Assignment: Legal Ethics

1. Importance of Judicial Ethics

In Re: Sotto 82 Phil 595

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

VICENTE SOTTO             January 21, 1949

In re VICENTE SOTTO, for contempt of court.

Vicente Sotto in his own behalf.

FERIA, J.:

This is a proceeding for contempt of our court against the respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto, who was required by their Court on December 7, 1948, to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt to court for having issued a written statement in connection with the decision of this Court in In re Angel Parazo for contempt of court, which statement, as published in the Manila Times and other daily newspapers of the locality, reads as follows:

As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53.) interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency of narrow mindedness o the majority of its members, In the wake of so many mindedness of the majority deliberately committed during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To his effect, I announce that one of the first measures, which as its objects the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: the Supreme Court very of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary.

Upon his request, the respondent was granted ten days more besides the five originally given him to file his answer, and although his answer was filed after the expiration of the period of time given him the said answer was admitted. This Court could have rendered a judgment for contempt after considering his answer, because he does not deny the authenticity of the statement as it has been published. But, in order to give the respondent ample opportunity to defend himself or justify the publication of such libelous statement, the case was set for hearing or oral argument on January 4, the hearing being later postponed to January 10, 1949. As the respondent did not appear at the date set for hearing, the case was submitted for decision.

In his answer, the respondent does not deny having published the above quoted threat, and intimidation as well as false and calumnious charges against this Supreme Court. But he therein contends that under

section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon this Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, "this Court has no power to impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and that the Supreme Court can only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to be promulgated by Congress with the approval of the Chief Executive." And he also alleges in his answer that "in the exercise of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the press with the utmost good faith and with no intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion, erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked, or intended to attack the honesty or integrity of any one.' The other arguments set forth by the respondent in his defenses observe no consideration.

Rules 64 of the rules promulgated by this court does not punish as for contempt of court an act which was not punishable as such under the law and the inherent powers of the court to punish for contempt. The provisions of section 1 and 3 of said Rule 64 are a mere reproduction of section 231 and 232 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, amended, in connection with the doctrine laid down by this Court on the inherent power if the superior courts to punish for contempt is several cases, among them In re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944. That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of superior statue, is a doctrine or principle uniformly accepted and applied by the courts of last resort in the United States, which is applicable in this jurisdiction since our Constitution and courts of justice are patterned as expounded in American Jurisprudence is as follows:

The power of inflicting punishment upon persons guilty of contempt of court may be regarded as an essential element of judicial authority, IT is possessed as a part of the judicial authority granted to courts created by the Constitution of the United States or by the Constitutions of the several states. It is a power said to be inherent in all courts general jurisdiction, whether they are State or Federal; such power exists in courts of general jurisdiction independently of any special express grant of statute. In many instances the right of certain courts of tribunals to punish for contempt is expressly bestowed by statue, but such statutory authorization is unnecessary, so far as the courts of general jurisdiction are concerned, and in general adds nothing statutory authority may be necessary as concerns the inferior courts statutory authority may be necessary to empower them to act. (Contempt, 12 Jur., pp. 418, 419.)

In conformity with the principle enunciated in the above quotation from American Jurisprudence, this Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:

The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause, respecting the same, has always been considered as misbehavior, tending to obstruct the administration of justice, and subjects such persons to contempt proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to have their fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law, free from outside coercion or interference. Any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the upon court, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel, etc., with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all court. The summary power to commit and punish for contempt tending to obstructed or degrade the administration of justice, as inherent in courts as essential to the execution of their powers and to the maintenance of their authority is a part of the law of the land. (In reKelly, 35 Phil., 944, 945.)

Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or modifying its decision. Had the respondent in the present case limited himself to as statement that our decision is wrong or that our construction of the intention of the law is not correct, because it is different from what he, as proponent of

the original bill which became a law had intended, his criticism might in that case be tolerated, for it could not in any way influence the final disposition of the Parazo case by the court; inasmuch as it is of judicial notice that the bill presented by the respondent was amended by both Houses of Congress, and the clause "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the State" was added or inserted; and that, as the Act was passed by Congress and not by any particular member thereof, the intention of Congress and not that of the respondent must be the one to be determined by this Court in applying said act.

But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press, the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is pending reconsideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members of Justices from eleven to seven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration of justice, for in his above-quoted statement he says:

In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce that one of the first measures, which I will introduce in the coming congressional sessions, will have as its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now the Supreme Court of today constitutes a constant peril to liberty and democracy.

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately "so many blunders and injustices," that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

Respondent's assertion in his answer that "he made his statement in the press with the utmost good faith and without intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal," if true may mitigate but not exempt him from liability for contempt of court; but it is belied by his acts and statements during the pendency of this proceeding. The respondent in his petition of December 11, alleges that Justice Gregorio Perfecto is the principal promoter of this proceeding for contempt, conveying thereby the idea that this Court acted in the case through the instigation of Mr. Justice Perfecto.

It is true that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and the press must be protected to its fullest extent, but license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the right of the citizen, is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary. As Judge Holmes very appropriately said U. S vs Sullens (1929), 36 Fed. (2nd), 230, 238, 239: "The administration of justice and

the freedom of the press, though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press and the courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its prerogatives and the latter its jurisdiction. The right of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized and care taken at all times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary, in order to dispose of judicial business unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, this court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish for contempt. This Court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition if its business in an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as a individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal. . . ."

It is also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts, he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L. R. A. [N.S.], 586, 594).

In view of all the foregoing, we find the respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto guilty of contempt of this Court by virtue of the above-quoted publication, and he is hereby sentenced to pay, within the period of fifteen days from the promulgation of this judgment, a fine of P1,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The respondent is also hereby required to appear, within the same period, and show cause to this Court why he should not be disbarred form practicing as an attorney-at-law in any of the courts of this Republic, for said publication and the following statements made by him during the pendency of the case against Angel Parazo for contempt of Court.

In his statement to the press as published in the Manila Times in its issue of December 9, 1948, the respondent said "The Supreme Court can send me to jail, but it cannot close my mouth; " and in his other statement published on December 10, 1948, in the same paper, he stated among others: "It is not the imprisonment that is degrading, but the cause of the imprisonment." In his Rizal day speech at the Abellana High School in Cebu, published on January 3, 1949, in the Manila Daily Bulletin, the respondent said that "there was more freedom of speech when American Justices sat in the Tribunal than now when it is composed of our countrymen;" reiterated that "even if it succeeds in placing him behind bars, the court can not close his mouth," and added: "I would consider imprisonment a precious heritage to leave for those who would follow me because the cause is noble and lofty." And the Manila Chronicle of January 5 published the statement of the respondent in Cebu to the effect that this Court "acted with malice" in citing him to appear before this Court on January 4 when "the members of this Court know that I came here on vacation." In all said statements the respondent misrepresents to the public the cause of the charge against him for contempt of court. He says that the cause is for criticizing the decision of this Court in said Parazo case in defense of the freedom of the press, when in truth and in fact he is charged with intending to interfere and influence the final disposition of said case through intimidation and false accusations against this Supreme Court. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., concurring:

Respondent published in the Manila newspapers of Sunday, December 5, 1948, a written statement in relation with the decision rendered by this Court sentencing Angel Parazo to 30 days imprisonment for contempt.

On December 7, 1948, considering the statement as "intended not only to intimidate the members of this Court or influence the final disposition of said (Parazo) case, but also to degrade and vilify the administration of justice," this Court adopted a resolution ordering respondent to show cause within five days why he should not be punished for contempt, "without prejudice to taking further action against him as attorney."

Alleging to be suffering from myologenous leukemia, with moderately severe anemia, and that his physician had advised him to have "absolute rest and to avoid any form of mental and physical strain for a few weeks," respondent prayed for a 15-day extension to file his answer. He was granted a 10-day extension.

In the resolution of December 13, 1948, granting said extension, this Court branded as false respondent's allegations the effect that he had formal charges pending in this Court against Mr. Justice Perfecto and that the latter is the "moving spirit" of these contempt proceedings.

Two days after the expiration of the 10-day extension granted to him, respondent filed his answer. The belated filing of said answer was overlooked by this Court in order not to deprive respondent of the benefits of his answer. Filed out of time, due to his unexplained fault, it could legally have been rejected.

In said answer, dated December 24, 1948, respondent repeated one of his allegations which, in the resolution of December 13, 1948, this Court had already declared to be false.

Respondent has not denied that he is the author of the statement for which he has been summoned to our bar for contempt and he has not denied the correctness of the text published in the Manila Chronicle and other daily newspapers and which is reproduced in the resolution of this Court of December 7, 1948.

In his statement, respondent does not limit himself to saying that this Tribunal has erroneously interpreted Republic Act No. 53, but alleges that said erroneous interpretation "is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow-mindedness of the majority of its members," coupled with this sweeping and calumnious accusation:

In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court.

To fittingly crown this dastard imputation of deliberately committing blunders and injustice, respondent would bully the members of this Court, by making the following intimidating announcement:

To this effect, I announce that one of the first measures, which I will introduce in the coming congressional sessions, will have as its objects the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court.

There are other rhetorical passages in respondent's statement, aimed to emphasize the nuclear ideas of the statement, to the effect that the majority of the members of the Supreme Court are incompetent and narrow-minded and guilty of "so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed" and that the author will introduce in the coming congressional sessions a measure "to change the members of the Supreme Court" and to effect a "complete reorganization of the Supreme Court.

Among such maximizing expressions intended to stress the main ideas and purposes of the statement are the following:

1. As it is now constituted, the Supreme Court of today constitutes a constant peril to liberty and democracy.

2. It need be said loudly, very loudly so that even the deaf may hear: The Supreme Court if today is far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victoriano Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the glory of the Philippine judiciary.

3. The reporter, who is erroneously convicted of contempt and unjustly sentenced to 30 days imprisonment by the Supreme Court, should be immediately and spontaneously pardoned by the Executive Power, to serve as lesson in law to the majority of the members of that High Tribunal.

4. That sentence is intolerable, and should be protested by all newspapers throughout the country, under the cry of "The press demands better qualified justices for the Supreme Court."

There can be no question that respondent knowingly published false imputations against the members of this Court. He accused them of such depravity as to have committed "blunders and injustices deliberately." He has maliciously branded them to be incompetent, narrow-minded, perpetrators of evil, "a constant peril to liberty and democracy," to be the opposite of those who were the honor and glory of the Philippines judiciary, to be needing a lesson in law, to be rendering an intolerable sentence, to be needing replacement by better qualified justices.

Respondent has not presented any evidence or offered any to support his slanderous imputations, and no single word can be found in his answer showing that he ever believed that the imputations are based on fact.

Respondent appears to belong to the class of individuals who have no compunction to resort to falsehood of falsehoods. The record of this case indicates that the practice of falsehoods seems to be habitual in respondent, and this is proved when he reiterated in his answer one of his allegations in a previous petition which were pronounced by this Court to be false in its resolution in its resolution of December 3, 1948.

More than thirty years ago, using the words of respondent himself, in "those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, and Manual Araullo and other learned jurists who were the glory of the Philippines judiciary" and when it was the "impregnable bulwark of Justice," the Supreme Court pronounced respondent guilty of falsehoods three times: first, in case in which he was sentenced to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccionalfor criminally abducting Aquilina Vasquez, a girl less then 18 years of age, and to pay her a dowry of P500 and to support the offspring of his relations with her (U. S. vs. Sotto, 9 Phil., 231); second, in a sentence of disbarment as a blackmailer (In re Sotto, 38 Phil., 532); and third, in prison sentence for false libel (U. S. vs. Sotto, 38 Phil., 666). The first and the last sentences bear the signature of Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano himself.

In the first case the Supreme Court found that only on July 29, 1906, Vicente Sotto wrote a letter to Aquilina Vasquez, protesting his love for her and urging her to leave her house and go with him; on the afternoon of August 1, 1906, Sotto made an arrangement with Luis Crisologo for the renting of his house since that night when Sotto went with Aquilina into the room of the house, where she passed the night; Sotto had told Crisologo that he wanted the house for a forestry ranger who was just arriving from Bohol; Sotto did not leave the room until the middle of the night; Aquilina transferred to a house in Sambag where Sotto brought various housekeeping utensils; during the following days and nights Aquilina was visited by respondent.

On August 10, 1906, a complaint was filed against Vicente Sotto and Pio Datan, charging them with the crime ofrapto. As a defense, respondent offered evidence to show that on August 5, 1906, a legal marriage was celebrated between Aquilina and the accused Pio Datan, Sotto's washerman and accomplice in crime. Upon the evidence, the Supreme Court pronounced the celebration of the alleged marriage to be false. The certificate of marriage offered as evidence in support of the claim that the marriage took place had been declared a forgery.

It is not necessary to give the details of the whole disgusting affair, wherein the revolting and sinister nature of an individual is pictured in bold relief with some of its ugliest features. The more that 4 years of imprisonment imposed upon the accused did not reform him. It only served to emphasize the beginning of along career of falsehoods and slanders already spanning more than 40 years, soon nearing half of a century.

Respondent also chose not to deny his intimidating announcement to introduce in the coming sessions of Congress, among the first measures, one for the change of the members of the Supreme Court and for the latter's complete reorganization.

He has not explained or justified why he has to intimidate the members of the Supreme Court with change and reorganization, and why, to make the intimidation more dreadful, he had to announce the horrible course of subverting and trampling down the Constitution, as all who can read and understand the fundamental law know that it is beyond the powers of Congress to reorganize and change the membership of the Supreme Court.

Because the announcement is highly subversive, being aimed at shaking the very foundations of this Republic, it could have been no less terrible than for the respondent to have announced an intention to attain his purposes by resorting to open rebellion. The fact that respondent is a lawyer and a senator aggravates his flaunted purpose to assault the very Constitution he has sworn to obey and defend.

We have devoted considerable time to respondent's answer.

As first defense, respondent alleges that he made the written press statement, not as a lawyer or as a private citizen, but as a senator. He avers a senator should have ample liberty to discuss public affairs and should not be annoyed with contempt proceedings.

Now law or valid authority has been invoked in support of the theory, unless we could countenance a fictitious maxim that respondent is the sovereign. The theory lacks even the merit of novelty. Long before the claim of respondent that, because he is a senator, he is above the law, Mussolini, Hitler and all the tyrants and dictators who preceded them since the dawn of history had always claimed that they were above they law and acted as if they were really so. Unfortunately for respondent, senators are creatures of the Constitution and the Constitution makes them amenable to law.

As a second defense, respondent alleges that, not having appeared either as attorney or a witness in the Parazo case, he cannot be held either for direct or for indirect contempt.

The defense is based on stark ignorance of the law on the subject.

Respondent alleges, as third defense, that he made his statement with "utmost good faith," with "no intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of the High Tribunal," and that he has not attacked nor intended to attack the honesty or integrity of any one.

This allegation lacks sincerity in view of his imputation, among several others equally false and calumnious, that the majority members of the Supreme Court have committed many blunders and injustices deliberately." The slanderous imputation can only be attributed to bad faith.

As another defense, respondent questions the validity of the penal provisions of Rule 64, implying that said penalties are not procedural in nature, and invoking the provisions of section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, limiting the rule-making power of the Supreme Court to matters of pleading, practice, and procedure in courts, and to the admission to the practice of law.

Respondent's contention can be easily disposed of by quoting the following provisions of Act No. 190:

SEC. 231. What Contempts of Court may be Punished Summarily. — A court of First Instance or a judge of such court at chambers, may punish summarily, by fine not exceeding two hundred pesos, or by imprisonment not exceeding ten days, or both, a person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near the court or judge as to obstruct administration of justice, including the refusal of a person present in court to be sworn as a witness or to answer as a witness when lawfully required.

SEC. 232. What Other Acts are Contempts of Court. — A person guilty of any of the following act any be punished as for contempt:

1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment of command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge;

2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties, or in his official transactions;

3. A failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

4. The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of the court held by him.

5. The persons defeated in a civil action concerning the ownership or possession of real estate who, after being evicted by the sheriff from the realty under litigation in compliance with judgment rendered, shall enter or attempt to enter upon the same for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession or who shall in any manner disturb possession by the person who the sheriff placed in possession of said reality.

SEC. 235. Trial of the Charge. — Upon the day fixed for the trial, the court shall proceed to investigate the charge and shall hear any answer or testimony which the accused may make or offer.

SEC. 236. Punishment if Found Guilty. — The court shall then determine whether the accused is guilty off the contempt charged; and, if it be adjudged that he is guilty, he may be fined not exceeding one thousand pesos, or imprisoned not more than six months, or both. If the contempt consist in the violation of an injunction, the person guilty of such contempt may also be ordered to make complete restitution to the party injured by such violation.

Therefore, even on the false hypothesis that penalties for contempt are not procedural in nature, courts of justice may impose said penalties, if not under Rule 64, under the provisions of Act No. 190.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in courts of justice. It springs from the very nature of their functions. Without such power, courts of justice would be unable to perform effectively their functions. They function by orders. Every decision is a command. The power to punish disobedience to command is essential to make the commands effective.

Respondent is in error in maintaining that the Supreme Court has no power to enact Rule 64, He is correct in calling it judicial legislation although he fails to remember that judicial legislation in matters of judicial practice and procedure is expressly authorized by section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution.

As a last defense, respondent invokes the constitutional freedom of the press, which includes the right to criticize judges in court proceedings.

Respondent, undoubtedly, misses the point, and his citations about said freedom, with which we fully agree, have absolutely no bearing on the question involved in these proceedings.

No one, and the members of the Supreme Court would be the last to do so, has ever denied respondent the freedom of the press and his freedom to criticize our proceedings, this Court and its members. Respondent's statement goes much further than mere criticism of our decision and the majority members of this Court. The statement is an attempt to interfere with the administration of justice, to miscarry and defeat justice, by trammelling the freedom of action of the members of the Supreme Court, by bullying them with the menace of change, reorganization, and removal, upon the false accusation that they have been committing "blunders and injustices deliberately," and the menacing action constitutes a flagrant violation of the Constitution. Such a thing is not covered by the freedom of the press or by the freedom to criticize judges and court proceedings, as no one in his senses has ever conceived that such freedom include any form of expressed gangterism, whether oral or written.

The freedom of the press is not involved in these proceedings. To assert otherwise is to mislead. What is at stake in these proceedings is the integrity of our system of administration of justice and the independence of the Supreme Court and its freedom from any outside interference intended to obstruct it or to unduly sway it one way or another.

The freedom of the press is one of the causes which we have always endeared. The repeated prosecution and persecutions we have endured in the past for its sake — we have been hailed to court eight times, — are conclusive evidence of the firm stand we have taken as defender of such freedom. It can be seen from official records that every acquittal handed down to us by the Supreme Court had been a new step forward and new triumph for the freedom of the press. (U. S. vs. Perfecto, 42 Phil., 113 Sept. 9, 1921; U.S. vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil., 58, March 4, 1922; U. S. vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil., 887, March 4, 1922.) That stand has remained the same, as can be shown in our written opinion in another contempt proceedings in the Ben Brillantes case, which failed to attract public attention at the time.

Among the facts which we cannot ignore in deciding this case, are the following:

1. That this is not the first time respondent has been brought to a court of justice, for a grave misbehavior and for perpetrating stark falsehoods. In a decision by the Supreme Court of September 6, 1918, respondent was removed from the office of attorney-at-law and incapacitated from exercising the legal profession. He was found guilty of:

(a) Lack of fidelity to clients;

(b) Blackmailing, by abusing his position as director of a newspaper whose columns he used to blacken the reputation of those who refused to yield to demands made by him in his business as lawyer;

(c) Publication of malicious and unjustifiable insinuations against the integrity of a judge who had fined him for the crime of libel;

(d) Giving false testimony or perjury. (38 Phil., 532.)

2. On September 24, 1918, the Supreme Court sentenced respondent to imprisonment for libel, for besmirching the honesty of three private individuals, Lope K. Santos, Jose Turiano Santiago and Hermenegildo Cruz with false charges. (38 Phil., 666.)

3. After having been cited for contempt in these proceedings, respondent, in order to pose as a martyr for the freedom of the press, waged a campaign of viturperation against the Supreme Court. He made repeated press statements and delivered speeches in his home province to show that he cannot expect justice from the Supreme Court, that the Supreme Court will imprison him, that he will be imprisoned for the sake of the freedom of the press, thereby posing as a false martyr for it.

4. In his persecutory obsession, respondent would make all believe that, contrary to fact, the writer of this opinion is the moving spirit behind these contempt proceedings and that the Supreme Court is acting merely as a tool. Apparently, respondent was irked by his failure to sit even for a single moment in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, because of our objection. The publicity given to our objection has exposed the illegality of respondent's designation made by the Senate President as, under section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, the power to choose Senators for the Electoral Tribunal belongs to the Senate, and not to its presiding officer. At the bar of public opinion, the Senate President and respondent appeared either to be ignorant of the Constitution or to be bent on flagrantly violating it.

5. Respondent is the number of the bill which was enacted into Republic Act No. 53, but the purposes of his bill were thwarted by an amendment introduced by the Senate, denying the privilege granted therein when in conflict with the interest of the Senate. Respondent's bill was for an absolute privilege. Because the majority decision of the Supreme Court had made his failure patent, respondent took occasion to give vent to his grudge against the Supreme Court, wherein, of the 15 cases he had since liberation, he lost all except three, as can be seen in the records of the following cases:

L-23, Filomena Domiit Cabiling vs. The Prison Officer of the Military Prison of Quezon City LOST

L-212, Narcisa de la Fuente vs Fernando Jugo, etc. et al. WON

L-247, Monsig. Canilo Diel vs. Felix Martinez, etc. et al. WON

L-301, In the matter of the petition of Carlos Palanca to be admitted a Citizen of the Philippines

LOST(As amicus curiae

L-307, Eufemia Evangelista et al. vs. Rafael Maninang LOST

L-599, Amalia Rodriguez vs. Pio E. Valencia et al. LOST

L-1201, Vicente Sotto vs. Tribunal del Pueblo et al. LOST

L-1287, Ong Sit vs. Edmundo Piccio et al. LOST

L-1365, Vitaliano Jurado vs. Marcelo Flores LOST

L- 1509, Tagakotta Sotto vs. Francisco Enage LOST

L-1510, Bernarda Ybañez de Sabido et al. vs. Juan V. Borromeo et al. LOST

L-1938, Vicente Sotto vs. Crisanto Aragon et al. WON

L-1961, The People of the Philippines vs. Antonio de los Reyes LOST

L-2041, Quirico Abeto vs. Sotero Rodas LOST

L-2370, Voltaire Sotto vs. Rafael Dinglasan et al. LOST

Upon the records of his previous cases in 1918 and of these proceedings, it is inevitable to conclude that we have before us the case of an individual who has lowered himself to unfathomable depths of moral depravity, — a despicable habitual liar, unscrupulous vilifier and slanderer, unrepented blackguard and blackmailer, shameful and shameless libeler, unmindful of the principles of decency as all hardened criminals. He is a disgrace to the human species. He is a shame to the Senate.

Aghast at the baseness of his character, we felt, at first blush, the impulse of acquitting him, as his contemptible conduct, culminating in the press statement in question, seemed compatible only with the complete irresponsibility of schizophrenics, idiots, or those suffering from doddery.

His repeated press releases in which he tried to focus public attention to the most harmless part of his statement, wherein he accuses the majority of the Supreme Court of incompetency or narrow-mindedness, have shown, however, that respondent is not completely devoid of personal responsibility, as he is aware that he has no possible defense for alleging that the members of the Supreme Court have committed "blunders and injustices deliberately," for which reason he has widely publicized his expectation that he will be sentenced in this case to imprisonment, a penalty that, by his repeated public utterances, he himself gives the impression that he is convinced he deserves.

Verily he deserves to be sentenced to six months imprisonment, the maximum allowed by Rule 64, and such penalty would not be heavy enough because of the attendance of several aggravating circumstances, namely, the falsehoods he resorted to in this case, his insolence after he was cited for contempt, the fact that he is a lawyer and a Senator, the fact that he has already been sentenced to imprisonment for falsely libeling three private individuals, the fact that more than 30 years ago he had been disbarred as a blackmailer, the fact that more than 40 years ago he was sentenced to be jailed for more than 4 years as an abductor. The majority of this Court has sentenced a young and humble newspaperman to 30 days imprisonment only for refusing to answer a question. The offense committed by respondent is much graver than a mere refusal to answer a question.

We concur, however, in the decision imposing upon respondent a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment and ordering him to show cause why he should not be completely deprived of the privilege of practicing the profession of a lawyer. High reasons of humanity restrained us from sending respondent to prison, unless he should voluntarily choose to enter therein, instead of paying the fine. He is old and, according to his physician, suffering from myologenous leukemia with moderately severe anemia, requiring absolute and avoidance of any from of mental and physical strain, and we do not wish to endanger respondent's life by sending him to prison, and thus causing him the mental and physical strains which his physician advised him to avoid. Although the continued existence of respondents is more harmful than beneficial to our Republic and to human society, we have to be consistent with our abidance by the injunction of the Sermon on the Mount: "Thou shalt not kill." (Matth., Chapter 5, paragraph 21.) Although their segregation from the society of decent men is advisable because of the dangers of corruptive contamination, even the lives of moral lepers have to be spared. After all, the heaviest punishment for an evildoer is the inherent stigma of shame of his evildoings.

Let it be clear that we are not punishing respondent because we want to curtail his freedom of the press, but because of his wanton interference in the independence of the Supreme Court his overt attempt to deprive us of our freedom of judgment in a pending case, his swashbuckling bravado to intimidate the members of this Court to sway their decision in favor of a litigant.

The freedom of the press is not in the least involved in these proceedings. The offensive statements has not been published by respondent as a newspaperman, editor or journalist. He does not appear to be a member of the staff of any one of the newspapers which published his statement. We did not even molest said newspapers. Their editors have not been cited for contempt. We did not interfere with their freedom to publish the scurrilous statement.

If respondent has not attempted by his browbeating to undermine and overthrow the very foundations of our judicial system and actually sought to defeat and miscarry the administration of justification in a pending litigation, we would certainly have abstained from summoning him merely for criticizing, insulting and slandering the members of the Court. After all his reputation for lack of veracity, malice and unscrupulosity is well-known in official records branding him with the indelible stigma of infamy.

His blatant posing, therefore, in this case as a martyr for the freedom of the press, as part of his systematic campaign of falsehoods and slanders directed against the Supreme Court, is an imposture that only ignorants, blockheads and other mental pachyderms can swallow.

It takes too much effrontery for such a character as respondent to pose as a martyr and no less than for the sake of a sacred cause, the freedom of the press, which no one has no much dishonored with his blackmailing practices and by his long list of cases in the courts of justice, starting as far back as 1901. (Julia vs. Sotto, 2 Phil., 247; U. S. vs. Sotto, 9 Phil., 231; In re Sotto, 38 Phil., 532; U. S. vs. Sotto, 38 Phil., 666; R.G. No. 201; U. S. vs. Sotto, R.G. No. 11067; U. S. vs. Sotto, R.G. No. 14284; U. S. vs. Vicente Sotto, R.G. No. 16004; People vs. Vicente Sotto, R.G. No. 23643.)

Respondent belongs to that gang of unprincipled politicians headed by a Senate President who trampled down the popular will by the arbitrary and unconstitutional suspension of Senators Vera, Diokno and Romero (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192), who issued the false certification as to the voting of the congressional resolution regarding the infamous Parity Amendment, thus perpetrating falsification of public document (Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1), who muzzled the people by ordering, in usurpation of executive powers mayors all over the country not to allow the holding of public meetings which the opposition had organized to denounce the frauds in the elections of November 11, 1947 (Cipriano C. Primicias, as General Campaign Manager of the Coalesced Minority Partiesvs. Valeriano E. Fugoso, as Mayor of the City of Manila, 80 Phil., 71) who wantonly violated the Constitution by interfering with the management of the funds of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (Suanes vs. The Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil., 819), who, again in violation of the fundamental law, usurped the exclusive powers of the Senate when he designated respondent to sit in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and who crowned his misdeeds by enunciating on Saturday, January 15, 1949, the most immoral political philosophy — that of open toleration of rackets, graft and corruption in public office.

According to Rizal, the victims immolated in the altar of great ideals, to be acceptable, have to be noble, spotless and pure. They should, therefore, be as noble and pure as Socrates, Christ, Joan of Arc, Lincoln, Bonifacio, Mabini, Gandhi and Rizal himself. Then and only then will martyrdom be hallowed and glorified because it is will worthy of the effulgent grandeur of sacred ideals. "Hate never produces anything but monsters and crime criminals!" Love alone realizes wonderful works, virtue alone can save! Redemption presupposes virtue, virtue sacrifice, and sacrifice love! Pure and spotless must the victim be that the sacrifice may be acceptable!" (El Filibusterismo.)

Respondent complains in his answer that he is not accorded fair dealing because the writer of this opinion has not abstained from taking part in this case. The complaint is absolutely groundless. It is based on two false premises, concocted by respondent to make it appear that he is a victim of persecution, and on a conclusion, also false, because based on the two false premises.

Respondent alleges that there are pending in the Supreme Court certain charges he filed against the writer and that the undersigned is the "moving spirit" behind these proceedings. Both trump-up allegations are false, and the Supreme Court has declared it to be so in its resolution of December 13, 1948.

The records of the Supreme Court show that no such charges have been filed. Respondent ought to know, if he can read and understand the Constitution, that if he has any charge to file against a justice of the Supreme Court to seek his ouster, he has to file it with the House of Representatives, the only agency authorized by the fundamental law to institute impeachment proceedings.

If the House of Representatives should institute it, the respondent will have the opportunity to sit in judgment as a senator as, under the Constitution, the Senate is the sole tribunal on cases of impeachment.

No justice with full sense of responsibility should commit a dereliction of official duty by inhibiting himself in a case upon imaginary or fabricated grounds. The members of the Supreme Court are not such moral weaklings as to easily yield to dishonest appeals to a false sense of delicacy. A cowardly surrender to groundless challenges of unscrupulous parties is unbecoming to a judge, and much more to a Justice of the Highest Tribunal of the Republic.

It is true that, after respondent had failed to sit in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, because we objected to the designation issued to him by Senate President Avelino on constitutional grounds, he requested the Chief Justice to relieve us one of the members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and respondent would make it appear that for his move we are prejudiced against him.

He is absolutely wrong. His request to the Chief Justice did not disturb us the least. The Constitution does not grant anyone the power to oust, replace, or dismiss any member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, judicial or senatorial, during his term of office in the Tribunal. Although an illegal substitution has been made once in the case of Senators Sebastian and Cuenco, such precedent did not make constitutional what is unconstitutional, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court has made clear his stand to uphold the Constitution by stating it in black and white in the decision he penned in the Suanes case L-2460. Respondent's failure was so obvious for us to mind his move.

After all, should we waste time and energy by entertaining any kind of prejudice against respondent, when there are so many great minds, beautiful characters, and wonderful personalities that are demanding our attention and whose spiritual companionship makes life enjoyable?

If we had entertained any prejudice against respondent, we would have meted out to him the penalty of imprisonment which he well deserves ,without minding the ill consequences it may entail to his health and life and without heeding the promptings of our pity and sense of humanity. Fortunately, very many years have already elapsed since we acquired the state of mind with which we can judge things and persons with an open and free conscience, truly emancipated from the shackles of any prejudice. The hateful events during the Japanese occupation were the best mycelium for spawning and the choicest fertilizers for growing prejudices against Generals Yamashita and Homma, to the extent of justifying any measure or action that would spell their doom. Immediate members of our family and ourselves endured agonizing sufferings and some of our near relatives were liquidated under their regime. But when Yamashita and Homma came to this Supreme Court, seeking remedy against the absurdly iniquitous procedure followed by the military commissions which tried them, so iniquitous that it closed to the Japanese generals all chances of fair trial, no scintilla of prejudice precluded us from casting the lone vote intended to give them the remedy and justice they sought for, notwithstanding the fact that Yamashita and Homma, appeared, in the general consent of our people, to be veritable monsters of cruelty and murder. Certainly, respondent would not pretend having given us, if ever, stronger grounds for prejudice than Yamashita and Homma, or that he is worse than both of them.

We are not to end this opinion without expressing our steadfast addiction to the following propositions:

1. The independence of the judiciary from outside interference or obstruction is essential to the effectively of its functions so that it can afford protection to fundamental rights including the freedom of the press, against encroachments and illegal assaults.

2. The freedom of the press includes the right to comment on pending judicial cases and the right to criticize the public and private life of all public officers, without any exception.

3. The freedom of the press does not, however, safeguard any publication intended to bully courts and judges in order to sway their judgment on pending cases, and such interference and obstruction should be promptly and drastically checked for the sake of an effective administration of justice.

4. Tribunal should be prompt in stopping the threatening and browbeating tactics of swaggering political ruffians and cutthroats bend on thwarting the scale of justice, as the opposing alternative to such a stern judicial attitude is surrendered to judicial anarchy.

5. Courts of justice annealed to face and ever ready to deal vigorously with attempts to turn them into puppets of domineering would-be dictators are essential in maintaining the reign of law and guaranteeing the existence of an orderly society.

This opinion has been written to modify and clarify our stand in concurring in the decision.

2. Judges should not be persuade by the pressure of public opinion

Go vs CA 206 SCRA 165

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 106087. April 7, 1993.

ROLITO GO Y TAMBUNTING, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 168, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NCJR, PASIG, METRO MANILA and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; NATURE OF BAIL PROCEEDINGS. — Respondent judge is correct in appreciating the nature of the bail proceedings. "[T]he hearing of an application for bail should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court. By 'summary hearing' [is] meant such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the

weight of the evidence for the purpose of bail. In such a hearing, the court 'does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered is admitted.' . . . The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to the purpose of the hearing."

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE IN GRANT OF BAIL IS SIMILAR TO PROCEDURE IN CANCELLATION OF BAIL. — Although the proceedings conducted by respondent judge were not for an application for bail but to cancel that which was issued to petitioner, the principles and procedure governing hearings on an application for bail were correctly applied by respondent judge in the cancellation of bail proceedings since the bail was issued by this Court in G.R. No. 101837 without prejudice to any lawful order which the trial court may issue in case the Provincial Prosecutor moves for the cancellation of the bail. The grant of bail was made without prejudice because where bail is not a matter of right, as in this case, the prosecution must be given the opportunity to prove that there is a strong evidence of guilt. In the cancellation of bail proceedings before him, the judge was confronted with the same issue as in an application for bail, i.e., whether the evidence of guilt is so strong as to convince the court that the accused is not entitled to bail. Hence, the similarity of the nature and procedure of the hearings for an application for bail and the cancellation of the same.

3. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES; ESSENCE OF RULE ON DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES. — The Constitution commands that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have "a speedy, impartial, and public trial." This right is a derivation and elaboration of the more fundamental right to due process of law. The rule on the disqualification of judges is a mechanism for enforcing the requirements of due process.

4. ID.; ID.; REASON FOR REQUIREMENT OF IMPARTIALITY ON PART OF JUDGE. — "It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being just. Thereby there is the legitimate expectation that the decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts as found by a judge who does not play favorites." The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," although required primarily for the benefit of the litigants, is also designed to preserve the integrity of the judiciary and more fundamentally, to gain and maintain the people's faith in the institutions they have erected when they adopted our Constitution. The notion that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice" is an imposition by the citizenry, as the final judge of the conduct of public business, including trials, upon the courts of a high and uncompromising standard in the proper dispensation of justice.

5. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF MOTION FOR INHIBITION, DENIAL OF MOTION FOR INHIBITION, AND PETITION CHALLENGING DENIAL OF MOTION FOR INHIBITION. — Hence, if the trial judge decides to deny a motion for inhibition based on Rule 137, Sec. 1, par. 2, he shall proceed with the trial, unless of course restrained by either the Court of Appeals or by this Court. The mere filing of a motion for inhibition before the trial court or a petition before either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court challenging an order of the trial judge denying a motion for inhibition will not deprive the judge of authority to proceed with the case. Otherwise, by the expedient of filing such motion or petition, although the same be lacking in merit, a party can unduly delay the trial.

6. ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE; BIAS AND PREJUDICE NOT PRESUMED. — While bias and prejudice, which are relied upon by petitioner, have been recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of the judge under Rule 137, Sec. 1, par. 2,

the established rule is that mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge. Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed especially if weighed against a judge's sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to person and do equal right to the poor and the rich.

7. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, THE ACT OF RESPONDENT JUDGE OF NOT SUSPENDING HEARING OF CASE AFTER DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECUSATION AND DURING PENDENCY OF PETITION CHALLENGING HIS ORDERS DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECUSATION AND THE MOTION TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS AND TRANSFER VENUE OUTSIDE METRO MANILA NOT PROOF OF PARTIALITY. — In the case at hand, respondent judge acted in accordance with the Rules and prevailing jurisprudence when he proceeded with the trial after denying petitioner's Motion for Recusation. Petitioner cannot, therefore, cite the fact that respondent judge did not suspend hearing the case during the pendency of this petition as proof of his claim that the judge is partial.

8. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, THE ACT OF RESPONDENT JUDGE OF OVERRULING PETITIONER'S OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENT OF A PROSECUTION WITNESS WHO DID NOT TESTIFY THEREON, NOT PROOF OF BIAS; REASON. — The first of these allegedly "palpably biased and hostile orders" was that issued by respondent judge on August 14, 1992 overruling petitioner's objection to the admissibility of an affidavit of Geronimo Gonzaga offered by the prosecution. Petitioner contends that respondent judge should not have admitted the extrajudicial statements of Gonzaga because the latter did not take the witness stand to affirm the statements contained in the document presented by the prosecution. Petitioner suspected that respondent judge was trying to bolster the evidence for the prosecution. This contention is without merit. The mere fact that the trial judge overruled petitioner's objection to the admissibility of a particular piece of evidence is not proof of bias. In Jandionco v. Peñaranda, it was held that "[d]ivergence of opinions between a judge hearing a case and a party's counsel, as to applicable laws and jurisprudence, is not a sufficient ground to disqualify the judge from hearing the case on the ground of bias and manifest partiality." If petitioner disagrees with the judge's ruling, he may still question the admissibility of the evidence when he files an appeal, in case a judgment of conviction is rendered. To conclude, however, that respondent judge, by overruling the objection raised by petitioner's counsel, was trying to strengthen the prosecution's evidence is not only baseless because there was no evidence given to support this conclusion, but also premature because at that stage, the judge was not yet appreciating the merits and weight of the particular piece of evidence in question but was merely ruling on its admissibility. Petitioner's conclusion that "the offer and admission of Gonzaga's hearsay 'eyewitness' statement suggest a sinister concert to simulate evidential strength" is, if not suggestive of paranoia, at the very least, an overreaction.

9. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, THE ACT OF RESPONDENT JUDGE OF CONSIDERING THE CANCELLATION OF BAIL PROCEEDINGS RIPE FOR RESOLUTION AND REFUSING TO ALLOW PETITIONER'S COUNSEL TO PRESENT ANYMORE WITNESSES, NOT MOTIVATED BY BIAS; REASON. — The other supervening event allegedly demonstrating the judge's partiality occurred during one of the hearings concerning the prosecution's motion for the cancellation of petitioner's bail. On September 28, 1992, after eleven (11) witnesses had been presented for the prosecution and two (2) for the defense, respondent judge considered the cancellation of bail proceedings ripe for resolution and refused to allow petitioner's counsel to present anymore witnesses. The reasons given by respondent judge for his ruling were: (1) the proceeding in the cancellation of bail is summary and different from the hearing on the merits; (2) the court need not receive exactly the same number of witnesses from both the prosecution and the defense; and (3) the counsel for petitioner previously limited himself to two (2) witnesses as borne out by the record of the case . . . Having determined that respondent judge made a proper appreciation of the nature of the bail proceedings before him, we likewise hold that it was within his discretion to limit the number of

witnesses for petitioner. The power of the court in the bail proceedings to make a determination as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong "implies a full exercise of judicial discretion." If the trial judge believes that the evidence before him is sufficient for him to rule on the bail issue, after giving both parties their opportunity to present evidence, it is within his authority to consider the bail proceedings ripe for resolution. In any case, respondent judge acceded to petitioner's request and allowed him to present more witnesses in the bail proceedings. In fine, the Court holds that the respondent judge's ruling on September 28, 1992 considering the prosecution's motion for cancellation of bail ripe for resolution on the basis of the evidence already presented was not motivated by bias or prejudice.

10. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, RESPONDENT JUDGE'S ORDER ALLOWING PETITIONER'S ARRAIGNMENT AND TRIAL WITHOUT BENEFIT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, NOT NECESSARILY PROOF OF PARTIALITY. — Petitioner, in this Motion for Reconsideration, restates his argument in the Petition that the respondent judge is biased, as evidenced by his Order dated July 17, 1991 which in effect allowed petitioner's arraignment and trial without the benefit of a preliminary investigation. It is true that in Go v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992, a divided Court nullified respondent judge's July 17, 1991 Order and ordered that a preliminary investigation be conducted. But the erroneous Order of respondent judge is not necessarily proof of partiality. In People v. Lacson, we held that erroneous rulings do not always constitute evidence of bias. In Luciano v. Mariano, we made the pronouncement that "[t]he mere fact that the judge has erroneously ruled against the same litigant on two or more occasions does not create in our minds a decisive pattern of malice on the part of the judge against that particular litigant. This is not an unusual occurrence on our courts . . ." Moreover, the fact that the erroneous order issued by a judge can be remedied and was actually corrected, as in this case, militates against the disqualification of the judge on the ground of bias or partiality.

11. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, MOTION FOR RECUSATION IS ANOTHER DILATORY MOVE. — In the case at hand, the Motion for Recusation filed by petitioner must be viewed in the light of his lawyers' many attempts to suspend the proceedings before the respondent judge. Before the trial court, petitioner tried at least eight (8) times, not merely to reset the scheduled hearings, but to suspend the trial of the case itself. The following pleadings filed by petitioner before respondent judge all prayed either to suspend the proceedings entirely or for the respondent judge to delay the disposition of a particular issue . . . Before this Court, petitioner has already filed three (3) petitions assailing various orders of respondent judge in connection with the single murder case pending against him. Apart from the present petition which is docketed as G.R. No. 106087, petitioner has previously filed two (2) other petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 101837 and 105424. In all three (3) petitions, petitioner applied for a temporary restraining order to have the proceedings before the trial court held in abeyance. The murder case involving only one accused, the petitioner, has become unnecessarily complicated and the proceedings before the trial court protracted, as can be gleaned from the fact that between the filing of the information on July 11, 1991 and the end of last year or December 31, 1992, the records of the case now consist of four (4) volumes and the transcript of stenographic notes have reached a total of one thousand five hundred and twenty three (1523) pages. Hearings are still being conducted. When taken in the light of petitioner's repeated attempts to have the proceedings in the murder case suspended and his lawyers' transparent maneuvers for the needless protraction of the case, the Motion for Recusation can only be viewed as another dilatory move and the present Motion for Reconsideration a further ploy to stall hearings.

12. ID.; CONDUCT REQUIRED OF A LAWYER BEFORE COURTS AND JUDICIAL OFFICERS. — The Rules of Court commands members of the bar "[t]o observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers." Reinforcing this rule of conduct is the Code of Professional Responsibility which states in Canon 11 the following: "A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others." Rule 11.03 of the Code further states: "A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing

language or behaviour before the courts." The next succeeding rule, Rule 11.03 adds: "A lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the record or having materiality to the case."

13. ID.; ID.; REASON FOR THE REQUIREMENT. — To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar, in pursuing their duty to advance the interests of their clients, to use strong language. But this privilege is not a license to malign our courts of justice. Irreverent behavior towards the courts by members of the bar is proscribed, not so much for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but more importantly, for the maintenance of respect for our judicial system, so necessary for the country's stability. "Time and again, this Court has admonished and punished, in varying degrees, members of the bar for statements, disrespectful or irreverent, acrimonious or defamatory, of this Court or the lower courts . . . To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps more effective, in calling the Court's attention to the issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive."

14. ID.; ID.; AN INSTANCE OF HIGHLY DEROGATORY, OFFENSIVE AND CONTEMPTUOUS LANGUAGE TOWARD A JUDGE. — Indeed, in the Motion for Reconsideration, counsels for petitioner describe as "unparalleled for sheer malevolence" respondent judge's allegedly erroneous assumptions. Petitioner's lawyers further stated: "Petitioner's counsel, citing the above proceedings, contested the trial judge's baseless, nay despotic attempt to muzzle his right to be heard in his defense. . ." The trial judge's actions were also branded as an "obviously unholy rush to do petitioner in . . ." In the Urgent Motion filed by petitioner on December 16, 1992, respondent judge is alleged to have: (a) "generated belief of his being under contract to do the prosecution's bidding;" (2) "evinced contempt for Supreme Court case law;" and (3) "dishonored his judicial oath and duty to hear before he condemns, proceed upon inquiry, and render judgment on a man's liberty only after a full trial of the facts." . . . In light of the above doctrines and jurisprudence, as well as the inherent power and authority of this Court to cite members of the Bar in contempt and to discipline them, we are of the opinion that the language used by petitioner's lawyers is highly derogatory, offensive and contemptuous.

R E S O L U T I O N

ROMERO, J p:

This is a Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Resolution dated September 23, 1992 denying petitioner's Petition and affirming the Decision and Resolution promulgated on March 9, 1992 and June 26, 1992, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 26305. 1 The CA Decision and Resolution upheld the following: (1) respondent Judge Benjamin V. Pelayo's Order dated September 4, 1991 which denied petitioner's Motion for Recusation; and (2) respondent judge's Order dated September 17, 1991 denying petitioner's Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Transfer Venue Outside Metro Manila.

A review of the antecedent facts of this case, particularly those wherein respondent Judge participated, is in order to arrive at a just and correct assessment of his acts vis-a-vis the petitioner.

On July 2, 1991, Eldon Maguan was shot inside his car along Wilson Street, San Juan, Metro Manila. After conducting an investigation of the shooting incident, the police identified petitioner Rolito Go as the prime suspect in the commission of the crime. On July 8, 1991, petitioner, accompanied by two lawyers, presented himself before the San Juan Police Station. He was arrested and booked for the shooting of Maguan. The police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.

On July 11, 1991, an information for murder was filed against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Metro Manila, the victim Eldon Maguan having died on July 9, 1991.

On the same day, July 11, 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion praying for petitioner's immediate release and for a preliminary investigation. Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro interposed no objection to petitioner's being granted provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00.

The case was raffled to the sala of respondent judge, the Hon. Benjamin V. Pelayo, who, on July 12, 1991, approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release.

On July 16, 1991, respondent judge issued an Order granting leave for the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal to conduct a preliminary investigation.

However, on July 17, 1991, respondent judge motu proprio issued an Order 2 which: (a) recalled the July 12, 1991 Order granting bail; (b) directed petitioner to surrender within 48 hours from notice; (c) cancelled the July 16, 1991 Order granting leave for the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation; (d) treated petitioner's omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation dated July 11, 1991 as a petition for bail.

On July 19, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus questioning the July 17, 1991 Order of respondent judge. On the same day, petitioner filed before the trial court a motion to suspend all the proceedings pending the resolution of the petition filed before the Supreme Court. 3 This motion was denied by respondent judge. 4

On July 23, 1991, petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the CAPCOM. Upon motion 5 by petitioner, the respondent judge issued an Order 6 directing "the accused's continued detention at the CAPCOM until such time as the Court shall have properly determined the place where accused should be detained."

On July 29, 1991, the National Bureau of Investigation wrote a letter 7 to the trial court requesting that custody of petitioner be transferred to the Bureau in view of an investigation for illegal possession of firearms involving petitioner.

On the same date, July 29, 1991, the trial court issued an Order 8 granting the NBI temporary custody of petitioner subject to the following conditions: (a) the petitioner is to be accorded his constitutional rights during the investigation; (b) the NBI investigation is to be conducted only during office hours and petitioner is to be returned to the custody of the CAPCOM at the end of each day; and (c) the NBI should report to the trial court the status of the investigation.

On July 30, 1991, petitioner filed a motion 9 before the trial court praying that the Order dated July 29, 1991 be nullified and recalled.

The following day, July 31, 1991, the NBI filed a motion 10 praying that it be granted full custody of petitioner pending the investigation of the case involving illegal possession of firearms.

An Order 11 was issued by the trial Court dated August 1, 1991 setting for hearing the issue concerning the proper venue of petitioner's detention.

After the hearing on petitioner's custody, the trial court issued an Order 12 dated August 2, 1991 ordering the CAPCOM to bring the person of petitioner to the court not later than August 5, 1991 so

that a commitment order for his detention at the Rizal Provincial Jail could be issued. The Commitment Order 13 ordering the Provincial Warden of the Provincial Jail of Pasig to take custody of petitioner was issued on August 5, 1991.

On August 8, 1991, petitioner filed a Motion for Recusation 14 praying that respondent judge inhibit himself from hearing the case. The motion was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated September 4, 1991. 15

On August 22, 1991, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and Transfer Venue Outside Metro Manila which was denied by respondent judge on September 17, 1991. 16

Petitioner was arraigned on August 23, 1991. In view of his refusal to enter a plea, a plea of "Not Guilty" was entered for him by the trial court. 17

In the meantime, this Court, by Resolution dated July 24, 1991, remanded to the Court of Appeals the petition filed by petitioner assailing the July 17, 1991 Order of the trial court.

On August 27, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court of Appeals.

On September 23, 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision dismissing the two petitions. However, upon petition by petitioner, this Court by an 8-6 vote in G.R. No. 101837 issued a decision reversing the, CA decision and ordering (a) the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation; and (b) the release of petitioner without prejudice to any order that the trial court may issue, should the Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.

After conducting a preliminary investigation pursuant to this Court's decision in G.R. No. 101837, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor issued a Resolution dated February 27, 1992 finding probable cause to charge petitioner with the crime of murder. The Resolution was approved by the Provincial Prosecutor who filed with the trial court a motion to cancel the bail of petitioner and a motion to set the criminal case for resumption of the trial on the merits.

Petitioner attempted to have the Resolution of the Prosecutor reversed by appealing to the Department of Justice, and filing petitions with the Court of Appeals (CA, G.R. SP No. 27738) and finally to this Court (G.R. No. 105424), but his efforts did not meet with success.

On October 1, 1991, petitioner filed another petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before this Court seeking to annul: (1) the Order of the trial court dated September 4, 1991 denying petitioner's Motion for Recusation; and (2) the Order dated September 17, 1991 denying petitioner's Motion to Suspend Proceedings and Transfer Venue Outside Metro Manila. The petition, docketed as G.R. No. 101772, was remanded to the Court of Appeals.

On March 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals (13th Division) rendered a decision dismissing the petition. As to the denial of petitioner's Motion for Recusation, the Court of Appeals held in part:

"On the basis of the allegation of the petition, the Court is not inclined to strike down the denial of petitioner's motion for recusation as a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge absent any clear showing of such grave abuse of his discretion. The allegation of petitioner in support of his motion for recusation are conclusions based on his own fears and are therefore speculations than anything else.

In order to warrant a finding of 'prejudicial' publicity as urged by the petitioner, there must be allegation and proof that the judge has been unduly influenced, not simply that he might be, by the "barrage" of publicity (Martelino vs. Alejandro, 32 SCRA 106; emphasis supplied). While there is such allegation in the petition, the Court has however found no proof so far adduced sufficient to accept the petitioner's claim that the respondent judge has been unduly influenced by the alleged publicity.

Additionally, We quote hereunder the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Aparicio vs. Andal, 175 SCRA 569 where, citing the case of Pimentel vs. Salanga, 21 SCRA 160, it said:

Efforts to attain fair, just and impartial trial and decision, have a natural and alluring appeal. But, we are not licensed to indulge in unjustified assumptions, or make a speculative approval to this ideal. It ill behooves this Court to tar and feather a judge as biased or prejudiced, simply because counsel for a party litigant happens to complain against him. As applied here, respondent judge has not as yet crossed the line that divides partiality and impartiality. He has not thus far stepped to one side of the fulcrum. No act or conduct of his would show arbitrariness or prejudice. Therefore, we are not to assume what respondent judge, not otherwise legally disqualified, will do in a case before him. We have had occasion to rule in a criminal case that a charge made before trial that a party 'will not be given a fair, impartial and just hearing' is 'premature.' Prejudice is not to be presumed. Especially if weighed against a judge's legal obligation under his oath to administer justice without respect to person and to equal right to the poor and the rich.' To disqualify or not to disqualify himself then, as far as respondent judge is concerned, is a matter of conscience." 18

The Court of Appeals also sustained the trial court's denial of petitioner's Motion to Suspend Proceedings and Transfer Venue Outside Metro Manila with the following pronouncement:

"On the question of the denial by the respondent court of petitioner's motion to suspend proceedings and transfer venue outside of Metro Manila, suffice it to say that the respondent court was correct in denying petitioner's motion. For indeed, the authority to order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice is vested in the Supreme Court by Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 4 of the Constitution. Neither the respondent court nor this Court has the authority to grant petitioner's motion for transfer of venue. The cases cited by petitioner in support of this issue were all decided by the Supreme Court before the advent of the 1973 Constitution where the provision on transfer of venue was first adopted, hence not applicable to the instant case." 19

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA decision having been denied, 20 a petition under Rule 45 was filed before this Court on July 29, 1992 assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. On September 9, 1992, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent People of the Philippines, filed a Comment on the Petition.

On September 23, 1992, the Court, after considering the allegations contained, issues raised and the arguments adduced in the Petition, as well as the Comment filed by the OSG, issued a Resolution denying the Petition on the ground that the respondent Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in its assailed decision.

On October 12, 1992, the present Motion for Reconsideration 21 was filed in which petitioner reiterates his position that respondent judge should inhibit himself from the case.

On December 16, 1992, petitioner filed a pleading captioned "Urgent Motion (for preliminary mandatory injunction)." In said Motion, petitioner questioned the Order of the trial court dated December 9, 1992 denying petitioner's Motion to Reopen Hearing (of the cancellation of bail proceedings) and to Present Last Witness. It appears that after the presentation of eleven (11)

witnesses by the prosecution and six (6) by the defense, the trial court considered the question concerning the cancellation of petitioner's bail ripe for resolution. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Reopen and Present Last Witness. 22 But the trial court issued an Order 23 dated December 9, 1992 which, among other things, denied the Motion. In the Urgent Motion filed with this Court on December 16, 1992, petitioner prayed "for the issuance forthwith and ex parte of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction directing respondent judge to allow petitioner to complete his defense evidence by presenting his last witness on the bail issue . . ." 24

On December 29, 1992, the Court passed a Resolution 25 issuing a temporary restraining order (TRO) restraining respondent judge from resolving the bail issue and directing him to allow petitioner to present his last witness. This Resolution was clarified and the TRO confirmed in another Resolution issued by the Court on January 11, 1993. 26

On January 8, 1993, the OSG filed a Comment on petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

At the outset, it is noteworthy to observe that petitioner in this Motion for Reconsideration no longer raises the question of change of venue. Moreover, the Motion for Reconsideration is predicated on what petitioner alleges are "the supervening events demonstrating partiality to the prosecution, on one hand, and hostility against petitioner, on the other." 27 Perforce, this Resolution shall only consider the allegations and issues raised in this Motion for Reconsideration and in the Comment thereon filed by the OSG.

Petitioner's Motion for Recusation filed before the trial court is based on Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2 of the Rules of Court on disqualification of judges.

The Constitution commands that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have "a speedy, impartial, and public trial." 28 (Emphasis supplied) This right is a derivation and elaboration of the more fundamental right to due process of law. 29 The rule on the disqualification of judges is a mechanism for enforcing the requirements of due process. "It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being just. Thereby there is the legitimate expectation that the decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts as found by a judge who does not play favorites." 30

The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," 31 although required primarily for the benefit of the litigants, is also designed to preserve the integrity of the judiciary and more fundamentally, to gain and maintain the people's faith in the institutions they have erected when they adopted our Constitution. The notion that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice" 32 is an imposition by the citizenry, as the final judge of the conduct of public business, including trials, upon the courts of a high and uncompromising standard in the proper dispensation of justice.

While bias and prejudice, which are relied upon by petitioner, have been recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition 33 of the judge under Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2, 34 the established rule is that mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge. 35 Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice. 36 Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed especially if weighed against a judge's sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to person and do equal right to the poor and the rich. 37

In the Motion for Reconsideration now before the Court, petitioner, to prove his allegation of bias on the part of respondent judge, takes the latter to task for continuing with the trial during the pendency of this petition stating that:

"Even as the instant petition for the trial judge's recusation pends, the latter did not see fit to suspend the hearings. Indeed the trial judge has been conducting marathon hearings which, in the context of his questioned fairness and impartiality, roars out as a railroad rush to make official a pre-determined verdict of guilt." 38

The Court draws the attention of petitioner and his counsels 39 to the procedure to be followed by the judge before whom a motion for disqualification has been filed. Rule 137, sec. 2 provides:

"If it be claimed that an official is disqualified from sitting as above provided, the party objecting to his competency may, in writing, file with the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the official shall thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the question of his disqualification . . ." (Emphasis supplied)

In People v. Moreno, 40 we stated that if a judge denies the motion for disqualification and rules favorably on his competency to try the case, it becomes a matter of official duty for him to proceed with the trial and decision of the case. He cannot shirk the responsibility without the risk of being called upon to account for his dereliction. Although this case was decided prior to the introduction of par. 2 of Rule 137, sec. 1, there is no reason why the procedure laid down in Rule 137, sec. 2 and applied in People v. Moreno should not likewise apply to a motion for inhibition filed pursuant to Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2. 41 In fact, in Genoblazo v. Court of Appeals, 42 the Court applied the procedure prescribed in Rule 137, sec. 2 when the trial judge denied a party's motion for inhibition under Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2, thus:

"Moreover, the trial judge acted correctly in proceeding with the case by setting it for pre-trial since it is within her sound discretion, after her decision in favor of her own competency, to either proceed with the trial or refrain from acting on the case until determination of the issue of her disqualification by the appellate court [Section 2 of Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court; De la Paz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, at 76]. 43

Hence, if the trial judge decides to deny a motion for inhibition based on Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2, he shall proceed with the trial, unless of course restrained by either the Court of Appeals or by this Court. The mere filing of a motion for inhibition before the trial court or a petition before either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court challenging an order of the trial judge denying a motion for inhibition will not deprive the judge of authority to proceed with the case. Otherwise, by the expedient of filing such motion or petition, although the same be lacking in merit, a party can unduly delay the trial.

In the case at hand, respondent judge acted in accordance with the Rules and prevailing jurisprudence when he proceeded with the trial after denying petitioner's Motion for Recusation. Petitioner cannot, therefore, cite the fact that respondent judge did not suspend hearing the case during the pendency of this petition as proof of his claim that the judge is partial. This Court has not, in connection with the petition, issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining respondent judge from further hearing the case. The TRO which this Court issued on December 29, 1992 after the petition was denied and pending this Motion for Reconsideration ordered the judge to desist from resolving the question on the cancellation of bail until the last witness of petitioner was heard. The TRO did not restrain the judge from hearing the case. On the contrary, the judge was ordered to hear petitioner's last witness in the cancellation of bail proceedings. 44 Because it was his duty to continue trying the case and there was no order from this Court not to do so, respondent judge committed no impropriety evincing partiality when he continued hearing the case during the pendency of the petition before this Court.

Petitioner, in this Motion for Reconsideration, claims that since the issuance of the Court Resolution dated September 23, 1992 denying his Petition, there have been "supervening events demonstrating partiality to the prosecution on one hand, and hostility against petitioner, on the other hand." 45 Petitioner alleges:

"Pursuing his unconstitutional bent first evinced when, without benefit of preliminary investigation, petitioner's arraignment and trial, then arrest and detention for almost a year was peremptorily ordered — which this Court reversed and rebuked (G.R. no. 101837, promulgated 11 February 1992) — the unchastened trial judge let out yet with two palpably biased and hostile orders, infra, clearly and unmistakably demonstrating an unconstitutional prejudgment of petitioner's culpability." 46

The first of these allegedly "palpably biased and hostile orders" was that issued by respondent judge on August 14, 1992 overruling petitioner's objection to the admissibility of an affidavit of Geronimo Gonzaga offered by the prosecution. Petitioner contends that respondent judge should not have admitted the extrajudicial statements of Gonzaga because the latter did not take the witness stand to affirm the statements contained in the document presented by the prosecution. Petitioner suspected that respondent judge was trying to bolster the evidence for the prosecution.

This contention is without merit. The mere fact that the trial judge overruled petitioner's objection to the admissibility of a particular piece of evidence is not proof of bias. In Jandionco v. Peñaranda, 47 it was held that "[d]ivergence of opinions between a judge hearing a case and a party's counsel, as to applicable laws and jurisprudence, is not a sufficient ground to disqualify the judge from hearing the case on the ground of bias and manifest partiality." 48 If petitioner disagrees with the judge's ruling, he may still question the admissibility of the evidence when he files an appeal, in case a judgment of conviction is rendered. To conclude, however, that respondent judge, by overruling the objection raised by petitioner's counsel, was trying to strengthen the prosecution's evidence is not only baseless because there was no evidence given to support this conclusion, but also premature because at that stage, the judge was not yet appreciating the merits and weight of the particular piece of evidence in question but was merely ruling on its admissibility. Petitioner's conclusion that "the offer and admission of Gonzaga's hearsay 'eyewitness' statement suggest a sinister concert to simulate evidential strength" 49 is, if not suggestive of paranoia, at the very least, an overreaction.

The other supervening event allegedly demonstrating the judge's partiality occurred during one of the hearings concerning the prosecution's motion for the cancellation of petitioner's bail. On September 28, 1992, after eleven (11) witnesses had been presented for the prosecution and two (2) for the defense, respondent judge considered the cancellation of bail proceedings ripe for resolution and refused to allow petitioner's counsel to present anymore witnesses. The reasons given by respondent judge for his ruling were: (1) the proceeding in the cancellation of bail is summary and different from the hearing on the merits; (2) the court need not receive exactly the same number of witnesses from both the prosecution and the defense; and (3) the counsel for petitioner previously limited himself to two (2) witnesses as borne out by the record of the case. 50

Respondent judge is correct in appreciating the nature of the bail proceedings. "[T]he hearing of an application for bail should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court. By 'summary hearing' [is] meant such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of the evidence for the purpose of bail. In such a hearing, the court 'does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered is admitted.' . . . The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters avoiding

unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to the purpose of the hearing." 51

Although the proceedings conducted by respondent judge were not for an application for bail but to cancel that which was issued to petitioner, the principles and procedure governing hearings on an application for bail were correctly applied by respondent judge in the cancellation of bail proceedings since the bail was issued by this Court in G.R. No. 101837 without prejudice to any lawful order which the trial court may issue in case the Provincial Prosecutor moves for the cancellation of the bail. 52 The grant of bail was made without prejudice because where bail is not a matter of right, as in this case, the prosecution must be given the opportunity to prove that there is a strong evidence of guilt. 53 In the cancellation of bail proceedings before him, the judge was confronted with the same issue as in an application for bail, i.e., whether the evidence of guilt is so strong as to convince the court that the accused is not entitled to bail. Hence, the similarity of the nature and procedure of the hearings for an application for bail and the cancellation of the same.

Having determined that respondent judge made a proper appreciation of the nature of the bail proceedings before him, we likewise hold that it was within his discretion to limit the number of witnesses for petitioner. The power of the court in the bail proceedings to make a determination as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong "implies a full exercise of judicial discretion." 54 If the trial judge believes that the evidence before him is sufficient for him to rule on the bail issue, after giving both parties their opportunity to present evidence, it is within his authority to consider the bail proceedings ripe for resolution. In any case, respondent judge acceded to petitioner's request and allowed him to present more witnesses in the bail proceedings.

In fine, the Court holds that the respondent judge's ruling on September 28, 1992 considering the prosecution's motion for cancellation of bail ripe for resolution on the basis of the evidence already presented was not motivated by bias or prejudice.

Finally, petitioner, in this Motion for Reconsideration, restates his argument in the Petition that the respondent judge is biased, as evidenced by his Order dated July 17, 1991 55 which in effect allowed petitioner's arraignment and trial without the benefit of a preliminary investigation.

It is true that in Go v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992, a divided Court nullified respondent judge's July 17, 1991 Order and ordered that a preliminary investigation be conducted. But the erroneous Order of respondent judge is not necessarily proof of partiality. In People v. Lacson, 56 we held that erroneous rulings do not always constitute evidence of bias. 57 In Luciano v. Mariano, 58 we made the pronouncement that "[t]he mere fact that the judge has erroneously ruled against the same litigant on two or more occasions does not create in our minds a decisive pattern of malice on the part of the judge against that particular litigant. This is not an unusual occurrence in our courts . . ." Moreover, the fact that the erroneous order issued by a judge can be remedied and was actually corrected, as in this case, militates against the disqualification of the judge on the ground of bias or partiality. 59

We have earlier underscored the importance of the rule of disqualification of judges, not only in safeguarding the rights of litigants to due process of law but also in earning for the judiciary the people's confidence, an element so essential in the effective administration of justice. The rule should, therefore, not be used cavalierly to suit a litigant's personal designs or to defeat the ends of justice. "While We are exacting on the conduct of judges confronted with motions for disqualification's, We cannot, however, tolerate acts of litigants who, for any conceivable reason, seek to disqualify a judge for their own purpose, under a plea of bias, hostility, prejudice or prejudgment . . . [T]his Court does not approve the tactic of some litigants of filing of baseless motion

for disqualification of the judge as a means of delaying the case and/or of forum-shopping for a more friendly judge." 60

In the case at hand, the Motion for Recusation filed by petitioner must be viewed in the light of his lawyers' many attempts to suspend the proceedings before the respondent judge. Before the trial court, petitioner tried at least eight (8) times, not merely to reset the scheduled hearings, 61 but to suspend the trial of the case itself. The following pleadings filed by petitioner before respondent judge all prayed either to suspend the proceedings entirely or for the respondent judge to delay the disposition of a particular issue:

CAPTION OF PLEADING DATE OF FILING

1. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion July 19, 1991

2. Motion to Hold in Abeyance August 2, 1991

3. Motion for Recusation August 8, 1991

4. Motion to Suspend Proceedings

and Transfer Venue Outside

Metro Manila August 22, 1991

5. Motion to Suspend Proceedings March 4, 1991

6. Second Motion to Inhibit March 2, 1992

7. Motion to Suspend Action on

Formal Offer of Evidence and on

Submission of Memorandum Dec. 21, 1992

8. Motion to Reopen Hearing and

Present Last Witness Dec. 1, 1992

Before this Court, petitioner has already filed three (3) petitions assailing various orders of respondent judge in connection with the single murder case pending against him. Apart from the present petition which is docketed as G.R. No. 106087, petitioner has previously filed two (2) other petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 101837 and 105424. In all three (3) petitions, petitioner applied for a temporary restraining order to have the proceedings before the trial court held in abeyance.

The murder case involving only one accused, the petitioner, has become unnecessarily complicated and the proceedings before the trial court protracted, as can be gleaned from the fact that between the filing of the information on July 11, 1991 and the end of last year or December 31, 1992, the records of the case now consist of four (4) volumes and the transcript of stenographic notes have reached a total of one thousand five hundred and twenty three (1523) pages. Hearings are still being conducted.

When taken in the light of petitioner's repeated attempts to have the proceedings in the murder case suspended and his lawyers' transparent maneuvers for the needless protraction of the case, the Motion for Recusation can only be viewed as another dilatory move and the present Motion for Reconsideration a further ploy to stall hearings.

In sum, after a careful examination of the records of the case, including the transcript of stenographic notes, and considering the applicable law, the pertinent rules and prevailing jurisprudence, we reiterate our holding in the Court Resolution dated September 23, 1992 that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the respondent judge's Order which denied petitioner's Motion for Recusation. This extended Resolution should put an end to petitioner's obvious attempts at deferring the trial of his principal case by dwelling on incidental matters. The motion for reconsideration must, perforce, be denied with finality.

In the Comment on the petitioner's Motion for Recusation, the Solicitor General prays that Attys. Raymundo A. Armovit, Miguel R. Armovit and Rafael R. Armovit, be disciplinarily dealt with by this Court for allegedly using abusive and intemperate language against respondent judge which betrays disrespect to the trial court.

Indeed, in the Motion for Reconsideration, counsels for petitioner describe as "unparalleled for sheer malevolence" 62 respondent judge's allegedly erroneous assumptions. Petitioner's lawyers further stated: "Petitioner's counsel, citing the above proceedings, contested the trial judge's baseless, nay despotic attempt to muzzle his right to be heard in his defense . . ." 63 The trial judge's actions were also branded as an "obviously unholy rush to do petitioner in . . ." 64

In the Urgent Motion filed by petitioner on December 16, 1992, respondent judge is alleged to have: (1) "generated belief of his being under contract to do the prosecution's bidding;" (2) "evinced contempt for Supreme Court case law;" and (3) "dishonored his judicial oath and duty to hear before he condemns, proceed upon inquiry, and render judgment on a man's liberty only after a full trial of the facts." 65

The Rules of Court commands members of the bar "[t]o observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers." 66 Reinforcing this rule of conduct is the Code of Professional Responsibility which states in Canon 11 the following: "A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others." Rule 11.03 of the Code further states: "A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behaviour before the courts." The next succeeding rule, Rule 11.03 adds: "A lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the record or having materiality to the case."

To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar, in pursuing their duty to advance the interests of their clients, to use strong language. But this privilege is not a license to malign our courts of justice. Irreverent behavior towards the courts by members of the bar is proscribed, not so much for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but more importantly, for the maintenance of respect for our judicial system, so necessary for the country's stability. "Time and again, this Court has admonished and punished, in varying degrees, members of the bar for statements, disrespectful or irreverent, acrimonious or defamatory, of this Court or the lower courts . . . To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps more effective, in calling the Court's attention to the issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive." 67

In light of the above doctrines and jurisprudence, as well as the inherent power and authority of this Court to cite members of the Bar in contempt and to discipline them, we are of the opinion that the language used by petitioner's lawyers is highly derogatory, offensive and contemptuous.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY. Attys. Raymundo A. Armovit, Miguel R. Armovit and Rafael R. Armovit are hereby ordered to pay a FINE of P500.00 each with a stern WARNING that a repetition of this or similar act and language will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to their records.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Melo, JJ ., concur.

3. Judges should refrain from influencing the outcome of the litigation

Marces, Sr vs Arcangel 258 SCRA 503

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

 

A.M. No. RTJ-91-712 July 9, 1996

BEN D. MARCES, SR., complainant, vs.JUDGE PAUL T. ARCANGEL, Presiding Judge, Branch 12, Regional Trial Court Davao City, respondent.

 

MENDOZA, J.:p

Respondents was, at the time material to this case, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Brach 12, at Davao City. 1 He is charged with serious misconduct, grave abuse of authority, harassment, and immorality.

The complaint alleges the following:

(1) Complaint is a 61-year old retiree, married to Ruth Jovellar, by whom he has five children, namely, Farley, Lydia, Ben Jr., Nikki and Allan. Complainant and the members of his family are residents of the BRC Village, Catalunan Penqueño, Davao City.

In 1984 the spouses Wilfredo and Flordeliza Cañas moved into complaint's neighborhood. They became the nearest neighbors of the complainant, their houses being only 45 meters apart. In that year, a domestic helper of the Cañases sought complainant's help for alleged maltreatment she had

received from her employers. Complainant, who was the incumbent Purok leader, referred the matter to the barangay authorities. The dispute was resolved, but the relation of the Marces and the Cañas families became strained.

On September 27, 1990, Mrs. Flordeliza Cañas had an exchange of words with Mrs. Ruth Marces and the latter's daughter, Lydia, during which they hurled invectives at each other. The incident was triggered by a relatively minor matter involving a fight between the turkeys owned by the two families but which, because of the bad blood between them, became a major issue.

The following day, September 28, Mrs. Cañas, together with her sister and a neighbor, boarded a passenger jeepney despite the fact that there were no more seats available because complainant was riding on that vehicle. It turned out that Mrs. Cañas had intended to cause the complainant's arrest, because as the jeepney neared the police station, Mrs. Cañas asked the driver to stop the vehicle. Mrs. Cañas then got off and called a policeman and had the complainant Ben D. Marces arrested.

The arrest was made on the basis of alias warrants of arrest handed to the policeman by Mrs. Cañas. The warrants had been issued by MTCC Judge Edipolo Sarabia in three criminal cases against the herein complainant for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Complainant was detained for one night without the knowledge of his family, a fact of which Mrs. Cañas allegedly boasted in the neighborhood.

The following day, complainant saw Judge Sarabia and explained that the criminal cases against him, in connection with which the alias warrants were issued, had long been amicably settled. Judge Sarabia told the complainant that he really did not know anything about the cases and that he had only been requested by respondent Judge Paul Arcangel to issue the warrants.

(2) As a result of the September 27, 1990 shouting incident, Mrs. Cañas also filed a complaint with the Barangay Captain against complainant's wife and daughter, Lydia. Mediation conferences between the two families were conducted on October 27, 1990 and on November 3, 1990. Although he had not been asked to, respondent Judge Arcangel attended the conferences. It is alleged that respondent judge

— disturbed the proceedings by walking in and out of the Barangay Hall where the conferences were being held;

— introduced himself as the Executive Judge of the RTC of Davao City in an obvious attempt to influence the Barangay Officials; and

— accompanied Mrs. Cañas and acted as the baby-sitter of the latter's daughter.

During the October 27, 1990 conference, respondent judge allegedly confronted the complainant, accusing him of sending the judge a death threat by means of a letter which purported to have been sent by the New People's Army.

The barangay officials failed to amicably settle the dispute. It is averred that Mrs. Cañas showed "arrogance and callousness at all times as if to prove that she is protected by a hard rock and impregnable when she is with the judge."

(3) The feud between the Marces and Cañas families worsened. On December 29, 1990, there was a violent confrontation between members of the two families. Some of the parties were injured as a

result of hacking. Investigations were conducted by the police during which, according to complainant, he saw respondent Judge Arcangel talking to the policemen.

(4) On the night of January 2, 1991, armed men in uniform arrived in two military vehicles and arrested members of the complainant's family and took them to the Davao Metrodiscom Headquarters. The arrests were made on orders of a certain Col. Nelson Estares. A summary inquest was conducted which complainant laments to be irregular as the arrests were pre-arranged and the complaint sheet was fabricated. Complainant avers that the illegal issuance and service of the "warrant" (i.e., so-called Arrest Orders) by the Commander of the Davao Metrodiscom "can only be done by a person with a strong connection, power and influence," such as respondent judge, considering his high position in the government and close relations with the Cañas family.

(5) In a resolution dated May 11, 1991 the investigating prosecutor, Albert Axalan, found probable cause and filed charges of attempted murder against complainant Ben D. Marces, his wife and his son, Farley. Complaint's countercharges were dropped. Three days after, warrants of arrest were issued by the RTC against complainant, his wife Ruth and son Farley respectively. Complainant alleges that respondent Judge Arcangel, taking advantage of his position, influenced the conduct of the preliminary investigation.

(6) Subsequently, complainant's son, Farley, was arrested. He was handcuffed and taken to the Ma-a City Jail. It is alleged that respondent's Toyota car, with plate number LBT 555, followed the car of the arresting policemen "as if to make sure that the evil plan" allegedly "authored by Judge Arcangel is well followed and executed." "To add insult to injury," it is alleged that while the applications for bail bond of complainant, his wife and Farley were being processed at Branch 8 of RTC of Davao City, respondent Judge Arcangel arrived and questioned the validity of the bond posted, telling the representative of the bonding company, "Hindi puwede ito, who gave you the authority to issue?" He then removed the receipts and arrogantly left with the receipts.

(7) Because of these events, complainant started asking why a judge should have a special interest in his family's feud with the Cañas family. All he knew before was that the judge's car was often parked in front of the house of Mrs. Cañas, especially when Mr. Cañas was away working overtime.

In his Comment submitted in compliance with the resolution of this Court, respondent judge alleges (1) that the charges against him are not only false and malicious but utterly baseless; (2) that the same were filed merely to gratify complainant's personal spite and animosity against him; and (3) that the complaint was filed in anticipation of the cases which the respondent intends to file against the complainant for slander and threats.

Respondent judge further avers:

Anent the charge of causing the issuance of warrants of arrest against the complainant and the handling of the same to Mrs. Cañas for enforcement, it was Mrs. Esperanza Deiparine and Mrs. Flordeliza Cañas who obtained the warrants. He only requested judge Sarabia of the MTCC of Davao City to issue them. 2 Respondent judge claims the warrants were valid, having been issued in connection with pending cases and that there were other warrants against complainant which could not be served because of complainant's close connection with the officers of the warrant section. 3

As to the allegation that he disturbed the barangay conciliation proceedings in the case between the Mares and Cañas families and allegedly acted as "an escort" of Mrs. Cañas and "baby-sitter" of her daughter, respondent judge denies he acted as escort and baby-sitter and claims that he could not have disturbed the proceedings because none were held on November 3, 1990. He claims that he went to the barangay hall because he filed his own complaint against Ruth Marces and her daughter

Lydia. Apparently, respondent judge is referring to the incident on September 27, 1990 during which Mrs. Marces and daughter Lydia allegedly called Mrs. Cañas "KABIT, KABIT, KABIT SA ABOGADO" ("PARAMOUR, PARAMOUR, PARAMOUR OF A LAWYER"). 4 The judge probably felt alluded to.

Respondent judge likewise denies that he pressured the police officers and the prosecutors to file charges in court as a result of the December 29, 1990 hacking incident.

Respondent vehemently denies having illicit relations with Mrs. Cañas and that he went to the house of the Cañas family whenever Mr. Wilfredo Cañas was away. Respondent claims that he has known the Cañas family since 1983, when he was still a City Judge. According to him, in 1989 he used to go to the Cañas residence on request by Mrs. Cañas to mediate in the latter's family problem. After this was settled, he continued going there because he and Mr. Cañas had business interests in the manufacture of appliance protectors.

Finally, it is alleged that complainant is actually a fugitive from justice, who has a string of criminal cases 5 and is notorious in the community. Respondent further discusses the merits of the December 29, 1990 hacking incident pointing to complainant, his wife and son as the felons and the guilty parties.

On February 27, 1992, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. A Reply was subsequently filed by the complainant, alleging harassment by respondent judge, as follows: (a) respondent judge wrote the Administrator of the Social Security System, pretending to be interested in purchasing an acquired asset consisting of a house and lot, which happens to be the residence of the complainant; (b) the management of the Philippine Airlines was asked by a fictitious person to revive the criminal cases against the complainant; (c) the respondent judge, together with a certain Fiscal Dumlao, had been visiting witnesses to the December 29, 1990 hacking incident; (d) the respondent judge filed an administrative case with the Professional Regulations Commission against Nikki Marces; daughter of the complainant who had just passed the Nursing Board Examinations; and (e) respondent still visited the house of Mr. and Mrs. Cañas.

Complainant further avers that the criminal cases against him are all business-related, being cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and for estafa arising from the issuance of bouncing checks. He calls attention to the fact that respondent judge discussed in his pleadings the merits of the December 29, 1990 hacking incident and contends that this is improper and unethical.

On May 26, 1992, the Court referred the case to Associate Justice Luis Javellana of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. Unfortunately, Associate Justice Javellana suddenly died on August 25, 1993. The case was thereafter reassigned to Associate Justice Fidel P. Purisima, but the reception of the evidence was assigned to Executive Judge Romeo D. Marasigan of Branch XVI, RTC-Davao City. On September 18, 1993, Judge Marasigan forwarded the records of the case, together with the evidence adduced before him, to this Court. The records were later transmitted to Justice Purisima.

In his Report and Recommendation dated May 30, 1994, Associate Justice Purisima recommends dismissal of the charges against respondents judge for insufficiency of evidence, except the charge that respondent judge attended mediation conferences between the feuding families and tried to intervene. As to this charge the Investigating Justice finds that the evidence establishes the same. Justice Purisima recommends that respondent judge be admonished and sternly warned that repetition of the acts of impropriety by respondent will be dealt with more severely. The pertinent portions of Justice Purisima's report states:

The charge concerning the frequent visits by respondents Judge at the residence of Mrs. Flordeliza Cañas in Barangay Catalunan Pequeño, Davao City, and allusion that the former has illicit relation with the latter are utterly devoid of sufficient substantiation. The mere suspicion on the part of the complainant and members of his family that the respondent Judge has an affair with Mrs. Flordeliza Cañas has been completely effaced and reduced to nothing reprehensible or censurable by the unequivocal and straightforward testimonies of Flordeliza's husband and parents that the respondent Judge is just a family friend whose visits did not have any immoral implication. According to these knowledgeable witnesses, the latter was their frequent visitor in 1990, when respondent Judge and Engr. Wilfredo B. Cañas, were engaged in the manufacture of appliance protectors.

Obviously, Engr. Wilfredo B. Cañas, the lifetime partner of Mrs. Flordeliza Cañas, day and night, should be in the best position to observe her. Whether or not his wife is unfaithful to him is a matter within the sphere of the husband to detect. Here, Engr. Wilfredo B. Cañas having given his wife clean slate, We an do no less. A different conclusion and ruling could ruin families, which society cherishes and protects (Article 215, New Civil Code; Article 149, Family Code).

xxx xxx xxx

So also, respondent Judge cannot be held administratively liable for the handcapping [sic] of a son of complainant, who was allegedly handcapped [sic] and brought to the Ma-a jail, while working at the Davao Light and Power company. Absent any admissible evidence that the respondent Judge was the one who caused such malfeasance to happen, he is not answerable therefor.

xxx xxx xxx

But the charge that the respondent Judge was present during the mediation conference between the Marces family and Cañas family on October 27 and November 3, 1990, before the Lupon Tagapayapa of Catalunan Pequeño, Davao City, and that during such conference, respondent Judge was in and out of the conference room, trying to interfere with the proceedings, and to wield influence as Regional Trial Court Judge, is firmly anchored on Complainant's evidence, which has not been effectively traversed and negated by respondent's evidence.

From the evidence on hand, it is clear that on October 27, 1990, the respondent Judge arrived at the Barangay Hall of Catalunan Pequeño, Davao City, in the company of Mrs. Flordeliza Cañas, and the latter's small child. During the said mediation conference between the Marces family and Cañas family, respondent Judge entered the conference room and made it known to all and sundry that he is the Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao. Such actuation was indiscreet and improper because the disputes and controversies between the two warring families could develop into a litigation before any of the courts of Davao.

All things studiedly considered, with due regard to the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced, pro and con, before Honorable Executive Judge Romeo D. Marasigan of the Regional Trial Court, Davao City; the ineluctable conclusion is that on October 27, and November 3, 1990, the respondent Judge intruded into the conference room, and interfered with a mediation conference then being held

between the family of the herein complainant and the Cañas family, before the Lupon Tagapayapa of Catalunan Pequeño, Davao City, and while inside said room, tried to influence barangay officials thereat, by identifying himself as the Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Davao Regional Trial Court; a misbehavior and an improper actuation under the premises.

Equally anemic of evidentiary support is the charge that the respondent Judge influenced the prosecutors and police authorities of Davao City to harass the family of complainant.

The Court finds the conclusions of the investigator that respondent judge is guilty of improper conduct to be fully supported by the evidence in the record. It only needs to be added that the claim of respondent judge that he was at the mediation conference held on October 27, 1990 because he had himself filed a complaint against Ruth Marces and the latter's daughter, Lydia, is belied by the fact that respondent judge's complaint was filed only on November 3, 1990.

The report of the Investigating Justice fails to consider other serious allegations in the complaint, of which there is also sufficient evidence in the record, to wit:

(1) That respondent judge caused the issuance of alias warrants of arrest by requesting another judge, before whom the case against the complainant was pending, to issue the warrants; and

(2) That the arrest of the members of the Marces family on January 2, 1991 would not have been made without the intervention of respondent judge.

These charges have not only been proven by substantial and convincing evidence, but have actually been admitted by respondent judge. Thus, complainant alleges that he was informed by Judge Sarabia that the warrants had been issued by him upon the request of respondent judge. This allegation is supported by a handwritten not (Exh. E) of respondent judge, which reads:

Judge Edipolo SarabiaBr. 3, City Trial CourtDavao City

Dear Ed:

If these cases (Cr. Case Nos. 9-C-M, 10-C-M & 11-C-M) are still pending, please issue another aliaswarrants as the accused is now in town.

Thanks.

(Sgd.) Paul Arcangel

In addition, complainant presented a certification by the Clerk of Court 6 of the MTCC-Davao City, Branch 3, stating the following:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

THIS IS TO CERTIFY, that according to the records of this Court, the three (3) Estafa Cases against MR. BEN MARCES under Criminal Cases Nos. 9-CM, 10-CM

and 11-CM has been in archive since December 28, 1983 due to non-arrest of the accused and an alias warrant of arrest was issued against the accused.

That its discovery and revival was made possible upon the request for verification of its status and information by Judge Paul T. Arcangel that accused is back in town and that ultimately resulted to the dismissal of the three (3) cases on March 11, 1991, without which verification the said cases would have remained pending to date.

Instead of being delivered to the warrant officer, the warrants were actually given to Mrs. Cañas. The entry in the Daily Record of Events of the Ulas Police Substation 7 stated that "[e]lements of this unit led by P/Cpl. VA Secretaria arrested with alias warrant of arrest one BEN MARCES Y DOMANILLO. . .who was charge[d] with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 with Criminal Case No[s]. 9-CM, 11CM duly signed by Judge Edipolo Sarabia this 28th of September 1990 at Davao City. The warrant was given by one FLORDELIZA CAÑAS Y Pelegrino, 26 years old, married, housewife. . . ."

To cap it all, respondent judge himself admitted in his Comment, dated December 27, 1991, that Mrs. Esperanza Deiparine and Mrs. Flordeliza Cañas requested him "to have the warrants renewed, thus, he requested Judge Sarabia for the issuance of the new warrants" 8 against the complainant.

Respondent judge justifies his intervention on the ground that complainant Ben D. Marces had been able to evade service of the warrants because of connections with the warrant officers of Davao City. Even if this had been the case it would not excuse respondent judge in using his own influence.

Indeed this is the same excuse given for respondent judge's interceding with the Metrodiscom authorities for the issuance of a so-called order of arrest as a result of which complainant Ben D. Marces, his wife Ruth and his children Farley, Lydia, Nikki and Allan were arrested on January 2, 1991. Respondent's own witness, Wilfredo Cañas, stated that he was accompanied by respondent to Col. Nelson Estares. It was Col. Estares who ordered the arrest of complainant and members of his family. Thus, in his affidavit dated August 23, 1991, Wilfredo Cañas, stated:

13. That when my wife and mother-in-law were attacked and hacked by Ben Marces and his family within the premises of our house on December 29, 1990, I called Judge Arcangel for assistance because Ben Marces was trying to manipulate the case by making it appear that they were the victims. . .

14. That when I followed up the case at the Talomo Police Station and at the Tugbok Police Station, I was given a run around by the police authorities and I sensed that a ranking police officer was interceding in behalf of Ben Marces and his family;

15. That when the police authorities could not come up with a report of the incident after more than three days, I sought the assistance of Judge Arcangel, who accompanied me to Metrodiscom Chief Col. Nelson Estares, to whom I explained the entire incident and treatment I received from the police who was investigating the case;

In addition, Wilfredo Cañas testified in the investigation and affirmed that it was because of the help of respondent judge that he was able to talk with Col. Estares, thus: 9

[JUDGE ARCANGEL conducting examination:]

Q: In connection with the hacking of your wife and mother-in-law, what action did you take?

A: I tried to follow up the complaint to the police station about the hacking incident. I even went to the Tugbok police station.

Q: What action was taken at the police station?

A: The police station did not entertain my complaint and they tried to pass me around.

Q: When no action was taken in your complaint by the police station, what did you do?

A: Sensing that there is no hope (to go to the) police, I asked Judge Arcangel to accompany me to Col. Estares.

Q: When Judge Arcangel accompanied you to the Office of Col. Estares, what did you do?

A: He introduced me to Col. Estares and I told Col. Estares that my wife and my mother-in-law were attacked by the Marces family and they were hacked and I requested Col. Estares to help me because the police did not take any action and I even sensed that somebody was supporting the Marces family.

With the above-cited charges having been duly proven, in addition to the factual findings of Justice Purisima, it is clear that (1) respondent judge intervened in the feud between the complainant's family and the Cañas family and (2) such interference was not limited to the barangay mediation proceedings but extended as well to the various stages of the conflict. These acts of respondent judge must be viewed not as single, isolated actuations but in their totality and in the context of the enmity between the two feuding families. Thus viewed we find the actuations of respondent judge improper and censurable.

Respondent is, as we have so often said, the visible representation of the law, 10 the intermediary between conflicting interests, 11 and the embodiment of the people's sense of justice. 12 Unless it was a case filed with his court, it was improper for him to intervene in a dispute or controversy. The Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. 13

He should not suffer his conduct to create the impression that any person can unduly influence him or enjoy his favor. 14

Respondent judge allowed himself to be dragged into what was a purely private matter between feuding families. In attending, at the request of Mrs. Cañas, the barangay conciliation proceedings and introducing himself there as the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in an obvious demonstration of support for Mrs. Cañas, respondent lent the prestige of his office to a party in a case.

Respondent's request to the judge of a lower court to issue warrants of arrest against the complainant is no less censurable. As the Court had occasion to state in Sabitsana, Jr. v. Villamor: 15

Cardinal is the rule that a Judge should avoid impropriety in all activities. The Canons mince no words in mandating that a Judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another Court (Canon 2, Rule 2.04). Interference by members of the bench in pending suits with the end in view of influencing the course or the result of litigation does not only subvert the independence of the judiciary but also undermines the people's faith in its integrity and impartiality.

Respondent judge also acted improperly in accompanying Wilfredo Cañas to Col. Nelson Estares who ordered the arrest of complainant and members of the latter's family. It would have been impossible for the Cañas family to procure the arrest of complainant and of members of his family by the Davao Metrodiscom were it not for the intervention of respondent judge.

Wilfredo Cañas' claim that he had to seek the help of respondent judge because even after three days the police still had not made a report on the incident on December 29, 1990 cannot justify respondent's intervention in the quarrel. The possibility that the incident could become the subject of litigation in his court should have deterred him from getting involved in the feud.

Nothing can bring courts into disrepute more than the failure of the occupants thereof to be ever scrupulous in their conduct. Canon 30 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics cautions judges "in pending or prospective litigation before him [to] be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element in determining his judicial course." It cannot be overemphasized that "a judge's official conduct should be free from appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of official duties but also in everyday life, should be beyond reproach." 16

For the foregoing reasons, we find respondent judge guilty of improper conduct. We do not agree with complainant, however, that respondent's misconduct justifies his dismissal from the service. While in some cases involving similar acts the penalties imposed on the erring judges were dismissal, there were in those cases other grounds warranting the imposition of such drastic disciplinary penalty. For example, in Ubarra v. Mapalad, 17respondent, aside from pressuring complainants to drop criminal charges against the accused, likewise refused to inhibit herself when she knew it was improper to decide the case, and was guilty of delay in deciding the case. On the other hand, in Sabitsana, Jr. v. Villamor 18 the respondent was found guilty of attempting to influence another judge to acquit the accused in a criminal case and, in addition, of making untruthful statements in the certificate of service.

In the case at bar, there is no other charge against respondent judge. This is his first administrative case. On the other hand his record as City Judge of Davao City, from 1975 to 1983, and as Regional Trial Court Judge in the same city since 1983 is otherwise exemplary. In the circumstances of this case, the penalty of reprimand with warning that commission of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely, should suffice to accomplish the purpose of disciplining an erring member of the judiciary who has not shown himself to be beyond correction. As the Book of Proverbs says, "A single reprimand does more for a man of intelligence than a hundred lashes for a fool." (17:10)

WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED with WARNING that commission of similar acts of impropriety on his part in the future will be dealt with more severely. All other charges are hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Vitug, Kapunan, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Melo and Puno, JJ., took no part.

4. Conduct of Judges must be above reproach

Jacinto vs Vallarta 453 SCRA 83

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

THIRD DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-04-1541. March 10, 2005

Spouses JESUS V. JACINTO and NENITA C. JACINTO, Complainant, vs.Judge PLACIDO V. VALLARTA, Municipal Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Quiet dignity, self-restraint, civility and temperate language are expected of every judge. All members of the judiciary must strictly follow the ethical standards laid down by the Code of Judicial Conduct.

The Case and the Facts

This case originated from a Complaint1 filed by Spouses Jesus V. Jacinto and Nenita C. Jacinto on March 22, 2002. Judge Placido B. Vallarta was charged therein with gross negligence, gross ignorance of the law, issuance of an unjust interlocutory order, and vulgar and unbecoming conduct. The Complaint alleges as follows:

"1. That on September 4, 2001, Judge Placido B. Vallarta issued an Order against us for a Writ of Replevin for our vehicle Isuzu Cargo Truck. The Order was in favor of a certain rich and influential spouses from Nueva Ecija, Mr. & Mrs. Gaudencio and Carina Magundayao, who sold the truck to us on September 13, 1999;

"2. That according to our knowledge and belief [a] Writ of Replevin should not have been ordered against us considering our agreements with spouses Magundayao stated in the ‘Deed of Conditional Sale’ legalizing the sale of the Isuzu Cargo Truck;

"3. That we [did] not violate any of the agreement[s] in the Deed of Conditional Sale. Nevertheless, it was us who [were] cheated and the right to own the truck was taken from us by spouses Magundayao, hence, we sent them a demand letter;

"4. That after the Sheriff recovered the truck from our possession on September 7, 2001, we immediately went to the Office of Judge Vallarta to settle the problem amicably. We stooped down and pleaded for help. However, we were dismayed by the attitude shown by Judge Vallarta and the words from him [were] so surprising that we [did] not expect to hear from a public servant and from a Judge for that matter. Instead of giving sound advice to our case, Judge Vallarta acted otherwise and was totally rude towards us. For whatever reason he dealt with us in an ill-mannered way that even resulted for my fainting in the Office of the MTC-Gapan, because he at that time was asking him, if possible I will deposit the money to the Court, representing our payments to spouses Magundayao however, Judge Vallarta sarcastically uttered the following words: ‘Wala akong pakialam diyan sa pera ninyo kung gusto ninyo hanapin ninyo ang inyong kalaban’, I answered him ‘Wala po kasi ang aming kalaban (Magundayao) nagpunta daw po sa abroad’ and he replied ‘Eh, wala pala edi hanapin ninyo, sino ang gusto ninyong maghanap ako at saka hindi pumapasok sa isip ko yang mga sinasabi mo (pointing his forehead) humanap ka ng abogado mo na makatutulong sa iyo, dagdag ka pa sa problema ko’.

"5. That because of the injustice shown to us by Judge Vallarta we cannot help but to think that due to the money and influence by spouses Magundayao the Order of Writ of Replevin was issued wrongly. He issued the Writ of Replevin without clearance from the Supreme Court. We say this so because upon our thorough examination of the complaint and the attachment thereof we found out that the certification from the Supreme Court issued in favor of the Utility Assurance Corporation, prove a defective replevin bond;

"6. That because of [the] inconsiderate attitude of Judge Vallarta, given our limited resources, we were left with no other choice but to hire the service of a legal counsel. And on September 12, 2001[,] our Counsel filed an ‘Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Replevin’ and a hearing was set on September 18, 2001. Unfortunately, both the Plaintiff Magundayao and their Counsel failed to appear on the said hearing.

"7. That on September 19, we went to Supreme Court and found out that Utility Assurance Corporation, bonding company that issued Replevin Bond was not authorized to do business at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Gapan. A certification dated September 19, 2001 from the Supreme Court was issued to us;

"8. That on September 23, 2001 hearing for Motion to Quash was set for the second time. But then again Counsel for the Plaintiff (Magundayao) did not appear in Court and so they ask for postponement;

"9. That on October 9, 2001 third setting for the Motion To Quash, we (Defendant) submitted additional defense exhibits. For the third time counsel for the Plaintiff did not appear in court Judge Vallarta asked the Plaintiff why their counsel [was] not present for the third time. Without too much effort from their side Plaintiff bl[u]ntly responded, ‘Ewan ko po’;

"10. That on October 23, 2001[, the] fourth setting of hearing for Motion to Quash, Judge Vallarta gave another chance to the Plaintiff (Magundayao) to answer all our defense exhibits. And the Plaintiff asked for repeated postponement and [the] hearing was reset to November 6, 2001;

"11. That on November 6, 2001, surprisingly we were called inside the Chamber of Judge Vallarta by a certain retired Judge Jose E. Belen (MTC-GAPAN) and was asked by him to settle the case

between the Plaintiff and Defendant outside the court and tried to convince us not to question the clearance of Utility Assurance Corp. But the settlement did not materialize because of the demands of the Plaintiff which we believe too much for them to ask;

"12. That on November 6, 2001, after failed attempt for settlement Judge Vallarta advi[sed] the Plaintiff to withdraw the Writ of Replevin because the defect of the Replevin Bond was not cured. And our counsel withdraw the Motion to Quash as was advi[sed] by Judge Vallarta;

"13. That on November 7, 2001, our counsel filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Release Motor Vehicle. On the same date, much as he would not want it to do, Judge Vallarta ordered the release of [the] motor vehicle. But before he signed the Order for the release[,] he confronted us and uttered the following in verbatim, ‘O ngayong alam ninyo na mali ang aking ginawa hindi ninyo ako idemanda. Idemanda ninyo ako ng makita ninyo ang inyong hinahanap.’ We cannot believe that those words came from a Judge;

"14. That on November 8, 2001, the Plaintiff filed for another Replevin Bond dated November 5, 2001 for the second time, through the Pacific Insurance Company. But still this bonding insurance company was not authorized by the Supreme Court to do business with the Municipal Trial Court of Gapan;

"15. That on November 9, 2001, the Plaintiff filed Motion for Reconsideration dated November 8, 2001 without proof of service considering that it was only a mere scrap of paper;

"16. That on November 20, 2001, at the hearing for [the] Motion for Reconsideration, counsel for the Defendant raised [a] question regarding the proof of service for that motion. On the instant[,] Carina Magundayao presented a fake proof of service. But Judge Vallarta accepted or tolerated the proof of service as presented by Carina Magundayao and disregard counsel for the defendants questioning. He even instructed our counsel to just receive the motion on the date of the hearing and required [him] to answer it within 5 days. Then a hearing was set on November 27, 2001. Counsel for the Plaintiff [did] not appear in court;

"17. That on November 26, 2001, we went to Supreme Court and found out for the second time the defect of the second Replevin Bond. Another certification was issued upon our request. On the same date we were able to file our Opposition/Comment for the Motion for Reconsideration;

"18. That on November 27, 2001 hearing for Motion for Reconsideration and we (defendant) through our counsel presented another certification from the Supreme Court, Judge Vallarta made an Order, that both the Motion for Reconsideration and our Opposition/Comment be submitted for Resolution. Counsel for the Plaintiff again [was] not in Court;

"19. Surprisingly on December 21, 2001, Sheriff Ernesto Mendoza went to our house purposely to replevin the subject motor vehicle. Because we are law abiding citizen, after our consultation with our lawyer on the following day, we voluntarily surrender[ed] the vehicle to Sheriff Mendoza and to the Clerk of Court Atty. Herminigildo M. Linsangan;

"20. As much as we would like to go to the Municipal Trial Court of Gapan (MTC-Gapan) immediately after the truck was recovered from us to verify how the Writ of Replevin was again issued despite the pending incident, we [could] not do so because on [the] days following December 21, 2001 until January 1, 2002 the Court [was on] vacation. To our great dismay and mortification, Judge Vallarta did not resolve said Motion for Reconsideration and our Opposition/Comment to Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, an unsigned Order dated November 27, 2001 can attest to that. We were able to secure a certified true copy of the said unsigned Order from the Clerk of Court,

MTC-Gapan on January 2, 2002. Despite all these he still issued an Order dated December 21, 2001 approving the new clearance.

"21. That in view of said anomalies we discovered, our counsel file[d an] Urgent Motion For Reconsideration With Motion to Quash Writ of Replevin dated January 3, 2001;

"22. That on January 15, 2002[,] the date of hearing for Urgent Motion for Reconsideration With Motion To Quash Writ of Replevin, Judge Vallarta failed to appear in his sala;

"23. That on February 12, 2002, Judge Vallarta advi[sed] us to enter into [an] amicable settlement, hence we ask[ed] for the postponement of the case to file the appropriate compromise agreement. Judge Vallarta instructed our counsel to withdraw our Urgent Motion For Reconsideration With Motion to Quash Writ of Replevin;

"24. However, we failed to settle the case amicably because the Plaintiff reneged the previous commitment they made while we were inside the chamber of Judge Vallarta;

"25. That because of said development and in fact our Isuzu Cargo Truck has been deteriorating and its some accessories [were] missing one by one[,] we were constrained to file our Counter Replevin Bond to release the said truck on February 27, 2002;

"26. That on March 1, 2002, we filed our Motion To Release Motor Vehicle in lieu of the said Counter Replevin Bond and it was brought out to the attention of Judge Vallarta;

"27. That on March 5, 2002, we went to Cabiao, Nueva Ecija and show[ed] him our Counter Replevin Bond as well as the Motion of our counsel. However, he responded to us indifferently and uttered the following statement,‘O ano ang kailangan ninyo?’. We amiably responded, ‘Pakikiusap po sana namin na mai-release na ang aming sasakyan para makapaghanap-buhay na po kami, ito lamang po ang aming ikinabubuhay’. To our astonishment he showed impatience and said ‘Ayaw pirmahan ni Judge Bernardo ang pinapipirmahan ko, sabihin ninyo (while pointing his finger to us) na pirmahan ito at ubos na ang panggastos na ibinigay ko sa tauhan ko na P500.00 ayaw pa niyang pirmahan ito’. We were totally perplexed at that statement. Why would be brought out something for which we have no business at all? We are trying to plead for our case and has nothing to do with whatever dealings he has with Judge Bernardo. Still holding on our temper we told him, ‘Wala po kaming kinalaman sa sinasabi ninyo at wala po kaming karapatan na sabihan si Judge Bernardo na pirmahan kung ano man ang pinapipirmahan ninyo’. Upon hearing those words from us he again respond with anger and finality, ‘kung ayaw ninyong sabihin magtalikuran tayo. Hindi ko alam kung kailan ko maaksiyunan yang problema ninyo. Tingnan ko sa Martes (March 12, 2002) kung naroon ako (MTC-Gapan) kung hindi ako makarating pasensiya kayo at hintayin ninyo kung kailan ko aaksiyunan yang problema ninyo’. That manner he conversed to us as well as the statement he uttered were least expected to come from a moral and Honorable Judge. Even then, we were able to identify ourselves as only x x x ordinary citizens, as against Judge Vallarta who is the Acting Presiding Judge in our case, we contained our emotions and left the court;

"28. That on March 12, 2002, our case was called almost 11:30 in the morning because he arrived at around 10:30 in the morning and our counsel asked and presented that our Motion be granted. However, Judge Vallarta requested our counsel to give him time to study the matters regarding the posting of Counter Replevin Bond and just asked to follow him in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija on the following day, Wednesday, March 13, 2002;

"29. That on March 13, 2002, as agreed upon by Judge Vallarta and our counsel, we followed him in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija. Giving us enough hope that he will release the Isuzu Cargo Truck, we even requested one of his Clerk in MTC-Gapan to accompany us brought with her pertinent documents/records pertaining to our case. However, upon seeing us again Judge Vallarta gave various reasons for him not to release the truck. And base from our little knowledge of the law most of his excuses just trying to play trick on us. One flimsy reason he mentioned was that Plaintiff should be given [the] opportunity to examine our Counter Replevin Bond, an opportunity not once bestowed on us. Making us realized (sic) more how powerful money and influence work against us who have nothing. Our meeting with him ended up with another instruction that our counsel file an ‘Amended Motion to Approve the Release of Motor Vehicle’ for which Plaintiff must be furnished. Hearing for the said Motion was set on March 19, 2002;

"30. That on March 19, 2002, we waited Judge Vallarta until 12:00 o’clock in the morning in the Municipal Trial Court of Gapan but he did not show up for unknown reason."2 (Emphasis in the original)

On April 15, 2002, Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco Jr. referred the Complaint to respondent judge and asked him to file, within ten days from receiving it, a comment thereon.3 However, the latter failed to do so despite his receipt of the Complaint on April 30, 2002.4

During the 2002 barangay elections, respondent filed his Certificate of Candidacy and was considered automatically resigned effective June 10, 2002.5

Subsequently, the court administrator sent respondent the "1st Tracer" dated September 20, 2002, reiterating the directive for the latter to comment on the Complaint within five days from receipt of the Tracer; otherwise, the matter would be submitted to the Court for resolution without the comment.

The 1st Tracer was received by respondent on October 16, 2002, but he again failed to file his comment. Hence, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) made its report and recommendation on the matter even without his comment.

Findings and Recommendation of the OCA

The OCA considered respondent judge to have waived his right to present evidence to controvert the Complaint against him.

It opined that although he had erred in issuing the Writ of Replevin, complainants failed to prove that the error was deliberate and malicious or done with evident bad faith. It pointed out that an administrative complaint was not the appropriate remedy for every erroneous order issued by a judge.

However, it found that respondent had failed to comply with his duty "to conduct himself with courtesy and, to avoid using language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper." Hence, the OCA recommended that he be penalized with a fine of P5,000.

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the OCA.

Administrative Liability

Complainants fault respondent mainly (1) for issuing a Writ of Replevin, even if the bonding company that issued the replevin bond was allegedly not authorized to do business with the MTC of Gapan; and (2) for failing to act, favorably and with dispatch, on their various Motions and counter-replevin bond for the release of the truck to them.

The facts laid down by complainants are insufficient to support a finding of gross ignorance of the law. To be held liable therefor, "the judge must be shown to have committed an error that was ‘gross or patent, deliberate and malicious.’"6 Respondent may have erred in issuing the Writ of Replevin, but such error has not been shown to be gross or patent. Because complainants did not furnish this Court a copy of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 4896, there is no basis for showing how they presented the case and the need for a writ of replevin to respondent. While manifesting palpable impatience bordering on rudeness, as well as personal disinterest in their cause and problems, his utterances and behavior fail to support a finding that he acted deliberately and maliciously.

Neither is there any clear and sufficient basis for finding respondent liable for gross negligence and issuance of an unjust interlocutory order. He cannot, however, be completely absolved of administrative liability.

Judges are viewed as the visible representations of law and justice, from whom the people draw the will and inclination to obey the law.7 Thus, the official conduct of judges should be free from impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety. Their personal behavior, not only on the bench and in the performance of judicial duties but also in their everyday lives, should be beyond reproach.8 Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a "judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."9

In this case, respondent displayed conduct that fell short of the standards expected of a magistrate of the law.10His unguarded utterances, impatience, and undisguised lack of concern bordering on contempt for the plight of complainants, who had humbly looked up to him and sought his help, constituted vulgar and unbecoming conduct that eroded public confidence in the judiciary.

From the standpoint of conduct and demeanor expected of members of the bench, a resort to intemperate language only detracts from the respect due them and becomes self-destructive.11 The judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a magistrate and imposes a number of restrictions. This is a price that judges have to pay for accepting and occupying their exalted positions in the administration of justice.12Irresponsible or improper conduct on their part erodes public confidence in the judiciary.13 Thus, it is their duty to avoid any impression of impropriety in order to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary.14 "Maintaining the dignity of courts and enforcing the duty of the citizens to respect them are necessary adjuncts to the administration of justice."15

Respondent must be reminded that government service is people-oriented. "Patience is an essential part of dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding."16 Impatience and rudeness have no place in government service, in which personnel are enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at all times.17

Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies vulgar and unbecoming conduct as a light charge, for which a fine18 of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000 may be imposed.

WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Placido B. Vallarta is found guilty of vulgar and unbecoming conduct and hereby FINED five thousand pesos.

SO ORDERED.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Carpio Morales, J., on leave.

5. Judges impartiality

Ty vs Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank 422 SCRA 649

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 149797-98             February 13, 2004

NANCY L. TY, petitioner vs.BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, COURT OF APPEALS and HON. PATERNO V. TAC-AN, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of RTC Batangas City, Branch 84, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside and reverse the June 7, 2001 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 59173 & 59576 which dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner and affirmed the assailed Orders dated April 14, 2000 and May 8, 2000.

On August 16, 1995, respondent Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino, for brevity) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 84, presided by respondent Judge Paterno V. Tac-an, an action for reconveyance of real property against petitioner Nancy Ty, together with Tala Realty Services Corporation, Pedro B. Aguirre, Remedios A. Dupasquier, Pilar D. Ongking, Elizabeth H. Palma, Dolly W. Lim, Cynthia E. Mesina, Rubencito M. Del Mundo, and Add International Services, Inc. (hereinafter collectively referred to as Tala, et al.).

On November 15, 1995, Tala, et al. filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Respondent judge granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. However, on a motion for reconsideration by Banco Filipino, the complaint was reinstated.2

Tala, et al., with the exception of Nancy Ty3 and Cynthia Mesina,4 filed a motion for reconsideration, which was however denied in an Order dated June 3, 1996. The pertinent portion of the Order reads:

On the Motion for Reconsideration filed by defendants, except Nancy Ty and Cynthia Mesina, the record shows that the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the plaintiff dated February 23, 1996 was sent by mail on February 2, 1996 to this Court and received by the Court on March 5, 1996. The

copy of the said Motion for Reconsideration was furnished to Alampay Gatchalian Mawis Carranza and Alampay, Counsels for the defendants at their address in Makati City on February 26, 1996. The copy sent to the Court was received on March 5, 1996. It could safely (sic) assumed that copy sent to the defendant’s counsel at the nearer address at Makati City even before March 5, 1996 or on March 1, 1996, at least 4 days in transit. In the normal course of events or as a matter of practice, counsels file comments or opposition to Motions without need of Court orders. So, from March 1, 1996, they could have filed comment and opposition within 10 days therefrom, or on March 11, 1996 without awaiting for a Court order. The Court does not believe that the said motion for reconsideration was received by said defendant’s counsel on March 28, 1996 or one month and 2 days after mailing by plaintiffs counsel. The extension of 5 days given to defendants contained in the Order of March 7, 1996 was only a matter of grace extended by the court, a reminder that their opposition must be forthcoming. Lawyers must be vigilant in the defense of their clients. x x x. (Underscoring supplied)

On July 8, 1996, petitioner and Tala, et al. filed their respective answers to the complaint. Two days later, Tala, et al. also filed a motion to suspended proceedings, on the ground that an appeal by Banco Filipino to the April 1, 1996 Order of the respondent court is still pending resolution. The motion to suspend proceedings was, however, denied by respondent court.

On October 21, 1996, Banco Filipino moved for an order directing Tala, et al. to produce or make available books, documents and other papers relevant to the case.5 Notwithstanding Tala, et al.’s opposition thereto, the trial court directed Tala, et al. to produce certain documents within a specified period of time, despite failure by Banco Filipino to tender the costs for such production and inspection. In its Order dated November 20, 1996, the trial court justified Banco Filipino’s failure to advance the expenses of production and inspection in this wise:6

Further to the Order dated November 1996, requiring the defendant Tala to produce certain documents within the specified period of time, for those documents in which the defendant is bound to keep by law or regulation, their production cannot be the subject of assessment for cost against plaintiff-movant. Otherwise, cost maybe assessed and billed but the same shall be submitted to the Court for approval. x x x.

Thereafter, Taal, et al. filed their motion for reconsideration to the afore-quoted Order, on January 14 1997.

In the meantime, on December 20 1996, Banco Filipino filed a manifestation/omnibus motion7 praying, among others, for the declaration of certain allegations and propositions as being factually established and for the allegations/defenses in Tala, et al.’s answer to be stricken out.

The trial court granted Banco Filipino’s motion to declare certain facts as established in an Order on February 26, 1998, the dispositive portion of which provides:8

Premises considered, and pursuant to Rules 27 and Section 3, Rule 29 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court hereby:

A) Declares

1) as having been established the fact that defendant TALA did not have the financial capacity to acquire by purchase the disputed Batangas property at the time of their acquisition;

2) as having been established the fact that TALA had not the means of acquiring the Batangas property other than through the advanced rental payments made by plaintiff;

3) as having been established the fact that the Batangas property had merely been transferred by way of trust to TALA, as trustee for the benefit of the plaintiff, which was there as purchaser of the property;

4) prohibits defendant TALA from introducing any evidence contrary to sections (1), (2) and (3) of paragraph A, above.

B) Strikes out allegations/defenses in defendant TALA’s Answer and/or other pertinent pleadings averring that:

1) TALA is an independent corporation, not a trustee of the plaintiff;

2) TALA acquired the Batangas property independently and using its own funds through armslength transaction;

3) TALA is the full and absolute owner of the disputed property.

Meanwhile, Tala, et al. failed to produce the requested documents. In a Supplemental Order dated April 15, 1998, Tala, et al. were directed to produce additional documents. The Supplemental Order reads:9

Further to the Order dated February 26, 1998 and considering that the documents presented so far by the defendant Tala are not complete in relation to those itemized in the said Order, defendant Tala is further ordered to produce the following documents from 1979 to 1985:

1. records of stocks subscribed, paid-in and issued;

2. for loans payable leasees’ deposit, subsidiary ledger, evidence of indebtedness;

3. for lands purchased, the deeds of sale.

x x x           x x x          x x x

On May 4, 1998, Banco Filipino’s urgent motion to reset hearing and for extension of time to appoint a commissioner, through its special counsel, was granted. On May 11, 1999, Banco Filipino was directed to present its next witness.10

Thereafter, Banco Filipino formally offered its exhibits, all of which were admitted by the trial court.11 Tala, et al.’s motion for reconsideration of the order admitting the said exhibits was denied. Banco Filipino’s motion to withdraw certain exhibits was granted.

Thereafter, Tala, et al. filed a motion for the voluntary inhibition and/or disqualification of respondent judge Tac-an on the grounds of manifest prejudgment and partiality.

On April 14, 2000, respondent judge denied the motion for inhibition and ruled that all the Orders of the court were based on facts and applicable law and jurisprudence. Respondent judge likewise reprimanded Tala, et al. for filing several motions designed to delay the proceedings.12

Separate motions for reconsideration were filed by Nancy Ty and Tala, et al., but the same were denied by the trial court in an Order dated May 8, 2000.

Dissatisfied, Nancy Ty and Tala, et al. filed separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59576 and CA-G.R. SP No. 59173, assailing the two Orders of respondent judge dated April 14, 2000 and May 8, 2000.

In a consolidated Decision dated June 7, 2000, the appellate court dismissed the two petitions and affirmed the assailed Orders by respondent judge.13

Hence, the instant petition, based on the following grounds:

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, THUS CALLING FOR THE EXERCISE OF THIS HONORABLE COURT’S POWER OF SUPERVISION AND REVIEW, WHEN IT CHOSE TO EXAMINE ONLY SOME, NOT ALL, OF THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF JUDGE TAC-AN, WHICH, TAKEN COLLECTIVELY AND NOT INDIVIDUALLY, DEMONSTRATE A STRONG BIAS AND ANIMOSITY AGAINST PETITIONER AND TALA ET AL AND REVEAL AN OBVIOUS PARTIALITY IN FAVOR OF BANCO FILIPINO.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT REFUSED TO APPLY, OR EVEN CONSIDER THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINES LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT IN FECUNDO V. BERJAMEN, LUQUE V. KAYANAN AND OTHER SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE. AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO CONCLUDE THAT THE INTEMPERATE AND ACCUSATORY LANGUAGE OF JUDGE TAC-AN IN HIS ORDER DATED 14 APRIL 2000 IS A MANIFESTATION OF THE LATTER’S "EXASPERATION BORDERING ON INDIGNATION" AT THE PETITIONER WHICH "MAY UNNECESSARILY CLOUD HIS IMPARTIALITY" AND WHICH WARRANTS HIS VOLUNTARY INHIBITION.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE ORDERS OF THE LOWER COURT AND FOUND THAT THE ASSAILED ORDER DATED 20 MARCH 2000 DID NOT BETRAY THAT JUDGE TAC-AN HAD ALREADY PREJUDGED THE CASE PENDING BEFORE RTC BATANGAS BRANCH 84.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM THE CONSTITUTIONALLY MANDATED, ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, OR AT LEAST SANCTIONED SUCH DEPARTURE BY JUDGE TAC-AN, WHEN IT DELIBERATELY SELECTED ONLY A FEW OF THE BADGES OF BIAS, HOSTILITY AND PREJUDGMENT CITED BY THE PETITIONER AND, WORSE, WHEN IT WILLFULLY FAILED TO RESOLVE ISSUES RAISED IN PETITIONER’S AND TALA ET AL’S RESPECTIVE PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

V

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT PETITIONER’S OMNIBUS MOTION WAS INTENDED TO DELAY THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND NOT TO AVAIL OF THE LEGAL REMEDIES PROVIDED BY THE RULES OF COURT TO ENSURE THAT HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IS PROTECTED AND GUARANTEED.14

For resolution is the issue of whether or not respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for voluntary inhibition.

Petitioner argues that, by selectively appreciating some, and not all, of the orders of respondent judge cited as "badges of hostility, bias and prejudgment", the appellate court departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings and disregarded principles laid down by jurisprudence.

Petitioner asserts that the Orders which were issued by respondent judge demonstrated his predilection to act with bias in favor of Banco Filipino and manifested his escalating hostility and animosity towards petitioner and her co-defendants, Tala, et al.

In regard to the Order dated June 3, 1996, petitioner contends that it was not Tala, et al. but Banco Filipino, which was duty bound to establish the date of actual receipt of its motion for reconsideration. She complains that respondent judge contravened the express provisions of the Rules of Court when he "unilaterally relieved Banco Filipino of its statutory obligation to prove service of its motion for reconsideration and, instead, applied, x x x a so-called safe assumption in determining when petitioner and her co-defendants should have received the same."15 Moreover, she takes offense to the respondent judge’s statement that he did not believe Tala, et al.’s claim of receipt of the pleading on 28 March 1996, thus, in effect branding them as "liars".

Rule 13, Section 8, of the Rules of Court provides that service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee; but if he fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of the first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect at the expiration of such time.

In the case at bar, there is no postmaster’s certification that the registered mail was unclaimed by the addressee and thus returned to the sender, after first notice was sent to and received by addressee on a specified date. Absent such notice, the disputable presumption of completeness of service does not arise and by implication, respondent judge could not presume actual receipt by addressee.

Petitioner also alleges that the Order dated November 20, 1996 is another indicium of respondent judge’s manifest partiality when he granted the motion for production of documents despite failure by Banco Filipino to advance the cost for such production and inspection. The respondent judge justified his Order with a sweeping declaration that "the amount is insignificant by any standard and could readily been resolved between the parties involved. Records reveal that Tala did not charge Banco Filipino for the documents it eventually produced pursuant to the motion for production."16

Respondent judge’s peremptory act of absolving Banco Filipino from paying the expenses for the production of documents is disturbing for its lack of basis. There was no basis for respondent judge to conclude that the amount involved was "insignificant" considering that, as the records would show, no reference of any amount was made by the parties. Moreover, his categorical declaration that Tala, et al. did not bother to charge Banco Filipino the amount of expenses runs counter to the

evidence at hand. In opposing the motion for the production of documents,17 Tala, et al. cited, as one of their grounds, the excessive expense it would incur in case the motion would be granted. Sound judicial action dictates that he should have inquired first into the validity of Tala, et al.’s claim, whose rights were bound to be affected, instead of making a sweeping and dismissive Order exempting Banco Filipino from complying with its legal obligation.

Petitioner also assails the Orders dated: (1) April 15, 1998 Order directing Tala, et al. to produce certain documents not requested by Banco Filipino; and (2) May 11, 1999 Order directing Banco Filipino to present its witness.

The role of the trial judge in the conduct of judicial proceedings should only be confined to promote the expeditious resolution of controversies and prevent unnecessary waste of time or to clear up some obscurity. There is, however, undue interference where the judge’s participation in the conduct of the trial tends to build or bolster a case for one of the parties. This is enjoined by the Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 3.06 which provides:

While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time or clear up some obscurity, properly intervene in the presentation of evidence during the trial, it should always be borne in mind that undue interference may prevent the proper presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of truth.

There is undue interference if the judge, as in the instant case, orders the presentation of specific documentary evidence without a corresponding motion from any party, or directs a party when and who to present as a witness and what matters such witness will testify on. To our mind, respondent judge transgressed the boundaries of impartiality when he suggested to Banco Filipino what evidence to present to prove its case. While the trial court may interfere in the manner of presenting evidence in order to promote the orderly conduct of the trial, the final determination of what evidence to adduce is the sole prerogative of the contending parties. Courts, while not unmindful of their primary duty to administer justice, without fear or favor, and to dispose of cases speedily and in as inexpensive a manner as is possible for the court and the parties, should refrain from showing any semblance of bias or more or less partial attitude in order not to create any false impression in the minds of the litigants. For obvious reasons, it is the bounden duty of all to strive for the preservation of the people’s faith in our courts.18

Petitioner also questions the manner with which respondent judge resolved Banco Filipino’s formal offer of exhibits. The records show that on November 29, 1999, petitioner filed her comment on Banco Filipino’s formal offer of exhibits. On December 8, 1999, respondent judge granted Banco Filipino and Tala, et al. five (5) days each within which to file their respective reply and rejoinders. On December 9, 1999, Tala, et al. filed their comment. Yet the next day, December 10, respondent judge, without awaiting the reply and rejoinders of the parties, issued an order admitting all the exhibits offered.

The seeming haste with which respondent judge resolved Banco Filipino’s formal offer of exhibits cannot simply be ignored. It is true, as the appellate court observed, that the filing of a reply lies in the sound discretion of the court. What is objectionable, however, is that respondent judge expressly granted the parties a period of time within which to file their respective pleadings, only to disregard in the end, the period he himself had set and, thus deprived the parties an opportunity to ventilate their respective sides and render the issues clearer.

Finally, petitioner argues that respondent judge prejudged the case when he issued the March 20, 2000 Order. She claims that the Order, which categorically and unqualifiedly stated the existence of an implied trust, rendered a definite resolution of one of the principal issues in the main case without awaiting her and Tala, et al.’s evidence.

In his April 14, 2000 Order, respondent judge brushed aside petitioner’s argument by declaring that the "finding is only interlocutory because this can be rebutted by the defendants x x x. Necessarily, the Court must make an initial assessment of the evidence as presented by the plaintiff if they constitute prima facie evidence x x x."

There is no rule of procedure that requires a judge to conclude, out of necessity, the existence of a prima facie case on the basis alone of the evidence presented by the plaintiff. As correctly pointed out by petitioner, it is only when the plaintiff demurs to evidence that the trial court may rule on the case before the defense presents its evidence. Moreover, the assailed Order, being interlocutory in nature, is not the final decision. As such, it is inappropriate for respondent judge to rule, in an interlocutory order, on the principal issue that effectively disposes of the merits of the case. In the interest of substantial justice, the issue of whether or not there is a trust relationship between the parties must be threshed out in a full-dress hearing and not merely in an interlocutory Order.

It is of utmost importance that a judge must preserve the trust and confidence reposed in him by the parties as an impartial, unbiased and dispassionate dispenser of justice. When he conducts himself in a manner that gives rise, fairly or unfairly, to perceptions of bias, such faith and confidence are eroded. His decisions, whether right or wrong, will always be under suspicion of irregularity. In the case of Bautista v. Rebueno,19 we stated:

. . . The Judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the parties litigants. He must hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At the very first sign of lack of faith and trust to his actions, whether well grounded or not, the Judge has no other alternative but inhibit himself from the case. A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear that will induce doubt to his honest actuations and probity in favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the Courts of Justice is not impaired. The better course for the Judge under such circumstances is to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood, his reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved. What is more important, the ideal of impartial administration of justice is lived up to. (Underscoring supplied)

In the case at bar, the consistency and regularity with which respondent judge issued the assailed directives gives rise, not to a fanciful suggestion or to a superficial impression of partiality, but to a clear and convincing proof of bias and prejudice. While we are not unmindful of this Court’s previous pronouncements that to warrant the judge’s inhibition from the case, bias or prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extra-judicial or extrinsic source,20 this rule does not apply where the judge, as in the instant case, displays an inordinate predisposition to deviate from established procedural precepts that demonstrate obvious partiality in favor of one party. It is also true that the Supreme Court, on several occasions, ruled that the issuance of the complained orders and decision that pertain to the judge’s judicial functions may not be proper considerations to charge a judge of bias though these acts may be erroneous.21 However, where said complained orders, taken not singly but collectively, ineluctably show that the judge has lost the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate, due process dictates that he voluntarily inhibits himself from the case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The June 7, 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 59173 & 59576 which dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner and affirmed the Orders dated April 14, 2000 and May 8, 2000 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent judge is directed to inhibit himself from presiding in Civil Case No. 4521. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City is directed to re-raffle the said case to another judge.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.Panganiban, J., no part. Former counsel of a party.