursuit of knowledge

and the faith of belief might proceed on their respective courses, confident

that neither would conflict with the other. This project articulated the

Enlightenment’s highest ideals.

We must also review some key historical features that highlight the parting of

science from the humanities — very broadly and very briefly — and then I

will return to explore the circumstances of a new alliance, now based on

those who would still embrace the original Enlightenment values

characterizing modernity. I am following the tradition initiated by Kant (Wein

1961) and then developed by Whitehead (1925), Husserl (1935, 1970), and

Gadamer (1976, 1981), each of whom, despite the radical differences of their

respective philosophies, profoundly understood that the bifurcation of reason

bestowed a conundrum that could only be addressed by a synthesis of

science and its supporting philosophical critique.5 Here, we will ponder in

various ways how, reason must “be its own pupil” (Kant 1787, 1998, p. 109

[B xv]) and thus remain loyal to its own “character.” I will first review some

key historical features that highlight the parting of science from the

humanities, and then I will return to explore the circumstances of their

continued alliance.

The Fractured Alliance

1. History

“Natural philosophy” became “science” in the mid-19th century, when

practitioners, both natural and social scientists, distinguished their own

technical and professional route from the more general concerns of

humanists. The break was, however, already evident at the end of the 18th


century, when both poets and physicists recognized a seeming chasm

opening between them. Goethe, perceiving this division, sought a

reunification of “science” and “poetry” in the realm of aesthetics (Tauber

1993). This strategy proved futile. In the same period, Kant conceptualized

the split by dividing human cognition into what he called ‘pure’ and

“practical” reason. “Pure” reason referred to the cognitive functions that

humans apply to the natural world, and “practical” reason dealt with the

moral realm (social or humanistic concerns). Kant’s formulation provided a

model by which science and religion might co-exist secure in their respective

domains (discussed further below). To do so, a new lexicon was required to

distinguish practitioners of one sort from the other.

The term “scientist” was coined by a British scientist and philosopher of

science, William Whewell (1794-1866). In 1840, writing in the Introduction of

his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Whewell commented, “We need

very much a name to describe a cultivator of science in general. I should

incline to call him a Scientist”(p. cxiii). What strikes me as noteworthy is not

this definition, but the late date of its birth. After all, the word “science” is

ancient. The Latin scientia means “knowledge” as opposed to sapientia,

wisdom. In other words, scientia is knowledge of, or cognition about, the

world, as opposed to the more self-reflexive domain of wisdom. And, sciens,

“knowing,” originally meant “to separate one thing from another, to

distinguish,” which also points to analysis of a particular kind. Certainly this

etymology closely adheres to what we broadly understand to be what science

seeks. In short, the word “science” has an ancient etymology, but the word

“scientist” is distinctly modern. Indeed, Charles Darwin, who wrote during the

same period as Whewell, referred to himself as a “natural philosopher.”

Darwin was very careful with his language and as a gentleman he had good

reason to prefer the older designation. The term “philosophical” was not

explicitly defined, but generally stood for an approach to the study of the

natural world (Rehbock 1983), which included the search for laws in biology,

a dissatisfaction with teleological arguments, a certain speculative or intuitive

attitude in method (especially rampant amongst the Naturphilosophen) and

idealist approach (ibid. pp. 3-11). In addition, “scientist” was too easily

associated with commercial overtones of technical applications and thus the


designation carried a pejorative connotation of someone who was inclined to

look for the economic benefits of discoveries, in contrast to the pristine

search for knowledge. Not until the end of the 19th century could the term

scientist assume its current neutrality.

I mention all of this to make a simple point: Until the mid-19th century,

science was a category of philosophy. The examination of the natural world

was part of what philosophers did. Only as the methods of scientific inquiry

became increasingly technical and a new professionalism took hold in its

various disciplines, did a scientist emerge as someone different from a

philosopher. If one examines the Western intellectual world as late as the

1850s, the educated classes were comfortably conversant with the latest

scientific findings, and many pursued, what we would call amateur science

(Tauber 2001). Chemistry and physics began to separate a bit earlier, but

certainly natural history remained the province of a wide audience. And I am

not referring to its popular mode: I mean specifically that gentlemen would

go to natural history meetings well into the 1850s and 1860s without any

professional encumbrances to their full participation. In short, until about 150

years ago, most scientists and most philosophers shared the same

intellectual bed.

2. Methodological separation

Advances in scientific techniques and methods of study required

specialization. The techniques developed in the 19th century reflected a

growing sophistication, both in terms of material investigations, as well as

the mathematics supporting them. The field of “biology” was invented as its

own discipline in the first decade of the 19th century and by the 1820s,

Claude Bernard and other physiologists were reducing organic processes to

physics and chemistry. Concurrently, physics and chemistry were employing

new mathematics, primarily statistical in nature, which by the 1870s created

statistical mechanics and all that it spawned. In short, focused attention to

the rapid growth of technical knowledge became a pre-requirement for active

participation, and this demanded specialized training. Eventually this

professional narrowing led to academic and professional segregation. By the

1870s, science was divided into various natural and social sciences, each of


which assumed a high degree of technical competence and cognitive training

(Smith 1997).

The fruits of that labor resulted in new industries derived from scientific

findings and their successful application to material culture. Since the

Renaissance, science has been sold as a package deal: Invest in scientific

inquiry and the discoveries will be converted into economic, military, and

social power. Indeed, the investment has been true to its promise, and few

could dispute that the triumphs of technology are inseparably linked to the

success of the underlying science. But I wish to note that technology is not

science; the two are distinct. Technology builds on scientific insight, and

much else, while science is based in another domain: Science seeks to

discover the character of nature and is thus part of natural philosophy. On

this view, technology is the application of knowledge for material innovation,

while science underlies such engineering. It is the difference between second

order and first order pursuits. But with the close identification of science and

technology this distinction is often blurred. I mention it here to emphasize

that science has been too often associated with its product as opposed to its

deeper commitments to philosophical inquiry, albeit of a special kind. More

importantly, the intellectual discipline of each domain drifted apart. The

hermeneutical methods used in the humanities, writ large, have their own

standing. But the interpretations applied to human creativity are not suitable

for the study of nature under the present scientific paradigm. The object of

investigation determines different approaches and different truth criteria.

Those who would separate science and the humanities would do so primarily

on this difference. Indeed, these methodological differences are rooted in a

deeper philosophical divergence.

3. Philosophical divide

During the Enlightenment, those who pondered the nature of knowledge were

struck by a growing separation of investigative methods employed by those

who studied the natural world, on one hand, and those who commented on

the social, spiritual, and psychological domains, on the other. Distinctions

between opinion and knowledge, always a central concern of philosophy in

one form or another, by the mid-18th century had reached a critical crisis.

David Hume, the great Scottish skeptic, drew these distinctions with


particular sharpness. He presented Kant with the challenge of refuting a

skepticism that placed in doubt the reality of the natural world, or at least the

ability to know that world objectively. The place of reason, the role of

emotions, the intuitions of the spiritual domain, and the ability to understand

human psychology each required a model of the mind that would account for

their respective claims to these particular forms of knowledge. On what basis

could, for example, knowledge of the natural world or the moral universe be

conceived as legitimate and well-grounded?

Kant began by offering a schema of the mind that made the natural world

intelligible, and thus susceptible to scientific investigation. He conceptualized

that to know the natural world and the moral domain required two different

kinds of human cognition. He called these, respectively, “pure” and

“practical” reason. “Pure” reason referred to the cognitive functions that

humans apply to the natural world. Such knowledge is derived from

appearances — the cognitive product or the phenomenon that we perceive.

The noumenon, the thing-in-itself we cannot know, and thus our ontology is

of a “second-order.” Kant was satisfied: “What the things may be in

themselves I do not know, and also do not need to know….” (Kant 1787,

1998, p. 375 [B333]). In contrast, “practical” reason dealt with the moral

realm, that is, with social or humanistic concerns. In other words, Kant

thought that humans possess one faculty for knowing the material world,

best exemplified by scientific inquiry; and he held that a second universe, the

moral-spiritual-personal, was, in terms of the first form of understanding,

unknowable. People might believe in the freedom of the will, the immortality

of the soul, and God, but the means by which humans might know such

metaphysical claims was not discernable by the same means humans knew

the natural world. As Kant acknowledged: “Thus I had to deny knowledge in

order to make room for faith (ibid. p. 117 [Bxxx]). Faith refers to

metaphysics, by which Kant meant the possibility of going beyond the science

of appearances to address moral pursuits. Thus one kind of knowledge was

differentiated from the other, and in fact, the argument followed a strong

Christian tradition: “Faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction

of things not seen” (Epistle to the Hebrews 11:1) (See Appendix).


The consequence of this division was, from Kant’s perspective, a way to save

Belief. But what he in fact did (for those so inclined) was to legitimatize one

way of knowing as “real” and the other as “less real.” In short, science could

claim a special legitimacy, albeit the Kantian transcendental claims were

immediately attacked (Beiser 1987) and the philosophical basis of Kant’s

theory of science led to unresolved debate (e.g., Brittan 1978; Friedman

1992). Any commitment to this configuration of reason required that some

balance be sought between what Kant called the reason of the empirical

domain and the reason of the moral. Specifically, where does scientific

inquiry end and other modes of knowing take over? For instance, the

hermeneutical disciplines, those that interpret, as opposed to analyze,

employ a legitimate countervailing method of knowing. From this perspective,

only an interpretative stance makes any sense when assessing a work of art

or determining the emotional meaning of behavior. Systems of justice,

cultural practices, and the meaning of behaviors cannot be reduced to strict

objective inquiry (the standards simply do not exist), but rather rest on

different kinds of assessment and interpretation. And when religious

knowledge makes its claims, on what basis might a scientific attitude allow

for the spiritual?

These questions will not rest and, indeed, they frame the basic issues

regarding the place of science in our pluralistic society. The general point,

and the one to which I will return, is simply that when science is viewed

circumspectly it becomes only one of several modes of inquiry, albeit with its

particular strengths, but also with its limitations. The line separating

objectivity from subjectivity is highly dynamic, historically contingent, and

continuously contested. Despite the obvious importance of making these

distinctions, the history of science is marked by the controversy of defining

those margins. Indeed, from a philosophical point of view, this is a key

component of science’s epistemological mission.

Kant’s warnings not to trespass into a realm best left to others were naïve.

Analytically, we can separate the epistemological and metaphysical concerns

of a philosophy of nature, but as modern science developed its distinctive

epistemology, a new metaphysics also emerged. Indeed, it is disingenuous to

insist that science has no metaphysics: As a branch of philosophy it has first


principles, pre-suppositions, which dwell in the deep reaches of its conceptual

structure. I call this aspect of science’s metaphysics its “logical” structure and

it includes such precepts as 1) the world is ordered; 2) we might discern this

order by detached empirical observation, neutral rational description and

objective analysis; 3) laws will emerge from this inquiry and they remain

inviolable; 4) why nature corresponds to our human mathematical and

objective descriptions is mysterious, but the empirical product of that method

has been highly successful and thus approximates a depiction of the real as

truth, and so on. Indeed, the technical product of this methodological logic,

and the power of its predictability points to a new mastery of nature shared

by all.

A second dimension of science’s metaphysics concerns the abiding questions

that direct its inquiry. Within its ontological domain, science embraced the

basic questions ancient philosophers had inherited from even more ancient

myth and religion: What is the world? How is it organized? Where does Man

fit into that universe? What is distinctly human? Science presented cogent

answers in its distinctive voice in terms decidedly non-metaphysical. Yet,

while the terms of engagement had been radically altered and the ontological

voice muted, the original metaphysical inquiry remained embedded (but

hardly dormant) in the scientific enterprise. Given that the metaphysical

questions remained, it is not surprising that the results science offered were

construed as alternatives to traditional religious beliefs. Indeed, by the mid-

nineteenth century, Whewell could assert with arrogant confidence, “Man is

the interpreter of Nature, Science the right interpretation” (1840, xvii).

Into our own era, competing metaphysical positions have provoked

conservative theologians to accommodate themselves to science’s claims,

when the integration of empirical study did not clearly coincide with the

rational constructions of their dogmas. Discontent with a scientific worldview

that had relinquished divine guidance, left fundamentalists resenting the

scientist’s independence (or better, insularity). In the United States this

independence of religion led stalwart promoters of secularism (like the Robert

Ingersoll and Cornell’s founding president, Andrew Dickson White [Feldman

2005]) to denounce religion as an offense against science. Darwin’s prescient

early journal musings (July 1, 1838) soon became commonplace sentiments:


“Origin of man now proved.—Metaphysic must flourish.—He who understands

baboon <will> would do more toward metaphysics than Locke.” (1987, 84e,

p. 539). (Cosslett [1984] offers a rich compendium of the 19th century

debate.)

The answers science provided were hardly neutral, inasmuch as the

secularists regarded investigative findings with one set of lenses, while the

religionists peered through another. In short, the borders were violated by

both parties as they sought to bolster their own programs. Theoretically, a

strictly neutral science would posture itself towards neither camp, but given

its historical and cultural affinity with the humanist tradition, science became

a powerful instrument of secularization. Moreover, since neutrality was never

a viable option, science found itself caught in the cross fire of an ideological

war that has been waged for over five centuries. And no wonder, for no less

than The Truth was at stake.

Binding the Sciences to the Humanities

The project of protecting liberal education requires the alignment of science

with its humanistic origins, or what I am calling, science’s deeper

philosophical project. “Humanism,” (like the word “scientist”) was coined in

the 19th century to apply to the rediscovery of the classical tradition in the

medieval period. Humanists were originally concerned with a general

education, which spans the classics to modern science. But humanists

accorded particular importance to the liberal agenda: freedom of thought,

tolerance, revision and correction of opinion, open communication, and a

self-critical attitude. These underlying values tie together the central

concerns of the humanities and science into a powerful alliance. In fact, one

could argue that these values captured much of philosophy’s pride and

business. Accordingly, the scientific worldview could make its claims based on

a long history of coupling its particular concerns to this much larger agenda.

Today the humanities are the direct heir of the original humanistic disciplines,

and science seems far distant from those origins. But recall that science also

originated as a contributing member of the humanistic faculty, and on this

broad view, science is part of a larger historical development of humanistic

thought. Although we are usually struck by how science followed a

naturalistic philosophy, even its empiricism is based on a rationality that had


deep roots in philosophy. Through ruthless self-criticism, the frame of

reference is always in doubt; the historical record reveals fallibility; the place

of objective knowledge as opposed to subjective opinion is tested and

contested. And when opinion is held, it is open to revision through free

argument.

These are the deepest values of science and the underlying philosophy

guiding its methods and defining its aims. Science is sustained, indeed

instantiated, by a self-critical philosophy, tested against the investigations of

nature. Nature devoid of human value and human caprices demanded stark

answers to starkly posed questions. In short, although science and

humanities pursue different objects of inquiry, they support each other in

common purpose and the same philosophical self-critical attitude. And

beyond this kinship we find other aspects that link them.

Subordinate the difference of science’s object of study, the natural world, as

well as differing methodologies (the empirical basis of scientific

investigations), and we are left with an essentialist core: Science, like the

humanities, is a human-centered focus of inquiry –– “human-centered” in

two senses:

First, the standards of discourse are human-derived (as opposed to divinely

inspired). Revelation has been displaced by a critical stance oriented by new

standards of what is factual and what is not. What is knowledge and what is

opinion? What is objective and what is subjective? The second component

refers to knowledge directed at developing human industry. “Industry” does

not refer here to material culture, but rather the more general understanding

of industry as the systematic labor to create value. The study of nature is

deeply committed to a personal comprehension of the world, a picture of

reality that offers insight, and thereby an orientation, of Man in Nature.

Scientific findings alone are insufficient for determining significance, and thus

interpretation is required (Tauber 1993; 1996; 1997; 2001). Commentators

from Goethe (Tauber 1993) to Whewell (1840) to Michael Polanyi (1958,

1962) have understood that raw knowledge, a fact, is essentially

meaningless. What is the significance of a scientific fact or larger theory

unless it may be applied to human understanding? “Understanding” entails

many layers of interpretation, and here the linkage to the humanistic


disciplines becomes most evident. Science influences its supporting culture,

the values that govern its use, and ultimately the sense of meaning and

significance ascribed to the scientific portrait of the world. Polanyi called this

final step “personal knowledge” when he wrote about the same time as

Thomas Kuhn about the limits of positivism. Both recognized, as did an entire

generation following them, that scientific knowledge was ultimately human-

centered in the sense discussed here. On this broad view, science is part of a

larger historical development of humanism, and finds itself, ultimately, in its

service.

Certain conclusions beckon: First, the “package deal” of doing science and

placing science within its intellectual and social contexts argues that science

and its study as a human activity cannot be separated. This interdisciplinary

effort arises, because the boundaries of science cannot be circumscribed to

the laboratory or technical discourse (Gieryn 1995). The findings seep into

applications, which affect our material culture, medicine, the military, and

virtually all aspects of our society. Only an educated public can make

appropriate use of the fruits of scientific labor, thus a close coordination

between scientists and lay public is required to reap the greatest harvest

from the investment made in research.

Second, the critique of science is essential to its flourishing. Science gains its

place at the table precisely because of its power to define a competing

worldview. The “naturalization” of man, from the evolution of species to the

biological character of the mental testifies to how successfully scientific

explanations have been translated into potent theories of man and society.

(For instance, how much of human behavior is determined by the genetic

dimension? Why should we preserve natural resources? When does a fetus

become an individual? Can vaccines be developed to prevent AIDS? To what

use should nuclear energy be applied? And on, endlessly.) Notwithstanding

the effective penetration of scientific theory into notions about the nature of

our social and psychological existence, a careful scrutiny is required to apply

the conceptual lessons appropriately. Closely linked to that application, the

converse operation is also necessary, namely a critical view of the truth

claims made by scientists. With these critiques, philosophy and history of

science find their most pressing calling.


Perhaps not surprisingly, as science assumed its new independent standing,

the disciplines of history and philosophy of science matured. They filled a

gapping hole. After all, as Thomas Kuhn noted 40 years ago, scientists were

not interested in their own histories, much less the philosophy undergirding

their discipline (Kuhn 1962). In turn, the humanists lamented the scarcity of

meaningful dialogue between themselves and their scientific colleagues. The

sociologies of each group had radically diverged, and beyond this professional

separation, the respective mode of discourse seemed foreign to the other.

Thus cross-fertilization had become increasingly barren.

The mission of the humanistic disciplines to critique science, interpret its

development, and assist efforts made from within the scientific establishment

in its own self-critical evaluations seem to warrant historians and

philosophers the status of bona fide adjuncts in science faculties. And more,

the ability to translate scientific discoveries and theories into wider

conceptual and social contexts, where their significance might be more fully

appreciated, also requires an intimacy between the laboratory scientist and

her humanist commentator. After all, science is only one system of

investigation within that larger arena of human study of nature, man and

society. As such it has proven to be a crucial means of discovering our world

and characterizing our relationship to it. But like any mode of philosophical

study, it is subject to criticism, and in that critique, scientific method itself is

scrutinized and thereby improved. One might even say that self-critical

scientists are themselves engaged in the philosophical project of ‘natural

philosophy’ by carefully examining their methods and truth claims. This

essentially philosophical self-criticism is probably the most fundamental

shared characteristic of science and philosophy as generally construed.

Third, beyond the material fruits of scientific labor, the most profound effect

is science’s worldview, or, as Heidegger (1977) noted, that there is a

worldview at all! The theories and methods that have demonstrated the

worlds of molecular biology, tectonic plates, quantum mechanics, and so on,

have markedly altered how we conceive the world in which we live and our

relation to it. Further, the human sciences, for better and for worse, have

bestowed their own theories on human character and conduct. Taking their

lead from Goethe and Schiller, philosophers as diverse as Heidegger and


Whitehead, Weber and Foucault, have repeatedly shown how science has

effectively competed with earlier metaphysical systems, and thus has

provided views of a reality replete with novel challenges for defining meaning

and significance to human existence.

The crisis created by the ascendancy of a scientific material universe was

aptly summarized by Schiller (1801, 1993: 121): “How are we to restore the

unity of human nature…” in a disenchanted world? Viewed from the secular

perspective, science joined other cultural forces to offer alternative definitions

of human identity and Man’s relationship to the larger universe — cultural,

natural, and supernatural. Of course, science’s worldview is not necessarily

incompatible with a divine presence, but protecting free inquiry and open

interpretation remains a challenge that can only be successfully accomplished

by the strong alliance of those committed to the larger liberal agenda.

An Unholy Alliance

Until fairly recently, investigating the natural world was of one piece with the

rest of philosophy. Natural philosophy, that part of philosophy which focused

on nature, was easily integrated with the other concerns. This fundamental

kinship remains. What have changed are the sociologies of science and the

humanities, and the technical virtuosity of the modern scientist. But the

intellectual drive is the same. At the foundations that set their respective

agendas, scientists and humanists share the same set of basic values to

govern their pursuits and their respective logics: a telos of inquiry that has

no telos — the inquiry is done for itself. For those who wish to impose their

own theological teleology on human knowledge, this position is unacceptable.

Secularism is the object of dissension. And beneath that religious conflict,

liberalism rests on the altar for sacrifice, a liberalism which advocates

tolerance for each point of view.

Basically, science is agnostic about religious claims. It makes no attempt to

address God, or to listen to Him. Whether the divine exists or not is simply

not at issue, for science has no means to explore that dimension. Further,

existence is mysterious enough to make room for both knowledge and belief.

But science’s neutrality is intolerable, to both secularists and religionists, and

therein is the rub. Because the secularists were better able to employ science

for their own ends, science, was guilty by association in the eyes of the true


believers. And, indeed, if science must choose, it has little choice but to move

with the secularists, who make no theological demands on its truth claims.

Secularization signals God’s retreat from the everyday world of common

experience and activities, and also refers to a major realignment of social

hierarchies and the rationale for new political structures. Science partook in

this social revolution in at least three ways: 1) the technology based on

scientific discoveries revolutionized the material culture, revealing mysterious

forces and events as natural and thereby open to human understanding; 2)

this naturalized world view placed divine intervention increasingly peripheral

to human understanding; and 3) the logic and standards of knowledge as

applied to the natural world were extended to the social and psychological

domains of human experience, thereby rationalizing a redistribution of power

and authority from monarchial and ecclesiastical centers to liberal

institutions. These developments placed God under a new lens of inquiry, and

as God’s place in the universe shifted, so did Man’s.

The power of science’s discourse rests in its powerful epistemology. The

empiricist measures his findings against a natural object that “speaks” back

to him in a public voice. Objectivity thus attains a new standing as communal

witnessing has effectively replaced private inspiration and insight. Here we

see the convergence of other cultural forces that combined in the rise of

secularism: the re-alignment of authority; the autonomy of the individual;

the claims for individuality; the rise of free agency. (And of course, strong

arguments have been made as to how post-Reformation Protestantism also

contributed to rise of modern scientific epistemology [Harrison 1998].)

Scientists embraced these new cultural values and enthusiastically declared

that a more rigorous objectivity had replaced folk psychology, superstition,

and other intimacies of the heart with a different logic and a different

understanding of the world. And in this context, human nature also became

increasingly naturalized at the expense of an older religious metaphysics.

Scientific knowledge thus displaced opinion in every realm of knowledge.6

Instead of aligning science to the secularist project, the more judicious

adopted an agnostic metaphysical orientation: Following Kant, science may

allow a divine presence, but only one consistent with the best scientific

interpretations. In short, various forms of knowledge must be differentiated


from beliefs. Kant’s formulation provided a model by which science and

religion might co-exist secure in their respective domains. What we can know

is one set of experiences, and what we feel, intuit, or opine is a set of

different kinds of assertions. To know the difference and to keep them

separate is the foundation of a liberal society. God may come and go as He

likes, but Man must govern himself by human-derived standards and modes

of knowledge that in our era reflect a certain kind of rationality. Kant thus

alerted the natural philosopher not to probe into areas that scientific method

had no ready access. He thus left a domain for belief that would originate in

different human faculties of thought and emotion. He profoundly understood

that science would not ask for, and thus would not offer, a basis for religious

belief, one way or the other. Science erected a neutral picture that tilts one

way with God, and another without Him. But which way the cosmos tilts is

dependent on individual choice. That pluralistic option threatened those who

could not claim the same kinds of certainty science exhibited employing a

different kind of rationality and a different basis for objective judgment.

Unfortunately, Kant’s suggestion has had only mixed success, because the

growing hegemony of a non-revealed worldview continues to be intolerable to

those who steadfastly champion their particular religious beliefs. If science

was regarded simply as a tool for technological advancement, the debate

would have been quelled, but all understood that much more was at stake

than material gain.

Belief falls into the domain of personal choice; knowledge is what we agree is

universally accessible. Following Kant, we call such knowledge ‘objective’ and

we attain it by a form of reason fashioned by certain epistemological criteria.

These may change, indeed, they do, but revelation is not one of them.

Socrates specifically opposed reasoning directed to confirming revelation and

opinion. By endless interrogation, he drove his interlocutors to face their

complacent assumptions and lazy beliefs. He thus established the basic

demand of philosophical inquiry. Fallibilism is the lynch pin of the entire

enterprise, for the body of knowledge is assumed to be incomplete, if not in

error (Popper 1963, pp. 228ff.).


[A]ny thinking … is under a standing obligation to reflect about and criticize

the standards by which, at any time, it takes itself to be governed. … [this] is

implicit in the very idea of a shaping of the intellect. (McDowell 1994, 81)

The perfectionism of endless critique provides the scientist with the basic

value of inquiry, a value which binds science to its philosophical antecedents.

Doubt and skepticism remain the cardinal virtues of scientific theory as well

as underlying its various modes of proof.

Derived from this self-critical foundation, science developed values that seek

to legitimate interpretation by parsimony, coherence, and predictive

capacities. And success is assessed by rationality oriented by criticism:

Entertaining a doubt adds up to little more than applying a question mark, or

raising one’s eyebrows; serious criticism, by contrast, requires fashioning an

argument. To doubt is to suspect something might be amiss, to criticize is to

argue that it is. Skeptical discourse requires a supply of interrogatives,

critical discourse requires rich background knowledge and a developed logic

of problem-seeking and solving. Criticism necessarily presupposes doubt, but

is also a necessary prerequisite for positive action. In the face of suspected

imperfection the first step toward improvement will always be critical. Hence

the term ‘constructive skepticism.’ (Fisch 2006) Rationality on this view

becomes a category of action, a means to expose and solve problems, and

how inquiry might gauge its success or failure is determined by a larger set

of goals, and thus rationality assumes an instrumental quality.

This understanding of rationality might be equally applied to religious

argument and scientific dispute, but the key difference is the object of

inquiry: The theologian probes the human heart and soul; the scientist

explores the natural world. The difference is telling: The values by which

science defines nature have evolved during the modern period to attain a

powerful means to separate human prejudice and belief from an objective

account. Kant established this crucial distinction by disallowing “pure reason”

to impose its own categories upon the metaphysical universe, thus “saving”

belief from the tyranny of science’s power. By segregating religious insight

from knowledge, he made room for belief. This lesson is a key precept of the

liberal agenda, by leaving different kinds of rationality to explore distinctive

domains.


Again we see the deep affinity of science and the humanities: Both must

promote pluralism to protect free inquiry and critical analysis freed of

doctrine. But with the vast social and intellectual forces that bestowed a

unique mode of inquiry (and the rewards of technological success), science

seemed to forget its humanistic origins. That amnesia has dire consequences

given the new challenges of a postmodern era, where reason, in certain

quarters, has been redefined by standards inimical to scientific ideals.

Sharing a common ancestry, science and the humanistic disciplines are rivals

and at the same time locked into the same “family,” a family that has shared

goals and characteristics.

I believe that in order to understand the current attacks on science, we best

understand the character of scientific inquiry within its larger context and

defend it on the basis of its crucial role as a liberal institution, one that

instantiates our highest ideals of unfettered inquiry. Science, more than other

intellectual activities, has provided us with those standards. It is time for

humanists of all stripes to train their collective sights on the real enemy.

Whether their protection of liberalism, intellectual freedom and pluralism will

be steadfast and successful represents the crucial test in these days so

painfully marked by the fundamentalist assaults of the Taliban and Cardinal

Schönborn.

Conclusion

So in the end, how should we regard the religionists’ project? Two attitudes

beckon, one which is conciliatory, the other which is not. Let us begin with

the latter, which is largely political, political in the broadest sense of the

term. Like most Americans, I have become preoccupied with thinking about

the fate of democracy since 9/11; about terrorism and torture; about our

military exploits and conservative domestic politics; about stem cell research

and creationism. From deeply blue Boston, I peer at the New York Times

daily and conclude that it is hardly clear that the liberal program is thriving,

or whether it can sustain assaults on its central role in democratic societies.

Will the Enlightenment — with its commitment to the autonomy of reason —

someday in the not too distant future be viewed as an anomalous event in

world history? Can the values of tolerance, self-scrutiny and pluralism hold

the ground against religious fundamentalism? In 1989, with the fall of the


Berlin Wall, I doubt that many would have predicted the world in which we

now live — a world full of ironies. Perhaps the view from Waco is more

optimistic, but I can only share my own perspective that religious

fundamentalism continues to haunt the liberal tradition, where pluralism

protects free inquiry and critical analysis freed of doctrine. At stake is not

only the standing of science in the American educational system, but the

character of reason in a liberal society.

And on a more conciliatory note, I end by emphasizing that human reason

apparently has a basic property, one demonstrated by myriad psychological

and cognitive studies: Coherence of experience, coherence of belief,

coherence of understanding seems to be a basic property of the human mind.

Freud discovered numerous defense mechanisms to hold the psyche

together; cognitive scientists have demonstrated the ability to screen out or

forget data or experience conflicting with more dominant experience; and

metaphysicians jealously guard their presuppositions to hold their world

together. But as we gaze at the deep chasm of a materialistic universe, we

do well to recognize that the metaphysical wonder that lies at the heart of

the scientific query originates with the very same religious questions that

evolved into philosophical ones, and then into the domain of science. In that

evolution, the questions remained, but the answers became increasingly

circumscribed, so that now science admits it cannot address the original

query, at least not directly. Accepting its limits, science resides within its own

metaphysical strictures, and we thereby acknowledge that the drive for

coherence requires a different kind of understanding, one which

acknowledges science’s own domain. That challenge is to find a way of

cohering a world that has no obvious coherence. Indeed, many worlds

comprise reality. May we engage each as best we can.

Acknowledgements

I am most appreciative of the Reynolds Lectureship Committee, chaired by

Professor Robert Baird, for the invitation to deliver this lecture and to

participate in the other activities related to it. I have enjoyed stimulating

discussions with colleagues in the Baylor University Department of

Philosophy, and especially the warm hospitality extended by Jim Marcum.

This project helped to crystallize ideas that had been in suspension for some


time, and the paper is part of a continuing dialogue with Menachem Fisch,

whose work has inspired me to again re-visit the question of the relationship

between science and religion in the context of debates about rationality and

objectivity. Despite the differences we hold, I am much indebted to his

delineation of these issues, and in dedicating this paper to him, I offer my

sincere thanks for his constructive criticisms.

Notes

1. The debate about the evolution of biological complexity has a long history (Ruse

1996), and a rich literature has recently developed on this question (Pennock 2001;

Ruse 2003; Dembski and Ruse 2004; for a concise review, see Nakhnikian 2004) In

the spate of letters following Schönborn‘s editorial (NY Times July 11, 2005), Robert

Cone succinctly noted that “natural selection may be unplanned, but it is not unguided.

It is guided by need, whether for shelter, reproduction, food, safety, or other vital

necessity.” Indeed, in the course of random mutations, more complex options are

offered and these may be chosen to accommodate the stresses of changing

environments and competition among other species. On this view, biological diversity,

initiating sometimes more complex, and at other times, more simple “solutions,” have

appeared. According to neo-Darwinism, “design” is an unnecessary element in

explaining evolution. Complex structures evolve, according to this view, by a step-wise

process, where structure A is used for one function and may then be used as the basis

for the evolution to structure B that addresses a different function, and so on. In short,

a complex biological structure cannot appear de novo, but rather develops by myriad

intermediate stages to appear as a complex entity.

2. Science’s instrumentality has at least two dimensions: The first refers to how

research is applied (perhaps, employed) to devise technologies. These might be put to

constructive use (the usual case) or instead, employed as a tool for purposes quite at

odds with the original intent of seeking knowledge for our social good. This

instrumental quality of science (its technological power) holds one of its ironies:

Instead of maintaining its original philosophical credentials, science, more precisely its

technological progeny, too often has become so divorced from those earlier concerns

that the basic research has become a tool that may be applied independently of the

primary intent of the investigation. Co-opted by those whose own agenda has nothing


to do with promoting the Western values that spawned science in the first place, we

have painfully learned how powerful technologies may be used as an instrument of

power for socio-political ends at odds with our own.

A second sense of instrumentality refers to science’s intellectual activity, a mode of

discovery and knowing, where the findings are used like a currency to buy different

goods. The goods are findings or ideas, which are then placed into a conceptual

context. The competing context may be differing scientific theories, but in this

discussion, I am interested in religious contexts. Where the physicist will admit that

knowledge reaches a limit, the true believer will push the universe’s origins back into

the divine act. The question at hand thus may be simply defined: Where does

knowledge end and belief begin? That border has again become an active battlefield,

for no less than the authority of knowledge is at stake. Simply, science without its

supporting liberal, self-critical foundations becomes instrumental, solely a tool for

technology, or, as a tool for ideologies, competing with liberalism.

3. The creationists pose a somewhat different kind of argument, not one that

acquiesces to the scientific findings, but rather a dispute over the facts themselves.

They have stubbornly opposed contemporary Darwinism by insisting that creationism is

a bona fide theory of life and that the findings documented by evolutionists assume a

different meaning in creationist theory. Students of this controversy have concluded,

and I think fairly, that the argument cannot be won by evidence (Sober 1993). The

Darwinists point to myriad molecular, paleontologic, and organismic data to show blind

evolution at work in the field and laboratory, as well as in the geological record. The

creationists argue that God placed the history there by reason of His own wisdom; that

evolution is directed and thus bestowed by God; that he created the world, or perhaps

He continues to guide evolution, for His own purposes. Given the fundamentally

different underlying presuppositions of each point of view, there is no meaningful

debate.

4. Interpretation follows from a complex array of underlying suppositions and a

tradition of supporting interpretations. For instance, in the 19th century those seeking

a materialistic explanation of life to discredit vitalism measured heat production of

contracting muscles to account for the energy exchange of muscle metabolism.

Hermann Helmholtz, and others, could fully account for the biochemistry of this

process to argue effectively against vitalist forces. That episode was in a long train of

laboratory findings that followed a reductionist strategy to establish a materialistic


science of life. It was part of a revolutionary philosophical program (Galaty 1974;

Moulines 1981). Darwin’s theory of evolution and Pasteur’s microbiological

demonstrations against spontaneous generation were battles fought in the same war.

Needless to say, the vitalists held to a radically different philosophy of the organic, so

their interpretations wildly differed. They simply argued that Helmholtz’s experiments

were still too insensitive to detect the vitalistic element. Indeed, vitalism, even in

respectable scientific circles, would not fully expire until the turn of the century, and

again, its demise was supported by a large intellectual project of support that brought

not only biophysical findings to bear, but invoked a cultural environment accepting a

non-vitalist interpretation. In our own era, science for the creationist, or for that

matter anyone holding to a conflicting metaphysics, may use research findings as an

instrument for support of their own agenda. (See footnote No. 2)

5. How science might require a philosophical self-consciousness is an old theme, and,

at least for me, builds from Alfred North Whitehead’s own commentary about the need

for scientists to become more self-aware of their philosophical debts: “If science is not

to degenerate into a medley of ad hoc hypotheses, it must become more philosophical

and must enter upon a thorough criticism of its own foundations” (1925, p. 24). I am

not pursuing that agenda here except in the broadest sense, namely to remonstrate

the place of science in the liberal university. Thus this essay might better be regarded

as a contribution to the wider discipline of science studies.

6. The enthusiasts even argued that scientific methods were applicable to all domains

of human need. As discussed, this caused controversy within the academy, because

scientism not only became a method of investigating the natural world, it was regarded

by some as representing the way we best construct a worldview from one end of

human experience to another (Wilson 1998).

Appendix: Kant and the Unity of Reason

From our perspective, Kant occupies a unique position, poised between the

Enlightenment’s ideal of exercising pristine rationality and the Romantic confusion of a

collapsed conviction in that project. As opposed to a romantic integration of man and

nature, or at least the assumption of a harmony of structure between reason and

nature, Kant perceives a tension. Although reason maintains its hegemony, albeit

somewhat restricted to certain questions, its grounding has vanished. If the noumenal

reality can only be refracted by reason’s own laws, if the real is a synthesis of mind

and nature, if the very self which knows the world is itself a noumenon and thus


observed as any other natural object, what could reason’s own foundations be? Kant’s

answer: “Reason operates according to laws that it gives to itself” (Neiman 1994,

p.91), and these laws are distinctly human. Kant meticulously derived reason’s “laws,”

which include the unrequited search for the Unconditioned (the ground of the world

from a unified, single substance [ibid. p. 86]). This Kantian presentation of how

“metaphysical wonder” drives human inquiry is formulated as a “regulative” (as

opposed to constitutive) teleology. Simply, reason becomes “the capacity to act

according to purposes” (ibid., p. 88, citing Kant’s Critique of Judgment, #370), which is

comprised by the search for its own grounding, i.e., nothing less than the pursuit of an

all-encompassing ontology. Further, by seeking “its own reflection in nature” (ibid.),

reason structures reality according to a human perspective, not as the world really is in

any final sense, but only in reason’s own terms. So both in its impossible search for the

Unconditioned and its enclosure within the laws of its function, reason constructs a

world delimited by its resources and faculties. And key to this formulation is the

regulative principle of reason, namely, its pursuit of the Unconditioned. This idea, or

hope, underlies every scientific investigation.

For Kant, reason’s ends are practical, not speculative, and since the rational is not

centrally concerned with cognition per se, but rather with ideas, so we might better

understand the relationship of theoretical and practical reason as unified by another

agenda, altogether. The schema calls for the Understanding to gather all that which

constitutes knowledge, and Reason then applies its quest for ends (both metaphysical

and moral) “to question experience and so to form constructions more interesting than

simple aggregates of assertions about the data of experience” (Neiman 1994, p. 5).

Science demands a subtle dialectic, where reason must judge the world and itself in

interplay, where the demands of each are met:

Reason, in order to be taught by nature, must approach nature with its principles in

one hand, according to which alone the agreement among appearances can count as

laws, and, in the other hand, the experiments thought out in accordance with these

principles — yet in order to be instructed by nature not like a pupil, who has recited to

him whatever the teacher wants to say, but like an appointed judge who compels

witnesses to answer questions he puts to them. (Kant 1787, 1998, p. 109 [B xiv])

Thus the “concepts of the understanding give order to experience; the principles of

reason are the standard by which it is judged” (Neiman 1994, p.6). Those standards,

as already mentioned, are derived from the regulative principle Kant introduces to


guide the search to constitute experience. Indeed, according to Kant, “regulative

principles of reason shape our actions in science, morality, religion, and philosophy

itself” (ibid. p.7).

Reason must be free of experience to accomplish its responsibilities, and on this view,

science becomes an expression of this human freedom. As Kant wrote in the first

Critique,

reason does not give in to those grounds which are empirically given, and it does not

follow the order of things as they are presented in the intuition, but with complete

spontaneity it makes its own order according to ideas, to which it fits the empirical

conditions and according to which it even declares actions to be necessary that yet

have not occurred and perhaps will not occur…(A548/B576, 1787, 1998, p. 541)

He goes on to maintain that “the ideas of reason have actually proved their causality in

regard to the actions of human beings” (A550/B578, ibid. p. 542), and more radically,

he regards reason possessing a freedom from natural causality that distinguishes it

from the world that it examines. Unlike certain human behaviors that have an obvious

empirical content and thus deterministic causality,

of reason, one cannot say that before the state in which it determines the power of

choice, another state proceeds in which this state itself is determined. For since reason

itself is not an appearance and is not subject at all to any conditions of sensibility [i.e.,

naturalistic], no temporal sequence takes place in it even as to its causality, and thus

the dynamical law of nature, which determines the temporal sequence according to

rules, cannot be applied to it. (A553/B581, ibid. p. 543).

In short, reason is outside the natural domain, which allows it to be free and

autonomous. Thus reason’s freedom is not solely a moral characteristic, but constitutes

its basic feature, which when extended to the study of nature, permits reason to

function independently of nature and thereby engage in a science of discovery and

understanding. Indeed, genuine scientific thinking is a product of reason, more

specifically reason’s freedom to develop ideas based on experience, which, without the

ordering reason provides, remains unprocessed and unstructured, recorded but

unexplained.

Thus Kant’s description of reason would allow for rational self-determination in both

the domain of theoretical pure reason and the ethical deliberations of practical reason.

Seeing theoretical reason functioning analogously to practical reason, that is by being

able to develop ideas about experience autonomously, by employing principles of


organization of its own, and by adopting its own motives and purposes for its own

actions, reason is unified. Reason possesses a general property, a capacity to surpass

the confines of experience [that] allows theory to be extended to the realm of the

unobservable,” (Neiman 1994, p. 71) and thus construct solutions whether posed

naturalistically or morally.

The challenge of how reason might be regarded as unified, the “unity of reason”

problem, does not first appear with Kant’s schema, but grows from modernity’s

conundrum of determining how humans can be both part of the natural world of cause

and effect, and at the same time exercise free will and thus assume moral

responsibility. How Kant regarded reason as unified has been deliberated in three basic

formulations:

1. they are compatible with each other, that is, insofar as the principles of one do not

conflict with those of the other;

2. both can be derived as components of a unitary and complete system of philosophy,

which has as its starting point a single first principle;

3. they possess an identical underlying “structure,” or constitute what is in essence a

single activity of the subject. (Neuhouser 1990, p. 12)

As presented here, the autonomy of both theoretical and practical reason serves as the

bedrock of Kant’s entire philosophy, a system that provides for freedom in both the

apprehension of the natural world and the discernment of moral action in the social

world. This fundamental characteristic seems best to address the unity of reason

question, but

needless to say, neither this interpretation, nor the argument for others has resolved

the issue. Suffice it to note that while Kant regarded reason as fundamentally unified,

others did not, and at the very least, how theoretical and practical reason functioned in

different domains remained a beguiling question.

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The Relationship between Religion and Philosophy in the History of Islamic Thought Reza Akbarian ∗

The obvious question, which arises for anyone looking at the history of

Islamic philosophy, is: what is the relation between religion and philosophy?

This has been a controversial question for a long time, and it is indeed

difficult to find a response, which is entirely satisfactory for such thinkers and

systems of thought. We are all well aware of the extraordinary importance

attached to religion in the Islamic civilization, and we know too that Islam,

and other Abrahamic religions each produced a certain body of doctrine in

which philosophy went more or less happily hand-in-hand with religious

dogma of doctrine rather vaguely known as scholastic philosophy. Now the

precise question is whether Shreds of Greek thought more or less clumsily

patching up theology that, we are told, is about all the Islamic thinkers have

left us. Sometimes they borrow from Plato, sometimes from Aristotle, that is

to say when they are not engaged in something considerably worse, an

impossible synthesis of Plato and Aristotle, an effort to reconcile the dead

who never ceased to differ when alive. Never do we meet with a genuine

impulse of thought which at one and the same time is thoroughly Islamic and

really creative; and it follows that Islam has contributed nothing to the

philosophical heritage of humanity.

In this identification the most illustrious Muslim sages, from al-Kindi, al-

∗ Associated professor, Member of the Department of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University, Iran. E-Mail: [email protected]


Farabi, Ibn Sina (or Avicenna), to Suhrawardi, and Ibn 'Arabi, and from them

to Mulla Sadra and Allameh Tabatabaee, hoping to be expressed the point of

view of four important schools, namely, the philosopher-scientists,

Illuminationists, Sufis and transcendent theosophy. The personalities their

doctrines are of great importance in their own right and playa particularly

significant role in the school with which they are connected. In addition, each

speaks for a perspective, which has been lived, and a worldview, which has

been contemplated by generations of sages and seers over the centuries.

Moreover, although their schools are not the only ones to have existed in

Islam, they are among the most important to have come into being after this

early period, and they demonstrate in their totality a very significant aspect

of Islamic intellectuality, revealing horizons which have determined the

intellectual life of many of the great sages of Islam. These schools of

philosophy functioned in a universe dominated by the Qur'anic revelation and

the sayings of the prophet of Islam. In this regard also, it has always been

the sayings of Imam Ali and other Shi’ite Imams that have dominated over

the centuries as the representatives par excellence of Islamic wisdom and of

the esoteric and exoteric message of the Prophet.

In this paper, attempts have been made to repeat the metaphysical

principles, which relate knowing and being as well as knowing, and the

sacred revelation, which is the direct manifestation of being in becoming of

the Eternal in the temporal. Also attempts have been made to discuss the

relation between religion and philosophy before delving into the various

schools and different attitudes of Islamic philosophy in itself and in its

relation to different stages of Islamic thought. To see how much truth there

may be in this view, thinkers’ thought in the Islamic world in its nascent

state, at that precise point, namely, where the Islamic graft was inserted into

the Hellenic tradition will be examined. Thus, the demonstration attempted is

purely historical: if, very occasionally, a more theoretical attitude is provi-

sionally adopted, it is merely because a historian who deals with ideas is

bound at least to make them intelligible to his readers, to suggest how

doctrines, which satisfied the thought of our predecessors for so many

centuries, may still be found conceivable today.


The Sciences which Developed because of the Qur'an

The sciences of the din (religion) of Islam came into being at the beginning of

the Prophet's mission and the revelation of the Qur'an, including laws

governing the behavior and transactions of Muslims. Study of these sciences

developed in the first century after the Hijrah (hegira) although initially, not

in any formal way. It was at this point that a number of disciplines came into

being including the Science of Traditions and the Science of establishing the

authority and sincerity of those men who transmitted it (transmitters of

tradition). Even philosophy, which entered the Islamic arena via the Greek,

and remained there for some time in its original Greek, took on the color and

beliefs of the people after a time. Changes in the subject matter and the

structure of disciplines took place such that today, amongst Muslims, all

subject matter concerning divine gnosis is supported by proofs and reasons

taken from the Qur'an and the traditions.

All these subjects were also studied as an integral part of the Arabic

language: mastery of the science of verb declension, grammar, and

meanings of words, commentary and explanation, the art of metaphors and

good style, and the philosophy and science of derived meanings allowed

greater precision and clarity in the study of the Islamic Sciences as a whole.

Indeed, what stimulated scholars to record and arrange the laws of the

Arabic language coherently was the sense that they were serving God; love

of Him drew them to a clarity and sweetness of style, which in turn generated

the Science of correct speech and composition.

The original reason the Muslims translated and transmitted the natural

Sciences and mathematics from other cultures and languages into Arabic was

the cultural stimulation given to them by the Qur'an. Many different Sciences

were translated from Greek, Syriac and Sanskrit into Arabic. Access to these

sciences was at first available only to the Caliph (who was at that time leader

of only Arab Muslims). Gradually they were made available to all Muslims and

improved upon as research methods, structuring, classification and ordering

of the subjects

Islam, which was formed after the death of the Prophet, came to include a

large part of the inhabited world (and which today numbers over six

hundred million inhabitants), was the Qur'an. We as Shi'as, however, deny


that the caliphs and the kings who followed them had legitimate claim to the

guardianship and execution of the law even though they expanded Islamic

civilization, and do not fully agree with the way they explained the realities of

Islam. Indeed the light of wisdom, which illuminated the world, was from the

light of the miracle of the Qur'an. The appearance and diffusion of the

revelation caused a change in the direction of history and generated a chain

of important events resulting in the progress and development of the culture

of man.

The doctrine propounded by the Qur'an is not a new doctrine, for it is similar

to the Scriptures of the earlier apostles.1

It confirms in the Arabic tongue what went before it, the Book of Moses and

the Gospel of Jesus-in being a guide to mankind, admonishing the unjust and

giving glad tidings to the righteous 2 The Qur’an is a book of wisdom, parts

of which relate to its basic principles, (umm al-kitab) and explain and

illustrate them in detail. It is a book essentially religious, not philosophical,

but it deals with all those problems, which religion and philosophy have in

common. Both have to say something about problems related to the

significance of such expressions as God, the world, the individual soul, and

the inter-relations of these; good and evil, free-will, and life after death.

While dealing with these problems it also throws light on such conceptions as

appearance and reality, existence and attributes, human origin and destiny,

truth and error, space and time, permanence and change, as well as eternity

and immortality.

The Qur'an is a book essentially religious, not philosophical, but it deals with

all those problems, which religion and philosophy have in ommon. The Qur'an

claims to give an exposition of universal truths with regard to these problems

– an exposition couched in a language (and a terminology) which the people

immediately addressed, with their intellectual background could easily

understand, and which the people of other lands, and other times, speaking

other languages, with their own intellectual background could easily

interpret. The Qur’an is full of ideas about God and His divine government,

which, although not properly philosophical in character, only needed to fall

into the right soil to become fruitful of philosophic consequences. The fact


that there is no philosophy in Scripture does not warrant the conclusion that

Scripture could have exerted no influence on the evolution of philosophy; if

Islamic life, from its beginnings, contained speculative as well as practical

elements-even if they were only speculative in a properly religious sense-the

possibility of such influence becomes at once conceivable.

Overwhelmed by the awesome sacredness of the divine Word and the

Prophetic Way, the first generation of Muslim scholars dedicated themselves

wholly to the fixing of the sacred canon, commenting upon it and drawing the

legal or moral corollaries implicit in it. Thus arose the sciences of reading

(‘ilm al-qira’at), exegesis (tafsir), and jurisprudence (fiqh), the only basic

sciences the nascent community needed in order to assimilate or live by the

divinely revealed ordinances of the Qur’an. From these sciences, however,

there soon stemmed the whole body of subsidiary disciplines, collectively

referred to as the linguistic or traditional sciences, as distinct from the

rational or philosophical sciences. 3

Besides the very diverse and rich spiritual tradition associated with Sufism

within Islam, Islam has also produced extensive and variegated forms of

theology, which came to be known in Islamic thought as kalam. It is said that

this term refers to the understanding of the Word of God (kalam Allah) or the

Qur’an and that the founder of this form of Islamic thought was 'Ali ibn Abi

Talib who was thus considered as the first mutakallim or scholar of kalam.

There is no doubt that the discussions of kalam go back to the very early

Islamic community. After the death of the Prophet of Islam, the early

community was faced with certain questions, which the inquiring human mind

obviously poses when confronted with the verities of religion. Without being a

book of theology that provides a systematic analysis, the Qur'an dealt with all

the issues that were discussed in kalam as fully developed later. 4

Discussions on these matters as qadar, the Attributes of God, the nature of

belief and unbelief, eschatology and the fate of sinners, continued during the

times of the sahabah (Companions of the Prophet) and the tabi'un (those

who followed them), laying the foundations for the later issues of 'ilm al-

kalam. What they refrained from was not the discussion of such issues but

from going deep into them or forcing the issues. 5


It was expected that Muslims would take to philosophical and intellectual

reasoning during the lifetime of Prophet Muhammad, for the seed of

philosophical reasoning in the universal sense of the term was sown in the

Noble Qur'an and nurtured by the Blessed Prophet through his sayings and

general guidance. As a consequence of the encouragement of intellection and

reasoning, and the pursuit of knowledge in matters relating to faith and the

universe in the Qur’an, there have, sprung up many denominations, sects

and schools of thought in Islam. This is so not only in matters of faith but

also in religious rituals and norms of worship. Right from the outset of

intellectual and juridical dispute, the Shi'a sided with 'Ali and after him with

his sons. In order to attain firm belief and conclusive conviction, therefore, it

is imperative to resort to those who have acquired knowledge in religion and

the ways of spiritual prosperity.

The intellectual and gnostic aspects of the personality of Imam 'Ali had a

great impact on the formation of Shi'ite intellectual and philosophical thought

and their openness to intellectual discourse. As evidence of this unique

quality of the Imam, one needs not go further than the collections of his

sermons, letters and sayings which were compiled by al-Sharif al-Radi (d.

406/1015) entitled Nahj al-balaghah ("Path of Eloquence").

In the ancient world, philosophy and science were not separated. Many of the

greatest scientists like Aristotle were also among the greatest philosophers.

The Muslims united these sciences into a new corpus, which was to grow over

the centuries and become part of the Islamic civilization, Integrated into the

basic structure derived from the Revelation itself. They absorbed the useful

elements and supplemented them with their own inquiries, and in most fields

they were able to make important discoveries. The schools of law and the

Sufi brotherhoods became separately established in the third Islamic century,

And the revelation, which was until that time, still close to its origin, and

therefore in a state of "fusion," became "crystallized" into its components. In

a similar manner, the various intellectual perspectives, after several

centuries, absorbed the nourishment provided by the vast heritage of the

ancient world, already existing in Arabic, into the Islamic worldview, and

founded the diverse schools of philosophy and the arts and sciences. We can

thereby legitimately refer to these schools as Muslim, since the concepts and


formulations used by them were integrated into the Islamic view even if they

originated elsewhere. The ideas and points of views contained in these

translations formed a large part of the nutriment which Islam sampled and

then assimilated according to its own inner constitution, and the foundation

given to it by the Qura’nic revelation. In this way there developed, in

conjunction with the three basic "dimensions" of the Law, the Path, and the

Truth, Islamic schools which were to become an accepted part of Islamic

civilization.

Rise of the Islamic philosophical school

The beginnings of the Islamic philosophical school coincide with the first

translations of the works of the Greek masters into Arabic from Syriac or

Greek. The Arabs, as well as the Persians, who contributed so abundantly to

the scientific and philosophical enlightenment in Islam, are a practical-

minded people. Their interest in the more abstract aspects of Greek thought

must have been a subsequent development. They were interested primarily

in Aristotelian logic and Greek philosophy as a prelude to the study of

theological texts. In addition to practical disciplines like scientific and medical

works, collections of moral aphorisms appear to have been among the

earliest texts to be translated into Arabic. Translators even when they

affected interest in other than the purely practical disciplines of astrology or

medicine at all were content with this species of ethical and religious

literature, which was cherished and disseminated partly as a matter of social

refinement and partly as a matter of moral edification.

Nevertheless, the development of philosophy and theology in Islam is bound

up with the advent of the ‘Abbasid dynasty. Interest in science and

philosophy grew during this period to such an extent that scientific and

philosophical output was no longer a matter of individual effort or initiative.

Theological divisions, growing out of philosophical controversy or inquiry

racked the whole of the Muslim community. Caliphs upheld one theological

view against another and demanded adherence to it on political grounds, with

the inevitable result that theology soon became the handmaid of politics. As a

consequence, freedom of thought and conscience was seriously jeopardized.

One lasting consequence of the introduction of Greek philosophy and the

Greek spirit of inquiry, however, was that the “Traditionism” of early


theologians and jurists, such as Malik b. Anas, was no longer tenable in its

pure or original form. The great Ash‘arite “reformers” committed, as they

were to the defense of orthodoxy against heretics and free thinkers, could no

longer do so without recourse to the weapons which their rationalist

opponents had borrowed from the Greeks.

Moreover, the varying degrees of allegiance to Greek philosophy and logic

not only gave rise to the diverse theological schools of thought, but

generated the more distinctly, Hellenic current of ideas, which we shall

designate as the Islamic philosophical school. The works of those early

translators were on the whole compilations which lacked originality. Being

Muslims by faith, they were naturally anxious to justify their interest in the

pagan philosophers of antiquity. Indeed, almost from the beginning it was

standard for the orthodox to reproach all those who “looked into the books of

the Greek philosophers” 6 even presumably when they did not understand

them. Such theological preoccupation was a distinctive feature of the

development of Islamic philosophy.

The rise and development of this school is the primary concern of the present

history. Scholastic theology will be discussed only in so far as it absorbed,

reacted to, or by-passed Islamic philosophy. To theology might be added

another movement whose relation to philosophy has also fluctuated between

the two poles of total endorsement or total disavowal-mysticism or Mysticism

is ultimately rooted in the original matrix of religious experience, which grows

in turn out of man’s overwhelming awareness of God and his sense of

nothingness without Him, and of the urgent need to subordinate reason and

emotion to this experience. The mystical experience, it is often claimed, is

distinct from the rational or the philosophical, and, less often, it is said to be

contrary to it. But, whether it is distinct or not, it can hardly be irrelevant to

man’s rational or philosophical aspirations; since it allegedly leads to the very

object which reason seeks, namely, the total and supreme apprehension of

reality.

How far they succeeded in so doing and how far it was possible for them to

span the distance separating Islamic belief from Greek speculative thought

will be seen in later chapters. But it might be mentioned at this stage that al-

Kindi’s theological interests did act as a safeguard against the total


submersion of religious belief in the current of abstract philosophical thought,

But it was not very long before geniuses such as Abu Nasr Farabi and Ibn

Sina were able to learn the entire sum of philosophical thought of that time

by their constant efforts.

With God given talents that flourished under the radiance of the light of

revelation and the explanations of the Imams, they were then able to review

and select from among the appropriate philosophical principles and to present

a mature philosophical system, which in addition to including Platonic and

Aristotelian ideas and Neo-Platonic thought from Alexandria, and the ideas of

oriental mystics (‘urafa) also included new thoughts and was thus able to

excel over all the systems of philosophy of the East and West, although the

largest portion of the new system was Aristotelian, and for this reason their

philosophy had an Aristotelian and peripatetic color. This is primarily

syllogistic: it seeks to determine the place of each being, in a vast system

based upon the philosophy of Aristotle. The best expression of the doctrines

of this school appears in Avicenna's early writings. The Book of Healing is the

most comprehensive encyclopedia of knowledge ever written by one person,

and undoubtedly the most influential Peripatetic work in Islam.

In the western Islamic world there has been existed a school of

"philosophical" thought, which profess to be disciples of the Greeks. It is the

Peripatetic school, whose doctrines are a combination of the ideas of Aristotle

and of some Neo-platonists. The representative of this school who was

closest to Aristotle was Averroes who, paradoxically, had less effect upon the

Islamic than upon the Christian world, and should be studied more as a great

member of the tradition of Western philosophy than as an integral part of

Islamic intellectual life.

Many Illuminatists, particularly those of later centuries, have also been Sufis,

who have made use of the eminently initiatic language of the Illuminatist

philosophers to describe the journey of the Sufi toward gnosis. Many

members of this school, and in general the learned men, have also been

among the group that have cultivated mathematics, astronomy, and

medicine; for these learned men took an interest in all the arts and sciences,

and helped to keep alive the traditions of learning in those fields, as an

integral part of their studies in philosophy. The Peripatetics were very strong


during the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries, but their influence

weakened during the succeeding period. The Illuminatists, on the other hand,

became strong after the sixth/twelfth century and al-Ghazzali's triumph. They

have had a continuous tradition down to the present day, chiefly because of

the metaphysical (as against rationalistic) emphasis in their doctrines, and

also because of the use of their language by certain Sufi masters.

For the gnostic, knowledge of Nature is secondary to knowledge of the Divine

'principle; Yet, because of the rapport between the Gnostic and the universe,

Nature does playa positive role in guiding him to his ultimate goal. The

phenomena of Nature become "transparent" for the gnostic, so that in each

event he "sees" the archetype. The symbols of substances-geometric forms

and numerical quantities, colors, and directions-these and many other such

symbols are aspects of the being of things. They increase in their reality-a

reality independent of personal taste or of the individual-to the extent that

the gnostic divorces himself from his individual perspective and limited

existence, and identifies himself with Being. For the gnostic, the knowledge

of anything in the universe means ultimately knowledge of the relationship

between the essence of that particular being and the Divine Intellect, And the

knowledge of the ontological relationship between that being and Being itself.

Although of course a single reality in itself, Islamic philosophy nevertheless

has had and continues to have several historical embodiments in them,

Islamic philosophy has had a continuous history going back to the earliest

Islamic centuries and transmitted from master to disciple over numerous

generations. Moreover, in this ambience, Islamic philosophy, called falsafah

and later hikmah, is an Islamic intellectual discipline in contention, debate,

accord or opposition with other intellectual disciplines but in any case it was

and remains a Part: and parcel of Islamic intellectual life. One need only look

at the number of works have been written in the history of philosophy in the

Islamic world, to realize how true is this assertion and how significant is

Islamic philosophy even in comparison with jurisprudence, not to speak of

kalam or theology which it overshadows in those intellectual circles in many

ways. All these embodiments of the Islamic philosophical tradition have

received treatments in various histories of Islamic philosophy which have

appeared in both Islamic and Western languages whether it be the older


school going back to the medieval period or modern Orientalism which

considers Islamic philosophy to have come to an end with Ibn Rushd or soon

thereafter. It was precisely to avoid such a limitation of historical perspective,

and the refusal by many to take Islamic philosophy seriously as philosophy.

So I have sought to discus about this philosophical tradition, in relation to the

Islamic revelation and other intellectual disciplines within Islamic civilization,

as an independent philosophical tradition and in its relation to earlier schools

of thought, especially the Greek, as well as its influence upon later Western

thought. Also, we have tried to bring out the relation of Islamic philosophy to

the Islamic revelation itself and to point out its rapport with other religious

and theological discourses and disciplines which grew over the ages as

branches of that tree of knowledge which has its roots in the Qur'anic

revelation and whose many branches include Islamic philosophy itself.

Of course, we should find no philosopher in the Islamic world who would

admit an absence of all relation between philosophy and religion. What they

would certainly deny is that no Muslim has ever successfully constructed a

philosophy, for they maintain that al-Farabi and Ibn Sina actually founded

one. But it does not require much pressure to extract the admission that his

philosophy is the only example and that if it is the only example it is precisely

because it stands on one hand in being constructed on a purely rational basis

and on the other hand have been influenced from the revealed teachings of

Islam. Thus, it is rather on facts than on principles that they disagree with

the rationalists, or, if there is any difference of principle, it is not concerned

with the concept of philosophy, but with the place it occupies in the hierarchy

of the sciences. While the pure rationalist puts philosophy in the highest

place, and identifies it with wisdom, the Muslim philosophers subordinate it to

Islamic philosophy, which alone, as he holds, fully deserves that name.

They would certainly regard an exercise of pure reason as a possibility as we

witnessed it after Plato and Aristotle and believed in this idea that reason can

not obtain knowing of the truth and can not stand to itself. They would view

the matter not so much from the standpoint of the mere definition of reason

as from that of the actual conditions of fact under which it has to work. Now

it is a fact that between ourselves and the Greeks the Islamic revelation has

intervened, and has profoundly modified the conditions under which reason


has to work. Once you are in possession of that revelation how can you

possibly philosophize as though you had never heard of it. The errors of Plato

and Aristotle are precisely the errors into which pure reason falls, and every

philosophy, which sets out to be self-sufficing, will fall into them again, or

perhaps into others still worse. So that henceforth the only safe plan is to

take revelation for our guide and make an effort to understand, its contents -

and this understanding of the contents of revelation will be philosophy itself.

But is it not also a mere confusion of philosophy with theology?

Confusion of philosophy with theology (Kalam)

There are discussions in the history of philosophical books which clearly are

Islamic, but which are certainly not clearly philosophy. Despite the best

efforts of some of the philosophers, it is not always easy to distinguish

philosophy from theology, or even from law or grammar, the traditional

Islamic sciences. Many of the questions, which arise within these contexts,

have direct philosophical relevance, and the shape of that philosophy was

powerfully affected by the disciplines, which produced the issues. It would be

tempting to argue that what makes Islamic philosophy an appropriate

general concept is that it encompasses a feature of that philosophy which is

shared by all its instances. Many commentators have argued that indeed

there is such an agenda.

A very influential school of interpretation is convinced that the basis of all

work in Islamic philosophy is the opposition between religion and reason,

between faith and philosophy, and between Islam and Greek thought.

Followers of this approach claim that it is possible to interpret any aspect of

Islamic philosophy in line with this central problem, since this problem runs

through all such writing. If it is not obvious that it does, then there are ways

to find appropriate clues beneath the surface of the text, which will show that

the central problem lurks there somewhere, and in fact represents the deep

structure of the argument of the text.

A different view has it that the whole of Islamic philosophy represents an

attempt to accommodate Islam with rationality, so that the central issue is to

carry out such reconciliation. This was the leading motive of the philosophers

themselves, and when we assess their work, we have to bear this in mind if

we are to understand what the texts they produced actually mean. Unless we


grasp the central idea, which is the basis to the philosophical writings, we are

in danger of misunderstanding those writings, and the assumption is made

that there is just such a common theme to those writings. After all, calling

philosophy "Islamic" implies, or might seem to imply, that the religious

character of what is discussed is crucial, and, since it is linked with

philosophy, the apparent conflict between two different approaches to the

same issue might seem to be highlighted. We should resist this temptation.

Although there are many discussions in Islamic philosophy of religion and

reason, it is entirely mistaken to see this dichotomy as lying at the heart of

that philosophy. It might be that that dichotomy lies at the heart of medieval

Jewish and Christian philosophy, but there is no reason to import such a

dichotomy as a leading principle in Islamic philosophy. It runs the danger of

trying to fit the whole of Islamic philosophy into a conceptual straitjacket,

which will inevitably restrict its scope and interest. The intention has been to

present in this book as much of the variety of Islamic philosophy as possible,

and to represent it as a continuing and living tradition of philosophical work,

not a dead and completed doctrine from the Middle Ages.

In this regard, however , most Western scholars of the subject have chosen

to identify other schools of Islamic thought such as kalam as Islamic and

Islamic philosophy as "foreign", appealing to those very voices within the

Islamic world which, have opposed Islamic philosophy. Furthermore, this

Western view has been adopted by a number of Muslim scholars trained in

the rationalistic and sceptical modes of Western thought and impervious to

the still living tradition of Islamic philosophy within the Islamic world and the

possibility of gaining certitude intellectually. Certainly, Islamic philosophy has

had its opponents in Islamic circles but it has also had its defenders in not

only the Shi'ite world but also in certain areas and schools of the Sunni world.

7 In any case, Islamic philosophy has remained a major intellectual activity

and a living intellectual tradition within the citadel of Islam to this day while

continuing to be fully philosophy if this term is not limited to its recent

schools in the Anglo-Saxon world, which would deny the title of philosopher

to even Plato and Aristotle.

There is difference between this living intellectual tradition and theology.

Theology remains in its proper place, based on divine revelation, from which


it receives its principles, it constitutes a distinct science starting from faith

and turning to reason only to draw out the content of faith or to protect it

from error. Philosophy, doubtless, depends on nothing but its own proper

method; based on human reason, owing all its truth to the self-evidence of

its principles and the accuracy of its deductions, it reaches an accord with

revealed teachings spontaneously and without having to deviate in any way

from its own proper path. In it, we have a system in which philosophic

conclusions are deduced from purely rational premises. If it does so, it is

simply because it is true, and because one truth cannot contradict another.

For Islamic philosopher any conflict between a certitude faith and a

philosophical thesis is a sure sign of philosophic error. When such a conflict

declares itself, he must re-examine his principles and check his conclusions

until he discovers the mistake that vitiates them. If his philosophy is true, it

is solely in virtue of its own rational evidence; and if he fails to convince his

opponent, it would be lack of candor on his part to appeal to faith for his

justification. As soon as we look at Islamic philosophy in this light some

rather surprising but no less inevitable consequences begin to appear. We are

reminded in the first place of all those vehement protests, made by

Mutakalimin against the paganization in Islam by philosophers. For when we

refuse to be guided by revelation, and prefer to follow instead the principles

of some pagan philosopher or his Muslim commentators, then reason is no

longer able to distinguish truth from error. But something still more curious

follows. Just as certain followers of kalam regard philosophy as a false, so

certain philosophers reply that it is true but not in the least because it is

Muslim. They are forced, in fact, into this position; because, once reason, as

regards its exercise, has been divorced from faith, all intrinsic relation

between Islam and philosophy becomes a contradiction. If a philosophy is

true it is simply because it is rational; but if it is rational, it is not at all

because it is Islamic. We must therefore choose. Never will a follower of

philosophy admit that there is anything in the doctrine of philosophy contrary

to the letter or the spirit of the faith, for a philosopher expressly maintains

that the accord between revelation and reason is an accord of truth with

itself.


Some of them deny that Islam has seriously influenced the course of philo-

sophic speculation, and maintain that the concept of Islamic philosophy is

quite obviously void of meaning. According to their opinion, al-Farabi and

Avicenna’s philosophy lacks all intrinsic character of Islamic philosophy. In

addition, how could it possibly have such a character without ceasing to be?

The philosophical principles of them are those of Aristotle that is to say of a

man, who knew nothing of any revelation, whether Islamic, Christian, or

Jewish. If they took up the doctrine of Aristotle and purified, completed it,

gave it precision, it did not accomplish this by means of any appeal to Islam,

but simply by a more correct and complete deduction of the consequences

implied in his own principles than Aristotle was able to achieve for him. Al-

Farabi and Avicenna, in short, regarded from the standpoint of philosophic

speculation, is nothing but Aristotelianism rationally corrected and judiciously

completed; and there was no more need for them to baptize Aristotelianism

in order to make it true, than there would be to baptize Aristotle in order to

discuss philosophy with him. Philosophical discussions pass between man and

man, not between man and Islam. The logical upshot of this attitude is a

pure and simple negation of the whole concept of Islamic philosophy.

Why not abandon a notion as an Islamic philosophy? Would it not be simpler

to disassociate the two notions altogether, to hand philosophy over to reason

and restore Islam to religion? How in fact have philosophic thought and

Islamic faith conceived their interrelations? What has each been conscious of

giving to and receiving from the other? These are immense questions,

regarding the concept of Islamic philosophy resting on serious bases, and if,

supposing that the corresponding historical reality exists, we are to have any

hope of defining it. But does this historical reality exist? Is it even

conceivable that it ever existed?

Some historians of philosophy have denied it, relying on what they conceived

to be the exclusively practical character of primitive Islam, a stranger, as

they considered, to all speculation. What is meant by the assertion that, at

the outset at any rate, Islam was altogether un-speculative? If it means that

Islam is not a philosophy, nothing could be more obvious. But if it is

proposed to maintain that even in the properly religious field Islam carried

with it no "speculative" elements, that it was no more than an effort of


mutual aid, at once material and spiritual, in communities, then that is going

somewhat farther than history will warrant. Where shall we find this

eminently practical and un-speculative Islam? Well, we shall have to go back

beyond Qur’an to tear a many pages of the collective of prophetic hadith, to

suppress the saying of the Imams, and all the speculative mysticism of the

Islamic world that sprang out of them. We shall have to deny that the

prophet Himself taught the doctrine of the unity of God, preached faith in

Divine Providence, announced eternal life in an everlasting Kingdom.

What distinct Islamic philosophers from Greek philosophers, is that Muslims

founded their own philosophy based on a presentation of the Divine

Existence, having never been reached by Plato and Aristotle before. They

started to think in philosophic way when there existed a great civilization

based on the Islamic piety. Doubtlessly, an important part of Islamic

Instructions consists of believing in the only God, his divine providence and

good tidings of an eternal life and the looking of the divine nature of the Most

high. The Holy Qur’an is full of theosophy and instructions in religious-

philosophical matters. The narratives of the Infallibles consist of fine matters

of philosophic and mystical subjects. "Nahj-Al Balaghah", "Toheed-e-

Sadough" and "Osool-e-Kafi" are consisting of the principles of mysticism and

philosophy, and despite not having a philosophic style of expression, present

some utterances that could be rewritten in a philosophic style and result in

the mentioned outcomes. This is not to mistake philosophy theology.

Philosophy is based upon human intelligence; therefore the correctness of its

laws lies within the improvisation of the principles and the accuracy of

conclusion.

If then history presents no obstacle to a study of this kind, we may add that

there is nothing that renders it absurd a priori from the philosophical

standpoint. If the case stands thus, then, although we do not yet know what

goes to make up an Islamic philosophy, there seems to be nothing

theoretically contradictory about the idea; there is at least a standing-ground

on which it would not be impossible, that, namely, of the conditions of fact

under which the reason of Muslims is to be exercised. There is no such thing

as an Islamic reason, but there may very well be an Islamic exercise of

reason. Why should we refuse to admit a priori that Islam might have been


able to change the course of the history of philosophy by opening up to

human reason, by the mediation of faith in revealed teachings, perspectives

as yet undreamt of? The thing might well have failed to happen, but that

does not warrant the assumption that it could not possibly happen. And we

may go a step further and say that a cursory glance at the history of

philosophy in the Islamic world would strongly suggest that it did happen.

Islam is a tradition based wholly upon a distinct revelation; consequently, the

sense of the transcendent and the revealed is a potent force in Islamic

society. No philosophy, which ignores both revelation and intellectual

intuition, and thus divorces itself from the twin sources of transcendent

knowledge, can hope to be anything but a disrupting and dissolving influence

in Islamic society. It is therefore what we quite call Islamic philosophy; a

worldview in which the role of revelation, in both the macrocosmic and the

microcosmic sense, looms large on the horizon. It is deeply rooted in the

worldview of the Qur'anic revelation and functions within a cosmos in which

prophecy or revelation is accepted as a blinding reality that is the source not

only of ethics but also of knowledge. Closely connected to above point, there

is the question of the relation between reason and revelation, which occupied

the Muslim philosophers from the very beginning. This question found its

most harmonious solution in the hands of Mulla Sadra, who like the sages

before him expounded that Divine Wisdom or sapientia, that gnosis in which

faith and reason find their common ground. The Islamic philosophical

tradition reacted in numerous ways with other schools of Islamic thought

and, on the basis of much of the wisdom of antiquity, created one of the

richest intellectual traditions in the world, one which has survived as a living

reality to this day. It is our hope that the present book will reveal some of

the riches of this tradition as well as clarify its history and role for Islamic

civilization as well as for European intellectual history in which it played a

crucial role at an important stage of the development of Western thought.

According to above points, it is important to realize that we have here a

dynamic relationship between the Islamic sciences and philosophy, with a

constant interplay of arguments and suggestions, so that it is important to

include a discussion of those sciences in such a way that one can see how

they have both affected and been affected by philosophy. After all, this


apparent interplay between these two different domains seems to be

highlighted. If one puts modern nationalistic and chauvinistic ideas aside and

looks upon the whole of the Islamic philosophical tradition, one cannot but

call it Islamic philosophy for both intellectual and historical reasons. Quite

obviously, a society, which is Islamic, will produce thinkers who will frame

their philosophical principles in a universe dominated by the Qur'anic

revelation and the manifestation of the nature of the Divine Principle as the

One.

In such a world, a philosophical tradition was created which acted as catalyst

for the rise of medieval Jewish philosophy and had a profound impact upon

both philosophy and theology in the Christian West. It also exercised an

influence upon Hindu India with which the present volumes have not been

greatly concerned although some allusions have been made to this important

chapter in the interaction of Islamic philosophy with intellectual traditions of

other civilizations. The Islamic philosophical tradition reacted in numerous

ways with other schools of Islamic thought and, on the basis of much of the

wisdom of antiquity, created one of the richest intellectual traditions in the

world, one which has survived as a living reality to this day. It is our hope

that this book will reveal some of the riches of this tradition as well as clarify

its history and role for Islamic civilization as well as for European intellectual

history in which it played a crucial role at an important stage of the

development of Western thought.

One need hardly mention that, once the function of the intellect is reduced to

reason and also revelation is limited to its most exoteric and outward level of

meaning, then faith and reason can never become truly harmonized. Every

attempt, which is then made to bring about a harmony, will meet with the

lack of success that the history of modem times so amply illustrates. They

want to consider despite the attempt of a number of not only Western but

also Westernized Muslim scholars who, having surrendered to the rationalism

of modern philosophy, to read this understanding of reason back into Islamic

philosophy. While being philosophy in the fullest sense of the term, its very

conception of al-'aql (reason/intellect) was transformed by the intellectual

and spiritual universe within which it functioned in the same way that reason

as transformed by the rationalism of the Age of Enlightenment began to


function differently from the ratio and intellectus of a St. Thomas. This fact is

an undeniable truth for anyone who has studied Islamic philosophy from

within the tradition it remains an essential reality. Also the Islamic

philosophers were Muslim 8 and nearly all of them devout in their following of

the Shari'ah.

There are also other reasons, which it is not possible to discuss here but

which are mentioned in several of the essays that follow. All these factors

converge to point to the Islamic nature of Islamic philosophy in the same way

that Christian philosophy is Christian and Jewish philosophy is Jewish.

Why it is Islamic philosophy

Is there, then, no philosophical agenda which Islamic philosophy has and

which uniquely characterizes it? Quite obviously, a society, which is Islamic,

will produce thinkers who will frame their philosophical questions in terms of

that society. Sometimes these are just Islamic versions of entirely universal

philosophical issues. For example, the question of how it is possible to know

God will take a particular form within an Islamic context, given the emphasis

on the unity of God. What is philosophical about the discussion is its use of

very abstract concepts to make sense of the idea of such knowledge. What is

Islamic about the discussion is its conception of God and His Qualities. This

need not be a uniquely Islamic idea, but it will be framed within the language

of Islam and will reflect on the way in which that conception of divinity has

been refined and developed within Islam. It is not a huge step from

discussing the relationship between God and His properties, to wondering

what the relationship is between a subject and its properties in general. This

latter enquiry has no direct reference to the religious context out of which it

originally arose, and yet it is still part of a way of doing philosophy, which

starts with a religious problem.

The relevant question is how far the particular philosophical idea or theory

can be connected with predominantly Islamic ideas along a chain of

transmission or influence. Islamic philosophy is first of all philosophy, and its

content is going to resemble the content of philosophy in general. Yet there

will remain a connection with ideas or thinkers who worked within the context

of Islamic culture at some stage. What make it significant are the excellence

of the philosophy itself, and the wealth of ideas which were produced. It is


patronizing to suggest that one has to stress the impact of Islamic philosophy

on the West, and beyond, for it to be taken seriously. The time has come to

put Islamic philosophy within its appropriate context, that of philosophy, so

that it can be recognized as a dynamic and living tradition, which speaks to,

philosophers today just as it did in the past. Although we have stressed here

the role of Islamic philosophy as a vibrant and important philosophical

activity, it cannot be doubted that much of the discussion of this type of

philosophy is carried out in terms of exploring its roots in other areas. All

these factors converge to point to the Islamic nature of Islamic philosophy in

the same way that Christian philosophy is Christian and Jewish philosophy is

Jewish.

That is, commentators will examine how the non-philosophical aspects of

Islam affect the development of the philosophy, which appeared in the

Islamic world. In particular, a whole range of that sort of philosophy was

quite clearly influenced by Greek thought, and the peripatetic tradition in

Islamic philosophy is obviously based upon an originally non-Islamic source.

It is important to emphasize that this is but one type of Islamic philosophy,

and a type, which has been criticized by some Islamic philosophers for its

very distance from religion. They have argued on occasion that what we have

here is the mere replication of Greek ideas in Arabic dress, without any real

attempt at showing how those ideas link up with specifically Islamic issues. It

will be fairly clear to any reader of the sections in this book which look at this

sort of philosophy that such a criticism is misplaced. There was a genuine

attempt at seeing how the conceptual machinery of Greek thought could be

applied to Islamic issues, and in this contact between two cultural

movements a great deal of interesting and perceptive work resulted.

Yet we should be very careful in what we say about such cultural contact. It

is all too easy to link discussions in Islamic philosophy with earlier Greek

discussions, and to think as a result that what is going on is quite different

from what is really going on. Many readers will observe al-Farabi using

religious terminology to express a point from Greek philosophy, and they will

argue that what he is doing is arguing that the latter form of thought is

compatible with Islam. That is, they will see the task of reconciling reason

with religion as the leading theme of Islamic philosophy.


Perhaps al-Farabi was deliberately trying to pass off Greek thought as being

far more religious, or at least Islamic, than it really was. Perhaps he was

using Islamic language to describe Greek arguments in order to take a short

cut along the path of reconciling Islam with Greek philosophy. Those thinkers

who were directly concerned with the nature of religion and religious

experience did not wish to distinguish precisely between the Greek use of

philosophical terminology and its Islamic version, since they went on to try to

show how relevant the conceptual distinctions in question are to the living

experience of faith. They wanted to show that the Islamic sciences which

were part of the traditional canon of doing things and sorting our problems

needed to be supplemented the ancient sciences, and especially by

philosophy, and this could only be done if the same sort of language is used

in both cases. If all that the philosophers were doing was to use what were

originally Greek ideas and applying them to Islamic problems, one might

think that there is not much originality or creativity at issue here. All that was

going on would have been highly derivative. Islamic philosophy then gets

relegated to the history of ideas, and is regarded as an interesting aspect of

cultural contact, as compared with the systems of philosophy which created

the conceptual materials of the debate in the first place. 9 It has to be

acknowledged also that the philosophers were interested in campaigning for

not only the acceptability, but also the inevitability of what they were doing.

The system of concepts and practices in which the old term was embedded

are now absent, or at least different, and the way in which the new term will

have to be related to such a system is distinct. This is very relevant to the

accusation that Islamic philosophy is derivative and so not of the first calibre

in so far as philosophical thought goes. It is not the case that the Islamic

philosophers took Greek (and indeed other) concepts and then used them in

their attempts to make sense of the Islamic world. Concepts are not like

clothes, which one can just pick up and put on. It was capable of taking some

of the key philosophical concepts from earlier cultures and using them to

answer problems, which arose within their own culture, and of adapting the

concepts so that they could carry out such a task. The combination of

abstract philosophical thought on the one hand with problems, which arose

within Islam on the other, is a potent and unstable mixture responsible for


the richness and diversity of Islamic philosophy itself.

It might be accepted that Islamic philosophy is interesting, and yet its

dependence on a system of thought coming originally from without the

Islamic world has led to the development of a tendency to study it from an

historical rather than a philosophical perspective. After all, if one is interested

primarily in the philosophical issues, one might be tempted to study them

within the context of their original Greek expression rather than via the

accretions, which occurred during their passage through the Islamic world.

But the Islamic philosophers should not be seen as being primarily concerned

with ersatz philosophical notions derived originally from non-Islamic

cultures. These thinkers certainly did use the notions, which came to them

through the rich intellectual background, which was available to them, and

they transformed them in the ways in which they used them. This was a

matter not just of choice but really of necessity. The philosophical issues,

which arose in the Greek world, could not always be simply replicated in the

Islamic world but have to be adapted to make sense, since the terms

themselves when moved from one context to another have a different range

of meanings.

It is just that the nature of a particular culture puts the emphasis upon a

different aspect of the problem depending upon the nature of that culture.

For example, in discussions of the creation of the world it is important to note

that the Islamic world wanted to mark the fact that according to the Qur'an

the world had a beginning and will have an end. This is not to say that

Islamic philosophers could therefore abandon Aristotelian accounts of the

creation of the world, which seem to point to its being eternal because it

went against the truth. Many Islamic philosophers produced modifications of

the Aristotelian theory, which made it compatible, or apparently compatible,

with their understanding of the Qur'an and offered the various explanations.

Some of these philosophical expositions are more interesting and well-

constructed than others, of course, but the important point to make is that

they are all philosophical arguments, and are to be assessed from the

perspective of philosophy.

In this regard, we can grasp the context within which it worked, but it does

not follow that it cannot be creative because it is dependent upon previously


existing intellectual traditions. On the contrary, we can see how on the basis

of those traditions it represents a new direction of thought, or, at the very

least, is capable of stepping out in a new direction. Much Islamic philosophy,

like much philosophy of any kind, is just the accretion of new technical

representations of existing issues, but some of it is capable of establishing

entirely new ways of going on which in turn establish new traditions of

thinking about problems and resolving difficult conceptual issues. Islamic

philosophy is primarily philosophy, and the appropriate techniques to use in

order to understand it are going to be philosophical. There is certainly no one

philosophical approach present in Islamic philosophy, but a large variety of

different techniques, which depend upon the particular point of view of the

thinkers themselves. The philosophy and Irfan like arts and sciences in Islam

are based on the idea of unity, which is the heart of the Muslim revelation.

To understand the approach of Islamic philosophy, it is necessary to point out

certain fundamental features of the vision of reality or the metaphysics,

which underlies all the teachings of this school. 10 In addition, understanding

of some of the principles of Islam is necessary here, insofar as they form the

matrix within which the Islamic philosophy have meaning, and outside of

which any study of them would remain superficial and incomplete. 11

Just as all genuine Islamic teachings, so do Islamic philosophy that can

properly be called Islamic reveal the unity of God as the axis of reality.

According to this philosophy, reality is not exhausted by the psychophysical

world in which human beings usually function, nor is consciousness limited to

the everyday level of awareness of the men and women of present-day

humanity. Ultimate Reality is beyond all determination and limitation. But in

either case, whether seen as the Transcendent or the Immanent, this

Ultimate Reality gives rise to a universe which is hierarchical, possessing

many levels of existence and of states of consciousness from the Supreme

Principle to earthly man and his terrestrial ambience. It is in this hierarchic

universe that man's life takes place and possesses meaning. According to it,

a Muslim as a complete and universal man and as a comprehensive role

model in his whole being is surrendered to God; he has no separate

individual existence of his own. He is like all the other elements of the

cosmos, in his yielding to the Creator; reflects the Divine Intellect to his own


degree. He has a complete character in relation to the esoteric and exoteric

aspect from the viewpoint of intellectuality, spirituality, and legal aspect. He

is a Gnostic truly. The true Gnostic is from this point of view "one with

reality"; he understands it "from the inside," He has become in fact the

channel of grace for the universe. We shall thus have to say, by way of

reestablishing the old distinction, that the Gnostic’s relation to world is

intellective,12 which is neither abstract, nor analytical, nor merely

sentimental.

In contrast to most modern theologians, philosophers, and scholars of

religion who have either consciously or unconsciously adopted the scientistic

view, which reduces Reality as such to physical or historical reality, the

traditionalists refuse to reduce the existence of religion to only the terrestrial

and temporal realm. Religion for them is not only the faith and practices of a

particular human collectivity, which happens to be the recipient of a

particular religious message. Religion is not only the faith of the men and

women who possess religious faith. It is a reality of Divine Origin. The

phenomena of Nature would lose any connection with the higher orders of

reality, as well as among themselves; they would become mere facts. This is

precisely what the capacity and, indeed, Islamic culture as a whole will not

accept.

Metaphysics understood in this perspective is a veritable "divine science" and

not a purely mental construct, which would change with every alteration in

the cultural fashions of the day or with new discoveries of a science of the

material world. This traditional metaphysics, which in reality should be used

in the singular as metaphysic, is a knowledge, which sanctifies and

illuminates; it is gnosis. At its core lies a metaphysical intuition, knowledge

such as comes only to the right "mode in the knower." From this spring a

science of the universe, a science of the soul, and the science of

mathematics, each of them in essence a different metaphorical setting for

that one science that the mind strives after, each of them a part of that

gnosis that comprehends all things. It is a knowledge, which lies at the heart

of religion. This religion illuminates the meaning of religious rites, doctrines

and symbols, and also provides the key to the understanding of both: the

necessity of the plurality of religions, and the way to penetrate into other


religious universes. Without either reducing their religious significance or

diminishing our own commitment to the religious universe to which we who

wish to study other religions belong.

The philosophy in the Islamic world possesses branches and ramifications

pertaining to cosmology, anthropology, art and other disciplines, but at its

heart lies pure metaphysics, if this latter term is understood, as the science

of Ultimate Reality, not to be confused with the subject bearing the name

metaphysics in post-medieval Western philosophy. It is first of all the

Supreme Science or metaphysics, as understood traditionally, which deals

with the Divine Principle and Its manifestations in the light of that Principle. It

is what one might call Islamic philosophy in the highest meaning of the term.

It is the science which lies at the very center of man's being as well as at the

heart of all orthodox and authentic religions and which are attainable by the

intellect. This early stabilization of the theoretical outlook of Islam extended

also to the type of man who embodied it. He is the hakim, who encompasses

within himself some or all of the several aspects of the sage; scholar, medical

healer, spiritual guide. The sage does not let himself be drawn into the

specialist's single-level "mode of knowing," for then he would forfeit the

higher knowledge. Intellectual achievement is thus, in a sense, always

patterned upon the model of the unattainable complete, that "total thing".

Inasmuch as the hierarchy of knowledge in Islam, as it has existed

historically, has been united by a metaphysical bond much as a vertical axis

unites horizontal planes of reference the integration of these diverse views

"from above" has been possible. Such conflicts are not, however, as

elsewhere, between incompatible orthodoxies. They are regarded by most

Islamic commentators as due to the lack of a more universal point of view on

the part of those who have only embraced a less universal one. Only the

gnostic, who sees all things "as they really are," is able to integrate all these

views into their principial unity. Regarded from their own point of view, each

of these schools may be said to possess a certain "philosophy” and, in

conformity with it, to cultivate the philosophy dealing with the reality. Some

of their writings, primarily those of the Peripatetics, were to be translated

into Latin to help form that Western scholasticism which was later to give

way to seventeenth-century "western philosophy." Other writings, such as


those of the Sufis and Illuminatists, which were to have an influence on

certain Western circles such as that of Dante, and yet for the most part to

remain almost unknown in the Western world, down to comparatively recent

times. Islamic philosophy also possesses a unified vision of things - that is, a

view of the interrelation between all realms of knowledge.

Islamic philosophy as a contradictory term

The very term 'Islamic philosophy' may appear contradictory to those for

whom 'philosophy' is identified with that particular mode of knowledge, which

has come to monopolize almost completely the term philosophy in the West.

Philosophy, thus understood, has by definition nothing to do with religion, a

term which is meaningless in its world view, while what is called religious to

the extent that this category still possesses meaning in the contemporary

world seems to have little to do with philosophy. It is first of all necessary to

clarify what is meant in this book by Islamic philosophy. This knowledge

which is available to the intellect 13 is, moreover, contained at the heart of all

religions or traditions, 14 and its realization and attainment is possible only

through those traditions and by means of methods, rites, symbols, images

and other means sanctified by the message from Heaven or the Divine which

gives birth to each tradition.

However, at the end of this introduction let me have a cursory glance at the

process of Islamic philosophy in the Islamic world. When we turn to Islamic

philosophy, we find it to be full of vast stores of wisdom which today remain

relatively unknown to the majority of contemporary Muslims. We come to

realize that so much of the knowledge which we seek elsewhere exists in its

pure and unadulterated form already in our midst, although we have been

practically unaware of its existence.15 Islamic philosophy, although rich in

many fields, is based most of all on metaphysics and nearly every treatise on

traditional philosophy deals with the transcendent origin and end of things.16

The Islamic philosophers were the first to make the discussion of being the

cornerstone of philosophy and sought to relate every existing thing to Pure

Being, which is the origin of all existence. Moreover, in metaphysics they

developed a philosophy of nature within a general world view in order to

create a close relationship between various forms and branches of the

sciences and to relate multiplicity to unity.17 The Islamic philosophers


developed an ethical system based not only on 'rational ethics' but on the

specific teachings of the Qur’an. In Islamic ethics, the Divine Will appears not

in an abstract manner but in concrete injunctions contained in the Sacred

Law or Shari'ah. This Law helps human intelligence to overcome the

limitations imposed on it by the passions and to see the good and evil nature

of things in their true perspective. Metaphysics is, moreover, never divorced

from ethics and from the practical aspect of religion in that, as the haqiqah, it

is the inner dimension of this very Shari’ah, which determines man's life and

conduct on earth.

Similarly, the Islamic philosophers developed an aesthetics highly refined and

closely connected to metaphysics. Because the spirit of Islam is based on

intelligence and discernment, every true manifestation of it possesses an

aspect of beauty and harmony. The Islamic philosophers - if of course we

understand by philosophers as we do throughout this essay hukama or sages

- based their conception of beauty on the notion of harmony and sobriety and

conceived of beauty not as the luxury it is considered today but as a

necessary condition of a truly human existence. The nature of the truth,

according to them, is such that it is beautiful. And for this reason the

expression of Islamic philosophy especially metaphysics is combined with the

beauty of language and with highly artistic forms of expression. These and

many other aspects of Islamic philosophy we must thoroughly re-explore and

re-understand before we take any further steps.

The way we could adopt in order to prove the identity and validity of what we

call "Islamic Philosophy" was firstly to study the philosophic thought of

Moslems as its early birth time and at the time when Islamic cult was linked

to Greek tradition; then review the other historical evidences of Islamic

philosophy growth process. The affective role of al-Kindi in entering and

widely spreading of Greek philosophical thoughts among Moslems is

considerable. We can not consider him as the founder of Islamic philosophy,

though he has been observed with the thoughts based on Greek principles in

the field of religious instructions and has somehow been mixed with it.

Al-Farabi was the first person to interpret Greek philosophy on a new basis of

principles, explaining the relation of piety and philosophy. Al-Farabi's answer

to the question of existence is totally different from those of Greek


philosophers. The path he took reaches the meaning of essence-less God.

Taking "existence" as a metaphysical being different from "identity", he has

gone farther than Aristotle and has taken the concept "existence" beyond the

area of essence; in other words to the area of Actual Existence. As a result of

this change, the truth, the causality and the other philosophic matters have

changed, none of which could be found in Greek works.

Avecina's philosophy is mostly around the analysis of Existence. He was well

aware of the religious concept of Creation and the concept of real Distinction

which exists, both in logic and also in metaphysic, between "Essence" and

"Existence". Essence is the presence of the possible in Divine knowledge, and

lacks its actual existence within itself. It will never exist if God does not grant

its existence. In Avecina's approach, the essence of God is a pure being,

therefore an infinite Existence. Based on above, Avecina is honored for

presenting a new demonstration called "Borhane e Seddigheen". It is not

imaginable that philosophers, like Plato and Aristotle to be able to present

such a demonstration where they do not believe in identity of Essence and

Existence in God; do not discuss the relationship between God and the world

on the basis of Existence, nor they believe in Creator-being. The primary

origin, in their view, is only capable to answer the question, "Why is the

world as it is?”, but can not make a clear reason why the world exists.

Mulla-Sadra gave a new figure to Islamic philosophy through his mastery

over the philosophy of Illumination and Peripatetics; also by focusing on the

Holy Verses and utterances renewed the islamic philosophy with his unique

recreation and faculty. His theory on Existence consists of a minute system

based upon the clear principle of distinction between "the concept of

Existence" and "the reality of Existence". He based the theory of the

Genuineness of Existence totally on the basis of his Supernatural structure,

and is transferred from all usual concepts of previous philosophies to the

discussions of existence. The Genuineness of Existence is a philosophic

theory having deep roots in supernatural experience of Existence, the

experience in which Mulla-Sadra could unite the ability of intellectual-

analytic thinking and the direct experience of reality together; and through

its clear and systematic expression enjoying full discipline and knowledge, he

could change his entire structure of Super-nature from Aristotelean


philosophy into a new philosophy basically non-Aristotelean. Mulla-Sadra and

his pupils' style of survey in God's Essence and Attributes which is fully

inspired by the Holy Qur’an, Nahj-Al Balaghah and the utterances of the

Infallibles, are totally different from the prevoius philosophers. The necessity

of Existence is the center around which Avecina and al-Farabi based their

reasons, while in Islamic texts the measure of necessity of Existence is

emphasized upon, which is the infinity of Divine Essence. Nahj-Al Balaghah

plays a great role in Islamic philosophy. Mulla-Sadra who revolutionary

changed theosophical thoughts, was deeply influenced by Imam Ali's

utterances. His method in monotheistic discussions and matters are based on

reasoning from essence to essence and from essence to attributes and

actions, and as Allamah Tabatabaei said, all these deep discussions are based

on a series of questions already proved in general principles of the

philosophy.

Conclusion

There are therefore good historical reasons for doubting the radical divorce of

philosophy and religion in the centuries that followed the Middle Ages; at

least we may reasonably ask whether the classical metaphysic was not

nourished on the substance of Christian revelation to a far greater extent

than we usually imagine. To put the question in this form is simply to re-state

the problem of Islamic philosophy in another field. If pure philosophy took

any of its ideas from Islamic revelation, if anything of the Qur’an has passed

into metaphysics, if, in short, it is inconceivable that the systems of

Avicenna, Suhrawardi and Mulla Sadra would be what in fact they are had

they been altogether withdrawn from Divine religion influence then it

becomes highly probable that since the influence of Islam on philosophy was

a reality, the concept of Islamic philosophy is not without a real meaning. For

anyone convinced of this, two different attitudes remain open. We may either

admit with this idea that metaphysics are destined to sink into oblivion along

with the theologies of which they are nothing but the shadow, or, since

theology seems to survive its own funeral oration, we may suppose that it

will long continue to inspire metaphysics. The great religious truths were not

rational when they were revealed, but they were revealed so that they might

become so" -not quite all of them perhaps, but some. In that formula we


have the whole meaning of the question to which the lectures that now follow

will attempt an answer. Our first task will be to interrogate the Islamic philo-

sophers themselves as to their own idea of Islamic philosophy; and this we

shall do by putting the following question: what intellectual advantages were

to be gained by turning to the Qur’an and hadiths as sources of philosophic

inspiration?

Everyone who is left far from his Sources wishes to return to the time when

he was united with It.18 The pertinence of studying the Islamic intellectual

tradition is that it can aid us to regain those principles, which alone can

render our existence and activity meaningful. But we felt that we had to

dispel the common conception of the Muslims as merely Puritan warriors and

merchants, whose strange bent for the subtleties of algebra and logic

somehow also enabled them to become the transmitters of Greek learning to

the West. As against that all too current notion, we have tried to present a

brief picture of a culture whose spiritual values are inextricably tied up with

mathematics and with metaphysics of a high order, and which once again

fused the constituent elements of Greek science into a powerful unitary

conception, which had an essential influence on the Western world up to the

time of the Renaissance. Strangely enough, it is this latter conception, half

unknown at best, and then quickly forgotten in the West, which has

remained, up to the present Western impact upon the Islamic world, the

major factor in the Islamic perspective.

Notes

1. Qur'an, x1vi, 9-10.

2. Ibid., v, 49; xlvi, 12.

3. See for this general classification of the sciences Ibn Khaldun, al-Muqaddimah, pp.

435f, and al-Farabi, ihsa’ al-’Ulum, pp. 58f.

4. The whole Qur'an is an invitation to reflect and draw lessons and directs attention to

the methods of reflection. Al-Bayadi, op. cit.: 36. Al- Tafsir al-kabir, 15 vols, 2.1

(Beirut, 3rd ed., n.d.): 90.

5. Al-Bayadi, op. cit.: 33.

6. Al-Milal, p. 18. See al-Ash‘ari, Maqalat al-Islamiyin, p. 485.


7. According to this universality of Islamic philosophy, we can not specialize it to a very

particular nation, that is Arabs. Neither language is criterion, or nationality. Since much

works was written in Persian going back to Ibn Sina himself and many and in fact,

most of the Islamic philosophers were Persian while some were from Turkish or Indian

ethnic backgrounds. Moreover, Persia has remained the main centre of Islamic

philosophy during most of Islamic history. And then there are arguments from the

other side. Islamic philosophy was created by Muslims who were Arabs, Persians and

later Turks, Indians, Malays ete based on translations often made by Christians and

influenced to some extent by Christian and Jewish interactions with Greek philosophy.

8. Islamic philosophy might be thought to be the sort of philosophy produced by

Muslims, but this would be too narrow also. A good deal of philosophy, which we have

included, was produced by non-Muslims, and some of it has no direct religious

relevance anyway. Many Christian and Jewish philosophers worked within the style and

tradition of Islamic philosophy. We do include some philosophical work here which has

direct reference to some religious topic which is just philosophy.

9. To this situation is added the observation that the Islamic philosophers did not have

access to the Greek thinkers in their original language or even in many cases in very

accurate translations, and they misidentified some of the authors anyway. Their

interpretation of Greek philosophy was highly mediated by Hellenistic and Neo-platonic

traditions, and failed to represent clearly what the original debate was.

10. For a synopsis of this metaphysics, see F. Schuon, From the Divine to the Human;

Schuon, Survey of Metaphysics and Esoternm; also R. Guenon, "Oriental Metaphysics"

in J. Needleman (ed.), The Sword of Gnosis (Baltimore, 1974). For a more fucile

approach to these metaphysical doctrines as far as the general American public is

concerned, see H. Smith, Forgotten Truth (San Francisco, 1992); and E.F.

Schumacher, A Guide for the Perplexed (New York, 1977).

11. For the traditional school the Buddhist or Taoist vision of the Void does not at all

negate the universality of the metaphysics enshrined in the philosophia perennis; in

fact it provides a most powerful expression of this metaphysics in a language, which is

complementary but not contradictory to that of, let us say, Hinduism and Islam.

12. The intellective function, so defined, may be difficult for Westerners to grasp. For

them the truly contemplative attitude is based on "intellection." We should be mindful

here of the changing usage of words. In the west, "Intellect" and "intellectual" are so


closely identified today with the analytical functions of the mind that they hardly bear

any longer any relation to the contemplative.

13. One of the most basic doctrines of the philosophia perennis is that intellectus is not

to be confused with ratio. Reason as currently understood is the reflection upon the

plane of the mind of the Intellect. On the distinction between intellect and reason, see

F. Schuon, The Transcendent Unity of Religions, trans. P. Townsend (New York, 1975),

pp. xxviii and 52; also F. Schuon, Stations of Wisdom, trans. G.E.H. Palmer (London,

1978), chapter I.

14. Tradition emphasizes more the aspect of continuity and transmission and religion

revelation and the reception of a message of Divine Origin. Otherwise, the two

constitute basically the same reality. See Nasr, Knowledge and the Sacred, chapter

two, "What is Tradition?"

15. All civilizations have decayed; only they have decayed in different ways: the decay

of the East is passive and that of the West is active. The East is sleeping over truths;

the West lives in errors.' F. Schuon, Spiritual Perspectives and Human Facts, translated

by D. M. Matheson, London, 1954, p. 22.

16. That is why so many of these treatises are called al-Mabda' wa'l-ma'ild in Arabic or

Aghaz wa anjam in Persian.

17. This question and its pertinence for the Muslims of the present day is dwelt on in S.

H. Nasr, Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines, especially the Prologue.

18. From Rumi's Mathnawi, translated by R. A. Nicholson, vol. II, London, 1926, p.5.

References

1.The Holy Quran

2. Al- Tafsir al-kabir, 15 vols, (Beirut, 3rd ed.)

3. Guenon, R. , (1974), "Oriental Metaphysics" in J. Needleman (ed.), The Sword of

Gnosis (Baltimore).

4. Rumi's Mathnawi, (1977) translated by R. A. Nicholson, vol. II, London, 1926.

5. Schumacher, E.F., A Guide for the Perplexed (New York).

6. Schuon, F., (1975), The Transcendent Unity of Religions, trans. P. Townsend

(New York)

7. Schuon, F. , (1978) Stations of Wisdom, trans. G.E.H. Palmer (London)


8. Schuon, F., (1954) Spiritual Perspectives and Human Facts, translated by D. M.

Matheson, London.

9. Smith, H. , (1992) Forgotten Truth (San Francisco)

Book Reviews Review of the Leiden Encyclopedia of the Quran* Mohammad Ali Rezaei Esfahani **

Abstract

The present writing seeks to introduce the new Encyclopedia of the Quran

organized by Dr. Jane Dammen Mc Auliffe in Leiden, Netherlands. Thus far,

some of its volumes have been published. Making use of the Introduction of

this Encyclopedia, the present paper is an attempt to provide an unbiased

report about the Encyclopedia. Also its strong and weak points will be

discussed. Criticisms of the Encyclopedia are, of course, general ones, which

will be discussed in the next issues of the Journal.

Keywords:

Encyclopedia: A comprehensive book written concerning a science in which

various subjects have been described, this book will be used as a reference

(for more details, see the first part of the present article).

Quran: The holy book of Muslims, containing 6236 verses handed down to us

by the Holy Prophet (s) successively and without interpolation.

Encyclopedia: Leiden Encyclopedia of Quran, which is under process in The

Netherlands.

*Assistant professor, Center of World Islamic Sciences , Qum , Iran. E-mail: [email protected] ** . McAuliffe, J. D.(General Editor), Encyclopedia of the Quran, Leiden, Netherlands, 2006.


Features of a Desired Encyclopedia:

The most important features of a desired Encyclopedia are as follows:

1. Portraying comprehensive information concerning a subject or scientific

discipline, which makes the researcher needless of other references.

2. Arranging information in the frames of articles (ordered thematically,

alphabetically or logically)

3. Following scientific method to compile encyclopedic articles, including:

3-1- Presenting articles within the framework of reports;

3-2- Observing impartiality in presenting points, viewpoints, and arguments

about the subject discussed, and avoiding prejudice or imposing one’s

viewpoint on the reader;

3-3- Observing technical styles of writing;

3-4- Observing conciseness and avoiding prolixity and repetition;

3-5- Points' being well-supported;

3-6- Making use of original and authentic sources;

3-7- Making use of scientific prose, and avoiding bombastic wordings;

3-8- Presenting points which have been put within the framework of

consistent knowledge, or theories previously presented (and not newly-

originated points resulting from the author's new speculations).

Note

It should be emphasized that the main principle in writing an Encyclopedia is

to make an unbiased report of information and avoid prejudice. Hence the

best way to defend correct opinion is to refrain from unfairness and present

the truth. Thus, there is no need to wordings and to keep them far from

truth. Such losses, as written by some authors1, cause the scholars to be

reluctant to compile Encyclopedia in sacred and religious subjects.

Features of the Leiden Encyclopedia of the Quran

From the Introduction of Dr. Mc Auliffe, the Editor, the following features may

be concluded for the Leiden Encyclopedia of the Quran.

Definition

A collection of articles which portrays a series of the exegeses of the Quran,

directly or indirectly; but its main axis is the Quran (and not the Encyclopedia

of the Quran together with exegesis); a research grown out of a host of


viewpoints and demonstrative bases coming to provide and uplift scientific

understanding of the Quran.

Editorial Board

The editor of this Encyclopedia, Dr. Jane Dammen Mc Auliffe is a professor of

Georgetown University (In the US), and four renowned Western Quranic

researchers accompany her: Claude Gilliot (France), William Graham (the

US), Widad al-Qazi (Chicago), Andrew Rippin (Canada); and its board of

advisors consists of Nasr Hamed Abu Zayd, Muhammed Arkoun, Gerhard

Böwering (the US), Gerald Hawting (England), Fred Leemhuis (Netherlands),

Angelica Neuwirth (Germany), and its contributors, whether Muslim or non-

Muslim, are from various countries. This Quranic work is sponsored by Brill

Publications.

Executive Stages

The project of the Encyclopedia of the Quran began in The Netherlands by

Jane Dammen Mc Auliffe with the cooperation of various scholars in 1993,

and its first volume was published in 2001 by Brill Publications in Leiden (The

Netherlands). This volume contains entries beginning with letters A to D. Its

second volume containing entries beginning with letters E to I, and the third

volume containing entries beginning with letters J to O were published,

respectively, in 2002 and 2003.

Goals

1. Creating a reference work, which may attain the highest achievement of

the century in the field of Quranic research.

2. The Encyclopedia advances more extensive studies in the field of Quran in

future decades.

3.To make researches in the Quran accessible for academic scholars and

learned readers, taking into account incomplete information concerning

Quran in European languages and to present such information to students.

Approaches

1.The Encyclopedia of the Quran looks both at future and past, and such an

insight has shaped structure of this Encyclopedia.

2.Alphabetical order predicted for the Encyclopedia will be extended to

include detailed and long articles.


3. Achievements of the past century will be valued, achievements of this

century as well will be promoted.

4.The Encyclopedia does not include exegeses of the Quran. Hence, there will

be no independent article, but only references to even such well-known

exegetes of the Quran as Tabari and Fakhr Razi.

5.The most extensive span of an accurate scientific research concerning the

Quran will be included in the Encyclopedia.

6.Various methods and viewpoints have been deliberately used in the

Encyclopedia.

Scientific Structure

About 1000 entries (arranged alphabetically) will be included in this

Encyclopedia, and these entries are of two kinds:

A) Entries concerning personalities, concepts, places names, values, acts,

and events found in the Quran or having a remarkable relation to the Text.

B)Entries concerning important issues in the field of Quranic studies such as

Arts and Architecture in the Quran, Science of History and Quran.

In this Encyclopedia, entries are in English (unlike the Encyclopedia of Islam

in which Arabic terms have been transliterated into English). And to solve the

problem of inventing equivalent words for Arabic terms, a thematic list

containing English words and Arabic ones, arranged alphabetically, will be

included in the last volume2.

For the reader’s information, the titles of some entries in the third volume are

introduced below.

Ears, Earth, Earthquake, East and West, Ecology, Economy, Heaven,

Education, Egypt, Election, Elements, Elephant, Elias, Jest, Theft, Emigrants

and Helpers, Emigration, Enemies, Virtues and Vices: Commanding and

Forbidding, Idris, Jealousy, Epigraphy, Interpolation, Eschatology, Eternity,

Ethics and the Quran, Exhortation, Eve, Evening, Quran in everyday life, Evil,

Evil deeds, Exegesis of the Quran: Ancient and Medieval, Exegesis of the

Quran: Early Modern and Contemporary, Advice, Exile, Refuge, Wars, Eyes,

Ezekiel, Ezra, Face, Face of God, Virtue, …

Study

A: Strong Points of the Leiden Encyclopedia of the Quran

1.Contribution of a large number of authors from the West and East;


2.Paying attention to new themes (such as feminism) along with traditional

Quranic themes;

3.Separating the Encyclopedia of the Quran from exegesis

4.Scheduled project and promptness in publication of the Encyclopedia;

5.Avoiding the approach of previous Orientalists and being fair in opinions in

many cases:

For example in the article “Feminism and the Quran”3, Margot Badran says

explicitly that the Holy Quran defends the rights of women.

Another example: in the article “Interpolation”4 written by Newby, it has been

said that the accusation of interpolation to Shi‘ism is unfounded, and the

Shi‘ia’s Quran is not different from that of the Sunnis.

Third example: in the article “’A'isha”5, Denis Spellbery says that superiority

of Fatima (s) to all women of the world has been explicitly mentioned.

B. Weak Points of the Leiden Encyclopedia

1.Claim of careful study (which has been mentioned in the Introduction of

Encyclopedia) is not consistent with works of some contributors in some

articles of the Encyclopedia.

For example, in “Exegesis of the Quran: Classical and Medieval”6, Claude

Gilliot mentions the book “Haqa’iq al-ta’wil fi mutashabah al-tanzil” of Sayyid

Murtada (d. 406 AH (Lunar)) as one of the commentaries of Mu‘tazalis, and

introduces Sahykh Tusi (d. 460 AH (Lunar)) and Shaykh Tabarsi (d. 548 AH

(Lunar)) among Mu‘tazali Shi’i exegetes.

But the author has not noticed that there are three main theological (kalami)

currents in the Islamic world:

First) Ash‘ari theologial (Kalami) current

Second) Mu‘tazali theological (Kalami) current

Third) Shi‘i theological (Kalami) current

And as to the third current, though similar to Mu‘tazali one in some

categories such as rationalism, it is an independent current, and each of the

two has its own features.

For example, Shi‘ism believes in continuance of prophethood in Imamah;

Mu‘tazalis, however, disagree with Shi‘ism concerning this important Shi‘i

theological (kalami) idea; or Mu‘tazalis accept “intermediate position” which

is not accepted by Shi‘i theology (Kalam)7.


Of course, it seems that such a mistake in the Leiden Encyclopedia has its

roots in books such as Dr. Dhahabi’s al-Tafsir wa’l mufassirun, which has

ascribed these ideas to Sayyid Murtada prior to them8. But, Sayyid Murtada

was a great Imami Shi‘i scholar.

And in the same article “Exegesis”, Rippin introduces AbulFutuh Razi’s

Exegesis as the greatest Shi‘i narrative Exegesis. But, the greatest Shi‘i

narrative exegeses are “Exegesis of ‘Ayyashi”, Muhaddith Bahrani’s al-

Burhan, ‘Arusi Huwayzi’s Nur al-thaqalayn, and Fayd Kashani’s Safi.

AbulFutuh Razi’s Exegesis is roughly a Persian translation of Shaykh Tusi’s

Tebyan (with some additions, of course, by the late AbulFutuh Razi); and the

two latter’s methodology for commentary is a deductive (and not pure

narrative) one. And this will become clear from above exegeses easily.

2. Methodological Problems in Presenting Reports of Exegeses

First example:

In “Exegesis of the Quran: Early Modern and Contemporary”9, Rotraud

Wielandt has restricted rational exegesis to deductive ones of those such as

the Indian Seyyed Ahmad Khan (d. 1898), and the Egyptian Muhammad

Abduh (d. 1905) who have combined the Western civilization and Science

with the Quran.

And interestingly enough, in what follows in the article, the author ascribes

al-Hidayat wa’l ‘irfan fi tafsir al-quran bi’l quran to Muhammad Abu Zayd (d.

1930).

Firstly, this book has not been authored by Abu Zayd, but by Indian Sir

Seyyed Ahmad Khan; and, secondly, this book is among scientific, and not

rational exegeses.

Thirdly, rational exegeses are not restricted to deductive ones. Rather, the

term "reason" in exegetical issues has two applications; first, demonstrative

reason which proceeds to comment using rational arguments. For example

the verse "The Hand of Allah is above their hands" (48: 10) is commented

upon taking into account the fact that "God is not body"; thus we pay no

attention to the appearance, and say that "hand" refers to power. The second

is the illuminating reason for faculty of thought, which is of use in various

exegetical approaches. And the faculty of thought is used to reflect upon and


understand verses and their frames of reference, to sum up and to deduce.

The latter approach is called deductive10.

Thus, rational exegeses are not restricted to those of the Egyptian

Muhammad Abduh (1848-1905) and the Indian Seyyed Ahmad Khan (1817-

1898). Such an exegesis has a one-thousand-year-old history among

Muslims beginning from exegeses of Shaykh Tusi and Tabarsi (d. 548 AH

(Lunar)), and is still going on.

Of course, there have been some innovations in Muhammad Abduh's

exegesis. For example paying attention to social trends in commentary as

well as to scientific methodology and the role of modern sciences which

become clear through studying Exegesis of ‘Amm Juz’ and exegesis of his

disciple Rashid Ridha in al-Minar.

The second example: in the same article "Exegesis of the Quran: Early

Modern and Contemporary", Rotraud Weilandt says that scientific exegesis of

the Quran began with Fakhr Razi (d. 606 AH (Lunar)) and through deducting

sciences from the Holy Quran; and then the author mentions Ruh al-ma'ani

of Alusi (d. 1856) and Tantavi's al-Jawahir.

In this article, of course, the author has admitted that scientific exegesis of

the Quran proves miracle of the Quran, and this is as arms in the hands of

Muslims against the West.

But the author has not realized that scientific exegesis of the Quran began

during the time of Ibn Sina (370-428 AH (Lunar)) in his Rasa'il and it has

been proceeded in three approaches:

First: Deduction of sciences from the Holy Quran. According to a wrong

understanding of the verse "And We reveal the Scripture unto thee as an

exposition of all things" (16: 89) it was thought that the verse meant that all

sciences are in the Holy Quran; and this is the approach chosen by Ghazali

(d. 505 AH (Lunar))11.

Second: Imposing scientific theses on the Holy Quran which is interesting for

those who are fond of the modern sciences. For example, the Egyptian

Abdulrazzagh al-Nufal in his various books follows this approach.

Third: employing sciences from the Holy Quran, which is the right approach,

and those such as Muhammad Abduh sought to follow this path.12


Repetition of Unfounded Claims and Accusation Imposed by the

Earlier Orientalists upon the Holy Quran

Although there is a great distance between the general approach of this

Encyclopedia and that of earlier studies of Orientalists and a fair and

scholarly approach governs many articles in it; some authors, without a new

research and imitating the earlier ones repeated the previous claims of

Orientalists, some of which are mentioned below.

Under the entry “Aaron”, Andrew Rippin says that the Quran, erroneously,

considers Jesus’ mother as Aaron’s sister, “O sister of Aaron!” (19: 28); while

Aaron had died centuries before Jesus’ mother. In the Bible, it has been said

that Aaron had a sister called Mary, but this was in the time of Moses, and

not in the time of Jesus13. But, if he had studied Shi‘i and Sunni important

exegeses, Andrew Rippin would have noticed that this sentence of the Quran

had been quoted by Mary’s enemies and is a proverb among his folk. In a

hadith attributed to the Holy Prophet (PBUH), it has been said that since

Aaron was such a virtuous man that he was an example among children of

Israel, they said about virtuous persons that “he (she) is Aaron’s brother

(sister)”14.

This Andrew Rippin’s error in understanding the Quranic verse and his

heedlessness to exegeses and exegetical hadiths as well as ascribing

historical mistake to the Holy Quran (that the Holy Quran has confused Mary

of Moses’ age with Mary of Jesus’ time) have created problems for the Leiden

Encyclopedia as much as heedlessness of Andrer Rippin, editor, and editorial

board of the above Encyclopedia to researches made by Orientalists and

critiques of Muslims concerning such studies have created. The point made

by Andrew Rippin is not a new one, rather a repetition of sayings of earlier

Orientalists. Since, for the first time, it was Adrian Rayland (1676-1718) who

posed such a question about the Holy Quran, and Muslims have answered

this question many times mentioning Orientalists’ mistake in understanding

the above verse. For example, Abdolrahman Badawi (d. 1988), in his Difa' 'an

al-Quran (p. 61), has posed the same question and answered it in details.

But, strangely enough, fourteen years after the publication of Abdolrahman

Badawi’s book, the same mistake of the earlier Orientalists is repeated in the


Leiden Encyclopedia without making any reference to the answer given by

Badawi.

Internal Inconsistency in the Leiden Encyclopedia

There should be, necessarily, no inconsistency between points provided in a

book, in particular about historical issues ascribed to religions and Scriptures.

However, such inconsistencies are sometimes seen inn the Leiden

Encyclopedia.

Example: Juynboll, in Hadith and the Quran, has said some points about

interpolation in the Quran; for example:

He quotes the verse Rajm from Suyuti, which has been sent unto Muhammad

(PBUH), but such verse is not included in the Quran at all.

The term A'immah has been altered into the term ummah. It is ascribed to

Shi‘as that they believe that the Chapter Ahzab was, originally, longer than

the Chapter Baqarah, but it has been altered.

Shi‘as have commented the Seven Readings of the Quran to deduce legal

decisions15. But, in “Interpolation”16 of Newby included in the Leiden

Encyclopedia, the Quran's being interpolated has been rejected.

This, firstly, makes internal inconsistency of the Leiden Encyclopedia of the

Quran clear; and makes duties of its editor, who attempts to avoid

inconsistent points in this book, more burdensome.

Secondly, hadiths concerning interpolation have been many times criticized

and rejected by the great Shi‘i and Sunni scholars. For, many such hadiths

are inconsistent with the Quran, and what is inconsistent with the Quran is

not authentic; and chains of transmission of such hadiths are inconsistent;

and some of them mention exegetical points and differences in Readings.

From among those who have written on this point, one may mention:

Ayatullah Kho’i (reh) (al-Bayan), Ayatullah Muhammad Hadi Ma‘rifat (Sianat

al-Quran min al-tahrif), Dr. Najjarzadegan (Salamat al-Quran min al-tahrif),

the latter's book has been recently reprinted with some additions.

Thirdly, the point that the original version of the Chapter Ahzab had been

longer than the Chapter Baqarah has been mentioned by some Sunnis,

ascribed to Ubay ibn Ka‘b and ‘Ayishah17. Then, why does the author accuse

Shi‘as of such point? While, as mentioned above, the point is not correct at

all, and the scholars of two schools reject interpolation.


Fourthly, the Seven Readings of the Quran mentioned in some hadiths have

been doubted by Shi‘i scholars for their chains of transmission18. And, since

the Readings have not been widely transmitted and the Quran cannot be

understood through them, they cannot be employed as bases to deduce legal

judgment. Of course, since Hafas’ Reading by ‘Asim has the greatest

correspondence with the Quran and generally accepted by Muslims, it has

drawn the attentions and the existing Qurans in the Islamic world are

published on the basis of this Reading.

5- It Has Not Collected all Necessary Information in a Field

As was mentioned above on the features of an Encyclopedia, the

Encyclopedia’s responsibility is to provide all necessary information in such a

concise manner that it would make the reader needless to refer to other

books. The Leiden Encyclopedia, however, has not sometimes fulfilled this

responsibility.

Example: in the Article “Fatima”, Mrs. Jane Dammen Mc Aulife has said that

the exegetes of the Quran regarding the verses 3:61 (Ayat al-mubahalah)

and 33:33 (ayat al-Tathir) are related to Faima (s).

Then, she quotes from Tabari's Tafsir that by “Household” in the Chapter

Ahazab, Muhammad, Fatima, ‘Ali, Hasan, and Husayn are meant; but she

quotes from ‘Akramah that the Holy Prophet’s wives are meant19.

However, it has been reported that the verses concerning Fatima (s) in the

Holy Quran amount to 60 to 135 verses20.

Occasions of revelation of some of them, of course, concern Fatima (s), and

in some of them Fatima (s) has been regarded as the verse’s referent,

interpretation, or inner implication. Yet some verses, including the Chapter

Kawthar21 and ayat al-nazr in the Chapter al-Insan (the verse 1 beginning

with hal ati (Hath there…?)), have been confirmed and emphasized by the

great Shi‘i and Sunni interpreters22.

Concerning Fatima, more than 24,00 books have been authored23; in many of

them, verses pertaining to Fatima have been mentioned.

Heedlessness of the editor and author of the Leiden Encyclopedia of the

Quran to this valuable Shi‘i and Sunni heritage regarding verses about Fatima

cannot be overlooked; and some people may take it as an indication of

unawareness of the author.


Secondly, the author of Encyclopedia should provide a comprehensive report

of viewpoints in a subject; and if she (he) makes a report about some

viewpoint, she (he) should report the opposite one as well. In the above

instance wherein a hadith was quoted from ‘Akramah, the author had to

mention the weakness of chain of transmission of ‘Akramah's hadith;

particularly because the great figures in the “biographies and criticisms of

traditionists” among Shi‘a and Sunnis have regarded ‘Akramah's hadiths to

be weak and considered him as a Kharijite24 (who are enemies of 'Ali (a) and

the Household (a)).25 Also, she had to mention the implicative weakness of

‘Akramah's hadith (: revealed concerning the Holy Prophet's special wives26);

for as mentioned by some interpreters ayat al-tathir signifies virtue, being far

from any sin, and in fact infallibility of the Household.27 And this cannot be

about all wives of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) concerning whose repentance the

verses 4-6 of the Chapter al-Tahrim have been revealed.28

1- It Has Not Employed Authors Specialized in the Quran

Employing various authors from all corners of the world is one of the strong

points of this Encyclopedia. But in the contemporary age and in the Middle

East, i.e., in Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan and some other

countries there are dozens of great Quranic researchers, some of whom have

authored dozens of Quranic exegeses or books in the field of Quranic or

related sciences. However, strong and prominent scholars of the Quran have

not been employed by the Leiden Encyclopedia of the Quran.

For example in Iran, they have employed Messrs. Muhammad Ali Amirmoezzi

and Mohsen Zakeri; while the two are unknown for the Scientific Society of

the Quran and for those who research in the Quranic field in Iran. But in Iran,

there are great Quranic researchers like Ayatullah Makarem Shirazi (author of

Tafsir nimunah), Ayatullah Marefat (author of Tafsir al-athari al-jami' wa'l

tamhid fi ulum al-quran) and many others.

Of course, some Quranic researchers in the Asian countries may not have

enough command of English, but their command of original sources as well

as their scientific strength cannot be ignored. And even their works might be

translated into English. For example, the abovementioned Tafsir Nimunah has

been translated into some current languages of the world.


Moreover, some authors have been employed in this Encyclopedia who are

against the general current of the contemporary Quranic researchers in the

Islamic world. And even the works of some of them like Muhammed Arkoun

and Hamed Abu Zayd have been put to question.

Along with employing these figures, the editor of the Encyclopedia was able

to invite their opponents to criticize their ideas and opinions and publish both

works in the same article or along with each other. In this way their reports

were not regarded as one-sided ones.

NB. There are, of course, other major objections to the Leiden Encyclopedia

of the Quran. But all of them have not been mentioned in this article, but will

be presented soon as a series of articles or in an independent book.

Notes

1. Da'irat al-ma'arif quran, vol. 1, Mustafa Mahami, p. 11

2. See, Introduction, Encyclopedia of the Quran (Leiden), vol. 1, (points are classified by the

author of this article)

3. Encyclopedia of the Quran (Leiden), vol. 2, pp. 199-203, "Feminism and the Quran",

Margot Badran

4 . Ibid., p. 242, Interpolation, Gordon Darnell Neweby

5 . Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 55-60, 'A'isha, Denis Spellbery

6 . Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 99-124, Exegesis of the Quran: Classical and Medieval, Claude Gilliot

7. For more details about Shi'I, Mu'tazali, and Ash'ari viewpoints, see kalami books such as

Khwajah Nasir's Sharh Tajrid and Sharh Mawaqif Iji.

8 . al-Tafsir wa'l mufassirun, Dr. Dhahabi, vol. 1, p. 404

9 . Encyclopedia of the Quran (Leiden), vol. 2, p. 12, Exegesis of the Quran: Early Modern and

Contemporary, Rotraud Wielandt

10. For more details, see Rezaei Esfahani, Mohhamad Ali, Handbook of Methods and Trends in

Commenting upon the Quran, Method for Rational and Deductive Exegesis

11. See, Ihia al-'ulum, vol. 1, p. 289; al-Jawahir, p. 18

12. For more details see Rezaei Esfahani, Muhammad Ali, An Introduction to Scientific

Exegesis of the Quran, Osweh Press

13. Encyclopedia of the Quran (Leiden), vol. 1, pp. 1-2, Aaron, Andrew Rippin


14. Mjama' al-bayan under the verse 19: 28; Nur al-thaqalayn, vol. 3, p. 333; Nimunah, vol.

13, p. 51

15. Encyclopedia of the Quran (Leiden), vol. 2, pp. 376-396, Hadith and the Quran, G.H.A.

Juynboll

16. Ibid., p. 242, Interpolation, Newby

17. See, Musnad of Ahmad, vol. 5, p. 132; Suyuti, al-Itqan, vol. 2, p. 72

18. See Kho'i Abolqasem, al-Bayan fi tafsir al-quran, Readings; Ma'refat, Muhammad Hadi,

Introduction to Quranic Sciences (qara'at wa'l tamhid fi 'ulum al-quran), Readings and hadith

of the Seven Interpolated (qara'at wa hadith sab'ah ahraf); Hojjati, Seyyed Muhammad

Bagher, An Study of the History of the Quran, , Readings (qara'at)

19. Encyclopedia of the Quran (Leiden), vol. 2, pp. 192-193, Fatima, Jane Dammen Mc Auliffe

20. See Shaykh Haydar Ali Mu'ayyid, Faza'il Fatima fi'l dhikr al-hakim; Seyyed Muhammad 'Ali

Halv, Ma nazzala min al-quran fi sha'n Fatima al-Zahra; Seyyed Sadiq Shirazi, Fatima al-

Zahra fi'l quran…

21. See Fakhr Rzai's Tafsir, under the Chapter al-Kawthar; al-Mizan, Nimunah…

22. See Commentaries by Qurtabi, Nishaburi in his Ghara'ib al-quran, Baghawi in Ma'alim al-

tanzil as well as al-Mizan, Nur al-thaqalayn, al-Burhan, Safi, Nimunah…

23. Esma'il Ansari Zanjani Kho'ini, Fatima dar a'yinah kitab (Fatima as Mirrored in Books)

24. See. Dhahabi, Mizan al-i'tidal, vol. 3, pp. 93-96; Tustari, Qamus al-rijal, vol. 6, p. 327

25. Some great figures, of course, authenticated 'Akramah; but they have doubted in ascribing

such hadith to him, see al-Tafsir wa'l mufassirun, vol. 1, pp. 348-361

26. Tabari, Tafsir, vol. 12, p. 8

27. al-Mizan, vol. 16, pp. 310-311

28 . Bukhari, Sahih, vol. 3, p. 314, hadiths 4914, 4915.

God and Man in the Quran* Toshihiko Izutsu**

A professor of the Faculty of Cultural Studies and Linguistics in Keio

University in Tokyo, Japan, the author of the book was one of the salient

figures in the field of studies concerning the Holy Quran and Islamic culture;

and as seen, many Islamologists and researchers of the Islamic culture refer

to his works. In the book under question as well, he himself refers the reader

to his own other work, The Structure of the Ethical Terms in Koran, which

seems to be helpful to understand conceptual structure of the Holy Quran.

In God and Man in Quran, the author shows his considerable ability in the

field of the Holy Quran and Arabic poetry. His numerous references as well

reveal his great attention to the history of Islamic culture from the very

beginning up to its blossoming, so that the reader feels his great respect for

the God's Book and Quranic concepts.

In this book, the author proceeds to study changes and developments in

Arabic terms used by the Holy Quran, and seeks to discuss their

developments since the Ignorance Era up to the time when they were

employed by the Quran. In this, his aim has been to say that such semantic

changes suggest a point of paramount importance; and this point is a fully

new look at the world; just equivalent to what is called in German

"Weltanschauung".

As said by Professor Toshihiko Izutsu in the introduction to book, he has tried

to somehow pave the way to better understand the mission of the Holy

Quran by people of the era of Revelation as well as people of our age. * . Introduced by: Isa Ali Al'akub (Qatar University , Qatar)

**. Arabic translator: Zahed veysi.


In the first chapter, "lesson of Semantics and Quran", he says that the in the

main body of this study, exactly, personal relation between the Creator- the

Great- and man in the Quran is discussed, and that through semantic study

along with Quranic look at the world. Then, he explains that he puts

importance on two essential points: semantic study and the Quran.

From the very beginning, the author has tried to give a clear picture of the

relation between semantic methodology and Quranic studies; and in this way,

he emphasizes that in this book, theses based on methodologies of semantic

studies and applied methodology based on the terminology of the Holy Quran

have been combined.

Nevertheless, taking into account difficulties of what is called semantics and

its great need to organization, from the very beginning, the author has

attempted to present his own viewpoint about this discipline. He says in this

regard that for him, semantics is analytical study of key-terms in a language

in order to find a conceptual understanding in looking at the world

(Weltschauung) for those who employ that language as a tool; of course not

only to speak and think, but also and in addition to these, to present their

understandings and interpretations about their surrounding world.

In this way, he believes that Quranic semantic study reveals viewpoint of this

valuable book to the structure of the world and its main parts, and their

relation with each other. Also, the author says that for him, the important

thing is, instead of individual and separate concepts which are far away from

the universal structure (Gestalt) in which they have been incorporated, the

sort of conceptual system used by the Quran. He explains that the key-terms

which are of crucial usages in shaping the look of the Holy Quran at the

world, including the term Allah, are not new and innovative, but rather

almost all of them had been of use in pre-Islamic era. For the same reason,

when the Islamic revelation began to employ them, all these systems or in

other words the universal context in which these terms were used led to

conflicts with polytheists; though this was strange, unconventional, and

hence unacceptable. In this regard, the author mentions the distinction

between basic senses of the terms and their relational senses. According to

him, terms create a strict system whose main pattern consists of some very

important terms. Yet, those terms of the vocabulary do not equally contribute


in shaping that existential look whose basis is vocabularies. For example, the

term "Qirtas" used in the Chapter "In'am" is literally and in terms of Arab

Culture history, of paramount importance. However, it plays no role in finding

Quranic viewpoint to the being. On the contrary, the term "sha'ir" seems to

be much more important, for the Holy Quran tries hard to negate such

qualification of the Holy Prophet. Nevertheless, value of this term, in

whatever way it may be seen, is much less than the term "nabi". These

terms, which are of semantic usages in creating conceptual structure of the

Quranic look, the author calls, as said, "key-terms". Of this kind are the

terms Allah, Islam, Faith (iman), Disbelief (kufr), Messenger (nabi), and

Prophet (rasul).

In the following chapters, the author tries to employ a methodology he

pictured in the first chapter. In the second chapter, he speaks of the Quranic

key-terms in the history and for this he uses two terms "synchronic" and

"diachronic". He comes to the conclusion that no semantic field in the Quranic

system may be found which has no relation to "Allah" and is not placed under

this essential concept. And this is the same concept which has forced

researchers in the field of semantic of words to say that the world of the

Quran is, essentially, concentrated about "Allah", while in the Ignorance Era

this was not the case.

Here, the author mentions a very important point, i.e. that the Quranic

dominance became so that all Islamic systems of thought had to go to the

treasure of Quranic terminology to acquire their primary elements. In this

regard, he gives examples of systems such as kalam, philosophy, and Sufism

which had taken their key-terms from Quran.

In the third chapter, the author explains essential structure of the Quranic

outlook, and tries to create a comprehensive idea of the conceptual sketch of

the Quranic viewpoint to the world; of course he does so through analytical

and systematic study of the important terms which seem to play a

paramount role in finding the prevalent idea which has been permeate

throughout the Holy Quran. Thus, in order to attain this goal, the author tries

to read the Holy Quran free from any a priori idea. In other words, he has to

try to read Quran without calling ideas presented by the Muslim thinkers after

revelation of the Holy Quran. That is, he has to attempt to find structure of


the idea of the world in the Quran, in the latter's principal face; i.e. in the

same way that it was understood by the Companions of the Prophet and his

immediate followers.

In this way, the author comes to a brief and important result: Quran is a

great and multi-layered system which relies on some essential and

conceptual opposites, each of which shapes a concrete semantic realm. The

first one of these conceptual opposites is relation between God and man for

which four forms may be imagined: existential relation, connective relation,

relation between the Lord and His Bondman, moral relation.

He believes that whenever these relations are established between God and

man, there will be found a special group of individuals who admit such

relations and select their positive aspects for their look at life and being; in

the same way that in the History of Islam, something called "Muslim Ummah"

was found.

In the closing chapters of the book, the author discusses four relations

between God and man, and it goes without saying that the fair reader will

agree with ideas presented by the author in an expressive way.1

Notes

1. From translated copy of that book which published in the "Islamic Knowledg" Journal

(www.iit.org), USA, 2007. (An Arabic translation is at the publishing precess).

Institute of Islamic Culture and Thought Publishes:∗ On Wisdom and Knowledge**

On Wisdom and Knowledge, a collection of philosophical-scientific articles and

interviews of the late Professor Seyyed Jalal al-Din Ashtiyani, was printed and

published in 514 pages in 1,200 copies.

Professor Seyyed Jalal al-Din Ashtiyani is one of the most eminent

commentators of the Islamic philosophy and mysticism.

Attendance in the classes of great teachers, along with his genius, strong

memory, persistence, and scientific tolerance, shaped him as a great figure

and a distinct symbol of philosophy and knowledge.

Through his relentless efforts to revive scientific heritage of the predecessors,

explanation of difficult points in Islamic philosophy, studying genealogy of

philosophical and mystical rules and principles and exploring the viewpoints

of Muslim philosophers, he played a critical role in the history of rational

sciences.

Professor 'Allamah Seyyed Jalal al-Din Ashtiyani may be considered among

neo-Sadrean philosophers. Throughout his life he was engaged in explaining

and defending Transcendental Philosophy and introducing it to Orientalists.

Henry Corbin calls him "Newly-appeared Sadra".

On Philosophy and Knowledge contains two sections. Arranged in 14

chapters, the first section includes his philosophical, mystical, theological

(kalami), and historical articles. The second section contains 10 scientific

interviews with the late Professor.

∗ . Introduced by: P.Kazemzadeh, Researcher of the Institute for Islamic Culture and Thought,Tehran, Iran. **. On Wisdom and Knowledge , A Collection of Philosophical- Mystical Articles and Interviwes (Professor Seyyed Jalaleddin Ashtiani) Editor: Hasan Jamshidi, Institute of Islamic Culture and Thought Pub., Iran , 2006 , 514 pages.


Titles of some chapters of this section are as follows: The End of Sainthood in

Ibn Arabi's Thinking, Tasawwuf (Mysticism) in Islam, Commentary on the

Chapter Fatiha, A Critique of the Critique of the Sih Asl (Mulla Sadra's

Treatise on Three Principles).

Concerning Henry Corbin, in one of his interviews, Professor Seyyed Jalal al-

Din Ashtiyani says: "For me, what attracted Corbin to the Eastern philosophy

and in particular our mysticism was his

disappointment of the Western

philosophy, and that he did not find

something satisfying in that

philosophy".

Professor Seyyed Jalal al-Din Ashtiyani

was born in 1925 in Ashtiyan, Iran.

After primary stages of education in

this city, he left his birthplace for Qom

to complete his education.

After completing his primary education,

he attended Ayatollah Borujerdi's

School of Jurisprudence (Fiqh), and

completed his Kharij level.

Because of his interest in philosophy and mysticism, Professor Ashtiyani

attended 'Allamah Tabataba'i's class for 8 years; and studied the main texts

of the two fields, a complete course in fiqh (jurisprudence), and commentary

on the Holy Quran (partially), in this class. To complete his studies in the

field of Sadrean philosophy, Professor Ashtiyani left for Qazvin and attended

the class of Aqa Seyyed AbolHasan Rafi'i Qazvini. Then, he left Qazvin for

Najaf, and attended the classes of the teachers in Najaf Seminary for two

years.

Having returned to Tehran, he attended the class of Mirza Ahmad Ashtiyani,

and made uses of his guidance to solve his problems.

In 1959, he was appointed a lecturer of Mashhad University in Islamic

philosophy and mysticism. Two years later, he was promoted and became

assistant professor.


For more than 40 years and before illness preventing him from teaching and

studying, he was teaching in Seminary and University. At the same time he

was authoring books and articles concerning religious philosophy, and editing

manuscripts of the philosophers and mystics of the predecessors.

After being inflicted with a protracted disease, the Muslim philosopher and

theosophist, Professor Seyyed Jalal al-Din Ashtiyani passed away at 80. He

was one of the last figures in Sadrean philosophy in Iran, and created works

of great value.

Some of his works are as follows: Being according Mysticism and Philosophy,

Biography and Philosophical Viewpoints of Mulla Sadra's Zad al-musafir,

Commentary on Qaysari's Introduction to Fusus al-hikam, Commentary on

Farabi's Fusus al-hikam, Commentary on the Chapter Fatiha, Mulla Sadra's

al-Masha'ir, Fayd Kashani's Usul al-ma'arif, Ibn Turkah's Tamhid al-qawa'id,

Mulla Sadra's Shawahid al-rububiyah, Mulla Sadra's al-Mabda' wa'l ma'ad,

Naqd al-nusus fi sharh naqsh al-nusus of 'Abdolrahman Jami, and Selection

of Works of Iranian Divine Philosophers.1

Reference

1. Borrowed from: www.Mehrnews.com. Introduced by: P.Kazemzadeh, Researcher of

the Institute for Islamic Culture and Thought,Tehran, Iran.

Rationality and Religion1 Roger Trigg

Rationality and Religion deals with the perennial question of how far

religious faith needs reason. Religion must claim truth, it is argued, and

indeed needs the idea of a transcendent God. The book deals squarely with

such problems as the existence of different religions, the relation between

science and religion, and how religion should be treated in a pluralist

society. This is one of the most fundamental issues facing religion at the

present time. Can religion still be the subject of rational discussion or must

it be privatized and left to the personal decisions of individuals as to how

they should live their lives? Can it make claims that demand universal

attention? This book is a spirited contribution to a vital contemporary

debate. Based on the prestigious Stanton lectures at the University of

Cambridge, the volume is ideal for student and general readership, as well

as for philosophers and theologians.2

Notes

1. Rationality and Religion , By Roger Trigg Blackwell Pub., UK ., 1998 , 224 Pages Introduced by: P.Kazemzadeh, Researcher of the Institute for Islamic Culture and Thought,Tehran, Iran.

2. www.Blackwell publishing.com

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