Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Security

Protection and Rescue Department

LESSONS LEARNED FROM CIVIL-MILITARY FIELD EXERCISE

TERRORIST ATTACK RESPONSE AND RELIEF MANAGMENT

Sarajevo, November 2010 ________________________________________________________________

Production of this brochure was funded and supported by OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina

Publisher

BiH Ministry of Security – Protection and Rescue Department

Editors Dr. Samir Huseinbašić, Head of Department in the Protection and Rescue Sector

Idriz Brković, Head of Department in the Protection and Rescue Sector, Evaluation Team Leader

For Publisher Samir Agić, Assistant Minister of Security in protection and rescue

Consultants (Exercise Evaluators)

Dr. Sead Omerbegović, BiH Minister of the Interior, Tuzla Canton, Evaluator, Exercise Management Bogdan Udriste, OSCE Mission to BiH, Evaluator, Exercise Management

Milorad Spasojević, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Serbia, Evaluator at the Assembly Point Želimir Škrbić, BiH RS Ministry of Internal Affairs, Assembly Point Evaluator

Dragomir Nišić, BiH, Brčko District Police, Evaluator at Scene 1 Major Michele Orlando, EUFOR, Evaluator at Scene 1

Ratko Jovović, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Monte Negro, Evaluator at Scene 1 Major Ismael Maldonado, NATO HQ Sa, Evaluator at Scene 2

Damir Pilčik, State Protection and Rescue Authority, Croatia, Evaluator at Scene 2 Dragan Papić, BiH, FBiH Ministry of Internal Affairs, Evaluator of the vertical MEDEVAC to the Clinic

Major Enver Osmanović, AF BiH, Evaluator at Scene 2 Major W. Thompson, NATO HQ Sa, Legal Evaluator

William Thomas, NATO HQ Sa, Legal Evaluator Ivana Veselčić, BiH Ministry of Security, Legal Evaluator

Technical Editor

_________

Design and Print

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Circulation: 200 copies (Printed in the official languages in BiH and English)

Special Thanks

Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA)

Border Police of Bosnia and Herzegovina Federation Police Administration, FBiH Ministry of Internal Affairs

Civil Protection Administration, BiH Federation Civil Protection Administration, Republika Srpska

Public Security Department, Brčko District Professional Firefighting Brigade, Canton Sarajevo

Emergency Medical Assistance Institute, Canton Sarajevo Public Health Institute, BiH Federation Clinical Center Kasindol, East Sarajevo

Clinical Center of Sarajevo University, Emergency Ward Red Cross Society of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Cantonal Red Cross Organization, Canton Sarajevo OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina

NATO HQ in Bosnia and Herzegovina NATO JFC Naples

EUFOR HQ in Bosnia and Herzegovina Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA)

And other institutions, agencies and organizations which took part in the exercise, supported the

exercise and contributed to this publication with their comments and suggestions.

CONTENTS

Foreword (by OSCE)

1. Introduction – Exercise in general 1.1. International importance 1.2. Purpose and goals of the exercise 1.3. Participants

2. Exercise analysis – by management phases 2.1. Exercise planning 2.2. Organization of exercise personnel and resources 2.3. Exercise analysis

2.3.1. Management during the exercise 2.3.2. Command during the exercise 2.3.3. Coordination and control 2.3.4. Communication and public relations

3. Lessons learned 4. Conclusions 5. Recommendations 6. Enclosures

5.1. Abbreviations and acronyms 5.2. Selection of photographs from the exercise

1. Introduction – Exercise in general

1.1. Security / political context and international importance of the exercise The civil-military cooperation exercise (terrorist attack response and relief management) represents a contribution of BiH institutions, the Entities and Brčko District to the full implementation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s obligations on the path to full-fledged NATO membership. BiH obligations with regard to NATO and the development and training of civil emergency and crisis management structures (NATO terminology), stem from the individual membership programs (Individual Partnership Program – IPP, Individual Partnership Action Plan - IPAP, Partnership Action and Review Process - PARP, Intensive Dialogue – ID and Membership Action Plan – MAP). In the core of the mentioned programs are the goals and actions required for the achievement of partnership goals from the roadmap to full-fledged membership. The goals are related to all major global security challenges (including both internal and external threats and risks) and candidate countries are expected to build and develop capabilities for prevention and resistance to the consequences of social conflicts and civil emergencies caused by terrorism and natural or other disasters. With regard to individual partnership programs, the exercise also conveys Bosnia and Herzegovina’s commitment to harmonize legal instruments and build capacities for better security and stability in the region in response to terrorism (involving WMD1) and other asymmetrical threats recognized in the UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy, UN Action Plan against Terrorism, European Security Strategy, NATO CBRN Policy, and other political and strategic documents. In 2009, the Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina accepted a support offer by NATO Joint Force Command Naples to accomplish Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Partnership Goal concerning civil emergency planning and crisis management, in order to meet the requirements for full NATO membership. Following NATO initiative and upon the proposal by the BiH Ministry of Security, the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at its 106th session on 3 December 2009 focusing on the organization and successful implementation of the 5th Regional Seminar, adopted conclusions regarding the final Action Plan for the implementation of the Civil-Military Cooperation Plan in response to terrorist attacks and relief management (adopted by the Council of Ministers in June 2008) and its testing through a field exercise. The Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted a conclusion confirming the exercise at the 45th session of the Joint Commission for Defense and Security of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, held on 1 December 2009.

1 Valid legislation and professional terminology in Bosnia and Herzegovina do not recognize the term “weapons of mass destruction”; instead, the term in use is “nuclear/chemical/biological/radiological weapon”. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their application in terrorist activities.

1.2. Purpose and goals of the exercise The purpose of the exercise was to check the status of structural capabilities for response to terrorist attacks and relief management. Goals of the exercise include:

- Test the Civil-Military Cooperation Plan for response to terrorist attacks and relief management (and response standards in the NATO format);

- Test communication procedures between participants in the exercise; - Test the border-crossing procedures for international teams, as well as their reception and

escort IAW NATO SOP; - Test the capabilities of BiH police forces for response to terrorism; - Test the capabilities of civilian protection and rescue forces for after-attack relief management,

and AF BiH capability to support civilian authorities; - Check coordination and cooperation between international teams and local protection and

rescue forces (including NATO and EUFOR); - Check security and safety measures for actions and participants in the exercise – Security comes

first!

1.3. Legislation overview and exercise participants

1.3.1. Legislation overview During the exercise, the participants could apply the valid legislation of Bosnia and Herzegovina concerning counter-terrorism and relief management following a terrorist attack. That legislation also includes the following:

- Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Law on Criminal Procedure of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH Official Gazette 36/03)

- Law on State Investigation and Protection Agency (BiH Official Gazette 27/04, 63/04, 35/05, 49/09)

- Law on the Border Police of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH Official Gazette 35/09); - Framework Law on Protection and Rescue of People and Property in the Event of Natural or

Other Disasters in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH Official Gazette 50/08); - BiH Law on Defense (BiH Official Gazette 88/05); - BiH Federation Law on Internal Affairs (FBiH Official Gazette 49/05) - RS Law on Internal Affairs (RS Official Gazette 48/08); - Law on Protection and Rescue of People and Property in the Event of Natural or Other Disasters

in the BiH Federation (FBiH Official Gazette 39/03, 26/06) and the Law on Changes and Amendments to the Law on Protection and Rescue of People and Property in the Event of Natural or Other Disasters in the BiH Federation (FBiH Official Gazette 43/10);

- Law on Civil Protection of the Republika Srpska (RS Official Gazette 26/02) and the Law on

Changes and Amendments to the Law Civil Protection of the Republika Srpska (RS Official Gazette 29/10);

- BiH Strategy for Prevention and Fight against Terrorism (2010-2013) adopted at the 116th session on 9 March 2010

Other by-laws and operational documents include: - Program for Chemical Weapon Protection and Response to Incidents and Accidents Involving

Toxic Chemicals (BiH Official Gazette 80/06); - Instructions for Border Crossing for the Purpose of Receiving and Providing International

Assistance in the Event of Natural or Other Disasters (BiH Official Gazette 56/09); - Standard Communication Forms in the Event of Natural or Other Disasters (Addendum to the

Instructions above); - Civil-Military Cooperation Plan for response to terrorist attacks and relief management; - NATO Guidelines for first response to CBRN incidents/accidents; - Agreement between Entity Governments on mutual assistance in the event of natural or other

disasters, 2001.

1.3.2. Participants

As part of operational teams and different exercise bodies, 14 institutions, administrations and non-governmental organizations from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Entities and Brčko District took part in the exercise, alongside with three (3) institutions from neighboring countries, as follows:

Institution/Organization Participants 1. Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina

State Investigation and Protection Agency – SIPA (Exercise Management, Incident Commander - OSC, counter-terrorist unit, radio communication) Border Police (Exercise Management, airport security unit, security guards, bomb squad) Protection and Rescue Department (key planner, organization, implementation and evaluation, BiH OC Center – 112) Other departments of the Ministry of Security engaged in exercise support teams (Department for Counter-Terrorism, Organized Crime, Illegal Drugs and War Crimes; Department for General, Personnel and Financial Affairs; Department for International Cooperation and European Integrations, IT Department)

90

2. Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Exercise Management, CBRN decontamination section, air support, complete logistic support – transport, food other communications (e-mail, phone/fax)

80

3. BiH Office of the Prosecutor (Exercise Management, on-scene 4

investigation) 4. BiH Red Cross Society (Exercise Management, make-up artists, Canton

Sarajevo multipurpose field team – first aid, psychological aid and search for missing persons)

13

5. FBiH Ministry of Internal Affairs – Federation Police Administration (Exercise Management, special unit, forensics, exercise evaluation, people and property physical protection unit, escort for the international aid convoy)

45

6. RS Ministry of Internal Affairs (Physical protection unit – part of the escort for the international aid convoy)

5

7. Police Department of Brcko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 8. FBiH Civil Protection Administration – FBiH CPA (Exercise

Management, final CBRN recovery team) 8

9. FBiH Public Health Institute (FBiH CPA service for CBRN detection engaged in CBRN detection)

5

10. Emergency Medical Assistance Institute, Canton Sarajevo (FBiH CPA first aid service – 4 teams: 2 for first aid, 2 for CBRN medical triage and decontamination)

14

11. Ministry of Internal Affairs, Canton Sarajevo – Police Administration (Police escort for convoys with response teams from the assembly point to the response area)

6

12. RS Civil Protection Administration – RS CPA (Exercise Management) 1 13. Kasindol Clinical Center, East Sarajevo (RS CPA first aid service,

providing first aid) 4

14. Public Security Department, Brčko District (Exercise Management, CBRN decontamination team)

9

15. Sarajevo University Clinic – Emergency Ward (Admission and triage of injured and poisoned, vertical MEDEVAC from the scene)

10

International Assistance and Support 1. State Protection and Rescue Authority, Croatia (Evaluation team, CBRN

support team – chemical decontamination point) 12

2. Ministry of Internal Affairs, Serbia (Exercise evaluation) 2 3. Ministry of Internal Affairs, Monte Negro (Exercise evaluation) 2 4. NATO HQ Sarajevo (Evaluation, logistic support, expertise) 10 5. NATO JFC Naples (Leading the international assistance coordination

team – EADRCC, evaluation, expertise) and the Center of Excellence Defense Against Terrorism – CoE DAT (expert observation)

10

6. HQ EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo (Communication and transport support, evaluation)

6

7. OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo (Logistic support to exercise preparation and implementation, expertise, evaluation, lessons learned)

3

TOTAL 340

2. Exercise analysis Given the importance of the exercise for the analysis itself and for derivation of lessons learned, we will here show a basic cross-section of the most important planning and organizational considerations, followed by a more detailed table overview of each management phase. 2.1. Exercise planning This part of the analysis, along with the part concentrating on force and resource organization for the exercise, includes preparatory activities for successful implementation of the exercise. The planning phase included definition of the preliminary format and exercise design, exercise scenario, resource planning and harmonization of the exercise design and format. All these planning components were harmonized and tested at the following events:

- Planning conference; - Four coordination meetings with operations and exercise support leaders; - Four rehearsals prior to the actual exercise “Joint Response – Sarajevo 2010”

Due to the inability to have Sarajevo International Airport as the venue of the exercise, with the assistance of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina we managed to designate an alternative location within the AF BiH Barracks in Rajlovac where we planned to simulate a situation developing at the airport. Besides approving the use of their location, the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina also ensured their continuous and necessary support in terms of logistics and personnel at all levels of planning, organization and implementation of the exercise. The following is a brief version of the scenario for the exercise, which was played on two scenes. Introduction

On 14 September 2010, at around 16:50, flight controllers at Sarajevo International Airport receive a call from the pilot of flight 413, seeking permission to land. He also informs the tower about a hostage situation onboard the plane and that the plane has been hijacked by an unknown terrorist group. The tower immediately informs the Airport Security and BiH Border Police. Upon notification, the Airport Director immediately confirms this information to the Border Police Operations and Communications Center, and the latter urgently notifies SIPA’s Operations Center and BiH Operations and Communications Center – 112 about the emerging hostage situation.

Contact with the hijackers is established, all relevant institutions for terrorist-related crisis management are activated and a solution for the hostage situation is sought. Scene 1 The next day, 15 September 2010 at 08:30, the Border Police Operations/Communications Center confirms to the BiH Operations and Communications Center – 112 that a number of passengers are held in an auxiliary Airport building by armed members of an unidentified group of hijackers. They demand that the authorities release their comrades from prison and ensure their unhindered departure by a special airplane or, if their demands are not met, they will execute one passenger every hour. They are also threatening with mass poisoning. Information from the scene is scarce and incomplete, but authorized police negotiators (SIPA) are already negotiating the hijackers’ demands and trying to resolve the hostage crisis. Local security forces, a special support police unit (SIPA and Federation Police Administration), and medical and firefighting teams have arrived in the first response area and they are on stand-by waiting for the incident commander’s (OSC) call to move. BiH Border Police is at the scene, as well as the Airport security personnel. The Border Police officers are taking steps and activities at the very scene in accordance with their operating procedures. Special units and tactical teams are operationally deployed for dealing with the hostage situation. According to available information, the group of hostages from the airplane includes two patients with advanced diabetes. The incident commander demands that all institutions and services for WMD relief and recovery remain available and on stand-by. Since the place in question is an international airport, SIPA is leading the investigation and solving the hostage crisis as authorized by the Prosecutor. Scene 2 During the special forces’ intervention aiming to free the hostages during the bus transfer to the place of unhindered take-off, the other part of the group (3 persons), located in Building B of the airport, blow their cover due to anxious behavior and engage the security personnel in conflict. Two border policemen are severely injured with a cold steel weapon. On their way out from the “terminal”, the terrorists take hostages as an insurance policy and leave the rest of the passengers with an activated gas-like toxic matter (chemical poison gas).

During their attempted escape, the terrorists are captured and the hostages freed thanks to a swift action by the special forces. After that, first aid is administered and the consequences of the poison gas are dealt with (detection and identification, recovery and triage, decontamination treatment and further medical treatment with vertical transport of injured border police officers to the Clinic by an AF BiH helicopter).

Based on the assessment that the relief forces after the terrorist attack are not sufficient, through the BiH Operational/Communications Center – 112 and NATO EADRCC, the Exercise Management war-games the use and coordination of international assistance (that role was played by the CBRN Decontamination Team of the State Protection and Rescue Authority, Republic of Croatia).

During the search of the airport, the special team of the Border Police finds a timed explosive device under a parked car in the immediate vicinity of the room where the chemical agent was used. The bomb squad takes operational and technical actions to remove and destroy the explosive device.

Following the relief operation and medical treatment, the area is cleared and relevant law enforcement agencies and prosecutors initiate other investigations.

2.2. Organization of exercise personnel and resources

As envisaged in the planned design (the outline scenario for the exercise) and exercise format, an elaborate structure was set up to support the implementation and to ensure that the purpose and goals of the exercise were accomplished, i.e. to check the capability of the civilian authorities to respond to a terrorist attack and deal with its consequences with the support of the BiH Armed Forces and with international assistance.

The exercise structure was made of the following: - Exercise Management (as in the list of participants), located in the barracks; - Operational teams from BiH and neighborhood (as in the list of participants, subtitle 1.3.2.); - Communication network (BiH OC Center – 112 and NATO/EADRCC2, located in the barracks, plus

the Command and Control Center of BiH Institutions, in situ); - Incident commander (OSC) on both scenes; - DISTAFF3 (in addition to the Exercise Management on the scene); - Evaluators4 (organized to evaluate on the five (5) points where the exercise was conducted); - Support teams for the preparation and performance of the exercise (logistics, communications

and IT support, exercise security – including medical, scene settings, VIP protocol, and press and public relations).

Over 350 people participated in the preparation and implementation of the exercise from the previously mentioned ministries, administration bodies, non-governmental and international organizations (including support staff and institutions and bodies from the neighboring countries Monte Negro, Croatia and Serbia).

2 NATO EADRCC – NATO Euro Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre

3 DISTAFF – A scenario management body that provided cues to BiH OC Center 112 and OSC 4 The evaluators evaluated the course of the exercise on the following points: assembly point for all teams; Exercise Management and communication between the centers; action on Scene 1, action on Scene 2 and vertical transport, admission and triage of casualties at the Emergency Ward of the Koševo University Clinic.

Medical scenario was for the first time planned in a format designed to test the capabilities and interoperability of medical institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and their operational teams in casualty treatment following a terrorist attack involving a weapon of mass destruction. A total of 9 persons, with different injuries and conditions, were on the two scenes. Their injuries and medical conditions included the following:

- 2 hypoglycemic patients/hostages in the state of shock (Scene 1) - 2 terrorists with severe injuries on Scene 2 (one with a gunshot wound inflicted by the special

forces, the other one with tissue lacerations inflicted by a police dog); - 2 police officers at the “terminal”, Scene 2 (both with stab wounds), transported by helicopter

to the University Clinic, Sarajevo; - 3 passengers/hostages at the “terminal”, Scene 2, all three contaminated with low-

concentration “sarin” gas used by the “terrorists”);

One of the extras on Scene 2 played a terrorist who had to be eliminated by the special forces in order for them to resolve the hostage situation.

The extras (faithfully made up by the youth of the Red Cross Society, Canton Sarajevo), who played the injured and victims of contamination as in the scenario, were in need of urgent medical assistance, primary triage, decontamination and treatment in situ and at the Clinic, based on the in-situ triage results.

Financial and expert support was provided by the OSCE Mission to BiH, NATO HQ Sarajevo, NATO JFC Naples, Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) and EUFOR Command in Bosnia and Herzegovina. All the elements of the exercise, broken down by the agency and action, are presented more specifically in the exercise analysis (2.3. Exercise analysis).

2.3. Exercise analysis The exercise analysis is provided in the table below. The table contains the good and the bad aspects of the exercise and shows the key stages and functions of the process of emergency/crisis management in the event of a human-caused threat:

2.3.1. Management during the exercise 2.3.2. Command during the exercise 2.3.3. Coordination and control 2.3.4. Communications and public relations

No. MANAGEMENT STAGE POSITIVE SHORTCOMINGS – IMPROVEMENT REQUIRED

2.3.1 Management during the exercise The room where the exercise management was based was well furnished

Entry to the exercise management room was not kept under control

The initial briefing was held prior to the exercise and the participants were informed of the goal and purpose of the exercise

The scenario did not follow the timeline of the exercise – the exercise was shorter than planned

The maps and valid legislation were used

There was no precise line management, everyone had the same authority

Too much time was devoted to the visitors, in terms of explanations, clarifications, etc.

The management did not have a clear idea about the participants’ functions – the commander/manager and the deputy, and possibly the expert teams and specific situations

The operational teams were efficient and their actions were convincing

There was no unique command, the Exercise Management played the coordinating role

2.3.2 Command during the exercise The practical part of the work was impressive

The medical teams did well

During the negotiations, the psychologist left the place of negotiations earlier

The detection part was performed well

The detection capabilities, both personnel and equipment, need to be expanded in accordance with NATO CBRN standards

The negotiations were conducted well; the plans for hostage release and evacuation were in place in addition to other instructions. The time promised to the hijackers was kept.

The vehicles transporting equipment were too close to the scene, which hampered the movement of the ambulance cars

The attack on the hijackers’ bus and rescue hostages on Scene 2 was professional and efficient

It is worth considering the recommendation not to keep the hijackers together or too close to each other following the arrest

It was difficult to keep up with which team was engaged where – more comments were required from the announcer

All relief management personnel did well

The team leaders led their teams well

The MEDEVAC was carried out exceptionally well, effectively and efficiently; Teams from the Koševo Clinic were well trained and they followed the procedures

The extras were convincing In future, the extras should not be replaced in the preparation phase for the sake of smooth role-playing

The on-site commander (OSC) established good communication with the Exercise Management and teams

OSC should be more visible on the scene while receiving the teams and during the contact with team leaders for direction purposes

2.3.3 Coordination and control Exercise coordination was a result of planning and good organization of the exercise, as well as force preparation for relief actions prescribed by the law

The teams came from different institutions and from different levels of the system, which would present a challenge to organization of response (command, coordination and control) in a real-life situation; the already good organization of the exercise should be approximated more to a real-life situation.

Interoperability of different teams and coordination of their activities were efficiently achieved

The centers of other law-enforcement agencies and relief management authorities were not tested (SIPA, Border Police, Civil Protection, etc); there was only one communication center

There was no systemic solution for the issue of coordination and control

The BiH OCC 112 functioned efficiently; the flow of messages was unhindered

2.3.4 Communications and public relations Cooperation and communication with the media was established

Lack of PR officials in the Exercise Management; in a real-life situation, this function should be planned for

Helicopter crew communication lasted throughout the flight; the Koševo Clinic confirmed its own

communication procedures, as well as procedures for admission of casualties, and they were followed in an organized and efficient fashion Participation of the MoD and AF BiH in the Exercise Management confirmed the justification of military involvement for the purpose of effective civil-military coordination in protection and rescue operations

Communication between BiH OCC 112 and the C2 Center of the BiH defense institutions was somewhat slower than required; the lack of fast e-mail communication and use of required military resources prescribed by SOPs was rectified by direct telephone communication between the MoD and their representative in the Exercise Management

The exercise communication plan was applicable

Due to late delivery, members of the Exercise Management were not clear about the communication plan; a master communication plan is required for all players in situations like this

Some operational elements (police, medical teams and CBRN teams) do not have enough closed communication systems

Good communication between the teams was key to the success of the exercise

There were problems with radio communication between different elements of the exercise; technical signaling capabilities need improvement

Communication (request for use) and coordination of the use of international assistance teams was effective

It was noticed that exercise participants used different terminology in same or similar operational circumstances

Too much unnecessary and open communication between participants

3. Lessons learned

1. The Exercise Management should represent a body authorized to handle such missions in accordance with the law, or more such bodies, acting in coordination within their respective competencies.

2. The issue of single exercise manager/commander and his deputy should be resolved. 3. More training is required for members of the Exercise Management. 4. More attention is due to the negotiators (are they professionals, what sort of special training

they require, and so forth). 5. The training has to continue to maintain the current level of efficiency. 6. Professional terminology needs to be adopted and the same terms should be used in order for

all participants at all levels to speak the same language, cooperate and achieve same operational goals.

7. The response and relief plan for a terrorist attack involving CBRN (in other words, weapons of mass destruction) should contain a Standard Operating Procedure for response to CBRN incidents/accidents, which should be harmonized with the regulations, NATO SOPs and the best practices in the Euro-Atlantic region (finish the initiated activities in that direction).

8. The evaluators performed well. Within the participating organizations, evaluators of various backgrounds should be trained for good and objective evaluation of capabilities and achievement of projected goals of the organization (focus on unbiased and neutral evaluators).

9. A communication plan should be developed for participants in CBRN response and relief operations, as well as for the media.

10. Continue with the activities on capacity building for relief following terrorist attacks, especially for dealing with consequences of CBRN incidents/accidents (strengthening the structure, additional equipment modernization, training and testing the capability level through exercise).

4. Conclusions The exercise should initiate the next phase projected in the BiH Strategy for Fight against Terrorism 2010-2013 and in the Civil-Military Cooperation Plan for response to terrorist attacks and relief management.

The exercise reflects the readiness of different institutions to test their level of preparedness for handling terrorist-related situations and consequences of terrorist attacks, especially those involving CBRN. Due to good organization, dynamics, accuracy, synchronization and required synergy, the exercise was publicly recognized as successful.

All stages of preparation and implementation were executed properly and on time. The concerned institutions, administration bodies and organizations had been informed about the date of the exercise and the general scenario, so they had enough time to act, demonstrate their skills and avoid failure and mental stress usually associated with real-life emergency situations. The readiness and efficiency in response to real-life situations entail effectiveness and efficiency of the structure and its functions and a clear line of management, command and control.

The current status of organization of the security system with regard to human-caused threats / risks is a reflection of the political organization of the state and its security system. It does not sufficiently ensure the fulfillment of the previously listed requirements.

Dramatic changes are necessary to ensure a clear structure, functions, the authority of relevant institutions, administrations and organizations at different levels, as well as lines of management, command and control. Without all that the system will not be functional. The readiness to response to CBRN incidents, especially those caused by asymmetrical threats (terrorists and use of WMD) is one of the greatest challenges and priorities for leading global and regional organizations (UN, NATO, EU). The capacities to respond and to handle the consequences must be developed within several lead agencies (Prosecutor’s Office, Police, Civil protection, medical institutions, Fire fighters, technological institutes and universities – laboratories performing tissue analysis for CBRN agents, licensed by the Prosecutor’s Office, and so forth).

Even after the exercise, preparations and standardization of equipment and training for response procedures should remain among the highest priorities and as such considered by a variety of lead agencies. A country that is not prepared for this type of threat, a country that is not safe, is a source of instability for the neighboring countries and the whole region, and it must accept a more active role in preparation for response to CBRN incidents/accidents and handling the consequences. 5. Recommendations

With regard to the next phases of the implementation of the laws, strategy and plans for fight against terrorism and dealing with the consequences, the following needs to be done:

- In accordance with NATO standards, good practices and BiH legislation (Criminal Code and Law on Criminal Procedure), develop an SOP for handling consequences of terrorist attacks involving CBRN agents, along with a communication plan for the participants;

- Raise CBRN monitoring and protection, as an important security aspect, to the level of BiH; - Finish the establishment of a specialized protection and rescue unit at BiH level involving

component of CBRN protection teams; - Through further training and exercise, continue the process of equipping and training CBRN

evaluators, on-scene commanders and security forces for response to terrorism and handling consequences of CBRN incidents;

- As soon as possible, define clear analysis capabilities for possible CBRN incidents/accidents, compile a list of existing laboratories and determine which of them meet the criteria, verify them and license them for field operations and handling court evidence;

- Continue with training and exercise.

6. Attachment

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ABBREVIATIONS/ ACRONYMS

INTERPRETATION

AF Armed forces CBRN Chemical-Biological-Radiological-Nuclear CoE DAT Center of Excellence Defense Against Terrorism C2 Command and Control Center DEMA Danish Emergency Management Agency DISTAFF Directing Staff FBiH Federation Bosnia and Herzegovina EADDRCC Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre EU European Union EUFOR European Union Force HQ Headquarter ID Intensive Dialogue IPAP Individual Partnership Action Plan IPP Individual Partnership Plan IT Information technology JFC Joint Force Command MAP Membership Action Plan MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation MOD Ministry of Defense NATO North-Atlantic Treaty Organization OC Operation Center OCC 112 Operational Communication Center 112 OSC Incident Commander OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe RS Republic of Srpska SIPA State Investigation and Protection Agency SOP Standard Operating Procedure UN United Nation

PHOTOGRAPHS FROM THE EXERCISE

Scene 1 – the release of hostages Scene 1 – terrorist arrest

Scene 2 – care of causalities Scene 2 – resolve hostage crisis and the arrest of terrorist

Scene 2 – medical treatment at Scene 2 – medical treatment at

primary point primary point

Scene 2 – search service of Red Cross Scene 2 – vertical Medical Evacuation to

in action Clinical University Sarajevo

Scene 2 – decontamination of the rescuers Scene 2 – detection and elimination car bomb

STRUCTURE OF THE EXERCISE

Exercise Management

OC K2 Institution of

Defense (for support)

DISTAFF, give tasks

from scenario

Scene 2

EVALUATOR

EVALUATORS

EVALUATOR

Scene 1

OSC

BiH Teams Team(s) of International help

EVALUATORS

EVALUATOR

EVALUATORS

EVALUATORS EVALUATORS EVALUATORS

OCC BiH- 112

NATO EADRCC (Coordination of

International assistance)