Leaders and Followers

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Leaders and FollowersAuthor(s): Jonathan ClarkeSource: Foreign Policy, No. 101 (Winter, 1995-1996), pp. 36-51Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLCStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149405 .

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Leaders and Followers

by Jonathan Clarke

n1960 the British socialist Aneurin Bevan defended Great Britain's possession of nuclear weapons on the grounds that, without them, the country's ministers would "go naked into the council chambers of the world." As funds for American foreign policy continue to wane, a similar fate may await Amer-

ica's representatives. With the political wind in the United States blowing hard in the direction of domestic regeneration, the realistic and reasonable premise must be that for the foreseeable future U.S. foreign policy will have to make do with meager resources and scant public interest. Under these circumstances, American leadership of the tous azimuts Cold War genre may be difficult to sustain.

Given that for one-half century American leadership has acted as the center of gravity for global order, this development carries im- portant implications for the way in which the world manages its affairs. Handled sensibly, there is no reason why both American influence and world order should not be able to survive reasonably intact. For this to happen, significant adjustment to the assumptions on which international relations are conducted will be necessary.

In the United States, the predominant ethos under which Amer- ican leadership is asserted as a natural, self-evident right will have to give way to a more nuanced, more finely calibrated approach to foreign policy. Abroad, foreigners will have to assume more responsibility for managing their own affairs without turning to Washington to bail them out whenever they get into a fix. As yet, however, the necessary changes-both here and abroad-have been slow in coming.

J O N AT H AN C LA RKE is a guest scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. His most recent book (co-authored with James Clad) is After the Crusade: American Foreign Policy for the Post-Superpower Age (Madison Books, 1995).

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FOREIGN POLICY

In separate articles in the Spring 1995 issue of FOREIGN POLICY, Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Senate majority leader Robert Dole presented their respective visions for American foreign policy in the wake of the November 1994 congressional elections. In otherwise contrasting accounts, both singled out one common desideratum: American leadership. Between them, they used the word "leadership" (in one form or another) some 36 times.

In these days of spite and bile in the political discourse of the United States, it may seem churlish to raise objection when a rare flash of bipartisanship illuminates the night sky. But this is precisely the point. Bipartisanship is so rare and precious a commodity that it needs to be jealously guarded. If leadership in its Cold War sense has lost its validity as the organizing principle of America's approach to the world, bipartisan endorsement of it is positively unhelpful, ob- scuring as it does the need for new thinking. Bipartisanship is not an intrinsic good. The fact that the House of Representatives passed the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution by a vote of 416 to 0 is today a source of embarrassment rather than pride.

What is wrong with the idea of leadership? To be sure, it is a sonorous word and a concept with wide popular appeal. Also writing in the Spring 1995 issue of FOREIGN POLICY, John Rielly, president of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, reported that polls in- dicate "Americans clearly want strong foreign policy leadership."

The word "leadership" carries populist connotations that have value as a routine political prop. But both Christopher and Dole use it for a more serious purpose: They want to combat what they see as the trend toward isolationism. In this sense, they use it as a near syn- onym for "engagement" or "commitment" and as an antonym for "withdrawal" or "decline."

If their purpose was simply to rally public opinion against the dangers of American global withdrawal, then one might be inclined to find both Christopher and Dole guilty of rhetorical overkill (hardly a mortal sin) but innocent of any more serious transgression.

Their claims, however, appear to go well beyond domestic cheer- leading. Christopher compared the need for American leadership today to the period in the immediate aftermath of World War II. For his part, Dole wrote that "never before..,. has America been so alone at the pinnacle of global leadership." Such claims raise high expectations about the substance of America's position in the world. If, as

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may be the case, performance falls short of these expectations, the result will be yet more disillusionment and cynicism. In time, this will inevitably produce dangerous stresses in the structure of international relations.

AMERICAN LEADERSHIP AS THE IDEAL

he embrace of American leadership as the foreign policy ideal is very much the "establishment" position. Most foreign policy writers and institutions share this sentiment in one form

or another. Sometimes, leadership is expressed with undertones of contempt for the non-American world, as by New York Times columnist William Safire, who has written of the United States as "master" castigating the "donkey" represented by the rest of the world. Else- where, in its 1992 report Changing Our Ways, the Carnegie Endow- ment National Commission on America and the New World treats leadership as a type of noblesse-oblige duty. "Twice before in this century the United States and our allies triumphed in a global struggle," it notes. "Twice before we earned the right to be an arbiter of a post- war world. This is our third chance." A third variant on the leadership theme contains a trace of anxiety. Commenting on the May 1995 summit between President Bill Clinton and Russian president Boris Yeltsin, former secretary of state Henry Kissinger lamented that this was a missed opportunity for American "leadership." Unless America leads, he added with a note of trepidation, it will be "marginalized."

Taken together, these claims amount to an unanimous reassertion of the "only America can do it" spirit that marked the most purple of Cold War prose. Their implication is that, unless the United States takes charge throughout much of the world, disaster will ensue. In other words, despite all the protestations to the contrary, for practical purposes America must remain the guarantor of global order. The American sentry must continue the lonely Wacht am Rhein-and on other, less familiar frontier rivers.

There is so much intellectual and emotional capital invested in the concept of "America as number one" that any questioning of it is usually dismissed as hangdog or unpatriotic. The furious contro- versy that engulfed Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Pe- ter Tarnoff, when, in 1993, he cautiously suggested-much as Kissinger had done in the 1970s-that there were some areas of

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global activity in which the United States would not take the lead, illustrates the point.

The sound-bite quality-"leaders" versus "declinists"-of the debate about America's foreign policy course is regrettable. In fact, the options are more nuanced. Sometimes, as recently in Bosnia, Amer- ican leadership can be decisive; at others, perhaps over North Asian security, a more collegial approach will be needed. The danger is that, with the onset of the presidential campaign, nuances will be sub- merged between, on the one side, the beguiling rhetorical image of American foreign policy leadership that politicians will offer voters and, on the other, the real resources that these same politicians and voters will be willing to devote to foreign affairs.

This mismatch between resources and aspirations tears at the heart of a successful foreign policy. As the gap between American pronouncements and the practical American ability to enforce them becomes more glaring-as, for example, has been the case over Iran-the defense of American interests will become measurably more difficult.

At the risk, therefore, of appearing "declinist," it makes sense to look at the idea of leadership not in any spirit of deconstruction or doom and gloom but soberly to examine its requirements in terms of attributes and resources. What does "leadership" mean? What con- crete actions are necessary to turn it from boilerplate oratory into on- the-ground reality?

Given greater clarity on these issues, the American people can judge whether they accept the full implications of leadership and whether they are willing to provide the necessary resources. As Christopher correctly points out, leadership cannot be had "on the cheap."

BEAR ANY BURDEN?

Leadership comes in many shapes and sizes. For the purposes of international relations, however, the essence of leadership can be said to lie in disproportion-positively of privilege, negatively

of obligation-and in a willingness to incur sacrifices for multilateral over unilateral interests.

Writing nearly a century ago at the height of the British Empire when the Royal Navy was dispensing free security to all and sundry,

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a British naval officer neatly summarized this sense of selfless service to a common purpose:

We looked on the Navy more as a World Police Force than as a warlike institution. We considered that our job was to safeguard law and order throughout the world-safeguard civilization, put out fires onshore, and act as guide, philosopher and friend to the merchant ships of all nations.

Most people find it easy to live with excess of privilege but usually are less happy with disproportion of obligation and sacrifice. Hap- pily for human liberty, the United States bucked this trend during the Cold War. The United States showed a consistent capacity both for intellectual leadership and for producing the necessary resources on its own account. Through its creative sponsorship of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), NATO, the international fi- nancial institutions, the rehabilitation of Germany and Japan, and so on, the United States has demonstrated a remarkable ability to give weight to systemic interests alongside, or even ahead of, national interests. No promissory notes were demanded for the Marshall Plan. Officials in the Truman administration regarded American trade deficits as a form of praiseworthy American aid. In 1961 President John Kennedy declared to a rapturous reception that America was prepared to "pay any price, bear any burden" in support of belea- guered foreigners.

American reactions to events since the fall of the Berlin Wall raise considerable doubt about whether today's interpretation of leadership still includes this commitment to unequal obligation. In many fields-aid, security, trade-that generous willingness to assume dis- proportionate burdens seems under notable strain. People no longer ask first what is good for the world; they ask what is good for Amer- ica. At his confirmation hearings in 1993, Christopher turned Kennedy's blank-check rhetoric on its head. "I want to assure the American people," he said, "that we will not turn their blood and treasure into an open account for use by the rest of the world."

The Persian Gulf war showed that, while the United States was still able to act decisively, it now felt entitled to present a bill to deep- pocketed beneficiaries of American action. Patrick Buchanan, the commentator and candidate for the Republican presidential nomi- nation, undoubtedly speaks for many Americans when he demands that Japan offer concessions on trade to compensate for the imbal-

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ance in U.S. and Japanese defense spending. The September 1995 peace agreement in Bosnia further illustrates

this reduction in instinctive American readiness to shoulder unilateral loads. Even against the backdrop of this considerable diplomatic success, the first instinct in the White House and on Capitol Hill was not to consolidate this display of American leadership, but-as the October Senate hearings showed-to minimize the exposure of American ground forces.

The implication is that, unless the United States

takes charge throughout much of the world, dis-

aster will ensue.

The aid debate shows similarly grudging attitudes. Most Ameri- cans are extremely unclear on the precise level of U.S. foreign aid (most significantly overestimate it), but there is an overwhelming consensus that it should be cut back-or that it should be cut off if the recipient does not do America's bidding. At work is a distinctly nonleadership feeling that America has been doing too much, has not been getting a big enough return on its money, and has been car- rying a disproportionately large share of the burden of assuring global order.

In the security field, similar doubts arise about whether today's leadership pretensions rest on the same spirit of commitment as in the past. For example, when building the case for American intervention in Greece and Turkey in February 1947, then deputy secretary of state Dean Acheson warned of the potential for immense So- viet gains at the expense of the West. "[America] alone," he said, "[is] in a position to break up the play." These were not mere words. The Truman doctrine followed some three weeks later.

Both Christopher and Dole refer back to the Truman period in their invocations of American leadership today. But both go to some length to set out the restrictions on American military deployment overseas. Both parties have made clear that their principal determi- nant for American intervention overseas is the national interest, not the integrity of the global system. The rhetoric may derive from the

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Wilson and Truman eras, but the behavior is light years removed. Finally, on trade, the American threat of unilateral sanctions

against Japan to obtain the June 1995 agreement on automobiles and auto parts provides instructive material for the shift in attitudes. Faced with a choice between systemic leadership-protecting an open free-trade system and the sanctity of treaty obligations while accepting a short-run sacrifice in a sectional national interest-and unilateralist attachment to American interests, the decision went in favor of national self-interest. While the validity of this decision can of course be argued on grounds of national interest, contrast this attitude with the tariff-cutting actions of the Truman administration, which encouraged an asymmetrical doubling of European imports to the United States while tolerating explicit discrimination against American products in Europe.

LEADERSHIP AND RESOURCES

I f-rhetoric aside-American international behavior since 1989 demonstrates an ebbing of classic leadership patterns, this trend is all the more marked in terms of the resources available for for-

eign policy. When the foundations for America's post-World War II leader-

ship were being laid in the 1940s, the United States was truly the dominant nation. Unlike the prostrate economies of Europe and Asia, the American economy had grown by one-half in real terms during the war years. The United States produced more than 40 per cent of world gross domestic product (GDP). It held a nuclear monopoly. Americans consumed on average 3,500 calories per day, nearly three times European levels. The United States financed some 65 per cent of imports into the western zone of Germany. Recognizing the des- perate economic position of Britain, the British National Union of Manufacturers noted in 1944, "Everything depends on the extent to which the Americans are willing to cooperate."

The situation in Asia at that time was very similar to that of Eu- rope. China was in the grips of a revolution. Japan's economy was one-twentieth the size of America's. Toyota was saved from bank- ruptcy by an order from the Department of Defense for its trucks. The United States enjoyed a trade surplus with Japan. South Korea, Tai- wan, and the other Asian tigers had not yet been heard from.

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It is of course a tired commonplace that this position of dominance has radically changed. The key statistic is that, with the laud- able return to health of foreign economies, the American share of world GDP has declined from its 1950 peak of 40 per cent to about 22 per cent, more or less the same level as in 1870. Other indicators of American foreign policy resource availability-in both the public and private sectors-are also in decline. These are the figures the United States is using to argue its case for a reduction in the Amer- ican U.N. assessment.

These drawdowns chip away at the American presence overseas. Sometimes the results are mostly symbolic. The State Department, for example, has announced its intention to close 25 diplomatic posts in 1996. And during Clinton's visit to Ukraine in May 1995, National Public Radio provided news coverage from the BBc rather than from American sources. But often the implications presage longer-term dangers. Japanese direct investment in China, for example, and development assistance to Asia in general now far outstrip that of the United States. The result is that over time Japan will be better placed to take advantage of these burgeoning markets.

An emotion-laden battle has taken place in the United States over the significance of these changes. This is not the place to re- hash the arguments. What should be of interest, however, is that the debate has been almost wholly insular. Foreigners have rarely been included. This is a serious omission, for foreigners constitute the flip side of the leadership coin. As the editor of this journal has pointed out, leaders need followers; for "leadership" to exist, there must also be a "followership" counterpart.

Foreigners do not seem eager to play this role. Without bothering to follow the intricacies of the internal American debate, they are already drawing their own conclusions. Like judges at a figure-skating competition, they are holding up large scoresheets that carry dis- tressingly low marks for American foreign policy performance. Rather than accepting American leadership, foreigners are tending to follow their own counsels.

This tendency includes both great and small nations. Defying in- tense American pressure in 1994, tiny Singapore proceeded to cane an American teenager. Bankrupt, isolated Cuba has successfully changed American immigration policy. Poland has defied American requests not to proceed with an arms deal with Iran. Jordan has re-

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sisted American pressure to break off commercial links with Iraq. Far from being able to use the Mutual Security Treaty to exercise subtle pressure to keep Japanese trade negotiators in line, American officials have been at pains to keep trade and security in separate com- partments, as was shown during the acrimonious summer 1995 dispute over automobiles and auto parts. China has rebuffed American demands on human rights and, in the wake of the granting of a visa to the president of Taiwan, extracted a public reaffirmation of the Clinton administration's commitment to a "one China" policy.

The same story applies in Europe. It is easy to lampoon European diplomatic muddle-headedness and military deficiencies, not to men- tion the crooked path of European integration, but this does not make American leadership an easy sell in Europe. There was once a time when the first reaction of the British Foreign Office to an overseas crisis was to send a cable to Washington seeking to know the American position. Today-even under the increasingly "Euroskep- tic" government of Prime Minister John Major-this cable is more likely to be addressed to Brussels, Bonn, or Paris. European political cooperation is far from being a perfectly tuned Rolls-Royce, but it has progressed well beyond the Yugo or Lada stage.

One consequence of this tighter European collaboration has been repeated European reluctance to follow the American lead. On Bosnia, Iran, Cuba, trade sanctions on Japan, and other issues, the Europeans have shown that they too can say no.

USING MILITARY POWER FOR DIPLOMACY

ome American politicians and commentators argue that these reversals do not signify any structural weakness in the American position. Instead, they say, the fault lies in inept presentation, as

was the case with the May 1993 attempt to persuade the Europeans to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia. Many suggest that an impe- rious, Cold War-style "do-as-you-are-told-or-we-pull-out" demand to the allies would have been more effective. Critics voiced similar sen- timents over the unsuccessful May 1995 representations to Russia to abandon its nuclear sales to Iran or to modify its behavior in Chech- nya. The more authoritative tone of National Security Adviser An- thony Lake's presentation to the European allies on Bosnia in early August 1995 is, they argue, a more appropriate model.

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Columnist Charles Krauthammer, a leading exponent of this school, put it thus in the May 12, 1995, Washington Post in lament- ing American foreign policy setbacks: "Clinton ... leads the sole re- maining superpower, fresh from victory in the Cold War, unchal- lenged by any Great Power for the first time in 50 years, in command of the world's dominant military force-and finds himself unable to be taken seriously by even the most minor world actors."

This approach grounds itself-both in terms of substance and psy- chology-in the undisputed fact that the United States is by far the most powerful military country in today's world. Even after reductions, the United States spends about as much on defense as does the rest of the world combined.

Like leadership, the relationship between force and diplomacy is an emotional issue. We cannot here do justice to the complex arguments on one side or the other. Two hundred years ago Frederick the Great of Prussia remarked that diplomacy without force is like an or- chestra without music. This sounds delightfully simple. But a contemporary military expert, British lieutenant-general Rupert Smith, who has held commands in both the Persian Gulf war and Bosnia- perhaps the two paradigmatic military experiences of the post-Cold War period-puts things differently: "[War], at least in its Western Form," he has written, "[has] to a large extent lost its utility."

Whatever the truth of the matter, the salient fact of today's world remains that overwhelming force is no substitute for inadequate diplomacy. The trade dispute with Japan is the most obvious case in point. But even in matters with more direct military content, such as Haiti, Somalia, and North Korea, American military dominance was hardly able to deliver clear-cut results. Over North Korea in Decem- ber 1993, sabers were rattled but never unsheathed. The potential cost of a war on the Korean peninsula effectively deterred the out- break of such hostilities. With regard to lowly Haiti and Somalia, few would regard these episodes as confirming the proposition that there is an easy path along which the United States can use military fire- power to advance its national interests.

Those who advocate American leadership as the organizing element in foreign policy find themselves, therefore, in something of a quandary. Regarding themselves as the heirs of the post-World War II titans, they are all too conscious that the recent U.S. world performance has not uniformly met their predecessors' rigorous standards.

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The response to this problem is, however, far from straightforward. It is difficult, for example, to believe the suggestion that the deficiencies are largely presentational. According to this idea, all would be well if only American policymakers would behave a bit more like Victorian grand-tourists by talking louder or like imperial viceroys by sending in the gunboats.

In fact, however, deeper forces appear to be at work. In terms of modem attitudes and contemporary resources, the foreign policy in- strumentality available to George Marshall, Dean Acheson, and George Kennan to project American leadership has vanished forever. A nation (United States 1995) with a 22 per cent share of world pro- duction inevitably encounters difficulty emulating a nation (United States 1950) with a 40 per cent share. Foreigners-the potential team of followers-are already making their positions clear; namely, that their deference to the United States cannot be taken for granted.

A valid response to the problem would be to attempt to restore the relative preponderance of the post-World War II American in- strumentality. This would involve a reversal of the downward direction of federal spending for foreign policy. Aid would need to be ex- panded and conditionality relaxed. With the United States now ranking at the bottom of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development nations in terms of per capita aid and with most aid now denominated in commercial credits tied to the purchase of American goods or to commissions for American consultants, aid today buys little influence. In the case of Russia, for example, Ameri- can aid, at less than $300 million, represents an insignificant pro- portion of the total Russian economy-certainly not enough to persuade the Russians to cancel lucrative contracts with Iran.

Increases in defense spending would be needed. Despite the rela- tively (compared with the rest of the world) generous U.S. defense budget, current defense spending, skewed as it is toward the acquisi- tion of advanced weaponry, contains little money for belligerent con- tingencies. Even small operations in America's immediate neighbor- hood (e.g., Haiti) have required supplementary funding. This situation causes administrative and political difficulties arising from current legislation, under which all additional spending must be off- set by corresponding reductions. If more active use of the armed forces is deemed essential in asserting American leadership, current appropriations--even allowing for the modest increases now foreseen

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in congressional legislation-will be seriously inadequate. Furthermore, spending on bureaucratic entities such as the State

Department and Voice of America would, at the very least, need to be maintained at current levels. World leaders do not close embassies; they open them-and they give the largest parties! They also pay their U.N. dues.

Readers can make up their own minds about whether such increases in foreign policy spending are likely to be forthcoming. At present, there does not appear to be a natural constituency for them. Public opinion, while showing a generalized wish that the United States should remain an influential nation, displays little inclination to push for additional resources or to accept the higher level of Amer- ican casualties that increased military activity would inevitably bring. Budget proposals before the Senate and the House of Representatives forebode major cutbacks in foreign aid and State Department funding, while doing little more than holding the line on defense. What- ever the eventual fate of these proposals, few observers expect to see any real growth in resources for foreign policy. The opposite is gen- erally considered more probable.

THE NECESSARY ADJUSTMENTS

he outside world, however, does not stand still in deference to the American budgetary process. American foreign interests still need to be protected, as does the integrity of the global

system. The job of world handyman performed so well by the United States for half a century still needs to be carried out. If Cold War patterns of behavior are no longer viable, a priority both for the United States and for other great powers interested in orderly world administration is to find a substitute.

Three major changes in the way the world carries out its business suggest themselves, two to be adopted by the United States and one by America's friends and allies.

First and foremost, American foreign policy attitudes need to be reviewed. Barring the (improbable) appropriation of increased resources, American leadership will never again be as widely or as un- questioningly accepted as it was during the Cold War. It will, therefore, no longer be possible to believe that policy can be independently formulated in Washington and then dispensed to the outside world

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like a papal bull. Just as this autocratic style no longer works domes- tically, so it will not work overseas.

This development means that, in terms of foreign policy attitudes, the United States should place more emphasis on collegiality, team- work, and coalition-building-in short, what Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich has called "partnerships." The skills of international "triangulation"-meaning to navigate with reference to other im- portant points-should be dusted off. In the domestic arena, these skills are second nature to all successful politicians, but to date they have been neglected in foreign affairs. A simple example is trade with Japan. The European Union (EU) shares many of the American complaints about market access, particularly with regard to agricul- tural products. A greater American disposition to build on European grievances would have strengthened the American case. Similarly, the United States's partners among the smaller Asian members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum share American concerns about predatory Japanese trade practices. They form a pool of potential support for the United States. As it is, the United States finds itself unnecessarily isolated on this issue.

It should be noted that a willingness to regard itself as primus inter pares rather than as paramount chief does not mean that the United States needs to abandon any core national interests. Indeed, this more realistic attitude affords greater probability that these interests will be protected.

Alongside attitudes, the techniques with which the United States interacts with the world need to be overhauled-once again with the objective of securing more durable protection for American interests. As leadership ebbs, the key requirement for the United States will be to find "multipliers" for its positions.

Fortunately, the United States finds itself well placed in this regard. Even as automatic deference to the United States has declined, overseas acceptance of U.S. policy positions has increased. The Eu- ropeans, for example, share American objectives in prying open Asian markets; they too have a strategic stake in successfully incor- porating Eastern Europe and Russia into the community of nations. Asians share American concerns about managing China's rise to world power. As the May 1995 permanent extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty shows, American objectives on this issue are almost universally shared. On ideological issues, there is no seri-

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ous challenge to the quintessentially American values of democracy, open markets, and human rights.

These factors represent very considerable strengths for the United States. They imply that the United States can achieve its objectives as readily by indirect means as through (less rewarding) direct, high- profile leadership. Stability and economic progress in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, for example, may be issues on which the Europeans can be allowed to lead by way of the EU rather than through transatlantic institutions. De facto this is already happen- ing. The EU has provided some three-quarters of total Western aid to the former Soviet Union and has opened its markets to East Eu- ropean goods far wider than have either the United States or Canada.

Regional organizations offer similar opportunities for achieving American objectives indirectly, and they may compensate for the American disinclination to have recourse to universalist organizations such as the United Nations. Regional organizations are prolif- erating steadily. Some, like the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, are merely fledgling entities, but others already have substantive ac- complishments to their credit. Examples might be the Council of Eu- rope, the Association of South East Asian Nations, the Economic Community of West African States, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, and the Argentine-Brazil Agency for Ac- counting and Control of Nuclear Materials.

With American attempts to superimpose global leadership look- ing increasingly unwelcome and futile, these and similar regional organizations offer genuine, alternative methods of furthering Ameri- can aims. To be sure, working through intermediaries will be complex. The process of building constituencies will require a high order of diplomacy-and therefore expertise, rather than patron- age-in America's foreign policy institutions. Also, the opportunities for flashy victories will be reduced. But these will be worthwhile sacrifices if thereby American long-term influence can be maintained.

The third leg in the triad of necessary changes lies with foreign countries. For more than half a century they have become used to the American nanny. They may have chafed against this-as did the French, for example-but American power represented the reality of international relations. In all fields, from economic to military to intellectual, the United States carried an unequal burden. An inter-

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national power vacuum never arose. These countries now need to accept much more of the burden for

themselves. Instead of simply wringing their hands over alleged American isolationism, they need to acknowledge their own responsibility for regional stability. The signs are not discouraging. As was noted, the EU is responding actively to the needs of Eastern Eu- rope, and Southeast Asia is taking steps to prevent regional misun- derstandings. But much more could be done, and more quickly. The pace of European integration remains painfully slow, inhibiting the ability of Europe to respond coherently to crises in such places as Bosnia and the Maghreb. In North Asia, the prospects for long-term regional security remain unsettled as the major Asian states cite doc- trinaire reasons for resisting moves toward some form of mutual security system. Too many states, but particularly those of the former Warsaw Pact, place the goal of unilateral short-term commercial profit over that of global stability.

As long as the United States served as the global balancing wheel, this behavior could be tolerated. Henceforward, however, foreign countries will have to assume much greater responsibility for world order. Japan, for example, will have to understand that it must con- tribute to, rather than simply benefit from, the world's free trade system. There are many ways in which foreign countries can exercise this greater responsibility. Some will do this through the United Na- tions, others through strengthened regional organizations. So long as the major regional powers recognize their new responsibilities, the precise manner of their actions can be left for later discussion.

If implemented, these changes would produce one central benefit: the distribution of world responsibility according to real rather than rhetorical ratios of power. For the United States, this will not be an easy argument for leaders to propose or accept. An apparent reduction in American leadership is always vulnerable to stump rhetoric. Yet present policies are subjecting American influence to ridicule. The emperor's nakedness is dangerously close to being ex- posed. The changes suggested here are designed to buy him some new clothes.

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