CATHERINE & HENRY YU, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. ANTONIUTTI K. PALAÑA, RESPONDENT. PER CURIAM: On November 16, 2006, complainants Henry and Catherine Yu filed a complaint [1] for disbarment against respondent Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaña for alleged acts of defraudation, before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). [2] Complainants attached therewith their Consolidated Complaint-Affidavit [3] which they earlier filed before the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati, charging the respondent and his co- accused (in the criminal case), with syndicated estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22). The facts, as found by the CBD, are as follows: Sometime in 2004, complainants met a certain Mr. Mark Anthony U. Uy (Mr. Uy) who introduced himself as the Division Manager of Wealth Marketing and General Services Corporation (Wealth Marketing), a corporation engaged in spot currency trading. [4] Mr. Uy persuaded the complainants, together with other investors, to invest a minimum amount of P100,000.00 or its dollar equivalent with said company. They were made to believe that the said company had the so-called "stop-loss mechanism" that enabled it to stop trading once the maximum allowable loss fixed at 3%-9% of the total contributions, would be reached. If, on the other hand, the company would suffer loss, Wealth Marketing would return to the investors the principal amount including the monthly guaranteed interests. Further, Wealth Marketing promised to issue, as it had in fact issued, postdated checks covering the principal investments. [5] It turned out, however, that Wealth Marketing's promises were false and fraudulent, and that the checks earlier issued were dishonored for the reason "account closed." The investors, including the complainants, thus went to Wealth Marketing's office. There, they discovered that Wealth Marketing had already ceased its operation and a new corporation was formed named Ur- Link Corporation (Ur- Link) which supposedly assumed the rights and obligations of the former. Complainants proceeded to Ur-Link office where they met the respondent. As Wealth Marketing's Chairman of the Board of Directors, respondent assured the complainants that Ur-Link would assume the obligations of the former company. [6] To put a semblance of validity to such representation, respondent signed an Agreement [7] to that effect which, again, turned out to be another ploy to further deceive the investors. [8] This prompted the complainants to send demand letters to Wealth Marketing's officers and directors which remained unheeded. They likewise lodged a criminal complaint for syndicatedestafa against the respondent and his co-accused. [9] Despite the standing warrant for his arrest, respondent went into hiding and has been successful in defying the law, to this date. In an Order [10] dated November 17, 2006, Director for Bar Discipline Rogelio B. Vinluan required respondent to submit his Answer to the complaint but the latter failed to comply. Hence, the motion to declare him in default filed by the complainants. [11] The case was thereafter referred to Commissioner Jose I. De la Rama, Jr. (the Commissioner) for investigation. In his continued defiance of the lawful orders of the Commission, respondent failed to attend the mandatory conference and to file his position paper. Respondent was thereafter declared in default and the case was heardex parte. In his report, [12] the Commissioner concluded that Wealth Marketing's executives (which included respondent herein) conspired with one another in defrauding the complainants by engaging in an unlawful network of recruiting innocent investors to invest in foreign currency trading business where, in fact, no such business existed, as Wealth Marketing was not duly licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to engage in such undertaking. This was bolstered by the fact that Wealth Marketing's financial status could not support the investors' demands involving millions of pesos. It also appears, said the Commissioner, that Ur-Link was created only to perpetuate fraud and to avoid obligations. The Commissioner likewise found that respondent had been previously suspended by this Court for committing similar acts of defraudation. [13] Considering
Transcript
CATHERINE & HENRY YU, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. ANTONIUTTI K. PALAÑA, RESPONDENT.
PER CURIAM:
On November 16, 2006, complainants Henry and Catherine Yu filed
a complaint[1]
for disbarment against respondent Atty. Antoniutti K.
Palaña for alleged acts of defraudation, before the Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP).[2]
Complainants attached therewith their Consolidated
Complaint-Affidavit[3]
which they earlier filed before the City
Prosecutor's Office of Makati, charging the respondent and his co-
accused (in the criminal case), with syndicated estafa and violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22).
The facts, as found by the CBD, are as follows:
Sometime in 2004, complainants met a certain Mr. Mark Anthony U.
Uy (Mr. Uy) who introduced himself as the Division Manager of
Wealth Marketing and General Services Corporation (Wealth
Marketing), a corporation engaged in spot currency trading. [4]
Mr. Uy
persuaded the complainants, together with other investors, to invest
a minimum amount of P100,000.00 or its dollar equivalent with said
company. They were made to believe that the said company had the
so-called "stop-loss mechanism" that enabled it to stop trading once
the maximum allowable loss fixed at 3%-9% of the total
contributions, would be reached. If, on the other hand, the company
would suffer loss, Wealth Marketing would return to the investors the
principal amount including the monthly guaranteed interests. Further,
Wealth Marketing promised to issue, as it had in fact issued,
postdated checks covering the principal investments.[5]
It turned out, however, that Wealth Marketing's promises were false
and fraudulent, and that the checks earlier issued were dishonored
for the reason "account closed." The investors, including the
complainants, thus went to Wealth Marketing's office. There, they
discovered that Wealth Marketing had already ceased its operation
and a new corporation was formed named Ur- Link Corporation (Ur-
Link) which supposedly assumed the rights and obligations of the
former. Complainants proceeded to Ur-Link office where they met
the respondent. As Wealth Marketing's Chairman of the Board of
Directors, respondent assured the complainants that Ur-Link would
assume the obligations of the former company.[6]
To put a semblance
of validity to such representation, respondent signed an
Agreement [7]
to that effect which, again, turned out to be another
ploy to further deceive the investors.[8]
This prompted the
complainants to send demand letters to Wealth Marketing's officers
and directors which remained unheeded. They likewise lodged a
criminal complaint for syndicatedestafa against the respondent and
his co-accused. [9]
Despite the standing warrant for his arrest, respondent went into
hiding and has been successful in defying the law, to this date.
In an Order[10]
dated November 17, 2006, Director for Bar Discipline
Rogelio B. Vinluan required respondent to submit his Answer to the
complaint but the latter failed to comply. Hence, the motion to
declare him in default filed by the complainants.[11]
The case was
thereafter referred to Commissioner Jose I. De la Rama, Jr. (the
Commissioner) for investigation. In his continued defiance of the
lawful orders of the Commission, respondent failed to attend the
mandatory conference and to file his position paper. Respondent
was thereafter declared in default and the case was heardex parte.
In his report,[12]
the Commissioner concluded that Wealth Marketing's
executives (which included respondent herein) conspired with one
another in defrauding the complainants by engaging in an unlawful
network of recruiting innocent investors to invest in foreign currency
trading business where, in fact, no such business existed, as Wealth
Marketing was not duly licensed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to engage in such undertaking. This was
bolstered by the fact that Wealth Marketing's financial status could
not support the investors' demands involving millions of pesos. It also
appears, said the Commissioner, that Ur-Link was created only to
perpetuate fraud and to avoid obligations. The Commissioner
likewise found that respondent had been previously suspended by
this Court for committing similar acts of defraudation.[13]
Considering
the gravity of the acts committed, as well as his previous
administrative case and defiance of lawful orders, the Commissioner
recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law,
the pertinent portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, after a careful evaluation of
the documents presented, including the jurisprudence laid down by
the complainants involving the same respondent, and said decision
of the Supreme Court forms part of the law of the land, the
undersigned commissioner is recommending that respondent Atty.
Antoniutti K. Palaña be disbarred and his name be stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys upon the approval of the Board of Governors and
the Honorable Supreme Court.[14]
In its Resolution dated August 17, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Commissioner's report and
recommendation.[15]
This Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors.
Lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice. As
vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not
only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. In so doing, the people's faith and
confidence in the judicial system is ensured. Lawyers may be
disciplined - whether in their professional or in their private capacity -
for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good
demeanor.[16]
In the present case, two corporations were created where the
respondent played a vital role, being Wealth Marketing's Chairman of
the Board and Ur-Link's representative. We quote with approval the
Commissioner's findings, thus:
As correctly pointed out by the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati, it
appears that the executive officers of Wealth Marketing Corporation
conspired with each (sic) other to defraud the investors by engaging
in unlawful network of recruiting innocent investors to invest in
foreign currency trading business. The truth of the matter is that
there was no actual foreign currency trading since said corporation is
not duly licensed or authorized by the Securities and Exchange
Commission to perform such task.
In the General Information Sheet (Annex "I") of Wealth Marketing
and General Services Corporation, the authorized capital stock is
only P9,680,000.00 and the paid up capital, at the time of
[in]corporation is (sic) only P605,000.00. Said corporation, as the
records will show, has been dealing with investors with millions of
pesos on hand, with the hope that their money would earn interests
as promised. However, their company resources and financial status
will show that they are not in the position to meet these demands if a
situation such as this would arise.
x x x x
Furthermore, in order to evade the investors who were then asking
for the return of their investments, said respondent even formed and
made him part of a new company, Ur-Link Corporation, which
according to the complainants, when they met the respondent, would
assume the obligations of the defunct Wealth Marketing Corporation.
It is also evident that respondent is frolicking with the Securities and
Exchange Commission for the purpose of employing fraud.[17]
To be sure, respondent's conduct falls short of the exacting
standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.
The fact that the criminal case against the respondent involving the
same set of facts is still pending in court is of no moment.
Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that
administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own.
They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of
criminal cases. A criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial
question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in
the administrative proceedings. [18]
Besides, it is not sound judicial
policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a
complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court
will be rendered helpless to apply the rules on admission to, and
continuing membership in, the legal profession during the whole
period that the criminal case is pending final disposition, when the
objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate.[19]
Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare and for preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice law.[20]
The attorney is called
to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court.[21]
As to the recommended penalty of disbarment, we find the same to
be in order.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. x x x.
Time and again, we have stated that disbarment is the most severe
form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must
always be exercised with great caution for only the most imperative
reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and
moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a
member of the bar.[22]
The Court notes that this is not the first time that respondent is facing
an administrative case, for he had been previously suspended from
the practice of law inSamala v. Palaña[23]
and Sps. Amador and
Rosita Tejada v. Palaña.[24]
In Samala, respondent also played an
important role in a corporation known as First Imperial Resources
Incorporated (FIRI), being its legal officer. As in this case,
respondent committed the same offense by making himself part of
the money trading business when, in fact, said business was not
among the purposes for which FIRI was created. Respondent was
thus meted the penalty of suspension for three (3) years with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt
with more severely.[25]
Likewise, in Tejada, he was suspended for six
(6) months for his continued refusal to settle his loan obligations.[26]
The fact that respondent went into hiding in order to avoid service
upon him of the warrant of arrest issued by the court (where his
criminal case is pending) exacerbates his offense.[27]
Finally, we note that respondent's case is further highlighted by his
lack of regard for the charges brought against him. As
in Tejada, instead of meeting the charges head on, respondent did
not bother to file an answer and verified position paper, nor did he
participate in the proceedings to offer a valid explanation for his
conduct.[28]
The Court has emphatically stated that when the integrity
of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies
the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that
degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of
him.[29]
Verily, respondent's failure to comply with the orders of the
IBP without justifiable reason manifests his disrespect of judicial
authorities. [30]
As a lawyer, he ought to know that the compulsory bar
organization was merely deputized by this Court to undertake the
investigation of complaints against lawyers. In short, his
disobedience to the IBP is in reality a gross and blatant disrespect of
the Court.[31]
By his repeated cavalier conduct, the respondent
exhibited an unpardonable lack of respect for the authority of the
Court.[32]
Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of
his prior misconduct herein-before mentioned for which he was
penalized with a three- year suspension with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more
severely; and another six-month suspension thereafter, the
contumacious behavior of respondent in the instant case which
grossly degrades the legal profession indeed warrants the imposition
of a much graver penalty --- disbarment. [33]
Of all classes and
professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws.
He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to
repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to
ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position
and office, and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and
dangerous elements of the body politic. [34]
WHEREFORE, respondent Antoniutti K. Palaña is
hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from
the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his
record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served
on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Guevarra vs. Eala, A.C. No. 7136 , August 1, 2007 Facts: Joselano Guevarra filed a Complaint for Disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath." The complainant first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent Atty. Eala, a lawyer and a sportscaster, to him as her friend who was married to Mary Ann Tantoco with whom he had three children. After his marriage to Irene, complainant noticed that Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall." He also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work. More so, complainant has seen Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house. Moreover, Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You" on its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene. Also, it was revealed that Irene gave birth to a girl in 2002 and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father.
In his answer, Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene, the truth of the matter being that their relationship was low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families. He also said that his special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalouscircumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment. Issue: Whether the respondent be disbarred from the practice of Law. Held: YES. The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law. Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law." As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect
for an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
Advincula vs. Atty. Macabata AC No. 7204March 07, 2007 Facts: The complainant, Cynthia Advincula filed a disbarment case Atty. Ernesto Macabata on the grounds of Gross Immorality. The complainant sought for legal advice from the respondent regarding her collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours which later failed to settle its accounts with the complainant. Thus, the possibility of filing a case against Queensway Traveland Tours was discussed. After the meeting on February 10, 2005, the respondent gave the complainant a ridehome. As the complainant gets off the car, the respondent allegedly held her arm, kissed her cheek and embraced her tightly. Again, after another meeting on March 06 2005, the respondent offered a ride. On the road, the complainant felt sleepy for no obvious reason. The respondent suddenly stopped the car in the vicinity of San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. This time, the respondent forcefully held her face, kissed her lips and held her breast. The complainant managed to escape and decided to hire another lawyer for her case. They had exchange of messages thru sms where the respondent apologized. The respondent admitted kissing the complainant on the lips however countered that there was no harassment, intimidation or lewdness instead everything was spontaneous. Issues: Whether or not the respondent committed acts are grossly immoral, or which constitute serious moral depravity that would warrant disbarment or suspension from the practice of law Decision: The acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks are mere gestures of friendship and camaraderie, form of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of the respondent, though, in turning the head of the complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips are distasteful. However, such act, even if considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered grossly immoral. The complainant miserably failed to establish the burden of proof required of her.
However, her efforts are lauded to stand up for her honor. The complaint for disbarment against the respondent, Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged immorality is dismissed. However, he is reprimanded to be more prudent and cautious in dealing with his clients.
CLARITA J. SAMALA, vs. ATTY. LUCIANO D. VALENCIA
Before us is a complaint1 dated May 2, 2001 filed by Clarita J.
Samala (complainant) against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia (respondent) for Disbarment on the following grounds: (a) serving on two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties; (b) knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
After respondent filed his Comment, the Court, in its Resolution of October 24, 2001, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
2
The investigation was conducted by Commissioner Demaree Jesus B. Raval. After a series of hearings, the parties filed their respective memoranda
3 and the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes prepared the Report and Recommendation
4 dated January 12, 2006. He found respondent
guilty of violating Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended the penalty of suspension for six months.
In a minute Resolution 5 passed on May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner Reyes but increased the penalty of suspension from six months to one year.
We adopt the report of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the issue on immorality and as to the recommended penalty.
On serving as counsel for contending parties.
Records show that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 272, Marikina City, entitled "Leonora M. Aville v. Editha Valdez" for nonpayment of rentals, herein respondent, while being the counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel for the tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga
6 by filing an Explanation and Compliance before the RTC.
7
In Civil Case No. 98-6804 filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 75, Marikina City, entitled "Editha S. Valdez and Joseph J. Alba, Jr. v. Salve Bustamante and her husband" for ejectment, respondent represented Valdez against Bustamante - one of the tenants in the property subject of the controversy. Defendants appealed to the RTC, Branch 272, Marikina City docketed as SCA Case No. 99-341-MK. In his decision dated May 2, 2000,
8 Presiding
Judge Reuben P. dela Cruz 9 warned respondent to refrain from
repeating the act of being counsel of record of both parties in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK.
But in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK, filed in the RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, entitled "Editha S. Valdez v. Joseph J. Alba, Jr. and Register of Deeds of Marikina City," respondent, as counsel for Valdez, filed a Complaint for Rescission of Contract with Damages and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 275500 against Alba, respondent's former client in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK.
Records further reveal that at the hearing of November 14, 2003, respondent admitted that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, he was the lawyer for Lagmay (one of the tenants) but not for Bustamante and Bayuga
10 albeit he filed the Explanation and Compliance for and in
behalf of the tenants. 11
Respondent also admitted that he represented Valdez in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK against Bustamante and her husband but denied being the counsel for Alba although the case is entitled "Valdez and
Alba v. Bustamante and her husband," because Valdez told him to include Alba as the two were the owners of the property
12 and it was
only Valdez who signed the complaint for ejectment. 13
But, while claiming that respondent did not represent Alba, respondent, however, avers that he already severed his representation for Alba when the latter charged respondent with estafa.
14 Thus, the filing of
Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK against Alba.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client.
15 He may not also undertake to discharge
conflicting duties any more than he may represent antagonistic interests. This stern rule is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste.
16 It springs from the relation of attorney and client
which is one of trust and confidence. Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
17
One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.
18
The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on principles of public policy and good taste. It springs from the attorney's duty to represent his client with undivided fidelity and to maintain inviolate the client's confidence as well as from the injunction forbidding the examination of an attorney as to any of the privileged communications of his client.
An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated.
20 The bare attorney-client relationship with a client
precludes an attorney from accepting professional employment from the client's adversary either in the same case
21 or in a different but
related action. 22
A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when the subject matter of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client.
23
We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez 24
that the termination of the relation of attorney and client provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The reason for the rule is that the client's confidence once reposed cannot be divested by the expiration of the professional employment.
25 Consequently, a lawyer should not, even after the
severance of the relation with his client, do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor should he disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation.
26
In this case, respondent's averment that his relationship with Alba has long been severed by the act of the latter of not turning over the proceeds collected in Civil Case No. 98-6804, in connivance with the complainant, is unavailing. Termination of the attorney-client relationship precludes an attorney from representing a new client whose interest is adverse to his former client. Alba may not be his original client but the fact that he filed a case entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband," is a clear indication that respondent is protecting the interests of both Valdez and Alba in the said case. Respondent cannot just claim that the lawyer-client relationship between him and Alba has long been severed without observing Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court wherein the written consent of his client is required.
In Gonzales v. Cabucana, Jr., 27
citing the case of Quiambao v. Bamba,
28 we held that:
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer's respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.
29
Respondent is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated."
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care.
30
From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent's representation of Valdez and Alba against Bustamante and her husband, in one case, and Valdez against Alba, in another case, is a clear case of conflict of interests which merits a corresponding sanction from this Court. Respondent may have withdrawn his representation in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK upon being warned by the court,
31 but the same will
not exculpate him from the charge of representing conflicting interests in his representation in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK.
Respondent is reminded to be more cautious in accepting professional employments, to refrain from all appearances and acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict of interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection and dedication
befitting a member of the Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his clients.
32
On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence.
Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 filed before MTC, Branch 75 for ejectment, respondent submitted TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership despite the fact that a new TCT No. 275500 was already issued in the name of Alba on February 2, 1995.
Records reveal that respondent filed Civil Case No. 00-7137 on November 27, 2000 and presented TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership of the subject property.
33 During the hearing
before Commissioner Raval, respondent avers that when the Answer was filed in the said case, that was the time that he came to know that the title was already in the name of Alba; so that when the court dismissed the complaint, he did not do anything anymore.
34 Respondent further avers that Valdez did not tell him the
truth and things were revealed to him only when the case for rescission was filed in 2002.
Upon examination of the record, it was noted that Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK for rescission of contract and cancellation of TCT No. 275500 was also filed on November 27, 2000,
35 before RTC, Branch
273, Marikina City, thus belying the averment of respondent that he came to know of Alba's title only in 2002 when the case for rescission was filed. It was revealed during the hearing before Commissioner Raval that Civil Case Nos. 00-7137 and 2000-657-MK were filed on the same date, although in different courts and at different times.
Hence, respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the title he submitted was already cancelled in lieu of a new title issued in the name of Alba in 1995 yet, as proof of the latter's ownership.
Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by any artifice. It matters not that the trial court was not misled by respondent's submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name of Valdez, as shown by its decision dated January 8, 2002
36 dismissing the complaint for ejectment.
What is decisive in this case is respondent's intent in trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No. 273020 despite the fact that said title was already cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 275500, was already issued in the name of Alba.
In Young v. Batuegas,37 we held that a lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will "do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court" and he shall "conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients."
38He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his
high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion.
39 The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect
only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client's rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his client's cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth.
A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice.
40 As such, he should make himself more an
exemplar for others to emulate.41
>On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees.
Complainant alleges that respondent filed the following cases: (a) Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK at the RTC, Branch 272; (b) Civil Case No. 00-7137 at the MTC, Branch 75; and (c) I.S. Nos. 00-4439 and 01-036162 both entitled "Valencia v. Samala" for estafa and grave coercion, respectively, before the Marikina City Prosecutor. Complainant claims that the two criminal cases were filed in retaliation for the cases she filed against Lagmay docketed as I.S.
No. 00-4306 for estafa and I.S. No. 00-4318 against Alvin Valencia (son of respondent) for trespass to dwelling.
As culled from the records, Valdez entered into a retainer agreement with respondent. As payment for his services, he was allowed to occupy the property for free and utilize the same as his office pursuant to their retainer agreement.
42
Respondent filed I.S. Nos. 00-4439 43
and 01-036162 44
both entitled "Valencia v. Samala" for estafa and grave coercion, respectively, to protect his client's rights against complainant who filed I.S. No. 00-4306
45 for estafa against Lagmay, and I.S. No. 00-4318
46 against
Alvin Valencia 47
for trespass to dwelling.
We find the charge to be without sufficient basis. The act of respondent of filing the aforecited cases to protect the interest of his client, on one hand, and his own interest, on the other, cannot be made the basis of an administrative charge unless it can be clearly shown that the same was being done to abuse judicial processes to commit injustice.
The filing of an administrative case against respondent for protecting the interest of his client and his own right would be putting a burden on a practicing lawyer who is obligated to defend and prosecute the right of his client.
On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
We find respondent liable for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three children by Teresita Lagmay who are all over 20 years of age,
48 while his first
wife was still alive. He also admitted that he has eight children by his first wife, the youngest of whom is over 20 years of age, and after his wife died in 1997, he married Lagmay in 1998.
49Respondent further
admitted that Lagmay was staying in one of the apartments being claimed by complainant. However, he does not consider his affair
with Lagmay as a relationship 50
and does not consider the latter as his second family.
51 He reasoned that he was not staying with
Lagmay because he has two houses, one in Muntinlupa and another in Marikina.
52
In this case, the admissions made by respondent are more than enough to hold him liable on the charge of immorality. During the hearing, respondent did not show any remorse. He even justified his transgression by saying that he does not have any relationship with Lagmay and despite the fact that he sired three children by the latter, he does not consider them as his second family. It is noted that during the hearing, respondent boasts in telling the commissioner that he has two houses - in Muntinlupa, where his first wife lived, and in Marikina, where Lagmay lives.
53 It is of no moment that
respondent eventually married Lagmay after the death of his first wife. The fact still remains that respondent did not live up to the exacting standard of morality and decorum required of the legal profession.
Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to specify the degree of moral delinquency that may qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as that "conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community.
54 Thus, in several cases, the Court did not hesitate
to discipline a lawyer for keeping a mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the community.
55 That respondent
subsequently married Lagmay in 1998 after the death of his wife and that this is his first infraction as regards immorality serve to mitigate his liability.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valencia GUILTY of misconduct and violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years, effective immediately upon receipt of herein Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in respondent's personal records.
SO ORDERED.
Donton vs Tansingco A.C 6057 June 27, 2006 Facts: On May 20, 2003, Peter T. Donton (complainant) filed a criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of public document against Duane O.Stier, Emelyn A. Maggay, and respondent Atty. Emmanuel O.Tansingco, as the notary public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement. Subsequently, respondent Tansingco filed a counter-charge for
perjury against complainant. The affidavit-complaint stated that:
The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was
prepared and notarized under the following circumstances: A. Mr.
Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property
located at No. 33 Don Jose Street,Bgy. San Roque, Murphy,
Cubao, Quezon City. B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier –
a U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to own real property in his
name – agreed that the property be transferred in the name of Mr.
Donton, a Filipino. C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton,
requested me to prepare several documents that would
guarantee recognition of him being the actual owner of the
property despite the transfer of title in the name of Mr. Donton. D.
For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY
AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr. Stier’s free and undisturbed use of
the property for his residence and business operations. The
OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied
up with a loan which Mr. Stier had extended to Mr. Donton.
Thereafter, complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred in violation of the Code for the act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite the knowledge that Stier was disqualified to own a real property for being a foreign national. On Oct 1, 2003 the Court referred the matter to the IBP for investigation and on Feb 26, 2004, Commissioner San Juan found respondent liable for taking part in a scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of land in the Philippines and recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for 2 years and cancellation of his commission as Notary Public. On April 16, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the report with modification and recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for 6 months. Then on July 28, 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP stating that his practice of law is his only means of supporting his family and 6 minor children. Issue: WON respondent is guilty of violation of Canon I and Rule 1.02 of the Codeof Professional Responsibility. Held: A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold. Respondent’s knowledge that Stier, a US citizen, was disqualified from owning real property and his preparation of Occupancy Agreement that would guarantee Stier’s recognition as the actual owner of the property, aided in circumventing the constitutionalprohibition against foreign ownershipof lands. Thus, he violated his oathand the Code when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement. Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended.
Quirino Tomlin II vs. Atty. Salvador N. Moya II 23 February 2006 Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J. FACTS: Atty. Salvador Moya II allegedly issued seven postdated checks to Quirino Tomlin II as partial payment for the P600,000.00 that the former borrowed from the latter. When Tomlin realized that all the said checks were dishonored by the bank, he made several demands to Moya but the latter still refused to pay his debt. Thereafter, the complainant filed seven counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 to the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan as well as an instant case for disbarment against Moya. ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the administrative case for the respondent’s disbarment should be dismissed for violation of the rule on non-forum shopping; and
2. Whether or not Atty. Moya is guilty of Gross Misconduct and violation or the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
1. No. The instant petition for disbarment was not a violation of the rule against forum shopping. Forum shopping is only applicable to judicial cases or proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings. Furthermore, the main object of the seven criminal cases of the respondent’s violation of BP Blg. 22 is different from the administrative case at hand. The former refers to the issuance of bouncing checks, while the latter refers to the dishonesty of the respondent in the payment of his debts.
2. Yes. Atty. Moya is guilty of Gross Misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His refusal to pay his monetary obligations His refusal to pay his monetary obligations without justifiable cause, despite acknowledging said obligations and doing so without remorse, fails to
comply with the expectation of lawyers to be honest in their dealings – be it in their professional or private affairs. What is more, his failure to file his answer and verified position paper despite extensions of time is a manifestation of his disrespect for judicial authorities. For his acts, he was then sentenced to be suspended from practice for two years.
Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan vs Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa (A.C. No. 7360)
FACTS: Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same case for which he previously appeared as prosecutor. Atty. Silvosa appeared as public prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 10256-00 (Esperon Case), for the complex crime of double frustrated murder and later on November 23, 2005, Atty. Silvosa, as private lawyer and as counsel for the accused, filed a motion to reinstate bail pending finality of judgement of the Esperon Case.
Atty. Silvosa made an attempt to bribe Prosecutor Toribio for 30,000.00php and failed. Prosecutor Toribio excuted her affidavit on June 14, 1999, a day after the failed bribery attempt, and had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then President of the IBP-Bukidnon Chapter. On May 18, 2006, the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case. 27776 for direct bribery on an NBI set-up entrapment operation, wherein, Atty. Silvosa demanded 15,000.00php from Lanticse for the dismissal of the case and for the release of Cadinas who was in detention for more than two years. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 2. Whether or not a delay of the filing for an administrative complaint exonerate a respondent. 3. Whether or not crime involving moral turpitude can be a
ground for disbarment. HELD: 1. Yes, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Atty. Silvosa's attempt to minimize his role in said case would be unavailing. The fact is that he is presumed to have acquainted himself with the facts of the said case. Such would constitute sufficient intervention in the case. Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service." The Court agree with Commissioner Funa's finding that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03, when he entered his appearance in the motion to Post Bail Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that "A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of concern given after a full disclosure of facts." Atty. Silvosa's representation of conflicting interests merit at least the penalty of suspension.
2. No, delay of filing for an administrative complaint does not exonerate a respondent.
There is certain difficulty to dissect a claim of bribery that occurred more than seven years ago. In this instance, the conflicting allegations are merely based on the word of one person against the word of another. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times expected of him. Atty. Silvosa failed in this respect. The Court says, mere delay in filing of an administrative complaint against a member of the bar does not automatically exonerate a respondent. Administrative offenses do not prescribe. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complaint
of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring member of the bench and bar can not escape the disciplining arm of the Court. Atty. Silvosa's failed attempt at bribing Prosecutor Toribio also merit at least the penalty of suspension.
3. Yes, crime involving moral turpitude can be a ground for disbarment.
Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness,vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals. There is no doubt that the Sandiganbayans' judgement in Criminal Case No. 27776 is a matter of public record and is already final. Rule 138, Section 27 provides, A member of the bar may be disbarred by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. The crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude, as ruled, in Magno vs COMELEC. The practice of Law is a priveledge, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise his privilege. Wherefore, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby disbarred and his name ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. So ordered.
RURAL BANK OF SILAY, INC., vs. ATTY. ERNESTO H. PILLA
KAPUNAN, J.:
Rural Bank of Silay. Inc. (complainant) filed with this Court the instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla (respondent) alleging deceit and gross misconduct on the part of the latter. The complaint alleges as follows:
1. That on July 23, 1975 the respondent executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of the complainant over a parcel of land located in the Municipality of Sagay, Negros Occidental, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-55380, purportedly as Attorney-in-Fact of the registered owners thereof, Pedro N. Torres and Oscar D. Granada. A copy of this Real Estate Mortgage is herewith attached as Annex ―A‖.
2. That together with the aforesaid Real Estate Mortgage the respondent submitted a Special Power of Attorney by virtue of which he was purportedly authorized and empowered by the registered owners Pedro Torres and Oscar D. Granada to mortgage the aforesaid parcel of land in favor of the complainant. A copy of this Special Power of Attorney is herewith attached as Annex ―B‖.
3. That on the security of, among others, the aforesaid parcel of land over which the respondent represented that he is authorized to mortgage, complainant extended and released a loan to the respondent in the amount of P91,427.00.
4. That complainant subsequently and much later learned that the respondent was not at all authorized and empowered by the registered owner Oscar D. Granada to mortgage the aforesaid parcel of land when it was joined as a defendant in a complaint filed by the aforesaid Oscar D. Grananda for removal of cloud on title with preliminary injunction and damages. A copy of this complaint is herewith attached as Annex ―C‖.
5. That in the aforesaid complaint as well as in the hearing conducted in connection therewith Oscar D. Granada specifically and categorically denied having executed and signed the Special Power of Attorney, Annex B, submitted by the respondent to the complainant in support of his application for a loan.
6. That the aforesaid civil case, Civil Case No. 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 60, was subsequently decided against the respondent wherein the aforesaid Court found that the Special Power of Attorney, Annex B, was indeed forged and falsified because the spouses Oscar D. Grananda and Lolita L. Granada have not signed the same and wherein the Court also made the finding that the defendant, considering that he has benefited from the said falsified document, is presumed to have a
hand in the preparation of the same. A copy of this Decision is herewith attached as Annex ―D‖.
7. That the respondent has not appealed from the aforesaid Decision thereby making the findings of fact made therein final as against him.
8. That the foregoing acts of the respondent in presenting to the complainant Bank a forged and falsified Power of Attorney for the purpose of obtaining a loan is a betrayal of his oath as a lawyer to do falsehood to no man and by his conduct herein has forfeited his right to continue further in the practice of law.
[1]
Upon the instance of the Court, respondent filed his comment refuting the charges of deceit and gross misconduct against him. Respondent denied employing any deceit or misrepresentation in obtaining a loan from complainant rural bank. According to respondent, he did not know that the signature of Oscar Granada on the special power of attorney appointing him (respondent) as attorney-in-fact was forged. The special power of attorney purportedly authorized respondent to mortgaged the parcel of land in Sagay, Negros Occidental in favor of complainant rural bank. Respondent also claimed that if indeed said document was forged, he was not a party to the forgery. He cited the findings of the trial court in Civil Case No. 1-C, thus:
Although there is no showing that Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla has actually falsified the signatures of the spouses, Atty. Oscar D. Granada, yet considering that he actually benefited from the said falsified documents, he is presumed to have a hand on the same. (Decision, p. 20-annex ―D‖.)
[2]
Respondent maintained that he obtained the loan from complainant rural bank without depriving it of the opportunity to investigate his financial capacity as well as to ascertain the genuineness of the special power of attorney under which he acted as the mortgagor. Thus, respondent is of the view that, under the circumstances, it cannot be said that he employed deceit and gross misconduct against complainant rural bank.
After receipt of respondent’s comment, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation. Both parties adduced their respective evidence before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP. Upon agreement of the parties, the matter was resolved on the basis of their respective pleadings and the annexes attached thereto. From these pleadings, the IBP, through Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo, established the following uncontroverted facts:
Purportedly acting as attorney-in-fact of a certain Pedro Torres and Oscar D. Granada, by virtue of a special power of attorney, respondent applied for a loan and concomitantly executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of the complainant bank covering the property of Pedro Torres and Oscar D. Granada. With such security, complainant extended to the respondent his loan in the amount of P91,427.00. In view of the failure of the respondent to pay the loan, the mortgaged property was foreclosed by the complainant bank. Later, Oscar Granada, the real registered owner of the mortgaged property filed a complaint against the respondent and the complainant for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and Special Power of Attorney. After the trial, the court declared null and void the said Special Power of Attorney as well as the Real Estate Mortgage for being products of forgery. This decision was not appealed by the defendants.
There is no showing that respondent, despite the adverse decision, returned or offered to return the money he took from the complainant bank. The bank then instituted this disbarment proceeding against the respondent.
[3]
The IBP found from the above facts that respondent violated his oath as a lawyer to do no falsehood, thus:
This office believes that the actuation of the respondent constitutes a betrayal of his oath as a lawyer. The findings of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental has persuasive effect in this proceeding.
As found by the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental in its decision in Civil Case No. 1-C, entitled ―Spouses Oscar D. Granada
and Lolita L. Granada vs. Ernesto H. Pilla, et al‖, the plaintiffs Granada spouses have not signed the questioned Special Power of Attorney in favor of the respondent and the said spouses’ signatures as appearing in the Special Power of Attorney are not their true and genuine signatures for actually they have not executed nor granted a Special Power of Attorney in favor of herein respondent authorizing him to mortgage the one-third (1/3) share of the said spouses in the mortgaged property. The trial court stressed that:
―…Although there is no showing that Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla has actually falsified the signatures of the spouses, Atty. Oscar D. Granada, yet considering that he actually benefited from the said falsified documents, he is presumed to have a hand on the same.
Defendant Antonio Pura testified and in fact he admitted that he notarized the said documents, Exhibit ―A‖ and ―B‖, with the assurance of Atty. Pilla that the signatures appearing in the said documents were the signatures of Atty. Oscar D. Granada and of Pedro Torres, registered owners of the property in question.‖
Antonio G. Pura, the notary public who notarized the questioned Special Power of Attorney in favor of the respondent, testified in said Civil Case as follows:
―Q Now, compañero, will you please relate to this Honorable Court the circumstances under which you notarized this Special Power of Attorney now marked as Exh. ―A‖ on April 21, 1975?
―A Yes, sir. I remember that on the same day, April 21, 1975, defendant Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla personally appeared before me and he brought along with him this Special Power of Attorney executed in his favor. He told me to notarize it. I asked him about the signature of Atty. Oscar D. Granada if this is his signature and he said ―Yes‖. I also asked him about the signature of the other principal and he said also ―Yes‖. With that assurance and being a brother lawyer I accommodated him. Knowing that he will not do anything that is illegal and I have confidence in him considering that he is a
lawyer and he knows what he was doing, I accommodated him.‖
(TSN, Hearing March 15, 1993, pp. 22-23, Civil Case No. 1, RTC, Branch LX, Cadiz City, Negros Occidental)
If indeed, respondent is not responsible for the falsification of the Special Power of Attorney, why did he not explain before the trial court or before this office the circumstances on how he obtained the same. He did not even bother to identify his alleged client who provided him the forged Special Power of Attorney. Instead, respondent is banking on his defense that the complainant bank has not introduced any evidence to prove that he forged the Special Power of Attorney. He relied on the argument that his transaction with the complainant bank was purely commercial business and did not involve his capacity as a lawyer. Further, if it is true that the respondent maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity as he asserted, why did he represent before the notary public that the signatures appearing in the Special Power of Attorney were the signatures of the real owners if he was not actually aware that the signatures were that of the real owners.
The office is convinced that the actuation of the respondent is misrepresentation constituting gross misconduct at the very least. This is a violation of his oath as a lawyer to do falsehood to no man.
[4]
In conclusion, Commissioner Elamparo recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for five (5) years. The IBP, through Resolution No. XIV-00-175, dated 7 April 2000, of its Board of Governors, substantially adopted and approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner Elamparo but modified the penalty. The IBP RESOLVED as follows:
…to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as annex ―A‖, and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, said recommendation is with modification that Respondent be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for THREE(3) years for misrepresentation.
[5]
We fully agree with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner.
As correctly pointed out by the trial court in Civil Case No. 1-C, since respondent actually benefited from the falsified document, he is presumed to have a hand in the falsification of the same. Respondent miserably failed to rebut this presumption with his barefaced denial that he had no knowledge of the forgery. The Court cannot give credence to respondent’s negative assertion that he did not know that the special power of attorney issued in his favor was falsified. As a lawyer, respondent knows or ought to know that parties to a public document must personally appear before the notary public to attest that the same is their own free act and deed. In utter disregard of this requirement, respondent caused the special power of attorney to be notarized without the parties appearing before the notary public. Thereafter, respondent presented the same to complainant rural bank in order to obtain a loan therefrom. It is thus apparent that respondent had a hand in the falsification of the document especially considering that it was he who chiefly benefited from it. Indeed, ―the settled rule is that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged document is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification.‖
[6] Further, ―if a person had in his possession a falsified
document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the clear presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification.‖
[7]
Respondent’s acts clearly fall short of the standards set by the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 1.01 thereof, which provides that ―[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.‖ The fact that the conduct pertained to respondent’s private dealings with complainant rural bank is of no moment. A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, or good demeanor.
[8] Possession of good moral character is not only a
good condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.
[9]
Considering the foregoing, the recommendation of the IBP that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years is approved.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds respondent Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla guilty of misconduct. He is suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years effective from receipt of this Resolution, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be more severely dealt with.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished, upon its finality, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all the courts in the Philippines, and spread on the personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES RAFOLS vs. ATTY. RICARDO BARRIOS
PER CURIAM:
The primary objective of administrative cases
against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline
the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard
the administration of justice by protecting the courts
and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and
to remove from the legal profession persons whose
utter disregard of their lawyer’s oath has proven
them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed
in them as members of the bar. A lawyer may be
disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in
his professional or private capacity, which shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue
as an officer of the court.
– Rivera v. Corral, A.C. No. 3548, July 4, 2002, 384
SCRA 1.
By its Board Resolution No. 1 dated March 7, 1998, the
South Cotabato-Sarangani-General Santos City (SOCSARGEN)
Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) resolved to
refer to the IBP Board of Governors in Manila, for appropriate action
and investigation, the purported anomaly involving
Judge Teodoro Dizon Jr. and Atty. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr.[1]
Thus,
on March 24, 1998, Atty. Joeffrey L. Montefrio, the
SOCSARGEN IBP Chapter President, transmitted the referral to the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).
The matter involving Judge Dizon, Jr., which was docketed
as Administrative Matter (AM) No. RTJ-98-1426 entitledManuel
C. Rafols and Lolita C. Rafols v. Judge Teodoro Dizon, Jr., RTC,
General Santos City, Branch 37,[2]
was resolved in
a per curiam decision promulgated on January 31, 2006,[3]
whereby
the Court dismissed Judge Dizon, Jr. from the service, with forfeiture
of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-
employment in the government or any of its subdivisions,
instrumentalities or agencies, including government-owned and
The case is a suspension from the practice of law.
Facts:The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and
a member of the provincial board of Isabela, that he made use of a
card written in Spanish and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as
follows:
LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela.
Respondent also admitted having written a letter in Ilocano
addressed to a lieutenant in his home municipality (Echague,
Isabela) in which he stated his continued exercise of his profession
as a lawer and a notary public, besides being a Member of the Board
of the municipality of Ilagan, Isabela. He also stated that he would be
willing to render his legalservices to the people who have not
contracted any other lawyer’s services.
Issue:
Whether or not the suspension of Luis B. Tagorda is meritorious.
Held:
Respondent Luis B. Tagorda was suspended from the practice as an
attorney-at-law for the period of one month. The solicitation of
employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or
suspension. (Canon 27 & 28, Code of Ethics)
SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSN. vs ROMANILLOS
Facts:
This is a disbarment case against Atty. Roberto Romanillos, for
representing conflicting interests and for using the title ―Judge‖
despite having been found guilty of grave and serious misconduct (in
Zarate v Romanillos).
Apparently, Romanillos was previously an active board member as
corporate secretary of Durano Corp. Inc. (DCI).But it allowed itself to
represent San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc (SJHAI) before
the human Settlements Regulation Commission in a case against the
same DCI.
Irrelevant info: the case above was an alleged violation of DCI of the
Subdivision and Condominium Buyer’sProtection Act. DCI sold
a land designated as a school site, without disclosing it
as such. (page 106)
When SJHAI’s petition over the land was denied, the SJHAI’s Board
terminated Romanillos’ services.
Also, Romanillos acted as counsel for Lydia Durano-Rodriguez who
substituted for DCI.
Thus, a disbarment case was filed for conflicting interests.
The IBP handled the case, but he was merely reprimanded.
In spite of this, he still continued to serve as counsel for Durano-
Rodriguez. Thus, a second disbarment case was filed. It also
included his use of ―judge‖ although he was found guilty of grave and
serious misconduct.
Issue:
W/N Romanillos should be disbarred
Held: Yes.
It is inconsequential that SJHAI never questioned the propriety of
respondent’s continued representation of Durano-Rodriguez. The
lack of opposition does not mean consent. As long as the lawyer
represents 2 or moreopposing clients, he is guilty of violating his
oath.
His continued use of ―judge‖ violated Rules 1.01 and 3.01. The
penalty imposed on him in the Zarate caseforfeiture of all leave and
retirement benefits and privileges: including the title judge. (he was
a judge before,but he resigned instead of being booted out)
The title ―judge‖ should be reserved only to judges, incumbent and
retired, and not to those who were dishonorably discharged from the
service.
Atty. Ismael G. Khan Jr. vs. Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo
Facts:
Simbillo advertised himself as an ―Annulment of Marriage Specialist.‖
These advertisements appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the
Philippine Daily Inquirer, and further research showed that similar
advertisements were published in the Manila Bulletin in August 2 and
6, 2000 and in the Philippine Star in August 5, 2000.
In September 1, 2000, Simbillo was charged for improper advertising
and solicitation of legal services, filed by Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief of Public Information Office, Atty. Ismael G,
Khan.
Simbillo’s advertisement undermined the stability and sanctity of
marriage, and violated rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the Rules of
Court.
Simbillo professed repentance and beg for the Court’s indulgence,
this rings hollow as he again advertised his services in an issue of
Buy and Sell Free Ads Newspaper in August 14, 2001, and again in
October 5, 2001.
Rulings:
Rizalino Simbillo was found to have violated Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibilty, and Rule 138, section 27 of
the Rules of Court, and therefore, suspended from the practice of
Law for One year. Repetition of the same or similar offense will be
dealt with more severely.
B. R. SEBASTIAN ENTERPRISES, INC vs.CA
This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary injunction, to review the Resolution dated 10 November 1975 of respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. 53546-R denying petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal, earlier dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief.
The material operative facts of this case, as gathered from the pleadings of the parties, are not disputed.
Eulogio B. Reyes, now deceased, filed an action for damages with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, against the Director of Public Works, the Republic of the Philippines and petitioner herein, B. R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 757-R.
1
On 7 May 1973, the trial court rendered a decision finding petitioner liable for damages but absolving the other defendants.
2
Petitioner, thru its counsel, the law firm of Baizas, Alberto and Associates, timely appealed the adverse decision to the respondent Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as C.A.-G.R. No. 53546-R.
3
During the pendency of the appeal, the plaintiff-appellee therein, Eulogio B. Reyes, died. Upon prior leave of the respondent Court, he was substituted by his heirs — Enrique N. Reyes, Felicisima R. Natividad, Donna Marie N. Reyes and Renne Marie N. Ryes — who are now the private respondents in this present petition.
On 19 February 1974, petitioner, thru its then counsel of record, received notice to file Appellant's Brief within 45 days from receipt thereof. It had, therefore, until 5 April 1974 within which to comply.
Counsel for petitioner failed to file the Brief; thus, on 9 July 1974, respondent Court issued a Resolution requiring said counsel to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief within the reglementary period.
4 A copy of this
Resolution was received by counsel for petitioner on 17 July 1974. 5
As the latter failed to comply with the above Resolution, respondent Court, on 9 September 1974, issued another Resolution this time dismissing petitioner's appeal:
It appearing that counsel for defendant-appellant failed to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed (for failure to file the appellant's brief within the reglementary period which expired on April 5, 1974) within the period of 10 days fixed in the resolution of July 9, 1974, copy of which was received by said counsel on July 17, 1974; . . .
6
On 28 September 1974, petitioner, this time thru the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE, filed a motion for reconsideration
7 of the resolution
dismissing its appeal alleging that as a result of the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas, senior partner in the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES, the affairs of the said firm are still being settled between Atty. Jose Baizas (son of Crispin Baizas) and Atty. Ruby Alberto, the latter having established her own law office; furthermore, Atty. Rodolfo Espiritu, the lawyer who handled this case in the trial court and who is believed to have also attended to the preparation of the Appellant's Brief but failed to submit it through oversight and inadvertence, had also left the firm.
In its Resolution of 9 October 1974, respondent Court denied the motion for reconsideration, stating that:
Upon consideration of the motion of counsel for defendant-appellant, praying, on the grounds therein stated, that the resolution of September 9, 1974, dismissing the appeal, be set aside, and that appellant be granted a reasonable period of time within which to file its brief: considering that six (6) months had elapsed since the expiration of the original period and more than two and one-half (2-½) months since counsel received copy of the resolution requiring him to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file brief; Motion Denied. 8
No action having been taken by petitioner from the above Resolution within the period to file a petition for review, the same became final and executory, and the records of the case were remanded to the court of origin for execution.
The trial court issued a writ of execution on 21 October 1975.
9 Pursuant thereto, respondent Provincial Sheriff and Deputy
Sheriff attached petitioner's Hough Pay Loader with Hercules Diesel Engine and issued on 5 November 1975 a Notice of Sheriff's Sale, scheduling for Friday, 14 November 1975 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning, the auction sale thereof.
10
On 6 November 1975, petitioner filed with respondent Court a Motion to Reinstate Appeal with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
11 dated 5 November 1975, and containing the following
allegations:
1. That late as it may be, this Honorable Court has the inherent power to modify and set aside its processes, in the interest of justice, especially so in this case when the case was dismissed on account of the untimely death of Atty. Crispin D. Baizas, counsel of BRSEI (B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc.).
2. That to dismiss the case for failure to file the appellant's brief owing to the untimely death of the late Atty. Crispin D. Baizas would be tantamount to denying BRSEI its (sic) day in court, and is, therefore, a clear and unmistakable denial of due process on the part of BRSEI.
3. That to reinstate BRSEI's appeal would not impair the rights of the parties, since all that BRSEI is asking for, is a day in court to be heard on appeal in order to have the unfair, unjust and unlawful decision, set aside and reversed.
The respondent Court denied the said motion in its Resolution of 10 November 1975:
12
. . . it appearing that appellant was represented by the law firm of Baizas, Alberto & Associates, and while Atty. Baizas died on January 16, 1974, his law firm was not dissolved since it received the notice to file brief on February 19, 1974, and the copy of the Resolution of July 9, 1974, requiring appellant to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed was received by the law firm on July 17, 1974 and no cause was shown; . . .
Hence, on 13 November 1975, petitioner filed the original petition
13 in this case against the Court of Appeals, Eulogio B.
Reyes, Nicanor G. Salaysay, as Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, and Antonio Marinas, as Deputy Sheriff. The petition likewise prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.
In the Resolution of 13 November 1975, this Court required respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, and issued a Temporary Restraining Order.
14
On 12 January 1976, respondents filed a Partial Comment on the Petition with a Motion to Suspend the Proceedings
15 on the ground
that respondent Eulogio B. Reyes is already dead and his lawful
heirs had already been ordered substituted for him during the pendency of the appeal before the respondent Court of Appeals.
In the Resolution of 21 January 1976, this Court ordered petitioner to amend its petition within then (10) days from receipt of notice, and suspended the filing of respondents' Comment until after the amendment is presented and admitted.
16
In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on 9 February 1976 a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Petition to which it attached the said Amended Petition.
17 The amendment consists in the substitution of
Eulogio B. Reyes with his heirs.
This Court admitted the Amended Petition 18
and required the respondents to file their Comment within ten (10) days from notice thereof, which they complied with on 5 April 1976.
19 Petitioner filed
its Reply to the Comment on 29 April 1976. 20
In the Resolution of 12 May 1976, this Court denied the petition for lack of merit:
21
L-41862 (B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.). — Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the amended petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, respondents' comment thereon, as well as petitioner's reply to said comment, the Court Resolved to DENY the petition for lack of merit.
However, on 31 May 1976, petitioner filed a motion for its reconsideration
22 claiming that since it was deprived of the right to
appeal without fault on its part, the petition should be given due course.
Respondents submitted on 22 July 1976 their Comment 23
to said Motion for Reconsideration.
On 10 September 1976, this Court resolved to reconsider 24
its Resolution of 12 May 1976 and required both parties to submit simultaneously their respective Memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice thereof.
Petitioner submitted its Memorandum on 5 November 1976 25
while respondents submitted theirs on 22 November 1976.
26 On 29
November 1976, this Court deemed the present case submitted for decision.
27
The sole issue to be addressed is whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal, previously dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief.
Petitioner, in its Memorandum, extensively expounds on respondent Court's authority to reinstate dismissed appeals and cites as basis thereof the decision of this Court in Heirs of Clemente Celestino vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
28 Indeed, in said case, this Court affirmed
the resolution of the Court of Appeals — reinstating an appeal after being dismissed for failure by the appellants therein to file their brief, and after entry of judgment and remand of the records to the lower court — and cancelled the entry of judgment, requiring the lower court to return the records to the Court of Appeals and admit appellant's brief. Said case, however, had a peculiar or singular factual situation" which prompted the Court of Appeals to grant the relief and which this Court found sufficient to justify such action. As this Court, through Associate Justice Ramon Aquino, said:
We are of the opinion that under the peculiar or singular factual situation in this case and to forestall a miscarriage of justice the resolution of the Court of Appeals reinstating the appeal should be upheld.
That Court dismissed the appeal of the Pagtakhans in the mistaken belief that they had abandoned it because they allegedly failed to give to their counsel the money needed for paying the cost of printing their brief.
But presumably the Appellate Court realized later that fraud might have been practised on appellants Pagtakhans since their oppositions were not included in the record on appeal. In (sic) sensed that there was some irregularity in the actuations of their lawyer and that Court (sic) itself had been misled into dismissing the appeal.
Counsel for the Pagtakhans could have furnished them with copies of his motions for extension of time to file brief so that they would have known that the Court of Appeals had been apprised of their alleged failure to defray the cost of printing their brief and they could have articulated their reaction directly to the Court. Counsel could have moved in the Appellate Court that he be allowed to withdraw from the case or that the Pagtakhans be required to manifest whether they were still desirous of prosecuting their appeal or wanted a mimeographed brief to be filed for them (See People vs. Cawili, L-30543, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 728). Since counsel did none of those things, his representation that the appellants had evinced lack of interest in pursuing their appeal is difficult to believe.
If the appellate court has not yet lost its jurisdiction, it may exercise its discretion in reinstating an appeal, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case and the demands of substantial justice (Alquiza vs. Alquiza, L-23342, February 10, 1968, 22 SCRA 494, 66 O.G. 276; C. Vda. de Ordoveza vs. Raymundo, 62 Phil. 275; Chavez vs. Ganzon, 108 Phil. 6).
But even if it has already lost jurisdiction over the appeal by reason of the remand of the record to the lower court, it, nevertheless, has the inherent right to recall the remittitur or the remand of the record to the lower court if it had rendered a decision or issued a resolution which was induced by fraud practised
upon it. Such a right is not affected by the statutory provision that after the record has been remanded, the appellate court has no further jurisdiction over the appeal (5 Am Jur. 2nd 433 citingLovett vs. State, 29 Fla. 384, 11 So. 176; 84 ALR 595; State vs. Ramirez, 34 Idaho 623, 203 Pac. 279).
In the instant case, no fraud is involved; what obtain is simple negligence on the part of petitioner's counsel, which is neither excusable nor unavoidable. Petitioner thus failed to demonstrate sufficient cause to warrant a favorable action on its plea.
As held in Chavez, et al. vs. Ganzon, et al., 29
and reiterated in Negros Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
30 We said:
Granting that the power or discretion to reinstate an appeal that had been dismissed is included in or implied from the power or discretion to dismiss an appeal, still such power or discretion must be exercised upon a showing of good and sufficient cause, in like manner as the power or discretion vested in the appellate court to allow extensions of time for the filing of briefs. There must be such a showing which would call for, prompt and justify its exercise (sic). Otherwise, it cannot and must not be upheld.
To justify its failure to file the Appellant's Brief, petitioner relies mainly on the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas and the supposed confusion it brought to the firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES. It says:
31
Petitioner, thru its president Bernardo R. Sebastian, engaged the services of Atty. Crispin D. Baizas to handle its defense in Civil Case No. 757-R; however, it appears that Atty. Baizas entered petitioner's case as a case to be handled by his law firm operating under the name and style "Crispin D. Baizas & Associates." Hence, the Answer to the
complaint, Answer to Cross-Claim, and Answer to Fourth-party Complaint filed for petitioner in said case, evince that the law firm "Crispin D. Baizas & Associates" represents petitioner in the action.
After rendition of the assailed Decision of the trial court, petitioner's counsel appears to have changed its firm name to "Baizas, Alberto & Associates." The appeal was thus pursued for petitioner by the law firm "Baizas, Alberto & Associates."
On January 16, 1974, Atty. Crispin D. Baizas died as a result of a brief heart attack. In consequence (sic) of his death, the law firm "Baizas, Alberto & Associates" was in a terribly confused state of affairs. In effect, said law firm was dissolved. Atty. Ruby Alberto formed her own law office and other associates left the dissolved law firms (sic) joining other offices or putting up their own. Atty. Jose Baizas, son of deceased Crispin D. Baizas, took over the management of why may have been left of his father's office, it appearing that some, if not many, cases of the defunct office were taken over by the associates who left the firm upon its dissolution.
But, none of the former partners and associates/assistants of the dissolved law firm filed the required appellant's brief for herein petitioner in its appealed case before the respondent Court of Appeals. No notice was served upon petitioner by any of the surviving associates of the defunct law firm that its appellant's brief was due for filing or that the law office had been dissolved and that the law office had been dissolved and that none of the lawyers herein formerly connected desired to handle the appealed case of petitioner. . . .
The circumstances that the law firm "Baizas, Alberto & Associates" was dissolved and that none of the
associates took over petitioner's case, and no notice of such state of affairs was given to petitioner who could have engaged the services of another lawyer to prosecute its appeal before respondent Court, constitutes (sic) an UNAVOIDABLE CASUALTY that entitles petitioner to the relief prayed for. On the other hand, the non-dissolution of said law firm "Baizas, Alberto & Associates" will not defeat petitioner's claim for relief since, in such event, the said firm had ABANDONED petitioner's cause, which act constitutes fraud and/or reckless inattention the result of which is deprivation of petitioner's day in court. In the abovementioned Yuseco case, this Honorable Court had emphatically and forcefully declared that it will always be disposed to grant relief to parties aggrieved by perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention and downright incompetence of lawyers, which has the consequence of depriving their day (sic) in court.
We find no merit in petitioner's contentions. Petitioner's counsel was the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES and not merely Atty. Crispin Baizas. Hence, the death of the latter did not extinguish the lawyer-client relationship between said firm and petitioner.
In Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 32
the appeal filed by the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES on behalf of respondent therein was dismissed for failure to comply with the requisites enumerated in the Rules of Court; the excuse presented by said counsel was also the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas. This Court held therein that:
The death of Attorney Baizas was not a valid excuse on the part of his associates for not attending to Alvendia's appeal, supposing arguendo that his office was solely entrusted with the task of representing Alvendia in the Court of Appeals. Attorney Espiritu (not Attorney Baizas) was the one actually collaborating with Viola in handling
Alvendia's case. He did not file a formal appearance in the Court of Appeals.
Undoubtedly, there was inexcusable negligence on the part of petitioner's counsel in failing to file the Appellant's Brief. As revealed by the records, petitioner's counsel, the BAIZAS ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES law firm, received the notice to file Brief on 19 February 1974. It failed to do so within the 45 days granted to it. Said law firm also received a copy of the respondent Court's Resolution of 9 July 1974 requiring it to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the Brief within the reglementary period. Petitioner chose not to comply with it, thus compelling the respondent Court to issue on 9 September 1974 a Resolution dismissing the appeal, a copy of which the former also received. Then, on 28 September 1974, the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE moved for reconsideration of the said Resolution which respondent Court denied in its Resolution of 9 October 1974. Nothing more was heard from petitioner until after a year when, on 6 November 1975, it filed the instant petition in reaction to the issuance of a writ of execution by the trial court following receipt of the records for the respondent Court.
The "confusion" in the office of the law firm following the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas is not a valid justification for its failure to file the Brief. With Baizas' death, the responsibility of Atty. Alberto and his Associates to the petitioner as counsel remained until withdrawal by the former of their appearance in the manner provided by the Rules of Court. This is so because it was the law firm which handled the case for petitioner before both the trial and appellate courts. That Atty. Espiritu, an associate who was designated to handle the case, later left the office after the death of Atty. Baizas is of no moment since others in the firm could have replaced him.. Upon receipt of the notice to file Brief, the law firm should have re-assigned the case to another associate or, it could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by the Rules of Court so that the petitioner could contract the services of a new lawyer.
In the Negros Stevedoring case, supra., this Court held:
The negligence committed in the case at bar cannot be considered excusable, nor (sic) is it unavoidable. Time and again the Court has admonished law firms to adopt a system of distributing pleadings and notices, whereby lawyers working therein receive promptly notices and pleadings intended for them, so that they will always be informed of the status of their cases. Their Court has also often repeated that the negligence of clerks which adversely affect the cases handled by lawyers, is binding upon the latter.
Compounding such negligence is the failure of the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE, which filed on 28 September 1974 the motion for reconsider the Resolution of 9 September 1974, to take any further appropriate action after the respondent Court denied said motion on 9 October 1974. The appearance of said counsel is presumed to be duly authorized by petitioner. The latter has neither assailed nor questioned such appearance.
The rule is settled that negligence of counsel binds the client. 33
Moreover, petitioner itself was guilty of negligence when it failed to make inquiries from counsel regarding its case. As pointed out by respondents, the president of petitioner corporation claims to be the intimate friend of Atty. Crispin Baizas; hence, the death of the latter must have been known to the former.
34 This fact should have made
petitioner more vigilant with respect to the case at bar. Petitioner failed to act with prudence and diligence, thus, its plea that they were not accorded the right to procedural due process cannot elicit either approval or sympathy.
35
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that there was failure to show a good and sufficient cause which would justify the reinstatement of petitioner's appeal. Respondent Court of Appeals did not them commit any grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order issued in this case is lifted.
Costs against petitioner.
IT SO ORDERED.
Dacanay vs. Baker & McKenzie [10 May 1985]
Facts: Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay sought to enjoin respondents
from practicing law under the name of Baker & McKenize, a law firm
organized in Illinois.
A letter dated 16 November 1979, using the letterhead of the said
firm and carrying the name of the respondents, requested Rosie
Clurman to release 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc.
to H.E. Gabriel, a client. Atty. Dacanay, in his reply dated 07
December 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He asked
whether Gabriel is represented by Baker & McKenzie, and if not, why
they misrepresented themselves by using the letterhead of
another law firm. Not receiving a reply, he filed this instant
complaint.
Issue: Whether or not respondents can make use of the firm name
Baker & McKenzie
Held: Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice
law in the Philippines. The respondents, members of the Philippine
Bar and practicing under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are
members or associates of Baker & McKenzie. Respondents’ use of
the firm name constitutes a representation that they could ―render
legal services of the higher quality to multinational business
enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment.‖
This is unethical, as Baker & McKenzie is unauthorized to practise
here.
Director of Religious Affairs vs. Bayot , 74 Phil. 579
Facts: Respondent is charged with malpractice for having published
an advertisement in Sunday Tribunal on June 13, 1943 which reads
as follows –
―Marriage license promptly secured thru our assistance and the
annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired and marriage
arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the
poor. Everything confidential.
―Legal assistance service
12 Escolta, Manila
Room 105, Tel. 2-41-60‖
Issue: Whether or not the advertisement is ethical.
Held: It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a
flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it
being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of
Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that ―the practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
