6/26/15 11:31 PM2. RANCE v. NLRCFacts:A CBA was wntered into on April 30, 1981 by and between respondents Polybag Manufacturing Corpo and Polybag Workers Union one of which is a stipulation that the former may dismiss any employeeif they would join other organization aside from the existing one. Petitioners were among the 125 members of the respondent union who were expelled by the latter for disloyalty in that they allegedly joined the NAFLUa large federation. Because of the expulsion, petitioners were dismissed by Respondent Corporation. Petitioners contend that the requisites of due process were not complied with in that, there was no impartial tribunal or union body vested with authority to conduct the disciplinary proceeding under the union constitution and by-laws, and, that complainants were not furnished notice of the charge against them, nor timely notices of the hearings on the samePetitioners sued for reinstatement and backwages stating their dismissal was without due process. Losing both in the decisions of the NL Arbiter and NLRC, they elevated their cause to the SCIssue:w/o the dismissal was due to a just cause.

Held: The court held that the dismissal was made in bad faith There was indeed connivance between the corporation and the Union. The facts show that even if the workers sought help from the union, they were disregarded by the leaders, who were not dismissed.Their plights were no heeded by the corporation. Therefore, the main recourse is to seek help from NAFLU, but such act did not authorize the federation (NAFLU) to represent them. Nor is it an act of disloyalty based on the CBA.The members did not even sign documents to prove the allegations. In fact it is a mere act of preserving what they have; their jobs. The state recognizes the right of the workers to security of tenure and they may not be terminated without just cause, which in this case was absent.It is the policy of the state to assure the right of workers to "security of tenure" (Article XIII, Sec. 3 of the New Constitution, Section 9, Article II of the 1973 Constitution). The guarantee is an act of social justice. When a person has no property, his job may possibly be his only possession or means of livelihood. Therefore, he should be protected against any arbitrary deprivation of his job. Article 280 of the Labor Code has construed security of tenure as meaning that "the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by" the code.In the case at bar, the scandalous haste with which respondent corporation dismissed 125 employees lends credence to the claim that there was connivance between respondent corporation and respondent Union. It is evident that private respondents were in bad faith in dismissing petitioners. They, the private respondents, are guilty of unfair labor practice.RULING:PREMISES CONSIDERED, (1) the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC-NCR-11-6881-82 dated April 26, 1984 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and (2) respondent corporation is ordered: (1) to reinstate petitioners to their former positions without reduction in rank, seniority and salary; (b) to pay petitioners three-year backwages, without any reduction or qualification, jointly and solidarily with respondent Union; and (c) to pay petitioners exemplary damages of P500.00 each. Where reinstatement is no longer feasible, respondent corporation and respondent union are solidarily ordered to pay, considering their length of service their corresponding separation pay and other benefits to which they are entitled under the law.

3. Bondoc vs. PEOPLE'S BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDSFacts:Domingo F. Bondoc (Petitioner), ), joined the People's Bank and Trust Company on October 1, 1966.Bondoc was chosen by the bank's board of directors on February 21, 1967 as the first manager of the bank's department of economic research and statistics which was organized in January, 1967That department had only four employeesOn May 15, 1973, Bondoc reported in writing to Manuel Chuidian, a bank director, certain anomalies committed by the officers of the bank. The Central Bank found that some officers of the bank utilized its found for their own intereststhe board of directors of the People's Bank, the board of directors of the People's BankBondoc was advised of the abolition of his department in the later part of September, 1973

On November 2, 1973, the People's Bank, pursuant to section 11 of Presidential Decree No. 21 (creating the ad hoc National Labor Relations Commission), applied with the Secretary of Labor for clearance to terminate Bondoc's services effective on November 5He filed in the NLRC his opposition to the termination his services. He alleged in his opposition that he was dismissed without causeAs all efforts for the amicable settlement of the case were fruitless, it was submitted for compulsory arbitration.Bondoc tried to prove that the abolition of his position was a reprisal for his aforementioned exposure of some anomalies in the bankthe (1)NLRC ARBITRATOR recommended to the Secretary of Labor the denial of the application to terminate Bondoc's employment and ordered the People's Bank to reinstate him with backwages from November 16, 1973 and with allowances and other benefits guaranteed by law and without loss of status and seniority rightsOn appeal, the (2)NLRC in its decision of January 21, 1975 reversed the decision of the arbitrartor, approved the clearance for Bondoc's dismissal and ordered the People's Bank to pay him seventy five percent (75%) of his monthly salary for every year of service in lieu of one-half month salary for every year of service fixed in the Termination Pay Law, Republic Act No. 1052, as amended by Republic Act no. 1787reason to justify the abolition of Bondoc's position (1) the fact that his position as manager being confidential in character, the bank had the rperogative to terminate his employment anytimel (2) Bondoc's department was nolonger necessary to the efficient operation of the bank in view of the merger; (3) the management is not precluded from undertakings a reorganization or making changes to meet the demands of the present and (4) in case of mergers, departments or position may be abolished or new ones created, as the necessity for them requiresBondoc appealed to the (3) Secretary of Labor, reversed the NLRC's decision on the grounds that the motivation for the termination of Bondoc's services was not taken into account by the NLRC and that the People's Bank should not have abolished Bondoc's department without prior clearance.ordered the People's Bank to reinstate Bondoc to his former position or any substantially equivalent position with backwages equivalent to his salary for six months, it being undrstood that the Bank of the P.I. has assumred all the liabilities and obligations of the People's Bankdenied the application for clearance to dismiss BondocRespondent appealed to the President of the Philippines, on the grounds relied upon in that appeal was that Bondoc was convicted of bigamy, a crime involving moral turpitude The Bank of P.I. cited Central Bank Circular No. 356, which disqualifies a person convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude from becoming an officer of a bankIn a decision dated May 17, 1976, Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave set aside the decisions of the arbitrator and the Secretary and confirmed in toto the NLRC's decisionPresident held that under the Termination Pay Law an employment without a definite period may be terminated with or without a cause, that the abolition of Bondoc's position was a necessary incident of the merger of the two banks and that his services were no longer indispensable to them. hence, the clearance for his removal was authorized for his removal was authorizedPetitioner filed a petition to (5) review the decision of the President,

Issue:1. w/o the termination of Bondocs employment was with just cause2. The petitioner invokes the policy of the State to assure the right of "workers" to security of tenureHeld:1.Under the peculiar or particular facts of this case the termination of bondoc's employment was lawful and justified and that no grave abuse of discretion was lawful and justified and that no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction was committed by the Presidential Executive Assistant in affirming the NLRC's decision sustaining their termination of his employment.Bondoc was not employed for a fixed period. He held his position of department manager at the pleasure of the bank's board of directors. He occupied a managerial position and his stay in therein depended on his retention of the trust and confidence of the management and whether there was any need for his services.Although some vindictive motivation might have impelled the aboliton of his position, yet, it is undeniable that the bank's board of directors possessed the power to remove him and to determine whether the interest of the bank justified the existence of his department.Under the old Termination Pay Law, it was held that in the absence of a contract of employment for a specific period the employer has the right to dismiss his employees at anytime with or without just causeIt may be noted that under Policy Instructions No. 8 of the Secretary of Labor "the employer is not required to obtain a previous written clearnace to terminate managerial employees in order to enable him to manage effectively".2. That guarantee is an act of social justice. When a person has no property, his job may possibly be his only possession or means of livelihood. Therefore, he should be protected against any arbitrary and unjust deprivation of his job.Article 280 of the Labor Code has construed security of tenure as referring to regular employment and as meaning that "the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by" the Code.As already noted above, the facts of this case do not warrant the conclusion that Bondoc's right to security of tenure was oppressively abridged. He knew all along that his tenure as a department manager rested in the discretion of the bank's board of directors and that at anytime his services might be dispensed with or his position might be abolished

Ruling:

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Presidential Executive Assistant is affirmed with the modification that the Bank of the P.I. should pay to the petitioner separation pay equivalent to his salary and allowances (if any) for seven months.

4. PHILIPPINE MOVIE PICTURES WORKERS' ASSOCIATION, vs. PREMIERE PRODUCTIONS, INC.

Facts: In October 1951, Premiere Productions, Inc. (PPI) filed a petition with the Court of Industrial relations (CIR) seeking authority to lay-off 44 workers on the ground of financial losses. on the ground that it was losing in the operation of its business.The union therein (Philippine Movie Pictures Workers Association) opposed the petition as it averred that PPI is merely retaliating against employees who joined a previous strike.Judge Arsenio Roldan of the CIR then conducted an ocular inspection. The inspection was attended by counsels for both parties. The judge inspected some records and interrogated some witnesses. The counsels for both parties were granted opportunities to cross examine in said ocular inspection. Thereafter, Judge Roldan granted PPI the authority to lay-off the 44 workers.After shutting the studios, the company filed another petition with the CIR for permission or authority to lease its equipments, studios, and other facilities to Eddie Infante, Braulio Calma and others.The association objected to the proposed lease on the ground that it was an attempt by the company to make use of its properties through other persons which would mean disturbance of the status quo while the dispute between the association and the company was pending.Then the company filed a motion to withdraw its petition saying that it was convinced that the lease of its properties was a mere exercise of its proprietary rights, and that court permission was unnecessary.The motion was granted.The company filed 3 petitions with the CIR for permission or authority to lease its equipments, studios, and other facilities The association filed 3 urgent petitions with the CIR, incidental case No. 98 V-8, for contempt and for injunction on the ground that the company had no right to remove its equipment from its studios to be leasedAfter the company had answered the three petitions for contempt and injunction, by agreement of the parties, these three incidental cases were heard jointly. During the hearing held before Presiding Judge Roldan and in the presence of one Martin Dolorico, a Commissioner of the CIR, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts and stated therein their respective contention, after which, both parties submitted the cases for decision without further evidence. This was on October 7, 1952. In the meantime, on April 18, 1953, the association filed a "Supplemental petition to annul lease contracts and for contempt of court and for injunction"The association filed a "Motion for production of document" under section 1, Rule 21, of the Rules of CourtThereafter, Commissioner Martin Dolorico filed his report, which report was approved and completely adopted by Judge Roldanwherein he found that the leases of the equipment, studios and other properties of the movie company to third parties were not simulated but genuineAs to the supplemental petition to annul he lease contracts and for contempt of court and for injunction filed on April 18, 1953 and the motion filed on June 14thJudge Roldan held that they would be heard separately from the incidental cases, for purposes of expediency. The decision ended by denying the three petitions for injunction and for contempt of court.Upon motion for reconsideration by the association and over the opposition of the companythe CIR in banc by resolution dated November 13, 1953, reconsidered the decision aforementioned and set it aside, as premature, saying that before rendering a final decision, the court should have awaited further presentation of evidence on the supplemental petition of April 18, 1953, "so that all ingredients for the proper disposal of the case would have been complete."ISSUE:Whether or not an ocular inspection may be the basis, without receiving full evidence, of determining the cause or motive of laying off employees.

HELD:No. An ocular inspection does not satisfy the procedural requirement. The petition for lay-off was predicated on the lack of work and of the further fact that the company was incurring financial losses these allegations cannot be proven simply by an ocular inspection. The parties, especially the workers in this case, should not be deprived of their opportunity to present evidence they may deem necessary to establish their case in the main trial. Here, the main trial is absent because all that was conducted was an ocular inspection such is tantamount to a deprivation of their right to be heard. It is recognized that ones employment, profession, or trade, or calling, is a property right and the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong. Therefore, the dismissal of the 44 workers without opportunity to be heard is a violation of their property right.The association has now filed these petitions for review by certiorari, not only of the decision of Judge Roldan but also of the resolution of the majority of the CIR, to set the same aside, and for the rendition of another decision holding the leases entered into by the movie company to be illegal and that the company and its officers and agents be held to have committed contempt of court in entering into those leases without authority of the CIR.The majority of the Tribunal believe that it is unnecessary to go into the merits of the present cases, because the resolution of the majority of the CIR setting aside the decision of Judge Roldan, left the cases without any decision to appeal from, and that said resolution is in the nature of a mere interlocutory order, which is not subject to appeal.

RULING:In view of the foregoing, these petitions for certiorari are hereby denied, and the cases are ordered remanded to the CIR for further proceedings. No costs.

5. Masing & Sons Development Corporation (MSDC) v RogelioGR No. 161787April 27, 2011

FACTS: Rogelio is an employee of the Ibajay branch of MSDC, with Lim as Branch Manager. In 1991, he availed himself of the SSS retirement benefits, and in order to facilitate the grant of such benefits, he entered into an internal arrangement with Chan and MSDC to the effect that MSDC would issue a certification of his separation from employment notwithstanding that he would continue working as a laborer in the Ibajay branch but it was only on 1997 that Rogelio was paid his last salary but without retirement benefits, he was 67 years old at that time.

Rogelio then filed the case for payment of his retirement benefits before the Labor Arbiter. MSDC defense is that they were not engaged in copra buying in Ibajay and they did not ever register in such business in any government agency and that Lim is an independent copra buyer.

LA: dismissed. no employer-employee relationship between Rogelio & MSDC. NLRC: dismissed. no double retirement in the private sector. CA: granted. Rogelio is an employee of Chan and MSDC, benefits under RA 7641 is apart from the retirement benefits that a qualified employee could claim under the Social Security Law.

Hence, Masing appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: WON Rogelio had remained the Company's employee from July 6, 1989 up to March 17, 1997; WON Rogelio is entitled to retirement benefits.

HELD: YES, Rogelio is entitled to retirement benefits.

Even if there is a Certification of Separation from Employment dated August 10, 1991, "... in light of the incontrovertible physical reality that petitioner and his co-workers did go to work day in and day out for such a long period of time, doing the same thing, and in the same place, without apparent discontinuity, except on paper, these documents cannot be taken at their face value."

In case of doubt, the doubt is resolved in favor of labor, in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer as mandated by Article 1702 of the Civil Code. The reality of the petitioner's toil speaks louder than words.

RATIO:(1) In any controversy between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence are resolved in favor of the laborer.(2) The beneficent provisions of Article 287 of the Labor Code, is apart from the retirement benefits that can be claimed by a qualified employee under the social security law.(3) The benefits was enacted as a labor protection measure and as a curative statute to respond, in part at least, to the financial well-being of workers during their twilight years soon following their life of labor, can be extended not only from the date of its enactment but retroactively to the time the employment contracts started."

APPLICABLE LAWS:"ART. 287. Retirement. Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age establishedin the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract.

"In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining agreement and other agreements:

Provided, however, That an employee's retirement benefits under any collective bargaining and other agreements shall not be less than those provided herein.

"In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year."

"Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term 'one-half (1/2) month salary' shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves. "Retail, service and agricultural establishments or operations employing not more than ten (10) employees or workers are exempted from the coverage of this provision.

"Violation of this provision is hereby declared unlawful and subject to the penal provisions provided under Article 288 of this Code."

6. Asian Transmission Corporation v. CA Holiday Pay

Facts: On March 11 1993, DOLE issued an Explanatory Bulletin stating that employees are entitled 200% of their basic wage on April 9 1993, whether unworked, since that day, apart from being a Good Friday, (legal holiday) is also Araw nag Kagitingan (a legal holiday also.Despite the explanatory bulletin, Asian Transmission Corp. opted to pay on April 9, 1998. Thus, Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATLU protested.In accordance with Step 6 of the grievance procedure of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) existing between petitioner and BATLUthe controversy was submitted for voluntary arbitrationOffice of the Voluntary Arbitarator:Directed the Asian Transmission Corp. to pay its covered employees 200% of their regular daily waged for unworked April 19, 1998 which covers regular holiday. CAUpheld the findings of the Voluntary Arbitrator, holding that the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between petitioner and BATLU, the law governing the relations between them, clearly recognizes their intent to consider Araw ng Kagitingan and Maundy Thursday, on whatever date they may fall in any calendar year, as paid legal holidays during the effectivity of the CBA and that "[t]here is no condition, qualification or exception for any variance from the clear intent that all holidays shall be compensated.""in the absence of an explicit provision in law which provides for [a] reduction of holiday pay if two holidays happen to fall on the same day, any doubt in the interpretation and implementation of the Labor Code provisions on holiday pay must be resolved in favor of labor."ISSUE: W/o employees are entitled to 200% of their daily basic wage when 2 legal holidays fall on the same day.

HELD: YESArticle 94 of the Labor Code, as amended, affords a worker the enjoyment of ten paid regular holidays (inclusive of 1. New Years Day January 1

2. Maundy Thursday Movable Date

3. Good Friday Movable Date

4. Araw ng Kagitingan April 9 (Bataan and Corregidor Day)

5. Labor Day May 1

6. Independence Day June 12

7. National Heroes Day Last Sunday of August

8. Bonifacio Day November 30

9. Christmas Day December 25

10. Rizal Day December 30Holiday pay is a statutory benefit demandable uner the law. Since a worker is entitled to the enjoyment of ten (10) paid regular holidays, the fact that two holidays fall on the same date should not operate to reduce to nice the ten holiday pay benefits a worker is entitled to receive. Holiday pay is a legislated benefit enacted as part of the Constitutional imperative that the State shall afford protection to labor.7 Its purpose is not merely "to prevent diminution of the monthly income of the workers on account of work interruptions. In other words, although the worker is forced to take a rest, he earns what he should earn, that is, his holiday pay."8 It is also intended to enable the worker to participate in the national celebrations held during the days identified as with great historical and cultural significanceUnlike a bonus, which is a management prerogative,12 holiday pay is a statutory benefit demandable under the law.It is elementary, under the rules of statutory construction, that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says.In the case at bar, there is nothing in the law which provides or indicates that the entitlement to ten days of holiday pay shall be reduced to nine when two holidays fall on the same day.In any event, Art. 4 of the Labor Code provides that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of its provisions, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor. For the working mans welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration.16Moreover, Sec. 11, Rule IV, Book III of the Omnibus Rules to Implement the Labor Code provides that "Nothing in the law or the rules shall justify an employer in withdrawing or reducing any benefits, supplements or payments for unworked regular holidays as provided in existing individual or collective agreement or employer practice or policyFrom the pertinent provisions of the CBA entered into by the parties, petitioner had obligated itself to pay for the legal holidays as required by law. Only an employee who works on the day immediately preceding or after a regular holiday shall be entitled to the holiday pay.RULING:The petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA is devoid of merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED

7. IBAA E U vs Inciong

Facts:

On June 20, 1975, the Union filed a complaint against the bank for the payment of holiday pay before the then Department of Labor, National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Office IV in Manila. Conciliation having failed, and upon the request of both parties, the case was certified for arbitration on 7 July 1975. The records disclosed that employees of respondent bank were not paid their wages on unworked regular holidays as mandated by the Code, particularly Article 208Art. 208.Right to holiday pay.

(a)Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than 10 workers.

(b)The term "holiday" as used in this chapter, shall include: New Year's Day, Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, the ninth of April the first of May, the twelfth of June, the fourth of July, the thirtieth of November, the twenty-fifth and the thirtieth of December and the day designated by law for holding a general election.

On 25 August 1975, (1) Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano rendered a decision in the above-entitled case, granting petitioners complaint for payment of holiday pay. Respondent bank did not appeal from the said decision. Instead, it complied with the order of the Labor Arbiter by paying their holiday pay up to and including January 1976.On 16 December 1975, Presidential Decree 850 was promulgated amending, among others, the provisions of the Labor Code on the right to holiday pay. Accordingly, on 16 February 1976, by authority of Article 5 of the same Code, the Department of Labor (now Ministry of Labor) promulgated the rules and regulations for the implementation of holidays with pay. The controversial section thereof reads as Status of employees paid by the month. Employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not. On 23 April 1976, Policy Instruction 9 was issued by the then Secretary of Labor (now Minister) interpreting the above-quoted rule. The bank, by reason of the ruling laid down by the rule implementing Article 94 of the Labor Code and by Policy Instruction 9, stopped the payment of holiday pay to an its employees.

On 30 August 1976, the Union filed a motion for a writ of execution to enforce the arbiters decision of 25 August 1975, which the bank opposed. On 18 October 1976, the Labor Arbiter, instead of issuing a writ of execution, issued an order enjoining the bank to continue paying its employees their regular holiday pay. On 17 November 1976, the bank appealed from the order of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. On 20 June 1978, the NLRC promulgated its resolution en banc dismissing the banks appeal, and ordering the issuance of the proper writ of execution. On 21 February 1979, the bank filed with the Office of the Minister of Labor a motion for reconsideration/appeal with urgent prayer to stay execution. On 13 August 1979,s the NLRC issued an order directing the Chief of Research and Information of the Commission to compute the holiday pay of the IBAA employees from April 1976 to the present in accordance with the Labor Arbiter dated 25 August 1975. On 10 November 1979, the Office of the Minister of Labor, through Deputy Minister Amado G. Inciong, issued an order setting aside the resolution en banc of the NLRC dated 20 June 1978, and dismissing the case for lack of merit. Hence, the petition for certiorari charging Inciong with abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether the Ministry of Labor is correct in determining that monthly paid employees are excluded from the benefits of holiday pay.

Held:

From Article 92 of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree 850, and Article 82 of the same Code, it is clear that monthly paid employees are not excluded from the benefits of holiday pay. However, the implementing rules on holiday pay promulgated by the then Secretary of Labor excludes monthly paid employees from the said benefits by inserting, under Rule IV, Book Ill of the implementing rules, Section 2, which provides that: employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not. Even if contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive officers whose duty is to enforce it is given great weight by the courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, the same must be declared as null and void. So long, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid. Where an administrative order betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the Act, the mandate of the Act must prevail and must be followed. A rule is binding on the Courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom. Further, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.In the case at bar, the provisions of the Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay are clear and explicit - it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion from the benefits. In Policy Instruction No. 9, the then Secretary of Labor went as far as to categorically state that the benefit is principally intended for daily paid employees, when the law clearly states that every worker shall be paid their regular holiday pay. This is a flagrant violation of the mandatory directive of Article 4 of the Labor Code, which states that "All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.

RULING:

The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the order of the Deputy Minister of Labor, and reinstated the 25 August 1975 decision of the Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano.

8. Land and Housing Development Corporation vs EsquilloFacts:[Respondent] Marianito C. Esquillo was hired as a structural engineer by [Petitioner] ABV Rock Group (ABV) based in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. He commenced employment on July 27, 1989, with an initial monthly salary of US$1,000.00 that was gradually increased, on account of his good performance and the annual renewal of his employment contract, until it reached US$1,300.00. Private respondent Land & Housing Development Corporation (LHDC), a local placement agency, facilitated [respondents] employment papers.

[respondents] employment contract was supposed to be valid until July 26, 1995, it was pre-terminated, through an Inter-Office Memo on Notice of Termination, dated November 17, 1994, allegedly, for the reason, reduction of force. Petitioner however, claims that the reason adduced was negated by the fact that a lot of transferees from other sites were taken in and promotions as well as re-classifications in the lower ranks were done as shown by the list of fifteen (15) transferees from Riyadh effective November 5, 1994, as well as letters of promotion and re-classification. He further claimed that [Petitioner] ABV maliciously confiscated his iqama or resident visa despite the fact that it was [respondents] previous employer, FEAL IBC., which secured his iqama. Consequently, [respondent] was prevented from getting another job in Jeddah.Respondent subsequently received the amount of twenty-three thousand, one hundred fifty-three Saudi Riyals (SR23,153.00) from [Petitioner] ABV, as final settlement of his claims and was issued an exit visa that required him to immediately go back to the Philippines.[respondent] filed a complaint for breach of contract and/or illegal dismissal, before the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration which was referred to the National Labor Relations Commission, Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch No. IV, San Pablo City[petitioners] maintained that [respondents] dismissal was for valid cause, that is, reduction of force. Due to the Gulf War, the projects of [Petitioner] ABV were reduced and it was forced to terminate the contracts of workers whose job were not so immediate and urgent and retain only those workers whose skills were needed just to maintain the projects. [Respondent] was informed, one month in advance, of the pre-termination of his contract, and he was paid his salary, overtime pay, bonus and other benefits in the total amount of US$6,716.00 or Saudi Riyals SR25,192.00. With respect to the alleged confiscation of [respondents] iqama, [petitioners] alleged that the law requires its surrender to the Saudi authorities upon the termination of the employees contract of employment.the Hon. Labor Arbiter Andres Zavalla issued his Decision, dated February 27, 1997, decreeing, as follows:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering [petitioners] jointly and severally to pay [respondent] his salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract from December 19, 1994 up to July 26, 1995 in the total amount of NINE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN U.S. Dollars (US$9,447.00) and ten percent (10%) of his monetary award as attorneys fees both in Philippine currency to be computed at the prevailing rate at the time of payment.When [petitioners] filed their joint appeal, reversed the aforecited decision and dismissed the [respondents] complaint for lack of merit.[Respondents] motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution, dated July 10, 1997The Court of Appeals ruled that despite the absence of a written categorical objection to the sufficiency of the payment received as consideration for the execution of the quitclaim, jurisprudence supported the right of respondent to demand what was rightfully his under our labor laws. Hence, he should have been allowed to recover the difference between the amount he had actually received and the amount he should have receivedThe CA also found that the NLRC had erroneously applied RA 8042 to the case. The appellate court held that respondent was entitled to the salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his Contract, in addition to what he had already received.Hence, this Petition

ISSUE:Whether respondent, despite having executed a quitclaim, is entitled to a grant of his additional monetary claims.

HELD: YES The Petition has no merit.Indeed, an employee cannot be dismissed except for cause, as provided by law, and only after due notice and hearing. Employees who are dismissed without cause have the right to be reinstated without loss of seniority rights and other privileges; and to be paid full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits, plus proven damages.

With regard to contract workers, in cases arising before the effectivity of RA 8042 (the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act11), it is settled that if "the contract is for a fixed term and the employee is dismissed without just cause, he is entitled to the payment of his salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract."12 In the present case, the Contract of respondent was until July 26, 1995. Since his dismissal from service effective December 18, 1994, was not for a just cause, he is entitled to be paid his salary corresponding to the unexpired portion of his Contract, in the total amount of US$9,447.We now go to the Release and Quitclaim signed by respondentPetitioners claim that the foregoing Release and Quitclaim has forever released them from "any and all claims, demands, dues, actions, or causes of action" arising from respondents employment with them. They also contend that the validity of the document can no longer be questioned.Unfortunately for petitioners, jurisprudence does not support their stance. The fact that employees have signed a release and/or quitclaim does not necessarily result in the waiver of their claims. The law strictly scrutinizes agreements in which workers agree to receive less compensation than what they are legally entitled to. That document does not always bar them from demanding benefits to which they are legally entitled.While rights may be waived, the same must not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.Article 6 of the Civil Code renders a quitclaim agreement void ab initio where the quitclaim obligates the workers concerned to forego their benefits while at the same time exempting the employer from any liability that it may choose to reject. This runs counter to Art. 22 of the Civil Code which provides that no one shall be unjustly enriched at the expense of another.""Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking."Hence, quitclaims in which employees voluntarily accept a reasonable amount or consideration as settlement are deemed valid. These agreements cannot be set aside merely because the parties have subsequently changed their mindsTo determine whether the Release and Quitclaim is valid, one important factor that must be taken into account is the consideration accepted by respondent; the amount must constitute a "reasonable settlement." The NLRC considered the amount of US$6,716 or SR23,153 reasonable, when compared with (1) $3,900, the three-month salary that he would have been entitled to recover if RA 8042 were applied; and (2) US$9,447, his salaries for the unexpired portion of his Contract.It is relevant to point out, however, that respondent was dismissed prior to the effectivity of RA 8042. As discussed at the outset, he is entitled to his salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his Contract. This amount is exclusive of the SR23,153 that he received based on the November 29, 1994 Final Settlement. The latter amount was comprised of overtime pay, vacation pay, indemnity, contract reward and notice pay -- items that were due him under his employment Contract. For these reasons, the consideration stated in the Release and Quitclaim cannot be deemed a reasonable settlement; hence, that agreement must be set aside."This Court has allowed supervisory employees to seek payment of benefits and a manager to sue for illegal dismissal even though, for a consideration, they executed deeds of quitclaims releasing their employers from liability."19To stress, "in case of doubt, laws should be interpreted to favor the working class -- whether in the government or in the private sector -- in order to give flesh and vigor to the pro-poor and pro-labor provisions of our Constitution."RULING:WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED

9. PNCC vs NLRC

Facts:Private respondents Raul C. Abrico, Rodrigo Vasallo, Eduardo A. Sibbaluca, and Benigno M. Manasis were deployed by herein petitioner for overseas employment to Iraq as security guards pursuant to individual appointment contracts dated April 15, 1985.These were submitted to the POEA and were validated by the latter on April 22, 1985. The contracts provided for a US$350.00/month salary.However, on May 12, 1985, a second overseas contract was executed by the PNCC which was accepted by private respondents. It modified the April 15, 1985 contract by providing for a monthly salary of US$260.00 for the same position. The contract was for a two-year period. When the period lapsed, private respondents were repatriated and were extended local employment. However, all of them filed their voluntary resignation effective August 31, 1987 so that they could avail of more benefits under the Retirement Program offered by the PNCC.On August 17, 1987, private respondents filed a complaint before the POEA for, among others, (a) non-payment of promotional pay increase for Raul C. Abrico and Rodrigo J. Vasallo; (b) underpayment of salaries, overtime pay, bonuses, night differential pay, sick leave, and vacation leave benefits; (c) assigning Friday overtime guarding duties to non-guards.In disposing of the complaint, the POEA ruled as follows:

The issues to be resolved in these are:

1.Whether or not herein complainants are entitled to salary and overtime pay differentials. YES

2.Whether or not herein complainants are entitled to vacation leave and sick leave differentials, bonus differential and night shift differential. YES

3.Whether or not complainants Raul Abrico and Rodrigo J. Vasallo are entitled to promotional pay differential. NO

From the decision of the POEA, the PNCC appealed to the NLRC. It alleged that the POEA erred in applying Article 34(i) of the Labor Code; and in holding that the notice of employment, dated April 15, 1985, providing for a monthly salary of US$350.00 was the actual overseas employment contract instead of the one dated May 12, 1985 which provided for a salary of US$260.00/month.NLRC affirmed the decision of the POEAThe PNCC now finds fault in that decision by saying that the April 15, 1985 document was but a mere notice/offer of employment. Petitioner alleges further that it was never signed and accepted by private respondents. Consequently, it never became a binding contract between the parties concerned. Petitioner further stated that the real contract of employment was the one executed on May 12, 1985 which provided for a monthly salary of US$260.00 and which was accepted by private respondentsHence this petition

ISSUE:Whether or not the monthly salary of herein complainants is US$350.00 a month or US$260.00.

HELD:As correctly invoked by complainants paragraph (1) of Article 34 of the Labor Code prohibits the substitution or alteration of employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor from the time (of) the actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of expiration of the same without the approval of the Department of Labor.While the allegations of the PNCC may cast doubt on the real nature of the April 12, 1985 document, our Civil Code 7 states:In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborers.The mandate of the law for a liberal interpretation of labor contracts in favor of the working man was applied in the case of Ditan vs. POEA Administrator 8 where We made the following pronouncement:A strict interpretation of the cold facts before us might support the position taken by the respondents. However, we are dealing here not with an ordinary transaction but with a labor contract which deserves special treatment and a liberal interpretation in favor of the worker . . . the Constitution mandates the protection of labor and the sympathetic concern of the State for the working class conformably to the social justiceUnder the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less privileges in life should have more privileges inRULING:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the questioned Resolution of the NLRC is hereby AFFIRMED. Consequently, this petition is DISMISSED. With costs.

Labor Cases DIGEST6/26/15 11:31 PM

6/26/15 11:31 PM