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Gaa vs Court of Appeals (1985) 140 SCRA 304

Facts: It appears that respondent Europhil Industries Corporation was formerly one of the tenants in

Trinity Building at T.M. Kalaw Street, Manila, while petitioner  Gaa was then the building administrator.

On December 12, 1973, Europhil commenced an action in CFI Manila for damages against petitioner for having perpetrated certain acts that Europhil considered a trespass upon its rights, namely, cutting of its electricity, and removing its name from the building directory and gate passes of its officials and employees",

On June 28, 1974, said court rendered judgment in favor of respondent Europhil, ordering petitioner to pay the former the sum of P10,000.00 as actual damages, P5,000.00 as moral damages, P5,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.

The said decision having become final and executory, a writ of garnishment was issued pursuant to which Deputy

Sheriff Roxas on August 1, 1975 served a Notice of Garnishment upon El Grande Hotel, where petitioner was then employed, garnishing her "salary, commission and/or remuneration."

Petitioner then filed with the CIF of Manila a motion to lift said garnishment on the ground that her salaries, commission and or remuneration" are exempted from execution under Article 1708 of the New Civil Code.

Said motion was denied by the lower Court CA dismissed the petition holding that petitioner is not a mere laborer as contemplated under Article 1708 as the term laborer does not apply to one who holds a managerial or supervisory

position like that of petitioner, but only to those laborers occupying the lower strata.

Issue: WON the Petitioner is covered by Article 1708 of the New Civil Code. RULING: Petitioner is not covered by Article 1708 since she does not fall within the criteria of laborer.

Article 1708 of the Civil Code provides: “The laborer's wage shall not be subject to execution or attachment, except for debts incurred for food, shelter, clothing and medical attendance."

It is beyond dispute that petitioner is not an ordinary or rank and file laborer but a responsibly place employee, of El Grande Hotel, responsible for planning, directing, controlling, and coordinating the activities of all housekeeping personnel so as to ensure the cleanliness, maintenance and orderliness of all guestrooms, function rooms, public areas, and the surroundings of the hotel. Considering the importance of petitioner's function in El Grande Hotel, it is undeniable that petitioner is occupying a position equivalent to that of a managerial or supervisory position. We do not think that the legislature intended the exemption in Article 1708 of the New Civil Code to operate in favor of any but those who are laboring men or women in the sense that their work is manual.

Persons belonging to this class usually look to the reward of a day's labor for immediate or present support, and such persons are more in need of the exemption than any others. Petitioner is definitely not within that class.

Millares vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 305 SCRA 500 (1999)

Posted by Pius Morados on November 15, 2011(Labor Standards – wages, customary facilities)

Facts: Article 97, par. (f), of the Labor Code defined “wage” as the remuneration or earnings, however designated, capable of being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, or commission basis, or other method of calculating the same, which is payable

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by an employer to an employee under a written or unwritten contract of employment for work done or to be done, or for services rendered or to be rendered and includes the fair and reasonable value, as determined by the Secretary of Labor, of board, lodging, or other facilities customarily furnished by the employer to the employee.

116 employees of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) in Bislig, Surigao del Sur were terminated under a retrenchment program as a solution to a major financial setback. Aside from their one month basic pay, petitioners believe that the allowances they allegedly regularly received on a monthly basis should have also been included in the computation of their separation.

PICOP grants the following allowances:

Staff allowance/managers allowance to those who live in rented houses near the mill site which ceases whenever a vacancy occurs in the company’s free housing facilities.Transportation allowance in the form of advances for actual transportation expenses subject to liquidation is given to key officers and managers who use their own vehicles in the performance of their duties. This privilege is discontinued when the conditions no longer obtain.Bislig allowance is given to managers and officers on account of the hostile environment prevailing therein. Once the recipient is transferred elsewhere, the allowance ceases.Applying Art. 97, par (f) of the Labor Code which defines “wage”, the Executive Labor Arbiter opined that the subject allowances, being customarily furnished by respondent PICOP and regularly received by petitioners, formed part of the latter’s wage.

However, the NLRC decreed that the allowances did not form part of the salary base used in computing separation pay since the same were contingency-based.

Issue: Whether or not the allowances in question are considered facilities customarily furnished.

Held: No. “Customary” is founded on long established and constant practice connoting regularity. The receipt of allowance on a monthly basis does not ipso facto characterize it as regular and forming part of salary because the nature of the grant is a factor worth considering.

The subject allowances were temporarily, not regularly received by petitioners because once the conditions for the availment ceased to exist, the allowance reached the cutoff point. The petitioners’ continuous enjoyment of the disputed allowances was based on contingencies the occurrence of which wrote finis to such enjoyment.

Songco vs. NLRC [G.R. No. L-50999 March 23, 1990] Facts: Zuellig (M) Inc. filed with the Department of Labor (Regional Office No. 4) a clearance to terminate the services of petitioners Jose Songco, Romeo Cipres and Amancio Manuel due to alleged financial losses. However, the petitioners argued that the company is not suffering any losses and the real reason for their termination was their membership in the union. At the last hearing of the case, the petitioner manifested that they no longer contesting their dismissal, however, they argued that they should be granted a separation pay. Each of the petitioners was receiving a monthly salary of P40, 000.00 plus commissions for every sale they made. Under the CBA entered by the Zuellig Inc. and the petitioners, in Article XIV, Section 1(a), Any employee, who is separated from employment due to old age, sickness, death or permanent lay-off not due to the fault of said employee shall receive from the company a retirement gratuity in an amount equivalent to one month’s salary per year of service. One month of salary as used in this paragraph shall be deemed equivalent to the salary at date of retirement; years of service shall be deemed equivalent to total service credits, a fraction of at least six months being considered one year, including probationary employment. Other basis for petitioners’ contention are Article 284 of the Labor Code

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with regards to reduction of personnel and Sections 9(b) and 10 of Rule 1, Book VI of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code. The Labor Arbiter rendered his decision directing the company to pay the complainants separation pay equivalent to their one month salary (exclusive of commissions, allowances, etc.) for every year of service that they have worked with the company. The petitioners appealed to the NLRC but it was denied. Petitioner Romeo Cipres filed a Notice of Voluntary Abandonment and Withdrawal of petition contending that he had received, to his full and complete satisfaction, his separation pay. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not earned sales commissions and allowances should be included in the monthly salary of petitioners for the purpose of computation of their separation pay.

Held: The petition is granted. Petitioners’ contention that in arriving at the correct and legal amount of separation pay due to them, whether under the Labor Code or the CBA, their basic salary, earned sales commissions and allowances should be added together. Insofar as whether the allowances should be included in the monthly salary of petitioners for the purpose of computation of their separation pay is concerned, this has been settled in the case of Santos vs. NLRC, 76721, in the computation of backwages and separation pay, account must be taken not only of the basic salary of petitioner but also of her transportation and emergency living allowances. In the issue of whether commission should be included in the computation of their separation pay, it is proper to define first commission. Black’s Law Dictionary defined commission as the recompensed, compensation or reward of an agent, salesman, executor, trustees, receiver, factor, broker or bailee, when the same is calculated as a percentage on the amount of his transactions or on the profit to the principal. The nature of the work of a salesman and the reason for such type of remuneration for services rendered demonstrate clearly that the commission are part of petitioners’ wage and salary. Some salesmen do not receive any basic salary but depend on commission and allowances or commissions alone, are part of petitioners’ wage and salary. Some salesman do not received any basic salary but depend on commission and allowances or commissions alone, although an employer-employee relationship exist. In Soriano v. NLRC, it is ruled then that, the commissions also claimed by petitioner (override commission plus net deposit incentive) are not properly includible in such base figure since such commissions must be earned by actual market transactions attributable to petitioner. Applying this by analogy, since the commissions in the present case were earned by actual market transactions attributable to petitioners, these should be included in their separation pay. In the computation thereof, what should be taken into account is the average commissions earned during their last year of employment.

PNB V PNB EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION

NATURE

Appeal from decision of the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR)

FACTS

– PNB and PNB Employees Association (PEMA) had a dispute regarding the proper computation of overtime pay. PEMA wanted the cost of living allowance (granted in 1958) and longevity pay (granted in 1961) to be included in the computation. PNB disagreed and the 2 parties later went before the CIR to resolve the dispute.

– CIR decided in favor of PEMA and held that PNB should compute the overtime pay of its employees on the basis of the sum total of the employee’s basic salary or wage plus cost of living allowance and longevity pay. The CIR relied on the ruling in NAWASA v NAWASA Consolidated Unions, which held that “for purposes of computing overtime compensation, regular wage includes

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all payments which the parties have agreed shall be received during the work week, including differentiated payments for working at undesirable times, such as at night and the board and lodging customarily furnished the employee.” This prompted PNB to appeal, hence this case.

ISSUEWON the cost of living allowance and longevity pay should beincluded in the computation of overtime pay as held by the CIR

HELDNO

Ratio Overtime pay is for extra effort beyond that

contemplated in the employment contract; additional pay given for any other purpose cannot be included in the basis for the computation of overtime pay.

– Absent a specific provision in the CBA, the bases for the

computation of overtime pay are 2 computations, namely:

1. WON the additional pay is for extra work done or service

rendered

2. WON the same is intended to be permanent and regular, not contingent nor temporary as a given only to remedy a situation which can change any time.

Reasoning

– Longevity pay cannot be included in the computation of

overtime pay for the very simple reason that the contrary is expressly stipulated in the CBA, which constitutes the law between the parties.

– As regards cost of living allowance, there is nothing in Commonwealth Act 444 [or “the 8-hour Labor Law,” now Art. 87 Labor Code] that could justify PEMA’s posture that it should be added to the regular wage in computing overtime pay. C.A. 444 prescribes that overtime work shall be paid “at the same rate as their regular wages or salary, plus at least 25% additional.” The law did not define what is a regular wage or salary. What the law emphasized is that in addition to “regular wage,” there must be paid an additional 25% of that “regular wage” to constitute overtime rate of pay. Parties were thus allowed to agree on what shall be mutually considered regular pay from or upon which a 25% premium shall be based and added to makeup overtime compensation.

– No rule of universal application to other cases may be justifiably extracted from the NAWASA case. CIR relies on the part of the NAWASA decision where the SC cited American decisions whose legislation on overtime is at variance with the law in this jurisdiction. The US legislation considers work in excess of forty hours a week as overtime; whereas, what is

generally considered overtime in the Philippines is work in

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excess of the regular 8 hours a day. It is understandably

material to refer to precedents in the US for purposes of computing weekly wages under a 40-hour week rule, since the particular issue involved in NAWASA is the conversion of prior weekly regular earnings into daily rates without allowing diminution or addition.

– To apply the NAWASA computation would require a different formula for each and every employee. It would require reference to and continued use of individual earnings in the past, thus multiplying the administrative difficulties of the Company. It would be cumbersome and tedious a process to compute overtime pay and this may again cause delays in payments, which in turn could lead to serious disputes. To apply this mode of computation would retard and stifle the growth of unions themselves as Companies would be irresistibly drawn into denying, new and additional fringe benefits, if not those already existing, for fear of bloating their overhead expenses through overtime which, by reason of being unfixed, becomes instead a veritable source of irritant in labor relations.

**Overtime Pay Rationale Why is a laborer or employee who works beyond the regular hours of work entitled to extra compensation called, in this enlightened time, overtime pay?

Verily, there can be no other reason than that he is made to work longer than what is commensurate with his agreed compensation for the statutorily fixed or voluntarily agreed hours of labor he is supposed to do. When he thus spends additional time to his work, the effect upon him is multi- faceted; he puts in more effort, physical and/or mental; he is delayed in going home to his family to enjoy the comforts thereof; he might have no time for relaxation, amusement or sports; he might miss important pre-arranged engagements; etc. It is thus the additional work, labor or service employed and the adverse effects just mentioned of his longer stay in his place of work that justify and are the real reasons for the extra compensation that is called overtime pay.

**Overtime Pay Definition The additional pay for service or

work rendered or performed in excess of 8 hours a day by employees or laborers in employment covered by the 8 hour Labor Law [C.A. 444, now Art. 87 Labor Code] and not exempt from its requirements. It is computed by multiplying the overtime hourly rate by the number of hours worked in excess of eight.

Disposition decision appealed from is REVERSED.

ACIWU vs NLRC, 247 SCRA 256

Posted by Pius Morados on November 10, 2011(Labor Standards – Bus drivers and conductors on a purely commission basis are entitled to 13th month pay)

Facts: Petitioner union complaint for payment of 13th month pay to the drivers and conductors of respondent company, on the ground that although said drivers and conductors are compensated on a purely commission basis as described in their CBA, they are automatically entitled to the basic minimum pay mandated by law should said commission be less than their basic minimum for eight (8) hours work.

Respondent Vallacar Transit, Inc. contended that since said drivers are compensated on a purely commission basis, they are not entitled to 13th month pay pursuant to the exempting provisions enumerated in paragraph 2 of the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law. Section of Article XIV of the CBA expressly provides that drivers and conductors paid on a

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purely commission are not legally entitled to 13th month pay. Said CBA, being the law between the parties, must be respected.

Issue: WON the bus drivers and conductors of respondent Vallacar Transit, Inc. are entitled to 13th month pay.

Held: Yes. For purposes of entitling rank and file employees a 13th month pay, it is immaterial whether the employees concerned are paid a guaranteed wage plus commission or a commission with guaranteed wage inasmuch as the bottom line is that they receive a guaranteed wage. Thus is correctly construed in the MOLE Explanatory Bulletin No. 86-12.

The 13th month pay of bus drivers and conductors must be one-twelfth (1/12) of their total earnings during the calendar year.

LMG vs.SEC. OF LABORG.R. No. 127422 April 17, 2001

FACTS: LMG Chemicals Corp, (petitioner) is a domestic corp engaged in the manufacture and sale of various kinds of chemical substances, including aluminum sulfate which is essential in purifying water, and technical grade sulfuric acid used in thermal power plants. Petitioner has three divisions, namely: the Organic Division, Inorganic Division and the Pinamucan Bulk Carriers. There are two unions within petitioner’s Inorganic Division. One union represents the daily paid employees and the other union represents the monthly paid employees. Chemical Workers Union, respondent, is a duly registered labor organization acting as the collective bargaining agent of all the daily paid employees of petitioner’s Inorganic Division.

Sometime in December 1995, the petitioner and the respondent started negotiation for a new CBA as their old CBA was about to expire. They were able to agree on the political provisions of the new CBA, but no agreement was reached on the issue of wage increase. The economic issues were not also settled.

With the CBA negotiations at a deadlock (Strike…Secretary assumed jurisdiction)

Secretary of Labor and Employment granted an increase of P140 (higher than the offer of petitioner-company of P135). Also, as to the effectivity of the new CBA…Sec held:

3. Effectivity of the new CBA

Article 253-A of the Labor Code, as amended, provides that when no new CBA is signed during a period of six months from the expiry date of the old CBA, the retroactivity period shall be according to the parties’ agreement, Inasmuch as the parties could not agree on this issue and since this Office has assumed jurisdiction, then this matter now lies at the discretion of the Secretary of labor and Employment. Thus the new Collective Bargaining Agreement which the parties will sign pursuant to this Order shall retroact to January 1, 1996.

petitioner contends that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion when he ordered that the new CBA which the parties will sign shall retroact to January 1, 1996

ISSUE: Whether or not the new CBA shall retroact?

HELD:Petitioner insists that public respondent’s discretion on the issue of the date of the effectivity of the new CBA is limited to either: (1) leaving the matter of the date of effectivity of the new CBA is limited

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to either: (1) leaving the matter of the date of effectivity of the new CBA to the agreement of the parties or (2) ordering that the terms of the new CBA be prospectively applied.

It must be emphasized that respondent Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the dispute because it is impressed with national interest. As noted by the Secretary, “the petitioner corp was then supplying the sulfate requirements of MWSS as well as the sulfuric acid of NAPOCOR, and consequently, the continuation of the strike would seriously affect the water supply of Metro Manila and the power supply of the Luzon Grid.” Such authority of the Secretary to assume jurisdiction carries with it the power to determine the retroactivity of the parties’ CBA.

It is well settled in our jurisprudence that the authority of the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to national interest includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising therefrom. The power is plenary and discretionary in nature to enable him to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute.

This Court held in St. Luke’s Medical Center, Inc. vs. Torres:

Therefore in the absence of the specific provision of law prohibiting retroactivity of the effectivity of the arbitral awards issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, such as herein involved, public respondent is deemed vested with plenary powers to determine the effectivity thereof.”

PETITION DENIED.

SPECIAL STEEL PRODUCTS, INC. v.   VILLAREAL

Doctrine:Article 116 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:

ART. 116.Withholding of wages and kickbacks prohibited.  It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to withhold any amount from the wages (and benefits) of a worker or induce him to give up any part of his wages by force, stealth, intimidation, threat or by any other means whatsoever without the workers consent.

The above provision is clear and needs no further elucidation.Indeed, petitioner has no legal authority to withhold respondents 13th month pay and other benefits.What an employee has worked for, his employer must pay. Thus, an employer cannot simply refuse to pay the wages or benefits of its employee because he has either defaulted in paying a loan guaranteed by his employer; or violated their memorandum of agreement; or failed to render an accounting of his employers property.

Fast Facts:

Villareal (Assistant Sales Manager) and So (Salesman) were Special Steel’s EEs.

Case of Villareal:May 1993 - Respondent obtained a car loan from the Bank of Commerce with Special Steel as surety as shown by a continuing suretyship agreement and promissory note wherein they jointly and severally agreed to pay the bank the monthly installments.

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January 15, 1997 – Villareal resigned and joined Hi-Grade Industrial and Technical Products, Inc. as executive VP.

Case of So:As reward for So’s outstanding sales performance, he was sponsored by Special Steel to attend a training course in Austria, conducted by BOHLER, Special Steel’s principal company. When So returned after nine months of training, he was directed to sign a memo which says that BOHLER requires trainees to stay with Special Steel for 3 years after the training. Otherwise, he will have to refund BOHLER $6k by way of set-off or compensation. 2 years and 4 months later, January 16, 1997, So resigned.

Immediately, Special Steel ordered So and Villareal to render an accounting of its various Christmas giveaways they received. These were intended for distribution to petitioners customers.

In protest, the two demanded from Special Steel payment of their separation benefits, commissions, vacation and sick leave benefits, and proportionate 13th month pay.But petitioner refused and instead, withheld their 13th month pay and other benefits.

LA decided in favor of the two. NLRC affirmed.

Special Steel does not question the decision. What it contends is that it is witholding the wages and benefits of the two as lien to protect its interest as a surety in Villareal’s car loan and for So’s training expenses abroad.

CA held it could not withhold such wages and benefits. SC affirmed.

Regarding Villareal’s debt, Special Steel may only protect its right as surety by instituting an action to demand a security. It may not take the law in its own hands.

As for So’s case, the CA held that he has already substantially complied with the 3-year requirement. The SC also said that compensation cannot take place between So and Special Steel since they are not the principal creditor and debtor each other. So’s creditor is BOHLER and not Special Steel.

MAYON HOTEL & RESTAURANT vs. ADANA

FACTS:

Petitioner Mayon Hotel & Restaurant (MHR) hired herein 16 respondents as employees in its business in Legaspi City. Its operation was suspended on March 31, 1997 due to the expiration and non-renewal of the lease contract for the space it rented. While waiting for the completion of the construction of its new site, MHR continued its operation in another site with 9 of the 16 employees. When the new site constructed and MHR resumed its business operation, none of the 16 employees was recalled to work.

MHR alleged business losses as the reason for not reinstating the respondents. On various dates, respondents filed complaints for underpayment of wages, money claims and illegal dismissal.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not respondents were illegally dismissed by petitioner;

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2. Whether or not respondents are entitled to their money claims due to underpayment of wages, and nonpayment of holiday pay, rest day premium, SILP, COLA, overtime pay, and night shift differential pay.

HELD:

1. Illegal Dismissal: claim for separation pay

Since April 1997 until the time the Labor Arbiter rendered its decision in July 2000, or more than three (3) years after the supposed “temporary” lay-off, the employment of all the respondents with petitioner had ceased, notwithstanding that the new premises had been completed and the same resumed its operation. This is clearly dismissal – or the permanent severance or complete separation of the worker from the service on the initiative of the employer regardless of the reasons therefor.Article 286 of the Labor Code is clear — there is termination of employment when an otherwise bona fide suspension of work exceeds six (6) months. The cessation of employment for more than six months was patent and the employer has the burden of proving that the termination was for a just or authorized cause.

While we recognize the right of the employer to terminate the services of an employee for a just or authorized cause, the dismissal of employees must be made within the parameters of law and pursuant to the tenets of fair play. And in termination disputes, the burden of proof is always on the employer to prove that the dismissal was for a just or authorized cause. Where there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for termination of employment, the law considers the case a matter of illegal dismissal.

If doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter — the employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause. It is a time-honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements and writing should be resolved in the former's favor. The policy is to extend the doctrine to a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection of labor.

2. Money claims

The Supreme Court reinstated the award of monetary claims granted by the Labor Arbiter.

The cost of meals and snacks purportedly provided to respondents cannot be deducted as part of respondents' minimum wage. As stated in the Labor Arbiter's decision.Even granting that meals and snacks were provided and indeed constituted facilities, such facilities could not be deducted without compliance with certain legal requirements. As stated in Mabeza v. NLRC, the employer simply cannot deduct the value from the employee's wages without satisfying the following: (a) proof that such facilities are customarily furnished by the trade; (b) the provision of deductible facilities is voluntarily accepted in writing by the employee; and (c) the facilities are charged at fair and reasonable value. The law is clear that mere availment is not sufficient to allow deductions from employees' wages.

As for petitioners repeated invocation of serious business losses, suffice to say that this is not a defense to payment of labor standard benefits. The employer cannot exempt himself from liability to pay minimum wages because of poor financial condition of the company. The payment of minimum wages is not dependent on the employer's ability to pay.

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SALARY-CEILING METHOD

EMPLOYERS CONFEDERATION vs. NWPC

FACTS

On October 15, 1990, the Regional Board of NCR issued Wage Order No. NCR-01, increasing the minimum wage by P17 daily.

The Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP) and Personnel Management Association of the Philippines (PMAP) moved for reconsideration. Petitioner Employers Confederation of the Philippines (ECOP) opposed.

Board then issued Wage Order No. NCR-01-A, amending the wage order by stating that all workers and employees in the private sector already receiving wages above the statutory minimum wage rates up to P125 per day shall also receive the P17 daily increase.

Petitioner ECOP appealed to respondent National Wages and Productivity Commission (NWPC).

NWPC: Appeal dismissed for lack of merit. Motion for reconsideration denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not respondent NWPC committed grave abuse of discretion. NO.

REASONING:

Petitioner says

Wage Order No. NCR-01-A is an excess of authority as under RA 6727, the boards may only prescribe “minimum wages”, not determine “salary ceilings”.

RA 6727 is meant to promote collective bargaining as the primary mode of settling wages, so boards cannot preempt CBAs by establishing ceilings

Boards may only adjust floor wages

Solicitor-General (for NWPC) comments

The across-the-board hike did not “grant additional or other benefits to workers and employees, but rather fixed minimum wages according to the salary-ceiling method”

RA 6727 is to correct “wage distortions” and the salary-ceiling method does just that

Court rules

The Court is inclined to agree with the Government.

The NWPC noted that the determination of wages involved 2 methods: the floor-wage method and the salary-ceiling method.

Floor-wage method- involves the fixing of a determinate amount that would be added to the prevailing statutory minimum wage

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-adopted in earlier wage orders

Salary-ceiling method- wage adjustment is applied to employees receiving a certain denominated salary ceiling

-used in RAs 6640 and 6727 as well as 11 COLA issuances

The shift is due to the labor disputes arising from wage distortions.

RA 6727 was intended to rationalize wages.

This is done by:

1. providing full-time boards to police wages round-the-clock2. giving the boards enough power to achieve this objective

SO, if RA 6727 only intended boards to set floor wages only, the Act would not need a board but only an accountant to keep track of the latest consumer price index or have Congress do it when the need arises.

The Board did not perform an unlawful act of legislation.

Congress may delegate he power to fix rates, provided that it leaves sufficient standards. RA 6727 gave statutory standards for fixing the minimum wage.

ART. 124. Standards/Criteria for Minimum Wage Fixing — The regional minimum wages to be established by the Regional Board shall be as nearly adequate as is economically feasible to maintain the minimum standards of living necessary for the health, efficiency and general well-being of the employees within the framework of the national economic and social development program. In the determination of such regional minimum wages, the Regional Board shall, among other relevant factors, consider the following:

(a) The demand for living wages;

(b) Wage adjustment vis-a-vis the consumer price index;

(c) The cost of living and changes or increases therein;

(d) The needs of workers and their families;

(e) The need to induce industries to invest in the countryside;

(f) Improvements in standards of living;

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(g) The prevailing wage levels;

(h) Fair return of the capital invested and capacity to pay of employers;

(i) Effects of employment generation and family income; and

(j) The equitable distribution of income and wealth along the imperatives of economic and social development."

The wage order was not acted in excess of board’s authority. The law gave reasonable limitations to the delegated power of the board.

ECOP is of the mistaken impression that RA 6727 leaves labor and management alone to decide wages.

The Court does not believe RA 6727 is meant to deregulate the relation between labor and capital for several reasons:

1. The Constitution calls upon the State to protect labor2. The Constitution calls upon the State to intervene when the common goal so demands I

regulating property and property relations3. The Charter urges Congress to diffuse the wealth of the nation and regulate the use of

property4. The Charter recognizes the just share of labor in the fruits of production5. Under the LC, the State shall regulate the relations between labor and management6. Under RA 6727, the State is interested in seeing that workers receive fair and equitable

wages7. The Constitution is primarily a document of Social Justice and has not fully embraced the

concept of laissez-faireCourt cannot give an Act a meaning that will conflict with these basic principles.

The concept of minimum wage is more than setting of a floor wage to upgrade existing wages as ECOP believes.

Minimum wages underlies the rationales of RA 6727 and the Constitution.

The salary-cap method serves the purposes of RA 6727. Whether or not it is a permanent policy of the Board s a question we may only speculate. At the moment, it is a reasonable policy. Dispositive: Petition denied.

PRUBANKE`RS ASSOCIATION vs.PRUDENTIAL BANK

FACTS: The Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board (RTWPB) Region V issued Wage Order No. RB 05-03 which provided for a Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) to workers in the private

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sector who had rendered service for at least three (3) months before its effectivity, and for the same period thereafter. RTWPB Region VII however followed suit but the COLA amounts in other cities nationwide were different from that issued by RTWPN region V. This caused Prubankers Association to write the petitioner requesting that the Labor Management Committee be immediately convened to discuss and resolve the alleged wage distortion created in the salary structure upon the implementation of the said wage orders. As the grievance could not be settled in the meetings, the parties agreed to submit the matter to voluntary arbitration.

Respondent brought the case to appeal and was favored by CA, petitioner then sought the review by SC. It argued that a wage distortion exists, because the implementation of the two Wage Orders has resulted in the discrepancy in the compensation of employees of similar pay classification in different regions.

ISSUE: WON two wage orders resulting in the discrepancy of employees’ compensation in different regions also results to a wage distortion.

HELD: No.

There is no wage distortion since the wage order implementation covers all the branches of the bank. The hierarchy of positions was still preserved.

Also, petitioner’s claim of wage distortion must also be denied for one other reason. The difference in wages between employees in the same pay scale in different regions is not the mischief sought to be banished by the law. Republic Act No. 6727 (the Wage Rationalization Act), recognizes “existing regional disparities in the cost of living” as provided in Section 2 of said law.

***Notes: The levels of different pay classes was not eliminated. The statutory definition of wage distortion is found in Article 124 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6727, which reads: Standards/Criteria for Minimum Wage Fixing. ―As used herein, a wage distortion shall mean a situation where an increase in prescribed wage results in the elimination or severe contraction of intentional quantitative differences in wage or salary rates between and among employee groups in an establishment as to effectively obliterate the distinctions embodied in such wage structure based on skills, length of service, or other logical bases of differentiation. Wage distortion involves four elements: (1) An existing hierarchy of positions with corresponding salary rates; (2) A significant change in the salary rate of a lower pay class without a concomitant increase in the salary rate of a higher one; (3)The elimination of the distinction between the two levels and (4) The existence of the distortion in the same region of the country.

A disparity in wages between employees holding similar positions but in different regions does not constitute wage distortion as contemplated by law. As stated, it is the hierarchy of positions and the disparity of their corresponding wages and other emoluments that are sought to be preserved by the concept of wage distortion.

BANKARD EMPLOYEES vs.NLRC

FACTS: Bankard, Inc. classifies its employees according to level: Level I, Level II, Level III, Level IV and Level V (See Note #1 for corresponding salary rates). On May 28, 1993, the directors of

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respondent Bankard, Inc. approved a new salary scale for the purpose of making its hiring rate competitive in the labor market. The new salary scale increased the hiring rates of new employees, to wit: Levels I and V were increased by P1,000.00 while Levels II, III and IV were increased by P900.00 (see Note # 1). The salaries of employees who fell below the new minimum rates were also adjusted accordingly to reach such rates under their levels. As a result, Bankard Employees Union-Workers Alliance Trade Unions (Bankard Union) demanded for salary increase of its old, regular employees. Bankard refused on the ground that it had no obligation to grant all its employees the same increase. Bankard Union filed a Notice of Strike on the ground of discrimination and other acts of Unfair Labor Practice. This was initially treated as a preventive mediation case on the ground that the issues raised were not strikable. Upon the second notice of strike, the dispute was certified for compulsory arbitration. The NLRC dismissed the case for lack of merit, finding no wage distortion. The CA denied the same for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:Whether the unilateral adoption by an employer of an upgraded salary scale that increased the hiring rates of new employees without increasing the salary rates of old employees resulted in wage distortion within the contemplation of Article 124 of the Labor Code.

RULING:No. The Court held that wage distortion does not exist in this case as all the elements were not met. There are four elements of wage distortion (See note #2), namely: (1) An existing hierarchy of positions with corresponding salary rates, (2) a significant change in the salary rate of a lower pay class without a concomitant increase in the salary rate of a higher one, (3) the elimination of the distinction between the two levels and (4) the existence of the distortion in the same region of the country. In a problem dealing with "wage distortion," the basic assumption is that there exists a grouping or classification of employees that establishes distinctions among them on some relevant or legitimate bases. Various factors such as the degrees of responsibility, the skills and knowledge required, the complexity of the job, or other logical basis of differentiation are involved in such classifications.

According to the NLRC, to determine the existence of wage distortion, the "historical" classification of the employees prior to the wage increase must be established. In this case, the employees of Bankard have been “historically” classified into levels (I-V), and not on the basis of their length of service. New employees are automatically placed under any of these levels upon their entry. This is the wage structure formulated by Bankard, a recognized management prerogative which Bankard Union may not encroach upon by creating their own independent classification (ie, based on newly hired and old employees) to use as a basis for demanding an across-the-board salary increase. According to established jurisprudence, the formulation of a wage structure through the classification of employees is a matter of management judgment and discretion.

Based on the wage structure, there is no hierarchy of positions between the newly hired and regular employees of Bankard since it is a structure which is based on level, not seniority. The first element of wage distortion is therefore lacking.

Second, the third element of wage distortion ie the elimination of the distinction between the two levels, is also missing. Even if there was indeed a resulting decrease in the wage gap between the salary of the old and new employees, the gap was held to be insignificant as to result in severe contraction of the intentional quantitave differences in the salary rates between the employee group as the classification under the wage structure is based on rank, and not seniority.

Third, pursuant to Article 124 of the Labor Code, Bankard cannot be legally obligated to correct the alleged “wage distortion”, should it have existed in this case, because the increase in the wages and

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salaries of the newly-hired was not due to a prescribed law or wage order. (See Note #3) The fixing of hiring rates which resulted to wage increases was a voluntary and unilateral increase made by Bankard. The Court held that Article 124 is to be construed in relation to minimum wage fixing, the intention of the law being that in case of an increase in minimum wage, the distinctions in the wage structure will be preserved. The case of Metro Transit Organization Inc. v. NLRC (See Note #4) is not applicable in this case as in the former, there was no CBA but instead, an existing company practice "that whenever rank-and-file employees were paid a statutorily mandated salary increase, supervisory employees were, as a matter of practice, also paid the same amount plus an added premium.” The mere existence of a wage distortion does not ipso facto result to an obligation to rectify it, absent a law or other source of obligation which requires its rectification. Furthermore, Bankard’s right to increase its hiring rate, to establish minimum salaries for specific jobs, and to adjust the rates of employees affected thereby is embodied under the parties’ CBA (See Note #5). The CBA is a valid and legally enforceable source of rights between the parties and as such, will not be interfered with by the Courts absent any bad faith on the part of the employer.

DBP vs. NLRC

Development Bank of the Philippines vs. NLRC and Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Atlas Textile Development Corporation

January 19, 1994

Short version: When ATLAS’ mortgaged properties were foreclosed, ATLAS’ workers filed a claim for unpaid wages etc. pursuant to Article 110 of the Labor Code. Court said that workers’ claims do not create a lien on employer’s properties. Principles as to why are summarized at the end of the case.

FACTS

ATLAS, a textile firm, hypothecated its certain assets to DBP. After ATLAS defaulted in its obligations, DBP foreclosed on the mortgage in March 1985. The latter acquired the mortgaged assets by virtue of the foreclosure sale.

Malayang Samahan filed a claim with the Labor Arbiter for wage differentials, illegal salary deduction, separation pay and similar money claims against ATL AS and DBP. The LAbor Arbiter ruled in favour of Malayang Samahan and held ATLAS and DBP liable to pay the workers’ claims. NLRC sustained the decision upon appeal.

DBP filed the present petition, contending that it was error on the NLRC’s part to consider the workers’ preference under Article 110 of the Labor Code over that of DBP’s mortgage lien.

ISSUE: Whether the claims of Malayang Samahan should be preferred over that of DBP’s mortgage lien (NO)

REASONING

Republic vs. Peralta: Article 110 of the Labor Code does not purport to create a lien in favour of workers or employees for unpaid wages either upon all of the properties or upon any particular property owned by their employer.

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Claims for unpaid wages does not therefore fall at all within the category of specially preferred claims established under Articles 2241 and 2242 of the Civil Code, except to the extent that such claims for unpaid wages are already covered by Article 2241, number 6: "claims for laborers' wages, on the goods manufactured or the work done;" or by Article 2242, number 3: "claims of laborers and other workers engaged in the construction, reconstruction or repair of buildings, canals and other works upon said buildings, canals or other works."

To the extent that claims for unpaid wages fall outside the scope of Article 2241, number 6 and 2242, number 3, they would come within the ambit of the category of ordinary preferred credits under Article 2244.

Applying Article 2241, number 6 to the instant (Peralta) case, the claims of the Unions for separation pay of their members constitute liens attaching to the processed leaf tobacco, cigars and cigarettes and other products produced or manufactured by Insolvent, but not to other assets owned by the Insolvent. And even in respect of such tobacco and tobacco products produced by Insolvent, the claims of the Unions may be given effect only after the Bureau of Internal Revenue's claim for unpaid tobacco inspection fees shall have been satisfied out of the products so manufactured by the Insolvent.

Article 110 of the Labor Code was later amended by RA 6715 which became effective on March 21, 1989.

Article 110. Worker preference in case of bankruptcy. — In the event of bankruptcy or liquidation of an employer's business, his workers shall enjoy first preference as regards their unpaid wages and other monetary claims, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding. Such unpaid wages, and monetary claims shall be paid in full before the claims of the Government and other creditors may be paid.

Effects of the amendment:

Development Bank of the Philippines vs .   National Labor Relations Commission :

The amendment expands worker preference to cover not only unpaid wages but also other monetary claims to which even claims of the Government must be deemed subordinate.

Notably, the terms "declaration" of bankruptcy or "judicial" liquidation have been eliminated. Does this mean then that liquidation proceedings have been done away with?

NO. Considerations:

1. Because of its impact on the entire system of credit, Article 110 of the labor Code cannot be viewed in isolation but must be read in relation to the Civil Code scheme on classification and preference of credits.

2. In the same way that the Civil Code provisions on classification of credits and the Insolvency Law have been brought into harmony, so also must the kindered provisions of the Labor Law be made to harmonize with those laws.

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3. In the event of insolvency, a principal objective should be to effect an equitable distribution of the insolvent's property among his creditors. To accomplish this there must first be some proceeding where notice to all of the insolvent's creditors may be given and where the claims of preferred creditors may be bindingly adjudicated.

4. A distinction should be made between a preference of credit and a lien. A preference applies only to claims which do not attach to specific properties. A lien creates a charge on a particular property. The right of first preference as regards unpaid wages recognized by Article 110 does not constitute a lien on the property of the insolvent debtor in favor of workers. It is but a preference of credit in their favor, a preference in application. It is a method adopted to determine and specify the order in which credits should be paid in the final distribution of the proceeds of the insolvent's assets. It is a right to a first preference in the discharge of the funds of the judgment debtor.

6. Even if Article 110 and its Implementing Rule, as amended, should be interpreted to mean "absolute preference," the same should be given only prospective effect in line with the cardinal rule that laws have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided (Article 4, Civil Code). Thereby, any infringement on the constitutional guarantee on non-impairment of the obligation of contracts (Section 10, Article III, 1987 Constitution) is also avoided. In point of fact, DBP's mortgage credit antedated by several years the amendatory law, RA No. 6715. To give Article 110 retroactive effect would be to wipe out the mortgage in DBP's favor and expose it to a risk which is sought to protect itself against by requiring a collateral in the form of real property.

In fine, the right of preference given to workers under Article 110 of the Labor Code cannot exist in any effective way prior to the time of its presentation in distribution proceedings. It will find application when, in proceedings such as insolvency, such unpaid wages shall be paid in full before the "claims of the Government and other creditors" may be paid. But, for an orderly settlement of a debtor's assets, all creditors must be convened, their claims ascertained and inventoried, and thereafter the preferences determined in the course of judicial proceedings which have for their object the subjection of the property of the debtor of the payment of his debts and other lawful obligations. Thereby, an orderly determination of preference of creditors' claims is assured; the adjudication made will be binding on all parties-in-interest, since those proceedings are proceeding in rem; and the legal scheme of classification, concurrence and preference of credits in the Civil Code, the Insolvency Law, and the Labor Code is preserved in harmony.

The case at bench concerns monetary claims of workers that are not involved in judicial proceedings in rem  in adjudication of claims of creditors vis-a-vis  the assets of the debtor, nor have such claims accrued after the effectivity of Republic Act 6715.

To recapitulate.

(1) Article 110 of the Labor Code, as amended, must be viewed and read in conjunction with the provisions of the Civil Code on concurrence and preferences of credits;

(2) The aforesaid provisions of the Civil Code, including Article 110 of the Labor Code, require judicial proceedings  in rem  in adjudication of creditors' claims against the debtor's assets to become operative;

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(3) RA 6715 has the effect of expanding the "worker preference" to cover not only unpaid wages but also other monetary claims of laborers, to which even claims of the Government must be deemed subordinate; and

(4) The amendatory provisions of R 6715, which took effect on March 21, 1989, should only be given prospective application.

Petition GRANTED. The assailed decision of public respondent, National Labor Relations Commission and that of the Labor Arbiter, insofar as the latter holds the petitioner liable for monetary claims of private respondents, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

DBP vs NLRC (1995) G.R. 108031Facts:

In September 1983, petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines, as mortgagee of TPWII, foreclosed its plant facilities and equipment. Nevertheless, TPWII continued its business operations interrupted only by brief shutdowns for the purpose of servicing its plant facilities and equipment. In January 1986 petitioner took possession of the foreclosed properties. From then on the company ceased its operations. As a consequence private respondent Leonor A. Ang was on 15 April 1986 verbally terminated from the service.

After hearing on a complaint for separation pay, 13th month pay, vacation and sick leave pay, salaries and allowances against TPWII, its General Manager, and petitioner, the Labor Arbiter found TPWII primarily liable to private respondent but only for her separation pay and vacation and sick leave pay because her claims for unpaid wages and 13th month pay were later paid after the complaint was filed. The General Manager was absolved of any liability. But with respect to petitioner, it was held subsidiarily liable in the event the company failed to satisfy the judgment. The Labor Arbiter rationalized that the right of an employee to be paid benefits due him from the properties of his employer is superior to the right of the latter's mortgagee, citing this Court's resolution in PNB v. Delta Motor Workers Union.

On 16 November 1992 public respondent National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter.Petitioner argues that the decision of public respondent runs counter to the consistent rulings of this Court in a long line of cases emphasizing that the applicant of Art. 110 of the Labor Code is contingent upon the institution of bankruptcy or judicial liquidation proceedings against the employer.

Issue: Whether or not Art. 110 of the Labor Code, as amended, which refers to worker preference in case of bankruptcy or liquidation of an employer's business, is applicable to the present case notwithstanding the absence of any formal declaration of bankruptcy or judicial liquidation of TPWII.

Held: Article 110 is applicable NOT applicable in the absence of any formal declaration of bankruptcy or judicial liquidation of TPWII.We hold that public respondent gravely abused its discretion in affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Art. 110 should not be treated apart from other laws but applied in conjunction with the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and the Insolvency Law to the extent that piece-meal distribution of the assets of the debtor is avoided. Art. 110, then prevailing, provides:

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ARTICLE 110. Worker preference in case of bankruptcy. — In the event of bankruptcy or liquidation of an employer's business, his workers shall enjoy first preference as regards wages due them for services rendered during the period prior to the bankruptcy or liquidation, any provision to the contrary notwithstanding. Unpaid wages shall be paid in full before other creditors may establish any claim to a share in the assets of the employer.

Complementing Art. 110, Sec. 10, Rule VIII, Book III, of the Revised Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code provides:

SECTION 10. Payment of wages in case of bankruptcy. — Unpaid wages earned by the employees before the declaration of bankruptcy or judicial liquidation of the employer's business shall be given first preference and shall be paid in full before other creditors may establish any claim to a share in the assets of the employer.

We interpreted this provision in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Santos to mean that —

. . . a declaration of bankruptcy or a judicial liquidation must be present before the worker's preference may be enforced. Thus, Article 110 of the Labor Code and its implementing rule cannot be invoked by the respondents in this case absent a formal declaration of bankruptcy or a liquidation order . . .

The rationale is that to hold Art. 110 to be applicable also to extrajudicial proceedings would be putting the worker in a better position than the State which could only assert its own prior preference in case of a judicial proceeding. Art. 110, which was amended by R.A. 6715 effective 21 March 1989, now reads:

ARTICLE 110. Worker preference in case of bankruptcy. — In the event of bankruptcy or liquidation of an employer's business, his workers shall enjoy first preference as regards their unpaid wages and other monetary claims, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding. Such unpaid wages and monetary claims shall be paid in full before the claims of the Government and other creditors may be paid.

Obviously, the amendment expanded the concept of "worker preference" to cover not only unpaid wages but also other monetary claims to which even claims of the Government must be deemed subordinate. The Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 6715, approved 24 May 1989, also amended the corresponding implementing rule, and now reads:

SECTION 10. Payment of wages and other monetary claims in case of bankruptcy. — In case of bankruptcy or liquidation of the employer's business, the unpaid wages and other monetary claims of the employees shall be given first preference and shall be paid in full before the claims of government and other creditors may be paid.

Although the terms "declaration" (of bankruptcy) or "judicial" (liquidation) have been notably eliminated, still in Development Bank of the Philippines v. NLRC , this Court did not alter its original position that the right to preference given to workers under Art. 110 cannot exist in any effective way prior to the time of its presentation in distribution proceedings. In effect, we reiterated our previous interpretation in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Santos where we said:

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It (worker preference) will find application when, in proceedings such as insolvency, such unpaid wages shall be paid in full before the 'claims of the Government and other creditors' may be paid. But, for an orderly settlement of a debtor's assets, all creditors must be convened, their claims ascertained and inventoried, and thereafter the preferences determined in the course of judicial proceedings which have for their object the subjection of the property of the debtor to the payment of his debts or other lawful obligations. Thereby, an orderly determination of preference of creditors' claims is assured (Philippine Savings Bank vs. Lantin, No. L-33929, September 2, 1983, 124 SCRA 476); the adjudication made will be binding on all parties-in-interest since those proceedings are proceedings in rem; and the legal scheme of classification, concurrence and preference of credits in the Civil Code, the Insolvency Law, and the Labor Code is preserved in harmony.

In ruling, as we did, in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Santos, we took into account the following pronouncements:In the event of insolvency, a principal objective should be to effect an equitable distribution of the insolvent's property among his creditors. To accomplish this there must first be some proceeding where notice to all of the insolvent's creditors may be given and where the claims of preferred creditors may be bindingly adjudicated. The rationale therefore has been expressed in the recent case of DBP v. Secretary of Labor (G.R. No. 79351, 28 November 1989), which we quote:

A preference of credit bestows upon the preferred creditor an advantage of having his credit satisfied first ahead of other claims which may be established against the debtor. Logically, it becomes material only when the properties and assets of the debtors are insufficient to pay his debts in full; for if the debtor is amply able to pay his various creditors in full, how can the necessity exist to determine which of his creditors shall be paid first or whether they shall be paid out of the proceeds of the sale (of) the debtor's specific property. Indubitably, the preferential right of credit attains significance only after the properties of the debtor have been inventoried and liquidated, and the claims held by his various creditors have been established.

In the present case, there is as yet no declaration of bankruptcy nor judicial liquidation of TPWII. Hence, it would be premature to enforce the worker's preference.The additional ratiocination of public respondent that "under Article 110 of the Labor Code complainant enjoys a preference of credit over the properties of TPWII being held in possession by DBP," is a dismal misconception of the nature of preference of credit, a subject matter which we have already discussed in clear and simple terms and even distinguished from a lien in Development Bank of the Philippines v. NLRC:

. . . A preference applies only to claims which do not attach to specific properties. A lien creates a charge on a particular property. The right of first preference as regards unpaid wages recognized by Article 110 does not constitute a lien on the property of the insolvent debtor in favor of workers. It is but a preference of credit in their favor, a preference in application. It is a method adopted to determine and specify the order in which credits should be paid in the final distribution of the proceeds of the insolvent's assets. It is a right to a first preference in the discharge of the funds of the judgment debtor. . . . In the words of Republic v. Peralta, supra: 'Article 110 of the Labor Code does not purport to create a lien in favor of workers or employees for unpaid wages either upon all of the properties or upon any particular property owned by their employer. Claims for unpaid wages do not therefore fall at all within the category of specially preferred claims established under Articles 2241 and 2242 of the Civil Code, except to the extent that such claims for unpaid wages are already covered by Article 2241, number 6: 'claims for laborers' wages, on the goods manufactured or the

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work done'; or by Article 2242, number 3: 'claims of laborers and other workers engaged in the construction, reconstruction or repair of buildings, canals and other works, upon said buildings, canals and other works. . . . To the extent that claims for unpaid wages fall outside the scope of Article 2241, number 6, and 2242, number 3, they would come within the ambit of the category of ordinary preferred credits under Article 2244.

The DBP anchors its claims on a mortgage credit. A mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted (Article 2176, Civil Code). It creates a real right which is enforceable against the whole world. It is a lien on an identified immovable property, which a preference is not. A recorded mortgage credit is a special preferred credit under Article 2242 (5) of the Civil Code on classification of credits. The preference given by Article 110, when not falling within Article 2241 (6) and Article 2242 (3) of the Civil Code and not attached to any specific property, is an ordinary preferred credit although its impact is to move it from second priority to first priority in order of preference established by Article 2244 of the Civil Code.

The present controversy could have been easily settled by public respondent had it referred to ample jurisprudence which already provides the solution. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Once a case is decided by this Court as the final arbiter of any justiciable controversy one way, then another case involving exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same manner. Public respondent had no choice on the matter. It could not have ruled any other way. This Court having spoken in a string of cases against public respondent, its duty is simply to obey judicial precedents. Any further disregard, if not defiance, of our rulings will be considered a ground to hold public respondent in contempt.