Kinbar ~ Kaddushin

1

HAGADDAH AND HALACHAH IN THE WRITINGS OF MAX

KADUSHIN

Carl Kinbar

In Kesher, Issue 14 (Winter 2002). Pages 87-105

In his article on “The Rabbinic View of God: A Contrast to the Rambam,”1 John Fisher writes

that “when we employ the terms of classical philosophy even in an attempt to clarify rabbinic

ideas, we are no longer within the rabbinic universe of discourse.”2 Dr. Fisher has openly taken

his cue from Max Kadushin, a Twentieth Century Jewish scholar of Rabbinic Judaism, whom he

quotes profusely. In this article, I highlight some essential aspects of Kaddushin’s analysis of

Rabbinic thought.

How do articles like these find a place in a Messianic Jewish journal such as Kesher? Our

movement has much to learn from Judaism and Jewish scholarship. We should not read such

texts uncritically, of course. But we may find, on deeper analysis, that some of the same – or

similar - currents of thought, as well as the struggle between competing worldviews, are found in

our Messianic Judaism.

When Max Kadushin began to study Seder Eliahu, a collection of midrashim3 of uncertain

dating4, he sought to find and explain what other, well known scholars had failed to discover – an

1 John Fischer, “The Rabbinic View of God: A Contrast to the Rambam” Kesher 13 (Summer

2001) 82-96 2 Ibid. 95 This Rabbinic universe of discourse is illustrated primarily in the texts of the first six

centuries of the Common Era. 3 In this paper I assume a general knowledge of Rabbinics including basic terms such as midrash,

Haggadah, and Halachah, items such as the names of scholars, and dating, such as 200 CE as the

commonly agreed date for the editing of the Mishnah. Terms coined by Kadushin will be

explained. However, Kadushin was a bit erratic in his spelling of Hebrew terms and occasionally

in the names of the terms he coined. For the sake of simplicity and readability, I will regularize

2

overarching logic or system in Rabbinic thought. He was impelled forward by a deep inner

assurance – one might even say an instinctual conviction – that there must be an inner coherence

to Rabbinic thought and to the corpus of texts in which that thought is embodied – Rabbinic

literature from the Mishnah to the Talmud Bavli. As he puts it, “We ought not to reconcile

ourselves to accepting Rabbinic theology as a congeries of ideas unrelated to each other, an

inarticulate mass of separate concepts.”5

Kaddushin describes his initial experiences: “With the warnings of Schechter and Moore

to deter me, I nevertheless attempted for a time to cast the Rabbinic concepts in the Seder into

some sort of logical order. All this work was, of course, fruitless. At the last, however, a careful

analysis yielded the conviction that this Midrash does possess coherence, but of an entirely

different kind from that produced by logical, systematic thought. I have called the type of

thinking which, it seems to me, characterizes Rabbinic theology, ‘organic thinking’.”6

In Kadushin’s subsequent books, which focused on specific Rabbinic works, overall

Rabbinic thought, and application in the realm of worship and ethics, he undertook to elaborate

the basic findings first published in his study of Seder Eliahu. The purpose of this article is to

describe the “organic thinking” that Kadushin discovered and elucidated, in particular as it

relates to the comparison and contrast between Haggadah and Halachah.

the spelling and terminology in this paper, including passages quoted by Kadushin. The terms for

the value concepts will be given in English. 4 In Organic Thinking, pp. 4-5 Kadushin discusses the various perspectives on dating this

document. He favors Louis Ginzberg’s proposition that portions of the document are early

(perhaps even Tannaitic), while may be post-Talmudic. 5 Theology of Seder Eliahu, p. v

6 Ibid.

3

The Nature of Rabbinic Thought

Kadushin identifies four “fundamental concepts” in Rabbinic theology; each expressed by a

conceptual term – God’s Loving-kindness, Justice, Torah, and Israel.7 He repeatedly emphasizes

that these four are fundamental not because they are more important than other concepts, but

because they are organizing principles to which all other concepts are connected in relationships,

like interconnected family trees. He sees other concepts – such as Truth, Saving Life, Fear of

Heaven, or Repentance – as equally essential to the Rabbinic worldview. “Rabbinic concepts are

not like articles of a creed, some of which have a position of primary importance while others are

relegated to secondary rank. All Rabbinic concepts are of equal importance, for the pattern

would not have the same character were a single concept missing. We have, however, called

[these four] fundamental concepts because all the Rabbinic concepts are built, woven rather, out

of these four.”8

Each of the four fundamental concepts has a number of related sub-concepts.9 For

example, the fundamental concept of “Torah [includes] the sub-concepts of the Study of Torah,

Commandments, Good Deeds, and Ethics [Derek Erez], the latter also having its own sub-

concepts of Charity and Deeds of Loving-kindness and such ethical matters as humility, honesty,

reverence and the like…”10

All of this, and all that follows, is specific to Israel as a people,

whose violations of Torah come under God’s Judgement, a sub-concept of Justice. God’s

7 I will systematically present Rabbinic concepts in capitalized English words

8 Organic Thinking, p. 6-7

9 Although each is identified by a concrete conceptual term (such as Torah or Commandments),

the fundamental concepts and sub-concepts appear in Rabbinic writings even when the terms

themselves are not used. 10

The Rabbinic Mind, p. 15

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Loving-kindness includes Providence – His care for individuals – Mercy, and Atonement, which

temper Judgement and Justice.11

The fundamental concepts and all their sub-concepts intertwine with one another to form

the whole of the Rabbinic value-complex. This inner coherence of Rabbinic thought is unveiled

only after a careful examination of the whole system.12

As an example of this intertwining and

coherence, let us survey the concept of the Sanctification of the Name. When Israel is ready to

die as martyrs for the one God, God’s Name is made known, or sanctified, among the nations. In

parallel, Israel takes upon itself the Yoke of God’s Sovereignty by the Recitation of the Shema.

Thus, both the Sanctification of the Name and the Recitation of the Shema are declarations – the

first is an objective declaration to the nations, the second a subjective acknowledgment of God

by individual or congregation. The same individuals who take the Yoke are the ones who are

ready to Sanctify the Name. This is Israel. The unity of relationship among these concepts does

not lie in an ordered logic, or even in the words involved (since the concepts can appear even

when their names do not), but in the inner organic coherence of Rabbinic thought.

Thus, we see the subtlety of Rabbinic thought as its concepts form organic relational

patterns on the macro- and the micro-levels. These patterns – and the overarching organic whole

of Rabbinic thought – are such that a full description of any one concept or sub-concept ultimately

involves its relationship with all the other concepts, that is, with the entire conceptual system.13

The meaning of any particular concept is “a function of the entire complex of concepts as a whole.

11

Organic Thinking, p. 9-10 12

The Rabbinic Mind, p. 16 13

Organic Thinking, p. 11

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If every Rabbinic concept depends for its meaning upon all the rest, then all the concepts together

constitute an organic whole.”14

Not only is each element of the organic complex fully defined only in terms of the entire

system, but also every concept is vital to the system as a whole. None is more important or

crucial than any other. Rabbinic thought is organic, not hierarchical. The concepts are related

like the organs of a body. And yet, even more than in a physical organism, the removal of even a

single concept – at any level – would damage the very integrity and nature of the whole

organism.15

To remove one concept would be to change the whole – and to distort the meaning

of every other concept.

Because all the concepts are part of one organic whole, each may be seen in combination

with a variety of other concepts. This can give rise to understandings that appear to contradict

one another. For example, “at one time the Rabbis declare that because God loves the scholar’s

devotion to Torah He deliberately withholds from him wealth which would distract him from

study, and at another time they affirm that wealth is the reward of those who study Torah. The

first statement combines Torah with the concept of God’s Loving-kindness; the second, Torah

with the concept of God’s Justice.”16

These kinds of combinations and apparent contradictions

can be seen at every conceptual level.

Organic thought allows for such divergence without losing its essential unity. It is this

flexibility that both empowered and encompassed great individuality of expression during the

14

Worship and Ethics, p. 4. Kadushin’s result, repeated in all of his books, is that the concepts

“combine or interweave with every value-concept of the Rabbinic complex of concepts.” … The

upshot is that we can never know what anything means in general, because all language is

specific in its setting…” (Neusner, “Forward: The Inquiry of Max Kadushin”, in Understanding

the Rabbinic Mind, p. xii-xiii) 15

The Rabbinic Mind p. 22-25 16

Organic Thinking, p. 13

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Rabbinic period – the houses of Hillel and Shammai, Akiba and Ishmael, the various authors of

the haggadic and halakhic midrashim. “Fluid yet unified, the organic complex gives room for

differences in temperament among individuals, even for different moods in the same individual,

for the stressing of different concepts in different historical periods…”17

“It is the organic coherence, not hard-and-fast logical consistency, that permits the

development and expression of individuality.”18

And yet, organic thought works not against, but

alongside, logical thinking. In fact, both are necessary for the full coherence and expression of

human thought.19

The only cause for friction between organic and logical thinking arises from

the attempt to bend organic concepts to a rigid logical consistency.

What factor or factors allow the concepts to interweave and cohere? Kadushin asserts

that, “the Rabbinic concepts are, in every instance, rooted in the Bible; there are biblical

antecedents for every Rabbinic concept,”20

although the actual terms (such as the recitation of

the Shema) are not always found there. However, the Rabbinic concepts have often developed

beyond their biblical antecedents, taking on a broader application and significance. “Compare,

for example, the manifold concretizations of the Sanctification of the Name [in Rabbinic

literature] with its biblical antecedent in Leviticus 22:32.21

The world of Rabbinic thought

developed from the Bible not so much as individual and discreet concepts but as a whole, as an

organism. It is as if we leave the Second Temple period when the Bible was being assembled and

enter a tunnel. When we emerge in the Rabbinic period, we see the Biblically-rooted order

17

Organic Thinking, p. 14. Kadushin explains how the organic nature of the rabbinic value-

complex allowed for its diverse and creative expression. But he gives us no tools for dealing with

the obviously distinct conceptual characteristics of various rabbinic texts – what, for example,

accounts for the conceptual and methodological difference between the Mishnah and the Bavli? 18

Organic Thinking, p. 14 19

Organic Thinking, p. 14 20

Commentary on Leviticus Rabba p. xi 21

Commentary on Leviticus Rabba p. xii

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developed into a distinct conceptual universe that can be identified as Rabbinic thought, the

product of the Rabbinic mind.

How does the Rabbinic mind reveal itself? Kadushin sees Rabbinic thought as ready to

spring into action at every opportunity. It is concretized, and expressed as fully as possible,

wherever it finds an opening. The organism is ready to express itself textually when triggered by

any narrative, event, or situation in the Bible that touches on its interests.22

Because of its highly

laconic style, the Bible is an ideal catalyst for the expression of Rabbinic thought.

What the Biblical narrative leaves to the imagination, the Rabbinic mind sees as an

opportunity for elaboration. The various concepts and sub-concepts are then applied in their

permutations and combinations. Genesis Rabbah 106:7, concerning the narrative of the Akeidah,

is one such passage:

“And the angel of the Lord called to him out of heaven, and said,

‘Abraham, Abraham.’” (Genesis 22:11) R. Hiyya taught: This is an expression of

love and encouragement. R. Liezer said, [The repetition of Abraham’s name

indicates that he spoke both] to him and to future generations. There is no

generation that does not contain men like Abraham. And there is no generation

which does not contain men like Jacob, Moses, and Samuel... “And he said: Lay

not your hand upon the young man, etc.” (22:12). Where was the knife? Tears

had fallen from the angels upon it and dissolved it. “Then I will strangle him,”

[Abraham] said to him. “Lay not your hand upon the young man.” was the reply.

“Let us bring forth a drop of blood from him,” he pleaded. “Neither do anything

to him, he answered.” Inflict no blemish upon him, “‘for now I know’ – I have

made it known to all – that you love me, ‘and you have not withheld, etc.’ And do

not say that all ills that do not affect one's own person are not ill. For indeed I

ascribe merit to you as though I had bidden you sacrifice yourself and you had not

refused.”

Thus, this one brief slice of narrative simultaneously expresses God’s Loving-

kindness, Israel, the Love of God, and Atonement.

22

Worship and Ethics p. 5

8

The same verse may also be used repeatedly, with emphasis by different authors – or

even the same author at different times – on different concepts. “A verse, the same verse, can be

used over and over again in haggadic interpretations, each of them independent of the others, and

thus a feature of haggadic interpretation is multiple interpretation of biblical texts.”23

God tested

Abraham in order to exalt him, that his Justice might be known in the world. 24

God tested

Abraham in order to improve him,25

expressing God’s Loving-kindness, or in order to vindicate

Abraham’s utter devotion to God,26

expressing the Love of God and a unique instance of the

Sanctification of the Name.

How can these various interpretations co-exist in the Rabbinic mind? It is not a matter of

constructing a meta-narrative that will account for divergence. Rather, Kadushin uncovers an

aspect of Rabbinic thought that he calls indeterminacy of belief, “a qualified or modified belief”

that exists within the rabbinic value-complex,27

ready to give credence to diverse and even

apparently conflicting narrative, or to interpretations that conflict with the plain sense of a

Biblical passage. How the Rabbinic mind attained this elasticity of belief we do not know. But as

long as the competing story or interpretation falls within the orbit of the Rabbinic value-

complex, it is given a credence that coexists comfortably with divergent statements. Neither can

we easily enter into this way of thinking. Yet it does seem to be the only way of explaining the

ability of the Rabbinic mind to encompass what are for us clearly conflicting and contradictory

narratives.

23

Approach to the Mekilta p. 21 24

Genesis Rabbah 106:1 25



The Rabbinic Mind 135

9

Although the body of Kadushin’s work delves into additional aspects of, and perspectives

on, the coherence and subtlety of Rabbinic thought,28

we will now focus on the place of

Haggadah and Halachah as expressions of the Rabbinic mind.

Haggadah and Halachah

Haggadah and Halachah – two seemingly disparate literary forms – are intimately related not

because they share a number of common attributes or even, in some cases, common authorship,

but because of their common possession and embodiment of the same organic web of Rabbinic

concepts.29

Although there are genuine distinctions between the two, their fundamental

connection in the conceptual realm allows haggadic and halakhic expressions and interpretations

to be juxtaposed and interwoven in some Rabbinic texts.30

Thus, in a typical development from

Biblical to Rabbinic thought, the word ger (as in Exodus 12:49) is understood to refer not to the

stranger but to the Proselyte. Since they express the same Rabbinic concepts, there is no marked

rift between haggadic stories and halakhic rulings about Proselytes.31

Haggadah and Halachah are two complementary expressions of Rabbinic thought. They

differ in many respects. And yet they also work together to express the organic network of

Rabbinic value-concepts and to ensure that these concepts are incarnated in the lives of the

Jewish people.

Virtually every haggadic story – full-blown or as brief as a line or two – expresses the

organic character of Rabbinic thought by embodying a number of Rabbinic concepts in a single

28

See especially The Rabbinic Mind p. 15-54, in which he discusses conceptual phases and

auxiliary ideas, such as Immanence and Transcendence 29

See Worship and Ethics, 9 and 148f 30

Approach to the Mekilta, 22 31

Approach to the Mekilta, 22

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narrative. Each story is unified because the concepts are woven together, apparently without

effort, into a seamless whole.32

According to the Rabbis, for example, Jonah thought: “I will go

outside the Land [of Israel], where the Shekinah does not reveal itself, for since the Gentiles [the

men of Nineveh are more inclined to repent, I might be causing Israel to be condemned [by

contrast].”33

Woven into this one statement are the concepts of Gilluy Shekinah (Revelation of

God), Israel, Gentiles, and Repentance.34

There is no sense of artificial construction undertaken

to relate these concepts. (See the discussion of Genesis Rabbah 106:7 above.)

Not only is each haggadic story a unified reflection of the organic nature of Rabbinic

thought, but each haggadic story is complete in itself, “an independent entity… Even in those

instances in which haggadic stories are connected to others, they are connected only through the

association of ideas,”35

collected and joined in literary forms that most likely stem from

haggadic-style preaching, in which stories were strung together on a common theme. 36

Despite

these larger literary forms found in the midrash collections, each story or statement is an entity in

itself, freestanding and organically whole.

Unlike Haggadah, Halachah is not composed of independent entities. The meaning of

Halachah is not expressed in discrete units. Rather, there is a connecting bond that unites the

halakhic material in Rabbinic literature. Kadushin calls this innate property of Halachah a “nexus

between the laws,”37

a nexus which becomes increasingly explicit as a result of logical processes.

Classification is one such process. The interrelations inherent in the halakhic nexus permit the

laws to be classified by subject matter – matters dealing with impurity in one order, festivals in

32

Approach to the Mekilta, 17, 19 33

Mekhilta, Tractate Piskha Aleph 34



The Rabbinic Mind, 62 37

The Rabbinic Mind, 93

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another, damages in still another, and so on.

The process of halakhic classification reveals the relatedness of the laws in any one order

and among the orders. The Mishnah, which is the first product of Rabbinic classification, made

the nexus partially explicit.38

It was made more fully explicit in the Talmud where the use of

highly subtle inferential reasoning exposes the relatedness among laws belonging to different

classifications or orders.39

“It is elicited in a discussion, for example, that an identical principle

underlies both a law concerning acquisition and a law in an entirely different classification

concerning the prohibited mixture of animals.”40

Despite the process of classification and inferential reasoning, Halachah also possesses

characteristics of organic thought. An act governed by Halakah is able to concretize a number of

value concepts simultaneously, particularly in acts of worship.41

The recitation of the Shema, for example, expresses at least three key, interlocking value-

concepts – the Kingdom of Heaven, Commandments, and the Study of Torah.42

Acceptance of

the Kingdom of Heaven (or Kingship of God) takes place when reciting the first verse of the first

section (Deut 6:4-11): “Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is One,” a declaration that

also implies the rejection of idolatry. Acceptance of the yoke of the Commandments takes place

38


Approach to the Mekilta, 23-24. Although Kadushin mentions the increasing elaboration of the

nexus of Halachah from Mishnah to Talmud, he does not account for increased halakhic rigidity

or for the suppression (in practice though not in literary preservation) of divergent halakhic

views as we move through the rabbinic period. In other words, why did Halachah became less

and less organic as we move from through the period? 40

Approach to the Mekilta, 24; see also The Rabbinic Mind, 91-93; also the nexus was later

elaborated more fully, its development can be seen in the process leading up to the final editing

of the Mishnah – see Judaism: The Mishnah, especially chapters 1 through 4 41

Worship and Ethics, 11 42

Worship and Ethics, 11-12

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when reciting the first verse of the second section (Deut 11:13-21): “And it shall come to pass if

ye shall hearken diligently unto my commandments which I command you this day.”

In the sequence of these passages, R. Joshua b. Korhah sees a logical relationship: ‘so

that a person shall first accept upon himself the yoke of the Kingship of Heaven, and after that

accept upon himself the yoke of Commandments.”43

The sequence of recitation reflects a

sequence in the very nature of things. Yet according R. Simeon b. Yohai, the sequence of these

passages in the Shema is due to another series of commitments – to learn Torah, to teach it, and

to practice it.44

The commitments expressed in the Shema are logically coherent and its

recitation, shaped by Halachah, is thus a unified act that simultaneously expresses a number of

value-concepts.45

In the area of Biblical interpretation we also see both similarity and difference between

Haggadah and Halachah.

In Haggadah, a biblical phrase or verse may receive various interpretations, none of them

considered more authoritative than the others.46

Because of the Rabbinic capacity for

“indeterminacy of belief” (as explained above), they are not seen as being in conflict with one

another. An example of this is found in Exodus Rabbah 27, which gives nine diverse

interpretations of “And Jethro... heard” (Exodus18:1). Many of these interpretations result from

seeing Jethro as the reference of texts in such diverse books as Psalms 145:18; Psalms 14:4;

Proverbs 3:35; Jeremiah 16:19; Job 31:32; and Ecclesiastes 11:1. Within the chapter, there is no

sense of tension between these interpretations.

43

Mishnah Berachot II.2 44

Sifre on Numbers 15:39 45



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Moreover, Rabbinic texts confirm the equality of interpretations when they preface a

statement by the term, “another interpretation,” as we read numerous times in the

aforementioned chapter of Exodus Rabbah. “‘Another interpretation’ can only mean that the

preceding interpretations, as well as that about to be given, are each independent of the others

[although related organically in thought] and that all are of the same rank. And this prefatory

term is employed profusely throughout midrashic literature.”47

Because there is no demand for consistency among the various interpretations of

Scripture, even the same individual may offer more than one interpretation of a passage. For

instance, in Genesis Rabbah 70:8, R. Hama bar Hanina presents six consecutive interpretations of

Genesis 29:2-3.48

In Haggadah, the biblical text acts as stimulus to the resulting haggadic story. The

haggadic imagination is given great play in explicating the biblical text and relating it to other

texts. However, the haggadic understanding of a word, phrase, or incident must have some

connection, even if quite slender, with the plain meaning of the text. Sometimes that connection

is a mere play on words. “And you shalt have a paddle among your weapons (azeneka)”

(Deuteronomy 23:14); read not ‘azeneka but ‘ozneka (your ears) – if a man hears a thing that is

not proper, let him put a finger in his ears.”49

Often the lack of vowels in the written Hebrew text

is a stimulus to such word play, resulting in this oft repeated “Read not... but....”

There are also halakhic interpretations that exhibit the midrashic characteristics of

Haggadah, being related to biblical texts by nothing more than word play, bare sequence of

words, or doubtful relationship with another text. However, it should be noted, it is for these very

47



Ketubot 5a-b in The Rabbinic Mind, 118

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characteristics that objections are sometimes voiced to this type of interpretation serving

Halachah. For example, when R. Eliezer employed a midrashic interpretation of Leviticus 13:47

in halakhic discourse, his colleague R. Ishmael exclaimed, “You say to the verse, “Keep silent

until I interpret [you]!” The root of his objection is that, in theory at least, Halachah should rest

only on straightforward exegesis.50

Kadushin asserts that, in most cases, a slender connection between a biblical text and a

Halachah is a good indicator that the Halachah in question was practiced before it was connected

with the biblical text.51

Such is the derivation of the morning, afternoon, and evening prayers

from verses in Genesis relating to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Another example are various

‘biblical” reasons given for the number of blessings in the Amidah, which number had already

been established.52

The practices involved were long-standing, but the developing nexus of

halakhic thought required a basis in Scripture, and so one (or more) had to be found.

It was much less common to develop new Halachah using the looser methodology of

Haggadah. But such practice was not unknown. The Mekilta is a work emanating from one

school, that of R. Ishmael. Nevertheless, it contains numerous differences of opinion with regard

to the derivation of laws, and a significant number of divergent opinions on actual matters of

practice.53

Occasionally, two different halakhot are derived from the same verse, the second

interpretation usually being prefaced with the words, “another interpretation,” the very term

which introduces alternative haggadic interpretations of a verse.54

50

Sifra to Leviticus 13:47 in The Rabbinic Mind, 127 51




Approach to the Mekilta, 24-25

15

The Biblical text normally acts as a more straightforward catalyst to Halachah. Such is

the case with verses dealing with the multitude of ethical, commercial, and ritual laws found in

Torah, including those involving festivals and holy days. An example of this would be Mishnah

Tractate Pesachim, which is largely an expanded, text-based response to Exodus 12:1-28, with

some secondary amplification. 55

Halachah is not only stimulated by biblical texts. The Halakhic process is aroused and

sustained by an impetus to use logical procedures – such as inference, comparison, analogy, and

argumentation – to expand existing Halachah, beginning with its base in Scripture, to apply to

every facet of life.56

Kadushin refers here to the development of the halakhic principle of agency.

According to Torah, “every man” should take a lamb for his household for Passover (Ex 12:3).

But this is modified in the very next verse: “and if the household is too small for a lamb, then he

and his neighbor… shall take one according to the number of people” (Ex 12:4). The

commandment is for every man, and yet it is not necessary for each to take or buy a lamb for

himself. It was thus deduced that a man’s agent is like the man himself. This principle of agency,

with its profound implications for commercial and family law, is not given explicitly in the

Biblical text, but is legitimized by inferential reasoning.57

Whether a specific law was stimulated by a text or by the use of logical procedures, the

organic elasticity of Rabbinic thought left ample room for differences of opinion in Halachah.

The Mishnah is replete with halakhic controversy, much of it unresolved. In fact, the Mishnah

55

“Pesachim as we know it simply restates and carries forward what is explicit in Scripture.”

Judaism: The Mishnah, 186 56

The Rabbinic Mind, 126; Approach to The Mekilta, 23 57

The Rabbinic Mind, 123-124

16

contains only six complete chapters in which no controversy is recorded. The halakhic

midrashim show similar characteristics.58

The Mishnah’s unresolved controversies do not relate only to matters of theory or

abstract interpretation. They often reveal actual divergence in practice. Apparently, it was not

only the right but also the responsibility of one authority to stand against the majority. For this

reason, it is often the case that a single sage is able to hold to an opinion contrary to all of his

colleagues.

Kadushin quotes Louis Ginzberg: “Hence we need not wonder at the many conflicts of

opinion among the Rabbis from the days of Shammai and Hillel to the close of the Mishnah. Not

only could each of the Rabbis differ from the majority when dealing with theoretical questions,

but the individual authority could decide according to his own opinion without regard to the

opinion of the majority in any specific case that came before him, outside of those matters

already decided by The Great Court.”59

Another aspect of Rabbinic thought that Kadushin observed was the powerful drive of the

value-concepts toward expression. “They could not be left abstract. Every Rabbinic value-

concept had a drive toward actualization or concretization”60

in both words and in action.

Haggadah, Kadushin asserts, is “the most important product of the value-concepts’ drive

toward concretization.”61

The value-concepts were powerfully manifested in story form. The

midrashim, the haggadic stories - either collected separately or interspersed with halakhic

58


Louis Ginzberg, A Commentary on the Palestinian Talmud, I, 82-83 quoted in The Rabbinic

Mind, 95. Later, the differences and divergence were increasingly limited by the strong

propensity of the Talmudic mind to demonstrate the utter unity and seamlessmness of Jewish

law. 60



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thought - expressed the value-concepts in ways that captured the imagination, making them vivid

and powerful to the people at large.62

Haggadah brought to life both individual value-concepts

and the totality of the Rabbinic matrix of value-concepts. It nurtured and cultivated them in the

thought life of the people, without ever having to define its terms dictionary-style. Haggadah

made the value-concepts vivid, and by means of sermons, nurtured and cultivated them.63

Haggadah is the textual or literary expression of the value complex. It “concretized the value-

concepts and made them determinate in textual interpretation [and narrative.]64

By incisively

expressing an interwoven fabric of Rabbinic concepts in simple, seamless stories, Haggadah was

the clearest expression of the organic nature of Rabbinic thought.65

Halachah served an altogether different function. It prescribed concrete ways for the

value-concepts to be incarnated in the fabric of daily life, beyond interpretation and story. It is

one thing to read about the concept of visiting the sick (as in Genesis Rabbah 8:13, which depicts

God visiting Abraham as he recovered from his circumcision). It is quite another to fulfill the

Commandments by visiting a sick person oneself.66

Where Haggadah inculcated the value-concepts in the imagination of the people,

Halachah nurtured and cultivated the value-concepts by embodying them in ritual, worship, and

ethics.67

As Martin S. Jaffee puts it, “in The Rabbinic Mind [Kadushin] attributed to the halakhic

system a central role in transforming the ethical values of Judaism from potency to actuality, or

from sentiments or traits of mind into concrete acts expressive of the organic system as a

62



Max Kadushin: Scholar, 344 65


Max Kadushin: Scholar, 345 67


18

whole.68

The concept of Charity, for example, was made concrete by the various agricultural

regulations, including the tithes for the poor, peah (corner of the field), gleaning, and forgotten

sheaves, as well as by the institutions of tamchuy (community place) and khuppah (community

chest) and by the laws concerning personal charity.69

Lacking Halachah, the value-concepts, with their need for steady concretization in actual

life, might not have functioned at all. However, Kadushin contends that Halachah was not simply

a calculated, “legalistic” means of promoting the value-concepts. Unless we “realize that they are

concretizations of warmly felt values, we shall completely fail to apprehend [the inner significance

of] such outward actions. For here we are dealing with the springs of human actions, in other

words, with the self, wherein inner experience and outward action are hardly separable.”70

Because of the strong internalization of the Rabbinic value-concepts, we should not be

surprised that the system of halakhic norms did not exhaust the drive of the value-complex

toward concretization in daily life. Halachah did not crowd out the possibility for spontaneous

concretization. For example, the concept of Deeds of Loving-kindness includes not only required

actions of Charity but also unconstrained deeds of love done beyond what is required by Torah.71

This halachic process of concretization is powerfully demonstrated in the dynamics of

Jewish prayer. “Halakah governs Rabbinic worship. It determines not only the occasions and the

forms of the various acts of worship but the content of the acts as well.”72

“Halakhah gives

68

In “Halakhic Personhood,” Understanding the Rabbinic Mind, 96 69




Worship and Ethics, 9

19

regularity and steadiness to the drive toward concretization possessed by the concept of prayer,

enlarges the scope of its expression, and supplies the means for its expression.”73

It is due to Halachah that prayer is regular and steady rather than haphazard and random.

“It is Halachah that makes of every occasion on which a person eats or drinks a stimulus for

prayer.”74

It is Halachah that provokes prayer according to the time of day, the days of the week,

the month, the Holy Days. And within all this prayer, the diversity of the organic complex of

Rabbinic value-concepts is expressed with beauty and power.

Returning to the recitation of the Shema – it is because of the halakhic requirement to

recite the Shema twice daily that its value-concepts of the Kingdom of God, Commandments,

and the Study of Torah are guaranteed a consistent and lifelong embodiment. Even the inner

motivational aspects of the recitation of the Shema are partly governed by Halachah.75

The

recitation of the Shema requires Kavvanah, a term best expressed by such words as intention,

devotion, and concentration. According to the opinion of R. ‘Akiba,76

this Kavvanah is required

for the entire first section of the Shema (Deut 6:4-11). The first verse, however, “Hear, Oh

Israel…”, which is the declaration of the Kingdom of God and the accepting of its yoke, is

distinguished by special instructions with respect to Kavvanah.77

The last word of the declaration

– echad – is to be lengthened in enunciation so as to allow enough time for one “to make Him

King above and below and in the four directions of heaven”78

73

Kadushin’s account of the rabbinic value-concepts’ inherent “drive toward concretization,”

especially in Halachah, does not adequately factor in such motivations as the desire fully to obey

God and the striving for merit. It seems to me that these would also play a significant role in the

drive toward concretization, toward an extensive, integrated, and definitive daily practice of

Torah. 74



Berachot 13.a-b 77


Berachot 13b

20

Conclusion

How could such variety, diversity of interpretation, and strong controversy exist in Rabbinic

Judaism without producing fissures between the parties concerned? Kadushin found that such

disagreements, such divergent interpretations and halakhot, could be tolerated because all parties

involved shared the same conceptual universe, the organic complex of rabbinic value-concepts.

Biblical interpretation, Haggadah, and Halakhah could just as easily trend one way as another, as

long as they stayed within the same complex of organic thought.

As Messianic Jewish thought gels into a coherent world-view, we may find that it also is

expressed within an organic conceptual universe. If that is so, then our discourse will show

increasing signs of organic, rather than systematic, thinking. Perhaps our progress toward that

goal would be enhanced by a deeper study not only of Kaddushin, but also of the Rabbinic texts

whose organic nature he unveiled.

References

Kadushin, Max. A Conceptual Approach to the Mekilta. New York: The Jewish Theological

Seminary, 1969.

Kadushin, Max, A Conceptual Commentary on Midrash Leviticus Rabbah. Atlanta: Scholars

Press, 1987.

Kadushin, Max. Organic Thinking: A Study in Rabbinic Thought. New York: The Jewish

Theological Seminary, 1938.

Kadushin, Max. The Rabbinic Mind. New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary, 1965.

Kadushin, Max. The Theology of Seder Eliahu: A Study in Organic Thinking. New York: Bloch

Publishing Company, 1932

Kadushin, Max. Worship and Ethics: A Study in Rabbinic Judaism. Evanston: Northwestern

University Press, 1964

Neusner, Jacob, Judaism: The Evidence of the Mishnah. Atlanta: Scholar’s Press, 1988.

Ochs, Peter, ed. Understanding the Rabbinic Mind: Essays on the Hermeneutic of Max

Kadushin. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990.

Steinberg, Theodore. Max Kadushin: Scholar of Rabbinic Judaism. New York: New York

University, 1979.

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Kinbar ~ Kaddushin

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