LINA JOY — UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

IN THE FEDERAL COURT, MALAYSIA

AT PUTRAJAYA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 01-2-2006 (W)

Lina Joy

(Appellant)

vs

1. Islamic Religious Council of the Federal Territory

2. Government of Malaysia

3. Director of National Registration

(Respondents)

JUDGMENT OF THE MAJORITY

[Except Richard Malanjum, the judge in the minority]

1. The appellant was given leave to appeal to this court on the following questions:

a. whether the National Registration Department (‘NRD’) is entitled in law to

impose a requirement that the appellant produce a certificate or a declaration

or an order from the Syariah court that she has apostatised before the word

"Islam" in the applicant's identity card (‘IC’) is deleted?

b. whether the NRD has correctly construed its powers under the National

Registration Regulation 1990 especially Rules 4 and 14, to impose the

requirement as stated above when it is not expressly provided for in the 1990

rules?

c. whether the case of Soon Singh a/l Bikar Singh vs Kedah Islamic Welfare

Body, Malaysia (PERKIM) (1999) 1 MLJ 489 was rightly decided when it

adopted the implied jurisdiction theory propounded in the case of Md Hakim

Lee vs Federal Territory Islamic Religious Council, Kuala Lumpur (1998) 1

MLJ 681 and not following the case of Ng Wan Chan v Federal Territory

Islamic Religious Council, Kuala Lumpur & Anor (No.2) (1991) 3 MLJ 487

and Lim Chan Seng vs Director of the Department of Islamic Religion,

Penang and 1 other case (1996) 3 CLJ 231 which declared that if no express

jurisdiction is conferred on the Syariah court, the civil courts will retain their

jurisdiction?

2. Appellant was born a Muslim. Because she intended to marry a Christian man,

Appellant made application to NRD on 21 February 1997 to change her name from

Azlina binti Jailani to Lina Lelani on the reason that she had already embraced

Christianity. This application was not approved by the Third Respondent (Director of

National Registration). On 15 March 1999 the Appellant applied once again to change

her name by this time from Azlina binti Jailani to Lina Joy. In her statutory

declaration, he Appellant once again said she wanted her name to be changed because

she had already embraced Christianity. On 2 August 1999, the Appellant, acting on

the advice of an officer at NRD, made another statutory declaration in which she gave

the reason of her wish to changed her name as deliberately choosing that name and

not because she changed her religion. In November 1999, the Appellant was given her

new Identity Card but the NRD inserted the word ‘Islam’ at the front of her IC and

her previous name a the back of that card. On 3 January 2000, the Appellant applied

to the NRD to have the word ‘Islam’ deleted. This application was rejected and the

Appellant was told that her application was incomplete without an order from the

Syariah Court which stated that she had already left the religion of Islam. The

Appellant then made application to the High Court for several declarations against the

Federal Territory Islamic Religious Council and the Government of Malaysia. The

Declarations applied for were based on infringements of her basic right to the freedom

of religion as guaranteed by Article 11(1) of the Federal Constitution. Nevertheless,

the High Court rejected that application. The Appellant then appealed to the Court of

Appeal. The Court of Appeal by majority rejected her appeal. The Appellant then

made application for leave to appeal to this court and her application was granted on

the questions as stated at the beginning of this judgment.

3. At the Court of Appeal the parties agreed (and this is clear from the grounds of

judgments of the majority and dissent) that only one issue needed to be considered by

the court – namely, whether the NRD was right, under the law, when it rejected the

Appellant’s application to delete the word ‘Islam’ from her IC and to require a

certificate or order of apostasy from the Syariah Court beforehand. The majority

judgment of that court decided that the NRD was not wrong under administration law

when rejecting the appellant’s application; (2005) 6 MLJ at page 213. The Appellant

in her application to NRD stated that there was an error in her IC and the said error

was her religion was described as ‘Islam’. Hence the majority judgment was of the

view that the Appellant’s statement had indirectly meant that the Appellant said she

had already left Islam. Because of that, NRD could require the Appellant, under Rule

4(c)(x) of the 1990 Regulation, to produce documentary evidence to support the

accuracy of her claim that she was no longer a Muslim. The majority judgment also

ruled that whether a person had left Islam is a question which is related to Islamic

law, and that question is not within the NRD’s jurisdiction which was not equipped or

qualified to decide that matter. Because of that, the NRD maintained a policy to

require confirmation by the religious authority before the NRD acted to delete the

word ‘Islam’ from a Muslim’s IC. This policy is completely reasonable, according to

the majority judgment; (2005) 6 MLJ at page 209.

4. In this court, Appellant’s lawyer argued that only the 1990 Regulation formed the

written source of powers under which the NRD could require an apostasy order.

According to the lawyer, the 1990 Regulation did not contain provision which

permitted the NRD to require that documents from the Appellant. The lawyer then

went on to stress that the document specified under Rule 14 was only a statutory

declaration. Therefore, by requesting the production of a document and that document

was however not provided for or permitted by Rule 14, the NRD acted ultra vires its

powers under the 1990 Regulation. This, the lawyer argued, is not valid under

administration law. That lawyer then argued that the majority judgment should have

decided that way and their failure to do so should become the reasons upon which this

court, as an Appellate Court, must set aside that judgment.

5. The 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ lawyers stressed that the Appellant’s application was

to delete the word ‘Islam’ from her IC. Therefore, that application falls under Rule

14(1)(c) which is to correct the details of her religion. Rule 14(1) reads:

(1) A person registered under these Regulations who—

(a) Changes his name;

(b) Acquires the citizenship of Malaysia or is deprived o his citizenship of

Malaysia; or

(c) Has in his possession an identity card containing any particular, other than

his address, which is to his knowledge incorrect,

shall forthwith report the fact to the nearest registration office and apply for a

replacement identity card with the correct particulars.”

The lawyer then referred to Rule 4 which reads:

Any person who is required to register under regulation 3(1) or 3(2) or to re-register

under regulation 18 or 28 or who applies for a replacement identity card under

regulation 13 or 14, shall—

(a) …

(b) …

(c) give the following particulars to the registration officer as aforesaid,

namely:

(i) his name as appearing in his Certificate of Birth or such other

document or, if he is known by different name, each of such names, in

full;

(ii) his previous identify card number, if any;

(iii) the full address of his place of residence within Malaysia;

(iv) his race;

(iva) his religion (only for Muslims);

(v) his place of birth;

(vi) his date of birth and sex;

(vii) his physical abnormalities, if any;

(viii) his status as a citizen of Malaysia or other citizenship status;

(ix) such other particulars as the registration officer may generally or

in any particular case consider necessary; and

(x) produce such documentary evidences the registration officer may

consider necessary to support the accuracy of any particulars

submitted.”

The lawyer then stressed that Rule 4(c)(ix) and (x) are the powers which justified the

NRD introducing the condition of the need for apostasy certificate.

6. Regarding these arguments, I agree with the majority agreement that Rule 14(1) is

related to:

(a) change of name under paragraph (a); and

(b) to correct particulars which are not true under paragraph (c).

The Appellant’s case falls under the particulars which are not true according to

paragraph (c). Nonetheless, Rule 14 did not state what should be given in the cases of

untrue particulars but Rule 14(1) certainly requires the Appellant to report facts

regarding untrue particulars to the nearest Registration Office and to apply for a

replacement IC which contains the correct particulars. When it comes to this, Rule 4

becomes relevant because that rule clearly states that whoever applies for a

replacement IC under Rule 13 or 14 shall follow Rule 4. Based on that, I agree with

the 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ lawyers that the NRD has justification under Rule

4(c)(x) to require confirmation from the Islamic religious authority regarding the

Appellant’s apostasy or her leaving of Islam. Based on that, I agree with the majority

judgment which states that the Appellant in her 3rd application stating the error in her

IC is regarding the statement of her religion as ‘Islam’ and the Appellant wants that

error to be corrected by removing the word ‘Islam’ from that IC. This is the same as

the Appellant saying that she has already left Islam. Therefore, the NRD can,

following Rule 4(c)(x), require the Appellant to produce documentary evidence which

supports the accuracy of her insistence that she is no longer a Muslim. I also agree

that if the NRD receives a person’s admission that he has already left Islam based on

declaration made by him then the NRD took the risk when approving, erroneously,

that a person as non-Muslim while according to the Islamic laws that person still has

not left Islam. This would also make it easy for those who were born and educated as

a Muslim but has the attitude of apathy or indifference towards Islam be classified as

non-Muslims solely to avoid being penalized for offences under Islamic laws. All

these would result in disparagement from the Muslim society. It is because of these

reasons, same as the views of the majority judgment, that I believe, the NRD adopted

the policy that statutory declaration alone is not enough to enable the word ‘Islam’ be

removed from the IC of a Muslim. This is because the matter of leaving Islam is a

matter which is related to the Islamic laws and because of that the NRD adopted the

policy which requires confirmation from the Islamic religious authority before the

NRD could act to delete the word ‘Islam’ from a Muslim’s IC. Based on the

considerations as enumerated above I agree with the majority judgment that rightly

the NRD policy is something which is completely reasonable.

7. Regarding this NRD policy, the Appellant also argued that by requiring the apostasy

certificate, the NRD has delegated its power and duties under Rule 14 to a 3rd party

so that the 3rd party would decide whether to approve the application to delete the

word ‘Islam’. This, according to the Appellant, cannot happen except when being

permitted by the relevant laws. Hence, that NRD policy without permission under

Rule 14 conflicts with the laws. Then the Appellant’s lawyer argued that the court’s

job is not to confirm that a policy is reasonable; but what the court has failed to

appreciate is that such matters are for the legislators and not for the court to decide

whether reference should be made to another religious body.

8. On that argument by the Appellant, I am of the view that, as argued by the 2nd and

3rd Respondents’ lawyers, that Rule 4(c)(x) clearly gives the power to the

Registration Officer to require documentary evidence which is deemed important to

support the accuracy of any particulars which has been put forward. Therefore the

reference to an authority of Islamic law is provided for by the laws and hence it is not

wrong under the laws as argued by the Appellant. The reference does not mean that

the Syariah Court is asked to decide whether to permit the application to delete the

word ‘Islam’. The Syariah Court is merely asked to confirm whether the Appellant is

of the religion of Islam or not based on Islamic laws. Guided by this decision then, it

is within the NRD’s discretion to decide whether the approval could be given to delete

the word ‘Islam’ or not.

9. Appellant’s lawyer has also referred the case of Ismail bin Suppiah vs Director of

National Registration (R-1-24-31 year 1995) to this court. According to that lawyer,

both the Ismail case and the case under appeal at this court are about:

(a) change of name because of change of religion;

(b) powers of NRD under Rule 14;

(c) a certificate from the Religious Council as a pre-condition before the NRD

could consider the application under Rule 14;

(d) the freedom of a person to choose religion guaranteed under Article 11 of

the Federal Constitution;

(e) third party cannot decide on what religion a person should choose; and

(f) Rule 14 did not introduce a condition that a certificate to be obtained from

the Religious Council.

The lawyer then showed that I was the judge in the Ismail case and I had dismissed

the NRD’s decision which required a certificate from the Religious Council as ultra

vires Rule 14.

9.1. The Plaintiff in the Ismail case was a Muslim since birth. The Plaintiff

applied so that his Muslim name as stated in his IC be changed to a Hindu

name on the reason that, as stated in his statutory declaration, he had

already left Islam and embraced Hinduism. NRD was insistent on requiring

the approval of the Johor Department of Islamic Religion or the Grand Qadi

of Johor about the Plaintiff’s action in leaving Islam. The NRD still refused

to approve the Plaintiff’s application even though the Plaintiff’s lawyer had

already reported to the Grand Qadi of Johor about the fact that the Plaintiff

had already left Islam. Hence the NRD referred the matter to and for the

action of the Johor Department of Islamic Religion. Because of that the

Plaintiff applied and obtained from Kuala Lumpur High Court a declaration

that the approval of the Johor Department of Islamic Religion was not

required and that any reference by the NRD to that Department was ultra

vires Rule 14, the 1990 Regulation, s 141(2) of the Administration of

Islamic Law Enactment 1978 Johor State, and Article 11(1) of the Federal

Constitution. The Plaintiff also applied and obtained an order so that the

NRD issued temporary IC with the Plaintiff’s new name.

9.2. Regarding the Appellant’s argument that the NRD did not appeal against

the High Court’s decision in that Ismail case and because of that the NRD

could not take a stand in this appeal which conflicts with the High Court

decision.

9.3. The majority’s judgment stressed that the Ismail case was a case which

involved application to change name in the IC whereas the Appellant’s

appeal in this court is to delete the word ‘Islam’ from her IC. Because there

was no reasons for judgment in that Ismail case, the reasons for the High

Court in making such a decision could not be known. Hence the Court of

Appeal only managed to make a few guesses regarding why I decided like

that in the Ismail case. Those guesses originate from saying that I looked at

the Ismail case from the angle that it should be decided in the context of

Johor laws. I was said to have perhaps held the view that the NRD was

wrong when required the consent of the Johor Department of Islamic

Religion before the Plaintiff could leave Islam whereas according to the

Johor Enactment the correct authority was the Qadi under s 141(2). Section

141 of the Johor Enactment says:

Section 141

(1) Whoever entered anybody to embrace Islam shall immediately

report the matter to the Qadi by giving evidence which is required for

registration.

(2) Whoever found that a Muslim has already left Islam shall

immediately report to the Qadi regarding his decisioin to leave Islam

by giving evidence required and the Qadi shall declare that the person

has left Islam, and shall be registered.

9.4. It is also the guess of the majority judgment that I have held the view that

NRD had misunderstood s 141 because at para 10 of the affidavit of NRD

dated 28.7.1995, the NRD officer seemed to have said that sub-section (2)

only applied to a person who previously embraced Islam under sub-section

(1). The majority judgment also guessed that I might have held the view,

from the clear words of sub-section (2), that in Johor, the Qadi himself also

did not have the right to give or not give consent to a Muslim to leave

Islam. That matter is left only to the relevant person. The Qadi’s job was

only to announce the facts of a person leaving Islam and then register it.

That job was only mechanical. Deducing from this, I was guessed to hold

the view that:

(a) In Johor, a Muslim was free to leave Islam and he does that by only

saying so;

(b) no approval or determination by any religious authority was

required;

(c) the NRD should have accepted the Plaintiff’s statutory declaration

which stated that the Plaintiff had already left Islam as the proof that

the Plaintiff was no longer a Muslim; and

(d) the NRD should have approved the Plaintiff’s application to change

his name.

9.5. From the guesses as enumerated above, it is clear that the Ismail case

should be analyzed in the context of Johor laws. S 141(2) of the

Administration of Islamic Law Enactment 1978 Johor State clearly showed

that even the Qadi had no right to give or not give consent for the leaving of

Islam. Hence the guess of the majority judgment was correct when it is said

that because of the clarity of the words in s 141(2), the NRD should have

accepted the Plaintiff’s statutory declaration which stated that the Plaintiff

had left Islam as the proof that the Plaintiff was no longer a Muslim and the

NRD should have approved the Plaintiff’s application to change his name.

It should be stressed at this stage that the above enumeration shows that

Article 121(1A) and item 1, list 2, Schedule 9 of the Federal Constitution

did not arise in the Ismail case.

10. The next issue argued by the Appellant is whether the Federal Territory Syariah Court

had the jurisdiction to decide on apostasy. Appellant argued that the NRD had so far

taken the same position regarding the Appellant’s various applications i.e. the

Appellant must first obtain an apostasy order from the Syariah Court or, as later said

by the Director in his affidavit, from any other Islamic authority. The Appellant also

argued that the Administration of Islamic Laws Act (Federal Territory) 1993 (Act

505) did not have provision regarding apostasy. The Syariah Court or any other

Islamic body was not given the jurisdiction in apostasy matter and neither was any

power given to any authority under that Act to issue apostasy order. This was the

situation at all time which is material in the Appellant’s case from February 1997 to

January 2000 and until today. According to the Appellant again, section 46(2)(b) Act

505, as found today, listed matters in which the Syariah Court could exercise its civil

jurisdiction and under this section the matter of apostasy is not found under that list.

The majority judgment accepted that Act 505 did not contain any provision regarding

apostasy. That judgment then considered the Appellant’s argument that the Federal

Court’s decision in the case of Soon Singh (supra) had shaped the procedure followed

by the NRD in requiring the confirmation from the Syariah Court before the

department accepts the fact that a Muslim has left Islam. The decision in the case of

Soon Singh, according to the majority judgment, is and still authoritative in

administration laws, from the angle of that decision, the NRD acted correctly when

named the Syariah Court as the authority which could issue apostasy confirmation and

the NRD will accept the confirmation as proof that the Appellant is no longer a

Muslim. The majority judgment, nonetheless, held the view that the question of

whether the decision in Soon Singh was correct or not was not important because the

appeal before it was already agreed by the parties to the appeal to be deemed to be

about the correctness of the NRD decision according to the administration laws and

no longer about constitutional questions. Therefore the Appellant argued in the Court

of Appeal that the NRD’s action in introducing the condition that the order of the

Syariah Court should be obtained was an action which was not reasonable according

to the case of Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp (1948) 1

KB 223. This was because, according to the Appellant, that order was impossible to

obtain because of the lack of provision about apostasy in Act 505. At this stage, I

should state my agreement with the part of the majority agreement which states that

what he NRD wanted was a confirmation from someone who has the power to make it

and if the NRD acted in accordance with that confirmation, then the NRD was free

from any mistake or from being faulted by the public in a matter which is so

important and sensitive. Hence the majority judgment decided that the unwillingness

of the NRD to act without the confirmation form the Islamic religious authority was

reasonable. The judgment also decided that the question of whether a Muslim was an

apostate or not was a question which was related to Islamic laws. And if the court

decided that the NRD’s unwillingness was not reasonable, then it would mean that the

court required the NRD to accept the fact that according to Islamic laws a Muslim

could be considered by the world as having left Islam and was no longer a Muslim

when that person said he had already left Islam.

10.1. Regarding the majority’s judgment that the NRD’s action was reasonable

when the NRD required a certificate / declaration / order from the Syariah

Court which stated that the Appellant was an apostate, I wish to add by

stressing that item 1, list 2 in Schedule 9 of the Federal Constitution

provided that, among others, that the Syariah Courts shall have jurisdiction

only over persons who practices Islam and only regarding matters which are

included in that paragraph (item 1) and one of the matters in that paragraph

is “Islamic laws”. In relation to this, Article 74(4) of the Federal

Constitution stressed that the width of the general expressions in the

Schedule 9 could not be deemed to be limited by the specific expressions

found in that Schedule 9. Article 74(4) is as follows:

Article 74

(4) Where the general as well as specific expressions are used in

describing any of the matter enumerated in the Lists set out in the

Schedule 9 the generality of the former shall not be taken to be limited

by the latter.

As such it was reasonable for the NRD to introduce those conditions

because this matter of apostasy, according to the majority judgment (and I

agree with it), is a question which is related to Islamic laws and as stated by

the Supreme Court in the case of Dalip Kaur vs District Police Officer,

District Police Station, Bukit Mertajam & Anor (1992) 1 MLJ 1 that the

answer to the question of whether a person is a Muslim or has already left

Islam before he passed away, is included in the world of Syariah laws

which require serious considerations and due interpretation based on those

laws. In this situation, I agree with the 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ lawyer’s

argument that the condition that a certificate or declaration or order from

the Syariah Court that the Appellant has become apostate is not a decision

which is unreasonable until so excessive in deviating from logic or accepted

moral standard such that no rational person who has concentrated his

thinking to the question which needs to be decided could reach that

decision.

11. Regarding the 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ lawyer’s argument that the NRD is entitled

to enter the word ‘Islam’ at the front of the Appellant’s IC in November 1999 because

of amendments to Rule 4(c)(iva) and Rule 5(2) have been made effective

retrospectively to 1 October 1999 and this retrospective effectiveness was allowed

because the amendments were in the nature of procedure, the Appellant argued that so

long as the amendment was not gazetted the executive (such as the NRD) could not

apply that amendment and act on it. The Appellant brought attention to the fact that

her application for IC was made on 25 October 1999 whereas on 1 October 1999 that

amendment was not gazetted. The Appellant stressed that the real state of the laws at

that time was that the Appellant was entitled to a new IC with the name Lina Joy

without any statement about religion placed on that IC. That amendment according to

the Appellant could not be made effective retrospectively because it affected the

existing right of the Appellant.

11.1. On the issue of retrospective effectiveness I wish to refer to the case of Sim

Seoh Beng @ Sin Sai Beng & Anor vs Tunas Muda Sungai Ara

Cooperative Limited (1995) 1 CLJ 491 which states that the correct test to

be applied to determine whether a written law is prospective or

retrospective is to first ascertain whether it would affect substantive rights if

applied retrospectively. If it would, then, prima facie that law must be

construed as having prospective effect only, unless there is a clear

indication in the enactment that it is in any event to have retrospectivity.

The Federal Court in the case of Lim Phin Khian vs Kho Su Ming (1996) 1

MLJ 1 has said that the question that falls for determination is whether the

prima facie presumption against retrospectivity has been displaced by

contrary Parliament intention, and if so, to what extent. The case of

Attorney General vs Bernazar (1960) 3 AIIER 97 says but it is different

when the statute is retrospective either because it contains clear words to

that effect or because it deals with matters of procedures only; for then

Parliament has shown an intention that the Act should operate on pending

proceedings, and the Court of Appeal is entitled to give effect to this

retrospective intent as well as court of 1st instance. In the case of Yew Bon

Teow vs Mara Bus Vehicle (1983) 1 MLJ 1 the Privy Council has said that

the question of whether a statute is to be construed in a retrospective sense,

and if so to what extent, depends on the intention of the legislature as

expressed in the wording of the statute, having regard to the normal canons

of construction and to the relevant provisions of any interpretation statute. I

wish to also refer to section 19 of the Interpretation Act 1948 and 1967

which states:

Section 19

(1) The commencement of an Act or subsidiary legislation shall be the

date provided in or under the Act or subsidiary legislation or, where no

date is so provided, the date immediately following the date of its

publication in pursuance of section 18.

(2) Acts and subsidiary legislation shall come into operation

immediately on the expiration of the day preceding their

commencement.

(3) Notwithstanding section 2(1) and (2) and section 65(2), subsections

(1) and (2) shall apply—

(a) to all Acts enacted after the 31st December 1968 including

Acts which amend laws enacted before the commencement of

Part I of this Act; and

(b) to all subsidiary legislation made after the 31st December

1968, whether made under a law enacted before or after the

commencement of Part I of this Act whether or not that law has

been revised under the Revision of Laws Act 1968.

In the appeal in this court there is clearly a direction (as mentioned in the

case of Sim Seoh Beng) that amendments to 1990 Regulation, except for

Rule 19, shall be deemed to have come into operation on 1 October 1990).

Hence amendments to Rule 3, Rule 5 and 1st schedule is effective

retrospectively. Therefore the NRD’s action to issue the IC with addition of

the word ‘Islam’ is valid legally.

12. The Bar Council, HAKAM, and Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism,

Christianity, Hinduism and Sikhism, as amici curiae, have in turn given their

respective opinions which are briefly as follows:

(a) if a person no longer profess Islam, then he could no longer be under the

jurisdiction of the Syariah Court. If he is said to be still under the Syariah

Court’s jurisdiction then that act is an invasion on his human rights under

Article 11(1) and 8, of the Federal Constitution;

(b) apostasy is not included in item 1, list 2 of Schedule 9 of the Federal

Constitution;

(c) apostasy confirmation is clearly in conflict with the provision of basic

freedom under Article 11;

(d) the Appellant’s declaration that she is a Christian means that she professes

Christianity and this means that she could no longer be regarded as a Muslim

or a person professing Islam;

(e) Chua H in the case of Re Mohamed Said Nabi, deceased (1965 (3) MLJ

121) has referred to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary for the meaning of

‘profess’. That dictionary states: “profess” means ‘to affirm one’s faith in or

allegiance to (a religion, principles, God or Saint etc)’. This means the NRD

was not entitled to introduce the condition that the Appellant produces a

certificate because the Syariah Courts have no jurisdiction over the Appellant

who no longer professes Islam. The Appellant still lives and has already made

statutory declaration and affidavits which show that she professes Christianity.

Hence, there is no need for any Islamic authority to decide whether she is an

apostate or not;

(f) The Malaysian Government has represented at the international level and to

her citizens, that she subscribes to the norms of freedom of comprehensive

faith, thought and conscience as declared under Article 18 of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights. Hence the Appellant has legitimate expectation

that the Government of Malaysia and her agencies would not act in conflict

against that representation;

(g) The Appellant has been, because of her application to delete the word

‘Islam’ was disallowed, denied her rights to marry someone who professes

Christianity or to marry someone according to her wish. This is a denial of her

rights under Article 5(1) of the Federal Constitution.

13. ABIM, Muslim Lawyers Association and the Malaysian Syarie Lawyers Association,

also as amici curiae, have in turn gave their respective opinions which are briefly as

follows:

(a) Article 11 of the Federal Constitution used the words ‘profess and

practice’. Hence, the matter of leaving Islam should follow the related laws. A

person could leave Islam but has to follow its procedures. If follows the whims

and fancies of a person then the ummah and Islam would be in chaos.

Therefore the confirmation by the Syariah Court is in accordance with the

requirements of Syariah laws and hence it cannot be in conflict with Article

11;

(b) Regarding the equal rights under Article 8 of the Federal Constitution,

Article 8 is subject to provisions which regulate personal law.

14. Regarding the views at paragraphs (12) and (13) above I agree with the views at

paragraph (13). In the appeal before this court now, there is no firm determination that

the Appellant no longer professes Islam. So, the statement that the Appellant could no

longer be under the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court because the Syariah Court only

has jurisdiction over a person professing Islam cannot / should not be stressed. The

manner for a person to leave a religion must follow the rules or laws or practices

which have been fixed by that religion itself. The Appellant is not prevented from

marrying. The freedom of religion under Article 11 of the Federal Constitution

requires the Appellant to follow practices or rules of Islam especially regarding

leaving that religion. When the requirements of Islam are followed and the Islamic

authority confirms her apostasy then the Appellant could profess Christianity. In other

words a person cannot enter and leave a religion as she likes it. When she professes a

religion, common sense itself requires that she follows the practices and laws of that

religion.

15. The Appellant then argues that the NRD could not act in a way which undermines the

rights to freedom of religion of every citizen under Article 11 of the Federal

Constitution or in a discriminatory way violates the guarantees under Article 8(2) of

the Federal Constitution which prohibits any discrimination on grounds of religion.

The Appellant stressed that Article 11 gives her unconditional freedom to leave Islam

and become a Christian. According to her that freedom cannot be lawfully restricted

or regulated by any laws such as the Administration of Islamic Laws Act (Federal

Territory) 1993 by the Syariah Court, or any other authority. Hence, the Appellant

applied that the High Court confirms that her act of leaving Islam was proper and

valid under Article 11 of the Federal Constitution. This, stressed the lawyer for the

Malaysian Muslim Lawyers Association, assumes that the Civil Court has jurisdiction

to make the declaration applied by the Appellant (hence it raises the 3rd question).

15.1. The Appellant’s lawyer then brought this Court’s attention to the

conflicting decisions of the High Court. Cases such as Ng Wan Chan v

Federal Territory Religious Council (No. 2) (supra) and Lim Chan Seng v

Director of the Department of Islamic Religion (supra) decided that

without jurisdiction which is clearly given to the Syariah Court on a

particular matter, the civil court should maintain its jurisdiction on that

matter. However, the case of Md. Hakim Lee v Federal Territory Islamic

Religious Council (supra) put forward the theory of implied jurisdiction.

According to that theory, it is sufficient if the matter has been specified

for Syariah Court under item 1, list 2, in Schedule 9 of the Federal

Constitution. According to that lawyer again, the case of Soon Singh

(supra) has resolved that conflict by applying the theory of implied

jurisdiction as put forward by the case of Md. Hakim Lee. The

Appellant’s lawyer then referred to the decisions of the Federal Court in

cases of Penang Islamic Religious Council v Shaik Zolkaffily (2003 (3)

MLJ 705) and Azizah binti Shaik Ismail v Fatimah binti Shaik Ismail

(2004 (2) MLJ 529) which followed the decision of the Soon Singh case.

Be that as it may, the lawyer firmly argues that the Soon Singh case is

wrong in law because:

(a) that decision failed to consider that all state Islamic law enactments

creates 2 different entities, i.e. Religious Council and Syariah Court. In

those enactments, the Religious Council plays the role of

administration whereas the Syariah Court is a judicial body. That

lawyer later referred to Act 505 which through sections 24, 7 and 10

provided matters of establishment, membership, functions, duties and

activities of the Religious Council whereas section 46 provided for the

Syariah Court’s jurisdiction. The Soon Singh case (supra), says that

lawyer, made a mistake because of not distinguishing between the

Council and the Syariah Court. Due to the above error the Soon Singh

case is accordingly wrong when it considered that Syariah Court

anywhere is the authority which manages and deals with matters of

embracing Islam. Sections 139-141 of the Kedah state Enactment refer

to the Council as the authority which handles matters of embracing

Islam. So are sections 77-89 of the Penang Enactment which refers to

the Registry of Embracing Islam and section 82 shows that it is the

Council which keeps the record of those embracing Islam. This is also

the same for Act 505 which through sections 85-95 explains that it is

the Council which handles matters of embracing Islam. Hence, the

lawyer stressed, the statement by the Soon Singh case tht all state

enactments give jurisdiction to the Syariah Court in matters related to

the embracing of Islam is clearly wrong.

(b) Authorities used by the case of Soon Singh as the basis for the

implied jurisdiction theory does not support its decision. If those

authorities are studied, the authority “Craies on Statute Law (7th

edition) page 112 actually states that express and unambiguous

language are needed to alter the jurisdiction of courts of law. The

authority case Albon v. Pyke (1842 (4) M&G 421) shows that Tindal

CJ at para 424 says that the general rule undoubtedly is that the

superior courts’ jurisdiction is not taken away, except by express

words or necessary implication.

(c) The errors of the Soon Singh case as enumerated in paragraph

15(a)-(b) above has caused the Soon Singh case to summarise that the

Syariah Court’s jurisdiction does not need to be given by laws but

sufficient by referring to the state list in the Schedule 9 as done by the

Md Hakim Lee case. This, says the lawyer, contradicts the principle of

creating laws by the legislator and the rule that a written law must be

made by the legislator and it cannot be effective until that law is made

know by gazette. According to the lawyer again, the effect of the Soon

Sing case is that a law is regarded as already exists even though the

matter is only found in item 1, list 2, Schedule 9 of the Federal

Constitution and the legislator has not made laws on that matter. The

Soon Sing case has failed to identify the difference between power to

make laws on a matter and the making of the laws itself. The lawyer

then quoted what the Supreme Court of India says in the case of

Calcutta Gas Co v State of Weat Bengal (AIR 1962 SC 1044 at 1049)

i.e. the power to legislate is given to the appropriate Legislatures by

Article 246 of the Indian Constitution. The entries in the 3 lists are

only legislative heads or fields of legislation: they demarcate the area

over which the appropriate Legislatures can operate. Hence, the

Appellant’s lawyer stressed, the decision of Soon Singh that the right

to make law on a matter is the same as making the laws itself should be

rejected as bad precedent.

(d) Section 67 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act 1967

declares that every Act of Parliament or State Enactment is an Act or

Enactment for general and it could be given judiciary notice. The case

of Soon Singh has already exempted the need to publish the laws or the

process of making laws by the stage of draft laws and ends with the

King’s recognition. Hence the Soon Singh case should be corrected

immediately, as pressed by the Appellant’s lawyer. In proceeding with

his arguments on this Soon Singh case, the lawyer quoted the

observation by Hashim Yeop Sani in the case of Dalip Kaur a/p

Gurbox Singh vs District Police Officer, District Police Station, Bukit

Mertajam & Anor (supra) which among other things, says that the new

clause (1A) of Article 121 of the constitution effective from 10 June

1988 has taken away the civil courts’ jurisdiction in respect of matters

within the Syariah Court’s jurisdiction. But that clause does not take

away the jurisdiction of civil court to interpret any written laws of the

states enacted for the administration of Islamic law. For that lawyer,

that observation clearly showed that the civil court should decide

whether a matter is within its jurisdiction or the jurisdiction of the

Syariah Court.

15.2. The lawyer for the 2nd and 3rd Respondents however took the position

that the Md Hakim Lee case was decided correctly. Hence, he was of the

view that the cases of Soon Singh and Shaik Zolkaffily contain the correct

principles regarding the jurisdiction of Syariah Court.

15.3. 1st Respondent’s lawyer referred to the implication word as found in

“Bernion’s Statutory Interpretation 2nd Edition” at page 362 i.e.

Implication may arise from the language used, from the context, or from

the application of some external rule. The that lawyer stressed that

because Act 505 contained provisions regarding matters related to the

embracing of Islam as under the Syariah Court’s jurisdiction (s 87 and s

91 read with s 46(2)(b) Act 505) then by implication, matters regarding

apostasy and leaving Islam are also within the Syariah Court’s

jurisdiction.

15.4. In the Soon Singh case, the Appellant applied so that the High Court issue

declaration that he was not a Muslim. The lawyer for the Department of

Religion of Islam Kedah (JAIK) made opposition early applied so that the

Appellant’s application be rejected because the High Court had no

jurisdiction on matter that a person is not Muslim. That matter is under the

Syariah Court’s jurisdiction. The High Court agreed with the lawyer of

JAIK and rejected the Appellant’s application who later appealed to the

Federal Court. In its judgment the Federal Court said that the question

before it was regarding the jurisdiction of Syariah Courts under Article

121(1A) of the Federal Constitution. The Federal Constitution also

admitted that there were no express provisions in the Kedah Enactment to

deal with the question of apostasy. After that the Federal Court referred to

Craies on Statute Law, the case of Albon v Pyke, Bennion’s Statutory

Interpretation and the case of Dalip Kaur.

15.5. Regarding the Appellant’s lawyer’s criticism on the reference made by the

Federal Court to Craies on Statute Law and the case of Albon v Pyke, I

only need to stress that Tindal CJ also used words of necessary

implication. Hence the Federal Court was of the view that it was logical

for the Syariah Court, which has been clearly given jurisdiction to deal

with matters related to the embracing of Islam do, by necessary

implication, also have jurisdiction to deal with matters related with a

Muslim’s leaving of Islam or apostasy. I do not see any defect in that

reasoning of the Federal Court. Therefore I have no choice except to

answer the 3rd question by saying that the Soon Singh case was decided

correctly.

16. Like already enumerated at the previous paragraph, the Soon Singh case clearly

showed that the matter of apostasy is within the Syariah Court’s jurisdiction. At

paragraph (10) I also referred to item 1, list 2, Schedule 9 of the Federal Constitution

to show that the important word used there was ‘matters’ and because ‘Islamic Law’

is one of the ‘matters’ which is found in item 1 and when read in the background of

the Dalip Kaur case, then it is very clear that rightly the matter of apostasy is a matter

which is related with Islamic Law and clearly therefore it is within the Syariah

Court’s jurisdiction and because of Article 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution, then

the Civil Courts cannot interfere in the matter.

17. A few arguments are also made about a few of the Appellant’s rights under the

Federal Constitution. Also it has been argued that the need to produce

certificate/confirmation from the Syariah Court/Authority to confirm that the

Appellant is an apostate is in conflict with the freedom under Article 11 of the Federal

Constitution. According to that argument Article 11 of the Federal Constitution gives

freedom to the Appellant to profess whichever religion and to leave from any religion.

Nobody and nothing could stop her from doing so. Any action stopping the Appellant

from doing as she likes in choosing religion or to leave from any religion is in conflict

with Article 11 of the Federal Constitution.

17.1. Article 11 of the Federal Constitution is as follows:

Article 11

(1) Every person has the right to profess and practice his religion and,

subject to Clause (4), to propagate it.

(2) No person shall be compelled to pay any tax the proceeds of which are

specially allocated in whole or in part for the purposes of a religion other

than his own.

(3) Every religious group has the right—

(a) to manage its own religious affairs;

(b) to establish and maintain institutions for religious or charitable

purposes; and

(c) to acquire and own property and hold and administer it in

accordance with law.

(4) State law and in respect of the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur,

Labuan and Putrajaya, federal law may control or restrict the propagation

of any religious doctrine or belief among persons professing the religion

of Islam.

(5) This Article does not authorize any act contrary to any general law

relating to public order, public health or morality.

17.2. What is clear in Article 11 is that the use of the words “…right to profess

and practice his religion…” As said by Abdul Hamid Mohamad HMR (at

that time) in the case of Kamariah bte Ali v Kelantan State Government,

Malaysia (2002 (3) MLJ page 657 at page 665): “words ‘has the right’

applies to ‘profess’ and also ‘practice’.” Following the case of Che Omar

bin Che Soh v Public Prosecutor (1988 (2) MLJ 55). Islam is not only a

gathering of dogmas and rituals but it is also a complete way of life

including all fields of activities of humans, private or public, laws,

politics, economy, social, culture, moral or judiciary. And if studied,

Articles 11(1), 74(2) and item 1 in list 2 in Schedule 9 of the Federal

Constitution is clear that Islam includes among other things, Islamic laws.

Hence, as argued by the lawyer for the Malaysian Muslim Lawyers

Association watching brief, if a Muslim wishes to leave Islam, he should

use his right in the contexts of Syariah laws which has its own

jurisprudence about the issue of apostasy. If a person professes and

practices Islam, surely it means he should follow Islamic laws which

determines the way of entering Islam and also the way of leaving Islam.

That is the meaning of professing and practicing Islam. And what has

been done by the NRD officer is only to decide the Appellant was no

longer professing Islam like the way which has been decided by Islam.

Hence, I cannot see how that action could be said to conflict with Article

11(1) which by itself provides the need to follow the requirements of that

religion before he leaves Islam. Professing and practicing Islam surely

means practicing not only the theological aspect in that religion but also

the laws of that religion.

17.3. The Appellant in the Kamariah case (supra) argued that Article 11 not

only gives her the freedom to profess any religion, but also to leave any

religion. The Appellant says that the laws cannot prevent her from doing

so. The laws, according to the Appellant, cannot require her to follow a

rule whether to embrace or leave a religion. Laws like that, the Appellant

argues, is in conflict with Article 11 and therefore not valid and void.

17.4. On this argument by the Appellant, Abdul Hamid Mohamad, HMR in the

Kamariah case says:

“If that is the meaning of that provision then not only the laws which

determines the manner for a person to embrace Islam and leave Islam

are not valid, but the laws which make it an offence if a Muslim

commits adultery, close proximity, not paying zakat and so on are also

all not valid. Because, following that argument, Article 11 gives the

right to a person to practice his religion, and it is up to him whether he

wants to practice any of the direction which he wants to practice and

which not, follow whichever prohibition he wishes to follow and

which not. Therefore, following that argument, any law which requires

a person to carry out a matter or to abandon a matter is in conflict with

the freedom given by Article 11 and therefore all not valid.

In my view, in relation to Islam (I do not decide regarding other

religions), Article 11 cannot be interpreted so wide until it nullifies all

laws which requires a Muslim to pursue a religious obligation of Islam

or prohibits them carrying out a matter which is prohibited by Islam or

which determines other methods to carry out a matter related to Islam.

This is because the position of Islam in the Federal Constitution is

different from the position of other religions. Firstly, only Islam, as a

religion, is mentioned by its name in the Federal Constitution, i.e. as

‘the religion of the Federation’ — Article 3(1).

Secondly, the Constitution itself gives power to the State Legislative

Body (for states) to codify Syariah Laws in matters mentioned in List

II, State List, Schedule 9, the Federal Constitution (‘List II’). In

accordance with the requirements of that List II, Syariah Courts

(Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965 [*666] (‘Act 355/1965’) and various

enactments (for States) including as mentioned in this judgment, have

been codified.

So, if those laws, including s 102 of Enactment 4/1994, do not conflict

with the provisions of List II, and do not conflict with the provisions of

Act 355/1965, then they are valid laws.

This provision could be compared with provisions about marriage and

divorce. Syariah Laws requires a man and a woman who wish to stay

together to marry according to particular conditions and regulations.

Current needs require laws be made about it, including, among others,

requiring the marriage be registered and application for divorce be

made at the Syariah Court and order be given, if given, be registered

(for me the law last mentioned which is frequently called

‘administration law’, is a part of the development of Syariah Laws

also.) Are these laws also not valid and void on the basis that it

conflicts with Article 11 because, following that argument, it prevents

the freedom of religion which is guaranteed by Article 11? In my

opinion, no.”

17.5. Based on the above authorities it is very clear that:

(a) The issue of changing religion is directly related to the rights and

duties of the Appellant a a Muslim before the change happens;

(b) Article 11(1) should not be argued as a provision which gives the

right to unlimited freedom;

(c) The right to profess and practice a religion should always be subject

to the principles and practices as determined by that religion.

18. Based on the reasons enumerated above my answers to the questions at paragraph (1)

above are as follows:

(a) NRD is entitled to;

(b) NRD is correct; and

(c) The case of Soon Singh has been decided correctly.

In this situation, this appeal is rejected without order on cost.

Date 30 May 2007

Signed by Tun Dato’ Sri Ahmad Fairuz bin Dato’ Sheikh Abdul Halim

The Nation’s Chief Justice