FREEDOM OF RELIGION

1987 Philippine Constitution, Art 3, Sec. 5. “No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.”

DATU FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS, DATU BLO UMPAR ADIONG, DATU MACALIMPOWAC DELANGALEN, CELSO PALMA, ALI MONTAHA BABAO, JULMUNIR JANNARAL, RASHID SABER, and DATU JAMAL ASHLEY ABBAS, representing the other taxpayers of Mindanao v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE GUILLERMO C. CARAGUE, DEPARTMENT SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENTG.R. No. 89651 November 10, 1989

FACTS:

A plebiscite was scheduled for the ratification of RA 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an

Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao" (Organic Act). The Act’s

constitutionality is being assailed in the consolidated petitions on the ground that it violates the

freedom of religion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not certain provisions of the Organic Act are unconstitutional for being violative

of the freedom of religion.

HELD:

The petition has no merit and the law is constitutional. Both petitions question the validity

of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantee on free exercise of

religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection centers on a provision in the Organic Act which mandates

that should there be any conflict between the Muslim Code and the Tribal Code on the one had, and

the national law on the other hand, the Shari'ah courts created under the same Act should apply

national law. Petitioners maintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran, which

makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any "man-made" national law.

Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by enumerating possible instances of conflict between

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provisions of the Muslim Code and national law, wherein an application of national law might be

offensive to a Muslim's religious convictions.

In the present case, no actual controversy between real litigants exists. There are no

conflicting claims involving the application of national law resulting in an alleged violation of

religious freedom. This being so, the Court in this case may not be called upon to resolve what is

merely a perceived potential conflict.

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Based on the grounds raised

by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds that petitioners

have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of these two petitions is, therefore,

inevitable.

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THE PROVINCE OF ABRA, represented by LADISLAO ANCHETA, Provincial Assessorv. HONORABLE HAROLD M. HERNANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch I, Court of First Instance Abra; THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF BANGUED, INC., represented by Bishop Odilo etspueler and Reverend Felipe FloresG.R. No. L-49336 August 31, 1981

FACTS:

The provincial assessor of Abra levied taxes on the real property of the Catholic Bishop of

Bangued. The latter filed for relief on the ground that the Constitution grants tax exemption on

properties exclusively, directly and actually used for religious or charitable purposes. Judge

Hernando, after a summary hearing granted the relief out right and without hearing the side of

petitioner, stating that the CBB without a doubt falls within the said Constitutional exemption. The

case is submitted to the SC on certiorari

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge erred in denying the petitioner’s motion to question

the exemption being claimed by the CBB

HELD:

The Supreme Court granted the certiorari, stating that it is only right to seek proof that the

said properties fall within tax exemption granted by the Constitution.

The Constitution provides that “charitable institutions, mosques and non-profit cemeteries

and required that for the exemption of “lands, buildings, and improvements,” they should not only

be “exclusively” but also “actually” and “directly” used for religious or charitable purposes. The

exemption from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly

construed against the taxpayer. In this case, there is no showing that the said properties are

actually and directly used for religious or charitable uses.

It was wrong for the judge not to let the petitioner seek proof as to whether CBB really not

only exclusively, but also actually and directly use the said properties for religious or charitable

purposes so that they would fall within the exemption granted by the Constitution.

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GREGORIO AGLIPAY v. JUAN RUIZG.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937

FACTS:

The Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of

Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic

Congress. Petitioner also contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating

that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system of religion,

etc. This provision is a result of the principle of the separation of church & state, for the purpose of

avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa, as a weapon to further

their ends & aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in accordance to Act No. 4052,

providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the production & issuance of postage

stamps as would be advantageous to the government.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner’s freedom of religion was violated

HELD:

What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom & not mere religious toleration.

It is however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion & is not a denial of its influence in

human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds & elevates man to his

Creator is recognized. & in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its

influence is deeply felt & highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052 “advantageous to the

government” does not authorize violation of the Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not

inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. They were not sold

for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage stamps, instead of showing a Catholic

chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines & the location of Manila, w/ the

words “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress.” The focus of the stamps was not the

Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila, being the seat of that congress. This was to “to

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advertise the Philippines & attract more tourists,” the officials merely took advantage of an event

considered of international importance. Although such issuance & sale may be inseparably linked

w/ the Roman Catholic Church, any benefit & propaganda incidentally resulting from it was not the

aim or purpose of the Government.

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AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY v. CITY OF MANILAG.R. No. L-9637 April 30, 1957

FACTS:

Law Education in new york requires local public school authorities to lend textbooks free of

charge to all students in grade 7 to 12, including those in private schools. The Board of Education

contended that said statute was invalid and violative of the State and Federal Constitutions.There

was an order barring the Commissioner of Education (Allen) from removing appellant’s members

from office for failure to comply with the requirement and an order preventing the use of state

funds for the purchase of textbooks to be lent to parochial schools were sought for. The trial court

held the statute unconstitutional. The Appellate Division reversed the decision and dismissed the

complaint since the appellant have no standing. The New York Court of Appeals, ruled that the

appellants have standing but the law is not unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid (contention: it restrains the

free exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of appellant).

HELD:

Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution, provides that:

(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religion test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

The provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of

religious profession and worship, which carries with it the right to disseminate religious

information.

It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious

pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot

mean that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for

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profit. For this reason. The Court believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529,

as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and

enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious

beliefs.

With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the Court do not find that it imposes any

charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious

practices.

It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional,

however inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. As to Ordinance No. 2529

of the City of Manila, as amended, is also not applicable, so defendant is powerless to license or tax

the business of plaintiff Society. Defendant shall return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly

collected from it.

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GIL BALBUNA, ET AL., v. THE HON. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, ET AL.G.R. No. L-14283 November 29, 1960

FACTS:

Members of the Jehovah’s witnesses a religious sect are the petitioner of this case. They

filed a complaint assailing the constitutionality of an Executive Order, mandating salute during flag

ceremony in public schools. Members argue that such practice violates their freedom of worship

and of speech guaranteed by the Bill of Rights; that it denies them due process of law and equal

protection of the laws; and that it unduly restricts their rights in the upbringing of their children.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the assailed Executive Order violates the petitioner’s religious freedom

HELD:

No. As held in the case of Gerona vs. Secretary of Education, the practice of flag ceremonies,

where in students render salute to the Philippine flag is in no way religious nature. The flag is not a

religious icon, but an emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity. Such practice is but a

demonstration of allegiance, devotion and love of country. It is in no way discriminatory and public

schools are within their right to require compliance from their students.

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SABINA BASA, BONIFACIO BASA, BONIFACIO CABALHIN and PRIMITIVO GALLARDO v. FEDERACION OBRERA DE LA INDUSTRIA TABAQUERA Y OTROS TRABAJADORES DE FILIPINAS (FOITAF) and LA DICHA LA PAZ Y BUEN VIAJE CIGAR AND CIGARETTE FACTORY defendants. FEDERACION OBRERA DE LA INDUSTRIA TABAQUERA Y OTROS TRABAJADORES DE FILIPINAS (FOITAF)G.R. No. L-27113 November 19, 1974

FACTS:

This case is an appeal from decision of Quezon City Court of First Instance which the court

instructed La Dicha La Paz Cigar and Cigarette Factory to dismiss Sabina and Bonifacio Basa and

Bonifacio Cabalhin and Primitivo Gallardo from employment, as well as making the company and

FOITAF to reimburse all union dues and assessments collected from plaintiffs-appellees starting

from the date of their resignation in defendant union until the date of the last collection. This also

included attorney's fees in the amount of P900.00 and the costs of suit.

The plaintiffs-appelees are members of Iglesia ni Cristo and employees of La Dicha La Paz

Cigar and Cigarette Factory when there was a collective bargaining contract between the company

and the defendant union, FOITAF. The agreement stated that:

a. All workers and members of FOITAF must maintain membership as requisite to their

employment in the company.

b. New workers should become members of the FOITAF after 60 working days of continuous

employment.

The plaintiffs-appellees resigned from FOITAF in 1964, invoking right to freedom of religion. They

should not be forced to join any labor organization that is contrary to religious beliefs and

convictions. They were given 15 days upon receipt of resignation to reconsider or else the company

would enforce the union agreement. Plaintiffs asked for amended of union agreement to which:

a. They have a right to remain in their employment. They should not be fired for not

maintaining their FOITAF membership.

b. The resignation should be understood as an act of their right to freedom of religion.

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c. They should no longer be forced to pay dues and assessments through payroll deductions

due to their resignation from FOITAF.

Company argued that:

a. The working agreement between the company and FOITAF makes it a “closed shop”.

b. Plaintiffs resigned.

c. FOITAF insists that Company maintain the contract.

d. If Company does not maintain contract, it will be liable for damages or violation of collective

bargaining agreement.

e. Seeking exemption from Union is unconstitutional because it impairs obligations of

contracts, denies equal protection of laws, stops freedom of workers to form associations

and stops constitutional mandate to protection to labor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not freedom of religion impairs obligations of contracts, equal protection of

laws, freedom to form associations and protection to labor.

HELD:

Plaintiffs cannot be dismissed from employment, as result of their resignation, if resignation

is due to labor organization is contrary to beliefs and convictions. Any member of labor union may

leave and cancel membership at any time. The moment he resigns, he is no longer obliged to pay his

dues and assessments. There is no error in trial court’s order in requiring reimbursement.

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DELFIN A. BRION v. SOUTH PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION OF THE SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST CHURCH, represented by PASTORS PATERNO DIAZ, ULYSSES CAMAGAY, MANUEL DONATO and WENDELL SERRANOG.R. No. 135136 May 19, 1999

FACTS:

The petitioner Delfin A. Brion became a member of a respondent South Philippine Union

Mission of the seveth day advendist church(hereafter SDA). He became an ordain minister and a

president of the northern Mindanao Mission of the seventh day advendist church in Butuan city.

Respondent SDA claims that due to corruption charges, Brion was transferred to the Davao Mission.

Thereafter, allegedly due to an act of indiscretion with a masseuse, petitioner was demoted to the

position of sabbath School director at the northern Mindanao Mission of the SDA located at Cagayan

de Oro city. Here, Petitioner worked until he retired in 1983. As was the practice of the SDA,

petitioner was provided a monthly amount as a retirement benefit. Sometime thereafter, Brion got

into an argument with Samuel Sanes, another pastor of the SDA. This disagreement degenerated

into a rift between brionan the SDA, culminating in the establishment by brion of a rival religious

group which he called the “home church.” He succeeded in enticing a number of SDA members to

become part of his congregation because of his action, Brion was excommunicated by the SDA and

his name was dropped from the church record book. As a consequence of his “Disfellowship”

petitioner’s monthly-retirement benefit was discontunued by the SDA.

Brion filed an action for mandamus with the RTC of Cagayan de Oro city asking that the SDA

restore his monthly retirement benefit. The regional trial court finds in favor of Brion and oredered

SDA to pay the retirement benefits. The court of appeals reversed RTC and oredered the dismissal

of Brion’s complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Petitioner is entitled to retirement benefits even though he was

regarded by SDA as excommunicated.

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HELD:

YES. Retirement has been defined as a withdrawal from office, public station, business,

occupation, or public duty.  It is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary agreement

between the employer and the employee whereby the latter, after reaching a certain age, agrees

and/or consents to sever his employment with the former. In this connection, the modern socio-

economic climate has fostered the practice of setting up pension and retirement plans for private

employees, initially through their voluntary adoption by employers, and lately, established by

legislation.  Pension schemes, while initially humanitarian in nature, now concomitantly serve to

secure loyalty and efficiency on the part of employees, and to increase continuity of service and

decrease the labor turnover by giving to the employees some assurance of security as they

approach and reach the age at which earning ability and earnings are materially impaired or at an

end. Courts cannot follow [a person] every step of his life and extricate him from bad bargains,

protect him from unwise investments, relieve him from one-sided contracts, or annul the effects of

foolish acts.  Courts cannot constitute themselves guardians of persons who are not legally

incompetent.  Courts operate not because one person has been defeated or overcome by another,

but because he has been defeated or overcome illegally.  Men may do foolish things, make ridiculous

contracts, use miserable judgment, and lose money by them-indeed, all they have in the world; but

not for that alone can the law intervene and restore.  There must be, in addition, aviolation of law,

the commission of what the law knows as an actionable wrong, before the courts are authorized to

lay hold the situation and remedy it.

Petitioner’s establishment of a rival church hardly qualifies as an actionable wrong.  In fact,

it is a perfectly legitimate exercise of one’s freedom of religion enshrined in our Constitution.

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MARTIN CENTENO v. HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994

FACTS:

Centeno the petitioner was a part of a group of elderly individuals who seek to raise funds

for the rehabilitation of the local chapel. The group received P1,500 from Judge Angeles who later

filed an information against the petitioner stating that the solicitation was done without a valid

permit and was therefore in violation of PD1564. Centeno contends that since the solicitation was

for a religious purpose, it is not within the ambit of PD1564.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PD 1564 covers the case at bar , it being a religious exercise.

HELD:

No. PD1564 mentions charitable activities which is decidedly different from the purpose of

the petitioner , it being for the rehabilitation of the chapel. The decision of the lower court is

reversed and Petitioner Centeno is acquitted of the offence charged.

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ROEL EBRALINAG, EMILY EBRALINAG, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. LEONARDO EBRALINAG, et. al. v. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBUG.R. No. 95770 March 1, 1993

FACTS:

Petitioner were expelled from the by the school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the

flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265

of July 11, 1955, and by Department Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of Department of Education,

Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.

Jehovah’s Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national

anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are “acts of worship” or “religious

devotion” (p.10 of, Rollo) which they “cannot conscientiously give . . . to anyone or anything except

God”. They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State

ISSUE:

Whether school children who are members of a religious sect known as Jehovah’s Witnesses

may be expelled from school for disobedience or R.A. No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8, series

of 1955.

HELD:

Court held that exemption are accorded to the Jehovah’s Witnesses with the regard to the

observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however “bizarre” those

beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does

not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercise. Religious freedom is a fundamental right

which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it

involves the relationship of man to his Creator. Also, the expulsion of members of Jehovah’s

Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled violates their right as Philippine citizens, under

the 1987 Constitution, to “protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education, and to

make such education accessible to all (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).

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ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, v. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITORA.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003

FACTS:

Complainant, Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, for a request of investigation

of rumors that Soledad Escritor, a court interpreter in the RTC of Las Piñas City, has been living

with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband and that they had eventually begotten a son.

Escritor claims that there is no truth to the allegations and she challenges Estrada to appear in open

court and prove such allegations. On ¬¬the other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another

woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio. According to the complainant,

respondent should not be allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the

court allows such act.

Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower

and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their

religious beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a “Declaration of

Pledging Faithfulness” which was approved by the congregation. It allows members of the

congregation who have been abanoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. Such

declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their

union, therefore not constituting disgraceful and immoral conduct.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Escritor is administrative liable for gross and immoral conduct HELD: A

distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The

jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that

gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause . This

benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it

does not offend compelling state interests. The state’s interest is the preservation of the integrity of

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the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency. “There is

nothing in the OCA's (Office of the Court Administrator) memorandum to the Court that

demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should override respondent’s plea of

religious freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present

evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by

the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General”.

In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an

opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the

respondent’s position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is within

the scope of free exercise protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where

the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her

right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at

respondent’s claim of religious freedom but must also apply the

“compelling state interest” test.

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ANDRES GARCES, Reverend Father SERGIO MARILAO OSMEÑA, NICETAS DAGAR and JESUS EDULLANTES v. Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Ormoc City Branch V, BARANGAY COUNCIL of Valencia, Ormoc City, Barangay Captain MANUEL C. VELOSO, Councilmen GAUDENCIO LAVEZARES, TOMAS CABATINGAN and MAXIMINO NAVARRO, Barangay Secretary CONCHITA MARAYA and Barangay Treasurer LUCENA BALTAZARG.R. No. L-53487 May 25, 1981

FACTS:

The barangay council adopted Resolution No. 5, “reviving the traditional socio-religious

celebration” for the feast day of Señor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia. The brgy

council passed Resolution No. 6 where the Chairman of hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the

caretaker of the image of the saint until it is passed. The resolutions were submitted for a plebiscite

and were duly ratified. The image was placed at the altar of the Church so that the devotees could

worship the saint and then later on the parish priest refuses to return the image of the saint

because he argues that it was property of the Church for church funds were used for its acquisition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the parish priest or a layman should have the custody of the image

HELD:

This case is a petty quarrel over the custody of a saint’s image.it would have never arisen if the

parties had been more diplomatic and tactful and if Father Osmeña had taken the trouble of causing

contributions to be solicited from his own parishioners for the purchase of another image of San

Vicente Ferrer to be installed in his church. There can be no question that the image in question

belongs to the barangay council. Father Osmeña claim that it belongs to his church is wrong. The

barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right determine who should have custody thereof.

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RELI GERMAN, RAMON PEDROSA, TIRSO SANTILLAN, JR., et. al. v.GEN. SANTIAGO BARANGAN and MA. JOR ISABELO LARIOSAG.R. No. L-68828 March 27, 1985

FACTS:

Petitioners went to JP Laurel Street, Manila to hear mass in St Luke Chapel but they were

barred by respondent General Barangan from entering the church on the ground that it is within

the vicinity of the Malacañang. When their pleadings were to no avail they left. German’s group is

expressively known as the August Twenty One Movement and on that day, petitioners were

wearing yellow shirts with clench fists, Barangan deemed that they were not really there to

worship but rather they are there to disrupt the ongoing events within the Malacañang.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the bar disallowing petitioners to worship and pray at St. Luke is a violation

of their freedom to worship and locomotion.

HELD:

In the case at bar, German are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice

of their religion, but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into

action. There has been a clear manifestation by Barangan et al that they allow the German et al to

practice their religious belief but not in the manner that German et al impress. Such manner

impresses “clear and present danger” to the executive of the state hence the need to curtail it even

at the expense of curtailing

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GENARO GERONA, ET AL. v. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, ET AL.G.R. No. L-13954  August 12, 1959

FACTS:

RA 1265, Section 2 is authorizing and directing the Secretary of Education to issue or rules

and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony. Petitioners' children attending the

Buenavista Community School, Uson, Masbate, refused to salute the flag, sing the national anthem

and recite the patriotic pledge contrary to the requirement of Department Order no. 8; as a result

they were expelled from school sometime in September, 1955. It is said that other children

similarly situated who refused or failed to comply with the requirement about saluting the flag are

under threats of being also expelled from all public schools in the Philippines.

Petitioners-appellants belong to what is called the Jehovah’s Witness, an unincorporated body

teaching that the obligation imposed by law of God is superior to that of laws enacted by the state.

Their religious beliefs include a literal version of exodus, chapter 20, verses 4 and 5, which say:

"thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven

above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under earth; thou shalt not bow down

thyself to them, nor serve them." they consider that the flag is an "image within this command. For

this reason they refuse to salute it.

ISSUE:

Whether or not saluting the flag involve religious ceremony.

HELD:

After a careful and conscientious examination of the patriotic pledge as reproduced at the

beginning of this decision, frankly we find nothing, absolutely nothing, objectionable, even from the

point of view of religious belief. The school child or student is simply made to say that he loves the

Philippines because it is the land of his birth and the home of his people; that because it protects

him, in return he will heed the counsel of his parents, obey the rules and regulations of his school,

perform the duties of a patriotic and law- abiding citizen; and serve his country unselfishly and

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faithfully, and that he would be a true Filipino in thought, in word, and in deed. He is not even made

to pledge allegiance to the flag or to the republic for which it stands. So that even if we assume for a

moment that the flag were in image, connoting religious and veneration instead of a mere symbol of

the state and of national unity, the religious scruples of appellants against bowing to and venerating

an image are not interfered with or otherwise jeopardized.

In enforcing the flag salute on the petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion involved,

and for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute they were not being

persecuted. Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sanction. If they

chose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being

maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more. According to a popular expression,

they could take it or leave it. Having elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute,

they forfeited their right to attend public schools.

In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the state thru the Secretary of

Education was not imposing a religion or religious belief or a religious test on said students. It was

merely enforcing a non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all alike whether Christian,

Muslim, protestant or Jehovah’s Witness. The state was merely carrying out the duty imposed upon

it by the constitution which charges it with supervision over and regulation of all educational

institutions, to establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public education, and see

to it that all schools aim to develop among other things, civic conscience and teach the duties of

citizenship. (Art. XIV, Section 5 of the Constitution). It does nothing more than try to inculcate in the

minds of the school population during the formative period of their life, love of country and love of

the flag, all of which make for united and patriotic citizenry, so that later in after years they may be

ready and willing to serve, fight, even die for it.

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ERNESTO G. GONZALES, AGUEDO GUILLERMO, JOSE MERCADO, RODOLFO C. TOLENTINO, FRISCO IBARRA, MELCHOR DIZON, GAVINO LOPEZ, MAXIMO FELICIANO, CATALINO MUÑOZ, DOMINGO CAPILI, MAGNO MANALANG, HONORIO DOMINGO, DONATO ESPIRITU, JUAN SANTOS, VICTORINO MERCADO and E. DE GUZMAN v.CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE TARLAC LABOR UNION, represented by PACIFICO P. MILLO, President, and CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE TARLAC, INC.G.R. No. L-38178 October 3, 1985

FACTS:

The plaintiffs, through members of the Iglesia ni Kristo joined the defendant Labor Union.

Upon being informed of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3350, which exempts them from the

effects of Section 4 of the Exclusive Collective Bargaining Agreement due to their religion, the

plaintiffs resigned from the defendant Labor Union, who in turn demanded from its co-defendant,

the Tarlac Development Corporation, the dismissal of the plaintiffs from their work under the

above-quoted provision of Section 4 of the bargaining agreement.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Republic Act No. 3350 which exempts members of any religious sect —

prohibiting the affiliation of their members in any labor organization — from the operation of a

union security provision, constitutional.

HELD:

This Court finds that plaintiffs-appellees, as members of the Iglesia ni Kristo, may not be

dismissed from their employment by reason of their resignation from the defendant-appellant

Labor Union. Republic Act No. 3350, which exempts plaintiffs-appellees from the operation of the

union security clause in the Collective Bargaining Agreement of October 19, 1962, remains

constitutional.

The purpose sought to be achieved by Republic Act No. 3350 was to insure freedom of belief

and religion, and to promote the general welfare by preventing discrimination against those

members of religious sects which prohibit their members from joining labor unions, confirming

thereby their natural, statutory and constitutional right to work, the fruits of which work are

21

usually the only means whereby they can maintain their own life and the life of their dependents. It

cannot be gainsaid that said purpose is legitimate.

It may not be amiss to point out here that the free exercise of religious profession or belief is

superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to the former.

Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a fundamental personal right and liberty, and has a

preferred position in the hierarchy of values. Contractual rights, therefore, must yield to freedom of

religion. It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the

security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and

only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.

The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or

religious or holy and eternal. It was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the

constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons be refused

work, or be dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to

pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security agreements. To help its citizens to

find gainful employment whereby they can make a living to support themselves and their families is

a valid objective of the state. In fact, the state is enjoined, in the 1935 Constitution, to afford

protection to labor, and regulate the relations between labor and capital and industry. More so now

in the 1973 Constitution where it is mandated that 'the State shall afford protection to labor,

promote full employment and security in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless

of sex, race or creed and regulate the relation between workers and employers.

22

ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., herein represented by PROF. ABDULRAFIH H. SAYEDY v. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY of the Office of the President of the Philippines, herein represented by HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, Executive Secretary, and the OFFICE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS, herein represented by its Executive Director, HABIB MUJAHAB HASHIMG.R. No. 153888. July 9, 2003

FACTS:

Petitioner IDCP was granted by RISEAP accredited petitioner to issue halal certifications in

the Philippines and among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient

manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers.

Petitioner alleges that, on account of the actual need to certify food products as halal and

also due to halal food producers’ request, petitioner formulated in 1995 internal rules and

procedures based on the Qur’an[ and the Sunnah for the analysis of food, inspection thereof and

issuance of halal certifications. In that same year, petitioner began to issue, for a fee, certifications

to qualified products and food manufacturers.

Respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 creating the Philippine Halal

Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee its implementation. Under the

EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other

related regulatory activities. Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates the constitutional

provision on the separation of Church and State. It is unconstitutional for the government to

formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a

function only religious organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the

Muslims.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the act was indeed unconstitutional

HELD:

In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim

organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on

23

the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the

exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos’

right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies

charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption,

properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of

Muslims.

Through the laws on food safety and quality, therefore, the State indirectly aids Muslim

consumers in differentiating food from non-food products. The NMIC guarantees that the meat sold

in the market has been thoroughly inspected and fit for consumption. Meanwhile, BFD ensures that

food products are properly categorized and have passed safety and quality standards. Then,

through the labeling provisions enforced by the DTI, Muslim consumers are adequately apprised of

the products that contain substances or ingredients that, according to their Islamic beliefs, are not

fit for human intake. These are the non-secular steps put in place by the State to ensure that the

Muslim consumers’ right to health is protected. The halal certifications issued by petitioner and

similar organizations come forward as the official religious approval of a food product fit for

Muslim consumption.

24

IGLESIA NI CRISTO (INC.), v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOTION PICTURES AND TELEVISION and HONORABLE HENRIETTA S. MENDEZG.R. No. 119673 July 26, 1996

FACTS:

“Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” is a television program of Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) where it presents

and airs the sect’s religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with

other religions. They submitted to the BRMPT the VTR tapes of some of its shows and the board

gave them an “X” rating (not for public viewing), based on the ground that it offends and constitutes

an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law.

In their complaint, INC questioned the Board’s jurisdiction, citing grave abuse of discretion on its

part in requiring INC to submit VTR tapes. INC argued that it is not within the Board’s power to

review their TV program and the latter’s act of prohibiting the airing of some episodes on the

ground that such programs constitute an attack against other religions and contrary to morals is an

abuse of discretion.

The trial court rendered a decision granting INC’s petition, which is in turn reversed by the CA.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Board has the power to review petitioner’s TV program “Ang Iglesia

ni Cristo,”

2. Assuming it has the power, whether or not the Board gravely abused its discretion when

it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious program, series Nos. 115, 119 and 121, for the

reason that they constitute an attack against other religions and that they are indecent, contrary to

law and good customs.

HELD:

The Decision of the CA sustaining the jurisdiction of the Board to review the TV program

entitled “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” is AFFIRMED. The law gives the Board the power to screen, review

and examine all “television programs.” the Board has the power to “approve, delete x x x and/or

25

prohibit the x x x exhibition and/or television broadcast of x x x television programs x x x The law

also directs the Board to apply “contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard” to determine

those which are objectionable for being “immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs,

injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous

tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime.

The court rejected INC’s argument stating that they are beyond the reach of review. Religios

freedom is limitless only in the aspect of thought and belief, but may be regulated by the State in the

aspect of practice, especially if it can be shown to affect the public and its welfare. And in this case,

such practice is televised which enables their beliefs to reach millions who have in their home a TV

set. It is only right that the State take interest in whatever is televised and regulate it as it sees fit.

Its decision sustaining the action of the Board x-rating petitioner’s TV Program Series Nos. 115,

119, and 121 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The court found that the alleged “attacks” by the INC were merely criticisms on the beliefs

of other religions and is within INC’s rights to practice. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not

the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion.

Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers,

especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from

leaning towards any religion. To prevent INC in doing so would be an infringement on its right to

free speech, which can only be done in the presence of a clear and present danger against the public

welfare. Moreover, such “attacks” do not justify an X rating.

26

IGLESIA NI CRISTO v. JUDGE LEOPOLDO B. GIRONELLA, Court of First Instance AbraA.M. No. 2440-CFI July 25, 1981

FACTS:

Teofilo C. Ramos, Sr., in behalf of Iglesia Ni Cristo, contends that there was no need for the

statement of the respondent Judge who referred to their actions in court as a “gimmick.” Judge

Leopaldo B. Gironella is being charged with ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming member

of the bench. Respondent argues that charges against him are unfair and unfounded. He alleges that

such statements complained of are his honest appraisal and evaluation of the evidence presented.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Judge is guilty of ignorance of the law and conduct

unbecoming member of the bench

HELD:

The use of of the word “gimmick” could offend the sensibilities of the members of Iglesia ni

Cristo. It is not inaccurate to state that as understood by popular sense, it is not exactly

complimentary. It may indicate lack of sincerity. It is a ploy or device to persuade others to take a

course of action, which without it may not be acceptable. While it would be going too far to assert

that intentional deceit is employed, it could have the effect. The Latin maxim, suggestio falsi est

suppresio veri, comes to mind. It is to be expected that a religious sect accused of having to resort to

a “gimmick” to gain converts would certainly be far from pleased. Freedom of religion implies

respect for every creed. No one, much less of a public official, is privileged to characterize the

actuation of its adherents in a derogatory sense. It should not be lost of sight of either that the

attendance at a trial of many members of a religious sect finds support in a Constitution. The right

to a public trial is safeguarded by the public law. No adverse implication can arise from such

concurrence. It goes without saying that if their presence would create disorder, it lies within the

power of a trial judge to maintain proper decorum.

27

MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA C. AGUJA and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., v.ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., ABDULRAHMAN R.T. LINZAG, IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID DE GUZMAN, AL-FARED DA SILVA and IBRAHIM B.A. JUNIOG.R. No. 135306 January 28, 2003

FACTS:

ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., a local federation Muslim religious

organizations, filed a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class suit in behalf of the

Muslim members nationwide against MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC arising from an article published

in the 1 August 1992 issue of Bulgar, a daily tabloid.

The complaint alleged that the libelous statement was insulting and damaging to the

Muslims; that these words alluding to the pig as the God of the Muslims was not only published out

of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslims and

Islam, as a religion in this country, in violation of law, public policy, good morals and human

relations; that on account of these libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the

Philippines but the entire Muslim world, especially every Muslim individual in non-Muslim

countries.

RTC dismissed the complaint holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish their cause of

action since the persons allegedly defamed by the article were not specifically identified. The Court

of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and stated that there was clear defamation in the

article. It added that the suit for damages was a "class suit" and that IDCP’s religious status as a

Muslim umbrella organization gave it the requisite personality to sue and protect the interests of all

Muslims. MVRS brought the issue to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the elements of libel are present in the Bulgar article

HELD:

28

In the present case, there was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by the

Bulgar article. Since the persons allegedly defamed could not be identifiable, private respondents

have no individual causes of action; hence, they cannot sue for a class allegedly disparaged. Private

respondents must have a cause of action in common with the class to which they belong to in order

for the case to prosper.

An individual Muslim has a reputation that is personal, separate and distinct in the

community. Each Muslim, as part of the larger Muslim community in the Philippines of over five (5)

million people, belongs to a different trade and profession; each has a varying interest and a

divergent political and religious view — some may be conservative, others liberal. A Muslim may

find the article dishonorable, even blasphemous; others may find it as an opportunity to strengthen

their faith and educate the non-believers and the "infidels." There is no injury to the reputation of

the individual Muslims who constitute this community that can give rise to an action for group libel.

Each reputation is personal in character to every person. Together, the Muslims do not have a

single common reputation that will give them a common or general interest in the subject matter of

the controversy.

The article was not libelous. Petition GRANTED. The assailed decision of CA was REVERSED

and SET ASIDE and the decision of the RTC was reinstated.

29

ANG LADLAD LGBT PART, represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO v. COMISSION ON ELECTIONSGR No. 190582 April 8, 2010

FACTS:

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians,

gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for

registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the

organization had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition for

registration with the COMELEC.

Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-

represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity;

that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes,

LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point

guidelines enunciated by the Court laying out its national membership base consisting of individual

members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.

On November 2009, the COMELEC dismissed the petition on moral grounds stating that the LGBT

sector tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs and that the State penalizes immoral doctrines.

Seeking reconsideration, Ang Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the paty-list

system, proving their under-representation and marginalization, and it cannot be said that Ladlad’s

expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the denial of accreditation by COMELEC, violated the constitutional

guarantees against the establishment of religion. insofar as it justified the exclusion by using

religious dogma.

30

HELD:

Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for

accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC’s moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence,

nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a

party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “No law shall be made respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment

clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious

justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” The Court thus find that it was grave violation of the

non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang

Ladlad.

31

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of Landsv. JUDGE CANDIDO P. VILLANUEVA, of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Malolos Branch VII, and IGLESIA NI CRISTO, as a corporation sole, represented by ERAÑO G. MANALO, as Executive MinisterG.R. No. L-55289 June 29, 1982

FACTS:

In 1933, private respondent, a corporation sole duly existing under Philippine laws,

acquired two lots with a total area of 313 square meters from Andres Perez, who had possessed the

property since 1933 and had declared the same for tax purposes. On September 13, 1977, private

respondent filed an application for registration of the two lots pursuant to Section 48(b) of the

Public Land Law alleging that it and its predecessor-in-interest had possessed the land for more

than 30 years. The Republic of the Philippines opposed the application on the ground that the

Iglesia Ni Cristo, as a corporation sole, is disqualified under the Constitution to hold alienable lands

of the public domain and that the land applied for is a public land. After hearing, the trial court

ordered the registration of the two lots in the name of private respondent. Hence, Republic appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Iglesiani Cristo is disqualified to hold alienable lands of public domain

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the Constitution prohibits a corporation sole or a juridical

person like the Iglesia Ni Cristo from acquiring or holding lands of the public domain; that said

church is not entitled to avail of the benefits of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Law which applies

only to Filipino citizens or natural persons; and that the subject lots are not private lands because

possession by the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest has not been since time immemorial

and because land registration proceeding under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Law presupposes

that the land is public.

32

THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL v. UNG SIU SI TEMPLEG.R. No. L-6776 May 21, 1955

FACTS:

Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal refused to accept for record a deed of donation

by Jesus Dy, a Filipino citizen, conveying a parcel of residential land, in Caloocan, Rizal, known as lot

No. 2, block 48-D, PSD-4212, G.L.R.O. It is in favor of the unregistered religious organization "Ung

Siu Si Temple", operating through three trustees all of Chinese nationality. The donation was duly

accepted by Yu Juan, of Chinese nationality, founder and deaconess of the Temple, acting in

representation and in behalf of the latter and its trustees. Due to register of deeds of Rizal refusal

the case was elevated to the IVth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila where the court

upheld the action of of the Rizal Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal. Not satisfied with the

ruling of the Court of First Instance, counsel for the donee Uy Siu Si Temple has appealed to the

court of appeals and contended that the acquisition of the land in question, for religious purposes, is

authorized and permitted by Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission particularly section 1

and 2 and that the refusal of the Register of Deeds violates the freedom of religion clause of our

Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not  a deed of donation of a parcel of land executed in favor of a religious

organization whose founder, trustees and administrator are Chinese citizens should be registered

or not.

HELD:

The court of appeals upheld the decision of the lower court that in view of the absolute

terms of section 5, Title XIII, of the Constitution, the provisions of Act No. 271 of the old Philippine

Commission must be deemed repealed since the Constitution was enacted, in so far as incompatible

therewith. In providing that, save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land

33

shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to

acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines, the Constitution makes no exception

in favor of religious associations. Neither is there any such saving found in sections 1 and 2 of

Article XIII, restricting the acquisition of public agricultural lands and other natural resources to

"corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such

citizens" 

The fact that the appellant religious organization has no capital stock does not suffice to

escape the Constitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that its members are of foreign nationality.

The purpose of the sixty per centum requirement is obviously to ensure that corporations or

associations allowed to acquire agricultural land or to exploit natural resources shall be controlled

by Filipinos; and the spirit of the Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock, the

controlling membership should be composed of Filipino citizens.

To permit religious associations controlled by non-Filipinos to acquire agricultural lands

would be to drive the opening wedge to revive alien religious land holdings in this country. We can

not ignore the historical fact that complaints against land holdings of that kind were among the

factors that sparked the revolution of 1896.

34

ELISEO F. SORIANO v. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, in her capacity as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board, MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M. DELA CRUZ, MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE S. YARIA, JR., MICHAEL M. SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A. GAVINOG.R. No. 165636 April 29, 2009

FACTS:

Eliseo S. Soriano the host of the “Ang dating daan” uttered following remarks in his TV

program against Micheal Sandoval (a regular host of the TV program “Ang tamang daan” and a

minister of Iglesia ni Cristo) Lehitimong anak ng demonyo! Sinungaling! Gago katalaga, Micheal!

Masahol ka pa sa putang babae, o di ba ? Yung putang babae, ang gumagana lang doon, yung ibaba,

dito kay Micheal, ang gumagana ang itaas, o dib a? O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang

kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito. The MTRCB initially slapped the Soriano’s Ang dating

daan, which was earlier given a “G” rating for general viewership, with a 20 day preventive

suspension after a preliminary conference. Later, in a decision, it found him liable for utterances,

and was imposed a three-month suspension from his TV program Ang Dating Daan. Soriano

challenged the order of the MTRCB.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Soriano’s remarks are obscene.

HELD:

The SC ruled that “Soriano’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the

average child,” and thus his utterance cannot be considered as protected speech. Citing decisions

from the US Supreme court, the high court said that the analysis should be “ context based” and

found the utterances to be obscene after considering the use of television broadcasting as a

medium, the time of the show, and the “G” rating of the show, which are all factors that made the

utterances susceptible to children viewers. The court emphasized on how the uttered words could

be easily understood by a child literally rather in the context that they were used.”

35

The SC also said “ that the suspension is not prior restraint, but rather a “form of

permissible administrative sanction or subsequent punishment.” In affirming the power of the

MTRCB to issue an order of suspension, the majority said that “it is a sanction that the MTRCB may

validly impose under its charter without running afoul of the free speech clause.” The court said

that the suspension “ is not prior restraint on the right of the petitioner to continue with the

broadcat of Ang Dating Daan as permit was already issued to him by MTRCB, “ rather, it was a

sanction for “the indecent contents of his utterances in a “G”.

36

THE UNITED STATES v. BUENAVENTURA BALCORTAG.R. No. 8722 September 10, 1913

FACTS:

The defendant entered a private house, uninvited, where there were around ten to twenty

persons conducting a divine service. These men are from the Methodist Episcopal Church. The

defendant interrupted the service and threatened the assemblage with a club. While the defendant

was of a different religion, there were no proof that can show that the defendant showed any

remarks or motives against the religion of the people in inside the house, thus article 223 cannot be

established against him, and that his offense was that he disturbed the divine service being

conducted at the time.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant is guilty of interference with the freedom of will in religious

matters.

HELD:

In the case at hand, it was held that the defendant was not guilty of interference with the

freedom of will and conscience in religious matters, but merely interruption of religious services

without motive under Article 571 of the Penal Code. When the defendant went into the house, the

people inside were not holding religious services, but merely reading some verses from the Bible.

There has been no provision that they can find in the law which requires religious services to be

conducted in approved orthodox style in order to merit its protection against interference and

disturbances.

37

THE UNITED STATES v. LEON MORALES, ET AL., PEDRO RIGOR, MARIANO GORUSPE, and CIPRIANO DE LOS REYESG.R. No. L-12644 December 22, 1917

FACTS:

This cause was instituted by a complaint filed by the provincial fiscal, on December 7, 1915,

charging the above-mentioned fourteen defendants with the crime defined and punished by article

223 of the Penal Code. That shortly after 8 o'clock of the evening of July 15, 1915, about thirty

residents of the barrio of Moriones started out a procession from the Catholic church of said

municipality intending to pass through some of the streets of the town, as they had already done on

previous evenings. As they went along in the procession they said prayers and carried the image of

the Virgin of the Immaculate Conception; but on arriving in front of the Aglipayan church the

defendants there posted with others and provided with clubs and sticks, prevented the Catholic

procession from proceeding further and compelled its members to take another route, which was

not a street and was dirty. thereupon Maximo Cayetano, a resident who on that occasion was

conducting the procession and leading those in it who were saying prayers in novena, replied to the

priest, Rigor, that the latter ought not to prohibit them from doing a good deed, and after this reply,

gave the order for the procession to continue its march; but at this moment defendants attacked

said Maximo Cayetano, some of them with sticks and clubs while a majority of the others engaged in

pushing back the people in the procession, as a result of which aggression they started to run, the

image of the Virgin fell to the ground and was abandoned, and the procession was disbanded.

During the disturbance the crown of the image disappeared and one of its hands was broken.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendants committed an act of preventing some other person from

performing any act of worship as stated in article 223 of the Penal Code or was it just a

misdemeanor?

38

HELD:

It is seen that the defendants, by dissolving the procession and by main force dispersing its

members, proposed not only to interrupt and disturb a religious procession, but also absolutely to

prevent the person taking part therein from being able to address their prayers to God in the

manner established by the Catholic church, to the community and confession of which they

belonged. This procedure was entirely unlawful and the acts committed by them are punishable

under the aforecited article of the Penal Code. In the present case, the crime prosecuted is totally

different from that concerned in the case of the United States vs. Balcorta (25 Phil. Rep., 273), for

the reason that the herein defendants, in dissolving the procession and putting its members to flight

by means of violence exercised upon their persons, prevented them from being able to perform

technically religious acts which they were entitled freely to perform and under the protection of the

authorities.

39

BENJAMIN VICTORIANO v. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS’ UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY, INC.G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974

FACTS:

Benjamin Victoriano, a member of the religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had

been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. since 1958. As such employee, he was a

member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union which had with the Factory a collective bargaining

agreement containing a closed shop provision which requires that membership in the Union is

required as a condition of employment for all permanent employee workers.

Under Republic Act No. 3350, employer was not precluded “from making an agreement with

a labor organization to require as a condition of employment memberhip, if such labor organization

is the representative of the employees” and as amended, it was added that “...but such agreement

shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiiation of their members in any

such labor organization.” Victoriano, being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation

in the said Union, presented his resignation to the Union in 1962. The Factory notified Victoriano

that unless he could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Factory would be

constrained to dismiss him from the service. This prompted Victoriano to file an action.

Victoriano claims that as per RA 3350 he is an exemption to the close shop agreement by

virtue of his being a member of the Iglesia Ni Cristo because apparently in his religion, one is

forbidden from being a member of any labor union. The Elizalde Rope Factory and its Union

reiterated that he is not exempt from the close shop agreement because RA 3350 is

unconstitutional and that said law violates the Union and Elizalde Rope Factory’s legal/contractual

rights.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 3350 is unconstitutional.

40

HELD:

The purpose of RA 3350 was to insure freedom of belief and religion, and to promote the

general welfare by preventing discrimination against those members of religious sects which

prohibit their members from joining labor unions, confirming thereby their natural, statutory and

constitutional right to work, the fruits of which work are usually the only means whereby they can

maintain their own life and the life of their dependents. The validity of a statute is to be determined

from its general purpose and its efficacy to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects on a

particular case.

The Court believes that in enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress acted consistently with

the spirit of the constitutional provision. It acted merely to relieve the exercise of religion, by

certain persons, of a burden that is imposed by union security agreements. Compelling persons to

join and remain members of a union to keep their jobs in violation of their religious scrupples,

would hurt, rather than help labor unions.

In conclusion, the right to join a union includes the right not to join a union. The law is not

unconstitutional as it recognizes both the rights of unions and employers to enforce terms of

contracts and at the same time it recognizes the workers’ right to join or not to join union. RA 3350

recognizes as well the primacy of a constitutional right over a contractual right.

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