CASE TITLE:G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner, vs.THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent.TOPIC:

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION

FACTS:

These two (2) petitions were consolidated per resolution dated August 9, 1988 1 and are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284.

In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein.

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:

The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:

Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

DEFENDANTS CONTENTION:

The Solicitor General counters that Department of Justice opinion on EO No. 248 is "reasonably valid and constitutionally firm," and construed the limitation imposed by E.O. No. 284 as not applying to ex-officio positions or to positions which, although not so designated as ex-officio are allowed by the primary functions of the public official, but only to the holding of multiple positions which are not related to or necessarily included in the position of the public official concerned (disparate positions).

ISSUE:

Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.

DECISION:

No, it is unconstitutional.It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitutions manifest intent and the peoples understanding thereof.

In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

==================================================================================================================

CASE TITLE:G.R. No. 124360 November 5, 1997FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner, vs.THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents.TOPIC:

PROPER PARTY (LOCUS STANDI)

TAXPAYERS SUIT - REQUISITES

FACTS:

Oil Deregulation Law

PETITIONERSCONTENTION:

Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has always been finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law allows that any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims, among others, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxed on unrefined crude products and 7% on refined crude products.

DEFENDANTSCONTENTION:

Respondents, on the other hand, fervently defend the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392. In addition, respondents contend that the issues raised by the petitions are not justiciable as they pertain to the wisdom of the law. Respondents further aver that petitioners have no locus standi as they did not sustain nor will they sustain direct injury as a result of the implementation of R.A. No. 8180. The Court then tries to resolve the petitions on the merit. The petitions raise procedural and substantive issues bearing on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392. The procedural issues are: (1) whether or not the petitions raise a justiciable controversy, and (2) whether or not the petitioners have the standing to assail the validity of the subject law and executive order. The substantive issuesconcerning its constitutionality.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.

DECISION:

The SC declared that the effort of respondents to question the locus standi of petitioners must also fall on barren ground. In language too lucid to be misunderstood, this Court has brightlined its liberal stance on a petitioner's locus standi where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people.In KapatiranngmgaNaglilingkodsaPamahalaanngPilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,the Court stressed:Objections to taxpayers' suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing or interest are, however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions.

==================================================================================================================

CASE TITLE:G.R. No. 88265 December 21, 1989SANTIAGO A. DEL ROSARIO, GEORGE G. GACULA, EDGARDO G. SANTOS, ALBANO S. SIBAL, ALBERTO C. REYES, NONITO P. ARROYO, EMMANUEL F. TERENCIO, DOMINGO S. DE LEON, MODESTO O. LLAMAS, FARIDA U. ALONTO, ZENAIDA A. FLOIRENDO, ISABEL A. MEJIA, LUZ P. MABANAG, RAMON H. RABAGO, JR., SAMUEL D. TROCIO and OSCAR M. BRION, petitioners, vs.HON. ALFREDO R. BENGZON, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Health, respondent.TOPIC:

TESTS OF VALID EXERCISE (LIMITATIONS)

LAWFUL SUBJECT: PUBLIC INTEREST

FACTS:

The Philippine Medical Association is the national organization of medical doctors in the Philippines. They assail the constitutionality of some of the provisions of Generics Act of 1988 (Rep. Act 6675) and the implementation of Administrative Order No. 62. The law specifically provides that All government health agencies shall use generic terminology or generic names in all transactions related to purchasing, prescribing, dispensing, and administering of drugs and medicines. It also includes medical, dental and veterinary, private practitioners shall write prescriptions using the generic name. PETITIONERS CONTENTION:The petitioners main argument is the alleged unequal treatment of government practitioners and those on the private practice. It is because the former are required to use only generic terminology in the prescription while the latter may write the brand name of the drug below the generic name. It is allegedly a specie of invalid class legislation. In addition, the petitioners gave a distorted interpretation on RA 6675 and Admin Order No. 62 saying that the salesgirl and or druggist have the discretion to substitute the doctors prescription. The court says that the salesgirl at the drugstore counter merely informs the customer, but does not determine all the other drug products or brands that have the same generic name and their prices. RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:Respondent points out that the institution of generics in the Philippines will compel physicians to prescribe drugs based on their therapeutic or "active ingredient," instead of their well-known brand names. Multiple medications which may produce potentially adverse, even lethal, chemical reactions in the patient will thereby be avoided. Patients with limited means will be able to buy generic drugs that cost less but possess the same active ingredients, dosage form, and strength as brand names, many of which are priced beyond the reach of the common tao because the high costs of advertising, packaging, royalties, and other inputs of production determine their pricing for the market.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Generics Act is constitutional as to the exercise of police power by the government.

DECISION:Petition Dismissed. The court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act. It implements the constitutional mandate for the State to protect and promote the right to health of the people and to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. The alleged unequal treatment of government physicians, dentists and veterinarians on one hand and those in the private practice in the other, is a misinterpretation of the law. The salesgirl at the drugstore counter merely informs the customer of all available products, but does not determine all the other drug products or brands that have the same generic name and their corresponding process. The penal sanction in violation of the law is indispensable because they are the teeth of the law. Without them, the law would be toothless. The Generics Act and the implementing administrative orders of theSecretary of Health are constitutional. The purpose of the Generics Act is to promote and require the use of generic drugproducts that are therapeutically equivalent to their brand name counterparts. The effect of the drug does not depend on its brand but on the active ingredients which it contains.

TITLE OF THE CASE: Dumlao v. COMELEC

TOPIC: Levels of Scrutiny; Bill of Rights; and Rights of the Accused

FACTS:

Petitioners Contention: Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of BatasangPambansaBlg. 52 as being contrary to the equal protection clause guarantee by the Constitution, and seeks to prohibit respondent COMELEC from implementing the said provision.

Respondents Contention: Respondent COMELEC claims that the purpose of special disqualification of section 4 of Batas PambansaBlg. 52 is to infuse new blood in local governments which accepted by majority. Said section 4 provides:

Sec. 4. Special Disqualification- In addition to violation of Section 10 of Art. XII-C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned I existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification of any of the elective enumerated in Section 1 hereof.

Any retired elective provincial, city municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under law and who shall been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of the office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.

FACTS:

Patricio Dumlao petitioner was a former governor of Nueva Viscaya. He has retired from his office and he has receiving retirement benefits therefrom. He filed for reelection to the same office for the 1980 local elections. On the other hand BP 52 was passed providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Petitioner assailed the said provisions BP52 is unconstitutional as it is contrary to the equal protection clause guaranteed by the Constitution.

The petitioner case is within the jurisdiction of respondent COMELEC and as provided by Sec.2, Art. XII-C, for the Constitution the pertinent portions which reads:Section 2. The COMELEC shall have the following power and functions.The sole judged of all contest relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all the members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials.

The aforequoted provision must also be related to Section 11 of Art. XII-C, which provides:Section 11. Any decision, order. Or rulling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from his receipt of a copy thereof.

ISSUE (S): Whether or not the first paragraph of Section 4 of Batas PambansaBlg. 52 is valid.

COURT DECISIONS:

Yes the Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg.52 is valid. In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit of such denial.

The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the low and applies to all those belonging to the same class.

DISSENTING OPINION:

Teehankee, J., Sec.4 of Batas PambansaBlg. 52 Special Disqualification is void. The claim of the respondent COMELEC as accepted by majority, is that the purpose of the special disqualification is to infuse new blood in local governments but classification is not rational. It is not germane or relevant to the alleged purpose of infusing new blood because such old blood retirees may continue in local governments since they are not disqualified at all to run at any other local elective office, other than the local elective office from which they retired.

Furthermore, in the case of 65-year old local elective officials, they are disqualified only when they have received payment of the retirement benefits to which they are entitled under the law. If they are not received such retirement benefit they are not disqualified.

In addition, the mere fact that a candidate is less than 65 or has young or new blood does not mean that he would be more efficient, effective and competent than a mature 65-year old like the petitioner who has experience on the job and who was observed in the hearing to appear to be most physically fit.

CONCURRING OPINION:

Barredo, J., I concur. But as regards the matter of equal protection, I reiterate my view of Peralta that Sec. 9 (1) Article XII is more expensive than the equal protection clause.

Aquino, J., I concur in the result as to paragraph 1 of the dispositive part of the decision. I dissent as to paragraph 2. In my opinion, paragraph 2, section 4 of Batas PambansaBilang 52 is valid, being similar to certain presumptions in Articles 217 and 315 of the Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885. See U.S. v. Luling, 34 Phil. 725 and People v. Mingoa, 92 Phil. 856.

Abad Santos, J., I concur but wish to add that a judgment of conviction as provided in Sec. 4, par. 2 of Batas PambansaBlg. 52 should be one which is final and unappealable.

CASE TITLE:In re Cunanan

PETITIONER: Albino Cunanan

RESPONDENT: Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag

TOPIC: Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates

FACTS:

The Congress passed Republic Act 972, also known to be the controversial Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which has the title An Act To Fix The Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and Including1955.

Section 1. Republic Act 972 provides that any bar candidate who obtained the following general average in their corresponding bar examination year, without obtaining a grade below 50% in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar: from 1946 to 1951-70%; 1952- 71%; 1953- 72%; 1954- 73%; and 1955- 74%.

Section 2. Republic Act 972 provides that any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in any bar examination after July 4, 1946 shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take. The Republic Act will benefit 1,094 examinees. Petitions were filed, however, questioning the validity of Republic Act 972.

PETITIONER CONTENTIONS:Petitioner together with other bar flunker believes himself or herself that they are fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and pass by the SC and feeling that they have discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained a few percentage lower than those admitted to the bar, went to the congress for, and secured in 1951 Senate no. 12 for a consideration.

RESPONDENT CONTENTIONS:The President vetoed the said Bill after he was given advice adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the senate then approved Senate Bill no. 372 embodying substantially the provisions of the veto bill.

ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act 972 is constitutional.

HELD:The Court held Republic Act 972 to be partly constitutional, declaring the portion in Section1referring to the 1946 to 1952 examinations and all of Section 2 as unconstitutional, and declaring the remaining portions of the law as valid and shall continue in force. First of all, Republic Act 972 was passed to admit to the Bar those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation because of the aftermath of the Japanese occupation. The Court declared some parts unconstitutional because:

1. Its declared purpose is to admit candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-1952, and who are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner, and this is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.

2. It is a judgment revoking the resolution of the Court on the petitions of the 810 candidates without having examined their respective examination papers. In attempting to do it directly, Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.

3. Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and these are just considered minimum norms. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing rules.

4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to facts, which are of general knowledge, and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly class legislation.

5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void. Because of lack of votes, the portion pertaining to the 1953-1955 is declared valid and shall continue in force.

CONCURING AND DISSENTING OPINION:

LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege of this Court, because lawyers are members of the Court and only this Court should be allowed to determine admission thereto in the interest of the principle of the separation of powers. The power to admit is judicial in the sense that discretion is used in is exercise. This power should be distinguished from the power to promulgate rules, which regulate admission. It is only this power (to promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given in the Constitution to the Congress, not the exercise of the discretion to admit or not to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of examination, the qualifications of applicants, the passing grades, etc. are within the scope of the legislative power. But the power to determine when a candidate has made or has not made the required grade is judicial, and lies completely with this Court.I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function, and lies beyond the scope of the congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say that candidates who obtain a general average of 72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955 should be considered as having passed the examination is to mean exercise of the privilege and discretion judged in this Court. It is a mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for different years with grades lower than the passing mark. No reasoning is necessary to show that it is an arrogation of the Court's judicial authority and discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as discriminatory. Why should those taking the examinations in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to have the privilege of a lower passing grade, while those taking earlier or later are not?I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within the rule-making power of Congress, because it is an undue interference with the power of this Court to admit members thereof, and because it is discriminatory.

CASE TITLE: PLDT v. NTC

TOPIC: Business Organization; Corporate Fiction; Franchise; Right of Succession

FACTS:

In 1958, Congress a franchise to build radio stations (later construed as to include telephony) granted Felix Alberto & Co., Inc (FACI). FACI later changed its name to Express Telecommunications Co., Inc. (ETCI). In 1987, ETCI was granted by the National Telecommunications Commission a provisional authority to build a telephone system in some parts of Manila. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT) opposed the said grant as it avers, among others, that ETCI is not qualified because its franchise has already been invalidated when it failed to exercise it within 10 years from 1958; that in 1987, the Albertos, owners of more than 40% of ETCIs shares of stocks, transferred said stocks to the new stockholders (Cellcom, Inc.? not specified in the case); thatsuch transfer involving more than 40% shares of stocks amounted to a transfer of franchise which is void because the authorization of Congress was not obtained. The NTC denied PLDT. PLDT then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the NTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PLDTs petition should prosper.

COURT DECISION:

No. PLDT cannot attack ETCIs franchise in a petition for certiorari. It cannot be collaterally attacked. It should be directly attacked through a petition for quo warranto which is the correct procedure. A franchise is a property right and cannot be revoked or forfeited without due process of law. The determination of the right to the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the subject of the prerogative writ ofquo warranto. Further, for any violation of the franchise, it should be the government who should be filing a quo warranto proceeding because it was the government who granted it in the first place.

The transfer of more than 40% of the shares of stocks is not tantamount to a transfer of franchise. There is a distinction here. There is no need to obtain authorization of Congress for the mere transfer of shares of stocks. Shareholders can transfer their shares to anyone. The only limitation is that if the transfer involves more than 40% of the corporations stocks, it should be approved by the NTC. The transfer in this case was shown to have been approved by the NTC. What requires authorization from Congress is the transfer of franchise; and the person who shall obtain the authorization is the grantee (ETCI). A distinction should be made between shares of stock, which are owned by stockholders, the sale of which requires only NTC approval, and the franchise itself which is owned by the corporation as the grantee thereof, the sale or transfer of which requires Congressional sanction. Since stockholders own the shares of stock, they may dispose of the same as they see fit. They may not, however, transfer or assign the property of a corporation, like its franchise. In other words, even if the original stockholders had transferred their shares to another group of shareholders, the franchise granted to the corporation subsists as long as the corporation, as an entity, continues to exist. The transfer of the shares does not thereby invalidate the franchise. A corporation has a personality separate and distinct from that of each stockholder. It has the right of continuity or perpetual succession.DISSENTING OPINION:

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.,I share with the rest of the Court the desire to have a "modern, efficient, satisfactory, and continuous telecommunications service" in the Philippines. I register this dissent, however, because I believe that any frustrations over the present state of telephone services do not justify our affirming an illegal and inequitable order of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). More so when it appears that the questioned order is not really a solution to the problems bugging our telephone industry.

A. CASE TITLE: City of Quezon v. Ericta

B. TOPIC: Eminent domain: Invalid taking under the police power

C. FACTS:

Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPECEMETERYOR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDINGPENALTIESFOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF. The law basically provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of thememorial parkcemeteryshall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking police power.Petitioners Contention: Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, " to make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein."Respondents Contention: Respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property.The respondent also stresses that the general welfare clause is not available as a source of power for the taking of the property in this case because it refers to "the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property." The respondent points out that if an owner is deprived of his property outright under the State's police power, the property is generally not taken for public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed in order to promote the general welfare. The respondent cites the case of a nuisance per se or the destruction of a house to prevent the spread of a conflagration.

ISSUE: WON Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power. No.

A. COURT DECISIONS:Court of First Instance: declared Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, of the Quezon City Council null and void.Supreme Court: The petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent court is affirmed.The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a privatecemeteryto benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a publiccemeteryfor this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit and confiscate.

1. Case Title: Gonzales v. COMELEC 21SCRA774Topic: Amendment and Revision of the Constitution; Stages; Ratification Facts: On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed Joint Resolutions (a) to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180 to be apportioned among the several provinces; (b) to call a convention to propose amendments to the present Constitution; and (c) to amend Section 16, Article VI of the said Constitution so they can become delegates themselves to the Convention.

Subsequently, Congress passed a bill which became RA 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.

(1) Petitioner's Contention:Ramon A. Gonzales for G.R No. L-28196Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) for G.R. No. L-28224In this consolidated petition, petitioners Ramon A. Gonzales and PHILCONSA seek to (a) declare RA 4913 unconstitutional and (b) to restrain COMELEC from holding the plebiscite for the ratification of the constitutional amendments proposed in Joint Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3.

It is further contested that said resolutions are null and void because: (1) The Members of Congress, which approved the proposed amendments and the resolutions are, at best, de facto Congressmen; (2) Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives-- propose amendments or call a convention-- but may not avail of both at the same time; (3) The election, in which proposals for amendment to the Constitution shall be submitted for ratification, must be a special election, not a general election.(2) Respondents Contention:COMELEC; Director of Printing and Audito GeneralThat they have done it in accordance with the provision of the Constitution which does not specifically provides through a special election but only "election".Issue:Whether or not Constitutional Amendments be submitted for ratification in a General Election?

Court Decisions:(1) Lower Court: COMELECDismiss the petition of non-iplementing of R.A. 4913 an act providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the House Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted for approval by the people.(2) Appeallate Court: N. A(3) Supreme Court:(a) Chief Justice Concepcion;There is nothing in Section 1 Article XV of the 1935 Constitution that indicates "election" therein referred to is a "special election" not general election. The circumstance that three previous amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstance then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.(b) Concurring Opinion of Justice Makalintal;The ratification of the amendments to the Constitution need not necessarily be in a special election or plebiscite called for that purpose alone. While such procedure is highly to be preferred, the Constitution speaks simply of "an election" at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.

(c) Concurring Opinion of Justice BengzonHad the framers of the Constitution thought of requiring a special election for the purpose only to proposed amendments, they could have said so, by qualifying the phrase with some word such as "special" or "solely" or "exclusively". They did not.

Dissenting Opinion:(a) Dissenting Opinion of Justice Sanchez;That the proper submission of amendments to the people to enable them to equally ratify them properly is the meat of the constitutional requirement is reflected in the sequence of uniform practices. The Constitution has been amended thrice in 1939, 1940 and 1947 of which through a special election.(b) Concurring the opinion of Justice Sanchez, Justice JBL Reyes;The framers of the Constitution, aware of the fundamental character thereof and of the need of giving it as much stability as is practicable, could have only meant that any amendments thereto should be debated, considered and voted at an election wherein the people could devote undivided attention to the subject, which means through a special election.

Definition of Terms:

2. Case Title: Tarrosa v. Singson 232 SCRA 553

Topic: Requisites of Judicial Review; Necessity of Deciding the Constitutional Question

Facts: This is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner as a "taxpayer," questioning the appointment of respondent Gabriel Singson as Governor of the BangkoSentral Ng Pilipinas for not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The petition seeks to enjoin respondent Singson from the performance of his functions as such official until his appointment is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments and respondent Salvador M. Enriquez, Secretary of Budget and Management, from disbursing public funds in payment of the salaries and emoluments of respondent Singson.(1) Petitioner's Contention: JESUS ARMANDO A.R. TARROSA

Petitioner argues that respondent Singson's appointment is null and void since it was not submitted for confirmation to the Commission on Appointments. The petition is anchored on the provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653, which established the BangkoSentral as the Central Monetary Authority of the Philippines. Section 6, Article II of R.A. No. 7653 provides that the Governor of the BangkoSentral shall be head of a department and his appointment shall be subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments(2) Respondents Contention:GABRIEL C. SINGSON and HON. SALVADOR M. ENRIQUEZ III

(a) Respondents claim that Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointment of the Governor of the BangkoSentral. They contend that an appointment to the said position is not among the appointments which have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, as provided in Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.

(b) Respondents also aver that the BangkoSentral has its own budget and accordingly, its budgetary requirements are not subject to the provisions of the General Appropriations Act.

Issue: Whether or not the question of constitutionality of Section 6, Article II of R.A. No. 7653isindispensable for the determination of the case filed by the petitioner

Court Decisions:(1) Lower Court: N.A(2) Appeallate Court: N.A(3) Supreme Court:No, the court ruled that likewise, it is refrained from passing upon the constitutionality of Section 6, R.A. No. 7653 in deference to the principle that bars a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question unless the resolution thereof is indispensable for the determination of the case (Fernandez v. Torres, 215 SCRA 489 [1992]).

Dissenting Opinion:Definition of Terms:

3.Case Title: Republic v. La Orden de PP. Benedictinos de Filipinas 1 SCRA 646Topic: Eminent Domain; Elements; Necessity of the Exercise

Facts: To ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda Street, the Government drew plans to extend Azcarraga street from its junction with Mendiola street, up to the Sta. Mesa Rotonda, Sampaloc, Manila. To carry out this plan it offered to buy a portion of approximately 6,000 square meters of a bigger parcel belonging to La Orden de PP. Benedictinos de Filipinas, a domestic religious corporation that owns the San Beda College, a private educational institution situated on Mendiola street. Not having been able to reach an agreement on the matter with the owner, the Government instituted the present expropriation proceedings.

(1) Petitioner's Contention:REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

It is to be observed that paragraph IV of the complaint expressly alleges that appellant needs, among other properties, the portion of appellee's property in question for the purpose of constructing the Azcarraga street extension, and that paragraph VII of the same complaint expressly alleges that, in accordance with Section 64(b) of the Revised Administrative Code, the President of the Philippines had authorized the acquisition, thru condemnation proceedings, of the aforesaid parcel of land belonging to appellee, as evidenced by the third indorsement dated May 15, 1957 of the Executive Secretary.

(2) Respondents Contention:LA ORDEN DE PP. BENEDICTINOS DE FILIPINAS

I. That the property sought to be expropriated is already dedicated to public use and therefore is not subject to expropriation.II. That there is no necessity for the proposed expropriation.III. That the proposed Azcarraga Extension could pass through a different site which would entail less expense to the Government and which would not necessitate the expropriation of a property dedicated to education.IV. That the present action filed by the plaintiff against the defendant is discriminatory.V. That the herein plaintiff does not count with sufficient funds to push through its project of constructing the proposed Azcarraga Extension and to allow the plaintiff to expropriate defendant's property at this time would be only to needlessly deprive the latter of the use of its propertyIssue: Whether or not the need to open the extension of Azcarraga Street to ease and solve the traffic congestion on Legarda Street is a valid necessity for the exercise of expropriation by the government.

Court Decisions:(1) Lower Court:Dismiss the case in favor of the respondents

(2) Appeallate Court: N.A

(2) Supreme Court:The Supreme Court did not rule on the subject matter but decided that the case to be set aside and a present case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in order for the parties to be given an opportunity to present their respective evidence upon these factors and others that might be of direct or indirect help in determining the vital question of fact involved.

It is the rule in this jurisdiction that private property may be expropriated for public use and upon payment of just compensation; that condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a genuine necessity therefore of a public character. Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether or not there is a genuine necessity therefore (City of Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40 Phil. 349; Manila Railroad Company vs. Hacienda Benito, Inc., 37 O.G. 1957)

Dissenting Opinion:Definition of Terms:

4. Case Title: EPZA v. Dulay 149 SCRA 305 (1987) (Reversing NHA v. Reyes)Topic: Eminent Domain; Elements; Determination of Just Compensation: Judicial FunctionFacts: The question raised in this petition is whether or not Presidential Decrees Numbered 76, 464, 794 and 1533 have repealed and superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court, such that in determining the just compensation of property in an expropriation case, the only basis should be its market value as declared by the owner or as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.

(1) Petitioner's Contention:EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY

(2) Respondents Contention:HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONIssue:Court Decisions:(1) Lower Court:(2) Appeallate Court:(3) Supreme Court:Dissenting Opinion:Definition of Terms:

1. Case Title: Gonzales v. COMELEC 21SCRA774Topic: Amendment and Revision of the Constitution; Stages; Ratification Facts: On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed Joint Resolutions (a) to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180 to be apportioned among the several provinces; (b) to call a convention to propose amendments to the present Constitution; and (c) to amend Section 16, Article VI of the said Constitution so they can become delegates themselves to the Convention.

Subsequently, Congress passed a bill which became RA 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.

(1) Petitioner's Contention:Ramon A. Gonzales for G.R No. L-28196Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) for G.R. No. L-28224In this consolidated petition, petitioners Ramon A. Gonzales and PHILCONSA seek to (a) declare RA 4913 unconstitutional and (b) to restrain COMELEC from holding the plebiscite for the ratification of the constitutional amendments proposed in Joint Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3.

It is further contested that said resolutions are null and void because: (1) The Members of Congress, which approved the proposed amendments and the resolutions are, at best, de facto Congressmen; (2) Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives-- propose amendments or call a convention-- but may not avail of both at the same time; (3) The election, in which proposals for amendment to the Constitution shall be submitted for ratification, must be a special election, not a general election.(2) Respondents Contention:COMELEC; Director of Printing and Audito GeneralThat they have done it in accordance with the provision of the Constitution which does not specifically provides through a special election but only "election".Issue:Whether or not Constitutional Amendments be submitted for ratification in a General Election?

Court Decisions:(1) Lower Court: COMELECDismiss the petition of non-iplementing of R.A. 4913 an act providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the House Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted for approval by the people.(2) Appellate Court: N. A(3) Supreme Court:(a) Chief Justice Concepcion;There is nothing in Section 1 Article XV of the 1935 Constitution that indicates "election" therein referred to is a "special election" not general election. The circumstance that three previous amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstance then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.(b) Concurring Opinion of Justice Makalintal;The ratification of the amendments to the Constitution need not necessarily be in a special election or plebiscite called for that purpose alone. While such procedure is highly to be preferred, the Constitution speaks simply of "an election" at which theamendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.

(c) Concurring Opinion of Justice BengzonHad the framers of the Constitution thought of requiring a special election for the purpose only to proposed amendments, they could have said so, by qualifying the phrase with some word such as "special" or "solely" or "exclusively". They did not.

Dissenting Opinion:(a) Dissenting Opinion of Justice Sanchez;That the proper subm,ission of amendments to the people to enable them to equally ratify them properly is the meat of the constitutional requirement, is reflected in the sequence of uniform practices. The Constitution has been amended thrice in 1939, 1940 and 1947 of which through a special election.(b) Concurring the opinion of Justice Sanchez, Justice JBL Reyes;The framers of the Constitution, aware of the fundamental character thereof and of the need of giving it as much stability as is practicable, could have only meant that any amendments thereto should be debated, considered and voted at an election wherein the people could devote undivided attention to the subject, which means through a special election.

Definition of Terms:

2. Case Title: Tarrosa v. Singson 232 SCRA 553

Topic: Requisites of Judicial Review; Necessity of Deciding the Constitutional Question

Facts: This is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner as a "taxpayer," questioning the appointment of respondent Gabriel Singson as Governor of the BangkoSentral Ng Pilipinas for not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The petition seeks to enjoin respondent Singson from the performance of his functions as such official until his appointment is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments and respondent Salvador M. Enriquez, Secretary of Budget and Management, from disbursing public funds in payment of the salaries and emoluments of respondent Singson.(3) Petitioner's Contention: JESUS ARMANDO A.R. TARROSA

Petitioner argues that respondent Singson's appointment is null and void since it was not submitted for confirmation to the Commission on Appointments. The petition is anchored on the provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653, which established the BangkoSentral as the Central Monetary Authority of the Philippines. Section 6, Article II of R.A. No. 7653 provides that the Governor of the BangkoSentral shall be head of a department and his appointment shall be subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments(4) Respondents Contention:GABRIEL C. SINGSON and HON. SALVADOR M. ENRIQUEZ III

(c) Respondents claim that Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointment of the Governor of the BangkoSentral. They contend that an appointment to the said position is not among the appointments which have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, as provided in Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.

(d) Respondents also aver that the BangkoSentral has its own budget and accordingly, its budgetary requirements are not subject to the provisions of the General Appropriations Act.

Issue: Whether or not the question of constitutionality of Section 6, Article II of R.A. No. 7653isindispensable for the determination of the case filed by the petitioner

Court Decisions:(1) Lower Court: N.A(2) Appellate Court: N.A(3) Supreme Court:No, the court ruled that likewise, it is refrained from passing upon the constitutionality of Section 6, R.A. No. 7653 in deference to the principle that bars a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question unless the resolution thereof is indispensable for the determination of the case (Fernandez v. Torres, 215 SCRA 489 [1992]).

Dissenting Opinion:Definition of Terms:

3.Case Title: Republic v. La Orden de PP. Benedictinos de Filipinas 1 SCRA 646Topic: Eminent Domain; Elements; Necessity of the Exercise

Facts: To ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda Street, the Government drew plans to extend Azcarraga street from its junction with Mendiola street, up to the Sta. Mesa Rotonda, Sampaloc, Manila. To carry out this plan it offered to buy a portion of approximately 6,000 square meters of a bigger parcel belonging to La Orden de PP. Benedictinos de Filipinas, a domestic religious corporation that owns the San Beda College, a private educational institution situated on Mendiola street. Not having been able to reach an agreement on the matter with the owner, the Government instituted the present expropriation proceedings.

(3) Petitioner's Contention:REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

It is to be observed that paragraph IV of the complaint expressly alleges that appellant needs, among other properties, the portion of appellee's property in question for the purpose of constructing the Azcarraga street extension, and that paragraph VII of the same complaint expressly alleges that, in accordance with Section 64(b) of the Revised Administrative Code, the President of the Philippines had authorized the acquisition, thru condemnation proceedings, of the aforesaid parcel of land belonging to appellee, as evidenced by the third indorsement dated May 15, 1957 of the Executive Secretary.

(4) Respondents Contention:LA ORDEN DE PP. BENEDICTINOS DE FILIPINAS

I. That the property sought to be expropriated is already dedicated to public use and therefore is not subject to expropriation.II. That there is no necessity for the proposed expropriation.III. That the proposed Azcarraga Extension could pass through a different site which would entail less expense to the Government and which would not necessitate the expropriation of a property dedicated to education.IV. That the present action filed by the plaintiff against the defendant is discriminatory.V. That the herein plaintiff does not count with sufficient funds to push through its project of constructing the proposed Azcarraga Extension and to allow the plaintiff to expropriate defendant's property at this time would be only to needlessly deprive the latter of the use of its propertyIssue: Whether or not the need to open the extension of Azcarraga Street to ease and solve the traffic congestion on Legarda Street is a valid necessity for the exercise of expropriation by the government.

Court Decisions:(3) Lower Court:Dismiss the case in favor of the respondents

(2) Appellate Court: N.A

(4) Supreme Court:The Supreme Court did not rule on the subject matter but decided that the case to be set aside and a present case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in order for the parties to be given an opportunity to present their respective evidence upon these factors and others that might be of direct or indirect help in determining the vital question of fact involved.

It is the rule in this jurisdiction that private property may be expropriated for public use and upon payment of just compensation; that condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a genuine necessity therefore of a public character. Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether or not there is a genuine necessity therefore (City of Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40 Phil. 349; Manila Railroad Company vs. Hacienda Benito, Inc., 37 O.G. 1957)

Dissenting Opinion:Definition of Terms:

4. Case Title: EPZA v. Dulay 149 SCRA 305 (1987) (Reversing NHA v. Reyes)Topic: Eminent Domain; Elements; Determination of Just Compensation: Judicial FunctionFacts: The question raised in this petition is whether or not Presidential Decrees Numbered 76, 464, 794 and 1533 have repealed and superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court, such that in determining the just compensation of property in an expropriation case, the only basis should be its market value as declared by the owner or as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.

(3) Petitioner's Contention:EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY

The petitioner maintains that the respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and in setting the commissioner's report for hearing because under P.D. No. 1533, which is the applicable law herein, the basis of just compensation shall be the fair and current market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. Therefore, there is no more need to appoint commissioners as prescribed by Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and for said commissioners to consider other highly variable factors in order to determine just compensation. The petitioner further maintains that P.D. No. 1533 has vested on the assessors and the property owners themselves the power or duty to fix the market value of the properties and that said property owners are given the full opportunity to be heard before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. Thus, the vesting on the assessor or the property owner of the right to determine the just compensation in expropriation proceedings, with appropriate procedure for appeal to higher administrative boards, is valid and constitutional

(4) Respondents Contention:HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

The judiciary who has interpreted the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution and established the meaning, under the fundamental law, of just compensation and who has the power to determine it.

Issue: Whether the courts under P.D. 1533, which contains the same provision on just compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the power and authority to determine just compensation, independent of what is stated by the decree and to this effect, to appoint commissioners for such purpose.

Court Decisions:(1) Lower Court: The valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.

(2) Appellate Court: N.A

(3) Supreme Court:The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.Dissenting Opinion:

Definition of Terms: Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered.

A. Case Title: Cruz v. DENR [G.R. No. 135385]

B. Topic: Requisites of Judicial Review > actual case or controversy

C. Facts of the case

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).C.1 Petitioners contentiona) Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7, 8, 57 and 58 of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the Regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. b)Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners. C.2 Defendants Contentiona)Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) ----- IPRA is constitutional and the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.b)Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General ----- IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.

D. Issue: Whether or not the petition raised has an actual case or controversy. (Issue is based on the topic and concurring opinion of Justice Mendoza)

E. Court DecisionsE.3 Supreme Court: ( no explanation why the justices decided to dismiss or sustain the validity of IPRA, just this.) Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition and to sustain the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition.As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was re-deliberated upon. However, after re-deliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

F. Concurring Opinion (Justice Mendoza)

The judicial power vested in this Court by Art. VIII, 1 extends only to cases and controversies for the determination of such proceedings as are established by law for the protection or enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress or punishment of wrongs. In this case, the purpose of the suit is not to enforce a property right of petitioners against the government and other respondents or to demand compensation for injuries suffered by them as a result of the enforcement of the law, but only to settle what they believe to be the doubtful character of the law in question. Such judgment cannot be executed as it amounts to no more than an expression of opinion upon the validity of the provisions of the law in question.

Indeed, the judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do not involve actual cases or controversies without upsetting the balance of power among the three branches of the government and erecting, as it were, the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, as a third branch of Congress, with power not only to invalidate statutes but even to rewrite them. Yet that is exactly what we would be permitting in this case were we to assume jurisdiction and decide wholesale the constitutional validity of the IPRA contrary to the established rule that a party can question the validity of a statute only if, as applied to him, it is unconstitutional. Here the IPRA is sought to be declared void on its face.

Guanzon v. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623Ponente: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.The Constitution and the Courts>Requisites of Judicial Review>No Locus StandiFacts:This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit the military and police officers represented by public respondents from conducting "Areal Target Zonings" or "Saturation Drives" in Metro Manila. The forty one (41) petitioners state that they are all of legal age, bona fide residents of Metro Manila and taxpayers and leaders in their respective communities. They maintain that they have a common or general interest in the preservation of the rule of law, protection of their human rights and the reign of peace and order in their communities. They claim to represent "the citizens of Metro Manila who have similar interests and are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before this Court.Petitioners Contention:The "areal target zonings" or saturation drives" are in critical areas pinpointed by the military and police as places where the subversives are hiding.The arrests range from seven (7) persons during the July 20 saturation drive in Bangkusay, Tondo to one thousand five hundred (1,500) allegedly apprehended on November 3 during the drive at Lower Maricaban, Pasay City.The petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow a common pattern of human rights abuses.Defendants Contention:First, the respondents have legal authority to conduct saturation drives. And second, they allege that the accusations of the petitioners about a deliberate disregard for human rights are total lies.

Issue:WON the respective Petitioners have Legal Standing in filing the case. Ruling:Not one of the several thousand persons treated in the illegal and inhuman manner described by the petitioners appears as a petitioner or has come before a trial court to present the kind of evidence admissible in courts of justice. Moreover, there must have been tens of thousands of nearby residents who were inconvenienced in addition to the several thousand allegedly arrested. None of those arrested has apparently been charged and none of those affected has apparently complainedWhere not one victim complains and not one violator is properly charged, the problem is not initially for the Supreme Court.Dissenting Opinions:CRUZ, J.,While acknowledging that the military is conducting the saturation drives, the majority practically blinks them away on mere technicalities. First, there are no proper parties. Second, there is no proof. Therefore, the petition is dismissed.The ruling that the petitioners are not proper parties is a specious pretext for inaction. We have held that technical objections may be brushed aside where there are constitutional questions that must be met. There are many decisions applying this doctrine. (Rodriguez v. Gella, 92 Phil. 603; Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, 41 SCRA 702; Philconsa v. Jimenez, 65 SCRA 479; Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481; Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835; Lagunsad v. Court of Appeals; 154 SCRA 199; Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208). Lozada was in fact an aberration.I believe that where liberty is involved, every person is a proper party even if he may not be directly injured. Each of us has a duty to protect liberty and that alone makes him a proper party. It is not only the owner of the burning house who has the right to call the firemen. Everyone has the right and responsibility to prevent the fire from spreading even if he lives in the other block.SARMIENTO, J.,The petitioners, precisely, have a grievance to raise, arising from abuses they pinpoint to the lower offices of the Executive (which presumably has its imprimatur). To make it an executive problem, so I hold, is to make the Executive judge and jury of its own acts, and hardly, a neutral arbiter.First, the facts are not "second-hand", they are undisputed:There had been saturation drives. Second, the petitioners have trooped to the highest court with a legitimate grievance against the Executive (and military).

Occena v. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 1Ponente: Fernando, C.J.Amendments and Revision>Stages>Proposal StageFacts:The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of threeBatasangPambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity.The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law. The following are the three resolutions: Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections.The three resolutions were approved by the InterimBatasangPambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the BatasangPambansaBlg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution.Petitioners Contention:Petitioners argue the proposition that the amendments proposed are so extensive in character that they go far beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the Interim BatasangPambansa as Successor of the Interim National Assembly.

Issue:WON the Interim BatasangPambansa can validly propose amendments.

Ruling:The Interim BatasangPambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned.Thus any argument to the contrary is unavailing. As for the people being adequately informed, it cannot be denied that this time, as in the cited 1980 Occena opinion of Justice Antonio, where the amendment restored to seventy the retirement age of members of the judiciary, the proposed amendments have "been intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim BatasangPambansa, as well as through the mass media, [ so that ] it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment [ s ]."

Dissenting Opinion:TEEHANKEE, J.,The proposed amendments to be valid must come from the constitutional agency vested with the constituent power to do so, i.e. inthe Interim National Assembly provided in the Transitory Article XVII which would then have to be convened and not from the executive power as vested in the President (Prime Minister) from whom such constituent power has been withheld.The proposed amendments at bar having been adopted by the Interim BatasangPambansa as the fruit of the invalid October, 1976 amendments must necessarily suffer from the same Congenital infirmity.The three resolutions proposing complex, complicated and radical amendments of our very structure of government were considered and approved by the Interim BatasangPambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 27, 1981. It set the date of the plebiscite for thirty-nine days later on April 7, 1981 which is totally inadequate and far short of the ninety-day period fixed by the Constitution for submittal to the people to "sufficiently inform them of the amendments to be voted upon, to conscientiously deliberate thereon and to express their will in a genuine manner."

Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659Ponente: Cruz, J.Police Power>Test of Valid Exercise>Lawful MeansFacts:The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of Executive Order No. 626-A. Which prohibited the interprovincial movement of carabaos. Petitioners contention:That the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process.

Defendants contention:They are just following the law.

Issue:WON there was a lawful means in the exercise of police power pursuant to Executive Order No. 626-A.

Court Decision:Regional Trial Court of Iloilo Citysustained the confiscation of the carabaos. Intermediate Appellate Court upheld the Trial Court decision.Supreme Court:Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.

A. Case Title: Eslaban v. De Onorio [G.R. No. 146062 June 28, 2001]

B. Topic: Eminent Domain > Just Compensation > Definition

C. Facts of the caseRespondent Clarita Vda. deEnorio is the owner of a lot in Barangay M. Roxas, Sto. Nio, South Cotabato with an area of 39,512 square meters. The lot, known as Lot 1210-A-Pad-11-000586, is covered by TCT No. T-22121 of the Registry of Deeds, South Cotabato. On October 6, 1981, Santiago Eslaban, Jr., Project Manager of the NIA, approved the construction of the main irrigation canal of the NIA on the said lot, affecting a 24,660 square meter portion thereof. Respondents husband agreed to the construction of the NIA canal provided that they be paid by the government for the area taken after the processing of documents by the Commission on Audit. A right-of-way agreement was entered into by the parties in which respondent was paid the amount of P4, 180.00 as right of way damages. Subsequently, respondent executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees which waives her rights for the damage to the crops due to construction of the right of way. After which, respondent demands that petitioner pay P111, 299.55 for taking her property but the petitioner refused.At the pre-trial conference, the following facts were stipulated upon: (1) that the area taken was 24,660 square meters; (2) that it was a portion of the land covered by TCT No. T-22121 in the name of respondent and her late husband (Exh. A); and (3) that this area had been taken by the NIA for the construction of an irrigation canal. D. Issue: Whether or not the value of just compensation shall be determined from the time of the taking or from the time of the finality of the decision.

E. Courts Decisions

Regional Trial Court held that the NIA should pay respondent the amount of P107, 517.60 as just compensation for the 24,660 sq meters that have been used for the construction of the canal.

Court of Appeals also affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Supreme Court:With respect to the compensation which the owner of the condemned property is entitled to receive, it is likewise settled that it is the market value which should be paid or that sum of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor. Further, just compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just for then the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.

Thus, the value of the property must be determined either as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first. Even before the new rule, however, it was already held in Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgosthat the price of the land at the time of taking, not its value after the passage of time, represents the true value to be paid as just compensation. It was, therefore, error for the Court of Appeals to rule that the just compensation to be paid to respondent should be determined as of the filing of the complaint in 1990, and not the time of its taking by the NIA in 1981, because petitioner was allegedly remiss in its obligation to pay respondent, and it was respondent who filed the complaint.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to the extent that the just compensation for the contested property be paid to respondent in the amount of P16,047.61 per hectare, with interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of taking until full payment is made. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.

Case Title:Oposa vs. Factoran (G.R. No. 101083 | 1993-07-30)

Topic: Proper Party (locus standi) [under Topic C: The Constitution and the Courts; subtopic 2: requisites of judicial review]

Ponente: Justice Hilario G. Davide

Facts of the Case:Petitioners: minors and their respective parents and the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc.Respondents: Hon. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., in his capacity as the Sec. of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (substituted by Hon. Angel C. Alcala)

The petition stems from a civil case instituted by minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents against Fulgencio S. Factoran, the then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical rainforests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource. The petitioners also aver that they represent their generation and generations yet born (by virtue of inter-generational responsibility and inter-generational justice.) In the said civil case, the petitioners prayed to have all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) cancelled and for the DENR Secretary to cease and desist from approving new TLAs. They sought to prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests and arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the countrys vital life-support systems and continue rape of Mother Earth.

The case was dismissed by the lower court on the ground inter alia that the plaintiffs were not proper parties, hencethe filing of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 asking the Court to set aside the judgment.

Petitioner's Contention:

1. The complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR,Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law.2. The respondent has a correlative obligation, per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.3. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn, hence they are proper parties.

Defendants Contention:On the matter of proper party, the challenged RTC order stated that the complaint fell short in alleging with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.D. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.E. Supreme Court DecisionThe Supreme Court reversed the lower courts decision to dismiss the case on the ground that the plaintiffs were not proper parties. Petitioners have the legal standing. In fact, they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue on behalf of succeeding generation can only be based on the personality concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.The complaint focuses on a fundamental natural and legal right enshrined in the Constitution. The same right and source of obligation can justify the claimed inter-generational responsibility. Hence, they may bring the matter at hand to court and be granted the proper recognition.Section 16, Article II which recognizes above all: THE STATE SHALL PROTECT AND ADVANCE THE RIGHT TO A BALANCED AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY IN ACCORD WITH THE RHYTHM AND HARMONY OF NATURE. Said provision is recognized as self executory and hence may be a source of obligation upon the state without need of further positive act from Congress.

A. Case Title:Tio v. VRB, 151 SCRA 208B. Topic: The Fundamental Power of the State > Police Power >Tests of Valid ExerciseC. Facts of the Case

Parties: VALENTIN TIO doing business under the name and style of OMI ENTERPRISES (petitioner) vs.VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, MINISTER OF FINANCE, METRO MANILA COMMISSION, CITY MAYOR and CITY TREASURER OF MANILA (respondents.)

This petition was filed on September 1, 1986 by petitioner on his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of other videogram operators adversely affected. It assails the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry (hereinafter briefly referred to as the BOARD). The Decree was promulgated on October 5, 1985 and took effect on April 10, 1986, fifteen (15) days after completion of its publication in the Official Gazette.

On November 5, 1985, a month after the promulgation of the abovementioned decree, Presidential Decree No. 1994 amended the National Internal Revenue Code providing SEC. 134.

Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.

Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program. Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall acrrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.xxx xxxxxx

C.1 Respondent's ContentionThe rationale behind the decree is set out in its preambular clauses: 1. The proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of moviehouses and theaters, and have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues;2. Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and such earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year;3. The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie industry, particularly the more than 1,200 movie houses and theaters throughout the country, and occasioned industry-wide displacement and unemployment due to the shutdown of numerous moviehouses and theaters;4. In order to ensure national economic recovery, it is imperative for the Government to create an environment conducive to growth and development of all business industries, including the movie industry which has an accumulated investment of about P3 Billion;5. Proper taxation of the activities of videogram establishments will not only alleviate the dire financial condition of the movie industry upon which more than 75,000 families and 500,000 workers depend for their livelihood, but also provide an additional source of revenue for the Government, and at the same time rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms;6. The rampant and unregulated showing of obscene videogram features constitutes a clear and present danger to the moral and spiritual well-being of the youth, and impairs the mandate of the Constitution for the State to support the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character and promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being;7. Civic-minded citizens and groups have called for remedial measures to curb these blatant malpractices which have flaunted our censorship and copyright laws;8. In the face of these grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the people and betraying the national economic recovery program, bold emergency measures must be adopted with dispatch;

C.2. Petitioner's Contention1. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local government is a RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject matter thereof;2. The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution;3. There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the vast powers conferred upon him by Amendment No. 6;4. There is undue delegation of power and authority;5. The Decree is an ex-post facto law; and6. There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a nuisance, which it is not.

D. Issue: Whether or not the tax imposed by the Decree is a valid exercise of police power.

E. Supreme Court Decision: On the matter of whether or not the decree is a valid exercise of police power, the court held that the levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition. The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one industry over another. It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that "inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation". Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power

A. Case Title: US v. Causby [ 328 US 256]

B. Topic: Eminent Domain > Elements > Taking

C. Facts of the caseRespondents own 2.8 acres near an airport outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. It hason it a dwelling house, and also various outbuildings which were mainly used for raising chickens. The noise is startling. And at night the glare from the planes brightly lights up the place. As a result of the noise, respondents had to give up their chicken business.

C.1 Petitioners Contention. Under those statutes the United States has 'complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air space' over this country. It is, therefore, argued that since these flights were within the minimum safe altitudes of flight which had been prescribed, they were an exercise of the declared right of travel through the airspace. The United States concludes that when flights are made within the navigable airspace without any physical invasion of the property of the landowners, there has been no taking of property.

C.2 Defendants Contention. Defendant argues that he owned the airspace above his farm. By flying planes in this airspace, he argued, the government had confiscated his property without compensation, thus violating the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

D. Issue.Whether respondents' property was taken within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment by frequent and regular flights of army and navy aircraft over respondents' land at low altitudes.

E. Courts Decisions

The ancient doctrine of common law ownership of the landdoes not control the present case. For the United States conceded on oral argument that if the flights over respondents' property rendered it uninhabitable, there would be a taking compensable under the Fifth Amendment. Though it would be only an easement of flight which was taken, that easement, if permanent and not merely temporary, normally would be the equivalent of a fee interest. It would be a definite exercise of complete dominion and control over the surface of the land.The reason is that there would be an intrusion so immediate and direct as to subtract from the owner's full enjoyment of the property and to limit his exploitation of it. While the owner does not in any physical manner occupy that stratum of airspace or make use of it in the conventional sense, he does use it in somewhat the same sense that space left between buildings for the purpose of light and air is used. The superadjacent airspace at this low altitude is so close to the land that continuous invasions of it affect the use of the surface of the land itself. We think that the landowner, as an incident to his ownership, has a claim to it and that invasions of it are in the same category as invasions of the surface.The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public domain. Flights over private land are not a taking, unless they are so low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land. For the findings of the Court of Claims plainly establish that there was a diminution in value of the property and that the frequent, low-level flights were the direct and immediate cause.

Mr. Justice BLACK, dissenting.It is inconceivable to me that the Constitution guarantees that the airspace of this Nation needed for air navigation, is owned by the particular persons who happen to ow